





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
*Portrait of Her Majesty on Porous China by A. Ducuzcaus,
Exhibited in the Great Exhibition by the French Government.*



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Albert

*Portrait of H.R.H. Prince Albert on Seiras China by A. Ducloscaus.
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ARTHUR WELLESLEY DUKE OF WELLINGTON

BY THOMAS LAWRENCE P.R.S.

IN THE COLLECTION OF HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON

BY THE COURTESY OF HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
the late

DUKE OF WELLINGTON;

LIEUT COL^L WILLIAMS.

COMPRISING THE CAMPAIGNS AND BATTLE-FIELDS
OF WELLINGTON AND HIS COMRADES

THE POLITICAL LIFE

The Duke and his Contemporaries.

WITH A SUPPLEMENTARY

ENGLAND'S BATTLES BY SEA AND LAND.

FROM THE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE GREAT GENERAL, AND HIS CORRESPONDENCE.


INTERSPERSED WITH

REMARKS, PARTICULAR INCIDENTS AND ANECDOTES.



By James R. Williams

THE HISTORY OF THE LATE DUKE OF WELLINGTON



HEB
1857
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THE LIFE AND TIMES

OF THE LATE

DUKE OF WELLINGTON;

William Ficke

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL WILLIAMS.

Comprising the Campaigns and Battle-Fields

OF

WELLINGTON AND HIS COMRADES,

THE

POLITICAL LIFE

OF THE DUKE AND HIS CONTEMPORARIES,

AND A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF

ENGLAND'S BATTLES BY SEA AND LAND,

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE GREAT FRENCH REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT TIME.

INTERSPERSED WITH

ANECDOTES, PERSONAL INCIDENTS, ADVENTURES, ETC., ETC.



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TO THE MEMORY

OF THE

Late Illustrious Duke of Wellington,

THE HERO OF WATERLOO,

THE PRIDE OF HIS COUNTRY,

AND

THE PRESERVER OF EUROPEAN FREEDOM;

AND TO THE

SURVIVING OFFICERS WHO WERE HIS COMPANIONS IN ARMS,

This Work is Dedicated,

WITH FEELINGS OF RESPECTFUL ADMIRATION,

BY A BROTHER OFFICER.



INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS

ON THE

LIFE AND GENIUS OF THE MOST ILLUSTRIOUS OF MODERN HEROES,

Arthur, Duke of Wellington.

“ ———— Samson hath quit himself
Like Samson, and heroically hath finished
A life heroic.” MILTON.

“Not only that thy puissant arm could bind
The tyrant of a world, and, conquering fate,
Enfranchise Europe, do I deem thee great;
But that in all thy actions I do find
Exact propriety:—no gust of mind—
Fitful and wild, but that continuous state
Of ordered impulse mariners await
In some benignant and enriching wind,—
The breath ordained of nature. Thy calm mien
Recalls old Rome, as much as thy high deed;
Duty thine only idol, and serene
When all are troubled; in the utmost need
Prescient; thy country’s servant ever seen,
Yet sovereign of thyself whate’er may speed.
RT. HON. B. DISRAELI.

THE death of this illustrious warrior has arrested the attention and elicited the sympathy and regret of the whole of the British nation. England has lost its most distinguished son; the greatest general of the age, the patriarchal statesman, and the father of his country, is no more. The great Duke who has mingled in the struggles of three generations of heroes and politicians, expired at Walmer Castle, at a quarter past three in the afternoon of Tuesday the 14th of September. His death, though long expected, came suddenly at last, and has thrown a grateful and admiring nation into a state of painful excitement and universal mourning.

His career is now matter of history; the time has arrived when his life can be dispassionately and truthfully written; the biographer need no longer fear being accused of interested adulation; and the truth with respect to the achievements of this illustrious man, startling and romantic as it may often seem, may be told without disguise, or the fear of being charged with exaggeration and “hero-worship.” A full and minute biography is intended in this work; but we shall doubtless be pardoned for here indulging in a brief reflective glance at the great events of his varied and brilliant life; in giving

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such a hurried review as will satisfy the immediate curiosity of our readers, and permit us to express those feelings which rise warmly and vividly in every reflecting and patriotic mind. The character of a great man may be viewed from many points, and many deep and valuable lessons may be gained from it. Something there is in every life, which is not absolutely in the province of the mere biographer, and not unfrequently altogether escapes him : the soul and inner sense of it, its spiritual under current, its application to the affairs both trivial and exalted of readers of all ranks and positions, from the sovereign to the artizan, the peer to the peasant ; and the lessons it teaches to the humblest as well as the most brilliant ; for the least gifted man finds some expression of his own feelings in the record of the thoughts and acts of the greatest.

Let us then to our task, and endeavour to pluck from the grave of the mighty dead, lessons of wisdom which shall serve in some measure for our government in the future. Let us place a word-picture of the moral and mental aspect of the dazzling career of the great Duke before our readers, and dwell thoughtfully upon a life so distinguished, gleaning from it the precepts of truth and wisdom it shadows forth, which may serve as a beacon and life-guidance to the young, and a joy and intellectual refreshment to the old.

Arthur Wesley was born in the year 1769, which by a remarkable coincidence was the same in which his great rival Napoleon, whose star sunk into darkness beneath his overpowering influence, first drew breath. Born to no title, Wellington rose by his own genius to the enjoyment of the loftiest that could be bestowed upon a subject, a fact which the ambitious youth may remember while engaged in the studies which are to fit him for the battles of life, and which may help to sustain him during the storms of adversity, and the transient frowns of fate. As a boy the future hero displayed no remarkable precocity ; he was an attentive student, but in other respects was considered rather slow and dull, and he was placed in the army because he evinced so little of that brilliancy of talent, and aptitude for literary studies, which distinguished most of the other members of his family. This fortunate accident led him to the field on which his natural genius was so perfectly and grandly developed, but a less happy choice might have deprived us of England's greatest military ornament. Parents should carefully study the minds and capabilities of their children, for the children of to-day are the men and women of to-morrow, and apparent dulness is sometimes real depth. Clever minds bud early, but greatness is a plant of slower growth.

It may be considered superstitious to say so, but there seems to have been something more than mere chance in this fortunate selection of a profession for the supposed dull boy ; for upon that choice, unimportant as it then seemed, the future fate of empires and the liberty of Europe depended. If there is a special providence in the fall of a sparrow, doubtless the same benevolent and divine interference occurs in the salvation of a continent.

On the death of his father, Arthur Wesley was sent to Eton, and afterwards to the military school of Angers, in France, where he remained six years, and, in 1787, when he had reached his eighteenth year, received his first commission as an ensign in the 73rd regiment of foot. Family connexion did something for him up to a certain point, and within a period of four years, he became first a lieutenant and then a captain. Beyond that he owed his distinction entirely to his own efforts and his own genius. Within a

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few years afterwards we find him distinguishing himself in India. Though very natural, it is still somewhat remarkable, that one of Captain Wellesley's (for in 1797 he altered his name of Wesley into that of Wellesley) earliest attempts in India was a failure, and the yet unrecognised hero was considerably agitated by it. The circumstance is worth remembering, because it shows that undisciplined genius is comparatively valueless; that the rarest genius, to become power, must be subjected to the rules of art and assisted by the resources of experience; that failure is the best of preceptors, and, if wisely considered, the true pathway to success. Scarcely more than two years after his landing at Calcutta, Colonel Wellesley was the conqueror of Seringapatam, and had risen to almost viceregal command. Failure had indeed taught him a lesson which he was quick to learn and speedy to apply.

The great, and indeed the most prominent truth, presented by the career of the illustrious Duke, is the triumph of integrity and patriotism over the probable suggestions of ambition; he had the seductive example of Napoleon before him, and he well knew that military genius could be turned to the promotion of personal renown at the expense of his country. Both ancient and modern history reveals such instances again and again; and the hero who has saved the liberties of his country, has too often lived to trample upon them. The steps that lead the conqueror to tyranny are too frequently but few and brief. In that direction our great English soldier never gazed—military glory and popular enthusiasm, the gaudy floating of victorious banners, the clang of trumpets, the welcoming roar of cannon, the peals of bells from hundreds of steeples, and the shouts of living masses of his fellow-creatures, never won him for one moment to a guilty ambition. His integrity was inflexible and adamant—even the daring sin of great and otherwise noble spirits had no temptations for him.

Men of all ranks may reflect profitably upon this interesting fact: the most prominent characteristic of the greatest Englishman of the nineteenth century was his integrity. Let us not be accused of vanity in saying that we trust and believe that it is peculiarly an English virtue; sure we are, that genius can never long be respected, or even successful, without it. Let the unacknowledged man of talent, struggling in want and almost in despair, remember this, and that it assisted to lead the Duke to the proud and noble position he held in the estimation of his countrymen; for, notwithstanding the great varieties of political opinion which prevail throughout the land, and the political bitterness once popularly entertained towards him, all parties have now joined in one sincere, deep, and solemn expression of sorrow at his death.

The following anecdote affords a small but yet valuable illustration of this pervading principle of his actions. In the early summer of life, he was not altogether insensible to the expensive amusements by which he was, of necessity, surrounded: expensive society leads to luxurious habits; and the young captain, when attached as aid-de-camp to the staff of the earl of Westmoreland, then lord-lieutenant of Ireland, became involved in extensive and very serious debts. Military society is notoriously gay; and it is almost equally notorious what is the fate of credulous tradesmen who are connected with it. The regiment is removed; the debts are too frequently evaded or forgotten; and bankruptcy or utter ruin stares the trusting traders in the face. So urgent were Captain Wellesley's wants, that he accepted an accommodating loan from his bootmaker;

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but when he left Dublin, he did not forget his debts, or apply to the whitewashing power of the law; but, straitened as he was in pecuniary matters, he yet confided a large portion of his income to another tradesman to settle his debts. There was something of heroism even in this small matter; for history reveals to us many distinguished soldiers who could conquer nations, but failed to subdue some personal appetite or caprice. True greatness unites integrity with self-denial. Such a mental conformation was, nearly two thousand years ago, observed in Cæsar, and was, in our age, equally traceable in Wellington.

It is somewhat remarkable, that this extraordinary soldier, who bore so well the vicissitudes of various and trying climates, the roughest fatigues of rapid marches, and the sternest toils of war, and who, in advanced life, attained the surname of the "Iron Duke," as much from his hardy constitution as from his inflexible adherence to duty, possessed but feeble health in youth, and was liable to attacks of disease which subdued his body, but never conquered his mind. In these fits of illness, he was sustained by that wonderful sense of self-reliance which ever animated him, either in sickness, in battle, or at the council-board. It is recorded of him, that some allusion being one day made to an approaching Lord Mayor's dinner, he remarked, that the last public dinner attended by Mr. Pitt was on a similar occasion, and that he was much struck by a remark in the speech made by that eloquent man. A gentleman, in proposing Pitt's health, spoke of that statesman as "the saviour of his country;" and, in his reply, the orator denied that any such credit belonged to him, observing, "The country saved itself by its own exertions; and other countries would be equally fortunate, if they would follow its example." This remark the Duke much admired: he saw that Pitt, like himself, recognised the magic power of self-reliance and resolute industry.

Previously to the time of Wellington—even at the commencement of his active service—England had lost much of its military renown; and it began to be said, both at home and abroad, that the sea was our element, but that on land our good genius had left us. The art of war, it was supposed, we had in some respects lost, or that the strength and courage of our soldiers had degenerated. But when the hour came for great efforts, and the opportunity for brilliant successes, the man was found—that man was the subject of this article—the General whose military genius regenerated the fame of his nation, and inspired a new and unconquerable spirit into her soldiers.

After a brief service, in a subordinate position, on the plains of Belgium, where he had no opportunity of distinguishing himself, except by the business-like coolness and intrepidity he displayed in a disastrous and terrible retreat, he landed, in the February of 1797, at Calcutta, and then was to commence his career of glory. On the shores of India he first revealed his true worth: there he won a reputation which after times and events rendered still more glorious. In India occurred an instance of that generosity of nature which he ever exhibited when it did not interfere with his ideas of duty. However stern might be his duty, he would fulfil it: no sentimental weakness or ill-timed pity entered his bosom or withheld his arm; but while he made war dreadful by his firmness and decision, he redeemed some of its worst features by his mercy to the fallen. A powerful foe ever found in him a terrible adversary; but he did not war with the helpless. Few will forget his generous adoption of the infant son of the adventurer Dhoondiah, who fell

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in endeavouring to avenge the death of Tippoo Saib, and to wrest from Wellesley his newly-acquired territory.

In the September of 1805, after an absence in India of nine years, he again landed in England, with the title of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and a great military reputation derived from the establishment of British ascendancy in India, and in the course of the next three years he made his appearance in parliament; the soldier became a statesman. He was not destined in that respect, at least at that period, to engross any large amount of public admiration; strictly speaking, he never was an orator; he had a hesitating manner, and sometimes an indistinct utterance; but he possessed what a remarkable living writer called an "ineloquent eloquence." The following extract, descriptive of his oratorical talents, is from a highly popular and interesting work, *Francis's Orators of the Age*:—"The Duke of Wellington an orator! He who never uttered two consecutive sentences without hesitation; who exhibits a hardy contempt for all the graces of language and style; and in whom the faculty of imagination, if it ever existed in his mind, has been dormant for half a century! Do you mean seriously to class him as an orator? This would be a very natural question if it were admitted that oratory is a merely extrinsic and superficial art, aiming at skill in the choice of words and the shaping of sentences, and trusting for its hold on the human mind rather to the vehicle in which the thought is conveyed than to the truth or force of the thought itself. But there are degrees and classes of oratory as there are of poetry. The chief object of oratory is to persuade or convince, to bring the mind of the hearer into agreement and co-operation with that of the speaker; and this is often effected with success in proportion to the sincerity and straightforwardness brought to bear on the task. Some of the most effective and influential speakers have been men who never received any regular training to the art of elocution; and among these a place may be claimed for the Duke of Wellington. Although it is now fifty-six years since the Duke of Wellington was returned as a representative to the Irish parliament, and although, after the Union, he continued, with the exception of some intervals of time, to be a member of the united parliament as representative of an English borough in the House of Commons, until he was raised to the peerage; we should not forget that it is only within the last twenty or twenty-five years that he has taken so active a part in parliamentary life, or occupied so commanding a position as a politician in the state. In the earlier part of his career, he made no great figure as a speaker. When in the Irish parliament, he gave no promise of that intellectual distinction which he afterwards achieved, but some of the most obvious characteristics of his public speaking were as observable then as they are now. There was the same abruptness of delivery, the same plain, straightforward, but unassuming expression of his views, that has since been the distinguishing feature of his speaking in the House of Lords. A contemporary observer speaks of his address as being unpolished, and says, that he showed no promise of his subsequent unparalleled celebrity. During the years that intervened between this period and his second entrance into political life—years which witnessed his successes in India, his steady progress of triumph in Spain, and the final glories of Waterloo—his mind was occupied with thoughts and pursuits far different from those which qualify a man to become an influential public speaker. And when, at length, the course of events forced him into a position of responsibility which

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compelled him repeatedly to speak in parliament, he had nothing to rely on but the strong natural resources of his mind, the noble candour and sincerity of his disposition, and the consideration which he might hope would be extended to his deficiencies as a speaker, on account of his brilliant services as a soldier. As the character of his mind developed itself, it presented an aspect of strange originality to the civilians around him. They could not at first understand, though they soon learned to appreciate, that admirable organization of mind, matured, if not produced, by the habits of military life; an organization so perfect as to retain all subjects of discussion, all principles of political science, all the facts with which his mind was stored, in that exact subordination which was their relative due; and so well maintained as to enable him to call them up and use them for his purpose, with a readiness to which even the most practised minds around him were strangers, from their not having been subjected to the same discipline."

It was not long before he was again engaged on military service; after a fruitless expedition to Hanover, he proceeded to Denmark, and received the thanks of the House of Commons for his services. Spain was the next theatre on which this great actor was to appear. The Peninsular war would have undoubtedly terminated in the subjugation of Spain, and the humiliation of England, but for the extraordinary military genius, courage, and coolness of the supposed dull schoolboy,—the soldier whom Napoleon had at first pretended to despise, and contemptuously denominated "the Sepoy General;" but who defeated the Marshals of the great French chieftain with armies of fearful inferiority in point of numerical strength. Romantic as it may seem, resembling the extravagances of fiction rather than the sober revelations of fact, it is matter of unimpeachable history, that with a force seldom exceeding 50,000 troops, he maintained, first a defensive, and then an aggressive war, against an army of French veterans containing from 200,000 to 300,000 men, the flower of the military strength of France; and that he conducted this unequal war by a succession of brilliant victories to a glorious close. The reputation of the British arms was vindicated—no detractive spirit could any longer urge that the valour of English soldiers was exceeded by that of any other troops in the whole world.

In tracing this portion of the career of our illustrious warrior, we are astonished at his almost superhuman self-reliance, intrepidity, and iron determination. Temporary reverses seemed only to nerve him to increased efforts; that which discouraged other men added to his calm resolution, and his eagle glance was never to be diverted from the desired end. His conceptions were grand, and often apparently impossible; timid minds were startled, and shrunk from a contemplation of them; they could only act upon precedent; but genius requires no example, its convictions alone are its law, it does not understand timidity, but *acts* while others *deliberate*, and success usually crowns the result. We do not mean that Wellington was inspired by a reckless bravery: by no means; a lofty heroic courage certainly animated him, the courage of the heroes of a past world when Rome was in its glory; but no merchant at his books, no mathematician over a problem, no astronomer measuring the dimensions or tracking the progress of some newly discovered star, displayed a greater regard for the minute details of business or calculation; indeed he himself believed that his talent would have been greater as a financier than as a general. Mere courage alone, however distinguished, cannot make a successful warrior

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now; in this age of strategy and scientific warfare strength of muscle is as burnt flax to beaten iron, in comparison with strength of mind. The great soldier can spare the former, but must possess the latter; and to a manly courage that never valued his own life in preference to the glory or advantage of his country, did this modern hero unite a clearness of perception, and a gigantic grasp of mind which overlooked no difficulties, but with a steady gaze provided every available means of overcoming them; his eagle glance discerned every opportunity, and his iron hand seized it.

His successes in the Peninsula were rewarded by the loftiest title a grateful country had to bestow, and he at once took his station with the highest peers of the land. He was created Baron Douro of Wellesley, and Viscount Wellington of Talavera, afterwards Earl, and finally Duke of Wellington; to these rewards were added a pension, successive grants of money, honours, and a shower of crosses and other imperial and military distinctions. He left his country a Knight, he returned to it a Duke; his introduction to the House of Lords was a grand one, he must have felt a great man's pride upon that memorable occasion. The House was crowded, and its most distinguished and august members were present: upon his entrance all rose, and with uncovered heads greeted him with prolonged and repeated cheers; the aristocracy of birth bent its head with a generous and becoming recognition of the superiority of the aristocracy of genius.

It is a noble reflection that his conquests in the Peninsula, like most of his great engagements, were fought and won in the holy cause of freedom, and to prevent Europe from being laid prostrate at the feet of one man. The "English leopard," as the French styled him, did not fight for the love of carnage, or of glory, or shed blood to satisfy a restless ambition, and a love of conquest; but he fought for the maintenance of order, of justice, of liberty, and for the final enthronement of peace. If ever war was righteous, it was in such a cause as this; the sword that wins the freedom and protects the honour of nations, is more precious than the sickle that reaps their bread, for national distress is in the eyes of every noble spirit preferable to national dishonour. It was the language, not of vanity, but of the strictest and most literal truth, that the Poet employed when he thus addressed the deliverer of Spain and Portugal:

"Thine was the sword which justice draws,
Thine was the pure and generous cause
Of holy rights and human laws
The impious thrall to burst;
And thou wast destined for thy part,
The noblest mind, the firmest heart,
Artless, but in the warrior's art,
And in that art the first."

The experience which he gained in his brilliant series of victories in the Peninsula, revealed to him all the weaknesses and inefficiencies of the British forces; he determined that his troops should not fight at a disadvantage; that their natural strength and valour should not be clogged by mistaken arrangements, or heavy and inefficient weapons. He saw much to be abolished, much to be improved; and he undertook the hazardous and responsible duties of a military reformer. In his later years certainly he was averse to changes in this respect, and satisfied with what he had done when practically engaged in warfare; but to his energy in this direction, during the maturity of his military career, many of his subsequent great triumphs are to be attributed.

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Wellington had not yet measured his strength against that of his great rival, Napoleon, but the hour was at hand when he was to be called upon to do so. The Emperor had escaped from Elba, and was again at the head of an enormous army; the great powers of Europe denounced him as a truce-breaker, and war was universally declared. Wellington was stationed at Brussels with an army of 78,500 men. The events of the next few days and nights were perfectly dramatic: on the evening of the 15th of June, 1815, Wellington was at the Duchess of Richmond's ball; on the 16th was the battle of Quatre Bras; and on the memorable 18th, the terrible Sunday desecrated by such a gigantic slaughter, occurred the great struggle of WATERLOO. Napoleon's army was computed at 154,370 men, and he felt confident of the victory. Terrible and protracted was the struggle; prodigies of valour were performed by the troops on both sides, and wonderful discernment and intrepidity exhibited by the two most remarkable commanders that perhaps ever contested together for victory. Such was the numerical superiority of the French army, that the issue might have been in their favour but for the arrival of the Prussians. Wellington, collected even at that awful moment, beheld their approach, and closing his telescope, with the exclamation, "The hour is come!" gave the order for a general charge. The result need not be detailed here; but when the sun set upon that bloody field, the glory of Napoleon was a thing of the past, and his star had set in darkness. The grim demons of discord and slaughter were sated, and Wellington's crowning victory at Waterloo, the last act of his military life, terminated war in Europe, and led to a peace as remarkable as the stormy struggle which preceded it. The olive and the vine flourished vigorously in the soil which had been ploughed with swords and bayonets, and commerce and reason tended and guarded the emblematic plants of peace. Wellington, warrior as he was, was also a man of enlarged views and sympathies, and thoroughly conscious of the immense value of the lasting peace this final conquest was to bestow. He himself said that the governments which had been engaged in the great and long-protracted struggle required such a peace as would give them "the power of reducing their overgrown military establishments, and the leisure to attend to the internal concerns of their nations, and to improve the situation of their people." Having conquered France, he did his best to restore that country to tranquillity; he was opposed to all confiscations and punishments, saying, that if the people were to be rendered tranquil, they must not be irritated. In the hour of victory he listened to the voice of generosity, and trusted for the restoration of order to the blandishments of peace rather than to the armed hand of power.

The meeting of the two greatest warriors of modern times in so grand a conflict as that of Waterloo, naturally suggests a comparison between the respective genius of these remarkable men. Stronger minds and more able pens than ours have been addressed to this subject; and perhaps few have accomplished it with more judgment, impartiality, and eloquence, than that distinguished writer and advocate, Sir Archibald Alison, in his *History of the French Revolution*. We subjoin the passage:—

"Napoleon and Wellington were not merely individual characters: they were the types of the powers which they respectively headed in the contest. Napoleon had more genius, Wellington more judgment: the former combated with greater energy, the latter with greater perseverance. Rapid in design, instant in execution, the strokes of the French hero fell like the burning thunderbolt: cautious in counsel, yet firm in action, the

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resources of the British champion multiplied, like the vigour of vegetation, after the withering stroke had fallen. No campaign of Wellington's equals in genius and activity those of Napoleon in Italy and in France; none of Napoleon's approaches in foresight and wisdom that of Wellington's at Torres Vedras. The vehemence of the French emperor would have exhausted, in a single campaign, the whole resources which during the war were at the disposal of the English general; the caution of Wellington would have alienated, in the very beginning, the troops which overflowed with the passions of the revolution. Ardour and onset were alike imposed on the former by his situation, and suggested by his disposition: foresight and perseverance were equally dictated to the latter by his necessities, and in unison with his character. The one wielded at pleasure the military resources of the half of Europe, and governed a nation heedless of consequences, covetous of glory, reckless of slaughter: the other led the forces of a people distrustful of its prowess, avaricious of its blood, but invincible in its determination. And the result, both in the general war and final struggle, was in entire conformity with this distinction: Wellington retired in the outset before the fierce assault of the French legions, but he saw them, for the first time since the revolution, recoil in defeat from the rocks of Torres Vedras: he was at first repeatedly expelled from Spain, but at last he drove the invaders, with disgrace, across the Pyrenees!

"The personal and moral character of the two chiefs was still more strikingly opposed, and characteristic of the sides they severally led. Both were distinguished by the unwearied perseverance, the steady purpose, the magnanimous soul, which are essential to glorious achievements: both were provident in council, and vigorous in execution: both possessed personal intrepidity in the highest degree: both were indefatigable in activity, and iron in constitution: both enjoyed the rarer qualities of moral courage and fearless determination. But, in other respects, their minds were as opposite as the poles are asunder. Napoleon was covetous of glory, Wellington was impressed with duty: Napoleon was reckless of slaughter, Wellington was sparing of blood: Napoleon was careless of his word, Wellington was inviolate in faith. Treaties were regarded by the former as binding only when expedient—alliances valid only when useful: obligations were regarded by the latter as obligatory, though ruinous; conventions sacred, even when open to objection. Napoleon's wasting warfare converted allies into enemies; Wellington's protecting discipline changed enemies into friends: the former fell, because all Europe rose up against his oppression; the latter triumphed, because all Europe joined to share in his protection. There is not a proclamation of Napoleon to his soldiers, in which glory is not mentioned and duty forgotten: there is not an order of Wellington to his troops, in which duty is not inculcated, nor one in which glory is alluded to. Singleness of heart was the great characteristic of the British hero, a sense of duty his ruling principle: falsehood pervaded the French conqueror, the thirst for glory was his invariable motive. The former proceeded on the belief, that the means, if justifiable, would finally work out the end: the latter, on the maxim that the end would in every case justify the means. Napoleon placed himself at the head of Europe, and desolated it for fifteen years with his warfare; Europe placed Wellington at the head of its armies, and he gave it thirty years of unbroken peace. The one exhibited the most shining example of splendid talents devoted to temporal ambition; the other,

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS.

the noblest instance of moral influence directed to exalted purposes. The former was in the end led to ruin, while blindly following the phantom of worldly greatness; the latter was unambitiously conducted to final greatness, while only following the star of public duty. The struggle between them was the same at bottom as that which, anterior to the creation of man, shook the powers of heaven: and never was such an example of moral government afforded as the final result of their immortal contest."

After the terrible conflict at Waterloo, which gave to Europe a peace as yet unbroken, we approach the second grand era of the life of Wellington, and consider him as a statesman. No man, whatever his gifts, can be equally brilliant and solid in every capacity; the field, and not the cabinet, was the peculiar province of the illustrious Duke. A severe disciplinarian, a lover of the sternest order, and habituated to the doctrines and practice of passive submission in the army, it was scarcely possible that he should have been, at least in the early possession of legislative power, what is now called a liberal politician. The wars in which he had been engaged, were in some measure attributable to the spread of democratic opinion; he believed them to be altogether so, and it was natural that he should regard such tendencies with suspicion and dislike, and even that he should suspect of democracy and revolution doctrines which had no connexion with them, but breathed only the purest constitutional freedom. But although not the friend of popular liberty, he was too wise, too generous and true-hearted, to be the apologist of wrong or tyranny. He was the stern advocate of duty, and demanded it peremptorily of every individual; he had a right to do so, for he had always been its slave, rigidly fulfilling its behests; and he regarded the discharge of duties as the only foundation of rights.

His early political conduct will not now meet with any very general approval; his doctrines were those of a school which is rapidly passing, if not altogether past. The Tory of the time of Lords Liverpool and Eldon would not now be understood or recognised among statesmen; and the last vestige of the doctrine of divine right has melted into nothingness; but those who would form an impartial judgment of the political progress of the great soldier, must recall the difference between the time of his political power and the present period. It was then necessary to educate the nation to the full enjoyment of freedom, and it was dangerous to trust an ignorant and bigotted populace with too free a use of a liberty for which they were not then fit, and which they were so likely to abuse.

Two great questions presented themselves to the Duke for solution in his capacity as statesman—questions of vital importance and gigantic aspect—questions which in those days could not be understood as they are now, because the present generation has seen them practically tried, and the difficulty of their expediency and applicability settled by actual experience. These subjects were, Catholic Emancipation and Parliamentary Reform. The great modern doctrine of Free Trade was not then prominently upon the scene of action, but flitted in the distance, a sort of political Will-o'-the-Wisp. Upon these topics he was called to legislate, for on the 15th of February, 1828, the exigencies of the country induced him to accept the position of Prime Minister of England. It is certain that he felt that this was not the place for which his genius and formation of mind fitted him. He had himself previously stated his conviction of

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS.

his unfitness for such an office, and publicly declared that he "should have been mad to think of it," but the emergencies of the age called for his assistance, and he was ever ready to serve his country. In the field or in the council-chamber he would never recoil from difficulties; he had dedicated his life to the service of his nation, and he was ever ready to risk all in its defence. His opinions were those of the old Tory school of statesmen, but though firm he was not violent; he desired no change because he feared change, and dreaded the results of political experiments.

Not the smallest tincture of selfishness entered into the formation of his principles; that is evident, for he had nothing further to gain; a grateful nation had laid its riches and honours at his feet, and his adherence to his principles was dictated by a love of order, the security of property, and the safety of the throne.

But though the study of politics was not the natural bias of his mind, he reached a point of greatness and true nobility of soul in his capacity of Prime Minister; he contentedly and resolutely sacrificed his own convictions to the necessities of the times, and to preserve undisturbed the peace of the nation, and wrung from his colleagues in power an assent which to no man but him they would have yielded. To obtain popularity is an easy thing to a man who occupies a lofty position in the service of his country, but to perform unpopular justice requires a hero. The Duke's measure in favour of the Catholics, though called for by a large body of the people, yet rendered him exceedingly unpopular with another body, if not certainly as powerful, equally as large. His adherence to the Protestant cause was rigid enough, though his yielding up his own convictions to a sense of what was requisite, caused them to be suspected. In later years he made the following clear and solemn expression of opinion upon this subject: "It is our duty in every case to do all that we can to promote the Protestant religion. It is our duty to do so, not only on account of the political relations between the religion of the Church of England and the Government, but because we believe it to be the purest doctrine, and the best system of religion, that can be offered to a people." These had ever been his convictions, but he would not war with destiny; he yielded to the imperative demands of the age, and did not tacitly consent to, but vigorously carried the great measure of Catholic Emancipation.

His noble declaration in the House of Lords upon that occasion ought never to be forgotten:—"My lords, I am one of those who have probably passed more of my life in war than most men, and principally I may say in civil war too, and I must say this, that if I could avoid by any sacrifice whatever even one month of civil war in the country to which I am attached, *I would sacrifice my life in order to do it.*" In these noble words the soldier disappears in the statesman and the philanthropist; the glories of war could not blind him to its terrors, and those terrors he would never inflict upon his own country; he would make any sacrifice to avert that; personal prepossessions and political consistency were nothing in comparison with such an awful probability; in such a case he would scatter them to the winds. We firmly believe that he used no rhetorical ornament when he said that he would sacrifice his life sooner than inflict a month of civil war upon the country that he loved. He did for a time sacrifice his reputation, which, with such a man, is often dearer to him than his life, and may eternal honour wait upon his memory for that noble act.

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS.

In 1830 came his second trial as a statesman ; the question of Parliamentary Reform had seized upon the national mind, and political agitation rose to a universal storm. France had been convulsed by another revolution ; the excitement resulting from it acted strongly in England ; a cry for reform and new institutions went like an electric shock throughout the land. The Duke was astonished ; he did not understand the political problem before him ; in his ears it sounded like the muttered thunder which precedes the terrible storm of revolution. Visions of the destruction of order, the desecration of the church, the insecurity of property, and the shedding of blood in fearful conflicts between the military and the people, passed through his mind. With characteristic promptness, he decided on opposing the measure, opposing it vigorously, unflinchingly, and to the last.

The haughty, unbending tone, and resolute manner in which he refused to grant, or even to regard the loud clamours of the nation for reform, sealed the fate not only of the Duke's ministry, but also of that of his party. A feeling of mad resentment seized the people ; they regarded him as the opponent of liberty, and the advocate of despotism, though, in reality, he was acting from a strict sense of what he regarded as his duty. His resolution upon this point threw him from office, and sunk the old Tory party to a depth of odium from which they never rose again. After a time, however, his opposition to the national will was lost sight of in his own inextinguishable military glory, and his universally recognised integrity.

As years rolled on, his opinions kept pace with the times, and his advice was sought by all parties upon all great occasions, until at length his advanced age and experience imparted something of an oracular character to his clear and strong perceptions. For a length of time he had altogether ceased to be a party man, but had been a sort of balance of opinion, or a connecting link between adverse factions ; and his approval added a weight to any measure second only to that of the sanction of the Sovereign.

He had an uncompromising hatred of all idleness, quackery, and false pretensions ; and his manners and mode of life were simplicity and plainness personified. He kept a French cook for the accommodation of his visitors, but he himself seemed indifferent to culinary luxuries. The poor cook was often extremely hurt at his master's want of appreciation of his services. " If," he would remark, " I cook a good dinner, the Duke observes ' it is well,' and if I cook a bad dinner he still says ' it is well.' "

The Duke was married in 1806, to the Honourable Catherine Pakenham ; he lost that lady in 1831, and died a widower in his eighty-fourth year, leaving two sons to inherit his name and honours, and mingle their tears and regrets with those of a nation. From such a life it might be anticipated that death would possess no terrors for him ; he glided silently from existence, and even the exact moment of his demise could not be detected by his attendants. His life shed a lustre upon the English name, and his death produced a sensation over the whole civilized world. His character, morally and intellectually, is a legacy to his country, and a study and imitation of it will assist in forming the minds and elevating the views of future heroes.

We append a Chronological Index of the military and political events of his life, for which we are largely indebted to Colonel Gurwood's *Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington*.



THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

*From the original statue in the City of London,
 a full-length copy was executed by the artist in 1812.*

COMMISSIONS, SERVICES, OFFICIAL COMMANDS, AND PUBLIC HONOURS

OF

Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Born	1 May, 1769.	Colonel	3 May, 1796.
Ensign	7 Mar., 1787.	Major-General	29 April, 1802.
Lieutenant	25 Dec., 1787.	Lieutenant-General	25 April, 1808.
Captain	30 June, 1791.	General, in Spain and Portugal	31 July, 1811.
Major	30 April, 1793.	Field Marshal	21 June, 1813.
Lieutenant-Colonel	30 Sept., 1793.	Died	14 Sept., 1852.

1794.

Embarked at Cork in command of the 33rd regiment to join the Duke of York's army in the Netherlands, and arrived at Ostend	June.
Re-embarked and proceeded by the Scheldt to Antwerp	July.

1795.

As senior officer, commanded three battalions on the retreat of the army through Holland	Jan.
Early in the spring, on the breaking up of the ice, the army, including the 33rd regiment, re-embarked at Bremen for England.	
On return to England, embarked in the command of the 33rd regiment for the West Indies, on board the fleet commanded by Admiral Christian	Oct.

1796.

But owing to the heavy equinoctial gales, after being six weeks at sea, returned to port	19 Jan.
Destination of the 33rd regiment changed for India	12 April.
Joined the 33rd regiment at the Cape of Good Hope	Sept.

1797.

Arrived in Bengal	Feb.
Formed part of an expedition to Manilla, but recalled on arrival at Penang	Aug.
Returned to Calcutta	Nov.

1798.

Proceeded on a visit to Madras	Jan.
Returned to Calcutta	Mar.
The 33rd regiment placed on the Madras establishment	Sept.

1799.

Appointed to command the subsidiary force of the Nizam, the 33rd regiment being attached to it	Feb.
Advance of the army on Seringapatam; Colonel Wellesley moving on the right flank, attacked and harassed by the enemy	10 Mar.
Tippoo Sultaun in position at Mallavelly; the attack and defeat of his right flank by the division under Colonel Wellesley and the cavalry under Major-General Floyd	27 Mar.
Arrival of the British army before Seringapatam	3 April.
The army take up their ground before the west face of that fortress: first attack on the Sultaun-pettah Tope, by the 33rd regiment and 2nd Bengal Native Regiment, under Colonel Wellesley	5 April.
Second attack with an increased force, the Scotch Brigade (94th regiment), two battalions of Sepoys, and four guns	6 April.
Siege of Seringapatam, until	3 May.
Assault and capture: Colonel Wellesley commanding the reserve in the trenches	4 May.
Colonel Wellesley appointed Governor of Seringapatam	6 May.

SERVICES, OFFICIAL COMMANDS, AND PUBLIC HONOURS OF

A commission, consisting of Lieutenant-General Harris, Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley, the Hon. H. Wellesley, and Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick, appointed by the Governor-General for the settlement of the Mysore territories 4 June.

Commission dissolved 8 July.

Colonel Wellesley appointed to the command of Seringapatam and Mysore . . . 9 July.

1800.

Colonel Wellesley named to command an expedition against Batavia, in conjunction with Admiral Rainier, but declines the service, from the greater importance of his command in Mysore May.

The tranquillity of Mysore troubled by Dhoondiah Waugh, a Mahratta freebooter. Colonel Wellesley takes the field against him July.

Defeats him; death of Dhoondiah, and end of the warfare 10 Sept.

Recalled from Mysore to command a force assembling at Trincomalee Oct.

Appointed to command this force, to be employed at Mauritius, or in the Red Sea, in the event of orders from Europe to that effect; or to be ready to act against any hostile attempt upon India 15 Nov.

1801.

A despatch, overland, received by the Governor-General, with orders, dated 6th October, 1800, to send 3,000 men to Egypt 6 Feb.

The expedition being ready at Trincomalee, the Governor-general directed the whole force to proceed to the Red Sea; and appointed General Baird to command in chief, and Colonel Wellesley to be second in command 11 Feb.

In the meantime Colonel Wellesley, having received from the Governors of Bombay and Madras copies of the overland despatch from Mr. Dundas, sailed from Trincomalee for Bombay in command of the troops 15 Feb.

Colonel Wellesley, on his way to Bombay, informed of the appointment of Major-General Baird to the chief command 21 Feb.

Prevented, by illness, from proceeding on the expedition to Egypt; Colonel Wellesley is ordered to resume his government of Mysore 28 April.

1803.

Appointed to command a force assembled at Hurryhur to march into the Mahratta territory 27 Feb.

Advance from Hurryhur 9 Mar.

Arrival at Poonah 20 April.

The Peishwah replaced on the musnud 13 May.

Empowered to exercise the general direction and control of all the political and military affairs of the British Government in the territories of the Nizam, the Peishwah, and of the Mahratta States and Chiefs in the Deccan; similar authority being given to General Lake in Hindustan 26 June.

The Mahratta war commenced 6 Aug.

Siege and capture of Ahmednuggur 11 Aug.

Siege and capture of Baroach 29 Aug.

Battle of Assaye 23 Sept.

Siege and capture of Asseerghur 21 Oct.

Battle of Argaum 29 Nov.

Siege and capture of Gawilghur 15 Dec.

Treaty of Peace with the Rajah of Berar 17 Dec.

— with Dowlut Rao Scindiah 30 Dec.

1804.

Surprise of a body of predatory Mahrattas, who were routed and destroyed, after an extraordinary forced march, near Munkaiseer 6 Feb.

FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

A sword of the value of £1,000 voted to Major-General Wellesley by the British inhabitants of Calcutta	21 Feb.
A golden vase voted to Major-General Wellesley by the officers of his division, afterwards changed to a service of plate, embossed with "Assaye"	26 Feb.
Visits Bombay	} 4 Mar. to 16 May.
<i>Fêtes</i> and address by the garrison and inhabitants	
Returns to the army near Poonah	17 May.
Resigns the military and political powers vested in him by the Governor-General	24 June.
Left the army for Seringapatam	28 June.
Address voted to Major-General Wellesley, on his return from the army, by the native inhabitants of Seringapatam	6 July.
Called to Calcutta to assist in military deliberations	July.
Appointed a Knight Companion of the Bath	1 Sept.
The civil and military powers vested in him on the 26th of June, 1803, and resigned on the 24th of June, 1804, renewed by the Governor-General	9 Nov.
Returns to Seringapatam by Madras	30 Mar.

1805.

Resigns the political and military powers in the Deccan, and proposes to embark for Europe	24 Feb.
Addresses on quitting India:—	
From the Officers of the division lately under his command	27 Feb.
Answer	8 Mar.
From the Officers of the 33rd regiment	28 Feb.
Answer	Mar.
From the native inhabitants of Seringapatam	4 Mar.
Answer	4 Mar.

Grand entertainment given to him at the Pantheon at Madras, by the civil and military Officers of the Presidency	5 Mar.
Appoints Colonel Wallace, Major Barclay, and Captain Bellingham to superintend the prize affairs of the army of the Deccan	6 Mar.
The thanks of the King and Parliament for his service in the command of the army of the Deccan, communicated in General Orders by the Governor-General	8 Mar.
Embarks in his Majesty's ship <i>Trident</i> , for England	Mar.
Arrival in England	Sept.
Appointed to command a brigade in an expedition to Hanover, under Lord Cathcart	Nov.

1806.

Appointed Colonel of the 33rd Regt., vice Marquis Cornwallis, deceased	30 Jan.
On the return of the expedition from Hanover, appointed to command a brigade of infantry in the Sussex district	Feb.
Returned to serve in Parliament	

1807.

Appointed Secretary to Ireland (the Duke of Richmond being Lord-Lieutenant)	3 April.
Sworn of his Majesty's Privy Council	8 April.
Appointed to command in the army under Lord Cathcart, in the expedition against Copenhagen	July.
Affair at Kioge	29 Aug.
Appointed to negotiate the capitulation of Copenhagen	5 Sept.

1808.

Receives the thanks of Parliament for his conduct at Copenhagen, in his place in the House of Commons, and replies to the Speaker	1 Feb.
Returns to Ireland	

SERVICES, OFFICIAL COMMANDS, AND PUBLIC HONOURS OF

Appointed to command an expedition assembled at Cork	July.
The expedition sails for Corunna and Oporto	12 July.
Finally lands at the mouth of the river Mondego, in Portugal	1 to 3 Aug.
Affair of Obidos	15 Aug.
— Roliça	17 Aug.
Battle of Vimiero	21 Aug.
Superseded in the command of the army by Lieutenant-General Sir H. Burrard	21 Aug.
By the desire of Lieutenant-General Sir H. Dalrymple, the Commander of the Forces, he signs the armistice with Lieutenant-General Kellermann, which led to the convention of Cintra	22 Aug.
A piece of plate, commemorating the Battle of Vimiero, voted to Lieutenant-General Sir A. Wellesley, by the General and Field Officers who served at it	22 Aug.
Commands a division of the army under Sir H. Dalrymple	22 Aug.
Convention of Cintra	30 Aug.
Returns to England	4 Oct.
Court of Inquiry on the Convention of Cintra	17 Nov.
His evidence before it	22 Nov.
Returns to Ireland	Dec.

1809.

Receives the thanks of Parliament for Vimiero, in his place in the House of Commons, and replies to the Speaker	27 Jan.
Appointed to command the army in Portugal	April.
Resigns the office of Chief Secretary in Ireland	April.
Arrives at Lisbon, and assumes the command	22 April.
The Passage of the Douro, and Battle of Oporto	12 May.
By a decree of the Prince Regent of Portugal, appointed Marshal-General of the Portuguese army	6 July.
Battle of Talavera de la Reyna.	27 and 28 July.
Created a Peer, by the titles of Baron Douro of Wellesley, and Viscount Wellington of Talavera	26 Aug.
Meets Marquis Wellesley at Seville and Cadiz	2 Nov.

1810.

Thanks of Parliament voted for Talavera	1 Feb.
Pension of £2,000 per annum voted to Lord Wellington and his two succeeding heirs male	16 Feb.
Appointed a member of the Regency in Portugal, in conjunction with Lord Stuart de Rothsay, then Mr. Stuart, his Majesty's Minister at Lisbon	Aug.
Battle at Busaco	27 Sept.
Takes up a position to cover Lisbon in the Lines, from Alhandra on the Tagus, to Torres Vedras and the Sea	10 Oct.
Follows the retreat of the French army, under Marshal Massena, to Santarem	16 Nov.

1811.

Again follows the retreat of the French army to Condeixa, and from thence along the line of the Mondego, to Celorico, Sabugal Almeida, and Ciudad Rodrigo	5 Mar. to 10 April.
Affairs with the French army on its retreat :—	
At Pombal	11 Mar.
At Redinha	12 Mar.
At Casal Nova	14 Mar.
At the Passage of the Ceira, at Foz d'Arouce	15 Mar.
At Sabugal	3 April.
Thanks of Parliament for the liberation of Portugal	26 April.

FIELD-MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

Battle of Fuentes d'Onoro	3 and 5 May.
Fall of Almeida	11 May.
Battle of Albuera	16 May.
Siege of Badajoz raised	10 June.
Concentration of the army on the Caya	19 June.
Carries the army to the north	1 Aug.
Affair at El Bodon	25 Sept.
— at Aldea di Ponte	27 Sept.
License granted in the name of the King, by the Prince Regent, to accept the title of	
Conde do Vimiero, and the insignia of Knight Grand Cross of the Tower and	
Sword, from the Prince Regent of Portugal	26 Oct.
General Hill's surprise of General Girard, at Arroyo Molinos	28 Oct.

1812.

Storm of Fort Renaud, near Ciudad Rodrigo	8 Jan.
Siege and capture of Ciudad Rodrigo	19 Jan.
Created by the Regency a Grandee of Spain, with the title of Duque de Ciudad	
Rodrigo	Feb.
Thanks of Parliament for Ciudad Rodrigo	10 Feb.
Advanced in the British Peerage by the title of Earl of Wellington	18 Feb.
Vote of Parliament of £2,000 per annum, in addition to the title	21 Feb.
Siege and capture of Badajoz	6 April.
Thanks of Parliament for Badajoz	27 April.
Forts at Almarez taken by General Hill	19 May.
Siege and capture of the fortified convents at Salamanca	27 June.
Battle of Salamanca	22 July.
Charge of Cavalry at La Serna	23 July.
The Order of the Golden Fleece conferred by the Regency of Spain	Aug.
Enters Madrid	12 Aug.
Appointed Generalissimo of the Spanish armies	Aug.
Advanced in the British Peerage by the title of Marquis of Wellington	18 Aug.
Advanced by the Regent of Portugal to the title of Marquez de Torres Vedras	Aug.
Marches towards Burgos	4 Sept.
Siege and failure of Burgos	22 Oct.
Retreat to the frontier of Portugal, to the	19 Nov.
Thanks of Parliament voted for Salamanca	3 Dec.
A grant of £100,000 from Parliament, to be laid out in the purchase of lands to that	
value, as a reward for his services, and to enable him to support the dignity of his	
peerage	7 Dec.
Advanced by the Regent of Portugal to the title of Duque da Victoria	18 Dec.
Visits Cadiz, where he is received by a deputation of the Cortes	24 Dec.

1813.

Appointed Colonel of the Royal Regiment of Horse Guards	1 Jan.
Returns to Portugal by Lisbon, where he is received by the whole population	16 Jan.
Fêtes given by the Regency, and at San Carlos	Jan.
Letter on quitting the 33rd Regiment as Colonel	2 Feb.
Elected a Knight of the Garter	4 Mar.
Advance into Spain in two columns; the left column, under Lieutenant-General Sir T.	
Graham, by the north bank of the Douro; the right column to Salamanca	6 May.
Quits Freneda for Salamanca	22 May.
Affair near Salamanca	25 May.
The Commander of the Forces proceeds to the left column, at Miranda de Duero	29 May.

SERVICES, OFFICIAL COMMANDS, AND PUBLIC HONOURS OF

Affair of the Hussar brigade at Morales de Toro	2 June.
Junction of the two columns at Toro, and advance of the army on Valladolid and Burgos	4 June.
The Castle of Burgos blown up	12 June.
The Ebro turned at San Martin and Rocamundo	14 June.
Affair at San Millan	18 June.
Battle of Vittoria	21 June.
Promoted to Field Marshal. (<i>Gazette</i> , 3rd July)	21 June.
Pursuit of the French army to France by Pamplona, and the passes of Roncesvalles and Maya in the Pyrenees; and by Tolosa, San Sebastian, and Irun	June.
Thanks of Parliament for Vittoria	8 July.
Siege of San Sebastian	17 July.
The Regency of Spain, on the proposition of the Cortes, offer to bestow on the Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo the estate of the Soto de Roma in Granada, "in the name of the Spanish nation, in testimony of its sincere gratitude"	22 July.
First assault and failure at San Sebastian	25 July.
Advance of the French army under Marshal Soult, by Maya and Roncesvalles; the right and centre divisions of the army concentrating near Pamplona	24 to 27 July.
Battle of Sorauren	28 July.
Retreat of the French army into France	30 July.
Affair at the Puerto de Echalar	1 Aug.
Re-occupation of the positions on the Pyrenees by the Allied Armies	2 Aug.
Second assault and fall of San Sebastian	31 Aug.
Affairs on the Bidassoa and San Marcial	31 Aug.
Castle of San Sebastian capitulated	8 Sept.
Passage of the Bidassoa, and entrance into France	7 Oct.
Thanks of Parliament for San Sebastian, and the operations subsequent to Vittoria	8 Oct.
Surrender of Pamplona	31 Oct.
The whole of the army descend into France; passage and battle of the Nivelle	10 Nov.
Passage of the Nive	9 Dec.
Marshal Soult attacks the left and right of the British army, and is successively defeated	10 to 18 Dec.

1814.

Leaves two divisions to blockade Bayonne, and follows Marshal Soult with the remainder of the army	Feb.
Affair at Hellette	14 Feb.
Battle of Orthez	27 Feb.
Passage of the Adour at St. Sever	1 Mar.
Affair at Aire	2 Mar.
The permission of the Prince Regent granted to the Marquis of Wellington to accept and wear the insignia of the following Orders:—	4 Mar.
Grand Cross of the Imperial Military Order of Maria Teresa.	
— the Imperial Russian Military Order of St. George.	
— the Royal Prussian Military Order of the Black Eagle.	
— the Royal Swedish Military Order of the Sword.	
Detaches two divisions to Bordeaux	8 Mar.
Affair at Tarbes	20 Mar.
Thanks of the Prince Regent and the Parliament for Orthez	24 Mar.
Passage of the Garonne	4 April.
Battle of Toulouse	10 April.
Advanced in the British Peerage by the titles of Marquis of Douro and Duke of Wellington	3 May.
Visits Paris	4 May.

FIELD-MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

Visits Madrid. King Ferdinand confirms all the honours and rewards conferred upon him in his Majesty's name by the Regency and the Cortes	24 May.
A grant of £400,000 voted by Parliament, in addition to the former grants	June.
Arrives in England	23 June.
Proceeds to pay his respects to the Prince Regent, then at Portsmouth with the Allied Monarchs	24 June.
His reception in the House of Peers on taking his seat as Baron, Viscount, Earl, Marquis, and Duke	28 June.
Returns thanks at the bar of the House of Commons, and is addressed by the Speaker	30 June.
Appointed Ambassador to the Court of France	5 July.
Banquet given by the Corporation of London	9 July.
Heraldic honours bestowed	25 Aug.
Assists at the Congress at Vienna	1 Nov.

1815.

On the arrival of Bonaparte in France, appointed Commander of the British forces on the Continent of Europe, and from Vienna joins the Army at Bruxelles	11 April.
Puts himself in communication with Prince Blücher, in command of the Prussian army on the Meuse	2 May.
Moves the allied army towards Nivelles, on the French army, under Bonaparte, crossing the frontier at Charleroi	15 June.
Battle of Quatre Bras	16 June.
Retires to a position to cover Bruxelles, on the border of the Forest of Soignies	17 June.
Battle of Waterloo	18 June.
Created Prince of Waterloo by the King of the Netherlands	June.
Thanks of the Prince Regent and Parliament for Waterloo	22 June.
Pursuit of the fugitive remains of the French army to Paris	June.
Surrender of Cambrai	25 June.
—— of Peronne	June.
Paris capitulated	3 July.
By his interference, prevents the Column in the Place Vendôme and the Bridge of Jena being destroyed	6 July.
A grant of £200,000 voted by Parliament, in addition to the former grants	July.
Appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies of Occupation in France	22 Oct.

1818.

Assists at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle	Oct.
Appointed Field Marshal in the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian Armies	Oct.
The evacuation of France by the Allied Armies	1 Nov.
Appointed Master-General of the Ordnance	26 Dec.

1819.

Appointed Governor of Plymouth	9 Dec.
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1820.

Appointed Colonel-in-Chief of the Rifle Brigade	19 Feb.
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1821.

Attends George IV., King of England, to the field of Waterloo	1 Oct.
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1822.

Statue of Achilles inscribed to the Duke, in Hyde Park	18 June.
Assists at the Congress of Verona	22 Oct.

1826.

Proceeds on an especial embassy to St. Petersburg	Feb.
Removes from the Government of Plymouth to be Constable of the Tower of London	29 Dec.

SERVICES, OFFICIAL COMMANDS, AND PUBLIC HONOURS.

1827.	
Appointed Colonel of the Grenadier Guards	22 Jan.
Appointed Commander-in-Chief	22 Jan.
Resigns	30 April
Re-appointed	27 Aug.
1828.	
The King having called upon him to serve in the office of First Lord of the Treasury, he resigns the command of the army	15 Feb.
1829.	
Appointed Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports	20 Jan.
1830.	
Resigns the office of First Lord of the Treasury	Oct.
1834.	
Elected Chancellor of the University of Oxford	Jan.
Intrusted by the King with the whole charge of the Government and the Seals of the three Secretaries of State	Nov.
Continues Secretary of Foreign Affairs	Dec.
1835.	
Resigns	April
Receives Queen Adelaide, as Chancellor of the University of Oxford	19 Oct.
1837.	
Received with great cordiality by the people at the coronation of Queen Victoria	28 June.
Presides at a meeting to erect a monument to Lord Nelson	1 Aug.
1839.	
Grand entertainment given to the Duke at Dover	30 Aug.
1841.	
Peel Ministry: the Duke in the Cabinet, without office	Sept.
1842.	
Her Majesty visits the Duke at Walmer Castle	
The Duke appointed Commander of the Forces	Dec.
1844.	
Equestrian statue of the Duke inaugurated at Glasgow	8 Oct.
Equestrian statue of the Duke, Royal Exchange, inaugurated	18 June.
1845.	
Her Majesty visits the Duke at Strathfieldsaye	20 June.
First stone of the Waterloo barracks, in the Tower, laid by the Duke	14 June.
1846.	
Peel Ministry resigns: the Duke retires from the Cabinet	6 July.
Colossal equestrian statue of the Duke erected upon the arch, Green Park	30 Sept.
1848.	
Publication of the Duke's letter to Sir John Burgoyne, on the national defences	Jan.
The Duke directs great preparations to prevent a Chartist outbreak	Mar.
Statue of the Duke erected in the Tower	Oct.
1850.	
The Duke sponsor at the baptism of the infant Prince Arthur	22 June.
1852.	
Equestrian statue of the Duke at Edinburgh inaugurated	18 June.
Death at Walmer Castle	14 Sept.

THE LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF WELLINGTON.

BIRTH, PARENTAGE, AND EARLY HISTORY.

THOUGH Napoleon has been styled by the author of the *History of the War in the Peninsula*, "the greatest of captains," and "the first of all generals,"* and by Berton, in his *Précis Historique des Batailles de Fleurus et de Waterloo*, "le génie de la guerre" (the genius of war), ARTHUR WELLESLEY, the late Duke of Wellington, may be said, without any hyperbolic exaggeration, to have been the greatest captain of modern times, and the most successful general that ever appeared on the theatre of warfare. He was born at Dangan Castle, on the 1st of May, 1769, and was the sixth child of a family nine in number. His ancestors, the Cowleys, Cooleys, or as the name is now written, Colleys, were originally of English extraction, being descended of an old Saxon family long settled in Rutlandshire, but migrated to Ireland in the reign of Henry the Eighth, who, for the purpose of promoting and strengthening the protestant religion in that country, offered grants of lands and high salaried offices to men of talent

and family. Robert and Walter Colley accepted the proffered reward, and settled in the counties of Meath and Kildare. They obtained the grant of the clerkship of the crown in chancery during their joint lives, with the benefit of survivorship; and, in 1537, Robert became master of the rolls, and Walter was appointed solicitor-general. A monument bearing date 1408, in the parish of Glaiston, in the hundred of Wrangdyke, Rutlandshire, and erected to the memory of Walter Colley and his wife Agnes, still remains a memorial of the English origin of the duke. The name of Wellesley, and the possession of Dangan castle, and its appurtenant estates, were obtained by intermarriage with the Wesley, Wellesley, or according to early orthography De Welesley family.

The family was raised to the peerage in 1746, by the title of baron Mornington, in Ireland. The second lord Mornington, the father of the duke, married the eldest daughter of the viscount Dungannon; and

* Among the numerous overstrained laudations, and the misplaced idolatry of his hero, by the author of the *History of the Peninsular War*, some of those that occur in the sixth volume of his work are rather startling, if not outrageously extravagant. He there informs his readers, that his "greatest captain" and "first general," was "untainted by any private vice," and, lest the astounding piece of intelligence should be lost among the blaze of virtues with which he has endowed the god of his idolatry, he again propounds a no less extraordinary piece of intelligence, namely, that he was endowed with "freedom from all vices;" and, lastly, to give due effect to the hyperbolic fictions of his rapturous admiration of his idol's perfection and immaculateness, he gravely declares, that he was of "inflexible probity of character," and was "devoid of all selfish ambition." Never did the most rabidly idolatrous worshipper (even in the guise and semblance

of a Gaulish devotee) of Napoleonic virtues and perfections—of Napoleonic probity and morality—draw more largely on his own imaginative powers, and require greater credulity on the part of his readers, than the otherwise judicious and instructive author of the *History of the Peninsular War* has done in favour of his "golden calf." It is to be regretted, that before he penned those misjudged and unfounded notions, and had suffered his judgment to be overlaid by his overweening admiration, he had not read and formed an accurate estimate of sir Walter Scott's more temperate and just estimate of Napoleonic probity and disinterestedness. "With a firm and unremitting attention to his own plans and *his own interest*," says that cautious and trustworthy authority, "Bonaparte proceeded from battle to plunder, less like a soldier than a brigand or common highwayman." Scores of other authorities of the highest credibility might be cited to the same effect.

was created viscount Wellesley and earl of Mornington in 1760. In his childhood he was distinguished by a great natural talent for music. His glees, songs, and some of his church compositions, obtained so much popularity, that the university of Dublin conferred on him, as a testimony of their respect for his skill and eminence in the science, the degree of doctor and professor of music. Among the most admired of his vocal productions are: "Come Forest Nymph," "Gently hear me, Charming Maid," and "By Greenwood Tree." One of his chants still continues to be performed in the churches of Dublin.

On the death of the earl in 1781, he was succeeded in his title and estates by his eldest son, Richard Colley Wellesley, who, in 1797, was raised to the British peerage, and in the same year was appointed governor-general of India. He was a man possessed of high classical attainments, and great oratorical powers. The other brothers, except the duke, were men ordinarily gifted in respect of mind, or were at farthest, but little above mediocrity in intellectual endowments.

Arthur Wellesley was sent with his eldest brother to Eton; but his mind, like that of

Napoleon, being of a scientific structure, after a brief struggle with the heroes and poets of antiquity, he was sent by his mother (a woman of strong and cultivated intellect) to the military college of Angiers, in the department of Maine and Loire, in France, then under the superintendence of the celebrated Pignerol. There, as at Eton, it is said, that he exhibited no indication of superior and commanding talent;* all he could pretend to was a fair and creditable proficiency. Neither did he in parliament, to which he was returned for the borough of Trim, in 1790, evince, as sir Jonah Barrington reports, "much promise of the unparalleled celebrity which he reached afterwards;" but as one (a member of the celebrated society of the "Monks of the Screw") of sir Jonah's friends said, "when he did speak, it was always to the purpose;" a remark which indicates, that sir Jonah's friend possessed more penetration than himself.

On leaving the college of Angiers, he was appointed, March 7th, 1787, to an ensigncy in the 73rd regiment of infantry; and on the 25th of December, in the same year, was promoted to a lieutenancy in the 76th. After various purchases and exchanges,

* Such is the general and unvarying report of the duke's biographers; but to those who possess a knowledge of human nature, and who take a deeper insight into the character of man than superficial observers usually do, it is well known, that it is scarcely possible that a mind of the duke's structure and direction could pass through the routine of school-discipline without evincing some indications of ability—some promise of future superiority and mastery in the great game and business of life. Be it, however, as it may, as to the duke's evincing talent or not during his school novitiate, the absence of indication of precocious talent during the period of academical life, and of oratorical powers in the early stage of parliamentary career, has not occurred only in the person of Arthur Wellesley. Among scores of instances that might be readily cited, of unpromising students and orators, who afterwards rose to distinction in their respective vocations, the names of Goldsmith and Curran stand conspicuous; the first, while an undergraduate in Trinity College, was considered a dull, heavy scholar; the second, in his first essays in the debating societies of London, an ungainly and awkward speaker. The late Adam Clarke, the dissenting minister, was, during his school novitiate, deemed "a grievous dunce." Liebig, the celebrated German chemist, was distinguished at school as "a booby." Even sir Isaac Newton was considered, while at school, "a backward and unpromising scholar:" according to his own statement, he "ranked very low in the school until the age of twelve." The mother of Sheridan pronounced him "the dullest and the most hopeless of her sons;" and Isaac Barrow's father used to say,

"that if it pleased God to take from him any of his children, he hoped it might be Isaac, as the least promising." Neither did Shakspeare, Molière, Swift, Gibbon, Johnson, Niebuhr, Franklin, Davy, or Walter Scott, display any indications of precocious capacity; but rather the contrary. Gesner, the Swiss poet, at the age of ten years, was declared by his preceptors incapable of any attainment. Nor are these singular cases. Those who ultimately rise to great distinction, either in civil or military life, are seldom distinguished for early proficiency. Besides, generals are not, like poets, "heaven-born:" they do not come into the world intuitively gifted and inspired. They acquire that knowledge which they are to be called on to put into practice through the medium of instruction and experience; they derive nothing by intuition: all their knowledge is obtained through the medium of the other sciences; and for this obvious reason, great military commanders have rarely given indications of precocity of that talent by means of which they have become eminent when engaged on the theatre of warfare. Marlborough, Turenne, Frederick of Prussia, Sobieski, Charlemagne, and even Napoleon (though his biographers have been profuse in their declarations to the contrary) gave but little prognostication, when school-boys, of military genius; and had we the means and opportunity of knowing the whole details and circumstances of the lives of the great Grecian, Roman, Carthaginian, and Asiatic commanders—the Cæsars, the Scipios, the Alexanders, the Hannibals, the Genghis Khans, &c.—there cannot be much doubt but that we should find the case to have been similar with them.

namely, into the 41st foot, the 12th light dragoons, the 58th foot, the 18th light dragoons, and the 33rd foot, his eldest brother purchased for him the lieutenant-colonelcy of the last-mentioned regiment, which was, at the time, stationed at the Cove of Cork.

From that port he embarked, May, 1794, with his regiment, for Ostend, where he remained in garrison, until the earl of Moira disembarked at that port the expedition which he commanded for the purpose of creating a diversion in Brittany in favour of the army under the command of the duke of York, then serving in Austrian Flanders. But the duke, in consequence of the defeat of the Austrians, under Clairfait, at Fleurus, being driven from his position at Tournay, and compelled to adopt a retrograde movement, for the purpose of falling back on Antwerp, and the republican forces at the same time advancing on Ostend, lord Moira evacuated Ostend, and marched by Bruges and Ghent, to the Scheldt, crossed that river at the Tête de Flanders, and effected a junction with the English army, which was then in front of Mechlin, or Malines. On its march, the force under the earl was attacked at Alost, July 6th, but repulsed the enemy. This was the first battle-field on which Wellington had been present, and on which he received his first practical lessons in the art of war.

The Republican forces were so vastly superior, both in numerical and physical strength, that the British army continued to retreat, first on Breda, and then on Boisle-duc. On the 14th of September, the advanced posts were attacked at the village of Boxel, and though the enemy was repulsed in two successive assaults, the army was compelled to resume its retrograde movement. The duty of covering the operation was confided to colonel Wellesley. In that arduous and responsible task, the rear-guard, under their spirited and able commander, always presented so steady and determined an attitude, that the attack of the enemy was either averted, or the assailants were repulsed. At the posts of Meteren and Geldermausen, the enemy was not only repulsed, but repossession was obtained of the guns that had been taken. While the army was clearing the village of Schyndel, the cavalry covering the rear-guard being compelled, by a superior force, to fall back, colonel Wellesley, halting the 33rd, and deploying it into line, at the same

time opening his centre files, allowed the disordered cavalry to pass through, when, closing up his files, he resolutely charged the pursuing foe, and compelled him to fall back on his main body. Throughout the whole of the disastrous retreat from Holland to Bremen, he displayed the greatest judgment and skill, and the most conspicuous gallantry in the discharge of the important duty which had been confided to him.

The hardships and privations sustained by the troops during this retreat were excessive. The route from the frozen banks of the Lech to those of the Issel, lay through the flat and desert heaths of the dreary and inhospitable provinces of Guelderland and Over-Issel. On that dreary and barren waste, the unbroken covering of the snow was so deep, that the roads could not be traced, even by those who knew the nature of the country; and the snow continued to fall so thick and fast, that the track of the line of march was obliterated, so that hundreds of the stragglers lost their way and perished; a lot to which the sick and wounded were unavoidably exposed, as the waggons could not proceed on account of the deepness of the ruts in the roads. To add to the sufferings of the fugitive, but not dispirited troops, a piercing and biting wind drove a cutting sleet direct in their faces. The inclemency of the season—winter being at the time in its utmost rigour, and the thermometer being frequently down at 15° and 21° below zero of Fahrenheit, which Jomini, *Vie de Napoléon*, says was never so low in the disastrous retreat from Moscow, which, for its horrors, throws all other retreats, except that from Cabool, into the shade—the long and rapid marches, and the dark and tedious nights of ceaseless watching, without food, fuel, or proper clothing, broke down the spirits and hopes of the men, and increased the severity of their destitute and forlorn condition. If the exhausted soldier, overpowered with fatigue, sat down to rest, and allowed the influence of slumber to steal on his senses, unless his companions quickly aroused him, he slept the sleep of death. The tears that the cold caused to trickle from their eyes, congealed as they fell on their cheeks, and the breath that escaped from their mouth and nostrils, was converted into icicles on their beards. Their hardships were further increased by the almost absolute want of food, the only available means of supporting life being “a mere drink of water.”

And to add to the sum of their calamities, they were often assassinated by the Dutch peasantry. From this dismal scene of suffering and privation—of bad faith and hostility shown to them by those who had solicited their assistance and confederation, they were at length relieved by their reaching Bremen. In the spring of 1795, they embarked for England at Bremerleche on the Weser, and soon reached its shores, ready to prove to the world that they had not degenerated from their forefathers, the victors of Agincourt, Poitiers, and Crecy—of Blenheim, Ramilies, Oudenarde, and Malplaquet, but that the bright examples of courage and patriotism there displayed, would be nobly and faithfully imitated by their descendants. That the inglorious and disastrous affair had not implicated the character and credit of the British soldier, we have the impartial testimony of general Jamini, who, in his *Histoire Critique et Militaire des Guerres de la Révolution*, has honourably acknowledged that the affairs were all between the bulk of the French army and merely the advanced posts of the British; and in another passage he adds, “L’armée Anglaise gémissait elle même sur rôle singulier qu’on lui faisait jouer;” by which expression he infers that the glory of the English arms had not been tarnished or diminished, but that the gallantry and efficiency of the British soldier had been foiled and frustrated by the ignorance and blunders of the allied commanders; and he closes his opinion of those leaders with this emphatic expression, “that the inefficiency and ignorance they exhibited are beneath all criticism, however severe.”

This inglorious campaign was a series of ill-advised and badly executed movements on the part of the allied generals; and the French leaders proved that they were equally incompetent, as they never availed themselves of the opportunity of taking advantage of those errors. The leaders of both sides were equally ignorant of the great principles of military science. When you design to assail your enemy, or are assailed by him, instead of occupying an extensive line of operations, and adopting the old and exploded cordon-system of posts and positions, you should group and concentrate your forces, ready to attack and overpower your foe where he presents his weakest points; or if you direct separate divisions of your forces against several distant points of an enemy’s frontier, you should have


made provision for their rapid concentration when an entrance has been effected, and while the opposing forces are in a state of disunion, which was necessary to guard against simultaneous attacks from different quarters. These great and first principles of the science of war were violated by both parties—the assailant and the assailed. They were formalists and pedants in the science; men of mere routine, devoted exclusively to one-sided views of their art. The consequence was, the one was discomfited, and the other was unable to derive all the advantages which fortune presented him.

Thus ended Wellington’s FIRST FLEMISH CAMPAIGN, or, in more subdued language, his first military services on “the great prize-fighting stage of Europe,” as Sterne, in his *Tristram Shandy*, makes his hero, “My Uncle Toby,” style Flanders. In it he gave the first dawn of that reputation which has filled the whole horizon of the civilized world with its splendour and effulgence; and in it, while he “heard those grand sounds with which he was to have so long and so glorious a familiarity in after life—the distant boom of the hostile gun, the rough thunder of batteries of cannon, the rolling of musketry, the tread of columns, the trampling of squadrons, and the dauntless cheers, the loud hurrah of those soldiers whom, under happier auspices, and on a more glorious theatre of action, he was so often to lead against the enemies of his country, and to guide to victory and glory”—he first learned and put into practice that “*patientia inediae, alioris, vigiliae, supra cuiquam credibilis*,” which laid the foundation of his “iron constitution,” and contributed, in conjunction with his extraordinary sagacity and well-poised mind, to save Europe from the most galling and tyrannous subjugation.

On the return of the British army to England, colonel Wellesley, as soon as the 33rd was reported fit for service, embarked (1795) with his regiment on an expedition fitted out against the French for the West Indies, but the fleet being repeatedly driven back by tempests, before it could proceed on its destination, the colonel and his regiment (1796) were ordered to India, which destination they reached in February, 1797. “Thus,” as a tasteful biographer of the duke has observed, “a star which might have set early in the west in obscurity—perhaps in death—arose in the east with life and brightness.”





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Longitude East from Greenwich







Engraved by W. Mearns

ROBERT, FIRST LORD CLIVE.

OB 1774

FROM THE ORIGINAL IN

THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE CALCUTTA.

THE INDIAN CAMPAIGNS.

FROM the swamps and dykes of Holland, in which he had given an earnest of the future eminence he was destined to attain, we have now to accompany Wellington to the sultry and burning plains of Hindustan, on which he was to lay the foundation, and display that superiority of talent and genius which was to entitle him to rank among the most consummate masters of military science.

As it has been correctly said, much misconception has been entertained respecting Asiatic warfare and Asiatic soldiers. It is generally supposed that Asiatic armies are mere hordes of undisciplined barbarians—that the Asiatic soldier has but little bodily power and personal prowess—"is an effeminate, silken slave, whose nerves tremble at the report of a cannon;" but the bloody and severe combats which the armies of India have maintained with the hardy and veteran troops of Europe, the fierce impetuosity of their assaults and attacks, led and directed by French officers and British deserters, of whom more than three-fourths of the officers of Tippoo Saib and the Mahratta powers consisted, prove that this "fancy picture" is not true. Both in ancient and modern times, the Asiatic soldiers have shown that they are not deficient either in physical courage and energy, or in ability to support fatigue and privation. They resisted, in a succession of well-contested engagements, Alexander's army, consisting of 120,000 men, whom he had collected as he traversed the various regions in his march to India. In the Mysore, Mahratta, Nepaulese, and Sikh wars, they have shown all the requisites of the soldier, either in the battle-field or in the breach of fortified places. And a very high military authority tells us, that "in the best requisites of a soldier, the Indian auxiliary might serve as a model to every service in Europe." In the field, the sepoy soldier emulates his European comrades in gallantry and discipline; and in the camp he surpasses them in sobriety and good conduct. In danger the Hindu exhibits a calm resolution which no reverses can overturn; want and suffering never induce him to desert his officers; and death alone detaches him from his colours, which, whether in victory or defeat, he regards with

a devotion that borders on idolatry. The fidelity of the Hindu soldier is never to be shaken; the strongest human tie, even that of kindred or affinity, never induces him to swerve from his duty. When circumstances require the sacrifice, he seals his loyalty with his life, and abandons everything but his faith. Numerous are the instances in which the Hindu soldiers have shown the most devoted affection for their officers. During the march of Baillie's army, in 1790, across the country, after their surrender to Tippoo Saib, the Hindu privates, who were kept separate from their officers, in hopes that they might be induced to accept service under the sultaun, often swam, during the night, tanks and rivers, by which they were separated from their officers, to carry them a part of their pittance of provisions. In Malcolm's *Life of Lord Clive*, we are told that when provisions were becoming scarce in the fort of Arcot, when besieged by Morari Row, the sepoys proposed that Clive should limit them to canjee, the water in which the rice is boiled, and which resembled very thick gruel. "It is," said they, "sufficient for our support; the Europeans require the grain." But warm and devoted affection is not the only good feeling displayed by the Hindu soldier; his fidelity and attachment to the military point of honour is unalterable, and greater than he bears to his country or kindred, or even his religion. When Warren Hastings was engaged at Benares, in his dispute with Cheyte Sing, not a corps showed any reluctance to engage the rajah and the people of Benares; not a single case of desertion occurred, though the sepoys engaged in the suppression of the insurrection were, for the most part, men of the same tribe and country as those against whom they acted; many of them were natives of Benares and the surrounding districts, and, as such, had been accustomed to consider Cheyte Sing as their legitimate prince. In the mutiny also occasioned at Vellore by the injudicious order to reduce the beard and mustachios of the sepoys to a regular standard, the swords of the native Madras cavalry were as deeply stained as those of the 19th dragoons, in the blood of their mutinous countrymen. And in the insur-


rection at Cabool, and during the siege of Jellalabad, the fidelity of the native portion of the troops engaged in that ill-fated affair, remained unshaken amidst the severe privations and sufferings to which they were exposed, notwithstanding the most insidious endeavours were repeatedly made by the enemy to seduce them from their allegiance.

The capture of Indian fortresses and towering strongholds, also, is not that easy and harmless affair that many persons suppose it to be. Many of the fortresses in the Indian peninsula are very strong, and had they been properly defended, would have been difficult to capture, often absolutely impregnable. They are occasionally situated on rocks that present a perpendicular face varying in height from 80 to 100 feet, and sometimes the walls of those fortresses are 40 feet in height, without a rampart, and therefore afford no room to stand upon, or means for descent. "It is quite fearful," says the eloquent author of *Recollections in India*, "to stand upon the walls which our soldiers have mounted in hot blood and carried by escalade in our Indian wars." Another reason, also, of popular apathy and indifference on this subject is, that Indian warfare is not deemed so glorious as that which takes place on the theatre of Europe, and that Indian nomenclature is not so grateful and musical to the ear as that of the classical vocabularies of Europe. "Ahmed-nuggur and Gawilghur are not quite so euphonious as Fuentes d'Onore, Talavera de la Reyna," or those classical and historical associations, the sound and mention of which afford delight and satisfaction to the refined and cultivated mind. But to resume the narrative.

At the time of the arrival of colonel Wellesley in India, the British interests in that quarter of the globe were environed with perils and difficulties. The greater part of the native powers were either avowedly inimical, or secretly disposed to assume a hos-

* Among the other displays of his hatred of the English, he caused the walls of the houses in the principal streets of Seringapatam, to be ornamented with rude paintings caricaturing the English. In one place there was a tiger seizing a trembling Englishman; in another, there was a Mysorean horseman rivaling the feats of Autor, and cutting off two or three English heads at a stroke; and in other places, there were Englishmen placed in positions, and subjected to treatment too disgusting for description. But he took good care to have these exhibitions of his silly and impotent rage erased as much as possible when he found that his capital was to be invested

tile attitude, when a favourable opportunity offered; and in this disposition they were encouraged by the agency and intrigues of French emissaries. Tippoo Saib, the sultaun of the Mysore, inheriting the deadly and immitigable hatred (a feeling that the loss of half his dominions, by virtue of the treaty of Seringapatam, in 1792, with Lord Cornwallis, had rendered more bitter and rancorous,) which his fierce and semi-barbarous father, Hyder Ali, had manifested in life, and recommended in death, carried his vindictive spirit to so great a degree of frenzy, that he was constantly indulging his fancy in schemes of vengeance, and devising plans for inflicting the most cruel torments on his foemen, the English, whom he contemptuously termed "Nazarenes." Some of his devices, to indicate this spirit, were as singular as they were childish. Among the curiosities found in the Jamdar Khana at the capture of Seringapatam, was a piece of mechanism, or big toy, for his amusement, representing a tiger in the act of tearing to pieces the body of a Nazarene; and when it was put into motion, a hideous noise issued from the mouth of the victim, and its arms were raised as if in supplication, intended to represent the growls of the tiger, and to express the agonies of the sufferings of its victim. This curiosity is now deposited in the Museum of the East India House, in Leadenhall-street; but it is greatly deranged by the frequent attempts of the visitants to put it into motion.* A copy of one of his letters to the French Directory was also found in his bureau, in which he says that, "in a short time, not a Nazarene should be found in India," but that "all the accursed ones should be sent to hell." So bitter and implacable was his hatred of the British nation, that it was, as sir Hector Munro informs us, "death for any man to be known as one who could speak or read English." His hatred of that nation, and its expulsion from India, were the ruling passions of his heart, the mainspring of his policy, the fixed fund by the British army, by having the whole of the walls whitewashed. Those that remained on the walls of the tyrant's superb mausoleum, still appear unobliterated by time and weather, having been retouched by colonel Wellesley's orders, and those of successive governors of Seringapatam, as a memorial of Tippoo's cruel and vindictive disposition. Sir Arthur also caused the native representations of Baillie's defeat (which were highly exaggerated to the prejudice of the English), exhibited in one of the halls of the palace of Doolut Bang, in which he resided during his governorship of Seringapatam, to be renovated, and restored to their original condition.



Engraved by W. B. D.

CHARLES, MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

OB. 1805.

FROM THE ORIGINAL OF COPLEY, IN

THE GUILDHALL, LONDON.



damental principle of his councils and government. To indicate his tiger-like ferocity towards the English, and perpetuate the recollection of the hatred which actuated his heart from the cradle to the grave, he altered the imperial crest of the elephant, which his father, Hyder, had adopted on his usurpation of the Mysorean throne, to the emblem of the tiger; and caused the same emblematic representation to be emblazoned on everything about his palace, as an indicative testimony of his fierce and bitter intentions.*

To put his designs into execution, he had recourse to the profoundest intrigue, practised the deepest duplicity and cunning, and spared no exertions and contrivances, to be in a condition to compete with his enemy. For this purpose, he secretly dispatched envoys to M. Malartie, the governor of the Mauritius, or Isle of France, soliciting the aid of men and arms; and was, at the same time, in correspondence with Buonaparte, then at Cairo with the army of Egypt. While practising these secret machinations, he professed to the British government in India, that "it was the desire of his heart to pay every regard to truth and equity, and to strengthen the foundations of harmony and justice between the two nations." At the same time, he put his army into an efficient state, by the introduction of the improved system of European tactics; and this he was enabled to accomplish by the great encouragement and reward of French officers. His infantry was tolerably disciplined and appointed, his artillery effective, his cavalry active and courageous; and though the last-mentioned force was unequal to repel the combined charge of European cavalry, they were, as irregulars, formidable from their rapid movements, sudden assault, and celerity of retreat. His European, or French force, sent by Malartie, consisted of ten officers, ninety privates, and four hundred and fifty half-castes and Caffres. Prior, however, to their arrival, he had a considerable body of Frenchmen, under M. Lally, in his service.

And the sultaun of the Mysore was not the only enemy that the British had to contend with in that critical and ominous aspect of their Oriental affairs. Besides the alliance, offensive and defensive, which he had entered into with the French Directory, he had, by

his intrigue, stirred up enemies throughout the Indian peninsula against the British interests, and his emissaries were aided in their endeavours by the numerous French adventurers who were in the service of the different native powers. The Mahratta chiefs, Scindiah and Holkar, the rajah of Berar, and Zemaun Schah, prince of Candahar and Cabool, were either avowed or secret enemies.

To meet these difficulties, lord Mornington, the eldest brother of the duke, and afterwards marquis Wellesley, the new governor-general, on his arrival in India, May 22nd, 1798, directed all the energies of his mind. He had the sagacity not only to discover the secret machinations of the native powers, but he possessed the wisdom and decision requisite to concert measures to disconcert and counteract them.

Having failed in his endeavours to effectuate amicable relations with Tippoo, and convinced of his duplicity and dissimulation, he made vigorous preparations for war. He strengthened his alliances with the nizam (the soubahdar, or chief prince in the Deccan), and the peishwah, the head of the Mahratta states; obtained the surrender of the French subsidiary force in the service of the first mentioned prince, at Hyderabad; and to obviate the consequences which had compelled lord Cornwallis to break up the siege of Seringapatam, in 1791, on account of the sudden rising of the river Cauvery, he ordered all the disposable forces (about 19,000 infantry, and 2,700 cavalry, of which force 6,500 were Europeans,) that were encamped at Wallajahabad, under the temporary command of colonel Wellesley, until general Harris assumed the command, to hold themselves in readiness to advance, so as to be able to terminate the siege of the capital, before the monsoon, or rainy season should set in; as from the swelling of the rivers from the rain, it would be impossible for an army to approach that city, from the month of June to the month of December. A Bombay force, under lieutenant-general Stuart, amounting to 6,400 men, of whom 1,600 were Europeans, had been assembled at Cannamore, a town on the Malabar coast, about one hundred miles south-west

* His name, in the native dialect, means tiger. He called his soldiers "tigers of war:" tigers were his pets, and often his executioners. The attendant that offended him, or the prisoner that was brought into his presence, was not unfrequently turned into a

barred room, or a large cage, and tigers were let loose upon him. Tigers were even his guardians and body-guards. On the capture of the fortress, a large tiger was found chained near the door of his treasury.

of Seringapatam, for the purpose of acting in combination with the Carnatic army. Two other divisions of 5,000 and 4,000 men, under lieutenant-colonels Reid and Brown, were also in motion, from the southern districts of the Carnatic, for the purpose of gathering in the fruits and resources of the productive country of Barrahmahal, in order to bring supplies to the grand army through the Caverypooram Pass. The preparations for the campaign being completed, war was declared, and the Carnatic and Bombay armies received orders to march upon Seringapatam.

The Carnatic army reached the frontier on the 4th of March, 1799, and, on the 5th, crossing the boundary line, invaded the Mysore territories. Colonel Wellesley commanded the Nizam contingent, together with the 11th, the 33rd, and part of the 2nd and 4th British regiments, two battalions of native infantry, and two brigades of artillery; amounting in all to eleven battalions.

Tippoo, determining to be the assailant, broke up his cantonments before Seringapatam, and marched with the *élite* of his army to attack the Bombay division, before it could effect a junction with the Carnatic force. Having crossed the Indus at Attock, the place where Alexander had passed that river, he on the 5th of March encamped in an extensive plain north-east of Periapatam, and on the 6th, having stimulated his "tigers of war," (11,000 men of all arms), as he called them, with opium and bang, made furious and repeated attacks on the rear and in front of colonel Montessor's brigade, consisting of four native battalions, amounting to 2,000 men, posted near the village of Seedaseer, and which was about eight miles in advance of the main body, and the park and provisions encamped at Seedapoor, a post not above three or four marches from Seringapatam; but on the advance of general Stuart, with the 77th European regiment, and two flank companies of the 75th, to the assistance of Montessor and his gallant brigade of sepoys, who had sustained the unequal contest for near six hours, and whose ammunition was almost expended, he was compelled to retreat with precipitation through the jungles, and with the loss of 1,500 men, to his original encampment; from which he retired on the 11th to Seringapatam.

The Carnatic army, having reduced several hill-forts on its march, crossed, on the 28th,

the Cauvery, by the ford of Sosilay; while Tippoo, who on the 14th had broke up his cantonments at Seringapatam, and moved forwards to meet that army, was waiting with the main body of his forces at the ford of Arakery, thinking that the passage would be attempted there. On the advance of the Carnatic army to Mallavelly, (March 27th,) the army of the sultaun was observed drawn up in order of battle, on the high-road to the westward of that village, having bivouacked on the preceding night on the left bank of the Maddoor. Tippoo, opening a distant cannonade from the elevated position upon which the Mysorean army was posted, an engagement immediately ensued; in which the army of Tippoo was routed, with the loss of one thousand killed. In that engagement, colonel Wellesley, observing a favourable opportunity of turning the right flank of the enemy, formed his division into echéllon of battalions, and advanced to the attack. The 33rd regiment advanced against 2,000 of the best disciplined of the turbaned infantry—Tippoo's favourite "cushoon"—and when within fifty paces, having received the enemy's fire, delivered its own with the most decisive effect; and immediately charging with the bayonet, annihilated the whole of their enemies. At the same time, general Floyd seizing this critical moment, ordered a charge of cavalry, by which great numbers of the enemy were destroyed, six standards taken, and the retreat of the Mysorean army became general. The loss of the Anglo-Indian army was sixty-six in killed, wounded, and prisoners; that of Tippoo near 2,000.

On the 1st of April, the Anglo-Indian army was within twelve miles of Seringapatam; and on the 5th took up its ground in front of that city. The encampment was made at the distance of 3,500 yards or paces from the western face of the works, amidst the topes or groves (which were thickly planted with cocoa, areka, betel, and bamboo trees); and, because a bastion constructed at the north-west angle, which had been selected for lord Cornwallis's attack in 1791, furnished a fire which swept the whole extent of the two faces, the south-west front of the fortress was selected as the point of attack. Many improvements and additions had been made to the works since the English army lay last under them; an idea of the extent of which may be formed from the circum-

stance, that 6,000 men had been constantly at work on the fortifications during the last six years. Since the last siege, a new line of entrenchments had been constructed within 700 yards of the walls. Between these works and the river, Tippoo had encamped nearly the whole of his infantry.

The town of Seringapatam, in the native language called *Patana*, and in their maps *Sre Ranga Patana*, stands on an angle of an island formed by the junction of the rivers Cauvery and Coleroon, which breaking against the rocks, separates itself into two streams, one flowing on each side of the city walls. Two walls encircle the town. The population at that time exceeded 150,000 souls, and the garrison amounted to above 20,000 men.

As several ruined villages, and an aqueduct terminating in a tope or grove, called the Sultaun-pettah, in front of the British camp, presented the enemy the means of effecting advantageous lodgments, on the night of the encampment a body of troops under major-general Baird, was detached to scour it. This was effected without opposition, but that officer missing his way, found that he was marching into the enemy's lines, instead of returning to his cantonments. The serious mistake was first discovered by lieutenant Lambton, an officer on his staff, who, observing from the stars, that they were marching in a northerly direction instead of a southerly (a mistake which would have brought the party direct on the fort

of Seringapatam), Baird, who had a pocket compass with him, putting a fire-fly upon the glass, ascertained his mistake; when, halting his party, he faced about in order to regain the British camp, which he reached about four o'clock in the morning.

On the following day, a part of the position in front of the enemy's advanced posts, being assailed from the pettah and the adjoining ruined villages, with a hot fire of musketry and rockets, colonels Wellesley and Shaw were ordered to dislodge the assailants. The attack was made in the night, Shaw carried the village, and had established himself in the nullah or water-course; but the entire chain of posts, forming the tope, village, and enclosure, was so strongly fortified, and so resolutely defended, that Wellesley was repulsed.* The attack, however, being renewed on the following morning, by the Scotch brigade and two battalions of sepoys under colonel Wellesley, for the purpose of supporting Shaw in the post which he had retained during the night, as also for the recovery of the tope, &c., the enemy abandoned his whole line of defences, or chain of posts, along the front of the besieging army, from the river on the left to the village of Sultaun-pettah on the right; and thus a ready-made first parallel was obtained to commence the approaches against the fortress, within 1,800 yards of the works, and extending two miles.† The business of the siege now went on vigorously.

* The following note written to general Harris on receiving the order for the attack, is no indifferent prestige of the military genius which the duke subsequently so eminently displayed.

"MY DEAR SIR,—I do not know where you mean the post to be established, and shall therefore be obliged to you, if you will do me the favour to meet me this afternoon in front of the lines, and show it to me. In the mean time, I will order my battalions to be in readiness. Upon looking at the tope as I came in just now, it appeared to me that when you get possession of the bank of the nullah, you have the tope as a matter of course, as the latter is in the rear of the former. However, you are the best judge, and I shall be ready.—I am, my dear sir, your most faithful servant,

"ARTHUR WELLESLEY."

† At the time, much ill-natured and misapplied criticism took place on colonel Wellesley's first attack on the Sultaun-pettah, and silly comparisons were made between his failure and Baird's scouring the post the preceding night, without any loss. The circumstance excited the sneers of the find-fault writers of the time, and is still alluded to by those liberalised patriots who love to depreciate their country's military renown. But without alluding to the hazardous nature of night-attacks, especially when the enemy is prepared and waiting for you,

the best answer is to be found in the following playful remark of one capable of explaining the cause of such failures:—"Men moving gently in the dark, may consult the stars, and read their high decrees; but nothing disturbs planetary observations more than a shower of musketry, accompanied with a flight of rockets." The fabulous circumstances alluded to by the late Mr. Theodore Hook, in his *Life of Baird*, and adopted by Mr. Alison in his *History of Europe*, and the startling scene which they credulously state to have taken place early in the morning of the 6th, partake, as a judicious writer has properly said, of the same character as those which are generally related of the early career of nearly every brilliantly successful general. "We have seen," adds the same writer, "in French books, and have heard from French lips, stories about young Buonaparte's skulking at the siege of Toulon, during which he first made his name known to the world." Mr. Hook's story of colonel Wellesley's being frightened, "spreading like wild-fire through the camp," and Mr. Alison's tale of his falling fast asleep upon a dining-table after his return from the night attack on the pettah, are as fabulous as "the solemn whispers" which Mr. Lushington, in his *Life of Lord Harris*, facetiously tells us he heard "in the Poligar counties, in 1800, to the same effect."

On the 9th, Tippoo being disappointed in his expectations of assistance on a large scale, from the governor of the Isle of France, addressed the following note to general Harris:—

“TIPPOO SULTAUN TO GENERAL HARRIS.

“The governor-general, lord Mornington, sent me a letter, the copy of which is inclosed. You will understand it. I have adhered firmly to treaties. What, then, is the meaning of the advance of the English armies, and the occurrence of hostilities? Inform me.”

To this laconic and peremptory communication, which, in style and spirit, bears a similitude to Napoleon's composition, though free from his inflation and magniloquence of language, general Harris referred the sultaun for an answer to the letters he had received from the governor-general. The British chief's reply was as brusque and as oriental in style as that of Tippoo:—

“Your letter, enclosing a copy of the governor-general's letter, has been received. For the advance of the English and allied armies, I refer you to the several letters of the governor-general, which are sufficiently explanatory on the subject. What need I say more?”


The Bombay army joined on the 14th, and took up its position on the north bank of the river. On the 20th a battery was opened to enfilade the front of the fortress against which the attack was directed; and on the evening of that day a parallel was opened within 780 paces of the works. The same day presented the contending chiefs with another opportunity of displaying the peculiar style of oriental diplomatic literature, in the communications which passed between them; Tippoo's note ending with the concluding sentence of his first communication—“What can I say more?” and general Harris's with that of his—“What need I say more?”



On the morning of the 22nd, the garrison made a furious sortie, with 6,000 infantry, and the French auxiliary corps, under Lally, but was repulsed with the loss of above 600 in killed and wounded. On the 26th, the working parties being much annoyed by the fire from a line of intrenchments in possession of the enemy, colonel Wellesley being ordered to dislodge them, advanced with two columns, under the cover of a cannonade, and effected the object. On the 30th, the first breaching battery was opened on the south-west bastion of the fortress; and on the 3rd of May, the breach in the *fausse-braye*, or outer work, for securing the covered way and the fosse,

being reported practicable, an immediate assault was determined on.

In the course of the night, the scaling-ladders, fascines, gabions, sand-bags, and other necessary *matériel* for the assault, were conveyed into the trenches; and before dawn of the following morning, the troops selected for the assault moved thither. The storming party consisted of about 4,400 men, of whom 2,500 were Europeans, and was distributed into two columns, the right commanded by lieutenant-colonel Sherbrooke, and the left by lieutenant-colonel Dunlop; major-general Baird having the chief command. The reserve corps, consisting of the foreign (Meuron's) regiment and four battalions of Sepoys, were posted in the advanced trenches, under the command of colonel Wellesley. The instructions for the assault were—that after the breach was carried, the storming party was to file off to the right and left along the ramparts, and sweeping them, to enter the body of the town. The time chosen for the assault was one o'clock (May 4th), an hour selected, because, to avoid the meridian influence of the sun, the native of the East then indulges in sleep and repose. But in that expectation the assailants were disappointed; for instead of finding the garrison buried in sleep, they found it ready to receive them.

At the hour appointed, the troops, “hot, panting, breathless for the signal,” moved from the trenches, crossed the rocky bed of the river under a very heavy fire, passed the glacis and ditch, and rushing up the ruins, crossed the breach, and, after a brief struggle with a few gallant Mysoreans on the slope, planted the British colours on its summit. The face of the wide breach was soon covered with assailants, who, on entering the rampart, filed off to the right and left, driving the enemy before them. The left division could not have passed the ditch, filled with water, between the inner and outer ramparts, had it not been for the scaffolding which had been raised for the use of the workmen who had been repairing the walls. On that side the assailants met with a vigorous opposition. The last resistance was in and round the principal mosque, where the carnage was very great, the resistance of the true Mussulmen, who would neither flee nor surrender, having been deadly and desperate. The sultaun, who is said to have been the last man to quit the traverses, as they were successively





THE KING AND THE ENGLISH ARMY



carried, was found dead, pierced with four wounds, three in his body and one in his head, among a heap of slain, under the sally-port or covered gateway that leads into the interior of the fort.* Despite the wounds, the sultaun's countenance wore an expression of stern composure. This intrepid warrior, when news was brought him that the assault was made, hastily washing his hands,

* Though Tippoo possessed great personal courage, and considerable energy of character, he proved in the siege of his capital his incapacity and unfitness as a leader. Instead of exerting himself, and animating his troops by his presence and example, he merged the character of the general in that of the sharpshooter, employing himself in discharging from behind a traverse carbines handed to him ready loaded by his servants. He was destitute of the military character and enterprising boldness of his father Hyder. Had he possessed either, instead of the formal attack on the Sedaseer post, he would suddenly and secretly have pushed forward under the cover of the jungle, and have taken Montessor's brigade by surprise. Instead, also, of becoming the assailant at Mallavelly, and attacking his opponent in the open field, he would have laid waste the country, harassed the outposts, intercepted the supplies, strengthened his hill-forts, and maintained a desultory warfare; with his description of troops, and the character of the enemy to whom he was opposed, no other mode promised a chance of success. In his misjudged plans, he forgot the mode of strategics which had been adopted by his father Hyder, and had been the means of promoting his success. When that chieftain was upbraided with cowardice by a British officer who pursued him, he coolly replied, "Give me the sort of troops you command, and your wish for battle shall soon be gratified. You will understand my mode of warfare in time. Shall I risk my cavalry, which cost me one thousand rupees each, against your cannon-balls which did not cost you two pice (a currency of almost only nominal value). No; I will march your troops till their legs shall become the size of their bodies. You shall not have a blade of grass, or a drop of water. I shall hear of you every time your drum beats, but you shall not know where I am once a month. I will give your army battle, but it shall be when I please, not when you desire it." Had Tippoo adopted his father's strategy, better success might have attended his measures. But he was wholly incompetent to the task; he possessed no military talent, nor any of the qualities that adorn the soldier. He was a ruthless and wayward barbarian; cruel, vindictive, and remorseless. The whole of the prisoners taken during the siege, were either hacked to pieces, or put to death by having nails driven into their skulls, or their necks twisted in a sudden and violent manner, so as to dislocate the vertebrae. Baird, who had been among those who surrendered under general Matthews, had been kept chained in a dungeon during three years. His only brother, Kerim Saheb, had sighed away, in a dungeon, the prime of life, beneath a weight of bolts and fetters rivetted on him by his brother's hand. The cruel punishments he inflicted, often on the most groundless suspicions, put an end to all private correspondence in his dominions; his nearest relations dared not venture

called for his arms, and while buckling on his sword, was told that Syed Goffer, his best officer, was killed. "Syed Goffer was never afraid of death!" was his exclamation; "let Mohammed Cassim take charge of his division." And with these words he went hastily forth to meet the assault. On the evening of the assault the body of the sultaun was conveyed, with military

to write to one another; their only communication was by verbal messages. On his succession to the throne, he compelled all the European soldiers in his dominions to submit to the Mahommedan rite of circumcision, and hanged those who refused to submit. Of those Hindu women who would not adopt the Mahommedan custom of covering the bosom, he cut off the breasts, and exposed them to the greatest indignities. He occasionally gratified his cruel and vindictive disposition on an extensive and systematic scale. When his prisoners, confined in the bungalow built on the summit of the Nundydroog rock, which was above 1,200 feet in perpendicular height above the level of the plain, became too numerous, they were thrown over the precipice, and left to be devoured by wild beasts. From the same rock he, on one occasion, cast several hundred sepoys, sewn up in sacks, who had been taken prisoners, because they refused to enter his service. And he was as capricious as he was cruel and vindictive. He indulged his whims of change and innovation to so great an excess, that he almost alienated even his Mahommedan subjects. He changed the dates of the ancient Mahommedan festivals, gave new names to the days and months—to weights, measures, coins, forts, towns, and offices, civil and military; in fact, he changed everything—government, law, religious institutions, and military tactics. His vanity was equal to his cruelty and capriciousness. Besides keeping in pay a corps of authors to record his exploits, he was an author himself; and never executed or meditated an evil deed, without writing himself, or causing to be written, some pedantic proclamation, treatise, or book, to extol his project. The book entitled *The King of Histories*, found in his palace at the storming of his capital, and which contains orientally exaggerated accounts of his bravery and exploits, and alludes to general Macleod's curious challenge to him, and of course gives a favourable version of the affair in behalf of himself, was written under his dictation. Yet this was the man whom Philip Francis and his coadjutors, in the unjust and vindictive prosecution of Warren Hastings, designated as "an inoffensive prince, sacrificed to English ambition and thirst of conquest." In person, Tippoo bore some resemblance to Buonaparte. Like him he was corpulent; and his hands and feet were remarkably small, and finely formed. Like him he was of temperate habits; fruits, milk, and jellies were his principal diet. Like him also he was licentious. At the time of the capture of his capital, 620 women were found immured within the walls of the zenana; and, like Buonaparte, he spent but little time among his female favourites. Like him, war and politics were his delight; but in military and diplomatic talent, and all the great qualities of the head and heart, there was an immeasurable disparity between them. In stature, Tippoo was about three inches shorter than the French emperor.

honours, to the mausoleum of Lang Bang, erected to his father, Hyder Ali. The loss of the garrison, in killed and wounded, exceeded 8,000 men; that of the Anglo-Indian army, 1,403. During the siege a spent ball struck colonel Wellesley's knee.*

The booty that fell to the lot of the victors was immense. The succession of quadrangles filled with ranges of storehouses and magazines in the Jamdar Khana, were stored with jewels, gold and silver plate and ornaments, costly fire-arms and swords, china, looking-glasses, pictures, telescopes, &c. The shawls, muslins, silks, satins, velvets, and rich gold and silver cloths



deposited there, were sufficient to burthen 500 camels. The value of the jewels of the zenana, or harem, alone, was estimated at a crore of rupees, equal to a million sterling. Gold and diamonds, to a very large amount, were carried off by the soldiers from the treasury and the zenana, and vast quantities were shared among the captors on the spot.† The military stores captured were, 520,000 lbs. of powder, 424,000 of round shot of different calibres, 99,000 fire-locks and carbines, and 929 pieces of ordnance.


Colonel Wellesley having, on the night following the storming of the town, been

* The escapes from wounds are often owing to very trivial circumstances. A button, a piece of money in the pocket, the handle of a watch, and even the locket of hair or the image of "a beloved one" deposited in the bosom, have arrested the fatal ball in its errand. At the action of the Coa, under general Robert Crauford, an officer of the 95th rifles happened to be reading a pocket volume of *Gil Blas*, and while in the middle of one of his interesting tales, when the order was issued for the regiment to prepare for action, not liking to throw his book away, he thrust it into the breast of his jacket. In the course of the day the friendly burden received a musket-ball which fate had ordained the heart of the reader was to have stopped had not the volume interposed its kind offices. Miss Pardoe, in her account of the transactions of her father's life, entertains her readers with the following singular occurrence; which proves that "the saving of one's bacon is sometimes the salvation of one's self." While captain C—, of the —th regiment, in the Peninsular war, was taking "a hasty snack," the bugle sounded for all to "fall in." The captain having often before experienced the woes of being without prog on "glory's field," clapped the piece of bacon of which he was partaking with his brother officers, into his bosom. When "the noble fray" was over, and the captain took his "snack of bacon" out of his breast to regale his famished stomach, to his astonishment he observed a musket-ball snugly deposited in its contents. At the skirmish of Aire, a musket-ball struck one of the buttons of the regimental jacket of lieutenant-colonel Dodgin, and entered the groin above the right hip. When extracted it bore a correct impression of the two sixties, the number of his regiment. Kincaid, in his entertaining work, *Random Shots of a Rifleman*, says, that in the action of Sabugal, while he was addressing a passing remark to an officer near him, who, in turning round to answer, raised his right foot, "I observed a grape-shot tear up the earth in the print which the foot had but that instant left in the mud." Henry, in his *Events of a Military Life*, tells us of a grenadier of the 77th regiment having been wounded by a ricochetting cannon-ball that was nearly spent, and which striking the soldier's knapsack with the tin over it, was turned downwards, so that it ploughed its way through the soft parts, "carrying the lid of the tin before it, which cut every thing down to the bone sheer off." Castello, in his *Memoirs*, mentions an instance where a ball was arrested in its passage by the serpent or buckle of the leather band that

encircles the waist. But of all the hair-breadth escapes of "heads doomed to stop bullets in their way," perhaps none exceeds Captain Kincaid's account of the officer (lieutenant Worsley of the 95th rifles), who, at the storming of Badajos, received a musket-ball in the right ear, which came out at the back of the neck, and though, after a painful illness, he recovered, yet his head got a twist, and he was compelled to wear it looking over the right shoulder, until at the battle of Waterloo, receiving a shot in the left ear, which came out within half-an-inch of his former wound in the back of the neck, his head was set right again. War, however, amidst all its horrors, often presents very ludicrous incidents. Few of those who shared in the perils and honours—the incidents and marvels—of the Peninsular war, but are in possession of a store of them. Among those known to the writer of these notes, the following is not the least laughable. A captain of artillery was to be seen walking about the streets of Bayonne presenting the following ludicrous plight. A cannon-shot had shaved off the skirts of his coat close to his posteriors, and as he was rather Dutch built, or squatty set, he looked like a fat cock-pheasant whose tail had been shot away by a bungling sportsman.

† Some idea may be formed of the amount of property that disappeared in this manner from the following statement:—"Dr. Mein, of the medical department, purchased from a soldier of the 74th regiment, for a mere trifle, two pair of bracelets, set with diamonds, the least costly of which was valued by a Hyderabad jeweller at £30,000 sterling; the other pair was, he declared, of so superlative value, that he could not fix a price. Valuable pearls were frequently bought in the bazaars from the soldiery for a bottle of spirits."—*Major Price's Journal*. "The throne, which consisted of an armed chair, covered with a thick plate of gold, encircled with steps silver-gilt, and thickly set with jewels, was sold to general Gent, of the engineers, for £2,500; and he obtained for the gold and silver alone nearly £25,000."—*Ibid*. The canopy was thickly set and decorated with jewels and fringes of costly pearls. A gold figure of a bird, covered over with the most precious stones, was fastened to the top of the canopy. Its beak was a large emerald, its eyes were carbuncles, the breast was covered with diamonds, many large jewels were fancifully arranged on its back, and its long tail so closely studded with diamonds, that the gold was scarcely visible.







BATTLE OF TEWKESBURY

appointed governor of the captured city, immediately proceeded to repress the excesses of the soldiery and protect the inhabitants. On the morning of the 5th he went in person to the houses of the chief inhabitants, placing guards for their protection. He removed the family of the late sultaun, and that of his father Hyder, together with their zenanas, to Vellore; and for their maintenance a sufficient income was allowed. He so restored the confidence of the inhabitants, and re-established order in the city, that in the space of three days the townspeople resumed their usual occupations, and the town assumed the appearance of an eastern fair. He conciliated the adherence of the late sultaun's chief officers and servants, either by granting them employment or by pensions. In a short time he restored the tranquillity of the whole kingdom (to the portion of which that had fallen, by virtue of the partition, to the lot of the East India Company, he had been appointed governor), and the population returned to their peaceful occupations, thankful for the happiness and security they enjoyed under the mild administration of the company.

The conquered dominions were partitioned among the East India Company, the nizam, and the lineal descendant of the rajah of the ancient Hindu dynasty of the Mysore, who had been conquered and deposed by Hyder Ali. The claimant of the vacant musnud or throne, was a grandson of the deposed monarch, and at the time of the partition was not above five years old, and passing his life in great indigence with the female branches of his family. To him was assigned about one-half of the conquered dominions, and the city of Mysore was appointed the seat of his government. The company received as their share the territory on each coast, below the Ghauts, the forts commanding these important passes into the highland of the Mysore, with the fortress and island of Seringapatam. The revenue arising to the company from their new acquisition, was about two-and-a-half millions sterling; and by a subsidiary treaty with the restored rajah, they obtained about the same amount.

But the tranquillity which the prudence and ability of colonel Wellesley had secured to the people of Mysore, was soon disturbed by the predatory incursions and cruelties of the reckless brigand, Dhoondiah Waugh, who had been liberated with the rest of

the prisoners immured in Tippoo's dungeons. That man, who was a native of the Mysore, but a Patan or Mahratta by descent, had been a trooper in Hyder's cavalry, and had obtained a petty command in the service of his son. Being of an ambitious and a restless disposition, he deserted during the siege of Seringapatam by lord Cornwallis, and collecting a band of desperate followers, acquired, by his depredations, great robber-reputation in the country near the Toombudra river. But Tippoo trepanning him to an interview, had seized, and having circumcised him, had thrown him into prison. On his liberation from prison, he resumed his old vocation of plunder and murder, and soon found himself at the head of a large predatory force, of which 5,000 were cavalry. Many of the disbanded troops of Tippoo flocked to his standard, and many of the killedars had betrayed their trusts, and surrendered many hill-forts and towns in Biddenore to him, before general Harris could send a sufficient force against him. He fancied himself so powerful, that he assumed the sounding and absurd title of "The King of the Two Worlds."

To suppress this brigand and his banditti, who had assumed a formidable aspect in respect of numbers and violence, and were committing the most inhuman atrocities, as also to suppress the hordes of other Pindarees, or robber bands, that had spread themselves over the Mysore, and to intimidate the Mahratta chiefs who were indicating their hostility to British interests, colonel Wellesley was, in September, 1799, appointed to the extensive command of the Ghauts, which are extensive ranges of mountains that divide the Deccan and Mysore from the low and flat country bordering on the sea. He immediately put himself in pursuit of the robber-duplicate monarch and his banditti band, and, after a long and harassing chase, with many doubles and crosses, he came up with one division encamped at Malowny, on the Malpoorba, and having sabred or driven into the river all the followers of his two-fold majesty, captured his baggage and guns, and soon after he attacked the brigand himself near the village of Conahgull. As his host of followers was strongly posted, having their rear and flank covered by the village and rock of Conahgull, the British commander, that he might not be outflanked by the superior extension of the enemy's line, formed four regiments of cavalry, the 19th and 22nd

dragoons, and two regiments of native horse, in all about 1,200 men, into single line, and, immediately charging, put the lawless host to rout, and slew his felon-majesty himself. Thus a desperate villain met with a soldier's death, instead of the ignominious fate of a malefactor; Colonel Wellesley having been instructed, when he captured his *Majesty of the Two Worlds*, to hang him on the first tree he came to. The dominion and career of "The King of the Two Worlds" having been thus brought to a close by Wellesley and his "regicide army," as sir Thomas Munro facetiously termed them in a letter to their gallant leader, tranquillity was restored to the Mysore and the whole of the Malabar country.

Shortly after this service, colonel Wellesley was appointed by lord Mornington to join an expedition, under general Baird, against Batavia, and to expel the French from the Indian seas, by the ultimate conquest of the isles of France and Bourbon; but the plan was frustrated on account of the demur to the governor-general's power, by admiral Rainier, who commanded in these seas. Thus the natural policy of freeing the trade of the East India Company from the losses occasioned by the enemy's cruisers was defeated by private pique.


The marquis was concentrating a large force at Trincomalee, in the island of Ceylon, to be employed as events should require, either against the enemy's eastern islands, or to proceed to any part of India which the French should menace, when, reports having reached the Indian government of the invasion of Egypt by Bonaparte, he appointed colonel Wellesley to its command. But before the colonel knew the governor-general's resolution as to the point of destination, the duplicate dispatch from London to the marquis Wellesley was transmitted to him from Madras, announcing the intention of the home government, that a diversion should be made from India by the Red Sea, in support of the expedition under general Abercrombie, against the French in Egypt. Colonel Wellesley, aware that the monsoon favourable for a voyage to the westward was near its termination, and that if the expeditionary force was not immediately put into motion, it must be retarded for some months, determined, on his own responsibility, to move

the fleet and army to Bombay, where it would be some thousand miles in point of space, and many months in point of time, advanced towards its Egyptian destination. This movement, which, for boldness, sagacity, and foresight, exceeds the same qualifications of Cæsar in his expedition to Pontus, receiving (by overland dispatch) the sanction of the home government, he advanced part of his expeditionary force to Mocha, on the Red Sea, before the arrival of general Baird to supersede him. Though deprived of the command to which he was originally destined, and in which he was confirmed by the home government, by whom he was appointed (1801) to the local rank of brigadier-general in Egypt—Baird claiming the appointment as senior officer, and alleging that Wellesley's appointment was an injustice, being a violation of the rules on which military command is based—he furnished that officer, for his assistance and direction, with memoranda on Egyptian affairs, and the operations to be assumed by the expedition, which he had drawn up for his own use; and as he was then labouring under a kind of jungle fever, exasperated by a cutaneous disorder, as soon as his health permitted, he returned to his government in the Mysore, and on the 11th of April, 1801, resumed his command as governor of Seringapatam, and chief of the army of the Mysore, and immediately devoted himself to the perfecting of the organization of the civil and military establishments of the country. By his mild conciliatory bearing, he no less gained the esteem of the people, than he commanded their respect and confidence by his moderation and justice.

In 1802 the political horizon began to darken through the whole of the extensive empire of the Mahrattas, particularly in the direction of Poonah. The Mahratta chieftains, though always ready to confederate for the overthrow of the British power, their mutual jealousies and suspicions of one another, and desire of securing only their own individual advantage, prevented him from adopting any enlarged political views for their general good. Though the five states into which the last empire was divided (namely, those of Scindiah, the Peishwah, Holkar, Guickwar, and the rajah of Berar),*

* All these men were usurpers, and were indebted for their elevation either to the unceasing contests for power and plunder in which the petty warrior-robbers, of whom that land of violence, of misrule,

and never-ceasing strife, India, has always been so prolific; or to the circumstance of the descendants of the ancient rulers having abandoned themselves, like the caliphs of Spain, or the Merovingian kings



Engraved by W. Finden

SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY.

OB. 1801

FROM THE ORIGINAL, OF HOPNER, IN THE COLLECTION OF

THE HON^{BLE} JAMES ABERCROMBY.



were all united in one confederacy, under the nominal control of the rajah of Sattarah, whose power Scindiah had usurped, they were always at variance, each having only his own interest in view. Holka, fearing the consequences of the interest of Scindiah* at the court of Poonah, marched against the united army of the two rajahs, and defeating it, seized Poonah, dethroned the peishwah, and, setting another puppet on the throne, reigned there in his name. The peishwah fled to Bussein, in Guzerat, and there, to enable himself to recover his dominions, formed a defensive alliance with the company.

During this dispute between the Mahratta chieftains, the governor-general had received secret information that Scindiah, Holkar, and the rajah of Berar had entered into a confederacy against the British; and that their animosity was fomented by French emissaries and adventurers, located in large numbers among them. To anticipate the effects of that confederacy, and neutralize French influence and intrigue, he ordered a *corps d'armée* of 20,000 men to assemble at Hurrypoor, on the north-west frontier of

the Mysore, for the protection of the company's territories, as well as those of the nizam, the rajah of the Mysore, and the peishwah, in pursuance of the recent treaty entered into with these powers. The object was also to counteract the machinations of the French in the service of Scindiah, in the Deccan, who were watching for a favourable opportunity for prosecuting the views of the French government, to effectuate the establishment of a French empire in India; the invasion of Egypt by Buonaparte having been undertaken for the express purpose of making it an entrepôt between France and India. The French adventurer, Perron, was already, under Scindiah's protection, forming an independent state in Delhi and the surrounding territory, having under his command 16,000 or 17,000 regular and well-disciplined infantry, a well-appointed and numerous train of artillery, commanded by his own countrymen, a body of irregular troops, and from 15,000 to 20,000 horse ready, while he looked for reinforcements of cavalry from the petty chiefs who were his tributaries or allies. His head-quarters were established near Coel, on a command-

of France, to sloth and sensual gratification, and having resigned the reins of government into the hands of their favourite ministers, who soon became possessed of all power, and usurped their authority. Thus, the rajah of Sattarah, the descendant of Sevajee, the founder of the Mahratta empire, was displaced by his prime minister, the peishwah. Thus Scindiah, Holkar, Quikwar, and Bhoonslah, had obtained power, either directly or collaterally. Scindiah was the grandson of a husbandman, by name Ranajee, who, enlisting among the predatory troops of Bajee Rao the First, was of so great service to his employer, that, at the partition of the spoils of the Mogul empire, he was rewarded with extensive grants of land, and raised to high rank. Holkar was the great-grandson of an agricultural labourer, who also had been a follower of Bajee Rao. The origin of the other specimens of Indian majesty was equally low and obscure. Scindiah had dethroned the Mogul emperor, Shah Allum, and had installed a French adventurer, of the name of Perron, as his viceregent on the throne of Delhi; but general Lake, by his victory, unseated the Gallic viceroy, as also his successor, Bourguien, from their musnuds, and restored the displaced monarch. Besides the Mahommedan and Hindu natives, some European aspirants had the "Oriental twist in their imaginations" of becoming rajahs and nabobs, and playing the game of royalty. Thus, rajah George Thomas, originally a boatswain of an English man-of-war, finding himself supplanted in the good graces of the begum Somroo, or, according to her Gallic orthography, Sombé (the old lady being tired of her *liaison* with the aforesaid George Thomas), by a Neapolitan rival, one signor Levasso, set up for himself as founder of an independent sovereignty in the county of Hurrianna, which is a vast tract of the Delhi province, and fixed

his royal residence at Hansi, about 90 miles north-west of Delhi. Like other rajahs, or anointed rulers, he coined his own money, had his zenana or harem, his court, and held his durbar in state. His views even extended to the conquest of the Punjaub and all the country to the mouths of the Indus. But untoward incidents, and the treacherous combinations among his officers and subjects, compelled him to throw himself into the hands of the company, and the ex-rajah shortly afterwards died in India, when on the point of returning home to his native cot in Tipperary. Adventures of this kind have ever abounded in India, and the eastern Dugald Dalgetties have always found adherents ready to promote their aspirations for performing their part in the drama of royalty. The begum Somroo, *alias* Sombé, was the widow of a Swiss or French adventurer, whose real name is lost in his Indian designation of Somroo, and who went to India as a serjeant in the French service. Deserting his country's standard, he enlisted under that of Meer Cossim, and was distinguished for his massacre of the English at Patna, while in that chief's service. In the course of time, having a *penchant* for royalty, he carved out for himself a rajahship, which he bequeathed in his royal will to his widow, "The little, queer, old-looking begum, with brilliant but wicked eyes," as major Thorn designates the old dame in his *Memoir of the War in India*. It was from this "queer-looking old begum" that Mr. Dyce Sombre, whose eccentricities have gained so much notoriety, derives his descent and parentage.

* This chieftain was the most powerful of the Mahratta princes; he not only undid his own sovereign, but he was master also of the mogul's person; holding thus in actual subjection the descendants and representatives of Sevajee and Aurenzale.

ing position on the frontier of the British possessions, and on their most vulnerable part. To counteract these designs, a campaign was planned on a much more extensive scale than had ever been contemplated in India. It comprehended almost the whole of Hindustan, from Calcutta and Madras on the eastern, to Bombay on the western side, and from Delhi to Poonah and Orissa. In the Deccan, general Wellesley had to oppose the confederated force under Scindiah and the rajah of Berar, and to protect the nizam and the peishwah. On the Oude frontier, general Lake had to destroy the influence of the French, and rescue the blind emperor, Shah Autum, from these adventurers. Major-general Wellesley (who had been so gazetted on the 29th of April, 1802,) was ordered to put himself at the head of 9,700 men, including one European regiment of cavalry, and two of infantry, to which were added 2,500 Mysorean horse, the whole being part of the force assembled at Hurrpooor, on the north-west frontier of Mysore, with directions to march upon Poonah, and drive Holkar from that place. The subsidiary force furnished by the nizam, and under the command of colonel Stevenson, as also that from Bombay, were ordered to co-operate with him.

On the 9th of March, 1803, he crossed the Toombuddra, in basket-boats, covered with double leather-skins, and entering the Mahratta territory, began his advance on Poonah. He chose that season of the year to begin his operations, because the rivers being then high (the monsoon having set in,) would prevent, in a great measure, the movements of the Mahratta forces, which chiefly consisted of cavalry. On the 15th of April, he was joined by colonel Stevenson at Akloose, on the Neera, about seventy miles from Poonah; and on the 19th of May, the Bombay force effected a junction with him. Amreet Rao, the father of Holkar's puppet, having taken to flight, he, on the 20th, entered Poonah without

any opposition, after a forced march of sixty miles in thirty-two hours, the last forty miles during the night, and reseatd the peishwah on his throne.

As the governor-general had invested the major-general with the discretionary power of declaring war or making peace, he judged the alternative of conciliation preferable; but after above two months of procrastination, finding Scindiah availing himself of the usual duplicity and evasion of Oriental diplomacy, he, on the 4th of June, marched from Poonah, and moved on Ahmednuggur, one of the strongest fortresses in India, situated about eighty miles from Poonah; which, though defended by 3,000 Mahrattas, and 1,500 Arab mercenaries, he carried by assault, on the 12th of August, with the loss of 140 killed and wounded. The fort surrendered on the second day after the attack on the pettah or town, from which it was separated after the manner of European towns and fortresses. The gallantry exhibited by the British soldiers and officers on that occasion was so conspicuous, that Goklah, a Mahratta chief, who was present at the assault, makes, in a letter to a friend, the following observation:—"These English are a strange people, and their general a strange man; they came here in the morning, looked at the pettah-wall, walked over it, killed all the garrison, and returned to breakfast! What can withstand them?"*

On the 21st of August, the Anglo-Indian army moved towards the Godavery, and crossing that river in wicker boats at Toka, reached Aurungabad on the 29th, once celebrated for its magnificence, and as the seat of the emperor Aunneggebe's government, but now, from the hand of time, the changes of fortune, and the revolutions of empires, a mere heap of splendid ruins—the mere shadow of its former self. Here, general Wellesley learning that Scindiah and the rajah of Berar had entered the nizam's territories, and were menacing Hyderabad, marched forwards to prevent their passage

* There is a great coincidence in this opinion with that expressed by another Indian chieftain. Dhoondiah Khan having repulsed three successive assaults made on his fortress of Kamona, in the Dooab, the garrison descended into the ditch to bring away their wounded comrades lying among the dead and dying. Among the rest, they brought a wounded European soldier, in a state of insensibility, and laying him down in the presence of Dhoondiah and his sirdars, an effort was made to revive him. In a short time he opened his eyes, and, gazing on the martial throng around him, faintly exclaimed, "Killa lia?"

(Have we got the fort?) and almost instantly expired. "A wonderful people are these Feringhees," said Dhoondiah to his attendants, struck with this exhibition of "the ruling passion strong in death." "Here is one of them almost cut to pieces, and yet the moment he comes a little to himself, his thoughts run on victory, and his first and last question is, if his countrymen have gained the day! It is in vain to contend against such men. Beat them back a dozen times, and they will return again and succeed at last."

of the river; but, by subsequent information, understanding that they were encamped near Bokerdun, he, on the 20th of September, broke up his cantonments on the Godavery, and advanced to give them battle. To obviate the delay which would be occasioned by marching *en masse*, through a narrow and difficult defile, or tract of hilly country, between Budnapoor and Jaulna, as also to prevent the enemy escaping to the southward by one of the defiles, the united force of the Anglo-Indian army pursued different routes; general Wellesley taking an eastward direction, and colonel Stevenson's column a westward one, round the hills. On reaching Naulniah, general Wellesley, ascertaining that the armies of the confederated chieftains were encamped between the villages of Bokerdun and Assaye (or, as it is sometimes written Assye,) with that decision and promptitude that have ever distinguished his military exploits, determined to attack them without delay. Dispatching a messenger to colonel Stevenson, who was then advancing in a parallel line of march with his own, at a distance of eight miles to his left, with orders to effectuate a junction as quickly as possible; and leaving the rear-guard to protect the baggage and stores at Naulniah, he advanced to the Kaitna, with the 19th light dragoons and three regiments of native cavalry, under colonel Maxwell, to reconnoitre from an eminence on its banks, the enemy's position. From a hill in front of their right, he beheld it to be strong, extending from Bokerdun to the fortified village of Assaye; having the Kaitna in front, and its tributary the Juah, which united with it at an acute angle, about half-a-mile beyond the left of the position, in its rear. The right of the line, which consisted of cavalry, rested on Bokerdun; the left, of infantry, the best in the service of the allied native powers, on the fortified village of Assaye; while the artillery, which consisted of above 100 guns, many of large calibre, formed a grand battery in front of the left and centre. Among the spoils taken were a number of orderly books kept by Europeans, by which it appeared that the enemy's force consisted of 10,800 infantry, and 30,000 cavalry.

General Wellesley, perceiving that the enemy being penned up between the rivers, had confined himself within a space so narrow, that he could neither present a more extended front than he already presented,

nor be able to turn the flank of his assailant; and fearing, should Scindiah assume the initiative, that the Anglo-Indian army would be greatly harassed in its retreat by the vastly superior numerical force of the enemy's cavalry, determined on instant attack; trusting that courage and discipline would compensate for the appalling disparity of force. Desiring Maxwell to keep his present position, while he himself brought up the infantry, as soon as his whole force was united he issued orders for the army, which was but just off a march of fourteen miles under a vertical sun, to descend from the rocky heights of the river, and cross the ford of Peepuglaon, which was a little beyond the left of the hostile army, and which the English general judged to be a ford from a few houses being on the opposite banks. The passage was effected without loss, though the enemy directed a cannonade on the line of march.

As soon as the troops reached the opposite bank, the British chief effected his formation of battle, though a field battery had opened its fire on the troops, as soon as the head of the column began to ascend the banks of the river. The army advanced in two lines; the first, consisting of the 78th highlanders, two battalions of sepoy, and advanced pickets, to the right; the second, of the 74th regiment of the line, and two sepoy battalions. The 19th regiment of dragoons, under colonel Maxwell, and the 7th native cavalry, took their battle station, as the reserve, in the rear. The Mahratta and Mysorean horse, consisting of the troops of the peishwah and the rajah of Mysore, amounting to about 2,500, were stationed at the ford of Peepuglaon, to protect the baggage and stores, cover the advance of the army, and hold in check a large body of the enemy's cavalry, that had crossed the Kaitna, and followed the rear of the Anglo-Indian army in its march.

The disposition of battle adopted by the major-general best adapted to ensure victory, was:—As each of the flanks of the enemy rested on a river, he determined to reduce the field of battle to so confined a space, as to neutralize his numerous cavalry, or, at least, to subject its operations to very confusing disadvantages; while, at the same time, he prevented them from surrounding him by their superior numbers, by having both his flanks covered by the two rivers, which, from the scarped nature of the banks, could be crossed by cavalry only at a few

The wisdom of the British general's hazarding a battle with a force so disproportionate to that of the enemy, has been the subject of considerable controversy, and has even been impugned by some writers. But the following facts justified his policy:—

1. The misapprehension occasioned by the name of the district being confounded with that of a village in it; and the consequent conclusion, that the enemy was posted in the district of Bokerdun, instead of at the village of Bokerdune; a mistake that induced the English general to suppose that he was six miles more distant from the enemy than was the case. He also learned from two horsemen taken during the march, that he was only five miles distant from the enemy, while from his previous information he supposed that he was twelve miles off.

2. From the intelligence he received from the two horsemen taken, that Scindiah and the rajah had put their cavalry in motion, he inferred that the intention of the enemy was either to escape, or to advance to attack him in the plain.

3. That on account of the numerous cavalry of the enemy, if he allowed his adversary to adopt the initiative, or had attempted to fall back to his camp at Naulniah, where he had left his baggage and stores under a slender guard, his retreat would have been difficult, if not impossible.

These considerations fully justified the English general's determination to deliver battle, and the event proved the soundness of his judgment, and the propriety of his

determination. The moral effect produced on the minds of the Indian population by a victory gained in so unequal a combat, stamped the dominion of Britain over prostrate India. Hindustan from that fatal day was viewed by its inhabitants as having passed into the hands of its invincible conquerors: they attached to it a mysterious agency, which partook deeply of the supernatural.*

Frustrated in his measures, Scindiah had now recourse to his usual artifice and duplicity. He sent a vakeel (*i.e.* an ambassador or envoy) to general Wellesley, with proposals of peace; but finding that the British chief was not to be deceived by his specious professions, he and his confederate, the rajah of Berar, collected their shattered forces, and with these and their fresh reinforcements, amounting to 11,000 infantry and between 30,000 and 40,000 horse, and marching in a western direction along the banks of the Taptee, with the intention of advancing on Poonah, took post at Arghaum.

On account of this apparent breach of the truce, the English general put the Anglo-Indian army in motion, and on November 28th reached that village; in front of which the army of Scindiah and the rajah of Berar was drawn up in order of battle, extending in line above five miles. In the centre were posted the rajah's infantry and artillery, commanded by Bhoonslay, the rajah's brother, flanked by his own cavalry. On the right was Scindiah's army, consisting of a heavy mass of horse, on whose right hovered a vast cloud of

* Twenty-five years after the battle of Assaye had been fought, a military officer visited its site, which he thus describes:—"Around the once scene of carnage and havoc—of the roar of artillery, the peals of musketry, the clangor of swords, the groans of the dying, and the shrieks of the wounded, with which the battle-field of Assaye resounded, everything now was repose; the verdure rich, the fragrance of the wild flowers delightful, the foliage of the peepul trees glittering and luminous, and the short and occasional bellowings of the Indian cows, were the only sounds that broke the stillness of the scene. A tope or grove of mangoes shaded a Moslem eedgah, or house of prayer, outside the village. Round the small fane reposed many of the officers who had been slain in the action; and high over head, attached to a pole, on one of the umbrageous mangoes, fluttered the triangular white flag of a fakeer, or religious mendicant. Under a single banian tree was the grave of a staff-officer, upon which lay a heap of stones, with a small lamp at the head. The trunk of the banian was hollow, and in it had lived a fakeer, who had nightly lighted the lamp on the tomb. The tree near which general Wellesley had stood in the commencement of the action, had been so shattered with shot, that after struggling for life,

had been dead ten years before the writer had visited the spot." The veneration with which the natives regard the memories of those Europeans whose kindness had won their affection, is by no means rare. Their tombs are honoured as the tombs of saints—a lamp is kept constantly burning, and the ground around is constantly and carefully preserved from all impurity. The natives never pass the spot without saluting it; and those who may have served under the direction or orders of him whose resting-place it is, offer up prayers for his soul. Among other instances that may be mentioned, the tomb of general Wallace, at Seroor, a cantonment of Western India, is a place of peculiar veneration. The guard of the place, called "the Picket Hill," turns out at a stated hour of the night, and presents arms to the imaginary vision of the general seated on his favourite white charger. At the tomb, in the neighbourhood of Rajmhal, of Augustus Cleveland, an English resident who filled the office of judge at Boglipore, two fakeers are employed to keep a lamp continually burning, and once a year a festival is held at the spot to celebrate the apotheosis of that highly revered individual, whose memory is regarded with feelings approaching to idolatry, as a testimony of esteem for his impartial administration of justice.

Pindarries and light troops. General Wellesley, determining to give instant battle, formed his infantry into a single line, and stationing his cavalry as a reserve, in the second line, advanced to the attack. The enemy opening a brisk cannonade, and the Mahratta horse and Persian cavalry in the service of the rajah charging at the same moment, three battalions of the native troops being panic struck, took to flight; but the British general, rallying the fugitives, stationed them in prolongation of his line to the right; when the 78th regiment, the 29th native infantry, and the remaining fragment of the 74th regiment, advancing against the enemy's cavalry, the confederated army made a precipitate flight, leaving two thousand dead on the field; above twenty standards, thirty-eight guns, and all their stores and ammunition. In their flight they lost also their elephants and baggage. The loss on the part of the Anglo-Indian army, was forty-six killed and three hundred wounded. The two thousand Arabs, called the Pharsee Risaulah, or Persian battalion, who were posted on the left of the enemy's line, singling out the 74th and 78th European regiments, advanced with a tremendous shout, but they were instantly repulsed with the loss of six hundred in killed and wounded.

Fortress after fortress now fell into the hands of the victors. Gawilghur, situated in Berar, upon a rock in a range of mountains between the sources of the rivers Poorna and Taptee, and one of the strongest fortresses in India, was at length invested; and as colonel Stevenson, on account of ill health, was about to retire from the service, general Wellesley determined that he should have the opportunity of encircling his brows with the mural crown; he therefore waived the right of being the captor of that fortress in favour of the colonel, who stormed it on the 14th of December. On the acquisition of the fortress, a scene of horror challenged the attention of the victors, that made them shudder at their success. On entering the killadar's palace, they were startled at the sight of above a dozen young and beautiful women weltering in their blood and struggling in the last agonies of death. They had all fallen victims to the mistaken sense of the honour of their fathers and husbands, who, to save them from the expected licentiousness of the victors, had been guilty of the cruel act. Those men were rajpoots of distinguished caste and determined character,

and fell, together with the garrison of 5,000 men, disdaining or deeming it hopeless to ask for quarter.

The signal defeats of Assaye and Argaum, and the loss of that hitherto supposed impregnable fortress, left no other hope to the Mahratta chiefs than that they could obtain from pacification. They therefore sued for peace, and preliminaries were entered into with them in the month of November, and ratified with Bhoonslay on December 17th, 1803, and with Scindiah on February 15th, 1804, on condition that neither of them should employ any subject of any European or American power at war with Great Britain, and the cession of all the territory and numerous forts between the Jumna and the Ganges to the company. During this marvellous campaign, the services of general Lake and the army of Hindustan were signally eminent. Perron, on the advance of that army to Delhi, retiring before it, the victorious English entered that city, and delivered the blind emperor from his degradation and bondage. The fort of Ally Ghur, the usual residence and grand depôt of the French adventurer, was taken by storm, though deemed impregnable. The capture of Agra and the battle of Leswaree, completed the destruction of the French force, Perron and his officers throwing themselves on the protection of the British.

With the capture of Gawilghur, and the reduction of the formidable banditti termed Pindarees, with which the country was infested, general Wellesley's military services terminated in India; for though he was subsequently appointed to a command against Holkar, the reduction of that chieftain was effected by general Lake.

Having thus triumphed over every advantage arising to the enemy from local position, numerical strength, and well-served trains of artillery formed under French training and discipline, general Wellesley resumed his government of Seringapatam, and continued in the execution of its duties till the month of February, 1805, when he resigned all his political and military offices and appointments in India, together with his local rank of major-general in the army. On the 25th of February, notification had reached India that he had been invested with the Order of the Bath.

The reasons of his resignation and leaving India were, discontent at the treatment he had received from the directors of the East

India Company, and the neglect with which his services had been treated by the British government. In a letter to general Stuart, he says, "I think it desirable I should leave this country. The peishwah has manifested a most unaccountable jealousy of me personally, and has refused to adopt certain measures, evidently for his advantage, only because I recommended them. He has allowed their benefit, and has avowed this motive for refusing to adopt them. We have always found it very difficult to manage him; but it will be quite impossible to do so, if this principle is allowed to guide his conduct. I therefore think that it is best that I should go away as soon as possible; and I am certainly very desirous of getting some rest." He embarked from Fort St. George in March, 1805, and arrived in England in September of the same year.

On his leaving India the most lively demonstrations of respect and esteem were shown to him. The inhabitants of Calcutta presented him with a sword of the value of £1,000; and a gold vase (for which a service of plate was afterwards substituted,)

of 2,000 guineas value, was voted to him by the officers of the division of the army of the Deccan that had served under his command, as "a testimony of their admiration of his exalted talents and splendid achievements; of his consideration and justice in command, which had made obedience a pleasure; and of that frank condescension in the private intercourse of life, which it was their pride individually to acknowledge." But the highest and most grateful tribute of homage paid him was that contained in the parting address of the inhabitants of Seringapatam, who implored "the God of all castes and of all nations, to hear their constant prayer, to bestow on him health, glory, and happiness."

Thus ended the Indian career of the military and political life of Arthur Wellesley, a career which had secured, not only the gratitude and affection of the people of Mysore, for the tranquillity and happiness they had enjoyed under his government; but had been marked by a succession of victories uninterrupted by a single disaster or defeat.


HOME SERVICE, AND AT COPENHAGEN.


AFTER a voyage of five months, sir Arthur Wellesley reached England from India. In November of the same year he sailed for Hanover, in command of a brigade in the expedition under the earl of Cathcart, for the purpose of effecting a diversion in favour of the Austro-Russian army then on the banks of the Rhine; but in consequence of the disastrous battle of Austerlitz, and general Mack's inglorious surrender at Ulm, in the February following, the object of the expedition was frustrated.

On his return to England, he was appointed to the command of a brigade, in the Sussex district, and was returned to parliament as member for Newport, in the Isle of Wight. In the same year he married the honourable Catherine Packenham, sister of the earl of Longford, and in 1807 he was appointed chief secretary in Ireland, and member of the privy council, during the viceroyalty of the duke of Richmond. In

the summer of that year he sailed, as second in command of the army under lord Cathcart, to Copenhagen, for the purpose of taking possession of the Danish fleet. The military operations undertaken against the Danish troops were entirely under his direction. He drove the Danes from their positions of Fredericksverk, Kiøge, and Hersøge, into Copenhagen, with considerable loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. He negotiated the capitulation, and drew up its conditions. On his return to England, in 1808, he resumed his duties as secretary for Ireland and member of parliament. In the thanks voted by the house of commons to the generals and commanding officers of the army and navy, the speaker thus particularized the services of major-general Wellesley: "I should be wanting to the full expression of those sentiments which animate this house and the whole country, if I forebore to notice that we are this day crowning

DENMARK





SCALE 10 20 30 Miles





with our thanks one gallant officer, long since known to the gratitude of this house, who has long trodden the paths of glory, whose genius and valour have already extended our fame and empire, whose sword has been the terror of our distant enemies,

and will not now be drawn in vain to defend the seat of empire itself, and the throne of his sovereign." In this just and eloquent eulogium, the future glorious career of Wellington was foreshadowed, and he nobly fulfilled the expectations of his country.

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

THE late Peninsular War, the greatest and the most vital that has been waged in modern times, will, as its tasteful historian, the late Mr. Southey, has observed, ever be memorable. It was no common war, of which a breach of treaty, an extension of frontier, a distant colony, or a disputed succession, a struggle for pre-eminence or political ascendancy between ambitious powers; such was not its cause and motive; but it was a struggle, a deadly conflict "for the life or death of national independence, national spirit, and those holy feelings, which are comprehended in the love of our native land." Had England been conquered, her existence as a free and an independent state would have been erased from the scroll of nations; she would have become the vassal and tributary of France, and besides being denationalized, would have been humbled to the dust, and compelled to submit to every insult and degradation that French vanity and vengeance could devise; massacre, rapine, and lust, would have stalked at large and unrestrained throughout the land: every holy tie and feeling would have been violated, and the most galling tyranny and bondage been inflicted. The leader of the French armies had unreservedly declared, that it was in his mission to triumph on British liberty; and his lieutenants Massena and Bessières gave expression to still more furious intentions. The former declared, that if he could land with an army in England, he would pledge himself, "not only to effect the conquest of the country, but to reduce it to a desert, not fit for the habitation of wild beasts." That England escaped that dire calamity, she should be eternally grateful to Wellington and his companions-

in-arms. Never were honour and gratitude more justly due to the defenders of their country. It is not the desolation of the land over which war passes—it is not the rivers of blood that flow in its prosecution—it is not the sufferings and horrors to which the inhabitants of the country in which it prevails are exposed, that makes warfare horrible; "it is the utter demoralization of the people with whom it comes in contact; it is the shock it gives to all those arts, and institutions, and influences, which ameliorate the condition and elevate the character of man; it is its burnings, its murders, its violations," that impart its dread and direful character to its visitations. Had the tide of battle during the contest with Bonaparte turned on the shores of England, as the duke of Wellington, with equal humanity and patriotism, observed in a letter to lord Liverpool, dissuading him from withdrawing the English army from the Peninsula, "then the English people would discover what are the miseries of war, of which, by the blessing of God, they have hitherto had no knowledge; then the cultivation, the beauty, and prosperity of the country, and the virtue and happiness of its inhabitants, would be destroyed, whatever might be the result of the military operations. God forbid that I should be a witness, much less an actor, in the scene."

At the commencement of this great and arduous struggle, Napoleon Bonaparte, "the scourge and wonder of the age" in which he lived, saw all the states of continental Europe prostrate at his feet; every banner of its various states had veiled its glories before his victorious eagles; France, Italy, Poland, Holland, the Austrian Netherlands,

and all the German confederated states of the Rhine, were immediately subject to him; Switzerland was under his protection, and the Germanic empire under his uncontrolled authority: all cowered before the magic of his name, all furnished contingents of men and arms for his projects and aggressions. From Spain, Portugal, and other countries, he drew large sums of money for his tacit allowance of their infringement of the continental system of non-intercourse with England; and he contrived to withdraw the flower of the armies of those degenerate nations, under the pretence of assisting him in enforcing the observance of the Berlin and Milan decrees in the north of Europe. Even Russia, duped by his insidious professions, and blindly subservient to his ambition, and seduced with the promise of being allowed to assume the empty title of "The Empire of the North," consented to his project of extinguishing the dynasties of Spain and Portugal, and seating his brother Joseph on the vacant throne, and Louis, Jerome, and his brother-in-law, Murat, on those of Holland, Westphalia, and Naples. In short, by the treaty of Tilsit, he had become omnipotent on the continent; all Europe tamely submitted to his will, and waited his bidding; throughout its whole extent there was only one solitary exception to his universal sway and dominion, and that exception was his hated rival—England.

The whole of continental Europe was fascinated with a craven-hearted dread of his supposed irresistible power; a silly wonder and admiration of his fancied stupendous, aye, even supernatural genius and ability. His name was "the nightmare" of all the continental nations, and his armies were regarded as invincible, and dignified with every moonshine appellation that folly, sycophancy, and stupidity could invent. "The terrible legions," "the invincible legions," "the famed and dreaded legions" of Napoleon, were the stupid and infatuated expressions from one end of Europe to the other. "They were," says general Foy, in his *History of the Peninsular War*, "considered as heroes of a superior species; as colossi, demigods, before whom Europe was dumb and prostrate." England alone, at least the sensible and true-hearted part of the nation, scorned to entertain so craven a spirit, so ridiculous a fantasy. To the honour of our country be it known, that no real and informed Englishman was ever subject to the stupid hallucination, the ab-

ject supposition of French invincibility and superiority; and I venture to predict that the same will be the case with every right-minded and brave-hearted man, when, as M. Michelet, in his bobadil and coxcombical style, vapours, "the day arrives in which the world conspires to take a clear view of France," although his "plebeian, weak people," the English (who "have no literature, no history or tradition, no hereditary glory," as he kindly condescends to inform us), shall have to contend against "thirty-four millions of nobles," armed with "the holy bayonets of France," and though the aforesaid M. Michelet pronounces that that "day will be hailed by the soldiers of France as the proudest in their lives."

Such were the power and resources of Napoleon Bonaparte, at the commencement of the Peninsular war, and though, "as the map of Europe lay spread before him, and the crossed swords of Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland, told silently of defeated armies, and subjugated kingdoms, of continental Europe prostrate at his feet, and ready to do his bidding, he turned dissatisfied and unsated away; there was 'a precious isle set in the silver sea,' which, in his eyes, disfigured that map, for it disputed his title and defied his power:" it remained, as one of his own satellites has truly and nobly said, "the bulwark of civilization, and the last refuge of liberty."—*Histoire de la Guerre de la Péninsule*, par Foy. The means to destroy that hated isle—that "nation of shopkeepers," and "heretical cotton-spinners," occupied all his thoughts; and his appetite for conquest was unsated while England remained free, and mocked and curbed his power. Degenerate Spain and Portugal presented him the likely means of putting his scheme into execution.

In furtherance of the tremendous system of "this enemy of liberty and the human race," for the desolation and subjection of the world, every country was compelled in succession, against which he turned his arms, to furnish men for the conquest of others. If any one of his vassal states presumed to be dissatisfied, the population of another was driven in arms to oppress it; and if any portion of his compulsory army exhibited signs of discontent, it was marched to some wasteful point of service, and it was thus destroyed before it had become dangerous; and yet not till it had performed a certain quantity of needful work for its fell destroyer. At the conference with the abbé

le Pradt, at Warsaw, when the abbé hinted the difficulty of finding men sufficient for the fearful expedition on which he was engaged, the heartless reply of the immolator of his fellow-men on the shrine of his criminal and insatiable ambition was, "Je ferais la guerre avec du sang Polonnais."* The best of his troops consisted of the natives of that nation and the German states, and by their aid he had enslaved nearly the whole of Europe. By the same means he contemplated the subjugation of England, when he had reduced the Peninsula under his power. To further this, the highest object of his ambition, he ordered the building of ships of war to proceed on a large scale throughout the ports of France, Spain, and Holland. He hoped, before the end of the year, to have above 130 vessels, in conjunction with the Russian fleet, ready for sea, and which were to receive the annual augmentation of about thirty more. Three hundred thousand men were to be stationed in the neighbourhood of the principal harbours, from Copenhagen to Venice, ready to embark at a moment's notice on board the various squadrons. This gigantic design of crushing hated England, and subjecting it, as Mr. Canning said in the debate for co-operation with the Spanish patriots (the 18th of June, 1808), to "the tyrant of the earth—the common enemy of all mankind;" and as Mr. Sheridan, on the same occasion, said, with equal truth, "to insults and injuries too enormous to be described by language,"—was frustrated and brought to nought by the energy and talent of the duke of Wellington, and the valour and patriotism of his companions-in-arms.

With the population of those countries in his armies, and the vast line of coast which they present for the training and supply of seamen, he thought that he saw England, like the rest of Europe, submissive at his chariot-wheels. A concurrence of circumstances at length presented him the opportunity for endeavouring to put his projects into execution. This was the corrupt and feeble state of Spain, labouring under the evils of an imbecile government, a profligate court, and a crafty and sanguinary priesthood. The mean submission of the meek and terrified prince of the Brazils, Dom Pedro, presented him the like facility of possessing Portugal, and declaring in his curt and imperious style, that "the house of Braganza had ceased to reign."

* *Histoire de l'Ambassade de Varsovie.*

To present the reader with a connective view of Spanish affairs, it is necessary to take a retrospective glance of the current events for the last twelve or thirteen years preceding this period of Spanish history.

At the outbreak of the French revolution, Spain, fearful that "the divine rights of kings" were likely to be jeopardized by the diffusion of political knowledge, which was by that event shed over the understandings of men, and alarmed at Mirabeau's expression, that "the tricoloured cockade was about making the tour of Europe," entered into an armed coalition with the other monarchies of Europe, to resist the dissemination of democratic principles. In the prosecution of this regal crusade, the soil of republican France was trodden by Spanish armies, under Ricardo and Ventura; and even some fortresses, as Bellegarde, &c., in Roussillon, had been taken, and the battle of Cerite won. But the French republic reinforcing its armies on the frontier of Spain, the Spaniards were driven back, Figueras was taken, and the Basque provinces were overrun. The court of Madrid, apprehensive of the advance of the republicans on the capital, entered into the disgraceful treaty of Basle, on the 12th of July, 1795, by virtue of which, among other conditions, all in favour of her "faithful ally," the "great and indivisible republic of France," she was compelled to declare war against England, and receive a French fleet into the harbour of Cadiz.

When, by the battle of Jena, Prussia lay prostrate at the feet of the conqueror, the king, queen, and minister of Spain, were thrown into the greatest consternation; and from fear of the vengeance of the arbiter of the destinies of Europe, they professed that the proclamation, or as general Foy terms it, "the unseasonable rhodomontade," which had been issued on the eve of battle, and in which a mysterious allusion was made to some approaching crisis—"some terrible struggle at hand"—and calling on the Spanish people to arm—was apocryphal, and had been forged by the enemies of the government, and those who wished to produce a breach of amity between them and their "august ally." Gold and presents were also lavished, without stint, among the minions of Napoleon, in order to secure their good offices in propitiating his favour. As Napoleon had still to contend with the disjointed fragments of Prussia, and the unbroken strength of Russia, he deferred

his vengeance until it should harmonize with his policy. To lay the train for this fell purpose, he demanded a contingent of troops to aid him in enforcing his anti-commercial or non-international system against England. The Spanish minister, to conciliate his favour, and neutralize the effect of his foolish proclamation, sent him 16,000 of the best troops, under the command of the marquis Romana, and 6,000 under general O'Farril; who, by forced marches, were hurried to Holstein and Tuscany. He also extorted large contributions of specie, both from Spain and Portugal; from the former for the forgiveness of her perfidy, and from the latter for his permission of allowing her to become neutral in his contest with England, and for being the carrier of the Spanish dollars from the transatlantic dominions of Spain.

Affairs continued in this condition till Napoleon Buonaparte found matters ready to put his projects into execution. On the 29th of October, 1807, a secret treaty was entered into between the cabinets of Fontainebleau and Madrid, for the dismemberment of Portugal, and the military occupation of that country. By the terms of the convention, the country was to be divided into three portions; one, (namely, the province of Entre-Minho-e-Duero and Oporto, under the title of the kingdom of Lusitania,) was to be given to the queen of Etruria; the second, (the Alemtejo and Algarves,) to be erected into an independent principality for Godoy; and France was to hold the central provinces of Estremadura, Beira, and Tras-os-Montes, with Lisbon. The ultra-marine dominions were to be similarly divided; and "the royal wittol" of

Spain, Charles IV., was to assume in three years, the title of "protector of Lusitania and the principality of the Algarves," and that of "emperor of the two Americas."* France was to take military possession of the country with 28,000 men, and Spain with 27,000. An army of observation, consisting of 40,000 men, was to be assembled at Bayonne, to advance in case of need.

To give some shadow of excuse for his violence and usurpation, the French emperor ordered the cabinet of Lisbon to close the Portuguese ports against the English; to arrest all the English residents in the country; to confiscate all British property which might be in that country; to contribute a contingent force† to enable him to carry out the continental system; and to furnish a war-contribution of one hundred million of francs, as "a ransom for the state," to enable him "to carry out his plan for the amelioration of Portugal, and save it from the tyrant of the seas." These conditions were pusillanimously conceded to by the prince of the Brazils, Dom Pedro; and he, moreover, agreed to declare war against England as soon as the transatlantic possessions of Portugal could be placed in a state of defence against English aggression.

To put this design into execution, the French contingent force, under the appellation of "the army of Gironde," under the command of Junêt, advanced from the frontiers of France, through Spain, on Portugal; and had nearly reached the capital, when Pedro observing in the *Moniteur* the announcement, that "the house of Braganza had ceased to reign," fled on the

* For this effort of political wisdom, "the royal wittol" with "the foolscap crown on the fool's head," created his connubial helpmate—Manuel Godoy, "The prince of peace." That man (Godoy) was originally a subaltern in the Spanish body-guard; but possessing a pleasing exterior and being of large dimensions (a great subject of attraction with vicious women) he attracted the notice of the worthless and profligate wife of the aforesaid "royal wittol." His ignorance was so great, that he could scarcely read; but he possessed those qualifications which please frivolous and weak-minded women—he could sing, touch the lute, and possessed the faculty of chatting on light and trivial subjects. By the interest of the profligate and adulterous wife of the "royal wittol," he was created minister of the crown, in the place of the patriotic Florida Blanca, who was dismissed to make room for him; grand commander-in-chief of all the forces, naval and military, admiral of Spain and the Indies; and protector of commerce. Moreover, he had a body-guard assigned

him, and was dignified with the title of most "serene highness." He had espoused the niece of the king, and his daughter was destined in marriage to the heir apparent to the throne. He was a man of the most profligate and depraved morals. His vanity was equal to his ignorance: he wished to be thought of high and illustrious descent. To gratify his vanity in that respect, one of his minions undertook to prove that he was descended from Montezuma, the emperor of the Incas; and another maintained that he derived his origin from the kings of the Goths. Friend Munos, the "duke of Reanzanares," Madame Christina's *cher ami*, is still of lower origin, and has even less pretensions to knowledge.

† This force consisted of between 8,000 and 9,000 men, under the command of the marquis d'Alorna; and the last miserable remnant of it perished in the calamitous retreat from Moscow, under the appellation of La Légion Portugaise. The Spanish contingent force under O'Farril had perished in Germany.

27th of November, on board of the English fleet in the Tagus, and had scarcely got without the range of the batteries when he beheld the ensign of France* waving on the towers of Lisbon. On his entering the capital, Junôt immediately substituted the arms of the emperor for those of the house of Braganza, over the gates of the palace, and issued a proclamation, declaring that the emperor willed that Portugal should henceforth be governed in his imperial name. At the same time, the estates of the crown were confiscated, and heavy contributions levied on the inhabitants. All the fortresses throughout the country were taken possession of by the French troops and the Spanish contingent force. To the eternal disgrace of the Portuguese military reputation, Lisbon, which contained 300,000 inhabitants, and above 14,000 regular troops, abjectly submitted on the anniversary of the day on which Portugal had freed herself from the Spanish yoke, to a wretched force of 1,500 men, scarcely able to bear their muskets on their shoulders, the greater part of the invading army in their advance from the frontier having perished, whole companies and squadrons having been washed away in ravines by the swollen mountain torrents, or perished through the severe hardships sustained in their advance. On the arrival of the French troops under Junôt, "his eminence" cardinal Mendoga, the patriarch of Lisbon, commanded, in a proclamation, dated 8th December, 1808, "his dearly beloved sons in Jesus Christ" to obey "the man whom past ages could not have foreseen, the man of prodigies, the great emperor whom God had called to establish the happiness of nations." In the same memorable patriotic document, "all opposition to the divine mission of the magnanimous ally of Portugal" was denounced "a crime against God." Don José Maria de Mello, bishop of the Algarves, also issued a proclamation in the same spirit of patriotism, and of fidelity to his trust; and the other bishops, like veritable "fathers

in God," were responsive to the revered and sanctified voice of the holy and faithful patriarch, in their charges to their flocks and clergy. The magistracy in their edicts vied with one another in recommending, as a civil and religious duty, a kind reception of the French, and obedience to their magnanimous general.

As an excuse for co-operation in the fulfilment of the articles of the treaty of Fontainebleau, the army of observation on the frontiers of Spain was put into motion. Two formidable corps, amounting to 53,000 men, under Dupont and Monecy, advanced into the very heart of Spain, and 12,000, under Duhesme, penetrated through the Eastern Pyrenees, at La Jonquera, and established themselves at Barcelona. All the key fortresses of the frontiers, namely, St. Sebastian, Figueras, Pampeluna, Barcelona, and Mont Joui, were obtained possession of by cunning and artifice so mean and despicable, that war, in its dignity, disdains their practice; and all the principal passes across the Pyrenees being secured, the three main roads from France, by Perpignan, Navarre, and Biscay, to Madrid, were in possession of the French troops.

The devices by which the French obtained possession of those strong fortresses, and the stupidity of the Spaniards in acceding to those devices, are graphically described by general Foy, in his work entitled, *Histoire de la Guerre de la Péninsule*. His information is as follows:—Two battalions of the 2nd regiment of infantry, commanded by the general of brigade, Nicolas, halted at Figueras, under pretence of waiting there for a great personage, who, it was whispered, was the emperor himself. As there were no barracks in the town, the general demanded permission to quarter his troops in the strong citadel of San Fernando. The governor, who was a weak-minded man, acceded to the request, and the Spanish garrison, quitting that almost impregnable fortress, took up their quarters

* When the standard bearing the arms of Portugal was surmounted by the foreign colours, the feelings of those Portuguese who felt as they ought to feel, are touchingly commiserated by general Foy. Veteran warriors, who, after their lives had been spared by war, have dragged out existence long enough to see the banner under which their blood had been shed, insulted by hostile bands, can imagine the anguish which was produced in the bosoms of the faithful sons of Lusitania. Their hearts were overwhelmed with the bitterest afflictions at the

humiliating sight. The fallen standard was consecrated by every remembrance of religion and glory. According to the legendary belief of every true and faithful Portuguese, Jesus Christ, in his invariable partiality for the Portuguese, had given it on the eve of the battle of Ourique, 1139, to Alphonso Henriquez, the first king of Portugal, and had impressed on it the marks of his passion; and while confiding that sacred labarum to such valuable keeping, had said to the favoured hero, "Behold the sign under which thou shalt conquer."

in the town. Thus Figueras fell into the possession of new masters.

In the intermediate time, the remainder of the army of the eastern Pyrenees, under Duhesme, had arrived at Barcelona, and bivouacked in the immediate neighbourhood of the town. On the following morning they were under arms, on pretence of being inspected before they commenced their march for another destination. Lecchi, the commander of the Italian division, ranged his troops in order of battle, with their backs to the fortifications. All the idlers of Barcelona, and even the Spanish soldiers of the guard, hastened to the review. While they were listening to the music, and their attention was fixed on the minute vigilance with which the officers and the general himself examined every part of the dress of the battalions, two companies of the right turned short before the citadel gate, and covered the drawbridge before it could be raised. At the same time, Lecchi, advancing at full gallop, called out to the Spanish soldiers, that intending to pay a visit of compliment to their commandant, he had sent the two companies to the drawbridge as his body-guard. During this parley, Barcelona was in the possession of the French, a fortification of such ponderous strength, that Napoleon, in his subsequent communication to Gouvion St. Cyr, impressing the necessity of its preservation, said, that it would cost 80,000 men for its recapture, should it be lost. "Thus," adds general Foy, "without striking a blow, the largest city (Barcelona) of the Spanish monarchy fell into the power of the French—that city which, a century before, when all the rest of Spain had been subjugated, had contended singly against the armies of Louis XIV. In the means which were employed to obtain possession of it," adds the general, with the noble scorn and indignation of the soldier at the practice of fraud and duplicity, "there was a mixture of the craft of weakness and the arrogance of strength."

The rock of Mont Jouiç, on which was situated the fort, was too difficult of access to allow of the troops reaching it unperceived: Duhesme, therefore, went to count Ezpeleta de Veyre. "My troops occupy your citadel," said the Frenchman; "open instantly the gates of Mont Jouiç; for the emperor Napoleon has ordered me to put garrisons into your fortresses." The stupid Spaniard obeyed the mandate, and gave up

the keys of Mont Jouiç. Possession of Pampluna, Figueras, and St. Sebastian, were obtained by the same kind of stratagem.

The plot was now ripe for development. The feuds and animosities that had been artfully fomented between the imbecile Charles and his worthless son Ferdinand, had now risen to the pitch that the crafty Frenchman had designed. Ferdinand had solicited aid against his father, and a matrimonial alliance with the Napoleonic dynasty. Charles, his vicious consort, and the expectant or reversionary prince of Portugal, her paramour Godoy, had invoked the assistance of their "august ally" against the alleged treason and contemplated matricide by Ferdinand, whom they denounced as a rebel and an usurper. To the recriminating solicitations of Charles and Ferdinand, Napoleon, for some time, paid no attention; but finding his schemes now fully ripe for development, and the country sufficiently occupied by his armies, which succeeded each other as the waves of the ocean, and had already inundated the northern and middle provinces of Spain, he commenced his professed mediatory measures.

Charles, in the mean time, had abdicated his crown, on condition that Ferdinand interposed his influence and authority with the people, who had seized Godoy as a traitor to his country, and were about to inflict the summary vengeance of death upon him, to release his wife's paramour. Ferdinand was accordingly proclaimed king; and the people hailed his elevation, while they welcomed the abdication of Charles.

In consequence of these events, Murat advanced from his cantonments at Aranda de Duero, and entered Madrid, March 23rd, with a strong corps of infantry and cavalry; and when Ferdinand made his appearance on the following day, with his father's crown tottering on his head, the lieutenant of the French emperor refused to acknowledge his title. A supreme junta was therefore appointed, of which Don Antonio, Ferdinand's uncle, was constituted president; and Murat was elected a member.

Napoleon now saw the moment had arrived for the *denouement* of his plot, and the extreme folly of the parties who were to be his dupes gave an apparent sanction to his acts. Both Charles and Ferdinand had, with the most extravagant flattery, solicited him to extend to them his protection. Both parties had been indirectly encouraged to believe, that he was disposed to favour them

respectively. They were both, by stratagem and artifice, induced to visit him at Bayonne, having been lured to the meeting by the artful Frenchman's hollow profession of "cementing their friendship," and "finding him their best and firmest friend." Napoleon having prepared them for the exhibition, confronted Ferdinand (who, notwithstanding that Napoleon had offered him one of his nieces in marriage, and had proposed to carve out a kingdom for him in some part of Europe, manifested a determined resistance to the resignation of the crown of Spain) with his father, his adulterous mother, and her paramour, Godoy; when an infamous recrimination took place between the royal brood, that would be scarcely credited, were it not confirmed by indisputable authority. The queen, with the rancorous hatred of an adulterous mother, thus broke forth to her son—"Traitor, you have for years meditated the death of the king, your father; but, thanks to the vigilance, the zeal, and the loyalty of the Prince of Peace, you have not been able to effect your purpose—neither you, nor any of the infamous traitors who have co-operated with you for the accomplishment of your designs. I tell you to your face, that you are my son, but not the son of the king! and yet, without having any other right to the crown than that of your mother, you have sought to tear it from us by force. But I agree and demand, that the emperor Napoleon shall be umpire between us;—Napoleon, to whom we cede and transfer our rights, to the exclusion of our family. I call on him to punish you and your associates as so many traitors, and abandon to him the whole Spanish nation." The parallel of this disgusting scene—this outrage on human nature—is not to be found in the pages of history: the case of Savage, the author of *The Bastard*, whose profligate mother, the countess of Macclesfield, who gloried in proclaiming her infamy, for the base purpose of disinherit her talented but unfortunate son, bears but a faint approach to it.

After this memorable interview, the weak-minded and despicably-souled old king ceded all his rights to the crown of Spain "to the great man who has already shown himself my beloved friend;" and Ferdinand, who had no other alternative but to follow the same course, or to meet death (Napoleon having told him in express terms—"There is no alternative, prince, between submission

and death"), declared his renunciation of all right of succession in favour, as he phrases it in the form of his abdication, of "the hero who was destined by providence to save Europe and support thrones." As a recompense for their mean and dastardly conduct, the imbecile father was pensioned and placed with his adulterous wife and her paramour in the palace of Compeigne, and the son sent a prisoner to the castle of Valencay.

Ferdinand, to propitiate Murat's favour, had, previous to this drama, delivered to him the sword of the French king, Frances, which had been surrendered at the battle of Pavia, and which the Spaniards had preserved with the highest veneration, fondly regarding it as a proud trophy of their former greatness. To give effect to its transfer, its delivery was accompanied with great pomp and pageantry.

The artful and insidious Napoleon having thus extinguished the Bourbon dynasty of Spain, and laid his train of designs for the subjugation of the Peninsula, convened, June 13th, at Bayonne, an assembly of notables, which was composed of the grantees and chief ecclesiastics of the state, "to devise," as he alleged, "a plan under him as protector of Spain, for the security of the happiness, and the regeneration of the country, and to render the Spaniards a great, glorious, and happy nation." Of the one hundred and fifty members summoned, ninety-one obeyed the call, and when Napoleon proposed his brother Joseph as their king, they all, with the most servile acquiescence, swore fealty and homage to him, declaring with abject and fulsome adulation that they submitted "to branches of a family destined by an overruling providence to reign over mankind;" and some of them accepted places of trust and confidence about his court and person.

Neither was this the whole of Spanish perfidy to Spain; in the course of the Peninsular war, the peasantry which had been armed at the expense of England, were also found fighting in the ranks of the enemy; and the French convoys were often under the care and guidance of Spanish commissaries and conductors. Joseph Buonaparte's ministry consisted of Spaniards, and he had a large body of Spanish troops in his service.

The intrusive king set out on his journey, to take possession of the vacated throne of the Bourbon dynasty of Spain, accompanied

by 10,000 Italian mercenaries,* and his faithful adherents, the members of "the assembly of notables." He entered the capital, May 20th, and was proclaimed "king of Spain and the Indies" on the 24th of the same month; the supreme junto, the council of Castile, the municipality of Madrid, and cardinal Bourbon, primate of Spain, and first cousin of Charles, having sent in their adhesions; the last-mentioned person having written a letter to Napoleon Buonaparte, congratulating him on the event.

While the farce of the digestment of the new constitution was enacting at Bayonne, which was "to secure the happiness of Spain, and make her a great and glorious nation," under "the protection of the magnanimous Napoleon," an event happened at Madrid which seemed likely to disconcert all the craft and duplicity of the French emperor.

Murat, in obedience to the commands of his master, to send him all the branches of the Bourbon family, sent off the various cargoes of the royal brood "duly packed and ticketed;" but in his attempt to transmit the queen of Etruria (the daughter of Charles,) and her son, the infante, the population of Madrid surrounding the carriage to prevent their departure, a riot ensued, May 2nd, and in the sanguinary conflict which took place, and which Murat continued while a pretext for resistance could be found, above 700 of the French, and nearly the same number of the Spanish population, were slain. Numbers of peasantry, who had flocked from the surrounding country to inquire about the fate of their friends in the city, were shot and sabred immediately that they approached the French position; and to deter the Spaniards from a repetition of resistance, the streets of Madrid were brilliantly illuminated throughout the night, to present to the inhabitants the ghastly exhibition of their dead and dying friends and relatives; nor were the bodies permitted to be removed till the evening of the second day from the occurrence of the bloody tragedy. A military commission was immediately appointed for the trial of the prisoners, and a number of them were shot, in batches of forty, tied two and two together, near the

church of Señora de la Solidad, and the promenade of the Prado.

The following extract from the *Memoirs of a Voltigeur in the French Service*, furnishes some interesting information on this subject:—"It is with grief I speak it, but truth compels me to acknowledge, that every conceivable atrocity marked the conduct of the French soldiery on this dreadful occasion. The troops took deadly vengeance, sparing neither age nor sex; the child and the adult, the male and the female, were cut down and pierced alike by the edge of the sabre or the point of the bayonet. Even the penitent at the altar found no protection from the soldiers' mad vengeance; and the unhappy individuals confined by sickness to the wards of the hospitals, were torn from their beds and inhumanly lacerated. One of our grenadiers encountering a young woman holding an infant in one hand, and brandishing a poniard in the other, stunned the mother with a blow of the butt-end of his musket, and impaled the child on the bayonet. To consummate the horrors of the dreadful scene which took place on this occasion, as soon as the insurrection was quelled, the matron and the virgin were the victims of the most brutal and unbridled lust."

The example which had been set by the capital was electric. The exalted display of courage and self-sacrifice of the Madrilenos, "the first among the patriotic and martyred brave who set the stern example of defying the oppressor of their country," was too inciting, and carried too home an appeal to every man's heart and soul, not to awaken every feeling that animates the heart. The pride and patriotism of the Spanish nation had been outraged and insulted. From a sense of the humiliation of their nation, the thirst for vengeance burst at once on their imagination. One universal cry for arms was heard throughout the land, and at the same moment a general insurrection took place; the first outbreak was at Santander. In Valentia, Rodrigo, Cadiz, Seville, Carthage, Valladolid, Granada, Badajoz, and many other cities, the French, and all Spaniards, the supposed partisans of Godoy and Napoleon, were massacred. Provincial and local juntas were constituted

* Many of the officers of the Italian regiments, particularly the Neapolitans, who were now engaged in assisting in the subjugation of Spain, were descended from Spanish families, whose founders had served and found fortune in the Spanish armies that had subdued Italy, under Gonsalvo de Cordova and other

for the conduct of public affairs, and the levying of money and troops. Deputies were sent from the Asturias to the cabinet of London, to solicit arms, clothing, money, and the other *matériel* of warfare.

When the intelligence of the Spanish insurrection reached Portugal, insurrectionary movements immediately took place in that country, to resist French oppression, and to endeavour to liberate the country from their galling tyranny. Melgaço led the way; the city of Oporto followed; and the example was imitated by almost every town throughout the provinces of Duero-e-Minho and Tras-os-Montes. At Coimbra, a considerable city midway between Oporto and Lisbon, a junta was established; and, in imitation of the Spaniards, deputies were sent to England to solicit money, arms, ammunition, and the other warlike necessities.

A treaty of alliance was concluded by the English government with both the Spanish and Portuguese deputies; and British agents were sent to both countries for the purpose of ascertaining their resources, and organizing their military levies. The Spanish prisoners were equipped with arms and clothes, and shipped for the purpose of being transported to their own country;* as were also those in the service of Napoleon in Holstein,† under the command of the marquis of Romana. Specie, arms, money, and all the necessary *matériel* of

warfare, were sent in profusion, almost without stint or limit, to Corunna, Santander, Cadiz, Gibraltar, Malaga, and other places. "They were all," says Napier, "incessantly demanded, and as profusely granted." Within twelve months from the commencement of the war, England had sent to the Spanish armies (besides £2,000,000 sterling, 150 pieces of field artillery, 420,000 rounds of ammunition, 200,000 muskets, 61,000 swords, 75,000 pikes, 23,000,000 ball cartridges, 6,000,000 leaden balls, 15,000 barrels of gunpowder, 92,000 suits of clothing, 356,000 sets of accoutrements and pouches, 310,000 pair of shoes, 37,000 pair of boots, 40,000 tents, 250,000 yards of cloth, 10,000 sets of camp-equipage, 118,000 yards of linen, 50,000 great coats, 50,000 canteens, 54,000 havresacks, with a variety of other stores, far too numerous to be recapitulated." And all this profusion was being made to the worthless government of Spain, while the British army was left neglected and without any funds. To men so imbecile was the government of England then entrusted.‡ The enormous demands of aid and supplies made by the Spanish juntas were scarcely credible. A rivalry often subsisted between the provincial juntas who should make the highest demand on the British government. And there was not much cause for surprise; Mr. Canning having instructed the accredited diplomatists, Stuart, Duff, and the

* These men, forgetful of the obligations and gratitude due to the English nation for its bounty and generosity, mutinied on the passage, and seizing the transports, carried them into different ports of the Peninsula, and disembarking, proceeded to their homes. This was the first display of Spanish ingratitude for British generosity.

† The late poet-laureate, Southey, in his classically written, but not very scientific and trustworthy *History of the Peninsular War*, introduces to the notice of his readers the following singular and interesting anecdote:—"The author of *The Plain Englishman* (vol. i. p. 294), tells us on the authority of sir Richard Keats, admiral of the English fleet in the Baltic, that when the Spanish troops under the command of the marquis Romana, in the service of Napoleon in Holstein, were about being embarked on board of English vessels, for the purpose of being transported to Spain, in order to co-operate with the Spanish patriot armies, it not being possible to take the fine, black, long-tailed Andalusian horses of the two regiments of cavalry, and the marquis being fond of horses, and knowing that every man was (like the German dragoons, between whom and their horses, there subsists an attachment more like that which takes place between human kindred than between man and beast) attached to the beast that had carried him from his native land to the shores of the Baltic, was not able to order that they should, according to the usual practice of warfare,

be shot, to prevent them falling into the hands of the French, ordered that they should be turned loose on the beach. As they moved off, they passed some of the country horses and mares which were feeding at a little distance; but turning back again they attacked the native horses. These resenting the aggression, a general conflict ensued, in which the Spanish horses, retaining their regimental discipline, charged in squadrons of ten or twenty together. The opposite combatants soon adopted the same tactics. Then both sides closely engaged, each party striking with their fore-feet, and biting and tearing one another with the most ferocious rage, trampled over those which were beaten down, till the shore, in the course of a quarter of an hour, was strewn with the dead and disabled. Part of them had been set free on a rising ground at some distance, but they no sooner heard the roar of the battle, than they came thundering down over the intermediate hedges, and catching the contagious madness, plunged into the fight with equal fury. 'Sublime as the scene was,' as Southey entitles it, it was too terrible to be long contemplated; and the marquis giving way to his merciful disposition, gave orders for shooting the surviving combatants; but it was found impossible to put the order into execution; and after the last boats had quitted the beach, the few horses that remained alive, were seen still engaged in the dreadful work of mutual destruction."

‡ Jones's *Account of the War in the Peninsula*.

other agents, to apprise the Spanish authorities, that no conditions were required as to the application of the pecuniary assistance afforded by the English government, and that the amount of money required to be granted was of no signification. In pursuance of these unlimited conditions, the central junta, in an application to Mr. Stuart, the plenipotentiary to the Spanish government, peremptorily demanded the following supplies to be furnished "without delay," namely: 10,000,000 of dollars, 500,000 yards of cloth, 4,000,000 yards of linen, 300,000 pair of shoes, 30,000 pair of boots, 12,000,000 of cartridges, 200,000 muskets, 12,000 pair of pistols, 50,000 swords, 100,000 arobas of flour, besides a large quantity of salt meat and fish. The gratitude displayed in return for the profuse grants of the English government may be estimated from a postscript to one of the duke of Wellington's letters to his brother the marquis of Wellesley:—"Just to show you the kind of people the Spaniards are to deal with, I mention that I cannot station even a corporal's party, in the Sierra de Gata, or the Sierra de Francia, without giving the corporal money for rations for the horses and men of his party, while the French have everything in the same district for nothing."* We shall also see in the course of the following pages their heartless and cruel conduct to the wounded at Talavera, as well as at other places in the course of the Peninsular war, and their treachery at the storming of Badajoz.

Of this improvidence on the part of the English government, Portugal took advantage, as well as the various juntas of Spain. Intending to convert the grants to their own private advantage, they demanded considerably more of every article than they had any occasion for, or could possibly find means of employing. The bishop of Oporto demanded accoutrements, arms, and ammunition for 40,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry, with an immense quantity of ammunition, clothing, &c., though he knew that not one-tenth of his demand could be made use of. "The arms were," says the author of the *History of the War in the Peninsula*, "generally left in their cases to rot, or to fall into the hands of the enemy;† the clothing seldom reached the soldier's back; and the

money, in all instances, misapplied, was in some embezzled by the authorities, into whose hands it fell, in others employed to create disunion, and to forward the private views of the juntas, at the expense of the public welfare. It is a curious fact, that from the beginning to the end of the war, an English musket was rarely to be seen in the hands of a Spanish soldier.

While these transactions were in progress of operation, hostilities broke out between the French forces in Spain and Portugal, and the natives of those countries. The Spaniards were defeated during the months of June, July, and August, 1808, at Logroño, Torquemada, Segovia, Cabezon, Soucillo, Huesca, Mallen, Kalou, Epila, Arbos, Moncada, St. Pol, Cabrillas, Melinos del Rey, Cuença, Quarte, St. Felipe, the passage of the Kucar, near Almanza, at Alcolea, and at Medina del Rio Seco, the loss of which last mentioned battle was the cause of Madrid opening its gates to the intruder. In the battles of Cabezon, Torquemada, and Cuença, of Huesca and Epila, under Palafox, and that of Medina del Rio Seco, under Cuesta and Blake, they sustained great loss, both in men and artillery. Amidst the un pitying and unsparing severity with which the enemy used the sword upon the fleeing and defenceless Spaniards, the French cavalry shone in the rank of slaughter. After the battles of Logroño and Tudela, the French generals, Verdier and Lefebre Desnouettes, put all the leaders of the Spaniards to death. During the same period the patriots were successful at the pass of Bruch; repulsed the French twice from Geroux, and twice from Valencia and Saragossa, and obtained the ignominious surrender of Dupont's army at Baylen. The Portuguese, during the same period, were beaten at Castro d'Airo, Villa Viciosa, Beja, Leyria, Montemor, Alobaça, Evora, Guarda, and Attalaya; but obtained some partial success at Oporto, Coimbra, Faro, and Figueira da Foz.

The two sieges of Saragossa, or as it is sometimes written Zaragossa, have been embellished with many romantic and exaggerated legends of Spanish heroism, both male and female, by the late poet laureate Southey, and credulously adopted by those writers who are so carried away with the

* *Wellington's Despatches.*

† After the defeat of the Spanish army at Rio Seco, under Cuesta and Blake, many thousand English muskets, and an immense quantity of stores and

ammunition, of clothing and provisions, all of which had been supplied by the English government, were captured at Benevente and Mayorja. The same loss happened on several other occasions.

love of the marvellous and impossible as to disqualify them for the examination of the truth. Neither the men nor the women did more than is generally done when brought to the push. Mr. Southey's extravagant laudation of Spanish gallantry and Spanish endurance were formed on the traditions of chivalry and romance with which the works of fiction of that nation abound, and in which he was very conversant. Had he had the opportunity of being personally acquainted with the defeats and disasters, the panics and flights, to which the rabble armies of the patriots, under their imbecile and arrogant leaders, were constantly subject, he would have been more circumspect and sparing in his eulogiums. The late Mr. Southey was not, however, singular in his exaggerations of Spanish heroism and other patriotic virtues; many other persons, among whom the political agents sent to that country, contributed to mislead the English public on the subject. Those gentlemen, in their reports, over-rated the power and capacity of the patriots, and mistook popular feeling for physical power and warlike capability.

On the termination of the first siege of Saragossa, notwithstanding the destitution to which the inhabitants were reduced, heavy contributions were levied on the woe-struck city. Junôt, among his other spoiliations, demanded for his own use a superb service of china, and fittings-up for a tennis-court. Lannes rifled the church of Our Lady of the Pillar, of jewels to the amount of nearly half a million of francs. Many of the monks were enclosed in sacks, and thrown into the Ebro. Palafox's chaplains, Gontiago Sao and Baulio Boggiero, met with the same fate, having been first bayoneted on the banks of that river.

Honourable as the sieges of Saragossa, as also that of Gerona, were to the Spaniards, the gallant defence of Mesolonghi, in the war of Greek independence, may vie with any similar event recorded in ancient or modern history, for the heroism displayed by all of every age and sex, from the opening of the siege to its dismal close.

The partial successes which the Spanish and Portuguese patriots had obtained, gave free scope for the display of the inordinate pride and arrogance, the absurd confidence and presumption of the first mentioned people, and for the vapouring and extravagant boastings of the second. By the surrender of the French army, under the timid and incompetent

Dupont, to Castanos and Reding, (the errors of the former of whom ought to have placed him and his army prisoners in the hands of the French, if their leader had possessed the ability of availing himself of them), all the innate pride and presumption of the nation burst forth, and was inflated to the highest degree; "the glory of past ages seemed to be renewed; every man conceived himself to be a second Cid, and perceived in the surrender of Dupont not only the deliverance of Spain, but the immediate conquest of France. 'We are obliged to our good friends the English,' was a common phrase among them when conversing with the officers of Sir John Moore's army; 'we thank them for their good will, and we shall escort them through France to Calais; the journey will be pleasanter than a long voyage; we shall not give them the trouble of fighting the French, but will be pleased at having them spectators of our victories.'""*

The brains of their ignorant and arrogant leaders teemed with the most extravagant projects; instead of devising means to resist the enemy, they employed themselves in composing manifestoes and decrees in inflated and bombastic language, or in making lofty and empty boasts. They also invoked the aid of religion and superstition to give greater nerve and spirit to their hearts. According to their version of affairs, the deity had signified that the cause of the Spaniards was his own. The priests reported, that the church of Our Lady of Guadalupe was struck by lightning on the very day on which Ferdinand VII. entered Bayonne. The tapers which were burning round the sacred image were extinguished, but the mother of God remained untouched. In the cavern of Covadenga, in the Asturias, so famous for having been the asylum of Pelago and his brave followers, attentive and devout devotees saw large drops of sweat trickle down the face of Our Lady of Battles. At Compostella, a clinking of arms was heard during the night, on the tomb of St. James, announcing that the war was begun, and that the glorious nation of Spain would again lead her armies to victory.

This humility of opinion of themselves was not confined to the Spaniards; their peninsular neighbours, the Portuguese, had formed a like estimate of their valorous propensities. When the British army approached the lines of Torres Vedras, that intriguing member of the regency, Souza,

* Napier's *History of the War in the Peninsula*.

proposed that the Portuguese troops should remain outside the lines, while the English took shelter within their protection. He was, no doubt, fearful that the French would escape the valorous clutches of his countrymen.

In Portugal, also, the junta, instead of teaching the people to practise the drill, to erect batteries, and to throw up trenches, employed them in puerile rejoicings, beating drums, ringing bells, and firing feu-de-joies. The Spaniards, in conformity with their accurate notions of military science, appointed their tutelar saint, Narcissus, generalissimo of all their forces; and the Portuguese, in the same spirit of wisdom and patriotism, conferred the like responsible and arduous employment on their unsubstantial friend, Don Antonio. Results proved how capable their saintships and their confiding votaries were to compete with their active and enterprising adversaries, who invoked no other assistance than common sense and common courage.

Such in the course of three short months had been the defeats and disasters, the panics and flights, to which the armies of the Spanish patriots were subject, in their unequal contests with the veteran and disciplined armies of France; and they experienced the same disasters and defeats, and were subject to the same panics and flights, during the whole six years of their contest for national independence. But it is impossible not to admire the untiring patriotism and unsubduable spirit of the people in their fearful struggle with the oppressors of their country. Though army after army had been routed and scattered as chaff before the wind, they returned again to the conflict with their

* Historians have talked largely and loosely about the former military superiority of the Spaniards; but they have omitted to state, that the causes of that superiority were:—1st, That the Spaniards were the first nation who made use of artillery in the field of battle; and 2nd, That the introduction of that powerful and main arm of military superiority, infantry, owes its origin to them. Their success at Pavia, Rocroi, and in the Low Countries, was entirely attributable to these causes. Readers should be cautious in giving implicit credence to facts taken from Spanish and Portuguese writers, who often wrote under fear, and subject to inquisitorial authority.

† The loss of the Flemish, and also the Italian provinces, was a blessing to Spain, instead of an injury, as it is stated by some authors; it freed her from wars and much useless national expenditure. And their loss was not only beneficial to Spain but to the whole of Europe. For while Spain, and other countries, which had no local proximity with the Netherlands, had any portion of them as their tributary, that part of Europe was the battle-field of dis-

powerful foe, undismayed and undisheartened. They were the victims of the folly and imbecility (often the treachery) of their leaders; but they still made the most heroic exertions for their deliverance from their moral and political degradation. History told them, that the military feeling of their ancestors was once their pride and boast,—that “Spain,” according to their historical annals, “had been the most warlike nation in Europe* till the battle of Rocroi, and the four-score years of warfare in the Netherlands,† when they unfortunately lost their provinces.” Though these glorious scenes had passed away, and might be considered the grave of Spanish military renown, pride, patriotism, and all those feelings that make life acceptable and dignify human nature, they still inclined them to hope that the national spirit might be resuscitated, and their country freed from the bondage of the foe, and restored to its former dignity and political importance. But the great and primary constituents of the military character‡ having been deteriorated and debased by the despotism and degradation, the benumbing and blighting influences of kingcraft and priestcraft, for a succession of ages; and the ignorant and arrogant leaders of the nation, both civil and military, not possessing sufficient talent, energy, and patriotism to awaken and elicit the requisite spirit, all the exertions and sacrifices of the patriots were fruitless and abortive.

During the contests above described, between the Spanish and Portuguese population and their fierce and haughty foes, all the terrors and dreadful visitations of war were practised by both sides, and on a

putants, or as Sterne makes his hero term it, “the great prize-fighting stage of Europe,” for thirty centuries, and had occasioned many unnecessary and ravaging wars during that long succession of ages.

‡ The Spaniard naturally possesses all the qualifications necessary for the formation of the soldier: he is disposed to subordination, sober, patient, abstemious. General Foy, in his *History of the Peninsular War*, says that the Spanish soldier is capable of living on a pilchard and a bit of bread rubbed with garlic. If the readers of the general's work should be disposed to believe this statement in its literal sense, they will labour under a serious error. The duke of Wellington, with his usual discrimination, and strict regard for truth and fact, will be found a safer authority. “It is a mistaken popular notion,” says the British authority, “that the Spanish, or any other troops, can subsist on a smaller quantity, or a coarser kind of food, than the British. I have had the opportunity of knowing, that the Spanish are more clamorous for it, and are more exhausted, if they did not receive it regularly, than the English are.”

scale of frightful magnitude. The most horrible excesses were perpetrated, and the most rancorous spirit of hatred and revenge subsisted between both parties. On each side human nature was degraded by the commission of the most fiendish barbarities and torments that the ingenuity and malice of man could devise. By the French, conflagration, murder, rape, pillage, and even desecration of churches, and every kind of atrocity and wanton outrage which the most demoniac wickedness could conceive, were practised. As a lively writer, who was an eye-witness of what he relates, has well expressed himself: "the progress and retreats of the French armies in the Peninsula were marked by acts more suited to the ruthless and savage deeds of a horde of barbarians—to the followers of an Attila, a Timour Bec, or a Ghenghis Khan—than to those of a European military force; they left behind them scenes of horror unparalleled in the annals of war, but which are the inevitable results of the revengeful passions inspired in a licentious soldiery, who are the instruments of evil and insatiable ambition. Many of their deeds are too revolting to human nature, and too indecent, to relate."

The French often burnt the towns and villages through which they passed, plundered the inhabitants, and not unfrequently massacred them, or hung them on the trees by the road-side. Even the generals, except Dorsenne, Monçon, Macdonald, Mar-mont, Brune, Mortier, Travôt, Brennier, Charlôt, and a few others, were rapacious and cruel, and sanctioned the excesses of the troops. Besides their rapacity in their public capacity, they forced the chief people in the towns and cities to keep open table for them. Junôt, at Lisbon, obliged baron Quintilla to supply his table with forty covers daily; and Loisson visited signor Bandero in the same fearful manner. Many French generals (among whom Vandamme and Davoust shone conspicuous) acted even more extravagantly in Germany, and the other conquered countries. The lower and more abject the origin of the man had been, the more sumptuously and ostentatiously he required to be treated; and the more fearful and exorbitant were his exactions. What a beautiful contrast do the following proclamations of the duke of Wellington and the duke of York form to the cruelties and licentious proceedings of the French generals and their troops, among whom, not to mention

the atrocious massacres, violations, conflagrations, and devastations, "pillage and plunder were systematically pursued by all grades, from the commander-in-chief to the common soldier."

We subjoin a few extracts from the proclamation of the duke of Wellington to the French people, when the British army was in France, dated at his head-quarters, Vera, November 13th, 1813:—That he would "prevent the evils that usually attend the advance of a hostile army, and which your government allowed to be committed by its armies in Spain." At the same time, to protect the French population against the licentiousness of the Spanish troops, he issued another proclamation, authorizing the people of the districts which the British army had overrun, to arm themselves for the preservation of order, and the protection of their lives and property, under the direction of the mayors and civil authorities of the towns and villages; and he moreover invited them to arrest all plunderers and evil-doers, and to convey them to British head-quarters, with proof of the crimes committed, promising to punish the culprits, and pay for all loss and damage. The justice of his proceedings, and the good discipline he enforced, not only among the Spanish troops, but throughout the allied army, so won the esteem and confidence of the French population, that the peasantry, to save their property from the pillage of the French soldiery, and the exactions and forced contributions of the French generals, passed into the British lines, and put themselves, their carts, implements of husbandry, and other property, under the protection of the British general. Also by his rigid probity in paying for all the supplies furnished to the British army, a preference was given by the French dealers in the supply of the British troops to those of their own country; but the consequence was that the value of commodities was greatly enhanced, the daily cost of the rations of each man having been at one period above six shillings British specie.

The order of the duke of York issued to the army under his command, in reply to the decree of the National Convention of France, issued in April, 1794, directing that no quarter should be given to the British troops, was equally honourable to the British character:—"Remember, soldiers, that mercy to the vanquished is the brightest gem in the character of the soldier."

The following observation of general Foy,

when speaking of the mode in which England carries on war, is as highly complimentary to our country, as it is honourable to the candour of that high-minded man, and his regard for truth:—"Plunder and exaction in foreign countries are regarded with generous aversion by men, who, even in war, show every respect to institutions and private property." In pursuance of this principle, the general proceeds to remark, that "10,000 English, with money in their hands, would die of hunger where 20,000 French would live for nothing."

The *lex talionis*, or law of retaliation, was adopted by the Spanish and Portuguese patriots, in its most extensive and unrelenting manner; but it must be admitted, that it was not to be expected, that a wild peasantry, and an oppressed and insulted people, who beheld their dwellings burnt, their property plundered, their fields laid waste and devastated, and their wives and daughters violated, and often massacred, before their very eyes, could restrain their vengeance and moderate their violence; such an expectation is in opposition to nature, and in contradiction of those feelings that were given us for the wisest and most obvious purposes: the unbridled perpetrations of lust, rapine, and cruelty, by an insolent foe, invoke and put into operation all the energy of patriotic hatred, and all the vengeance of outraged morality. Assassinations and cruelties were, therefore, adopted in the spirit of the wildest and severest retaliation. The barbarities practised against the stragglers and sick of the French armies, were horrible; they were the victims of either shocking lingering deaths, or frightful mutilations. As the author of *The Recollections in the Peninsula*, says, in one of his works, *The Tales of the Wars of our Time* (and his narrative is not the suggestions of fancy, but a true and faithful portrait)—"Blows and exactions, pillage and rapine, insults and cruelties, filled the bosoms of the Spaniards with deadly and vindictive hatred, which found a thousand secret and silent modes of exhibiting its awful power. While the veteran conquerors of Italy, Egypt, and Germany, marched into the battle-fields of Spain with a laughing insolence, which their easy and cheap-bought victories and trifling losses, had made natural to them, their ranks were daily thinned and wasted by the stiletto or the dose of poison, by the massacre of the sick and stragglers, by the overpower-

ing of small detachments, by the waylaying of small convoys, by the poisoning of wells and food, and by all the other means that revenge and insulted national honour could devise." Of the sickening and abhorrent atrocities put into execution in furtherance of this purpose, the following transactions afford but a faint and an imperfect conception.

A party of French soldiers who had been captured in Navarre, were buried in the ground up to their chins, and the heads of the leaders having been struck off, were bowled by the guerillas against those of the living; and that monstrous diversion was persisted in for some time, and with the most fiend-like delight. The prisoners were sometimes literally hacked to pieces; many were roasted alive; and often the ligaments of their arms and legs were separated, the limbs being left pendant to the body, to increase the pain and torture of the sufferer. In short, all the innate cruelty of the Spanish character was called into action to devise new modes of torture and punishment. All the atrocity and cruelty practiced on the Peruvians and other fenceless tribes of the South Americans by Pizzaro and the other Spanish marauders, seemed to be revived, and to assume new vigour and activity in the hands of the descendants of the savage and remorseless conquerors of the New World.

Brigadier-general René, on his return from Portugal, to which country he had been on civil affairs, being taken prisoner, was plunged alive into a cauldron of burning oil. Many officers, among whom were captain Cagnier and commissary Vaugier, were put between planks, and sawn to pieces. Several of the followers of the Empecinado having been nailed to the trees in the passes of the Guadarama mountains, by the French, and left there to expire slowly by thirst and hunger; before a week elapsed from the display of that act of barbarous cruelty, a like number of French prisoners were affixed to the same trees by the guerillas. And in this spirit a war of extermination was carried on by both parties with the most relentless fury. The 14,000 prisoners who surrendered at Baylen, were either massacred or sent to the desert island of Cabrera, in the Mediterranean, where, from the severest privations and the most cruel treatment, but few of them were found alive at the termination of the war. The cruelty inherent in the Spanish character at last reached to so high a pitch,

that the slaughter of prisoners, and of the sick in the hospitals that happened by the fortune of war to fall into their hands, was lightly and unfeelingly termed *asegurar*, that is, *make sure of them*. Indeed, hatred and vengeance had become so inveterate and predominant against the French, that

they were blended, not only in all acts and ideas of the Spanish population, but were even introduced into their national songs and ballads. Neither were the Portuguese less revengeful than their neighbours. Both nations rivalled each other in the fierce and vengeful passions.

THE FIRST PORTUGUESE* CAMPAIGN.

A.D. 1808.

THE deputies from the Portuguese juntas having solicited the aid of a British force to enable them to expel "Gaul's locust host" that infested the Peninsula, 9,000 men, who had been assembled at Cork for the destination of South America, sailed the 12th of July, 1808, under the command of lieutenant-general sir Arthur Wellesley (who had been so gazetted on the 25th of April), for the coast of Portugal. The landing was appointed to take place at Figueras, a little fort near the mouth of the Mondego; but as the line of coast of that country is extremely rocky, and exposed to the full sweep of the Atlantic, the whole of the troops, artillery, stores, &c., was not landed till the 5th of August, the weather having not been propitious for the purpose, as the slightest breeze from the seaboard occasions a surf to break along the coast, which ren-

ders all approach to it dangerous at the time. On the evening of the disembarkation of the last of the forces, the expedition under major-general Spencer hove in sight, which had been dispatched to co-operate with the Spaniards in the south of Spain, and when at St. Mary's, near Cadiz, had been sent for by sir Arthur.

When the whole of the forces had effected a junction, the advanced guard moved from its ground on the Mondego, on the 9th, and was followed on the following day by the main body. The army advanced by the coast-road to Leyria, reached Alcobaca on the 14th, Caidos and Obidos on the 15th, at which last-mentioned place an affair of advanced posts took place between the hostile armies, in which, on account of the precipitancy of the pursuit of the French piquets, by the riflemen of the 95th, the

* The configuration which Portugal presents in geographical maps, and as it is described in the various books on the science, give a very erroneous and imperfect idea of that country, as it has been formed by the hand of Nature. To one who casts his eye on the map of the Peninsula, it appears as if he had only to step over the boundary line, and he immediately transfers himself from one country to another. But a personal knowledge of that locality would soon convince him that he had formed a very erroneous conception of the geographical attributes which constitute the boundaries of Spain and Portugal. This may appear from the following sketch of its peculiarities:—The frontier of Portugal is very rugged; and this is occasioned by the country being intersected by several ridges of mountains, throwing off numerous offsets, which cover the face of a great part of the country. The parent-ridges are continuations of the chains which cross Spain from east to west, and which have a general inclination north-east to south-west. Another cause of the frontier ruggedness of Portugal is, that its physical geography varies from that which is peculiar to other maritime countries. In all other maritime positions, as rivers ap-

proach their mouths, the mountains dip and the valleys widen; but such is not the case in Portugal. There the mountains increase in height, and the valleys become narrower. The provinces of *Tras-os-Montes* and *Entre-Douro-e-Minho*, are more mountainous than the bordering provinces of Spanish Galicia and Leon. This peculiarity is occasioned by physical causes, dependent on the antagonist or counteractive powers of land and water; nature having, in her provident provision, formed the coast bold and rocky to resist the weight of the volume of the waters of the Atlantic, which is thrown upon them with great force and violence. The boundary line, besides ranges of mountains, consists of rivers. The Minho forms the boundary line from Melgaco to its mouth. The other river boundaries are formed by the Turones, the Erjas, the Lener, the Guadiana, and the Chanza; the banks of those rivers are very steep and rugged. All the great rivers of Portugal as the Minho, the Douro, the Tagus, and the Guadiana, have their rise in Spain, and belong to Portugal, only in their lower basins. The Mondego is the only river that has its source and whole course in Portugal.

latter lost some prisoners. At Leyria, the British army had been joined by 5,000 Portuguese, under Freire; but that general refused to advance, and appropriated to his own use the stores of provisions that had been collected in that city by the bishop of Oporto for the British. The only effect of sir Arthur's appeal to his honour and imputation against his patriotism and spirit, was the placing of 1,400 infantry and 250 cavalry under the orders of the British general. "It was now," to adopt the vivid and elegant language of the tasteful author of *The Military Memoirs of Wellington*, "on the wide theatre of fierce and sanguinary warfare that the careless whistle and the cheerful laughter of the English soldier was first heard. He, stranger alike to the violent and vindictive feelings which animated the invader and the inhabitant, marched gaily forward, looking for a combat as for some brave pastime; and panting to prove at home that the favoured jacket of blue covered not bolder hearts than those that beat proudly under his own crimson uniform;" and in the words of another eminent historian of English prowess, from this same source was to flow, "that mighty stream of battle, guided by the genius of Wellington, bearing the glory of England in its course, which burst the barriers of the Pyrenees, and, while it left deep traces of its fury on the soil of France, gave peace and happiness to Europe."

On information of the landing of the British army, the French commander-in-chief in Portugal, Junôt, had ordered Delaborde, Loisson, Thomières, Kellerman, Travôt, and Marganon, to advance towards Lisbon, leaving garrisons in the fortresses of Elvas, Almeida, and Peniche, and keeping advanced posts at Thomar, Santorem, Obidos, &c. He himself advanced with the

reserve from Lisbon. The design was for all the different corps to proceed in concentric lines to a given point (Leyria), at which it was arranged that the attack was to be made upon the British army.

To prevent the junction of Delaborde and Loisson, and thus force one of them to action, before the meditated junction could be effected, was the object of the commander-in-chief of the British army. This object he accomplished by severing the line of communication of the forces under those generals who were advancing from Abrantes and Lisbon, with the intention of forming their junction at Leyria. Thus Loisson was obliged to make a circuitous march, and compelled to fall back on Santarem; and Delaborde was placed in the predicament of retreat, and exposing the line of Torres Vedras and Mafra, or of accepting battle. The French general preferred the latter alternative, as he was in the neighbourhood of a strong natural position, and entertained sanguine hopes of being joined during the action by Loisson's force (from Rio Major), which amounted to between 7,000 and 8,000 men. He accordingly took up his position on an elevated plain in advance of Roliça,—or, as it is otherwise termed, according to the whim or carelessness of transcribers, Roriça, Roleia, Roliera, Rolissa—which is a pleasant and romantic village, situated at the intersection of the roads leading from Alcoentre, Torres Vedras, and Montechique, and at the southern extremity of a large oblong valley running north and south. Behind him, at the distance of one mile in his rear, a second position, parallel to his first, presented itself in the steep and difficult ridge of Zambugeira. This position, besides its great strength, enabled him to preserve a facility of communication with Loisson and Junôt.

BATTLE OF ROLICA.

ON the 17th of August, about seven o'clock in the morning, the British army broke up its temporary cantonments from Caldos and Obidos, and advanced in three columns towards the enemy. On the approach of the British to the French posi-

tion, Delaborde, perceiving from the skilful disposition of the English general, that both his flanks were threatened, fell back from his position on the plain in front of the village to the heights of Zambugiera (or as they are otherwise termed by some authors, Co-

lumbiera), and again he effected his formation of battle on the table-land of that ridge of rocks. As that precipitous and apparently inaccessible position was shut in by rocky thickets on both sides, covered with a close underwood of myrtles and gum cistus, it was to be approached only by a few difficult tracts, consisting of deep ravines, or water-courses, diverging from the foot of the heights to their crest, in the form of a fan; the original formation of the British army was altered to meet the correspondent changes of the French force and their altered position. General Ferguson's division and forces, consisting of 4,800 bayonets, 50 horsemen, and six guns, and a Portuguese force, consisting of 1,200 men, and 50 cavalry, under lieutenant-colonel Trant, were therefore ordered to skirt the base of the heights to the east and west, and turn the enemy's flanks. Another object of Ferguson's disposition was to intercept and retard Loisson's junction with Delaborde, which was hourly expected, as he had then reached Bombarel, which was only five miles distant from the field of battle. The centre of the English force, composed of Hill's, Nightingale's, Cotton's, Craufurd's, and Ford's brigades, and under the immediate command of sir Arthur Wellesley, being formed into five distinct columns of battalions, entered as many defiles or ravines in the front of the enemy, and after struggling with almost insurmountable difficulties (the ascent being so steep, that in many parts a slip of the foot would have been fatal; and in numerous places it was so overrun with briars, brushwood, and wild myrtlewoods, and in some places so impeded with rock, as greatly to interrupt the advance of the troops, and break their formation); and under a sultry sun, stormed all the passes, and reached the crest of the ridge; but the defile along which the 29th regiment advanced being so narrow as to admit of but three or four men abreast, when it reached the ground upon which it was to deploy, the men were so exposed to the fire of the French riflemen, who occupied the vineyards, that they were unable to form any front to return it, until the grenadier company charging that part of the enemy which was upon the open plain, gave time to the companies behind it to effectuate their formation, when, notwithstanding the murderous fire of grape and musketry, that had been poured into its dense columns, and that it had lost its gal-

lant colonel, Lake, it rallied, and being supported by the 9th regiment, they won back their dead and wounded, and were on the point of being led, under major-generals Hill and Nightingale, to a charge on the enemy's line, when Delaborde, perceiving that his right flank was about being turned by generals Ferguson and Fane,—whose advance had as hitherto been retarded by the nature of the ground over which they had to march, beyond the time which had been calculated necessary to enable them to reach their appointed destination, so as to have formed a simultaneous attack with the central portion of the English army,—retired his forces by alternate masses from the heights on which he was posted, to the village of Zambugeira; protecting his movements by vigorous charges of cavalry, and effecting his change of position in good order, on account of the deficiency of cavalry in the English army. There he rallied; but being dislodged by a spirited and vigorous charge, led by major-general Spencer, he retreated by the pass of Ruña in a long night march to Montechique, which was about nine leagues distant from the field of battle; leaving three guns in the possession of the victors, and the line of march to Torres Vedras uncovered. The loss of the English army was 78 killed, 325 wounded, and 74 missing. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded has been variously stated. Sir Arthur, in his despatch, said it exceeded 1,500. Thiebault (a dubious authority, as the French never acknowledge the truth on such occasions) says it was 600. A glaring violation of truth pervades all the French military works extant, as to the extent of their losses, and the effective force of the combatant French and English armies in all the battles that have taken place between those two nations, both in recent and former times. Even general Foy, one of the most liberal, enlightened, and most truth-speaking of French military authors, has sadly transgressed in this respect. He says, that the French army in Egypt was opposed to 14,000 British troops, and 60,000 Turks; and that the French army under Regnier was opposed at the battle of Maida by 10,000 English troops under sir John Stuart, as many Sicilians, and some Neapolitan refugees. The last mentioned battle he also denominates "a mere skirmish, unknown everywhere else but in England." He also gravely and logically attempts to prove, that Soult won

the battle of Toulouse (though he ran away) and asserts that the English army consisted of nearly twice the number of men than it actually did. Suchet, in his *Memoirs*, talks about "the reputation too easily acquired at Salamanca and Vittoria." Thiers, in his *History of the Consulate and Empire*, maintains that the English lost the battle of Alexandria; and that very conspicuous writer of military romance, kindly condescends in another part of his work, to inform us, that had Napoleon invaded England, he must have subjugated it, as his troops had been victors at Friedland, Jena, and Austerlitz. Some French writers have also undertaken to prove, in due logical form and figure, that the English lost the battle of Waterloo, but that they were so stupid as not to run away.

The amount of force under the British general at Rolica was 13,480 infantry, and 470 cavalry; but the troops actually engaged were only the 5th, 9th, 29th, some riflemen of the 95th and 60th, and the flank companies of major-general Hill's brigade, amounting in all to scarce 4,000 men; as it was not possible, from the nature of the ground, that a greater force could be brought into action. Fourteen hundred Portuguese infantry, and 250 cavalry, were with the army. This force general Wellesley had obtained from the Portuguese commander-in-chief Freire, for the sake of the moral and political effect which their presence and co-operation would have on the minds of the Portuguese nation. The amount of the French force, under Delaborde, has been variously stated. Thiebault, with the usual veracity of his countrymen on such occasions, says that it consisted of but 1,900 men. Sarrazin, Wellesley, and Napier (an authority by no means disposed to underrate French superiority and skill) all assert that it amounted to 5,000 men, of whom 560 were cavalry.

Such was the battle of Rolica, which lasted till four o'clock in the afternoon, and which dispelled the charm which had fascinated and overawed Europe, and had palsied the understanding of the weak and timid part of the English public and press, as to French invincibility and French superiority of military talent. Such was the issue of the first contest in which the "sepoys gene-

ral" and the "shop-keeping and cotton-spinning army" of Buonaparte and his vapouring generals, Junôt, Soult, and Massena, with all the other opprobrious epithets which braggart and mortified and humbled French pride, has assailed the British army and its illustrious leader.* Such was the prestige or earnest they had given of their ability for contending, in a series of successive combats and uninterrupted triumphs, from Rolica to Toulouse, from the heights of Lisbon to the walls of Paris, for the palm of victory, the glory of triumph, and the dispelling of the false halo of invincibility with which the brows of French warriors had been encircled by weak and misguided popular opinion, and ignorant and factious writers.

The British army pursued the foe to Villa Verde, on the road to Torres Vedras, where it bivouacked during the night. Next day, the commander-in-chief learning that major-generals Anstruther and Acland's divisions, amounting to between 4,000 and 5,000 men, and which had sailed from Harwich in July, had joined the fleet of victuallers off Peniche, orders were issued to discontinue the pursuit, and the line of march was directed on Lourinham, to cover the disembarkation, as a large hostile force of cavalry was in that neighbourhood. On the 20th sir Arthur took up a position at Vimiera, a village situated near the sea-coast, in the valley of Maceira, and about nine miles distant from Torres Vedras; and sent forward a detachment to cover the disembarkation of the troops in the bay of Maceira.

An officer who visited the battle-field of Rolica, thirty-six years after the bloody tragedy had been enacted on its theatre, says there was not a symptom or a fragment remaining to indicate the event, except the tombstone over the grave of colonel Lake, which the officers of his regiment had dedicated to his memory, as a tribute of their esteem and respect. He adds, "In the now peaceful and smiling valley of Rolica, which once resounded with the crash and clangor of arms, the deafening roar of cannon, and the peals of musketry, the exulting sound of victory, the shriek of agony, and the groans of despair, nature was then in her most lovely garb—green

* The English have been sneered at, not only by Buonaparte and his colleagues and satellites, in respect of their character as soldiers; they received the same compliment from Louis and Villeroy a century

before. Ships, their Gallic friends were of opinion, they might manage; but as to land-fighting, they were ciphers—mere "sea wolves," awkward and inexpert—impossible to contend with "the great nation."

fields of wheat and barley gracefully undulating under the influence of the morning breeze, now redolent of the perfume of the peach, the almond, and the orange blossom." The same is nearly the case with all the battle-fields of the Peninsular war.

The writer of this work witnessed the following scene:—On the countermarch of that part of the British army under the command of general Hill, which had occupied Madrid in observation of Soult, to the confines of Portugal, the ruined forts of Fort Napoleon and Ragusa, which had been dismantled but a few short months before, were overhung with wild weeds and grass; and the wallflower, the honeysuckle, and ivy, clung to the embrasures of Fort Napoleon, and nodded on the summit of the tower of Ragusa. The *avant fosse*, in which above 1,000 men had been buried under the ramparts, that had been thrown over them, was covered with grass and weeds, and no other indication of the mortality that had been immured there appeared, but a fleshless bone and a broken musket projecting here and there from the sod.

It would be unjust to the memory of the heroic dead, to close this chapter without a tribute to the bravery of colonel Lake,* who fell during the engagement; he was one whom "the officers adored, the soldiers revered, and there were few who would not have laid down their lives for." Mr. Guthrie has given the following graphic and touching description of his death:—"A narrow, steep ravine seemed the only accessible part, and up this, Lake, without further hesitation, led his grenadiers, on horseback. The whole regiment followed with unexampled devotion and heroism, and gained the summit; but not without the loss of three hundred men in the desperate conflict, which took place almost hand-to-hand in the olive-grove half-way up the hill. Broken and overpowered by numbers, Lake fell, and his soldiers would have been driven down, if the 9th regiment had not rushed up with equal ardour, led by a no less gallant soldier, colonel Stewart. The two regiments formed on the crown of the hill, supported on their right by the 5th,

which had been opposed, and the French retired, finding that their right was by this time turned. Colonel Lake, on horseback, on the top of the hill, seemed to have a charmed life. One French officer, of the name of Bellegarde, said afterwards, that he fired seven shots at him. Once he seemed to stagger as if he was hit; but it was only at the seventh shot he fell. It is probable he was right, for he was wounded in the back of the neck slightly; but the ball which killed him passed quite through from side to side, beneath the arms: I think he must have fallen dead. The serjeant-major, Richards, seeing his colonel fall, stood over him, like another Ajax, until he himself fell wounded in thirteen places by shot and bayonet. I gave him some water in his dying moments, and his last words were, 'I should have died happy if our gallant colonel had been spared;' words that were reiterated by almost every wounded man."

Sir Arthur Wellesley, who, fearless himself, was ever the first to recognise bravery and merit in others, for the truly heroic mind soonest perceives and most appreciates heroism, wrote thus to the brother-in-law of the deceased officer:—"It may, at the moment, increase the regret of those who lose a near and dear relation, to learn that he deserved and enjoyed the respect and affection of the world at large, and particularly of the profession to which he belonged; but I am convinced, that however acute may be the sensations which it may at first occasion, it must in the end be satisfactory to the family of such a man as colonel Lake, to know that he was respected and loved by the whole army; and that he fell, alas! with many others, in the achievement of one of the most heroic actions that have been performed by the British army." Much has been said, in later days, about the *iron* nature of the hero of the Peninsula; but when we find him, almost with a woman's gentleness, thus comforting the surviving friends of the fallen, we may be sure that no share of that iron entered into the composition of his heart.

* Colonel Lake was the second son of general Lake. His father's horse having been killed under him at the battle of Laswarree, during the Mahratta

war, his son, who was his aide-de-camp, while dismounting from his horse, for the purpose of transferring it to his father, was wounded.

BATTLE OF VIMIERO.

As soon as Anstruther and Acland's brigades had joined the British army, the commander-in-chief issued orders for the march of the troops at day-break on the following day (August 20th), with the requisite supply of ammunition and provisions for nine days; but being informed that sir Harry Burrard had arrived in Maceira Bay, to supersede him, he went on board the vessel in which that general had embarked, to report to him the plan of his future operations, and to apprise him that he had issued orders for the advance of the army on the following morning. He represented to him the advantage of acting on the offensive, the probability of his gaining, by a forced march with his advanced guard, Mafra, in the enemy's rear, and thus turning Torres Vedras; the nature of the ground the army had to traverse, which was well adapted to the projected movement, as it presented several strong positions perpendicular to the line by which the French army must advance to resist his flank march; and which, if possessed, the French line of march to Montechique must be intercepted; that from the broken nature of the ground, it was unfavourable to the movements of the cavalry, in which arm the enemy was strong; and, lastly, that while the French were advancing to Vimiero by the long, narrow defile of Torres Vedras, the English army would have turned that town, and have arrived in the neighbourhood of Lisbon before the enemy would be able to occupy, with advantage, the ground which would defend it; or if the enemy preferred that neighbourhood for the scene of action, a victory vigorously followed up, would prevent him from crossing the Tagus into the Alemtejo, and probably force him to an unconditional surrender. Sir Arthur also recommended the division (10,000 men) of sir John Moore, which had arrived in the Mondego, to be disembarked and marched on Santarem. But the man of etiquette and routine, insensible to those arguments, directed his now subordinate officer to countermand his orders for the forward movement against the enemy. Fortune, however, determined that the gallant and talented Wellesley should not be deprived of the laurels to which his

genius and spirit were entitled, Junôt's critical situation compelling him to determine on immediate action.

The British army was posted about a mile in front of the village, on a range of hills about a mile-and-a-half in extent. The centre of the British line was posted on a rugged isolated height, which rose in front of the village; the right rested on a mountain that swept in a half-circle from the village to the sea-coast; and the left, which was composed merely of a few pickets, occupied another rising ground extending from the opposite side of the village. The cavalry and artillery were posted in the valley behind the village. This position had been taken up temporarily.

Having made these arrangements, Sir Arthur Wellesley was about to retire to rest near midnight, on the 20th of August, when he was disturbed by a German officer of dragoons, who came hurriedly into the camp, and informed him that Junôt was advancing at the head of 20,000 men, in the hope of taking the British by surprise, and was then distant only one hour's march. Sir Arthur listened to this startling intelligence without betraying any emotion; let the enemy come when they would they would not find him sleeping or unprepared. He sent out patrols to warn the pickets to be vigilant, lost no time in making preparations to receive the enemy, and when the sun rose on the valley in which the village of Vimiero stands, and gilded the little rivulet Maceira, which murmurs by it, all his troops were under arms. "It may be remarked in passing," observes captain M. Sherer, "that no general ever received reports with such calm caution as sir Arthur Wellesley. Suddenly awaked, he would hear an alarming account from the front with a quiet—and to many a bustling intelligent officer—a provoking coolness, and turn again to his sleep as before. Few, if any, are the instances, during the war, of his putting the troops under arms by night, or disappointing them unnecessarily of one hour of repose."

About eight o'clock in the morning of the 21st, a cloud of dust arising over the hills, indicated the approach of the enemy; whose columns, which were partially con-

cealed by dark pine woods, were advancing in three divisions, under Delaborde, Loisson, and Kellermann, and his cavalry, consisting of 1,600 men, under Margaron. It appearing to be his design to turn the left of the English army, and attack it in rear, the brigades of Ferguson, Nightingale, Acland, and Bowes, were moved across the valley from the hill on the eastward of Vimiero, to the hills on the westward, to strengthen that part of the position; and thus a change of front was effected in the British army. A little before ten o'clock, A.M., Delaborde and Loisson's divisions advanced simultaneously to the attack of the position in front of the village, saluting the English with jeering epithets as they approached. They rushed forward with the characteristic impetuosity of French troops, and in full confidence of that success which attends men whose battles had hitherto always terminated in victory. No doubt, the disgrace they had just met with at Roliça, further stimulated them.

Delaborde's division, covered by a host of tirailleurs, had crowned the hill on the south-east of the village, on which the 50th regiment and the light troops were posted. To resist the impetuous onset, colonel Walker ordered the left wing of his regiment to stand fast, and throwing his right into companies of echelon, intending to form it into line at a right or obtuse angle (according to circumstances) on the left wing; but there not being time to complete the formation, part of the echelon companies poured in, at the distance of twenty paces, a shattering fire on the angle of the hostile column, and immediately the whole regiment rushing forward with lowered bayonets, and charging the hostile column in front and flank, forced the angle on the centre; and the column being also at the same moment attacked by Acland's brigade, was thrown into irremediable confusion, and driven down the height with great slaughter. In their flight, the French left a thousand of their men dead upon the ground, besides three hundred and fifty prisoners, and seven pieces of artillery. The flying Frenchmen were pursued for nearly two miles, when they were succoured by a reserve of horse; and many of the pursuers, overpowered by a superior force, fell victims

to their enthusiastic gallantry. The secondary column, led by general Brennier, which was to have supported Delaborde, became separately engaged with general Anstruther's brigade, and was beaten back with considerable loss. Sir Arthur, seeing the general hotly engaged, sent an aide-de-camp to tell him that a corps should be sent to his assistance; but that brave man instantly replied, "Sir, I am not pressed, and I want no assistance; I am beating the French, and am able to beat them wherever I find them."

The division under Loisson attacked the left of the British position, where the 36th, 40th, and 71st, were posted. After the interchange of several withering volleys, the British line rushing forward with levelled bayonets, overthrew the whole of the French front line, and driving the survivors with the utmost confusion down the steep, captured six guns. On this body a detachment of the 20th dragoons made a charge, but being overpowered by the reserved cavalry of the enemy, were compelled to retreat with considerable loss, among which was their gallant leader, lieutenant-colonel Taylor.* Kellermann, with the reserve of grenadiers and light infantry, consisting of four battalions, now made a desperate attempt to retrieve the fortune of the day, by a vigorous attack on the extreme left of the British centre, which was posted in the vineyards near the church; recaptured the six guns which Fane's brigade had won. These troops, exhausted with their extraordinary exertions, being at the moment lying down in loose array, but suddenly starting on their feet, and being supported by the 43rd regiment, they charged their opponents, and not only recaptured the artillery, but drove their assailants down the hill in so great confusion, that Solignac's and Brennier's brigades fled in opposite directions. At twelve o'clock the firing ceased, and the enemy retreated in great disorder, being driven back in a south-easterly direction, by which movement the British were masters of the great road by Torres Vedras to the capital. Thus the discomfiture of all the attacks of the enemy was complete; but no army can be destroyed, however beaten, that has protection for its fugitives in a superior cavalry. Had two of the regiments of dragoons, then kept

* General Kellermann was close to colonel Taylor, of the 20th dragoons, when he was killed. He spoke of him in high terms, and said that none but a truly brave man would have advanced against the French

as he did, unsupported by infantry. Kellermann, in admiration of his conduct, gave up the colonel's horse to the 20th dragoons.

idle in the barracks at home, been present, the march to Torres Vedras would have been made, and Lisbon been our own.

At this moment sir Harry Burrard, who had reached the field of battle in an early period of the contest, assumed the command, and issued orders for the army "to halt and pile arms;"* deeming it too hazardous to pursue the defeated and discomfited foe. At the moment that this fatal and unpropitious order reached major-general Ferguson, he was pressing the broken and fleeing columns of Solignac's Brigade. Indignant at the folly and timidity of the order, he dispatched his aid-de-camp to inform the commander-in-chief that he had cut off Solignac's brigade from the rest of the French army, and that the whole brigade would be obliged to lay down their arms, if he was allowed to continue his movement in advance. To strengthen the representation, sir Arthur Wellesley accompanied the aid-de-camp to sir Harry Burrard, and again earnestly pressed the advantage of a forward movement, by which the position that Junôt, who had been joined during the action by 1,200 fresh troops, had taken on the heights of Mafra, would be forced, the strong defiles of Torres Vedras turned, and the passage to Lisbon opened. But "the antiquated tactitioner" was deaf to all entreaty and remonstrance, and thus marred the brilliant victory which had been achieved by his now subordinate officer. An ingenious writer, in his comments on this battle, has well said, that Napier's "veteran" effected for the beaten enemy a miraculous deliverance from a condition which they themselves considered inevitable destruction. The author of *The Reminiscences of the Peninsula*, tells us, that when sir Arthur heard the decision of sir Harry Burrard, he turned his horse's head, and, with a cold and contemptuous bitterness, said aloud to his aid-de-camp, "You may think about dinner, for there is nothing more for soldiers to do this day."

* In the inquiry which took place before the board of commissioners respecting the Cintra convention, it appeared that it had been the opinion of all the general officers (except sir Harry Burrard, who alleged "his weighty reasons" to the contrary,) who were present at the battle, that had the enemy been vigorously pursued, the French army would not have been able to cross the Tagus, and must consequently have submitted to an unconditional surrender. Colonel Torrens, in his examination before the board, said, that immediately after the defeat of the French right column, and during its precipitate retreat, sir Arthur Wellesley

Another writer informs us, that to indicate his feeling of disappointment at being deprived of the glorious results of his victory, he, with affected gaiety, said to another officer, who was expressing his regret at the dishonourable condition imposed on the army by the commander-in-chief, "Well, we have nothing more to do but go and shoot red-legged partridges;" a species of game in which Portugal abounds. His opinion of the injury which the imbecility and timid caution of his superior in command (who, to adopt the indignant and well-merited castigation of a military critic, was one of those antiquated tacticians, bigoted in old-world notions, if he had to cross a bridge, would have spent half the day in reconnoitring), in preventing the interception of the retreat of the enemy on the capital, by turning Torres Vedras, is also emphatically expressed and demonstrated in his communication of the details of the battle to his royal highness the duke of York. "The enemy would have been cut off," says the indignant hero, "from Torres Vedras, and we should have been at Lisbon before him; if, indeed, any French army had remained in Portugal. But sir Harry Burrard, who was at this time upon the ground, still thought it advisable not to move from Vimiero." In the same despatch sir Arthur speaks thus warmly in praise of the conduct of the men and officers who fought under his command at Vimiero—"I cannot say too much in favour of the troops; their gallantry and their discipline were equally conspicuous; and, I must add, that this is the only action that I have ever been in, in which everything passed as it was directed, and no mistake was made by any of the officers charged with its conduct."†

Nor was sir Arthur Wellesley the only person who disapproved of the timidity and impolicy of his superior in command. The whole British army was disgusted with his conduct. "Murmurs," says the marquis

rode up to sir Harry Burrard, and said, "Now, sir Harry, is your time to advance on the enemy; they are completely broken, and we may be in Lisbon in three days; a large body of our troops has not been in action. Let us move them from the right on the road to Torres Vedras; and I will follow the enemy with the left." To this, sir Harry Burrard replied, that "he thought a great deal had been done, very much to the credit of the troops; and that he did not think it advisable to do more, or to quit the ground in pursuit."

† See the *Wellington Despatches*, August the 22nd, 1808.

of Londonderry, in his *Narrative*, "might here and there be heard; all of them condemnatory of that excess of caution which had checked a victorious army in the midst of its career; while a thousand wishes were expressed, that the new chief's arrival had been delayed till the campaign, so prosperously begun, had been brought to a conclusion." "What a different result would the Portuguese campaign have exhibited," says the author of *The Victories of the British Armies*, "had these two old gentlemen (namely, sir Harry Burrard and sir Hew Dalrymple,) been left in a district command, and not have been allowed to check the career of victory which opened so glorious a promise."

The loss of the French was about 3,000 in killed and wounded; that of the English, 175 killed, 584 wounded, and 51 missing. The enemy left 13 guns, several hundred prisoners, and a large quantity of ammunition in the hands of the victors. The amount of the French force in the action was 14,000 infantry, and 1,600 cavalry, with 23 guns; that of the English amounted to near 16,000 men, including 713 cavalry, of which last mentioned force only 180 were British, and 18 guns; but not more than one-half of the British force was engaged, the whole of the right of the army, consisting of the reserve of the 1st and 5th brigades, and the Portuguese, had not been brought into action, having been posted much nearer Torres Vedras than the left of the French was during the action. Thus a second time had the vainly deemed invincible legions of France, after efforts the most resolute and heroic, been fairly and signally beaten. The charm which had palsied the hearts and arms of all Europe had been now doubly broken by the gallant sons of hated England.

To the eternal disgrace of the French, be it said, that in their retreat over the field of battle, they stabbed and mutilated the wounded who lay in the course of their flight. This act of demoniac ferocity was more than once (particularly at the battle of Albuera) practised by them during the Peninsular war. At the battle of Waterloo, there is reason to suppose that they massacred the greater part of the prisoners who fell into their hands. Major Hodges, and the other captured officers of the 15th hussars, were seen alive in the possession of the French cuirassiers; but not one of those gentlemen was found alive at the close of

the battle. Sir Walter Scott has made the following admirable reflections on the conduct of the French:—"In the pursuit by the Prussians, after the battle of Waterloo, the fleeing French experienced little mercy; and, indeed, they had forfeited all claim to it; for their cruelty towards the Prussians taken on the 16th, and towards the British wounded and prisoners made during the battle of the 18th, was such as to exclude them from the benefit of the ordinary rules of war. Their lancers, in particular, rode over the field during the action, dispatching with their weapons the wounded English, with the most inveterate rancour; and many of the officers who have recovered from the wounds they received on that glorious day, sustained the greatest danger and most lasting inconvenience from such as were inflicted by those savages, when they were in no condition to offend others or defend themselves. The "*Quoi! tu n'ès pas mort, Coquin?*" of the spearman was usually accompanied with a thrust of the lance, dealt with an inveteracy which gives great countenance to the general opinion, that their orders were to give no quarter. Even the British officers who were carried before Buonaparte, although civilly treated while he spoke to them, and dismissed with assurances that they should have surgical and proper attendance, were no sooner out of his presence than they were stripped, beaten, and abused. Most of the prisoners that the French took from our light cavalry were put to death in cold blood, or owed their safety to concealment or a speedy escape. In short, it seemed as if the French army, when they commenced this desperate game, had, like buccaneers setting forth on a cruise, renounced the common rules of war, and bonds of social amity, and become ambitious of distinguishing themselves as enemies to the human species."

The late poet-laureate, Southey, relates the following interesting incidents, which may be not unjustly placed in contrast with the description just quoted of the barbarous conduct of the French troops, and which deserve to be recorded as striking episodes of this brilliant battle:—"General Solignac was severely wounded; general Brennier wounded and left on the field. He was in danger of being put to death by those into whose hands he had fallen, when a Highlander, by name Mackay, who was a corporal in the 71st, came up and rescued him. The French general, in gratitude for his

preservation, offered him his watch and purse; but Mackay refused to accept them. When he had delivered his prisoner in safety to colonel Pack, the French general could not help saying, 'What sort of man is this? He has done me the greatest service, and yet refuses to take the only reward which I can present offer him!' Brennier no doubt contrasted this with the conduct of his countrymen, in whose rapacity and cruelties it appears by the testimony of the Portuguese, that he had no share; when, therefore, colonel Pack replied, 'We are British soldiers, sir, and not plunderers,' he must have deeply felt the disgrace which had been brought upon the French character. Mackay was immediately made a sergeant by sir Arthur Wellesley's express desire; and the Highland Society, at their next meeting, voted him a gold medal, with a suitable device and inscription. The piper to the grenadier company of the same regiment, Stewart was his name, received, early in the action, a dangerous wound in the thigh; he would not, however, be carried off the field, but, sitting down where his comrades might hear him, he continued playing warlike airs till the end of the engagement.* A handsome stand of Highland pipes, with an inscription commemorating the manner in which he had deserved the donation, was voted him by the Highland Society."

The author of the *History of the War in the Peninsula*, has found cause for much hypercritical, if not unfair and unsound remark, on sir Arthur Wellesley's brilliant victories of Roliça and Vimiero. The English general's position and disposition of the troops at Vimiero, were not those of choice but of necessity, for the purpose of covering the disembarkation of the reinforcements on the coast. Confiding in his own talent and the indomitable courage of his troops, he was confident of victory. The position he assumed between the horns of the Coa, when assailed by Marmont's formidable host, was of the same character as that of Vimiero, as was also that at the battle of Assaye; and in each case the British chief was eminently successful.

A distinguished French military writer, in the course of his unjust and inapplicable criticisms on the duke of Wellington's victories, and the absence of immediate and

vigorous pursuit which occasionally attended them (the non-execution of which was in all cases his deficiency of cavalry), has quoted the following satire on English generals, given in that very clever work, *Advice to the Officers of the British Army*. It must be acknowledged, that it has been sometimes not inapplicable in British military operations:—"Nothing is so commendable as generosity to an enemy. To pursue him vigorously after a victory, would be taking advantage of his distress. It is enough to show that you can beat him whenever you think proper. You should always act openly and candidly with both friends and enemies. You should be cautious, therefore, never to steal a march, or lay in ambuscade. You should never attack the enemy during the night. Recollect what Hector said when he went to fight with Ajax—"Heaven light us, and combat against us." Should the enemy retreat, let him have the start of you several days, in order to show him that you can surprise him whenever you please. Who knows if so generous a proceeding will not induce him to halt? After he has succeeded in retreating to a place of safety, you may then go in pursuit of him with your whole army. Never promote an intelligent officer; a hearty boon companion is all that is necessary to execute your orders. Any officer who has a grain of knowledge beyond the common run, you should look on as your personal enemy, for you may depend on it, that he is laughing in his sleeve both at you and your manœuvres."

"The antiquated do-nothing tactitioner" was not doomed to enjoy his unenviable command, or to endure the odium and execration of every man of sense and spirit in the British army long. He was superseded by sir Hew Dalrymple, an officer of the same cautious school, though certainly not possessing the same amount of dulness and obstinacy. Sir Hew had been selected for the command on account of the activity and judgment he had exhibited in the south of Spain. Lord Castlereagh, then secretary for the war department, had addressed a private letter to him, strongly recommending sir Arthur Wellesley to his confidence, and trusting that sir Hew would select him for any service which required great prudence and temper, combined with much military experience. Sir Hew exhibited considerable delicacy of feeling, and left sir Arthur to carry out his own views;

* "Weel, my braw lads, I can gang nae farther wi' ye a fighting; but Deil ha'e my soul if ye sal want music," were his words.

after receiving a vague account of the battle of Rolica, he sent to sir Arthur, that though he wished to be informed of his proceedings, he did not mean to interfere with his command. On the return of his messenger, sir Hew learned the result of the battle, and that sir Arthur Wellesley had been superseded in the command by sir Harry Burrard. No longer restrained by the feeling of delicacy that had hitherto withheld him, sir Hew landed on the morning of the 22nd of August, and immediately assumed the command. Thus the British army had the opportunity of witnessing the singular anomaly of having three commanders-in-chief in the short space of twenty-four hours.

Sir Arthur Wellesley again urged the

policy of an immediate pursuit of the enemy, but the new commander-in-chief was as much disinclined as his predecessor had been to a measure which he considered a hazardous operation. Like sir Harry Burrard, he thought that sir Arthur had been guilty of rashness, which, although it had led to success, would, if it had failed, have terminated in complete ruin. The old and the new schools of warfare were brought into collision, and time was soon to decide between them. While, in a too rigid adherence to the principles of prudence, the aged commanders thought sir Arthur rash, the voice of the whole English nation was soon raised to stigmatize them for the exercise of a caution which narrowly escaped being branded as dishonour.

THE CONVENTION OF CINTRA.

ON the afternoon of the 22nd, an alarm was given in the British camp; the tramp of horses was heard approaching, and it was supposed that the French were advancing to renew the conflict; orders were given to fall in, and the troops were speedily under arms. The alarm was, however, an unnecessary one; it was caused by a body of cavalry who approached under general Kellerman, bearing a flag of truce. Presenting himself at the outposts of the English army, he demanded an interview with the commander-in-chief. When admitted into the presence of sir Hew Dalrymple, he proposed a suspension of arms, and the entering into a convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French. This arrangement was agreed to, and the British were now to lose by the pen, the glory which had been gained by the sword. Though defeated in arms, the French were successful in diplomacy, and succeeded in obtaining terms so favourable, that they excited the universal indignation and disgust of the English nation. In the course of the day the basis of a definitive agreement was arranged, the chief stipulations of which were as follows:—

I.—That a suspension should immediately take place, with a view to negotiate a con-

vention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French army.

II.—That a day should be appointed by the generals-in-chief of the two armies, and the commander of the British fleet at the entrance of the Tagus, for the negotiation and conclusion of the proposed convention.

III.—That the river Sizandra should form the line of demarcation between the armies.

IV.—That the British commander-in-chief should undertake to include the Portuguese armies in this suspension; and that for them the line of demarcation should extend from Leiria to Thomar.

V.—That the French should not, in any case, be considered prisoners of war; and that all the individuals composing the army *should be transported to France, with their arms, baggage, and the whole of their private property, from which nothing should be excepted.*

VI.—That no individual should be called to account for his political conduct; that property should be respected; and that all who were desirous to quit the kingdom, should be suffered to do so unmolested.

VII.—That the port of Lisbon should be recognised as neutral for the Russian fleet; and that the principles of maritime law,

in respect to the privileges of neutral ports, should be strictly observed by the British squadron.

VIII.—That the horses of the cavalry, and the artillery of French calibre, should be transported to France with the army.

IX.—That the suspension of arms should not be broken, on either side, without forty-eight hours' previous notice.

An additional article stipulated that the French garrisons and fortresses should be included in the convention, in case they should not have capitulated before the 25th of August.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, as might be anticipated, disapproved of the terms of this convention, particularly of the fifth article, which secured to the French the plunder they had taken from the Portuguese. He termed it "an extraordinary paper," and, with a blunt but noble honesty, proposed that an article should be introduced for the purpose of "making the French generals disgorge the church plate they had stolen." General Kellermann, however, urged that the introduction of such a stipulation would be a reproach to the French armies, and exceedingly unpleasant to its commander, and the polite sir Hew Dalrymple, and his colleague, sir Harry Burrard, were pleased to respect this assumed delicacy.

As sir Arthur had foretold, sir Charles Cotton, the commander of the English fleet in the Tagus, refused to subscribe to the article stipulating for the neutrality of the port of Lisbon in behalf of the Russian fleet stationed there. This, and other circumstances, particularly the subtilty and evasion of the French, occasioned a new arrangement of the convention, which was confided to the management of colonel Murray, the quarter-master-general, who was invested with full powers to conclude a definitive treaty on a fresh basis. That treaty consisted of twenty articles, and stipulated, that the French army, with all the cavalry, artillery of French calibre, arms, baggage, and private property of every description, with sixty rounds of ammunition, should be conveyed in English ships to La Rochelle and the other ports between Rochefort and L'Orient, in France, at the expense of the English government. That treaty, which is termed "The Convention of Cintra," was concluded at Lisbon on the 30th of the month, and soon after ratified. It received the misnomer of *Cintra* from the circumstance of sir Hew Dalrymple forwarding the

document to the secretary of state from Cintra. Cintra, which stands as a green oasis in the midst of a barren wilderness, is a village situated about thirty miles from Lisbon, and, on account of the mildness of its climate, is the resort of the wealthy inhabitants of that city. This lovely spot presents a picture of the magnificence of nature unequalled on the face of the earth, and when lighted up by the heavenly sun of Portugal, which animates everything on which it shines, is ravishingly beautiful. The scenery, as you approach it, is exceedingly picturesque. Waving oak and cork-tree forests, clear gurgling brooks, gushing fountains, groves teeming with golden fruit, cool and fragrant retreats, with convents and churches that appear among the profuse foliage, render it one of the most captivating scenes that the eye can love to dwell upon. When approached by night, at the time the quintas or country houses are lighted up, it presents a truly fairy scene. It is moreover a region of contrasts and scenic paradoxes. The abrupt transitions of scenery, and the alternations of rich landscape with barrenness and desolation—the darkness of the deep and profound ravines, and the lovely sunny slopes—the vast conical splintered rocks and the romantic cascades—the immeasurable expanse of the Atlantic to be seen from the summit of the mountain rising above the village—and the lovely dales (among which the delightful valley of Collares, which opens to the sea, stands pre-eminent), and the dark-bosomed glens beneath, render it one of the most enchanting and extraordinary localities on the surface of the globe—one on which the mind loves to dwell, and recal to recollection at the most distant period of life.

On the 24th, the British army moved by its left on Ramalhal, where sir Hew Dalrymple established his head-quarters. Here he was visited by the temporising Dom Bernardin Freire, "who concluding that the fighting must be all over now, came boldly to the front," and complained that he had not been consulted in the concoction of the treaty. On the 25th, sir John Moore disembarked his force at Maceira Bay, and formed a junction with the army under sir Hew Dalrymple at Ramalhal.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, aware of French subtilty and finesse, and perceiving an inclination on the part of Junôt to evade the conditions of the treaty, strenuously urged, in a conference held with sir Hew Dalrym-

ple and sir John Moore, on the morning of the 27th, the necessity of breaking off the negotiation, and giving the prescribed notice of the cessation of the truce prior to the resumption of hostilities. But his suggestions were overruled.

The conditions of the treaty not being carried into execution on the expiration of the period fixed for the resumption of hostilities, the forces which had been disembarked under the command of sir John Moore, and two brigades of the army present at the battle of Vimiero being left at head-quarters at Ramalhal, the advanced guard of the British army pushed on the 29th beyond Torres Vedras; and sir Arthur Wellesley, early on the morning of the 31st, marched his corps by the left to Sobral, in front of the enemy's position of Cabeça de Montechique; where he received a message, that the treaty on its new basis had been acceded to by colonel Murray. The English army immediately advanced towards Lisbon, and reached Oyeras on the 2nd of September. On the 9th, sir John Hope took possession of the castle of Belem, and on the 11th of the citadel of Lisbon. During the progress of these transactions, the Portuguese, encouraged by the presence and success of the English army, indicated a strong insurrectionary spirit, and a determination to gratify their thirst for vengeance against their rapacious and cruel oppressors. They resorted to the most sanguinary retaliation against the stragglers of the French army. A band of peasantry, and other rabble of the population of the metropolis, headed by the juiz de foro, or magistrate, Monteiro Mor, attacked the French patrols occupying the south bank of the Tagus, but were prevented from putting their designs into execution, only by Junôt's threat of exemplary vengeance, and of setting fire to the city. Those misguided men had been incited to the commission of these excesses by the intrigues and the representation of the bishop of Oporto and Freire, that their country had been treated as a conquered province in the convention, the junta of Oporto and themselves not having been parties to it.

The time for the execution of the convention being now at hand, the first division of

the French forces, with Junôt, his staff, and immense pillage, embarked on board the transports on the 13th, under the protection of the second and third divisions. On the following day, sir John Hope assumed the government of the capital, and immediately adopted measures for enforcing subordination among the population. The last division of the French sailed on the 30th, amidst the execrations of all classes of the people. The French garrisons of Elvas and Almeida* were not embarked until the 6th of October; and that of La Lippe till the 25th of the same month, on account of the Spanish general Guluzzo, who, like his prototype Freire, now that "the fighting was over," putting on a "swashing martial outside," refused to acknowledge the convention, and had invested La Lippe, but respectfully bombarded it at so great a distance, that all the damage his martial ire did, "was knocking away the cornices and chimneys of the governor's house." The French commandant, colonel Girval, despising the threats and deeds of the bobadil besieger, was about to inflict the merited vengeance on him, when, it being understood that sir John Hope had advanced as far as Estremos to remove the doughty Spaniard from before the fort, that specimen of Spanish heroism desisted from his fell purpose, and retired. This same Guluzzo shortly after undertook to defend the left bank of the Tagus with 5,000 men, and for that purpose occupied a line of forty miles; but on the appearance of a trifling French force, quickly took to his heels.

The pillage of the French, both officers and men, had during their domination in Portugal been enormous; no species of property had been exempt from their rapacity. They had robbed the national museum and library, the public treasury, the arsenal, the churches and convents, and even the tombs, of every thing that was valuable and portable. Junôt's aid-de-camp was detected in packing up even the duke of Sussex's carriage for his master. They had melted the church plate into bars to prevent its identification. Their military chest contained three months' pay; and one regiment alone boasted that it was in possession of one hundred thousand crowns; all obtained by the robbery of

* Almeida lies between the rivers Coa and Turones, which are tributaries of the Douro, and partially form the boundary, in this part of the Peninsula, between Spain and Portugal. Elvas is a strongly fortified frontier town, about twelve miles west of

Badajos, and 125 east of Lisbon. It is situated between two forts, Santa Lucia and La Lippe, which stand on distinct summits, commanding the town: both the forts and the barracks in the town are bomb-proof.

the people of Portugal. Junôt, the *quondam* or *ci-devant* corn-chandler, now "his excellency the duke of Abrantes," modestly demanded five ships (the Danish then in the harbour) to carry off his *private property*; among which were found fifty-three boxes of indigo. Their robbery and rapacity had been enormous; and so tenacious were they in their endeavours to retain their plunder, that the English commissioners, major-general Beresford and lieutenant-colonel lord Proby, who had been appointed to carry the convention into effect, declared "that the ingenuity of man could not devise means to defeat the cavil and dexterity of the French in the evasion of the treaty," and that "their conduct throughout the whole affair was marked by the most shameful disregard of honour and probity."

Having entirely delivered Portugal from French dominion and usurpation, sir Arthur Wellesley, as he expresses himself in a letter to the secretary for foreign affairs, feeling himself dissatisfied with the military and public measures of the commander-in-chief (sir Hew Dalrymple), and with his treatment of himself, determining to return home, devoted his attention to the affairs of the army, so that he might deliver over his command to his successor in as efficient a manner as possible. In the interim, he drew up documents for the guidance and direction of sir John Moore; the suggestions in which, while they display his sound judgment and comprehensive mind, are a proof of his disinterested patriotism. Having accomplished these purposes, he applied to the commander-in-chief for permission to return to England, and resigning his command, repaired to Lisbon, from which port he sailed on the 20th of September.

* The following letter expresses this testimonial of grateful admiration :—

"Camp at St. Antonio de Fayal,
September, 6, 1808.

"SIR,—The commanding officers of corps and field-officers, who have had the honour of serving in the army under your command, anxiously desirous of expressing the high opinion they entertain of the order, activity, and judgment with which the whole of that force was so ably and successfully directed, from the time of the landing, to the termination of your command in the action of Vimiero, request you will accept from them a piece of plate, as a testimony of that sincere esteem and respect with which your talents and conduct have so justly inspired.

"To the Rt. Hon. Lieut. Gen.
"Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B., &c."

The above was signed by all the commanding

Sir Arthur had previously thus expressed his feelings in a letter to viscount Castlereagh, the secretary of the war department :—"It is quite impossible for me to continue any longer with this army; and I wish, therefore, that you would allow me to return home and resume the duties of my office, if I should still be in office, and it is convenient to the government that I should retain it; or if not, that I should remain upon the staff in England; or, if that should not be practicable, that I should remain without employment. You will hear from others of the various causes which I must have for being dissatisfied, not only with the military and other public measures of the commander-in-chief, but with his treatment of myself. I am convinced it is better for him, for the army, and for me, that I should go away; and the sooner I go the better." In another letter to the viscount, sir Arthur had thus decidedly expressed the pain he felt in consequence of the obstinacy or jealousy, or both, of his superior officers. "I assure you, my dear lord, matters are not prospering here; and I feel an earnest desire to quit the army. I have been too successful with this army, ever to serve with it in a subordinate position, and with satisfaction to the person who shall command it." Prior to his departure, the generals who had been under his late command in Portugal, apprised him, that "as a proof of their high esteem and respect for him, and their satisfaction of their good fortune to have served under his command," they had voted him a service of plate of £1,000 value; which vote the field-officers increased to £2,000.*

When the news of the convention of Cintra reached England, "a nation to which military glory has ever been dear,"

officers of corps and field-officers who had served under the duke in this campaign, and was accompanied by the following :—

"Camp at St. Anna, near Lisbon.
September 18th, 1801.

"SIR,—It has happily fallen to my lot, as the oldest field-officer in your army, to have the honour of presenting the enclosed address from the commanding officers of corps and field-officers serving in it: we have but one sentiment on the occasion—admiration of your talents, and confidence in your abilities.

"JAMES KEMMIS,
"Lieut.-Col. 40th, and Colonel.

"To the Rt. Hon.
"Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B., &c."

The subjoined is the characteristic reply :—

"SIR,—I have had the honour of receiving your letter of this day's date, in which you have transmitted

as the speaker of the house of commons observed in his communication of the vote of thanks of the house to sir Arthur, for his services in Portugal, a burst of national indignation broke forth. Petitions to the throne and both houses of parliament were presented from all parts of the kingdom, calling for inquiry into the reasons for entering into so disgraceful a convention, "after two signal victories." "The newspapers," says Southey, "joined in one cry of wonder and abhorrence. Some refused to disgrace their pages by inserting the treaty; others surrounded it with black broad lines, putting their journals in mourning for the dismal intelligence it contained; some headed the page with a representation of three gibbets, and a general suspended from each." It was even debated whether this disgraceful convention should not be broken by the English. The feeling of the country upon this point is thus clearly and powerfully expressed by the same writer:—"What could be done? There were not wanting writers who called upon government to annul the convention. The Romans, they said, would have done so, and have delivered up the generals who signed it, bound and haltered, to the enemies' discretion. Would it be argued, that to break the treaty would be to break our faith towards the enemy? Why, it was so framed, that it could not be fulfilled without breaking our faith towards each and all of our allies! We were the allies of Portugal; and it was a breach of faith towards Portugal, to transport this army of thieves, ravishers, and murderers, out of the country in which they had perpetrated their crimes, and from which they had no other possible means of escape. We were the allies of Spain; and it was a breach of faith towards Spain, if four-and-twenty thousand French troops, cut off from all succour and all retreat, should be conveyed, under the British flag, into their own country, with arms and baggage, that they might join the

forces with which Buonaparte was preparing to march against the Spaniards. We were the allies of Sweden; and it was a breach of faith towards Sweden, to carry Russian sailors through the Swedish fleet, for the purpose of manning Russian ships against the Swedes. Were we then to annul this treaty with our enemies, or to betray our friends?—for to this alternative our triumvirate of generals had reduced us! No law of nations could justify them in making such stipulations; no law of nations, therefore, could justify us in performing them. But the French, it was urged, had already fulfilled their part of the convention; they had evacuated the fortified towns, and admitted us into Lisbon. Thus we had already reaped the advantages, and were, in honour, bound to carry into effect the remainder of the treaty, which was advantageous to them. In whatever way we acted, some loss of honour was inevitable; but it was less disgraceful to break the terms than to fulfil them; better that the French should reproach us, than that they should compliment us upon a fidelity which enabled them to injure our allies. The blow, it was affirmed, might have gone far towards deciding the fate of Europe. France had lost one army in Andalusia, and how deeply Buonaparte felt the loss, was shown by the anxiety with which he concealed it from the French people. What might not have been the effect of the destruction of a second and larger army, following so close upon that of the former! How would it have encouraged the Portuguese, given new animation to the Spaniards, and raised the hope and the courage of those various states who were suffering under the tyrant's yoke."*

To appease the mind of the public, sir Hew Dalrymple and sir Harry Burrard were recalled home, and a board of inquiry, consisting of four generals and three lieutenant-generals, was commissioned to meet at the Royal College, Chelsea, to

an address from the officers commanding corps and the field-officers who served under my command in the late operations in Portugal.

"I have had more than one occasion of expressing the satisfaction I had derived, from the state of discipline and order in which the several corps were kept throughout the service in which we were employed, and my sense of the assistance I had derived from the officers belonging to the different parts of the army. These advantages rendered our operations easy and certain; and we were enabled

to meet the enemy on fair terms in the field of battle.

"I beg you to convey to the field-officers of the army, the assurance that I shall not lose the recollection of their services; that I am fully sensible of their kindness towards me; and that I value highly their good opinion.

"I have the honour to be, Sir,

"Your most obedient, humble servant,

"ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

"Colonel Kemmis, 40th Regt."

* *History of the Peninsular War.*

investigate the affair. Their sittings continued from November 14th, to December 27th, 1808. Four of the members approved of the convention, and three disapproved of it. The direct censure fell solely on sir Hew Dalrymple; sir Arthur Wellesley and sir Harry Burrard received an indirect reproof. But the conqueror of Roliça and Vimiero received his just and appropriate sentence in the vote of thanks of the house of commons, which he acknowledged in the following brief but manly speech:—"Mr. Speaker, I beg leave to express my acknowledgments to the house for the high honour which they have conferred upon me, by the notice which they have taken, and the approbation they have conveyed, of my conduct during the time I commanded his majesty's troops in Portugal. No man can value more highly than I do the honourable distinction which has been conferred upon me—a distinction which it is in the power of a free people alone to bestow, and which it is the peculiar advantage of the officers and soldiers in the service of his majesty to have held out to them as the object of their ambition, and to receive as the reward of their services. I beg leave to return to you,

sir, my thanks for the handsome terms in which your kindness—I ought to say your partiality—for me, has induced you to convey the approbation of the house."

When the thanks of the house of commons were awarded to sir Arthur Wellesley, it was universally felt by the king, court, parliament, and people, that he thoroughly deserved them, and that if his advice had been followed, the convention would never have taken place, and that the French must have surrendered unconditionally. The chief censure fell, for the time, upon sir Hew Dalrymple, but the nation saw that the greatest error had been committed by the government in England, in not permitting the general who had planned the campaign, and commenced it so successfully, to carry it to a brilliant close.*

On the termination of the proceedings of the court of inquiry, sir Arthur Wellesley again assumed the execution of his duties as chief secretary for Ireland; but he shortly after returned to England, and resumed his seat in the house of commons; where he took an active part in the inquiry into the duke of York's transactions with Mrs. Clarke, relative to the affairs of the army.

SIR JOHN MOORE'S CAMPAIGN IN SPAIN, AND BATTLE OF CORUNNA.

For the purpose of preserving the concatenation of the events connected with THE PENINSULAR WAR, a brief sketch of the campaign in Spain of that much traduced and ill-requited officer, sir John Moore, is necessary.

On the evacuation of Portugal by the French, sir Hew Dalrymple had prepared to prosecute the war in Spain; and for this purpose the British army was cantoned in the Alentejo, along the road to Badajos, preparatory to its crossing the frontier, for

the purpose of pressing on the flank and rear of the enemy's advance on Madrid, and turning his position on the Ebro; but sir Hew being recalled to appear before the Board of Inquiry in London, respecting the Cintra convention, the command of the forces fortunately devolved on sir John Moore.

The British ministry, influenced by the reports of their military agents, who, mistaking the vain boasts and arrogant pretensions of the Spaniards for energy and

* *Official Report of the English Force commanded by Sir Arthur Wellesley at the battle of Vimiero, and in Portugal.*—Under GENERAL SPENCER:—Artillery, 269; royal staff corps, 48; 6th regiment, 1st battalion, 1,020; 29th regiment, 863; 32nd regiment, 941; 50th regiment, 1,019; 82nd regiment, 991: total, 5,151. Under SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY:—5th regiment, 1st battalion, 990; 9th regiment, 833; 38th regiment, 957; 40th regiment, 843; 60th regiment, 936; 71st regiment, 903; 91st regiment, 917; 95th

regiment, four companies, 400; royal veteran battalion, 737; 36th regiment, 1st battalion, 647; 45th regiment, 599: total, 8,762. A detachment of 20th light dragoons, about 300. Under GENERAL ANSTRUTHER:—9th regiment, 2nd battalion, 675; 43rd regiment, 861; 52nd regiment, 858; 97th regiment, 769: total, 3,163. Under GENERAL ACLAND:—Queen's regiment, 913; 20th regiment, 689; 95th regiment, five companies, 180: total, 1,672.

courage—possibly the tremendous announcement they saw emblazoned on glaring ribbons, round the hats, of “Los valerosos Spagnuolos,” “vencir o morir por Fernando” (the valorous Spaniards—conquer or die for Ferdinand), might have influenced their judgments,—had represented the Spaniards as “a nation possessing unparalleled energy,” determined to foster and aid the national feeling. They accordingly dispatched a force of 10,000 men under general Baird, to Corunna, and instructed sir John Moore to assemble all the disposable British troops (which had been increased by fresh contingents under major-generals Sherbrooke and Hill) in Portugal, to the amount of 20,000 men, and to advance on Valladolid, where Baird was ordered to effect a junction with the main body of the army. Baird’s division reached Corunna on the 13th of October, 1808; but the main body of the army, on account of the defective state of the magazines, and the poverty of the military chest,* was not put into motion from Lisbon† till the 18th of the month.

As the direct road on the line of route to Salamanca, was represented by the Spanish authorities to be impracticable for the passage of artillery, sir John Moore determined to adopt two distinct routes of march, a determination adopted also on account of the scantiness of subsistence to be found in that exhausted part of the country over which the line of march lay. Sir John Hope, with a protecting brigade of 3,000 infantry and hussars, marched with the artillery, by Elvas, Badajos, Truxillo, and Talavera, with orders to move by Talavera de la Reyna, and join the main body of

the English army at Salamanca, by the royal road which traverses the pass of the Guadarama mountains. The main body, under the commander-in-chief, advanced in three columns on Ciudad Rodrigo, crossed the frontier of Spain on the 11th of November, and the head of the columns entered Salamanca on the 13th of the month. Before the troops began their march, the commander-in-chief, in his general orders, declared his determination to show no mercy to plunderers or marauders —“in other words, to thieves and villains;” and to show that he was in earnest in his intentions, he punished a marauder on the march with death, at Almeida.

As from deficiency of transport and supplies (no magazines having been formed on the line of march), the troops were obliged to march in small and successive divisions, the whole of the main body of the army was not concentrated in that city till the 23rd. On the 26th the head of Baird’s division was at Astorga, the rear beyond Lugo; while the head of Hope’s division, which for want of money to provide the means of transport, was obliged to move in six subdivisions, each being a day’s march behind the other, was at the Escorial, and the rear at Talavera. Hope, on the 4th of December, having reached Alba de Tormes, which is distant about twelve miles from Salamanca, sir John Moore dispatched a detachment to assist in covering his march into Salamanca.

On the 27th of November sir John Hope was at the southern entrance of the Guadarama pass of the Carpenteras; which marshal Lefebvre, with the fourth *corps d’armée*, southern. The banks of the river present almost one continuous line of buildings, from fort St. Julien, which is near the bar, to the capital. The number of palaces, convents, and churches (all which are without domes or spires, except the Estrella convent),—the dazzling whiteness of the houses, the airy appearance of the windows and balconies, the tasteful arrangement of plants, flowers, and shrubs on the roofs and terraces, with the luxuriant appearance of the orange and lemon groves teeming with their golden fruit—the beautiful quintas and their gardens—and the olive, cypress, and judas trees in the surrounding country, present, when the sun shines on them, to the view of the observer, as he approaches the capital on his voyage up the Tagus, one of the most pleasing and delightful prospects that any city in the whole world affords. But though all is majestic and magnificent without, all is indescribable filth and stench within. The river in front of the city assumes a bay, or sea-like appearance, being five or six miles in breadth, and capable of containing all the fleets of Europe.

* As only £25,000 were granted for this purpose, sir John Moore was compelled to borrow of Frere, the English plenipotentiary to the Spanish government, some of the two millions of dollars with which he had been entrusted for the use of the Spanish patriots; and also to send agents to Madrid, and other places for the same purpose. “Such was the policy,” exclaims the author of the *History of the Peninsular War*, “of the British ministry, that they supplied the Spaniards with gold, and left the English army to get it back in loans.”

† Lisbon is situated about nine miles above the bar or entrance of the river Tagus. It is built on three hills, and rises in the form of an amphitheatre from the bank of the river. That section of it which stands on the most westerly of the hills, has received the name of Buenos Ayres, from the comparative purity of its air. It is unfortified and open on all sides like London; the only military defence being a small castle in the midst of the city, and some batteries and strong forts on each of the banks of the river; as St. Julien, St. Antonio, Cascaes, and Belem, on the northern bank; and Bugio on the

was in march to occupy, in order to intercept the retreat of the English army on Lisbon, a movement which Napoleon fancied sir John Moore was then executing. The circuitous and impolitic detour which had been imposed on Hope's division, in consequence of the false and insidious information of one Longa, a Spaniard, that the route by Rodrigo was impassable for artillery, occasioned the loss of more than one month in the operations of the English army, and imposed an additional march of above 150 miles on Hope's division, encumbered, too, as it was, with stores, artillery, &c. That that detour was unnecessary, is evident from the fact that Junót, in a far more inclement season, when he invaded Portugal, had advanced, with his artillery, by the route of Alcantara, Castel Branco, and Abrantes; and that Loisson had frequently moved his artillery and cavalry between Lisbon and Almeida. And of the possibility of this passage, sir John Moore, in the course of his march, made the mortifying discovery, by personal observation, that his artillery could have accomplished the march by Almeida. "But," as the author of the *Military Memoirs of Wellington*, justly observes, "it is one of the trials of an English general, that a good military survey of the intended theatre of war is never to be found in or furnished from any public office at home. England has no department or bureau to help a general in these matters; he must know everything, and do everything, unassisted; even without money, he must provide food and contentment, and see both the troops and the followers of his army in long arrears." To these disadvantages, sir John Moore was, in an especial manner, exposed. He was thrown into the heart of Spain, with no armies to support him, no generals or government with whom to concert measures, no intelligence on which he could rely; without magazines, and without money in the military chest to form them.

Nor was the false and insidious information of Longa the only instance of Spanish treachery and deceit that occurred during sir John Moore's arduous campaign. Morla, the Spanish secretary of war, proposed to sir John Hope, that the division under his command should march in ten subdivisions through Madrid, in as many successive days; and to further his delusive projects, which he had concocted with Napoleon Buonaparte, for the purpose of decoying

the division commanded by Hope by dribbets into the clutches of that intriguer, he concealed from Mr. Stuart, the English agent at Madrid, the calamitous condition of the Spanish armies, and asserted that there was no hostile force capable of preventing the junction of Hope's division with the main body of the English army under the command of sir John Moore. In this design he was aided, unwillingly, by Frere, the English plenipotentiary, "a person," to adopt Napier's phraseology, "of some scholastic attainments, but who was ill qualified for the duties" he had undertaken. That person, in his correspondence with sir John Moore, represented that the enthusiasm of the Spaniards was unbounded, and that the whole country, from the Pyrenees to the capital, was in arms. Morla, also, in his communications with the English commander-in-chief, asserted that 25,000 men under Castaños, and 10,000 from the Samosierra, were marching in all haste on Madrid, where there were already 40,000 men in arms; though the traitor was at the time in communication with Buonaparte for the surrender of the city; and no longer than two days after Frere's communication to the commander-in-chief, that gentleman, with the junta, was fleeing headlong towards the frontiers of Portugal. Nor was the treachery of the one party, and the hallucination of the other, the whole of the mischief designed for sir John Moore. A few days after Frere's letter had reached him, two Spanish officers, by name Don Ventura Enolenta and Don Augustin Bueno, arrived at his head-quarters, and presented a letter from Gareo, the minister of war, pressing him to advance on Madrid (already in possession of the enemy!) and to give full credence to Frere's information. At the same time, Frere sent to the English general one *colonel* Charmilly, a French emigrant, in the British service, and denized in England, but in the interest of Morla and Buonaparte, to persuade him to advance on Madrid, and if he declined to do so, to require him to submit its propriety to the consideration of a council of officers in the army. Moore, penetrating the insidious designs of the emissary, and confronting him with colonel Graham (the late lord Lynedock), who had just arrived at head-quarters with intelligence of the disasters of the Spanish armies, ordered him out of his presence. In the course of his narrative of this transaction, the author of the *History*

of the Consulate and the Empire of France has the candour to say that the letter of Morla "was written on the 2nd of December, and the men (namely, Castelfranco and Morla) had determined to betray their country, and lead on the British army to its destruction."

On the 11th of December, a forward movement was made by the British army from Salamanca (the reason that it had been delayed to that period was for the purpose of allowing the flank divisions of Hope and Baird to approximate, simultaneously, the main body of the army), with the intention of marching on Valladolid, and then advancing into the heart of Spain, in order to present the means for the wrecks of the armies of Castaños, Blake, and Belvedere, to rally on the English army. The object of this movement, namely, the attack of Soult's *corps d'armée*, which kept open the communication between France and Madrid, would also have forced Buonaparte to retrograde to oppose the British, and have thus constituted a powerful diversion in favour of Madrid, in case it was not in the enemy's possession, and of the southern provinces, to enable them to rise and organize their forces. On the evening of the following day occurred the first hostile *rencontre* between the English and French armies. While the army was moving from Arevalo, brigadier-general Stewart surprised, with a squadron of the 18th hussars, a French post, consisting of fifty infantry, and thirty cavalry, at Rueda, and slew or took prisoners almost the whole of the party.

During the progress of the operations of the English army the affairs of Spain were in a very critical position. As the intrusive king Joseph had, on the surrender of Dupont's army, fled from Madrid (taking good care, however, in imitation of his brother's example, to carry off with him all the valuable property of the palace, and the jewels of the crown) to Vittoria, Buonaparte determined to remedy the errors and incapacity of his lieutenants by his own presence. Accordingly, the veterans of Jena, Austerlitz, and Friedland—soldiers whose drums had beat to victory on the banks of the Adige, the Rhine, and the Nile—were collected from the central states

of Europe, into one body; and a host of cavalry, and a long train of infantry, in all amounting to 330,000 men, were marched into Spain. Buonaparte following them, reached Bayonne on the 3rd of November, and was at Vittoria on the 8th of the same month.

Immediately on his arrival in that city, he proceeded to arrange the plan of his campaign; which was completed in two hours. Soult was directed to proceed to Briviesca, and, with the second *corp d'armée*, to attack the Spaniards, posted at Gamonal, under the count de Belvedere. Buonaparte followed with the imperial guards and the reserve.

The right wing of the Spanish army fled as soon as it was attacked, and the left followed its example, although not assailed; but the volunteers from the universities of Salamanca displayed that courage, as a high-minded scholar has justly said, "which might be looked for from men of their condition." They twice repulsed the French infantry, and, when attacked in flank by the enemy's cavalry, the whole battalion fell almost to a man upon the ground on which they had been drawn up, exhibiting one of those bright examples which history furnishes of the noble devotion and self-sacrifice with which literature, when connected with honourable descent and exalted feeling, inspires its votaries, when their energies are invoked in the defence of their native soil. In the battle of Cabeçon, July 12th, and in the subsequent battle of Rio Seco, the students who had volunteered from the universities of Segovia and Leon, exhibited a like splendid valour and noble patriotism, proving that those whom the love of their country had brought to the field could not be frightened from it.*

The French cavalry pursued the scared fugitives, sabring them, without remorse or intermission, as long as any of the defenceless and unresisting unfortunates could be overtaken. The next day, November 10th, Blake (who had already been routed at Zornosa, on October 31st, as he had also been, in conjunction with Cuesta, at Rio Seco, on July 10th), was defeated with great loss; as he was also at Reynosa, on the 13th. On the 22nd, Vives and Reding

* The conduct of the 500 Greek students, who, stimulated with the love of country and the inspiration of freedom, left their universities in Italy, Russia, and Germany, to enrol themselves in the sacred band "*hieros logos*," in the army of Ypsilanti, was no

less memorable in the battle of June, 1821, fought on the plains of Dragesghan; who, though deserted by their countrymen, resisted the attacks of the Turkish cavalry, ten times their number, until the whole had fallen side by side.

were overthrown at Cardaden; on the same day, Castaños and Palafox were routed at Tudela; and, on the 30th, the almost impregnable pass of the Samosierra was forced by a few squadrons of Polish lancers, though defended by 12,000 men (among whom were men of the "heroic" regiments, that had captured Dupont's army at Baylen), and that sixteen pieces of artillery, which were planted in the gorge of the pass, commanded and swept the road that led to it. On the 21st of December, Reding was defeated at Molino del Rey; on the 4th of the same month, Madrid had capitulated after a few days' fruitless resistance; and in the course of a few hours afterwards, the nobles and clergy, the corporations and tribunals, and above 30,000 of the inhabitants of Madrid, presented an address of congratulation to Napoleon, soliciting his brother Joseph to resume the sovereign power; and they attested their sincerity by "declaring their allegiance on the holy evangelists." Thus, in the brief period of six weeks, all was submission from the Pyrenees to the capital; though many of the arrogant and presumptuous pretenders to patriotism (among whom the junta of Toledo stood pre-eminent), declared that they would bury themselves under the ruins of their towns, rather than submit to the oppressor of their country. Indeed, so arrogant and presumptuous were many of those vapouring patriots, that the supreme junta of Madrid projected a military board for the regulation of the operations of their armies, and appointed Castaños president, his seat to be taken "when the enemy was driven across the Pyrenees."

When the army had reached Alaejos, (December 14th), sir John Moore, ascertaining, from an intercepted despatch of Berthier to Soult, that Madrid was in the possession of the French, and that Buonaparte was advancing, by forced marches, to intercept his supposed retreat of the English army, sent orders to Baird to fall back on Corunna; and, at the same time, he with the main body fell back on Toro; and, continuing his route on Villapondo and Valderas, reached Mayorga on December 19th, where a junction was effected with Baird's division. At this time the British army amounted to 23,583 men, of whom 2,278 were cavalry. The winter had now set in. The whole face of the country was covered with snow, and the weather very severe.

While in this position, lieutenant-general

lord Paget, determining to surprise the enemy's cavalry, under general Debelle, and which was posted at Sahagun, marched early in the morning of the 20th from Melgar Abaxo, with the 10th and 15th hussars; and when his force had advanced two-thirds of the way, he directed general Slade to follow the course of the Coa with the 10th, and to enter the town by that side; while he with the 15th advanced by a more circuitous route. By the time the 15th had reached its destination, it was daylight, and they found the enemy, in consequence of the information of the advance having been communicated by a patrol of cavalry which had observed the 15th, formed in an open plain ready to receive them; but instead of rushing forward to the attack, they stood *pied-ferme*, the whole line keeping up a fire of carbines on their assailants. The 15th, without a moment's hesitation, came down full speed upon the enemy, and completely overthrowing them, took 13 officers, and 132 privates prisoner. The number of the enemy engaged was 700; that of the English, 400. In many other cavalry skirmishes that occurred at the outposts, the gallantry of the English was equally conspicuous. With perfect confidence, the smallest patrol would charge a body double its strength.

Sir John Moore, desirous of effecting a diversion in favour of the patriot cause, before he was in full retrograde motion, on the night of the 23rd, put his columns in motion from Sahagun towards the Carrion, for the purpose of attacking on the following morning Soult, whom he understood was at Saldanha, and who was not likely to be joined by any supporting force in time so as to render the attack hazardous. In the chill night the English columns were in motion, warmed and cheered by the promise of battle, when, intelligence being received from the marquis Romana, that Bonaparte was marching from Madrid with the 1st and 6th *corps d'armée*; that Soult, reinforced by Loisson and Hudelet's divisions, was advancing northwards to cut off the line of retreat; and that the other four *corps d'armée* were advancing in the radii of an irregular crescent, to a converging point on the rear and flanks of the English army; Sir John countermanded his order of advance, and on the 24th, commenced his retreat. Hope's division proceeded by the road of Mayorga, and Baird's by that of Valencia de San Juan. To conceal the retreat from the French marshal,

the reserve, the light brigade, and the cavalry, remained with sir John Moore at Sahagun; the latter pushing their patrols up to the enemy's lines to conceal the retrograde movement. On the 25th, the covering division followed the route of Hope's march; and it was not till the evening of that day, that the last of the cavalry pickets retired from the post of Sahagun.

While passing Mayorga, lord Paget's march being interrupted by a strong body of cavalry (1,500 in number), posted on a high ground that flanked the line of the English retreat, colonel Leigh being ordered to charge the enemy with two squadrons of the 10th hussars, they were put to flight, with the loss of 20 killed, and upwards of 100 taken prisoners. This decided superiority of the British cavalry was also evident in other rencontres. In all the cavalry affairs during the retreat, the hussar regi-

* The instances of heroic courage and devoted sense of duty displayed both by privates and officers during the Peninsular war, were numerous. Napier, in his work, mentions the following transaction which took place at this bridge:—"John Walton and Richard Jackson, privates in the 43rd regiment, being posted beyond the bridge of Castro Gonzalo, were directed, on the approach of the enemy, the one to stand firm, and the other to fire and run back to the brow of the hill, to give notice whether there were many or few of the enemy. Jackson fired, and received twelve or fourteen sabre cuts in an instant; nevertheless he came staggering on, and gave the signal; while Walton, with equal resolution, stood his ground, and wounded several of the assailants, who then retired, leaving him unhurt; but his cap, knapsack, belt, and musket were cut in above twenty places, and his bayonet was bent double, and notched like a saw." The same author tells us, that the honourable captain Somers Cock, in his private journal of the transactions in the Peninsular war, records the following remarkable exploit, performed by a serjeant of the 16th dragoons, of the name of Baxter, during Mas-sena's retreat from the lines of Torres Vedras to Santarem:—"That brave soldier, having only five troopers with him, came suddenly on a picket of fifty men, who were cooking their messes, but instantly running to their arms, killed one of Baxter's men; but Baxter broke in so resolutely on them, that, with the assistance of some Spanish peasants, who were near at hand, he made forty-two of his enemies captives." The following anecdote, mentioned by the author of the *History of the War in the Peninsula*, in the third volume of his valuable work, and detailed more at length in Leith Hay's *Narratives of the Peninsular War*, partakes a little of the marvellous:—Colonel Waters (the officer who procured the boats at the "Passage of the Douro,") having been taken prisoner during Mas-sena's retreat from Portugal, and refusing his parole, was ordered to be sent to Salamanca under the escort of four gens-d'armes. During the journey, the chief of the party, who rode the only good horse, having occasion to dismount for a moment,

ments, regardless of numbers, or the discouraging movements of a retreat, always sought a rencontre with the foe, and always came off victorious.

On the 26th Baird's division crossed the river Esla, by the ford or ferry of Valencia; and on the same morning, sir John Moore, with the reserve, passed that river, by the bridge of Castro Gonzalo.* The whole of the army having effected the passage of the Esla, was concentrated on the 27th at Benevente,† where it was halted for two days, for the purpose of putting the stores and magazines in a condition for removal; but means of transport not being obtainable, the greater part was destroyed. At the moment of the evacuation of the town by the rear-guard, general Lefebvre Desnouettes, having crossed the Esla at a ford opposite Benaren, with the chasseurs à cheval of the imperial guard, was driven by the 10th

Waters clapped spurs to his mare, which was "a celebrated animal," and galloped off at full speed. His flight lay through the French army. While he hurried past the flanks of the columns of the enemy, some cheered him, others fired at him, and the gens-d'armes followed close at his heels. At last, he rushed full speed between two of the columns, and, on the third day of his flight, reached headquarters, where lord Wellington had caused his baggage to be brought, observing, that "he would not be long absent." Among the instances of heroic daring in the French army during the Peninsular war, the following exploit, which occurred during the retreat of the English army from Burgos to Ciudad Rodrigo, is not the least interesting:—"The bridge of Torderillas having been broken down, sixty officers and non-commissioned officers formed a raft to carry their clothes and arms, and then plunged into the water, holding their swords between their teeth, at the same time swimming and pushing the raft forwards. Having reached the opposite bank of the Douro, naked as they were, they successfully stormed a tower behind the ruins of the bridge, which was occupied by a detachment of the Brunswick Oels regiment." At the siege of Badajos, in relieving the pickets in the trenches, the men, instead of going through the trenches or parallels in front of the walls of the town, often used to show their contempt of danger by jumping out of them, and running across the next parallel or trench in the face of the enemy's fire. In executing this feat of daring, one day a cannon-shot from the ramparts, first striking the ground, hit one of the working party on the back, when he fell, as it was thought, dead on the spot; but, to the surprise of his comrades, in a moment he jumped up unhurt, the shot having glanced off his knapsack. In commemoration of the event, he was known afterwards by the appellation of "the bomb-proof man."

† The castle of Benevente, the property of the duke of Ossuna, and one of the finest monuments of the age of chivalry, and in which Gothic grandeur was united with the richness of Moorish decoration, was disgracefully dilapidated by the troops stationed there for the night.

hussars, under general Stewart, across the river, with many killed and wounded, and the loss of seventy prisoners, among whom was Lefebvre.* From the termination of this affair, the French cavalry kept at a respectful distance as long as the English cavalry formed the rear-guard of the army.

Sir John Moore, with the rear-guard, reached Astorga on the 30th without any molestation; but that town being encumbered with the sick of Romana's army—which had the appearance of an ambulating hospital in need of an escort—and the ruins of his baggage, the retreat was resumed on the following morning; a large quantity of the remaining stores and ammunition having been first destroyed, and, for want of the necessary means of conveyance, the sick and wounded abandoned, the former of whom had been greatly increased by the contagious typhus fever, imparted to them by Romana's troops. On the 31st, the light division, under Craufurd, and the light German brigade, under Alten, were detached at Bonillos, to march by Orense on Vigo, for embarkation; which town they reached without having sustained any loss from the enemy. The reason for this separation of the light division from the main body of the army, was the inability to obtain a subsistence on one line of march, and to prevent the enemy from heading the British columns, and obstructing the retreat† by the lateral road to Orense and Vigo. The marquis of Romana took the same direction, his troops having

* The following graphic account of this spirited affair appears in the narrative of sir John Moore's campaign, by his brother:—"While lord Paget was preparing to move with the cavalry, some of the enemy's cavalry were observed trying a ford near the bridge which had been blown up; and presently between five and six hundred of the imperial guards—'men,' as their captured leader, general Lefebvre, said to sir John Moore, 'who had put to flight thirty thousand Russians at Austerlitz'—plunged into the river, and crossed over. They were immediately opposed by the British pickets, who had been divided to watch the different fords, but who were quickly assembled by colonel Otway. When united they amounted only to two hundred and twenty men. They retired slowly before the superior numbers of the enemy. The front squadrons repeatedly charged each other; and on the pickets being re-inforced by a small party of the 3rd dragoons, they charged with so much fury, that the front squadron broke through the enemy, and was for a short time surrounded, by the enemy's rear squadron wheeling up. But they extricated themselves by charging back again through the enemy. They then quickly rallied, and formed with the rest of the pickets. When lord Paget reached the field, which he soon did, general Stewart, at the head of the pickets, was

been supplied with firelocks and ammunition from the British stores.

From the commencement of the retreat to the moment of reaching Astorga, the weather had been severe and inclement in the extreme; and the distress of the army was further increased by the absence of the necessary supplies. The consequence unavoidably was, that the continued line of march was a scene of the greatest suffering and insubordination. "The length of the marches, the severity of the weather, and the wretched state of the roads, which, in many places, were knee-deep in mud, joined to the want of supplies, the only food which the troops could obtain to appease their craving appetites being a little flour mixed with cold water, produced," says one who participated in the sufferings and privations of that disastrous retreat, "so complete a disorganization of the army—starvation, under any circumstances, compels the soldier to lose his discipline and spirit—that it presented the appearance of a tumultuary rabble, and, in the case of many regiments, not fifty men were with their colours." During the whole retreat the rain fell in torrents and without intermission, with a violent and impetuous wind beating, alternately, rain, snow, and sleet, direct in the faces of the troops; and to add to their misery, the cold was in a degree nearly equal to that of a polar winter; the oldest inhabitant of Spain had no recollection of its having ever been so severe in the Peninsula. No retreat on sharply engaged; the squadrons on both sides sometimes intermixing. His lordship was desirous of drawing on the enemy further from the ford, till the 10th hussars, who were forming at some distance, were ready. This regiment soon arriving, lord Paget wheeled it into line in the rear of the pickets; which then charged the enemy, supported by the 10th hussars. But before they could close, the French wheeled round, fled to the ford, and, plunging into the river, left their killed and wounded, and seventy prisoners, among whom was Lefebvre in the hands of the victors."

† Of the two reasons which have been assigned for that division of the army, namely—first, to lessen the difficulties of the commissariat, and secondly, to secure the left flank of the army,—the first may be defended; but there does not appear to have been any necessity for the second. If the left flank was insecure, it could become so only from lateral roads, by which the troops from Astorga might have turned the line of march of the retreating battalions; but to separate from them, and proceed direct for the valley of the Minto, through a distant country, where no enemy had existence, was an extraordinary mode of securing the uninterrupted march of the army.—Leith Hay's *Narrative of the Peninsular War*.

record was ever attended with so much misery, horror, and desolation, except the dismal and horrific one of Napoleon from Moscow, and that of the Anglo-Indian army from Cabul. At Bembibre and Villa Franca the stragglers broke into the large wine-stores, and hundreds of them, who were scattered, in a state of senseless intoxication, in the streets and on the roads at a distance from the vaults, were sabred by the French cavalry, who dealt death around unsparingly, and flushed with their inglorious triumph, pursued the drunken rabble that attempted to escape their vengeance, to Cacabelos, slaughtering and wounding men, women, and children, indiscriminately, and with the most inhuman ferocity. Some of the ill-fated fugitives found their way to the British rear, and, mangled as they were, were paraded through the ranks, as an intimidation to those who might feel inclined to follow their example, and disregard that first and greatest principle of military duty—obedience, which constitutes the soul and spirit of war.

As there may be some persons disposed to consider this a mere "fancy picture," without truth or reality, the testimony of a French writer may probably satisfy their scepticism. Speaking of the licentious conduct and desperate excesses of the stragglers of the English army, the author of the *History of the Consulate and the Empire of France under Napoleon*, says—"Many were often intoxicated and uncontrollable, and neither threats nor warnings could make them quit their boozing places, (namely, the wine-stores, cellars, &c.) There they remained till the French came up, or else, staggering sluggishly along the road, they were overtaken by the dragoons, who, as they rode along, brandishing their swords to the right and left, cut down the tardy drunkards, many of whom were so insensible from liquor, as neither to resist nor attempt to get out of the way."

During the course of these operations of the British army, the French were actively employed in scattering the armies of the patriots, and in preparations to overpower with numbers the English army, or to intercept its retreat on Portugal, and thus, as Thiers vauntingly expresses himself, "end the war in Spain with a crushing blow." The whole of the eight corps d'armée were, as has been already said, in motion, to accomplish this purpose against the English force. Napoleon Buonaparte, as soon

as he understood that sir John Moore was not retreating on Lisbon, but was at Salamanca, put himself at the head of the 1st and 6th corps d'armée, which amounted to above 50,000 men, and marched from Madrid on the 21st of December; was at Tordesillas on the 24th; and, after having passed the Guadarama pass of the Carpenteras—a ridge of mountains which separate the province of Madrid from that of Segovia—was at Valderas twelve hours after the English army had quitted that place. He reached the Escla, in front of Benevente, on the 28th, and had the mortification to witness the discomfiture of the cavalry of his guard, under Lefebvre, by the English hussars. Soult and he reached Astorga on January 1st, at the same time, with a force amounting to 80,000 cavalry and infantry, and 200 pieces of artillery, where, receiving intelligence of the hostile intentions of Austria, he delegated the task of pursuing the English, and, in the imperial bombastic phraseology, "of driving them into the sea," to Soult. Having placed under his command near 60,000 men and 91 guns, he prepared to return to France, taking with him the imperial guard, which amounted to 15,000 men. Having been frustrated by the prescience and vigilance of the English general, he disguised his miscarriage by one of those brilliantly inflated bulletins, so well calculated to dazzle the fervid imagination of warriors.

This march of Napoleon from Madrid to Astorga, has furnished his adulators and idolatrous admirers an abundant theme for their laudation of his "unsurpassable and unequalled military genius." One of them (and of course the rest have taken up the tune) breaks out into the following reverie:—He thus "traversed two hundred miles of country in *ten* days, [forgetting to state the truth, namely, *eleven*], regardless of the difficulties which the severity of the weather, the almost impassable state of the mountain routes, and long dark nights, produced."

Let us examine the miraculous feat and the propriety and application of its extraordinary laudation. First, then, with regard to "the severity of the weather and the long night marches." Had not the English army to contend with the same disadvantages, and that too under the discouraging and depressing circumstances of a retreat, and hotly pursued by a vindictive and a remorseless foe? "Aye," but reply the adulators, "look at the genius of the mag-

unanimous Napoleon's execution," with all the rest of the nonsense on which they are continually ringing changes. Secondly, "the almost impassable state of the mountain routes." Those mountain routes were the Guadarama pass of the Carpenteras, which, as has been before stated, forms part of the royal road from Madrid to Badajos. That we may not be accused of a partial description, we will adopt the description of the passage by the French—by one of those who love to assign marvels and prodigies to the object of their fanatical idolatry:—"Crossing the Carpenteras in a hurricane of sleet and snow, and the snow being deep, the French advanced guard was preparing to round the mountain, the emperor hurrying to the front formed the chasseurs à cheval of the guard into close column, occupying the entire width of the road, and causing the men to dismount, directed the leading half squadron, mingled with their horses, to advance; at the same time placing himself in its rear, the whole moved forwards, and treading down the snow in such a manner as to point out the way to the troops behind; and thus the whole army descended to Epinas."

Now, let us calmly examine the prodigiousness of this marvellous exploit, which has called forth the unbounded admiration of "the emperor's genius and spontaneous spirit or intuition." Did not sir John Hope, and that too with all the artillery and magazines of the British army, and, moreover, with the enemy's cavalry hovering about him, effect this passage of "mountain routes?" "Oh," reply the adulators, "that was nothing; he was only a divisional general, and an Englishman, one of our own countrymen; and then you know, it is liberal to undervalue our countrymen's talent and heroism, and overrate those of their enemies, particularly where they were led by "the great and matchless Napoleon." But not to waste time on such nonsense, let us resume the narrative.

While the main body of the English army moved towards Villa Franca, the reserve, to repress the vigour of the pursuit, took up at Calcabellos (January 3rd) a position on a lofty ridge, broken with vineyards and low stone walls, where they were attacked by eight squadrons of hussars under general Colbert, supported by a body of voltigeurs; which were repulsed and driven across the Guia river, with the loss of 200 men taken and slain; among the latter of whom was Colbert.

As the face of the country from Villa

Franca to Lugo is mountainous and rugged, and therefore the cavalry rendered useless, they preceded the infantry. On the army reaching Herrierias, the engineers presenting their reports of the harbours and positions of Ferrol and Corunna, the latter place was selected as the port for embarkation, as being the nearest by two marches. On reaching Nogales, the army met forty-two waggons, laden with arms, ammunition, shoes, and clothing, sent by England for the use of Romana's troops. When the necessary supplies had been served out to the almost naked troops, the remainder was destroyed; and, at the same time, the contents of the military chest (25,000 dollars) were thrown over a precipice into a ravine, several feet deep in snow. Many men who straggled from their ranks in hopes of possessing themselves of some of the money, met with death either from the severity of the weather or the sword of the enemy.

At this period of the retreat, the sufferings of the army had reached their climax. Horrible scenes of affliction were momentarily occurring among the fleeing and disorganized crowd. Jaded and half famished, barefoot and knee-deep in mud, their fatigue was so excessive, that they often fell by whole sections on the way-side and perished. Hunger, despair, and the inclemency of the weather, had done their worst. "It was melancholy," says an eye-witness, "to see brave soldiers, who feared no mortal foe, possessed of a spirit undaunted by no enemy, who had arrived on the soil of Spain, burning with a desire for battle, and in all the confidence of victory, thus beaten by want and the elements, and falling victims to their severity and fury!"

The same fate attended the women and children. Women were to be seen frozen to death, with infants lying on their breasts, and seeking sustenance from the lifeless bodies of their mothers: one woman was found by the way-side, with two babes lying beside her to whom she had given birth before her broken spirit had fled for ever. Children were frozen in their mothers' arms. The sick and the wounded, from the impossibility of passage for the waggons and cars that bore them, were abandoned to a lingering death, or the merciless sabres of the pursuers. "I looked around," says one who was present in the disastrous scene, "when we had gained the highest point of the slippery precipices over which we were hurrying, and saw the rear of the army winding

along the narrow road. I saw their way marked by the wretched people that lay on all sides, expiring from fatigue and cold; their bodies reddened, in spots, the white surface of the ground. The saddest indications of human misery and suffering presented themselves on the whole line of march."

Nor was this the condition of the main body alone. The retreat of the light division, under Craufurd, from Bonillos to Vigo, was equally calamitous. Their route lay through a wild and mountainous country, presenting the appearance of a wilderness of the most dreary and desolate nature. Long day and night marches, fatigue, want of food, and all the miseries and wretchedness attendant on a rapid retreat, had, with as unsparing a hand, done their work, as with the main body of the army. The snow that lay on the ground was dotted along the whole line of the retreat with the dead and dying bodies of men, women, and children, as also of mules and horses. Clusters of men and women were to be seen sitting huddled together in the road, their heads drooping forwards, and apparently waiting for death to put an end to their misery. Whenever any one sank down from fatigue or exhaustion, there he generally found his last resting-place. The whole division presented the appearance of the most abject wretchedness and misery. The wayworn and gaunt figures of the men—their ghastly features—their heads swathed in old rags, or tied up in fragments of handkerchiefs—their clothes and accoutrements hanging in tatters—gave them the appearance of moving corpses. The scenes among the women and children were infinitely more distressing. During the whole of the calamitous retreat, the condition of the women, both of the light division and the main body of the army, was distressing in the extreme. They were to be seen huddled together in the rear, with their ragged and scanty clothing displaying their bare limbs to the inclemency of the season, and with their husbands' tattered great coats buttoned over their heads, presenting the appearance of a tribe of migratory gipsies. But great and severe as their distress and sufferings were, their fortitude and resignation under them drew forth the admiration of the whole division. One instance deserves special remembrance. One of the men's wives being overtaken by labour-pains, laid herself down in the snow, a little out of the main road,

and was delivered of a male infant, her husband being her only attendant. In the course of a few hours after her delivery, she was seen among the ranks with her newborn babe in her arms. Cases of this nature occurred more than once during the Peninsular war.

On the approach of the army to the village of Constantine, the French, not aware that a bridge was constructed there, pressed the pursuit hotly, in order to harass the retreating army in effecting its passage of the river; but they were repulsed in their attack. To check the pursuit, the reserve under brigadier-general Paget was appointed to impede the passage of the river, while the main body continued its route to Lugo; which town it reached on the 5th of January. The reserve, though repeatedly assailed by the enemy, held its ground firmly till midnight, when it retired on the main body, and was bivouacked either in position or cantoned in and round the town. The French on the same day quickly appeared in front of Lugo, and took up a position on a mountainous ridge, opposite the rear guard of the British, only the width of a narrow valley intervening between the positions of the hostile armies.

On the 6th, preparations having been made for battle, the troops, as soon as they knew that their colours were planted in bivouac on a line of battle, hurried to their ranks; subordination and discipline immediately assumed their ascendancy, and the organization of the disorderly battalions became, as if by magic, complete; and as they examined their locks, fixed their flints, and loosened in the scabbards those bayonets which the pouring rain had rusted fast in the sheaths, they again looked to their officers with the regard of a ready obedience and a brave devotion—a fact, confirming the just estimate and appropriate metaphor of one who well understands the qualities of the British soldier:—"A British army may be gleaned in a retreat, but cannot be reaped. Whatever may be their misery, the soldiers are always to be found ready at the fight."

The position chosen for the field of battle was tolerably strong. The centre being formed among vineyards, separated from each other by low stone walls, was difficult to attack. The right being flanked by rocks and ravines, was not easily to be turned; but the left was vulnerable. With the first dawn of the following morning the guns of

the French opened, but were quickly silenced by the British artillery. Attacks were then made on the centres of the English line; a feint was made on the right wing; and a column of considerable magnitude, covered by a cloud of tirailleurs, ascended the hill on the left, and drove in the pickets and a wing of the 76th; but those troops falling back on the 51st, which was stationed in their rear, the enemy was driven down the hill with great slaughter, at the point of the bayonet; and having been repulsed at all points, retreated to his position, with the loss of 400 men. At the attack of the right wing, the 51st falling back behind the stone walls, sir John Moore, at the head of his staff, rushed forward, with his hat in his hand, exclaiming, "Recollect, men, I was your lieutenant-colonel—follow me;" and gallantly leading the regiment to the charge, they rapidly drove back their assailants.

Advantageous positions had presented themselves for offering battle before the army had reached Lugo. From Villa Franca to Lugo, the tract of country called the *Biergo*, lying between the two great ranges of mountains that trend north to south, is very rugged and much wooded, with numerous enclosures, consisting of low stone walls, built around vineyards and plantations of mulberry trees. Here could have been selected many desirable positions in which battle might have been offered to the enemy; and in the event of his declining to accept it, an action might have been brought on by the employment of those feints which a retreating army has it in its power to call into practice without implicating its safety or credit.

On the dawn of the 8th, the English army was again drawn up ready for the contest; and, though both armies stood embattled opposite to each other during the whole day, amidst storms of rain and snow, no hostile occurrence took place. In the words of a French historian, "The British stood to their arms, again offering battle, and giving defiance to the enemy. But the French were not equally eager for the fight; they looked back from the hills on which they were posted, but did not venture to descend. The trial which they had made of their enemies, on the two preceding days, was not such as to encourage them." Besides, as the same author has observed in another part of his work, "the French commander-in-chief well knew, that 'fatigue would do

his work more surely than the sword.'"

As the enemy declined the offer of battle, the continuance of the retreat was again ordered to be resumed; and to deceive the enemy, the troops were directed to erect huts, and leave their bivouac fires burning. At ten o'clock at night, in silent order, the army filed off to the rear, by different routes, leading towards Betanzos; the position which had been chosen for the field of battle being about five miles distant from that town. The retreat commenced in a frightful storm of hail, rain, sleet, and wind. As the divisions advanced, the storm raged with increased violence; wind, hail, and sleet, swept so resistlessly across the plains, that it was with difficulty the lines could be induced to face the tempest; and to add to the misery of the troops, the bundles of straw that had been placed at certain distances to mark the tracks of march to be pursued in the night, had been swept away by the violence of the storm. The consequence was, only one division was enabled to gain the main road; the two others became bewildered, and after a night-march of five hours were still near Lugo. During the march of the following day, the troops temporarily bivouacked near the villages of Guilleriz and Valmeda, for a few hours, on ground streaming with water, and the rain and snow descending in torrents at the same time. In the second night's march, the whole army became disorganized, and the discipline and subordination which the stand at Lugo had tended to restore, was now no longer regarded or considered of any importance. The whole army became a continuous line of stragglers, and the repetition of the licentiousness and marauding that had disgraced the retreat to Lugo, again took place; the idea of fleeing from an enemy with whom they ardently longed to contend, had made so terrible havoc, both moral and physical, in their discipline and conduct, that they resembled more a tumultuous rabble than a gallant and an invincible army. At this time the Royals mustered with the colours only nine officers, three serjeants, and three privates; the rest had straggled on the march from Lugo. Most of the other regiments were equally disorganized. There was a memorable instance in this part of the retreat, of what might have been accomplished by presence of mind and by discipline among the stragglers. A party of invalids, between Lugo and Betanzos, were closely pressed by two

squadrons of the enemy's cavalry. Serjeant Newman, of the 2nd battalion, 43rd, was among them; not being able to pass those poor men, he rallied round him such as were capable of making any resistance, and directed the others to proceed as well as they could. He formed the party regularly into divisions, and commenced firing and retiring in an orderly manner, till he effectually covered the retreat of his disabled comrades, and made the cavalry give up the pursuit.

On the morning of the 10th, the columns reached Betanzos, where a halt was made to collect the stragglers, and re-organize the army. On that day the weather changed favourably, and the army again resumed its retreat on Corunna, in an orderly and compact body, amounting to 14,000 men. The loss from sickness, insubordination, and the casualties of the service, had amounted to nearly one-fourth of its original complement. The retreat between Sahagun and Lugo had occasioned the loss of 1,500 men; but more than twice that number perished between Lugo and Betanzos. But great as the loss had been, it was highly gratifying to reflect that it had not been inflicted by the enemy. Neither had any military trophy, gun or standard, fallen into his hands; and in the numerous affairs of posts that had taken place between the hostile armies, the French could not boast of one favourable issue, or even the most trifling advantage. Of the stragglers, near 1,000 found their way across the country to Portugal, after the battle of Corunna. "The good countenance that had been shown by the reserve, the partial actions at Lugo, and the risk to which they had been exposed of a general one" (to adopt the language of M. Thiers) "checked the French in their pursuit, and marshal Soult was too sensible of the danger he had escaped to trust himself again too near the British without a superior force." For these reasons the retreating army met with no interruption from the enemy, from the night of its reaching Valmuda to its arrival at Corunna, except on the evening of its reaching Betanzos, when the advanced guard of the French cavalry pressed on the British rear, but were quickly driven off by a volley from the English rear-guard.

* Corunna, or according to Spanish orthography, La Coruna, stands on the neck of a peninsular promontory, which widely extends into the ocean at the entrance of the Bay of Betanzos, or as it is otherwise called the Groyne, and at the head of a spacious

The leading division reached Corunna* in the course of the 11th of January. The three divisions took up their quarters in the town and suburbs, and the reserve was posted at the village of El Burgo. The defences by which the town could be approached were immediately put into a state of repair, and a position for a battle-field was selected. A rocky ridge, about three miles from the town, taking its rise on the river Mero, just behind the village of El Burgo, sweeping round to the north, and terminating on the ocean, presented a natural rampart. This would have been highly eligible for an army in sufficient force to defend it; but as that position was too extensive for the English army, an inferior ridge of heights, or rather swelling knolls, which form a sort of amphitheatre round the village of Elvina, and only two miles distant from Corunna, was chosen, though circumscribed, in a measure, by the large ridge before mentioned, and commanded by it within the range of cannon-shot.

The next object that claimed the attention of the commander-in-chief was the abundant magazines of stores, &c., which had been sent to Corunna by the English government for the use of the patriots. From those stores, fresh muskets, bayonets, flints, &c., were issued to the troops, for the battered and rusty arms they then had. The magazines containing the powder (between six and seven thousand barrels), and which were situated about three miles from the town, were blown up. The explosion was tremendous. "The earth trembled for miles; the rocks were torn from their bases; and the agitated waters rocked the vessels that were in the harbour as if they had been in a storm;" while a perpendicular column of flame and smoke rose to a considerable height, discharging a shower of stones and fragments, and bursting with a deafening roar, killed many persons within its reach, and destroyed a village.

The fleet of transports hove in sight on the evening of the 14th. On its coming to anchor, the women, children, sick, and wounded were immediately carried on board. A large portion of the artillery (fifty-two guns), the stores, and all the best horses,

harbour. It is defended by a chain of bastions, and a strong citadel which partly commands the road. At the time of the battle of Corunna, the fortifications were in a dilapidated state.

together with the dismounted men, followed. The foundered horses were shot, to put an end to their sufferings, as well as to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. During the transaction, many of the poor animals, anticipating their fate, broke loose and escaped. They eventually fell into the hands of the French.

On the 12th, the enemy had appeared in front of the town, and covered the heights on the opposite side of the Mero, extending from the village of El Burgo to the ocean. On the 13th, Baird's division marched into position, and the other brigades followed to their allotted posts. The position of the British army was,—General Hope occupied a hill to the left, with one division, with which he commanded the road to Betanzos, as the height sloped away gradually in a curve towards the village of Elvina, where Baird's division was posted. On Baird's right, the rifle brigade threw itself in extended order across the valley, and communicated with general Frazer's division, which was drawn up about a mile from Corunna, near the Vigo road. The reserve, under general Paget, occupied a village on the road to Betanzos, about half-a-mile in the rear of general Hope.

On the same day that the fleet of transports arrived, the French, having repaired the bridge of El Burgo, over the broad and swampy river that separated the two armies, pushed a considerable body of infantry and cavalry across the river; and on the 15th they constructed a battery, consisting of eleven guns of large calibre, in a commanding position along the range of the heights above the northern branch of the river, and, at the same time, the whole elevated outer ridge was covered with troops.

On the 16th, as no demonstration of a battle-movement had been made by the enemy, except a partial cannonade, orders were issued to prepare for embarkation in the course of the night; but, about two o'clock, the French were observed under arms, and an instant fusilade commenced between the enemy's tirailleurs and the English pickets and light troops. At the same moment four columns crossed the valley, two directing their march on the right of the English position, one moved on the centre, and the fourth threatened the left of the English line. Baird's right was turned, and the village of Elvina, which lay midway between the two positions, was carried by their impetuous onset in this

attack. General Baird's arm being shattered by a grape-shot, he was forced to quit the field. Sir John Moore directed the right wing of the 4th regiment, in order to counteract the effect of the enemy's outflanking movement, to form an acute angle on the rear of the left wing of the regiment, and to pour in a well-directed volley on the flank of the column. In this position they commenced a heavy raking fire, and the general watching the manœuvre, called out to them, "That is exactly what I wanted to be done." Sir John then rode up to the 50th regiment, commanded by majors Napier and Stanhope, who got over an enclosure in their front, and charged most gallantly. This drew from Moore the exclamation, "Well done, 50th! well done my majors." The enemy was driven from Elvina with great slaughter, by the 47th and 50th, but major Napier advancing too far, was wounded, and taken prisoner; and major Stanhope received a mortal wound. Approaching the 42nd regiment, which had formerly prevailed against Buonaparte's "Invincibles," Moore addressed them in these terms,— "Highlanders! remember Egypt!" They rushed on, driving the French before them, till they were stopped by a wall. Sir John accompanied them in their charge, and told them he was well pleased with their conduct. Captain Hardinge (now commander-in-chief) was sent to order up a battalion of guards to the left flank of the Highlanders. The officer commanding the light company conceived that as their ammunition was nearly expended, they were to be relieved by the guards, and began to fall back, but sir John discovering the mistake called to them, "My brave 42nd, join your comrades; ammunition is coming, and you have your bayonets." They instantly obeyed, and all moved forward. Captain Hardinge now returned to report that the guards were advancing. While he was speaking and pointing out the situation of the battalion, a hot fire was kept up, and the enemy's artillery played incessantly on the spot. Sir John Moore was too conspicuous. A cannon-ball struck his left shoulder and beat him to the ground. He raised himself, and sat up with unaltered features, looking intently at the Highlanders, who were warmly engaged. Captain Hardinge threw himself from his horse, and took the general by the hand; then marking his anxiety, he told him the 42nd were advancing; upon which his counte-

nance immediately brightened. His friend, colonel Graham, dismounted to assist him, and from the calmness of Moore's countenance entertained hopes that he was not even wounded; but observing the dreadful laceration of his person and the great effusion of blood, he rode off for surgeons. Sir John was carried from the field on a blanket by a serjeant of the 42nd and some soldiers. On the way he ordered captain Hardinge to report his wound to general Hope, who assumed the command of the army. Equally foiled in his attempt to pierce the centre, the French marshal endeavoured, with Delaborde's division, to overthrow the left of the British line. This attack was also rendered abortive by generals Hope and Paget's commands. Being thus unsuccessful on all points, his centre being defeated and broken, and his left turned, he fell back, as night came on, upon the high ridge of hills from which he had descended, darkness alone preventing his complete deroute; at the same time, the British line being considerably in advance on the ground it had occupied at the commencement of the action.

On the cessation of the battle, fires being kindled along the lines, and strong pickets (consisting of 2,000 men, under Beresford, in the lines and in the front of Corunna, and a reserve under Hill on a promontory behind the town), being left to guard the ground and watch the movements of the enemy; the victorious troops, at ten o'clock, filed down from the field of battle, and passed the night in embarking. At day-break, the enemy perceiving that the English had left their position (the pickets having been at that moment withdrawn), constructed a battery on the height of St. Lucia, so as to bear on the English shipping; but before the battery opened, the greater part of the troops had been embarked. Many of the masters of the transports, alarmed at the cannonade, having cut their cables, some of the vessels ran foul of each other. A few transports being wrecked, were burnt by the English navy. Hill and Beresford, with the rear-guard, embarked on the 17th; and in

the course of the afternoon of that day, the whole fleet was under weigh for England, with a fair wind. But, unfortunately, in the course of the voyage, it was scattered by a violent storm; and many transports were much damaged, and the Despatch transport lost, on board of which were 3 officers, 133 non-commissioned officers and privates, 4 women, and 68 horses of the 7th dragoons. The troops on their disembarkation presented a piteous appearance; haggard countenances, tattered garments, and damaged accoutrements; but their honour and courage untarnished, and their country's glory extended.

Thus ended the battle of Corunna, which, considering the numerical superiority of the French army, both in men and artillery, and the comparative moral and physical condition of the contending armies, a circumstance which, of course, rendered the disadvantage still greater on the part of the English in the contest, reflects no less credit on the talents and genius of the general, than it does on the courage and invincibility of his troops that won it, and "in that prodigious stand and noble feat of arms," as Thiers has had the candour and generosity to term it, immortalized their country's name.

The amount of the English army under arms was 14,500 men, but neither Hope's nor Frazer's divisions were engaged. Had they been engaged, and night not have intervened, the fate of the French army would have been inevitable, as its powder was nearly exhausted at the time of their falling back, and the Mero in its rear, the only passage over that river available for them, being the narrow bridge at El Burgo. The enemy's force exceeded 20,000 men. The British artillery consisted of twelve 6-pounders; but it was soon silenced by the number and superior weight of the enemy's guns. The loss of the English was 800 in killed* and wounded. The French admitted theirs to be double that number; but the truth is that it thrice exceeded it. Sir John Moore, while applauding the repulse of the enemy from the village of Elvina, was

* Among the killed and wounded were the two majors of the 50th; Lincoln Stanhope, the third son of the earl of Harrington, and the present sir Charles Napier. While the body of major Stanhope was being committed to the grave, his brother, captain Fitzroy Stanhope, aid-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, stooping forward to take a last view of the remains of his gallant brother, nearly escaped sharing the same grave, a ball from the

enemy passing through his cloak. Major Napier having been left for dead on the field of battle, where he received six wounds, a French soldier was about cutting off his head, when a French drummer interposed and saved him. The major was taken to Soult's quarters and kindly treated until exchanged. When Napoleon Buonaparte heard of the gallant generosity of the drummer, he presented him with the cross of the Legion of Honour.

wounded by a cannon ball, which carried away his left shoulder and part of the collar bone, leaving the arm hanging by the flesh. He died soon after he was carried out of the field. He was buried during the night of the embarkation in the rampart of the citadel. At midnight, he was borne to the grave (which had been prepared by a party of the 9th regiment), by colonel Graham, major Colborne, and his aides-de-camp, and, being laid in his bed of honour, wrapped in his camp-cloak, was "left alone in his glory."

The following inscription appears on a small column erected in the place where the battle had been fought, by the marquis Romana, to the memory of general Moore:

"A la Gloria

del

Exmo. Sir D. JUAN MOORE, Gen. del Exto Inglesse,
Y a la de sus valientes compatriotas

"

Espana agradecida."

And on the other side,

"Battalla de Coruna a 16 de Enero
Año 1809."

Marshal Soult directed the French consul, M. Foureroy, to cause the following inscription to be engraven on a rock near the spot where the English general was wounded:

"Hic cecitit JOHANNES MOORE, Dux Exercitûs
Anglicani,

In Pugua, Januarii xvi., 1809,

Contra Gallos, a duce Dalmatiæ ductos;"

but the order not having been carried into effect, marshal Ney caused a monument to be erected over the remains of sir John Moore; surmounted by a slab having on both its sides the sublimely simple inscription:

"JOHN MOORE,

Leader of the British Armies,

Slain in Battle, 1809."

The reputation of sir John Moore has been much assailed, and his judgment impugned, by those presumptuous and weak-minded men, who think that they have a prescriptive right "to find fault with unsuccessful measures." They condemn his halt at Salamanca; but in their condemnatory criticism they forget that had he advanced he must have left both his flank divisions unprotected; or that, if he had advanced to form a junction with one, he might have jeopardized the safety of the other. They find fault with his not advancing into the heart of Spain. Could there ever have been a more insane act? What! with eight corps d'armée, each ex-

ceeding his army, advancing on his flanks, and the rabble armies of the patriots routed and scattered, would it have been prudent to compromise the safety of his army, by submitting to the follies and caprices of infatuated and apathetic friends, and the delusions and designs of treacherous allies? The attempt might, possibly, have been attended with some partial and temporary success; but a conscientious self-denial made the British chief hesitate to risk the safety of his army on the desperate hazards of a chivalric effort; and for this preference he merits the gratitude of his country. Some of his critics have assigned the cause of his determination to retreat "to his melancholic and desponding temperament;" others assert, "that an excessive sensibility embarrassed his decisions;" and some, that he was "deficient" in that stern sufficiency of thought that marks the unhesitating character of the general.

Such are the objections of his critics. Had they condemned the subdivision which he made of his force, in the case of the light division, and the despatching that body by a different route to that pursued by the main body—had they reprehended his omission of taking advantage of the many defensible positions for offering battle which the Bierzo (a tract about twelve miles square, and enclosed by mountains, and one of the most defensible in Europe,) afforded—had they expressed their disapprobation of his declining to attack Soult at Lugo—had they reprehended his omission of having established a base or line of operations—or had they asserted, that if he had thrown himself behind the bridge of Almarez, on the Tagus (an almost impregnable situation)—or had they said that by retiring on Lisbon instead of Corunna (which was the shorter road), he would have increased the difficulties of Soult and Lefebvre, by widening the communications they would have had to maintain, thus compelling them to weaken themselves, by leaving behind them a greater number of detachments, (an operation subsequently executed by sir Arthur Wellesley with decided success,) he would have given time for the reorganization of the Spanish armies, and have furnished the troops of Romana and the peasants of Galicia and Portugal with the opportunity of carrying on a harassing warfare against the French detachments—there would have been some appearance of reason in their reproof, and they would have indicated that they possessed some know-

ledge of military science and enterprise. Had sir John Moore, instead of exhausting the strength and spirit of his gallant army in a harassing and an inglorious movement, put forth that strength and spirit on the field of battle, there is but little doubt that he would have secured, by a gallant victory, a safe and an unmolested retreat; and that there would have been less loss of the lives of his comrades by that victory than occurred in the precipitate retreat. The insubordination and excesses which disgraced the arms of England in that affair would also have been obviated. Sir John Moore's great error was an hallucination of belief in the invincibility of the French and the superiority of their military genius, and too subdued an opinion of the indomitable courage and military qualifications of his own countrymen. In the words of a distinguished French historian, "it was his misfortune to have imbibed that exaggerated opinion of the French, as a military people, the ability of their generals, and the consummate wisdom of their emperor, which the enemies of government in England were always labouring to produce for humbling the spirit of their country."

The true, and no doubt a most potent and influencing cause, that determined sir John Moore to retire before the enemy, was the temporizing, perverse, and apathetic—often treacherous—conduct of the Spanish juntas and their imbecile and arrogant generals. Those incompetent and presumptuous men, instead of adopting measures for the promotion of the cause, were employed in cabals for furthering their own private interests. When they did devote their attention to the affairs of the public, they often carried their proceedings to the climax of absurdity; many of their arrangements having been made consequent on the expulsion of the French from Spain, and only to take effect when the last of the invaders should be driven across the Pyrenees by their invincible armies and their own sage counsels. Their cupidity also was insatiable; and their bad faith and treachery were no less conspicuous than their folly and arrogance. In some instances, they openly divided among themselves the treasure and stores furnished by England for the maintenance and use of the Spanish armies.

* But fearful of meeting that "twenty thousand," or even not a sixth of it (which was the amount of Hope's division), "the magnanimous Napoleon"—"the greatest captain of the age"—"the genius of

Whether there is, or is not, much truth in the criticisms just stated, it is certain that he mainly contributed to the salvation of Spain, by withdrawing the attention of the French from their operations against the patriots, and thus affording them time and opportunity for retrieving their disasters. By his advance to Sahagun, he also arrested the march of the fourth corps d'armée on Lisbon; that force being obliged to cross the Tagus to aid the main body of the army.

But without taking into consideration whether the English general was right or wrong in his decision to retreat, the name of Moore ought, as sir John Hope observed in his despatch to the secretary of state, "ever to remain sacred to his country," and venerated by every real soldier and true-hearted Englishman. To his memory, the women of England, Ireland, and Scotland owe, in an emphatic manner, eternal and unbounded gratitude. By his firmness and foresight, the lives of near 20,000 of the sons of those brave nations were saved from the bitter and remorseless vengeance of the Corsican despot. In one of his inflated bulletins, issued during the presence of the British army in the Peninsula, "the great and magnanimous Napoleon," as his sycophantic adulators and infatuated admirers style him, and in which he states, "that all the evils, all the plagues which can afflict the human race come from London," he gives birth to the following monstrous and savage expression—an expression which would have disgraced the most ruthless barbarian that ever cursed the face of the earth:—"Oh!" exclaims, in an ecstasy of the most inhuman delight, "the magnanimous Napoleon!"—"oh, that they might be met with to the number of eighty or a hundred thousand men, instead of twenty thousand,* that English mothers may feel the evils of war." In another part of the same disgusting production, he says, "Oh! that they may dye with their blood this continent. The day," he adds, "will be a day of jubilee for the French army." After perusing these declarations of rancorous hatred and implacable revenge—of demon spite and rancour, I appeal to the decision of every right-minded man, be his nature what it may, whether "the idol of mankind"—"the man of the people"—

war," could condescend to enter into a plot with the traitor Morla, to trepan, in dribblets, Hope's division, into his clutches: so just a dread had that meanest of heroes of British soldiers.

"the friend of humanity"—"the patron of liberty"—"the legislator for the millions"—"the regenerator of nations"—"the untainted, unambitious, immaculate, and magnanimous Napoleon"—with all the other nauseous, insane, and ridiculous epithets with which folly, ignorance, and superstition—which hate of the country of their birth, its honour, its happiness, and its integrity—have invested their idol, and imposed on the understanding of the weak-minded and the credulous, are not deserving of contempt and ridicule?

Sir John Moore's character may be summed up in few words. He was brave, moral, high-minded, and good, in the highest degree which our frail nature will admit. No man that ever adopted the glorious profession of arms afforded so positive a demonstration as he did, in the course of his spotless and honourable life, that "religion is a necessary ingredient in the perfect military character." His military talents were of the first order: his only defect, as has been just said, a mistaken notion of the superiority of French military talent and prowess.

As in the detail of the particulars of the fall and death of sir John Moore, a material variance prevails, the following letter describing that event by captain Hardinge, who was one of the general's aides-de-camp, as also lieutenant-colonel Anderson's communications on the same subject, appear appropriate appendages to the preceding account of that event. At the moment before sir John received his wound, captain Hardinge had just returned from ordering up the guards to the support of the 42nd, and was repeating to the general, that the guards were advancing, as he was struck by the cannon-ball.

"The circumstances which took place immediately after the fatal blow which deprived the army of its gallant commander, sir John Moore, are of too interesting a nature not to be made public, for the admiration of his countrymen. But I trust that the instances of fortitude and heroism of which I was witness, may also have another effect, that of affording some consolation to his relatives and friends. With this feeling I have great satisfaction in committing to paper, according to your desire, the following relation. I had been ordered by the commander-in-chief to desire a battalion of guards to advance; which battalion was at one time intended to have dislodged a corps of the enemy from a large house and garden

on the opposite side of the valley; and I was pointing out to the general the situation of the battalion, and our horses were touching each other, at the very moment when a cannon-shot from the enemy's battery carried away his left shoulder and part of the collar-bone, leaving the arm hanging by the flesh. The violence of the stroke threw him off his horse on his back. Not a muscle of his face altered, nor did a sigh betray the least emotion of pain. I dismounted, and taking his hand, he pressed mine forcibly, casting his eyes very anxiously towards the 42nd regiment, which was hotly engaged; and his countenance expressed satisfaction when I informed him that the regiment was advancing. Assisted by a soldier of the 42nd, he was removed a few yards behind the shelter of a wall. Colonel Graham Balgowan, and captain Woodford, about this time came up; and, perceiving the state of sir John's wound, instantly rode off for a surgeon; the blood flowed fast, but the attempt to stop it with my sash was fruitless from the size of the wound. Sir John assented to being removed in a blanket to the rear. In raising him for that purpose, his sword hanging on the wounded side, touched his arm, and became entangled between his legs. I perceived the inconvenience, and was in the act of unbuckling it from his waist, when he said, in his usual tone and manner, and in a very distinct voice, 'It is well as it is. I had rather it should go out of the field with me.' Here I feel that it would be improper for my pen to venture to express the admiration with which I am penetrated in thus faithfully recording this instance of invincible fortitude, and military delicacy of this great man. He was borne by six soldiers of the 42nd and guards, my sash supporting him in an easy posture. Observing the resolution and composure of his features, I caught at the hope, that the wound would not prove mortal; and remarked, that I trusted when the surgeons dressed the wound, that he would be spared to us, and recover. He then turned his head round, and looking steadfastly at the wound for a few seconds, said, 'No, Hardinge, I feel that to be impossible.' I wished to accompany him to the rear, when he said, 'you need not go with me. Report to general Hope that I am wounded, and carried to the rear.' A serjeant of the 42nd and two spare files, in case of accident, were ordered to conduct their brave general

to Corunna; and I hastened to report to general Hope.

"I have the honour to be, &c.,

"H. HARDINGE."

The following is the report of colonel Anderson:—

"The tidings of this disaster were brought to sir David Baird while the surgeons were dressing his arm. He desired them instantly to attend on sir John Moore. When they reached the general, and offered their assistance, he said to them, 'You can be of no service to me; go to the soldiers, to whom you may be useful.' As the soldiers were carrying him slowly along, he made them turn him round frequently to view the field of battle, and to listen to the firing, and appeared to be well pleased when the sound grew fainter. A spring waggon, bearing colonel Wynch, wounded from the battle, came up. The colonel asked—'Who was in the blanket?' and being told it was sir John Moore, he wished him to be placed in the waggon. The general asked one of the highlanders whether he thought the waggon or the blanket best? who answered, that the blanket would not shake him so much, as he and the other soldiers would keep their step, and carry him easy. Sir John Moore replied, 'I think so too;' so they proceeded with him to Corunna, the soldiers shedding tears as they went. In carrying him through the passage of the house where he was to take up his quarters, he saw his faithful servant François, who was stunned at the spectacle. Sir John said to him, smiling, 'My friend, this is nothing.'"

The colonel continues:—"I met the general, on the evening of the 16th, being brought in a blanket and sashes. He knew me immediately, though it was almost dark, squeezed my hand, and said, 'Anderson, don't leave me.' He spoke to the surgeons, on their examining his wound; but was in such pain, he could say little. After some time, he seemed very anxious to speak to me, and, at intervals, got out as follows:—"Anderson, you know that I have always wished to die this way." He then asked, 'Are the French beaten?' which he repeated to every one he knew, as they came in. 'I hope the people of England will be satisfied! I hope my country will do me justice! Anderson, you will see my friends as soon as you can: tell them everything; say to my mother'—here his voice quite failed, and he was exceedingly agi-

tated—"Hope—Hope—I have much to say to him—but—cannot get it out. Are colonel Graham and all my aides-de-camp well?"—(A private sign was made by colonel Anderson not to inform him that captain —, one of his aides-de-camp, was wounded in the action.)—"I have made my will, and have remembered my servants: Colborne has my will, and all my papers.' Major Colborne then came into the room. He spoke most kindly to him; and then said to me, 'Anderson, remember you go to —, and tell him it is my request, and that I expect he will give major Colborne a lieutenant-colonelcy: he has been long with me, and I know him most worthy of it.' He then asked major Colborne 'if the French were beaten?' and on being told that they were on every point, he said, 'It is a great satisfaction to me to know we have beaten the French. Is Paget in the room?' On my telling him no, he said, 'Remember me to him—it's general Paget I mean—he is a fine fellow. I feel myself so strong. I fear I shall be long dying. It is great uneasiness—it is great pain. Everything François says is right: I have the greatest confidence in him.' He thanked the surgeons for their trouble. Captains Percy and Stanhope, two of his aides-de-camp, then came into the room. He spoke kindly to both, and asked Percy 'If all his aides-de-camp were well?' After some interval, he said, 'Stanhope, remember me to your sister.' He then pressed my hand close to his body, and, in a few moments, died without a struggle. This was every syllable he uttered, as far as I can recollect, except asking occasionally to be placed in an easier posture."

We here append sir John Moore's last despatch, a document of great value and interest, as it is explanatory of the motives and causes which induced that high-minded and accomplished soldier to adopt the measures he did while in command of the British army present in Spain during that part of the Peninsular war in which he held his command. In estimating the character and services of that "great and good man," the opinion of one fully competent to the task should be taken into consideration. "The only error," said the late duke of Wellington, "I can discern in sir John Moore's campaign is, that he ought to have looked on the advance to Sahagun as a movement in retreat, and have sent officers to the rear to mark and arrange

the halting-points of each brigade. But this is an opinion formed after a long experience of war, and especially of Spanish war, which must be seen to be understood. Finally, it is an opinion formed after the event."

On the 13th, sir John Moore, having been on horseback from daybreak, making every arrangement for battle, returned about eleven in the forenoon to his quarters, and being exhausted with fatigue, sent for brigadier-general Stewart, and telling him that he was incapable of writing, desired him to proceed to England, and as he was a competent judge, to explain to the ministers the situation of the army. But the vessel in which the general was to proceed not being quite ready, and sir John Moore recovering from his fatigue after taking some refreshment, he wrote off his last despatch to the British government:—

"Corunna, 13th June, 1809.

"MY LORD,—Situated as this army is at present, it is impossible for me to detail to your lordship the events which have taken place since I had the honour to address you from Astorga, on the 31st December. I have, therefore, determined to send to England brigadier-general Charles Stewart, as the officer best qualified to give you every information you can want, both with respect to our actual situation, and the events which have led to it. From his connexion with your lordship, and with his majesty's ministers, whatever he relates is most likely to be believed. He is a man in whose honour I have the most perfect reliance; he is incapable of stating anything but the truth; and it is the truth which, at all times, I wish to convey to your lordship and to the king's government.

"Your lordship knows that had I followed my own opinion as a military man, I should have retired with the army from Salamanca. The Spanish armies were then beaten; there was no Spanish force to which we could unite; and I was satisfied that no effort would be made to aid us, or favour the cause in which we were engaged. I was sensible, however, that the apathy and indifference of the Spaniards would never have been believed; that had the British been withdrawn, the loss of the cause would have been imputed to their retreat; and it was necessary to risk this army to convince the people of England, as well as the rest of Europe, that the Spaniards had neither the power nor the inclination to make any efforts for themselves. It was for this rea-

son that I marched to Sahagun. As a diversion, it succeeded. I brought the whole disposable force of the French against this army, and it has been allowed to follow it, without a single movement being made to favour its retreat. The people of the Gallicias, though armed, made no attempt to stop the passage of the French through their mountains. They abandoned their dwellings at our approach, drove away their carts, oxen, and every thing that could be of the smallest aid to the army. The consequence has been, that our sick have been left behind, and when our horses and mules failed, which, on such marches, and through such a country, was the case to a great extent, baggage, ammunition, stores, and even money, were necessarily destroyed, or abandoned.

"I am sorry to say, that the army, whose conduct I had so much reason to extol on its march through Portugal, and on its arrival in Spain, has totally changed its character since it began to retreat. I can say nothing in its favour, but that when there was a prospect of fighting the enemy, the men were then orderly, and seemed pleased, and determined to do their duty. In front of Villa Franca, the French came up with the reserve, with which I was covering the retreat of the army. They attacked it at Calcabalos. It retired, covered by the 95th regiment, and marched that night to Herrierias, and thence to Nogales and Lugo; where I had ordered the different divisions which preceded to halt and collect. At Lugo, the French again came up with me; they attacked our advanced posts on the 6th and 7th, and were repulsed in both attempts, with little loss on our side.

"I heard from the prisoners taken that three divisions of the French army, commanded by marshal Soult, were come up. I therefore expected to be attacked on the morning of the 8th. It was my wish to come to that issue; I had perfect confidence in the valour of the troops, and it was only by crippling the enemy that we could hope either to retreat or to embark unmolested. I made every preparation to receive the attack; and drew out the army in the morning to offer battle. This was not marshal Soult's object; he either did not think himself sufficiently strong, or he wished to play a surer game, by attacking us on our march, or during our embarkation. The country was intersected, and his position too strong for me to attack with an inferior force. The

want of provisions would not allow me to wait longer; I marched that night; and, in two forced marches, bivouacked for six or eight hours in the rain. I reached Betanzos on the 10th instant.

"At Lugo I was sensible of the improbability of reaching Vigo, which was at too great a distance, and offered no advantages to embark in the face of an enemy. My intention then was to have retreated to the peninsula of Betanzos, where I hoped to find a position to cover the embarkation of the army in Ares or Rodes Bays; but having sent an officer to reconnoitre it, by his report, I was determined to prefer this place. I gave notice to the admiral of my intention, and begged that the transports might be brought to Corunna. Had I found them here on my arrival on the 11th instant, the embarkation would have been easily effected; for I had gained several marches on the French. They have now come up with us; the transports are not arrived. My position in front of this place is a very bad one; and this place, if I am forced to retire into it, is commanded within musket-shot; and the harbour will be so commanded by cannon on the coast, that no ship will be able to lie in it. In short, my lord, general Stewart will inform you how critical our position is. It has been recommended to me, to make a proposal to the enemy to induce him to allow us to embark quietly; in which case, he gets us out of the country soon, and obtains this place with its stores, &c., complete; that otherwise, we have it in our power to make a long defence, which must ensure the destruction of the town. I am averse to make any such proposal; and am exceedingly doubtful if it would be attended with any good effect; but whatever I resolve on this head, I hope your lordship will rest assured, that I shall accept no terms that are in the least dishonourable to the army or to the country. I feel that I have been led into greater length and more detail than I thought I could have had time for. I have written under interruptions, and with my mind much occupied with other matter. My letter written so carelessly can only be considered as private; when I have more leisure, I shall write more correctly. In the meantime, I rely on general Stewart for giving your lordship the information and detail which I have omitted. I should regret his absence, for his services have been very distinguished; but the state of his eyes

makes it impossible for him to recover, and this country is not one in which cavalry can be of much use. If I succeed in embarking the army, I shall send it to England: it is quite unfit for further service until it has been refitted, which can best be done there.

"I have the honour to be, &c.,

"JOHN MOORE."

The despatch of general Hope, addressed to sir David Baird, and which for its eloquence and fidelity of narration is a model for such documents, states with so admirable precision the circumstances of the battle, that its introduction here seems indispensable. This admirable document was written as soon as general Hope had embarked.

"His Majesty's ship Audacious, off Corunna, June 18th, 1809.

"SIR,—In compliance with your desire, contained in your communication of yesterday, I avail myself of the first moment I have been able to command, to detail to you the occurrences which took place in front of Corunna on the 16th instant. It will be in your recollection, that about one in the afternoon of that day, the enemy, who had in the morning received reinforcements, and who had placed some guns in front of the right and left of his line, was observed to be moving troops towards his left flank, and forming various columns of attack at that extremity of the strong and commanding position which, on the morning of the 15th, he had taken more immediately in front. This indication of his intention was immediately succeeded by the rapid and determined attack which he made upon your division, which occupied the right of our position. The events which occurred during that period of the action you are fully acquainted with. The first effort of the enemy was met by the commander-in-chief of the forces, and by yourself at the head of the 42nd regiment, and the brigade under major-general lord William Bentinck. The village on your right became an object of obstinate contest. I lament to say that soon after the severe wound which deprived the army of your services, lieutenant-general sir John Moore, who had just directed the most able disposition, fell by a cannon-shot. The troops, though not unacquainted with the irreparable loss they had sustained, were not discouraged, but by the most determined bravery not only repelled every attempt of the enemy to gain ground, but actually forced him to retire, although he had brought up fresh

troops in support of those originally engaged. The enemy finding himself foiled in every attempt to force the right of the position, endeavoured by numbers to turn it. A judicious and well-timed movement was made by major-general Paget with the reserve (which corps had moved out of its cantonments to support the right of the army), by a vigorous attack, defeated this intention. The major-general having pushed forward the 95th (rifle corps), and first battalion 52nd regiment, drove the enemy before him, and, in his rapid and judicious advance, threatened the left of the enemy's position. This circumstance, with the position of lieutenant-general Frazer's division (calculated to give still further security to the right of the line), induced the enemy to relax his efforts in that quarter. They were, however, more forcibly directed towards the centre, where they were again successfully resisted by the brigade under major-general Manningham, forming the left of your division, and a part of that under major-general Leith, forming the right of the division under my orders. On the left, the enemy at first contented himself with an attack on our pickets, which, however, in general, maintained their ground. Finding, however, his efforts unavailing on the right and centre, he seemed determined to render the attack on the left more serious, and had succeeded in obtaining possession of the village through which the great road to Madrid passes, and which was situated in front of that part of the line. From this post, however, he was soon expelled, with considerable loss, by a gallant attack of some companies of the 2nd battalion 14th regiment, under lieutenant-colonel Nicholls. Before five in the evening we had not only successfully repelled every attack made on the position, but gained ground on almost all points, and occupied a more forward line than at the commencement of the action, whilst the enemy confined his operations to a cannonade, and the fire of his light troops, with a view to draw off his other corps. At six the firing ceased. The different brigades were assembled upon the ground they occupied in the morning, and the pickets and advanced posts resumed their original stations. Notwithstanding the decided and marked superiority which at this moment the gallantry of the troops had given them over an enemy who, from his numbers and the commanding advantages of his position, no doubt expected an easy victory, I did

not, on reviewing all circumstances, conceive that I should be warranted in departing from what I knew was the fixed and previous determination of the late commander of the forces, to withdraw the army on the evening of the 16th, for the purpose of embarkation, the previous arrangements for which had already been made by his order, and were, in fact, far advanced at the commencement of the action. The troops quitted their position about ten at night, with a degree of order that did them credit. The whole of the artillery that remained unembarked, having been withdrawn, the troops followed in the order prescribed, and marched to their respective points of embarkation in the town and neighbourhood of Corunna. The pickets remained at their posts until five in the morning of the 17th, when they were also withdrawn with similar orders, and without the enemy having discovered the movement. By the unremitting exertions of captains the honourable H. Curzon, Gosselin, Boys, Rainier, Serrett, Hawkins, Digby, Carden, and Mackenzie, of the royal navy, who, in pursuance of the orders of the rear-admiral De Courcy, were entrusted with the service of embarking the army; and in consequence of the arrangements made by commissioner Bowen, captains Bowen and Shepherd, and the other agents for transports, the whole of the army was embarked with an expedition which has seldom been equalled. With the exception of the brigades under major-generals Hill and Beresford, which were destined to remain on shore until the movements of the enemy should become manifest, the whole was afloat before daylight.

"The brigade of major-general Beresford, which was alternately to form a rear-guard, occupied the land-front of the town of Corunna; that under major-general Hill was stationed in reserve on the promontory, in rear of the town.

"The enemy pushed his light troops towards the town, soon after eight o'clock in the morning of the 17th, and shortly after occupied the heights of St. Lucia, which command the harbour. But, notwithstanding this circumstance, and the manifold defects of the place; there being no apprehension that the rear-guard could be forced, and the disposition of the Spaniards appearing to be good, the embarkation of major-general Hill's brigade was commenced and completed by three in the afternoon;

major-general Beresford, with that zeal and ability, which is so well known to yourself and the whole army, having fully explained, to the satisfaction of the Spanish governor, the nature of our movement, and having made every previous arrangement, withdrew his corps from the land-front of the town soon after dark, and was, with all the wounded that had not been previously moved, embarked before one this morning.

"Circumstances forbid us to indulge the hope, that the victory with which it has pleased Providence to crown the efforts of the army, can be attended with any very brilliant consequences to Great Britain. It is clouded with the loss of one of her best soldiers. It has been achieved at the termination of a long and harassing service. The superior numbers and advantageous position of the enemy, not less than the actual situation of this army, did not admit of any advantage being reaped from success. It must be, however, to you, to the army, and to our country, the sweetest reflection, that the lustre of the British arms has been maintained amidst many disadvantageous circumstances. The army, which had entered Spain amidst the fairest prospects, had no sooner completed its junction, than, owing to the multiplied disasters that dispersed the native armies around us, it was left to its own resources. The advance of the British corps from the Douro, afforded the best hope that the north of Spain might be relieved; but this generous effort to save the unfortunate people, also afforded the enemy the opportunity of directing every effort of his numerous troops, and concentrating all his powerful resources, for the destruction of the only regular force in the north of Spain. You are well aware with what diligence this system has been pursued.

"These circumstances produced the necessity of rapid and harassing marches, which had diminished the numbers, exhausted the strength, and impaired the equipment of the army. Notwithstanding all these disadvantages, and those more immediately attached to a defensive position, which the imperious necessity of covering the harbour of Corunna for a time had rendered indispensable to assume, the native and undaunted valour of British troops was never more conspicuous, and must have exceeded what even your own experience of that invaluable quality, so inherent in them, may have taught you to expect. When

every one who had an opportunity seemed to vie in improving it, it is difficult for me, in making this report, to select particular instances for your approbation. The corps chiefly engaged were the brigades under major-generals lord William Bentinck, and Manningham and Leith; and the brigade of guards under major-general Warde.

"To their officers and the troops under their immediate orders the greatest praise is due. Major-general Hill and colonel Catlin Craufurd, with their brigades on the left of the position, ably supported their advanced posts. The brunt of the action fell upon the 4th, 42nd, 50th, and 81st regiments, with parts of the brigade of guards, and the 26th regiment. From lieutenant-colonel Murray, quarter-master general, and the officers of the general staff, I received the most marked assistance. I had reason to regret that the illness of brigadier-general Clinton, adjutant-general, deprived me of his aid. I was indebted to brigadier-general Slade during the action for a zealous offer of his personal services, although the cavalry were embarked. The greater part of the fleet having gone to sea yesterday evening, the whole being under weigh, and the corps in the embarkation necessarily much mixed on board, it is impossible at present to lay before you a return of our casualties. I hope the loss in numbers is not so considerable as might have been expected. If I was obliged to form an estimate, I should say, that I believe it did not exceed, in killed and wounded, from seven to eight hundred; that of the enemy must remain unknown, but many circumstances induce me to rate it at nearly double that number. We have some prisoners, but I have not been able to obtain an account of the number; it is not, however, considerable. Several officers of rank have fallen or been wounded, among whom I am only at present enabled to state, lieutenant-colonel Napier, 92nd regiment, majors Napier and Stanhope, 50th regiment, killed;—lieutenant-colonel Wynch, 4th regiment; lieutenant-colonel Maxwell, 26th regiment; lieutenant-colonel Fane, 59th regiment; lieutenant-colonel Griffiths, guards, majors Miller and Williams, 81st regiment, wounded.

"To you, who are well acquainted with the excellent qualities of lieutenant-general sir John Moore, I need not expatiate on the loss the army and his country have sustained by his death. His fall has deprived

me of a valuable friend, to whom long experience of his worth had sincerely attached to me. But it is chiefly on public grounds that I must lament the blow. It will be the consolation of every one who loved or respected his manly character, that, after conducting through an arduous retreat with consummate firmness, he has terminated a career of distinguished honour by a death that has given the enemy additional reason to respect the name of a British soldier. Like the immortal Wolfe, he is snatched from his country at an early period of a life spent in her service! like Wolfe, his last moments were gilded by the prospect of

success, and cheered by the acclamation of victory! like Wolfe, also, his memory will for ever remain sacred in that country which he sincerely loved, and which he had so faithfully served! It remains for me only to express my hope, that you will speedily be restored to the service of your country, and to lament the unfortunate circumstance that removed you from your station on the field, and threw the momentary command in far less able hands.

"I have the honor to be, &c.

"JOHN HOPE, Lieutenant-général.

"To Lieut.-gen. SIR DAVID BAIRD,
&c. &c. &c."

THE SPANISH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE,

A. D. 1808.

FOR the purpose of not interrupting the narrative of sir Arthur Wellesley's campaign in Portugal, and that of sir John Moore in Spain, and rendering the details of their operations inconsecutive and illogical, but passing allusions have been made in these narratives to the struggles of the Portuguese and Spanish nations, with Napoleon and his invading army, in their endeavours to subjugate the Peninsula, and rob its inhabitants of their independence and nationality; a connected and consecutive narrative of those events will now be presented to the reader, to enable him to form a just and an accurate notion of those occurrences—the death-struggle of the patriots for their liberty and honour, and the gigantic and fiendish exertions of their op-

pressors to rob them of those highest of earthly blessings, for the purpose of satiating the reckless and unbounded ambition of a lawless adventurer, and enabling him to obtain, in violation of all the recognised principles of social and moral obligation, the means and resources of gratifying and rewarding the hosts of his desperate and ferocious followers,* and of reconciling the passive and succumbing French nation to his remorseless sacrifice of her youth in the prosecution of his schemes, by exempting it from the necessity of providing the means for his unprincipled and devastating warfare, and compelling the nations on whom he was making his aggressions, to maintain his armies by the medium of requisition.† Another object of his unprincipled invasion of

* M. Rocca, in his *Memoires de la Guerre Française en Péninsule*, enables his readers to form a correct opinion of the desperate and reckless character of the French soldiery. "Our soldiers never inquired to what country we were leading them; if there were provisions whither they were going, it was the only point of view in which they ever considered the geography of the earth." In another part of his interesting volume he gives further elucidation of their extreme ignorance. "As they heard at the beginning of every campaign that they were called on to strike the last blow at the tottering power of England, they confounded that power, in all its forms, with England itself. They judged of the distance which separated them from it by the number of marches they had made for so many years from one end of the world to the other, without having yet reached that kind of

imaginary and distant country, which was constantly receding from them. At length, said they, if the desert separated us from it in Egypt, and the sea at Boulogne, we shall reach it by land after we have crossed Spain. That men so informed, and subject to Buonaparte's despotism, should have committed the atrocities in Spain, Portugal, and the other conquered countries, there cannot be much cause of surprise.

† Having in the preceding note furnished the reader with a hint for estimating the character of the French soldiery, the agents in the unprincipled aggression and atrocities of "the imperial armies of France" on the countries they invaded and subdued,—to complete the picture, it is necessary to present him with the means of forming a correct opinion of the principal in that scene of violence and spoliation, of destruction and desolation. For

the Peninsula, was for the purpose of the enforcement of the Berlin decree for the exclusion of British commodities from Spain and Portugal, and thus, as he hoped, by crippling British commerce, eventually subject the hated isle to his despotism, having already reduced the whole of the continent to universal and slavish obedience.

The invasion of Portugal by the French army, under Junôt; the occupation of Oporto by General Carraffa with the Spanish troops, for the purpose of taking possession of that part of the Entre-Minho-e-Douro, which was to be erected into a kingdom, under the title of Northern Lusitania, to the

this purpose he is presented with the estimate of the man by the late poet-laureate, Southey, one of the fairest of critics and the soundest of judges, and as incapable of being the condemnatory partisan as the eulogistic admirer—of the perversion of truth and the distortion of facts—of deceiving his readers by exaggerated and idolatrous praise, or by indiscriminate and unjust condemnation. "Napoleon Buonaparte possessed all the qualities which are required to form a perfect tyrant. His military genius was of the highest order; his talents were of the most imposing kind; his ambition insatiable; his heart impenetrable: he was without honour, without veracity, without conscience; looking for no world beyond the present, and determined to make this world his own, at whatever cost. The military executions committed in Italy by his orders, had shown his contempt for the established usages of war, the law of nations, and the common feelings of humanity; the suppression of the Papal government, the usurpation of the Venetian states, and the seizure of Malta, had proved that neither submissiveness nor treaties afforded any protection against this fit agent of a rapacious and an unprincipled democracy. But it was during the Egyptian expedition that the whole atrocity of his character was displayed. He landed in Egypt, proclaiming that he was the friend of the grand seignior, and that the French were true Mussulmen, who honoured Mahomet and the Koran. His first act was to storm a city belonging to the grand seignior, which he now summoned to surrender, and which was incapable of defence. The butchery was continued some hours after the resistance had ceased. The very perpetrators of this carnage have related, that they put to death old and young, women and children, in the mosques, whither those unoffending and helpless wretches had fled to implore protection from God and from their prophet; and they have avowed that this was done deliberately, for the purpose of astonishing the people. Thus it was that Buonaparte commenced his career in Egypt. He left Alexandria, exclaiming, 'The virtues are on our side! glory to Allah!' He said, 'There is no other God but God; Mahomet is his prophet, and I am his friend.' He proclaimed to the Egyptians that destiny decreed all his operations, and had decreed from the beginning of the world, that after beating down the cross, he should come into that country to fulfil the task assigned him; and he called on them to enjoy the blessings of a system, in which the wisest and the most virtuous

king of Etruria, as an indemnity for his cession of the sovereignty of his Italian possessions in favour of Buonaparte, and the occupation by general Solano with the other contingent of the Spanish troops, of the Alemetjo and the Algarves, which were to form Godoy's kingdom; the embarkation of the royal family of Portugal for the Brazils, and the appointment of a regency to govern the kingdom in the interim; the pillage and butcheries of the French generals on that occasion; the assembling of nearly 70,000 men, and above 100 pieces of artillery, at Bayonne, and their entrance into Spain at the eastern and western extremities of the

were to govern, and the people were to be happy. It is literally true, that the Egyptian mothers mutilated or killed their daughters, to save them from the brutality of his troops; and that wherever the French moved a flock of kites and vultures followed, sure of the repast which those purveyors every where provided for them. Their general entered Syria, took Jaffa by assault, and issued a proclamation on its capture, professing that he would be 'clement and merciful, after the example of God.' Four days after the capture, and after that profession of clemency had been made, he drew out his prisoners, some 3,000 in number, and had them deliberately slaughtered. A whole division of his army was employed in the massacre; and when their cartridges were exhausted, they finished the rest with the bayonet and the sword, dragging away those who had expired in order to get at the living, who, in the hope of escaping death, had endeavoured to hide themselves under the bodies of the dead. To complete this monster's character it was only needful that he should show himself toward his own soldiers as to his prisoners. When sir Sydney Smith and captain Wright, then sir Sydney's lieutenant, compelled him to raise the siege of Acre, the sick and wounded in his army were more than he had the means of removing: any other general would have recommended them to the humanity of an English enemy; but this would have been humiliating to Buonaparte, and therefore poison was administered to them by his orders."

The above is a just estimate of Buonaparte's character. Had other writers shaped their opinions by the same rule, instead of their hyperbolical and idolatrous laudation and panegyric, France and Europe would not have been subjected to those calamities which, for the last four years, have desolated the continent of Europe. Buonaparte was not so much indebted for his success and power to his talents, as to his guileful and extensive system of corruption, fraud, and intimidation. Deceit and misrepresentation were his organs of action and delusion. Labautner, in his *History of the Downfall of the Empire*, incontestably proves that the accounts of the victories, and the relations of the defeats, were garbled. And such were all the other actions of the man whom Napier and Alison, and the herd of French writers from whom they have borrowed their information, find it difficult to devise adequate terms to extol and belpraise, as the god of their culpable idolatry: whom fact and experience have proved was a braggart and a mountebank—the first criminal of Europe.

Pyrenees; the capture of the strong fortresses of Pamplona, Barcelona, Monjuic, Figueras, and St. Sebastian, by French artifice and duplicity; the fraudulent inveiglement by Buonaparte of the Spanish king Charles IV., and his son Ferdinand, to Bayonne; their abdication of the Spanish throne to the Frenchman in exchange for 30,000,000 of Spanish reals to the imbecile father, and 400,000 francs to his equally imbecile son, each pension to be annually paid out of the imperial treasury of France and the relegation of the drivellers, with that extraordinary specimen of virtue, Maria Luiza, and her *cher ami* Godoy, to Valençay, in the interior of France; the abject submission of the Spanish *nobles* and notables at Bayonne, who were "dazzled" as the sycophants and slaves expressed themselves, "by the glory of the invincible emperor; the entrance of the French, under Murat, into Madrid, the slaughter of the inhabitants of that capital by the French troops, and the abject adulation of the grandees, dignitaries, and authorities of the city of Madrid to Joseph Buonaparte, who, they said, "was employed by an over-ruling providence to make Spain happy:" were the subjects which have been stated in the preceding pages; the progress and particulars of the insurrection and the War of Independence are now to be described.

The seizure of the fortresses, and the advance of the French troops, had roused the spirit of the Spaniards; and in that state of public feeling, the slaughter of Madrid, and the transactions at Bayonne, were no sooner known, than the people, by an instantaneous impulse, manifested a determination to resist the insolent usurpation, and free their country from its oppressors. They rose in general and simultaneous insurrection; a spirit of patriotism burst forth which astonished Europe, and seemed to predict the prestige of their success.

The firing during the insurrection, and the massacre of the Madrileños on the 2nd of May, being heard at Mostoles, a little town about ten miles north of Madrid, the alcalde dispatched a bulletin to the south, in these words: "The country is in danger; Madrid is perishing through the perfidy of the French; all Spaniards, come to deliver it!"

Asturias was the first province in which the insurrection assumed a settled form. A junta of representatives was elected, who declared that the entire sovereignty had devolved into their hands, and immediately despatched deputies to England to solicit suc-

cour; Corunna, Badajos, Seville, and Cadiz, followed. War was declared against France; troops and taxes were ordered to be levied, and voluntary subscriptions were entered into. The isle of Leon was put into a state of defence, and an attack being made, from the mortars and gun boats, on the French squadron in the harbour of Cadiz, it surrendered unconditionally. Early in the beginning of April, a communication had been opened between Sir Hew Dalrymple, the governor of Gibraltar, and general Castaños, at Algeziras. The popular ferment in Asturias, Galicia, and Andalusia, had quickly extended to Oviedo, Toledo, Valladolid, the city of Valencia, and other towns; and to raise and invigorate the national spirit to the highest degree, not only the patriotism of the nation, but also its popular faith, were appealed to. They were told to implore the aid of the immaculate conception; of Santiago, so often the patron and companion in victory of their ancestors; of our Lady of Battles, whose image is worshiped in the most ancient temple of Cavadonga, and who had there so signally assisted Pelayo in the first great overthrow of the Moorish invaders.

"No sooner was Napoleon aware of the formidable character of the insurrection, than he made preparations to meet the difficulty. Bessières received orders to put Burgos into a state of defence, to detach Lefebvre Desnouettes, with 5,000 foot and 800 horse, against Saragossa, and to reserve his main body so as to overawe the insurgents in Biscay, the Asturias, and Old Castile. A reinforcement of 9,000 men was prepared for Duhesme in Catalonia. A reserve was organized under Douet, on the Pyrenean frontier of Navarre; and another reserve was established in Perpignan. The communications and rear being thus adequately provided for, Marshal Mincey was directed, with part of his corps, to move upon Cuença, so as to prevent any communication between the patriots of Valencia and Saragossa; while Dupont, with two divisions of his corps, ten thousand strong, received orders to proceed across the Sierra Morena towards Cordova, Seville, and Cadiz. The remainder of his corps and that of Mincey were stationed in reserve at La Mancha, to keep up the communications of the divisions pushed forward, and be in readiness, if necessary, to support either which might require assistance."* Having made their

* Alison's *History of Europe*, vol. viii., p. 461.

arrangements, Napoleon Buonaparte returned to France, and the intrusive king Joseph proceeded on his journey to Madrid.

The French acted with their wonted celerity. Before Buonaparte had finished his arrangements at Bayonne, to preserve the communications of the French with the capital and the northern provinces, Freire, with a division of Dupont's army, advanced against Segovia, where a body of 5,000 men were posted and in possession of the *dépôt* of artillery; he defeated the insurgents and possessed himself of the town and artillery. The division under Verdier routed the armed force assembled at Logroño, and put their leaders to death. That under Lasalle, broke the armed peasantry, amounting to 6,000 men, at Torquemada, burnt the town, and pursued the fugitives with merciless severity. On the 12th of June, Cuesta, who had taken post with an undisciplined rabble at Cabeçon, a village situated about two leagues from Valladolid, was defeated by Merle and Lasalle, with the loss of between 5,000 and 6,000 wounded, 1,200 prisoners, all his artillery, and several thousand muskets, which his fugitive followers had thrown away in their flight. By these operations Bessièrès kept Navarre and the three Biscayan provinces in subjection, and opened a communication with Junô in Portugal.

But these successes of the French in Leon and Castile, were in some degree counterbalanced by the checks they met with in Aragon. Schwartz, who had been detached by Duhesme, with 3,800 men, to Manresa, to raise in that city, three quarters of a million of francs, as a contribution for the service of the division, the Somatenes, or armed population, taking post in the strong pass or position of Bruch, repulsed him, June 7th, with the loss of 400 killed, and one piece of artillery; and on the following day Chabran, who had been also detached by Duhesme, with 4,200 men, to seize Tarrago, retreating in consequence of Schwartz's discomfiture, was defeated by the Somatenes in the same fatal pass, with the loss of 450 men and some of his artillery.

We have seen that Lefebvre Desnouettes had been detached with 5,000 infantry and 800 cavalry on Saragossa; which is an unfortified town, surrounded by a brick wall, from ten to twelve feet high, but in many of its parts houses and convents formed part of the line of inclosure; and commanded by some high ground called the *Torrero*,

about a mile to the south-west, upon which stood a convent and some smaller buildings. The Ebro bathes the walls of the city; and separates it from the suburbs. Its population, which at the period of the siege was between 40,000 and 50,000, have always been honourably distinguished in Spanish history for their love of liberty. "Within the Peninsula (and indeed throughout the whole of Catholic Europe)," says Mr. Southey, "Saragossa was famous as the city of our Lady of the Pillar, whose legend is so firmly believed by the people and most of the clergy in Spain, that it was frequently appealed to in the proclamations of the different generals and the juntas, as one of the most popular articles of the national faith. The legend is this: when the apostles, after the resurrection, separated and went to preach the gospel in different parts of the world, St James the elder (or Santiago, as he may more properly be called in his mythological history) departed for Spain; which province Christ himself had previously commended to his care. When he went to kiss the hand of the Virgin, and request her leave to set off, and her blessing, she commanded him, in the name of her Son, to build a church to her honour in that city of Spain, wherein he should make the greatest number of converts, adding, that she would give him further instructions concerning the edifice upon the spot. Santiago set sail, landed in Galicia, and having preached with little success through the northern provinces, reached Cæsarea Augusta, (the ancient name of the city upon whose site Saragossa is situated,) where he made eight disciples. One night, after he had been conversing and praying with them as usual on the banks of the river, they fell asleep, and just at midnight the apostle heard heavenly voices sing *Ave Maria gratia plena!* He then fell on his knees, and instantly beheld the Virgin upon a marble pillar in the midst of a choir of angels, who went through the whole of the matin service. When this was ended, she bade him build her church round that pillar, which his Lord, her blessed Son, had sent him by the hands of his angels; there, she told him, that pillar was to remain till the end of the world, and great mercies would be vouchsafed there to those who supplicated for them in her name. Having said this, the angels transported her back to her house in Jerusalem (for this was before the assumption), and Santiago in obedience, erected

upon that spot the first church which was ever dedicated to the Virgin."

At the time of the arrival of Lefebvre Desnouettes before Saragossa, the inhabitants of the city suspecting their governor, the captain-general of Aragon, of being devoted to the usurper's interest, deposed him, and elected Don José Palafox, the youngest of three brothers, of one of the most ancient families in the country, and who had escaped from Bayonne. By indefatigable exertions and the agency of the priests and friars, who spread themselves over the country to animate the peasantry, and induce them to enrol themselves for the defence of their country, Palafox and the junta raised and armed a force of about 10,000 infantry and 200 cavalry; and with this force, his brother, the marquess of Lazan took post without the city, in a favourable position behind Huecha. On June 12th Desnouettes attacked the marquess, and though the Spanish undisciplined levies gallantly repulsed several fierce attacks of the French, they were overthrown.

Undeterred, they rallied on the following day at Gallur, but were again overthrown. Immediately Palafox himself marched out of the city with 5,000 burghers and peasants, to reinforce his discomfited countrymen, and took post on the banks of the Xalon; but being attacked on the 14th, he was routed, the burghers taking to flight at the first sight of the enemy. The French immediately appeared before the city, and invested it.

Now is to be recorded the heroic defence of Saragossa, which, like Numantia and Saguntum of old, is "to become immortal in the annals of fame." The following narrative, however, will be divested of all the apochryphal embellishments with which the creative genius of the late Mr. Southey has invested that memorable event. That amiable and accomplished man's mind was highly tinctured with the incidents of Spanish romance, and he interwove much of their high colouring of adventure and incident into his account of the siege and defence of Saragossa.

FIRST SIEGE OF SARAGOSSA.

As it has been properly said, though the whole of the population of Saragossa are entitled to the glory of the resolution of its defence, Palafox, Tio Martin, and Tio George—Tio, or uncle, or goodman, is the appellation by which men in the lower classes who have passed the middle age are familiarly addressed in that part of Spain—stood pre-eminently forward in the glorious task. The ensuing narrative will exhibit them in their full lustre and patriotism.

On the morning following (June 16th) the investment, the French attempted by a *coup-de-main*, to storm the city by the gate Portillo, and penetrated as far as the street Santa Engracia, but were driven back with great loss, as also that of part of their baggage and plunder. The loss of the patriots in the affair was about 4,000 in killed and wounded.

During the respite obtained by this repulse, the inhabitants, aided by the peasantry, who, to the number of 10,000, had thrown themselves into the town, worked so vigorously in throwing up defences, forming barricades,

loop-holing the walls of the houses, and raising ramparts with sacks and bags filled with sand, that in less than twenty-four hours, the city was in a condition to withstand an assault; and for the purpose of obtaining further aid, Palafox, uncle George, and four companions, in the mean time left the city by the suburbs, crossed the Ebro at Pina, and collecting on his march about 1,400 soldiers who had escaped from Madrid, formed a junction at Belchite with general Versage, who was in command of 4,000 men, levies from Calatayud. The united force collecting in their march the volunteers from the villages, took post at Epila on the river Xalon, in the rear of the besiegers. On the night of the 23rd, they were attacked by the French, and defeated with great loss. On the 27th, the French again attacked the city and the Torrero, but were repulsed with the loss of 800 men and six pieces of artillery; but the next morning, though repulsed from the city, they took the Torrero, in which 1,200 Spaniards were intrenched, by assault; and to add to the calamity of

the Saragossans, on the 28th, a powder magazine blew up in the very heart of the city, which occasioned great loss and consternation.

At the time of this success, Desnouettes having received reinforcements under Verdier, and a train of heavy artillery and stores from Bayonne and Pamplona, commenced a vigorous bombardment of Saragossa. At the same time repeated attacks were made to effect an entrance into the city; but the assailants, after several desperate struggles, were repulsed with severe loss. In this perilous work the women assisted; and, at the suggestion of the young, delicate, and beautiful countess Burita, formed themselves into companies, each headed and commanded by a lady of rank. The business of those companies was to carry meat and drink to the men who were fighting, to convey the severely wounded to the hospitals, and to bind up slight wounds upon the spot. In the midst of the most tremendous fire of shot and shells, the countess Burita attended coolly to these occupations, which were now become her duty; never, throughout the whole of a two months' siege, did the imminent danger to which she incessantly exposed herself, produce the slightest apparent effect on her, or in the least degree bend her from her heroic purpose. Some few females took a yet more active part, and fought side by side with their husbands, brothers, and fathers. The name of one of these heroines has acquired an enduring celebrity. Augustina Saragossa, a handsome young woman of humble birth, coming on the third day of the siege with provisions to the battery that suffered most from the enemy's fire, found every man belonging to it killed. For a moment every one hesitated to secure the guns. Augustina, undaunted, sprang over the dead and the dying, and snatching a match from the hand of a dead artilleryman, fired off a six-and-twenty pounder; and then, jumping upon the gun, made a solemn vow never to quit it alive during the siege. Her courage struck shame to the hearts of the men, who had shrunk from taking the places of the slain; her generous enthusiasm animated with fresh courage all who beheld it. The battery was instantly manned, and the fire being renewed with increased vigour, the French were repulsed at all points. Nor was this an isolated deed of heroism of that heroic girl, who is canonized in the annals of history by the

appellation of "The Maid of Saragossa." During the second siege, visiting a battery in which her husband held the command, and observing the artillerymen so discouraged by his fall, that the battery was on the point of falling into the hands of the enemy, she addressed the troops in an animated tone, and by her personal intrepidity and animated eloquence so rallied them, that they not only repulsed the enemy, but in a successful sortie beat them from the walls. In the course of the War of Independence, she was rewarded, as a testimony of her country's approbation of her patriotic heroism, with a field officer's commission.

Desnouettes now, (July 2nd), supposing that his destructive bombardment had so discouraged the Saragossans, that he could effect a lodgment easily within the gates, advanced with a column towards each of the gates Carmen and Portillo, but so heavy a fire of grape and musketry was opened upon the French, that they were dispersed with great loss.

On the same day, Palafox, with as many of his discomfited troops as he could collect, after his defeat at Epila, having re-entered the city by the suburbs on the left bank of the river which had been left unguarded by the enemy—and on the 17th, a regiment of the line from Estremadura, 800 strong, with some artillerymen and artillery, and 300 militia of Logroño, having effected an entrance by the same road—the patriots determined with their new accession of strength to endeavour to retake the Torrero; but they were repulsed with great loss.

By the end of July all communication was cut off with the surrounding country, and, consequently, Saragossa could no longer receive supplies. By the 4th, the French having completed their approaches, so furious a bombardment took place, that the walls of the church and convent of St. Engracia were levelled at the first discharge, and the besiegers rushing through the opening, after a day of dreadful carnage, succeeded in establishing themselves in the convent and the adjacent street. The enemy following up his success, forced his way into the Cozo, in the very centre of the city, and before the day closed was in possession of one-half of Saragossa, as also of one side of the Cozo, while the inhabitants sternly occupied the other. Palafox, Tio George, Tio Martin, and the whole of the Saragossans, performed prodigies of valour on this disastrous day. Desnouettes now thought that

he had conquered, and required Palafox to surrender, in a note containing these words: "Quartel-general, Santa Engracia. La Capitulation." (Head quarters, St. Engracia. Capitulation.) The heroic Spaniard immediately returned the reply "Quartel-general, Zaragoza. Guerra al Cuchillo." (War at the knife's point.)

"The contest which was now carried on is unexampled in history. One side of the Cozo, a street about as wide as Pall-mall, was possessed by the French; and, in the centre of it, their general, Verdier, gave his orders from the Franciscan convent. The opposite side was held by the Saragossans, who threw up batteries at the openings of the cross streets, within a few paces of those which the French had erected against them. The intervening space was presently heaped with dead, either slain upon the spot, or thrown out from the windows. A deadly contest now ensued, the strife was continued from street to street, from house to house, and from room to room, and was persevered in without intermission night and day. All classes of the citizens vied with each other in the dreadful struggle with the enemy.

In the midst of these difficulties, a reinforcement of 3,000 men, composed of Spanish guards, Swiss, and volunteers of Aragon, with a convoy of ammunition and provisions, having eluded the vigilance of the besiegers, entered the city under the command of Don Francisco Palafox, the general's brother. The murderous contest was now carried on with renewed vigour. In every conflict, the Saragossans now gained ground on the French, winning it inch by inch, till the space occupied by the enemy, which on the day of their entrance was nearly half the city, was gradually reduced to about an eighth part. But after eleven successive days and nights of obstinate and murderous contest, on the break of day of the morning of the 14th August, the enemy was observed in full retreat, over the plain by the road that leads to Pamplona, having abandoned or thrown into the canal, his heavy cannon and siege stores; a measure adopted in consequence of the defeat of Dupont at Baylen, and the failure of Moncey before Valencia. Such was the first siege of Saragossa, and slavish be the heart and base the tongue that attempts to obscure its glory. There is not, either in the annals of ancient or of modern times, an event more worthy to be held in admiration than the Siege of Saragossa.

On the 25th of August, solemn obsequies with military honours were performed in the church of Saragossa, for the heroic men who had fallen, and a funeral oration was pronounced in commemoration of their heroism from the pulpit, by the brave priest Santiago Sass, who had taken part in the perils of the siege. A pension was settled on the Saragossan maid Augustina, with the daily pay of an artilleryman; and she was authorised to wear a small shield of honour upon the sleeve of her gown, with "Saragossa" inscribed upon it. The priest Santiago was presented with a captain's commission; all other persons who had distinguished themselves were rewarded; and the perpetual and irrevocable privilege of never being adjudged to any disgraceful punishment by any tribunal for any offence, except for treason or blasphemy, was conferred on all the inhabitants of the city and its districts, of both sexes and all ranks.

The operations of the French were in several other quarters not more prosperous than they had been at Saragossa. While the sanguinary conflict was raging in that city, Duhesme and Moncey experienced reverses in the south and east of Spain.

About the time that Lefebvre Desnouettes advanced against Saragossa, Duhesme, who commanded the French army in Catalonia, was ordered by Murat to reduce Gerona, a city situated between Figueras and Barcelona, and strongly fortified both by nature and art, in order to open a communication with France for supplies and reinforcements for that garrison. In his march, the French general attacking the peasantry of Valles, who were posted on the heights which terminate at Mongat, to oppose his march, defeated them, and disgraced his victory by the cruelty which he exercised on his prisoners and the unarmed villagers who fell into his hands. Mataro, a rich and flourishing town, containing above 25,000 inhabitants, met with a like fate, because they had attempted to defend the entrance of the town against the French. The town was not only sacked, but the inhabitants were treated in the most merciless manner by the French troops, whom they had but two months before received as guests and friends while they were quartered on them.

Duhesme proceeded plundering, burning, and destroying everything in the whole progress of his march. On the 20th June, he appeared before Gerona, and attempted to take it by storm, but was repulsed by the

brave inhabitants, whose women rivalled the heroines of Saragossa in devotion and heroic conduct. The French general not being prepared to undertake a regular siege, and fearing that the Somatenes assembled without the town would harass him, having sacked the adjoining villages, Salt and St. Eugenia, he retreated by forced marches towards Barcelona, sacking and burning the towns and villages through which he passed, severely harassed by the Somatenes (the Catalonian militia), from their hill-sides in his march. About a week after his return to Barcelona, he again marched out of that city, and defeated a large body of peasantry assembled at Molinos del Rey, with the loss of all their artillery. He then, July 5th, detached general Reille to raise the blockade of Figueras, at that time besieged by the Somatenes, in which duty Reille succeeded; but attempting a *coup-de-main* against Rosas,

was repulsed (July 11th) with loss. On the 24th, Duhesme uniting his forces with those of Reille, advanced against Gerona and commenced operations against that fortress in form; and on the 15th of August, a breach being declared practicable, the assault was about to be commenced, when a general sally was made on the French lines, their cannon spiked, and works set on fire, while the besiegers were engaged in combat with 1,300 troops arrived from Majorca under count Caldague, the governor of the Balearic isles. In consequence of this event, Duhesme was obliged to break up the siege, having lost 2,000 men, and to abandon his baggage, stores, and ammunition; and being exposed to the raking fire of two English frigates as he retreated by the sea-coast, when he reached Catella he threw all his artillery down the precipices to expedite his flight.

THE SIEGE OF VALENCIA; BATTLES OF BAYLEN, AND MEDINA DEL RIO SECO.

MONCEY, who had been ordered to reduce Valencia, was almost equally unsuccessful in his operations against that city. Advancing from Cuenca, with a force consisting of 12,000 men, besides cavalry, he encountered the new levies of armed peasantry, some Spanish regulars, and Swiss troops, amounting to 6,000 men, assembled in an intrenched camp, at the defile, near Contreras, as also at Las Cabrillas, with the loss of their artillery. At length, on the 27th of June, he appeared before the walls of Valencia, a city containing about 80,000 inhabitants, and situated on the Guadalaviar, in the vicinity of the sea. The Valencians being aware of his approach, laboured day and night on the fortifications; trenches were cut in the principal streets, barriers were constructed across them, chariots and carts were overturned in them, and stones and boiling oil collected on the tops of the houses, to throw upon the assailants.

Having summoned the town to surrender, and received in answer, that the Valencians preferred death to capitulation, the French general ordered (June 29th) an assault to be made, and the French approaching a battery which a Spanish smuggler had treacherously agreed to betray to

them, instead of finding it manned by traitors, were received with a brisk and well sustained fire. As the French advanced, the enthusiasm of the inhabitants increased. The Valencian women imitated the conduct of those of Saragossa and Gerona; they heroically threw themselves into the hottest of the fire, for the purpose of bringing up ammunition to the combatants; and when the grape-shot began to fail, they furnished a supply of missiles consisting of their trinkets and other valuables. After persevering in fruitless attempts from one P.M. to eight in the evening, perceiving that his force was not numerous enough for the civil war which it would have been compelled to wage from house to house, and from street to street, the French general relinquished the attack, and drew off to Cuarte, about a league from the city, having lost 2,000 men in his operations. From this position he quickly retreated, leaving part of his artillery. In his retreat, he attacked and overthrew a corps of 6,000 men, posted on the banks of the Xucar, under the Conde Cervellen; and two days after coming up with the fugitives at Almanza, he overthrew them, with the loss of

all their artillery. On reaching St. Clemente, he began to make preparations which would enable him to renew his attack on Valencia. In the meantime (July 3rd) the town of Cuenca had been delivered up by Caulincourt to pillage, and the inhabitants, men, women, and children, butchered by the ferocious French troops.

THE BATTLE OF BATLEN, AND ITS ANTECEDENTS.—The fortune of Dupont was even more discouraging than that of his compatriots before Saragossa, Gerona, and Valencia.

One of the first acts of Murat, after he had reached Madrid, was to prepare for securing Cadiz, of which city Dupont had been appointed governor, soon after the abdication at Bayonne had been effected. As fears were now entertained for the French squadron at Cadiz, Dupont received orders to march and take possession of that city. At the time of the receipt of the order, he was at Toledo, repressing some tumults that had been manifested there. He began his march the end of May, and crossing the Sierra Morena mountains, and effecting the pass of Despeñas Perros, or Dog Rocks, without opposition, arrived on June 3rd at Andujar, where he had left his hospital of sick and wounded, in his march to Cordova, but who had been overpowered and massacred by a band of Spaniards from Jaen,* in retaliation for the atrocities prac-

tised by the French on the Cordovans. His enraged troops now cried for vengeance on the old Moorish town. Dupont dispatched a battalion of infantry and some cavalry, under one Baste, a sea captain, to put their sanguinary wish into execution. The ferocious seaman and his equally ferocious followers, having plundered and set fire to the town, committed every possible atrocity on the inhabitants, massacring old men and infants at the breast, and violating both women and children;† and to enhance this atrocity, Dupont's foraging and scouring parties being unsuccessful in their endeavours to obtain provisions and other supplies for the army, wounded and tortured all the country people whom they could seize for the purpose of compelling them to discover the places in which they had concealed their corn, money, and other property.‡ Proceeding now as in an enemy's country, he attacked the Spaniards posted at the black marble bridge of Alcolea, and defeating them after a brave resistance, carried both the bridge and the village.

Dupont now perceiving that his force was too weak to effectuate the conquest of Andalusia, applied to Joseph Buonaparte for succour. Two divisions were sent to him under generals Vedel and Gobert. Vedel, when he reached the Sierra Morena, found a considerable body of Spaniards intrenched in the tremendous defiles of that great chain

* The atrocities and rapacity of the French at this time were excessive. The inhabitants, both armed and unarmed, were slaughtered; women violated; and the public buildings, houses, churches, and even the humblest dwellings of the poor, were sacked. Besides exacting from the depôts of the treasury and the consolidation, ten millions of reals for his own private benefit, Dupont compelled the city to raise an enormous contribution for the army.

† The conduct of the French army had become so atrocious, that the Central Junta, with the hope—vain hope! little did they understand the character of the chief of that army, whose standing order to his generals was, to inflict condign vengeance on those patriots who defended their country, and in whose opinion, no crime was so heinous as that of patriotism, none so fearful as that of resisting the oppressor of one's country and the despoiler of its nationality—of shaming them, published a remonstrance, addressed to the French generals, in which the following appeal was made to their humanity and sense of honour:—"In other times war was carried on between army and army, soldier and soldier; their fury spent itself upon the field of battle; and when courage, combined with fortune, had decided the victory, the conquerors behaved to the conquered like men of honour, and the defenceless people were respected. The progress of civilization had tempered the evils of hostility, till a nation that had so lately

boasted that it was the most polished in the world, renewed, in the nineteenth century, the cruelty of the worst savages, and all the horrors that make us tremble in perusing the history of the irruptions of the barbarians of old. Like tigers, those enemies make no distinction in their carnage—the aged, the infants, the women—all are alike to them, wherever they can find blood to shed."

‡ The French soldiery and their officers were the most adroit marauders that ever marched under the banners of Mars. The first often carried a regular set of house-breaking tools in their knapsacks, and as soon as they entered a town, and were dismissed off parade, they immediately spread themselves over all its localities, like a ravenous brood of vultures, and broke open every house which they thought contained valuable property, or wine or spirits. If they thought the inhabitants had concealed their property by burying it, or by placing it between the walls of the house and a temporary wall they had erected, for the purpose of forming a vacuity in which to deposit the property; in the first case they threw water on the suspected spots, to ascertain whether it was quickly absorbed, as then it would be an indication of its having been recently dug; and in the second, they measured the inner and outer walls of houses and buildings, and according as they were disproportionate, they proceeded to dismantle the buildings.

of mountains. The first brigade and the cavalry of his army were allowed to pass the ambush, laid among the trees and rocks, in advance of the intrenchment, but on the second brigade a tremendous fire was opened; eventually the superior discipline of the enemy prevailed, and the patriots were dislodged with considerable loss. Vedel then passed the defiles, and advanced to Baylen, a village distant a short march from Andujar.

Dupont's situation was now becoming very insecure, his difficulties and distresses increasing daily. Twenty-five thousand peasants were gathering round his position, and Castaños was lining the opposite bank of the Guadalquivir with an equal number of infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and a heavy train of artillery; and these men, both of the regular and peasantry force, by the exertions of the Spanish general, had acquired habits of discipline, and obtained confidence in themselves and their officers. In effectuating that reform, he had endeavoured "to introduce among them that moral and religious discipline by which Cromwell, and the Swedish hero, Gustavus, before had made their soldiers invincible. He issued an order for banishing all strumpets from the camp, and sending them to a place of correction and penitence; he called on the officers to set their men an example, by putting away the plague from themselves, and dismissing all suspicious persons; he charged the chaplains to do their duty zealously, and threatened condign punishment to any person, of what rank soever, who should act in contempt of these orders. Such irregularities, he said, would draw down the divine anger, and make the soldiers resemble in licentiousness the French, who, for their foul abominations, were justly hated by God and man; and it would be in vain to gather armies, if at the same time they gathered together sins, and thereby averted from themselves the protection of the Almighty, which alone could ensure them the victory over their enemies."

The winding Guadalquivir flowed between the hostile armies. On the evening of the 16th of July, Castaños, with the main body of the Spanish army, crowned the Visos (heights) de Andujar, a strong and advantageous position directly in front of the town of Andujar, at the same time detaching Reding and Coupigny, with two divisions, to interpose between Dupont and Vedel.

In a desperate conflict at one of the fords of the river, the Swiss general, Reding, drove the enemy from their *tête-du-pont* at Menjibar, and the commanding officer, Goubert, fell mortally wounded. The patriots now took post in a strong position in front of Baylen.

Dupont now determined to march to the assistance of Vedel. On the night of the 18th, as soon as darkness had closed the day, the French, having first plundered the inhabitants of all that was portable, marched from Andujar, and advanced towards Baylen. At three o'clock in the morning of the 19th, he vigorously attacked Reding, but was repulsed. When day broke, the French re-formed their columns, and advanced to the attack. The greatest intrepidity was displayed by both armies. Several times the French broke the Spanish lines; but the Spaniards, knowing that reinforcements were at hand, resolutely recovered themselves. The battle had been long and bloody, when Dupont and his generals, putting themselves at the head of their men, made a last charge with the most determined bravery; but they were repulsed with equal determination. The arrival of the Spanish reserve under De la Peña (the future Bermeja hero), on the field of battle at the moment, and the desertion of some Swiss battalions, who went over to their countryman, Reding, during the battle, determined the French general to surrender; he therefore held up the white flag, and proposed an armistice. A capitulation was accordingly entered into on the morning of the 20th, by virtue of which Dupont and his army were to remain prisoners of war, as also Vedel and his division, who had surrounded and made prisoners a battalion of Reding's corps at Carolina, before he knew of Dupont's surrender, were, according to the first arrangement, after having laid down their arms, to have been allowed to quit Andalusia. Some of the prisoners were sent to serve in the hulks or prison-ships in the bay of Cadiz; others to the desolate island of Cabrera, lying about ten miles from the southernmost point of Majorca, in the Mediterranean. Dupont and the officers of his staff, as also all the generals, were exempted from the capitulation, and allowed to return to France. On their arrival there they were imprisoned, and having been tried, were condemned by a court-martial. As public opinion was loud in their favour, the sentence was not carried

into execution, but their imprisonment continued till the capture of Paris by the allies. The prisoners amounted to between 18,000 and 19,000, and the loss of the French in battle had been 4,000 in killed and wounded.

The loss of the battle by the French, was occasioned by Dupont's making independent attacks with separate brigades of his army, as they successively came into line, instead of a simultaneous charge with his whole force; and by his having kept the best of his troops in reserve, to guard his baggage and plunder, which was enormous, consisting of the pillage of the churches, convents, monasteries, and houses of all the towns he had entered. The approaching anniversary of the great victory of Las Navas de Toloso, so celebrated in Spanish annals, tended, from religious, national, and local feelings, greatly to animate Spanish bosoms on the day of the battle of Baylen.*

The news of the battle of Baylen diffused a joy and triumph over Spain. The Spaniards now thought themselves invincible, and that the issue of that battle was a confirmation of the national hallucination, that Spaniards cannot be overcome only by Spanish soldiers. Views of the Pyrenees, and of their triumphant march to Paris, attended by "*nuestros amigos los Ingleses*" (our friends the English), as quiet and admiring spectators of their valorous doings, flitted over their imaginations, and inflated their constitutional overweening conceit and vanity. But the victory of Baylen had a better result than the indulgence of national superstitious belief; it occasioned the breaking up of the siege of Saragossa, and the flight of Joseph and his adherents from Madrid to Vittoria, the road to which had been opened to the intrusive king in consequence of the battle of Medina del Rio Seco, fought July 14th, 1808; after which he proceeded on his journey to Madrid, to take possession of his usurped throne, which he had scarcely occupied a fortnight before he was, in conse-

quence of the victory at Baylen, compelled to flee neck and heels from it.

THE BATTLE OF MEDINA DEL RIO SECO. —The first battle of any importance between the patriots and the French was fought near the town of Medina del Rio Seco, which is situated a few leagues from the city of Valladolid. There the Spanish general Cuesta had taken post with an army variously stated from 14,000 to 40,000 men, consisting of raw levies and a few Walloon regiments. Bessières, in expectation of a sure victory, marched against him with 15,000 men. Cuesta had drawn up his army in two lines, at the distance of a mile and-a-half from each other. Blake commanded the first line, Cuesta the second. Bessières observing the faulty disposition, immediately threw himself in the chasm between the two lines, and attacked Blake in rear and front, and in an instant overthrew him. Cuesta immediately moved his line forward to repair the disorder. The Spaniards attacked the enemy's infantry with so impetuous ardour, that they forced it to give way, when the troops set up a shout of victory; but too soon; for the French, charging the left wing, after a short and sanguinary struggle, broke it, and thus the fortune of the day was decided, the Spaniards taking to headlong flight. Few bloodier battles, or, in more appropriate language, savage massacres, have ever been fought in proportion to the numbers in the field, even if the force of the Spaniards be taken at the highest estimate. According to the Spanish and French accounts, the Spanish loss was stated to be between 5,000 and 6,000 killed and wounded, 2,000 prisoners, with eighteen guns, and all their ammunition; that of the French, 50 killed and 300 wounded; but according to better authority, that of the neighbouring priests, it is affirmed that 27,000 bodies were buried. And this is the more probable account, as the battle was savagely fought, and little mercy shown in the pursuit. The victors in the pursuit of the scared and fleeing fugitives, sacked the town of Rio Seco, and compelled all the nuns of its convents to submit to the brutal violence of the soldiery.

* In that battle, fought July the 16th, 1812, at Baylen, Alphonso IX. gained the victory over a Mussulman host of two hundred thousand combatants.

THE PORTUGUESE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

A.D. 1808.

WHILE the events just recited were passing in Spain, Portugal was in a state of political convulsion. No sooner had the news of the popular insurrection of Madrid become known at the Spanish frontier town of Badajos, than a lieutenant of the Walloon guards, was sent by Moretti to Lisbon to consult with Carraffa, commanding the contingent of Spanish troops which had marched on that kingdom with Junôt.

When Moretti's mission became known to Junôt, awakening from his dreams of royalty, to prevent its success he divided the Spanish contingent force into small detachments, stationing with each detachment a superior number of French. His plan however was not successful. Some deserted in small parties; others in larger; but the regiment of Murcia marched in a body. To intercept the Spanish regiment, Junôt sent a detachment of 600 French; the two parties met at Os Pegoens; the Spaniards being victorious, proceeded on their march. The Spanish troops who had taken possession of the Alemtejo and the south of Portugal, to keep Godoy's kingdom warm till he was ready to occupy it, escaped to Badajos, whence they were forwarded to Leon to share in the disasters of the battle of Medina del Rio Seco. The Spaniards at Oporto, who had occupied the north of Portugal, under Bellesta, marched for Corunna.

The students of Coimbra were the first to join the patriotic standard; the mountaineers of Tras-os-Montes, the provinces of the Algarves, the Alemtejo, Beira, and Entre-Douro-e-Minho, quickly followed their example. The people of Oporto rose to a man, and the Portuguese soldiery joined them; the prince regent was proclaimed at Braganza, the standard of the displaced dynasty displayed, and, in imitation of the Spanish patriots, a provisional junta of supreme government was appointed at Oporto, till the government instituted by the prince should be established; deputies or envoys despatched to England, to solicit protection and succour, and the council of

the regency established, of which the principal, Souza, and that intriguing priest, the bishop, now denominated the *patriarch*, were members.

To suppress the insurrection, Junôt applied himself with diligence. Having disarmed between 4,000 and 5,000 of the Spanish troops, and secured them in ships and hulks upon the Tagus, he directed Loisson to proceed with a division against the insurgents in the north; but the insurrection was so formidable, and the insurgent peasantry were so rapidly gathering around him, that he countermarched on Lisbon, routing the insurgents at Celerico and Guarda with great slaughter; and sacking the villages of Pezo, Regoa, and Nazareth, where neither age, nor infirmity, nor sex, nor childhood, was spared, for he was a man devoid of honour and humanity, notorious for rapacity in the most rapacious army that ever disgraced the profession of arms, and carried on war in the worst spirit of the worst ages, plundering and massacring without limit and without remorse. Margaron executed like vengeance at Leiria, where he butchered the old and the young, women and children, the babe suckling at the mother's breast, and the infirm and the sick lying on the bed of helplessness, without remorse or discrimination. When the streets and houses lacked furnishing his savage followers with means for their carnage, the miserable inhabitants, who had taken refuge in the churches, were dragged out and slaughtered in the open space in front of the chapel of St. Bartholomew.* The town was then sacked, and partially set on fire. Equally atrocious practices took place at Guarda in the north, and at Evora, Beja, and Villa-viçosa in the south; those unhappy towns were given up to indiscriminate massacre, and the women, after having suffered violation, were slaughtered. "Beja," said the ruthless Kellerman, in his proclamation to the people of the Alemtejo, "is no more. Its guilty inhabitants have been put to the sword; its houses delivered

* The greater number of the unfortunate captives falling on their knees, in tones of agony implored the mercy of their executioners. The murderers, as if they delighted in the act of butchery, began their

work with the sword and bayonet, and the butt end of the musket, and finished it by firing upon their victims.—(*Historia Geral da Invasão dos Franceses em Portugal*, tom. iv., p. 42.)

up to pillage and the flames. Thus shall all those be treated who take up arms against us." At Villa-viçosa, insult had, in the wantonness of power and military licentiousness, been added to wrong. There was an image of *Nuestra Senhora dos Remedios*, (our Lady of Remedies,) which, after having, by a supernatural declaration of its own pleasure, changed its name, made sundry voyages to and from India, and travelled from one place to another during more than four-score years, had at length graciously condescended to take up its residence at Villa-viçosa, in a chapel of its own, where, being in high odour for its miraculous powers, it was visited with peculiar devotion on its own holiday, the 19th of June, by the people of that town, and the adjacent country. Some French soldiers, not disposed to reverence the systematic frauds to which the idol had contributed its influence to enable the priests to delude their Portuguese adherents, placing themselves in a gateway near the chapel, amused themselves with deriding the Portuguese, who, in the ignorant simplicity of their hearts, were going thither to worship. Some of the peasants resenting this insult, a scuffle ensued, and at length, amounting to a complete riot, an open insurrection broke out, in which a few Frenchmen being slain, Kellerman ordered general Aril to advance against the insurgents, of whom many hundred were bayoneted, and the place given up to pillage. Setubal escaped a fate similar to that of the cities just specified. That

beautiful city had been devoted to pillage, but was saved by the interference of a Portuguese woman, who lived as his mistress, with general Graindorge, who then was in command in the Alemtejo, having succeeded the sanguinary and peculating Loisson. Before the ruthless French had been able to enter Evora, to perpetrate their atrocities, they had to contend with 10,000 Portuguese, and 4,000 Spanish troops, posted in front of the town, who had advanced from Badajos to their aid. But at the first shock of the enemy's attack, the undisciplined peasantry fled in confusion, and their Spanish auxiliaries soon followed their example. Of the insurgents, the French military historian, Thiébault, boasts that 8,000 were slain or wounded, while the loss of his own countrymen, who mercilessly slaughtered those defenceless men, was trifling. The affairs of Portugal now were to assume a more promising complexion. The intelligence that a British army had appeared off the coast of Portugal, arrested Loisson in his blood-stained progress towards Elvas, infused life and spirit into the bosoms of the Portuguese portraits, and its bugles announced, from the rock of Lisbon, the advent of the removal of the hallucination and mistaken notions of French invincibility, of the craven-hearted dread of the French legions and their leader, which had fascinated and enchained the people of continental Europe, and the overthrow of the most grinding despotism that had ever cursed the face of the earth.

THE SPANISH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, CONTINUED TO CLOSE OF 1808.

THE train that the emperor had laid for his scheme of universal aggression and spoliation being now ready for ignition, he prepared to proceed to the scene of action. In *The Preliminary Observations to the Peninsular Campaigns*, the reader has been informed of the principal events that conduced to the completion of that scheme. But as the preparatory feat of the "Erfurth Conference" has not been mentioned there, its introduction here will tend to throw addi-

tional light on the dark doings of the French despot.

He had long designed the subjugation of the Spanish and Portuguese Peninsula. To disguise the prosecution of his designs, he invited the Russian emperor Alexander to a conference at Erfurth, a town in the north of Germany, having previously communicated to that "imperial personage" the design of overthrowing the English power in India, and of dismembering the Turkish empire,

and partitioning the spoil between himself, Austria, and Russia; the Austrian cabinet no doubt, having previously lent a willing ear to the righteous purpose. Having appointed a day for the conference, he hied to its locality with a crowd of obsequious and fawning princes and potentates—messieurs the parasites of “The Confederation of the Rhine”—in his train; and on the arrival of Alexander, eternal friendship was pledged between the two plotters.* To disguise their designs, they professed the object of their meeting was “influenced by the voice of humanity, to put an end to the bloody continental war that had so long been raging, and to seek, in a speedy pacification, the happiness and common interests of Europe.” The two emperors wrote a joint letter to the king of England, inviting him to co-operate with them in their humane design. A correspondence on the subject took place between the English government and the agents of the French government, but it was soon broken off, as the ruse of the joint imperial letter was too evident to be mistaken. Buonaparte having, as he thought, accomplished his long-cherished design of “driving the hideous leopard into the sea, and of planting his eagles on the ramparts of Lisbon,” issued the following braggart and bombastic proclamation to the French troops who were to be the agents to carry his design into execution:—“Soldiers, I have occasion for you! The hideous presence of the leopard contaminates the continent of Spain and Portugal. Let your aspect terrify and drive him hence.” When he issued this high-toned address to his soldiers, he hoped, no doubt, that his equally boasting threat of being in Lisbon in the course of three months was on the point of realization, when he was to “finish the war with a thunder-clap.”

The troops appointed for this Quixotic purpose were—first corps, Victor, 33,937; second corps, Bessières, 38,054; third corps, Moncey, 37,690; fourth corps, Lefebvre, 25,984; fifth corps, Mortier, 26,713; sixth corps, Ney, 38,033; seventh corps, St. Cyr, 42,107; eighth corps, Junôt, 25,730; re-

* Amidst the festivities, the fêtes, and the frolics of his ballet girls and opera dancers, collected to entertain and solace his imperial and regal guests, he studiously took the opportunity of giving a momentous admonitory hint to his guest, the imperial autocrat of Russia. He took him to the battle-field of Jena, where a temple to Victory was erected, in which the French emperor had passed the night pre-

serve, Napoleon, 42,382; on march from France, 14,060. In all, 319,690. This vast host was composed of all nations; of French, Germans, Italians, Poles, Swiss, Dutch, Saxons, Bavarians, and even Irish, Scotch, and Mamelukes—for every nation contributed to supply “the insatiable tyrant’s demand for human life”—all dressed in their national uniforms, except the Irish and Scotch; but all wore the same cockade, and had the same shout of war, and the same cry to rally.

Napoleon Buonaparte having, by his arrangements at the Erfurth conference, secured himself from the probability of being attacked on his rear, while carrying his projects into execution, set out for the scene of action, and arrived at Vittoria, November the 8th. He immediately proceeded to put his plans into execution, and assigned to each of his agents in his wanton and unprincipled aggression on the nationality of Spain, his part and character in the drama of fraud and butchery. Soult, in obedience to the mandate of spoliation, proceeded to prosecute the destruction of the army of the Spanish centre.

THE BATTLE OF GAMONAL, which is sometimes termed the *Battle of Burgos*, was fought November the 10th. Gamonal is a village, situated in front of Burgos, and about one league distant from it.

The Spanish army consisted of about 19,000 men, of whom 12,000 were regulars, the Spanish Walloon guards and the royal carabineers being among them; the rest were new levies, without any organization; the whole equipped and clothed by the English government.

This force was no sooner attacked by the French infantry, than it broke and fled in utter confusion towards Burgos, and was pursued by Bessière’s cavalry, which having inflicted dreadful execution on the fugitives, entered Burgos pell-mell with them; the victorious cavalry passing through immense piles of wood placed on each side of the streets, and intended to have been carried for sale into France in their contemplated reveries of a triumphal advance into that country. The loss of the Spaniards was vious to the battle, and tents were pitched around it, for the purpose of entertaining his visitors to a sumptuous breakfast. The French entertainer paraded his Russian guest over every part of the ground which the contending armies had occupied, and left him to make his reflections upon the spot where Prussia had received the galling chains with which she was fettered, as a reward of her subserviency to France.

2,500 in slain, 900 prisoners, six stand of colours, and all their artillery. The battalion of students, volunteers from the universities of Leon and Salamanca, had displayed that courage which might be expected from men of their condition, whom patriotism had brought to the field; they all fell in the ranks in which they had stood. Burgos was given up by the French general to the plunder of his troops. Belvedere and the wreck of his army fled to Segovia.

On the second day after the battle of Gamonal, Burgos became the head quarters of Napoleon Buonaparte, and the centre of the operations of the French; 10,000 light troops were dispatched forward to scour the country, levy contributions, and diffuse a general terror of the French arms. They swept over the plains of Leon as far as Benevente, Toro, and Torderillas, spreading everywhere the boastful proclamations of Napoleon Buonaparte, and declaring, that notwithstanding their utmost efforts, the French cavalry were not able to overtake the English army, which was fearfully fleeing to its ships. The armies of the left and centre, having been annihilated, Lannes with 30,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, was ordered to advance against that of the right under Castaños, who, notwithstanding he was acquainted with the overthrow of the armies of Blake and Belvedere, had adopted the extravagant conceit, of marching to Burgos, and there annihilating the French reserves and rear-guard; but ascertaining that Ney was advancing against himself, and had entered Soria on the 19th of November, he retreated towards Tudela, which he reached on the evening of the 22nd, and was there joined by Palafox, and the army of Aragon: their united armies amounting to 40,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, with 40 guns.

THE BATTLE OF TUDELA was fought November 22nd, and by its issue the fate of the patriot Spanish armies was sealed.

It had been the intention of the French generals, who considered the defeat and destruction of the army of the left as certain as that of the right under Blake had been, to practise the same manœuvre against it as had been done against Blake's army, namely, routing it by a powerful attack in front, and then destroying the fugitives by intercepting them with a second force in their flight; but Lannes, when he observed its faulty position, being drawn up on a range of inconsiderable hills, nearly

six miles in length, stretching from Tudela to Taragona, ordered general Maurice Mathieu to pierce the centre with a division of infantry, when the cavalry under Lefebvre Desnouettes, rapidly passing through the broken line, wheeled to the left, and by the oblique movement surrounded the Spanish right wing, which the Aragonese held; and, at the same moment, general Morlet attacking them in flank, the fate of the battle in that wing was decided. The assailants immediately turning fiercely on the centre, speedily routed it. The fate of the left wing, in which "the conquerors of Baylen" were stationed, was decided at the same moment by Lagrange's division. The disheartened Spaniards fled in confusion, leaving 5,000 of their comrades on the field of battle, 3,000 prisoners, and all their ammunition and guns in the hands of the victors. Fifteen thousand Aragonese, Valencians, and Castilians, found refuge in Saragossa, and the wreck of Castaños' force fell back on Calatayud, a turn of fortune with which Ney's greediness favoured them, that marshal halting in his pursuit of the fugitives, three days at Soria, for the purpose of pillaging that town, and possessing himself of the large quantities of wool collected there.

The battles of Espinosa, Gamonal, or as it is sometimes styled, Burgos, and Tudela, having opened the passage to the capital, Napoleon Buonaparte, who was at the time at Vittoria, immediately advanced with the imperial guards, Victor's corps, and the reserve, amounting to 60,000 men, towards Madrid. At break of day of the 30th of November, reaching the Samosierra Pass, which was defended by 12,000 men, the wreck of Belvedere's army, and sixteen pieces of cannon, intrenched on the heights of Sepulveda, which overlooked the principal pass. The advanced guard of the French, consisting of three regiments of infantry, commenced the attack, and the Polish lancers and chasseurs of the guard charging along the causeway, the pass and its batteries were won by assault, and its defenders fled in disorder towards Segovia. The way to Madrid being now open, the central junta, which had been appointed on the 25th of September, fled in dismay from Madrid to Badajos.

Two days before the passage of the Samosierra, the people of Madrid began to make preparations to resist the enemy. Trenches were opened, batteries erected, the streets

barricaded, and the pavements torn up. Eight thousand muskets were distributed; but when the ammunition was served out, many of the cartridges were found to be filled with black sand, instead of gunpowder; and when the people clamoured for cartridges, Morla, to whom the defence of the city had been entrusted, said that there were none. "Happy would it have been for Morla, had he then perished under the hands of the indignant mob, as then the treachery to his country which he was preparing, would never have been known on earth, and he would have escaped perpetual infamy."

On the morning of December 2nd, only an hour or two after the flight of the central junta, the advanced guard of the French came within sight of Madrid, and immediately summoned it to surrender; and as an answer was not returned, the fortified palace of the Retiro was attacked and carried. From its heights, which completely command the city, a few shells were thrown, in the hope of intimidating the inhabitants, and in the forenoon of the following day, Berthier sent a flag of truce threatening the utmost severity of military execution, if the signal of surrender was not hoisted within two hours. At five in the afternoon Morla and Ivriarte arrived at the French head-quarters, to negotiate as deputies on behalf of the town, the terms of surrender. At daybreak, on the morning of the 5th, the capitulation was signed, and by ten o'clock the French general, Belliard, took the command of the city. Soon numerous deputations of the nobles, clergy, and public authorities, waited on Buonaparte at his head-quarters at Chamartin, to swear fealty to the pseudo king Joseph, who had entered Madrid "in the tail of the French army," and taken possession of the royal palace of the Prado. The French adventurer having thus far succeeded in his projects, gave "orders to compose songs descriptive of the glory the grand army had acquired, and would acquire"—no doubt designed as an allusion to his design of "driving the hideous leopard into the sea;" for "*God had given power and inclination,*" as he had told the Madrilleños in his proclamation, "*to surmount all difficulties!*"

At this conjuncture, the English army, under sir John Moore, was struggling in the heart of Spain with the difficulties in which the disasters of the Spanish armies, and the imbecility and perverseness of its

generals and provisional government, had involved it. Buonaparte, aware of those difficulties, and having found that its presence paralyzed the movements of the whole of the French armies in the south of Spain, determined to overwhelm and destroy it. Orders were immediately dispatched from Madrid to all the French generals to advance in concentric lines on the devoted English army; while he himself, with 50,000 men, hurried through the Guadarama pass, for the same purpose. But on reaching Astorga, receiving intelligence of the preparation of Austria for war, he deputed Soult and Ney to pursue the English, with 60,000 men, and he set out with the imperial guard, to return to Paris.

The disasters of the patriots still kept increasing. On the 11th of December, Victor being in possession of Toledo, Aranguez, and Ocaña, overran the open and defenceless plains of Lower La Mancha, foraging and plundering the towns and villages with impunity as far as Manzanares. The little hamlet of Vellacoñas, by its heroism, having resisted the assaults of the enemy for five successive days, remained safe and uninjured, while the whole country round had been plundered. About the same time, Vanegas—who had taken post with the rear guard, consisting of 5,000 men of Castaños' broken army, near the village of Buvierca, in the narrow gorge where the river Xalon has forced its way through the two great mountain ridges in that portion of the high road to Madrid, in order to cover the retreat of the disorganized patriots—was attacked by 8,000 French troops under general Mathieu, but after eight hours' contest compelled the French to withdraw, and thus secured the retreat of Castaños and his forces.

But these gleams of successful exertion were to be soon obscured by fresh disasters. The provincial government of the central junta, influenced by the reckless and unreasonable self-confidence of their countrymen, and relying on the saints and the virgin, determined to endeavour to recover Barcelona. For this purpose, general Vives was dispatched to take the command of an army of 30,000 men, which had been assembled by the marquis of Palacios. The French determined on its relief. Gouvion St. Cyr was ordered by Buonaparte to effectuate it: as a necessary preparatory measure, he besieged Rosas, a town situated four leagues east of Figueras. On November the 6th, he sat down before the place; and on the 16th,

attempted to carry Fort Trinidad, into which lord Cochrane, with eighty marines of the *Imperieuse*, had thrown himself, but was repulsed.* After a month's siege the citadel having been battered in breach, till it was no longer tenable, capitulated Decem-

ber the 5th; and the garrison, marching out with the honours of war, were sent prisoners to France. As his post was no longer tenable, lord Cochrane then embarked his men, and blew up the magazine of the fort.

SIEGE (THE SECOND AND FINAL) OF SARAGOSSA.

AFTER the disastrous issue of the battle of Tudela, the Saragossans, aware that the first object of the French would be the attempt to reduce their city, exerted themselves with the greatest vigour in preparing for the assault. Every strong building was fortified; the convents and churches were converted into barracks; the streets were barricaded and retrenched; the doors and windows of the houses were walled up, their whole front pierced with loop-holes and communications opened within from house to house, and the suburbs were included in the new fortifications. That beyond the Ebro was defended by redoubts and fleches, with batteries and traverses at the entrance of the streets. The artillery amounted to 190 pieces, the greater part being four, eight, and twelve-pounders, the pieces of a larger calibre were mostly those that had been recovered from the canal into which the French had thrown them on their retreat after the first siege. Great part of the cannon balls also were what the French had fired or left behind them. To prevent all danger from the explosion of their magazines, it was determined to make the gunpowder as it was wanted, which could be easily done, as Saragossa was the place where all the saltpetre of Aragon was refined. The ammunition, stores, and provisions, were sufficient for six months.

The inhabitants, all combatants, were supported by 30,000 regular troops, and 15,000 armed peasants; and the excavators employed on the canal, were enrolled as sappers and miners. Even the women were enrolled

in companies to aid the combatants and attend to the sick. The countess Burita commanded those patriotically devoted females.

Three days had, by a general order, been allowed for all women, men above threescore years of age, and all boys under fourteen, to leave the town, and be provided for whithersoever they went. But the sentiment of patriotism was so ardent, that not one of the inhabitants left the place. In no place would they have imagined themselves so secure as in Saragossa, which had been so wonderfully defended and delivered, and which they believed to be invincible through the all-powerful protection of Our Lady of the Pillar, who had chosen it for the seat of her peculiar worship. During the former siege prints of that venerated idol had been distributed by women in the heat of action, and worn by men in their hats as a badge and an amulet; and the many remarkable escapes and deliverances that had occurred during that memorable event, were ascribed to the immediate interference of the Magna Mater of Saragossa. Thus the city was all fortress, the population one vast garrison.

The French, who had since the battle of Tudela, been sedulously making preparations for the reduction of Saragossa, advanced with an army consisting of nearly 30,000 men, under marshal Money, and on the 20th December invested the town. On the next morning, the fortified outpost of Monte Torrero was attacked and carried after a slight resistance, the garrison having retired into the town; but an attack on the suburb,

* Lord Cochrane had prepared for the defence of the place with that sportiveness with which English sailors are as much characterized as schoolboys. He formed a rampart within the breach of palisadoes and barrels, ships' hammock-cloths, awning, &c., filled with sand and rubbish: these supplied the place of walls and ditches. When the assault was made upon

the breach of his little garrison, he not only stationed men with bayonets immediately within the breach, but he laid well-greased planks across the breach, upon which many of the French slipped and fell, in endeavouring to pass; and he hung ropes there with fish-hooks fastened to them, by which not a few were caught in their retreat.

two days after, was repelled with great slaughter of the enemy, according to the Spanish accounts 4,000, but according to the French, only the same number of hundreds.

On the 24th, the French marshal having completed the investment of the town on both sides of the river, the trenches were opened on the night of the 29th of December, and a powerful fire was directed against the walls. Meantime the besieged had raised a line of counter approaches, which compelled the enemy to prolong their works, lest they should be enfiladed; sallies were made from the town to interrupt the works, to cut down the olive trees, and destroy the buildings which afforded the enemy cover; and on the last day of the year, the besieged made a general attempt along the whole line to interrupt and impede the enemy's proceedings, but were repulsed in all quarters.

St. Cyr having obtained possession of Rosas, on December the 5th, advanced to the relief of Barcelona, an object of so great importance, that Buonaparte, in his instructions to him, said he would sooner lose 80,000 men than that fortress. Vives, on hearing of his approach, dispatched Reding, the *real* conqueror at Baylen, with 4,000 men to oppose him; and leaving a sufficient force to keep up the blockade, followed him with 5,000 men, with the intention of occupying an advantageous position between Vallaba and Llinas. A junction was formed by the two Spanish corps at Granillars, just as the French had passed through the defile of Treinta-pasos. On the following morning, he came in sight of the enemy ready drawn up for battle.

Souham's division was ordered to turn Reding's right; and two battalions were ordered to make a false attack on the left of the Spanish division. The left and centre were forced at the same moment; and though Reding had hitherto been successful, being now attacked by Souham's division, a total rout ensued. It was eight o'clock when the battle began, and before nine the Spaniards were in full flight, having lost 2,000 in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the opportunity of repeating at

the defile of Trienta-pasos, the occurrence at Baylen.

Reding having collected as many of the fugitives as he could, took post at Molinos del Rey. On December 21st, the French took up a position in his front, and on the 21st, attacking the Spanish army, a total rout ensued, every man fleeing his own way, and abandoning everything—fifty pieces of artillery, and large magazines, rewarding the victors. On the withdrawal of that part of the besieging force under Vives and Reding, Duhesme sallied out of Barcelona, and attacked the blockading besiegers under Caldagues, but was bravely met and repulsed. The defeat at Llinas however, induced him to break up the siege and return behind the Lobregat.

This disastrous campaign closed with the duke del Infantado's chivalrous self-delusion of the recovery of Madrid, the relief of Saragossa, as also of aiding the English army by pursuing the left wing of Soult's army then in operation against the English. In the prosecution of this quixotic design, he first attempted to surprise a body of 1,500 French cavalry who were scouring the country on both sides of the Tagus, and plundering a great part of the provinces of Cuenca and La Mancha; but the infantry portion of his force, instead of surprising the enemy in Tarancon, were themselves surprised by them. The French, however, being inferior in number, after a stout resistance, retreated with some loss to Aranjuez.

Though England had not yet taken an active part in the contest between the patriots and their oppressors, it deeply sympathised in the cause of freedom and justice. From the beginning of the contest in June, 1808, to the commencement of 1809, subsidies in money amounting to £3,100,000, besides large voluntary contributions from the different towns throughout the country; and 200,177 muskets, 61,300 sabres, 79,000 pikes, 98 cannons, 38 mortars, 23,477,000 cartridges, 31,000 cannon balls, 6,000,000 of bullets, 150,000 barrels of powder, and an immense quantity of accoutrements, clothing, boots, shoes, and other necessaries, had been furnished to the patriots by the English government.

WELLINGTON'S PORTUGUESE AND SPANISH CAMPAIGNS.

A.D. 1809.

WHEN sir Hew Dalrymple and sir Henry Burrard were recalled to attend the board of inquiry with sir Arthur Wellesley, relative to the Cintra Convention, sir John Craddock was appointed to the command of the British forces in Portugal; and as the Portuguese troops were in a very inefficient state of discipline, the Portuguese regency consented that Lisbon, and the frontier towns, should be garrisoned by the English.

To reorganize the Portuguese army, major-general Beresford (with the rank of field-marshal in the Portuguese service), and a number of English officers, were dispatched to Portugal. On his arrival (March, 1809) in that country, the marshal established his head quarters at Thomar; and collecting the Portuguese troops in masses, recast their military system on the model of the British army; but in the prosecution of his measures, he met with much opposition and perverseness from the regency.

To preserve a connected view of the affairs of the Peninsula from the period of its evacuation by the British army under sir John Moore, till the arrival of sir Arthur Wellesley in Portugal, April 22nd, 1809, it is necessary to present the reader with a recapitulated abstract of the operations of the French armies, and of the reverses of the

* Ferrol is a seaport on the opposite side of the bay on which Corunna stands. It is almost impregnable, both by sea and land. To force the passage is impossible, ships having for the distance of a league to file one by one along a shore defended by forts.

† At Oporto, the conduct of the captors was cruel and outrageous in the extreme: neither age, sex, nor innocence, found favour at the hands of the infuriated foe. "Neither the shrieks of women and children, nor the prayers and entreaties of the feeble and helpless, arrested the sword of the merciless soldiery; ten thousand of the defenceless and unresisting inhabitants had been numbered among the slain of the defenders of the city, the cavalry charging through the streets, and slaughtering all whom they encountered." While that scene of horror was in operation, four thousand of both sexes were seen fleeing before their pursued countrymen, and reaching, in a frenzied tumult, the pontoon bridge, the foremost sunk into the stream, leaving a gulf in the agitated water, into which the dense mass was precipitated. To add to the dismal scene, the French artillery discharged incessant showers of grape on the mass in the stream, and the boats that attempted to approach the wretched throng. The plunder continued for several days, during which time it was accompanied with every

Spanish and Portuguese patriots during that period.

Immediately on the sailing of the British army from Corunna, Malgarejo, the governor, surrendered his trust to the French, though he, like many others of his countrymen, had sworn to bury himself under its ruins. Alcedo, governor of Ferrol,* followed his example; and he of Vigo, not to be outdone in heroic patriotism by his neighbouring compatriots, surrendered his trust. In Corunna and Ferrol, Soult possessed himself of immense stores, which had been sent to those towns by the English government, for the use of the patriots.

The French general now directed his march on Portugal; and entering that country, captured Chaves and Braga. The city of Oporto,† after a resolute resistance by the Portuguese for three days, surrendered on the 28th. Delaborde and Franceschi had defeated the Portuguese under Baron Eben (a German attaché in the English service, who had succeeded to the command on the murder of Freire by his mutinous troops) at Carvalho d'Esté, or as some accounts designate the battle, Braga, with great slaughter; which was greatly increased by the merciless havoc made by the French in the pursuit; Franceschi species of violence and outrage. Oporto, which is the largest city in Portugal, except Lisbon, is a seaport, situated on the Douro, about three-quarters of a league from the mouth of that river. It is built on the declivity of a steep hill, so steep in some parts, namely the east side of the town, that the houses are only approached by steps cut out of the rock. It is an unfortified town, but partly surrounded by an old wall five or six feet high, flanked at intervals by strong towers. To the east lies Villa Nova do Porto; and between it and Gaya lie, on a small plain along the river, the immense vaults or lodges in which the wines manufactured in the provinces of Tras-os-Montes and Entre-Douro-e-Minho are kept till stored. The river during the heavy rains and the melting of the snow on the mountains, often rises to the height of twenty feet. The mouth of the river being obstructed by rocks and quicksands, renders the navigation of the passage of its bar difficult and hazardous. In the contest between the emperor Pedro and his brother Miguel, for the restoration of Dona Maria to the Portuguese throne, and while Oporto was occupied by the liberating army of Portugal, 3,000 pipes of wine were started into the Douro, to prevent their falling into the hands of Pedro, when the river ran blood-red.

getting in advance of the fugitives, and compelling them to halt, until the infantry came up to bayonet them.

The Spanish patriots had been equally unfortunate. The beginning of their calamities was at Torquemada, where the Spaniards first resisted the oppressors of their country; the consequence was, the slaughter of the inhabitants, and the delivery of the town to the flames. Their next discomfiture was at Cabeçon, where, under Cuesta, they experienced so complete a derout, that the enemy entered that town with the fleeing foe; and the calamity would have been still greater, had not the corps of students from Segovia retarded in some measure, the pursuit of the enemy, until they all fell upon the field of battle. In Aragon, all their efforts were fruitless. Palafox, in his endeavours to relieve Saragossa, was defeated at Huecha, June 12th; at Gullur, June 13th; at Alagon, on the Xalon, June 14th; and at Epila, June 23rd. In Catalonia they were defeated at Mongul; Cruz surrendered his army at Lena, October 26th; Vives was defeated at Llina, December 6th; and Reding, at Molinos del Rey, December 17th. On July 14th, the army under Cuesta and Blake had been routed with immense slaughter. On the 27th of the same month, Castaños attacking the French posts on the Ebro, was repulsed at Logroño with the loss of all his artillery. On October 31st, the army of Blake, which had been joined on the 9th of the same month by the Spanish troops from the Baltic, under the marquess of Romana, was defeated with great loss at Zornosa, and retiring to Espinosa de los Enteros, was attacked on the following day by Victor, but the contest was by the exertions of Romana's infantry prolonged till nightfall. Early next morning, the Spanish army was totally routed, and fled in the wildest disorder towards the river Truebas, in which a great number of the fugitives perished. With the remainder Blake fell back on Reynosa, where his reserve artillery was stationed; but being attacked there by Soult, was routed, with the loss of his whole artillery, and escaped with only a few thousand of his troops into the Asturian mountains. The consequence was, that Bilbao, Santander, and the whole line of the intervening coast, fell into the hands of the enemy. The army of the Spanish left being annihilated, that of the centre, stationed at Gamonal, under the Conde de Belvedere, was on November 10th over-

thrown, with the loss of 2,000 killed and wounded, 800 prisoners, and all its artillery. The battle of Tudela followed, and in it the Spanish army under Castaños and Palafox, consisting of 45,000 men, was completely routed and dispersed. In the battle of Espinosa, though the Spanish authorities, with their characteristic falsehood and boasting, asserted that Romana's troops had, Spartan-like, died to a man in their ranks; above 4,000 of them, who had been taken prisoners by the French, and had subsequently entered the French service, were, after four years of servitude under the banners of the oppressor of their country, delivered over by the Russian government to captain Hill, at Cronstadt, in the year 1812; having been taken prisoners in the retreat of the French from Moscow. To complete the sum of Spanish disasters, which had increased so rapidly in the short space of one year, the strong pass of Samosierra, which formed the boundary between the French armies and Madrid, though guarded by 10,000 men, was forced, and thus the passage to the capital opened to Buonaparte, who, on his entry, on December 4th, was waited on by a body of the nobility, clergy, and public authorities of the city, who tendered him their allegiance and fidelity; and the servile junta, who were soon convened, published a proclamation announcing that "the only object of their imperial ally was the prosperity and happiness of their beloved Spain." During the course of these events, the towns of Cordova, Toledo, Jaen, Bilbao, Burgos, Manresa, Rosas, both citadel and town, &c., had been sacked and delivered up to fire, sword, and the outrage of females even of the tenderest age. Venturada, Buitrago, El Milar, Iglenas, Benezuela, Gandullos, and Brojiz, experienced a like fate in Joseph Buonaparte's flight from Madrid behind the Ebro. To counterbalance this series of misfortunes, whose amount no nation ever experienced in the same space of time, the patriots could produce only the repulses of Schwartz and Chabran, at the passes of Bruch and Casa Masara, the battle of Baylen, and the repulses from Saragossa, Gerona, and Valencia. We shall now see that the year 1809 dawned equally unpropitious on Spanish efforts and Spanish patriotism.

The British ministry having determined to make another effort to liberate the Peninsula from the aggression of Buonaparte, adopted Sir Arthur Wellesley's recommendation of making Portugal, than which, in the

hands of a skilful and enterprising leader; no country affords a more defensible theatre of warfare, the basis of the operations for that purpose. The spirit of patriotism and resistance was alive all over the Peninsula; all it needed was the requisite genius to guide and direct it to the great end—the full and final deliverance. That genius the British ministry recognising in the person of Sir Arthur Wellesley, they appointed him to carry the great and glorious measure into execution. Sir Arthur having resigned his appointment as chief secretary of state for Ireland, and vacated his seat in parliament, left England on April 15th, 1809, and reached Lisbon on the 22nd of the same month. At that period, the second and fourth corps-d'armée of the enemy threatened Lisbon. Soult, with the second corps, amounting to 25,000 men, lay at Oporto with his advanced posts on the Vouga; and Victor, with the fourth corps, exceeding 20,000 men, was posted on the banks of the Tagus, with his head quarters at Merida.

In the course of Sir Arthur's passage to Lisbon, an event occurred which had nearly proved fatal to the future hero of the Peninsula and Waterloo.

In the course of the night, after the frigate had parted from Spithead, it was nearly wrecked at the back of the Isle of Wight. The circumstantial account given by the Marquis of Londonderry, in his *Narrative of the Peninsular War*, is highly interesting:—"We set sail with a stiff breeze blowing ahead. We had not proceeded beyond the Isle of Wight, when about midnight, or rather later, the captain of the *Surveillante* burst into the cabin, entreating us to use without delay precautions for our safety, for we were on the eve of shipwreck. As may be imagined, we lost no time in leaping from our cots, and mounting to the deck, when a very alarming spectacle presented itself. In attempting to clear a shoal which runs from St. Catherine's Point into the sea, the ship had missed stays; this occurred again and again, each failure bringing us nearer and nearer to danger; and now, when we looked abroad, the breakers were to be seen at a stone's throw from the bows. There was not an individual amongst us who anticipated any other result than that in a few minutes, at the farthest, the vessel would strike; but we were deceived. The wind, which had hitherto been blowing on shore, suddenly changed, and we were at once relieved from a situation, than which the whole progress of

our lives, had not before brought us into any one more uncomfortable."

Sir Arthur, on his arrival at Lisbon, having had the command-in-chief ceded to him by Sir John Craddock, assumed the command of the British army, which had been augmented to 20,000 men by reinforcements under generals Sherbrooke, Mackenzie, Cameron, and Hill; and, May 2d, established his head-quarters at Coimbra. Having satisfied himself that no concert or communication between the armies of Soult and Victor could possibly be executed at that moment, he determined to drive Soult from Oporto, and clear the northern provinces of the enemy, and directed Mackenzie's brigade, and a body of 8,000 Portuguese, to take post at Santarem and Abrantes, for the purpose of defending the fords of the Tagus between those towns, and guarding the mountain passes into Portugal on the right side of the Tagus, as Victor and Lapisse were posted with strong corps on the eastern frontiers. While he advanced northwards to drive Soult from Oporto, Beresford, who was posted near Ciudad Rodrigo, was ordered to march with 6,000 Portuguese, a brigade of British infantry, and a squadron of cavalry, by Viseu, and crossing the Douro at Lamego, to turn Soult's left, and thus cut off his retreat into Galicia by Braga or through Tras-os-Montes, and compel him to proceed by Chaves, in order to prevent his junction with Victor.

On the 5th, the whole army, amounting to 14,500 infantry, and 1,500 cavalry, in which force four of the best Portuguese battalions were incorporated, was concentrated at Coimbra; and on the 7th the advanced guard was in motion on the Oporto road. At this moment intelligence was brought that the bridge of Amaranta, which afforded the most favourable road for the retreat of the French, had been crossed, and Silveira driven over the Douro.

The French having two positions at Albergoria Nova and Grijon, in advance of the main body at Oporto, sir Arthur, intending to surprise Franceschi, who was posted with two regiments of cavalry and one of infantry at the first-mentioned position, dispatched general Cotton, with the 14th dragoons, to accomplish the design; but Cotton, being misled by the guides, did not reach the French position till broad day-light, when he found the enemy ready drawn up to receive him, with a fine wood in their rear, and in too great force to hazard an

attack. But sir Arthur Wellesley coming up with Paget's division, Franceschi hastily retreated, and effected a junction with Mermet at Grijon; where, on the following day, the French forces being attacked by general Stewart, fled, with the loss of above one hundred prisoners, across the Douro. During these operations every means had been adopted by the French to render the passage of that river impracticable. The floating bridge at Oporto was destroyed, and the pontoons composing it burnt. All the boats on the Douro were also collected, and moored on the northern bank of the river.

At this period of the affairs of the Peninsula, an occurrence of a singular character took place. One John Viana, the son of a merchant at Oporto, had, at the instigation of the parties interested, communicated to marshal Beresford a design of a community of soldiers and officers in the French army, who were impatient of their subjugation, and disgusted with the tyranny of Buonaparte, to change the form of government; and as the conspirators were most numerous in the second corps-d'armée under Soult, they had come to the determination to seize him, and deliver him over to the British outposts. At the time of sir Arthur Wellesley's arrival in Lisbon, the chief of the conspiracy, D'Argenton, an adjutant-major, and who had been an officer on Soult's staff, being there, he had an interview with him, but, at the same time, refused all countenance of the projects of the malcontents. When at Coimbra, he also had an interview, between the English and French outposts, with a colonel Lafitte, who, as the conspiracy had been discovered (colonel Lefebvre, who had been taken prisoner in sir John Moore's retreat, and had broken his parole, having betrayed the conspirators), came at the instigation of Soult, to endeavour to penetrate sir Arthur's intended operations, and ascertain the strength and distribution of his army; but sir Arthur guessing his designs, had him conducted through by-paths to his presence, and again refused all countenance to the design. Sir Arthur, in his communication of

this transaction to the secretary of state, nobly observed, that it would be more honourable to the British arms to vanquish the enemy in the field, than to accomplish his overthrow by the countenance of any underhand project.

This conspiracy had been of considerable standing. The first knowledge of its existence, and which was obtained by the agency of the extensive system of espionage which Buonaparte had established not only throughout the dominions of France, but in all the states of Europe, and even in his palace, came under the notice of the French government about the time of the battle of Wagram. The conspirators had enrolled themselves under the title of Philadelphes or Brotherhood, and their object was the re-establishment of democracy. The founder was Joseph Oudet, an officer in the French service. The author of *Histoires des Sociétés Secrètes*, says that Oudet, and the officers who were known to be disaffected to the existing order of things, were recalled from their exile, for the purpose of furnishing the government an opportunity of getting rid of the malcontents, and gratifying the vengeance of the emperor. They were all appointed to the 9th of the line, and at the battle of Wagram were placed in such a condition with the enemy, that the whole of them were nearly destroyed. Colonel Oudet was severely wounded, and to complete the tragedy, was secretly assassinated in the course of the night following the battle. "It was part of the imperial policy, that if any part of the army exhibited signs of discontent, it was necessary to march it to the most wasteful point of service, and thus it would be destroyed before it could become dangerous, and yet not till it had performed a certain quantity of needful work for its fell employer." At this time a proclamation was found in which Soult announced himself as Nicholas I., king of Lusitania and Algarves. Joseph Buonaparte also accused him, in a letter to his brother Napoleon, of aspiring to the sceptre of Andalusia.

THE PASSAGE OF THE DOURO.

On the morning of the 12th May, the British army being concentrated at Villa Nova, a large village on the southern bank of the Douro, "the hero of Assaye," looking down from the convent of Serra upon the large

volume of waters which the Douro rolls swiftly into the sea, determined to effect the passage, though in the face of above twenty-five thousand opponents; an exploit unparalleled in the annals of warfare, and in the

glowing language of Napier, "so promptly, so daringly, so skillfully, so successfully executed, that it seemed rather the result of inspiration, than of natural judgment." For this purpose, viewing from the convent, which is situated on the elevated spot of the Serra, the opposite bank, he observed with an eagle's glance, a large unfinished building called "the Seminary," about half a mile from Oporto; and deeming it to present a defensible position, the area in which it stood being surrounded by a stone wall which came down to the water side, and enclosing space enough for at least two battalions to be drawn up in battle array; "with a marvellous hardihood," he determined to avail himself of it as a basis for his operations, and force the passage of the river. The army, in the mean time, "with hearts and hands all ready for the fray, joyous, careless, and full of hope," lay in the rear of the convent, concealed from the view of the enemy by the height on which it stood, and the bend which the river takes at that point. At this moment, the enemy's baggage and stores were seen moving in a long line on the Vallonga road.

Twenty guns were now placed in battery in the convent gardens. At the same time, major-general John Murray, with the German brigade, two squadrons of the 14th dragoons, and two guns, was directed to march to Barca de Avintas, about three miles down the river, and effect a passage there, for the purpose of intercepting the retreat of the enemy; and colonel Waters, of the Portuguese staff, was dispatched to endeavour to obtain some boats. About two miles from the convent the colonel had the good fortune to discover a boat concealed among some rushes, and in which a barber had, on the preceding evening, crossed the river from Oporto to Villa Nova for the purpose of seeing his sweetheart. Colonel Waters leaped into the boat, and with a priest and a few peasants, who happened to be standing by at the time, crossed to the opposite shore, where three large boats or barges lay in the mud. With these he hastened to the convent.

About 10 o'clock, a barge was reported ready to attempt the passage. "Let the men cross," was the decisive and confident order of the British chief; instantly an officer and twenty-five men of the buffs jumped on board, and, in the course of a few minutes, were in possession of the

Seminary. Two other barges, carrying three companies and general Paget, speedily followed.

Till this moment, all had been quiet in the city. Soult believed that the English army would, by means of the shipping, make its appearance at the debouchement or mouth of the river, and supposed that its passage otherwise, in presence of his force was impossible; especially as he had withdrawn all the boats to the southern side of the river, and had placed a strong guard over them. Nor were the operations of the passage observed; and for this reason, that the river in its course round the Serra rock, makes a sharp elbow or bending, shutting out the view of the upper river from the town. Just, however, as the third boat had reached the opposite bank, the enemy discovered the foe in the midst of their camp. Instantly all was hurry and noise in Oporto; drums beating, trumpets sounding, and troops—infantry, cavalry, and artillery—rushing in masses towards the Seminary, and assailing it with the utmost fury and desperation. The little party maintained itself, till the whole of the buffs, the 48th, 66th, and the 16th Portuguese battalion, had crossed under general Hill; the Serra battery, which swept both flanks of the Seminary garden, keeping up a well-directed fire, and thus confining the assault of the enemy, (whose fire both musketry and artillery, was sharp and voluble), to the iron gateway that opened on the Vallonga road. In the heat of the contest, Sherbrooke's brigade, consisting of the guards and 29th regiment, had crossed the river where the old boat bridge had been cut away, the citizens having brought boats across for the purpose. The appearance of Sherbrooke's brigade on the right of the enemy, and the head of Murray's column appearing at the same time, advancing down the bank of the river on his left, the enemy fled in confusion along the Vallonga road: Hill pouring in a destructive fire on his masses as they hurried past the Seminary gate. Murray, as the author of the *History of the Peninsular War* significantly observes, "seeming fearful lest they should turn and push him into the river," allowed them to pass in their confusion and dismay, without firing a shot on their flank; but brigadier-general Charles Stewart and major Harvey, impatient of the unaccountable inactivity of their chief, charged with two squadrons of cavalry, the rear guard, and riding over the

disorderly battalions, cut their way back to their own division, bringing with them above one hundred prisoners. As Napier justly observes, "had Murray attacked vigorously, the ruin of the French army would have ensued. It was an opportunity that would have tempted a blind man to strike; the neglect of it argued want of military talent and military hardihood;" an opinion fully verified in the same man's conduct at Alicant, where he abandoned to the enemy "the time-honoured Badajos artillery."

The loss of the British army was 20 killed, 96 wounded, and 17 missing; that of the French, 500 killed and wounded, and many prisoners. Five guns were captured in the attempt to pass the Seminary, and a vast quantity of ammunition, and fifty guns, with the hospital containing 700 men, were found in the city. To the wine (amounting to 3,000 tuns, and in value above half a million sterling), on board English, Swedish, Danish, and French ships in the river, sir Arthur Wellsley renounced all claim on behalf of himself and the army, in favour of the owners and the Portuguese nation; in opposition to the demand of the English admiral on that station, that those goods should be considered as prizes or the droits of war. For this exalted display of disinterestedness, he received a sorry requital from the selfish and ungrateful wine-company, and the senate and citizens of Oporto, in their refusal to subscribe to a loan of £10,000, to enable the army to adopt ulterior operations in the defence of Portugal. At four o'clock of the day, of the passage of the Douro, sir Arthur Wellesley sat down to the dinner and table service, that had been prepared for his antagonist, marshal Soult, "one of those trifling circumstances in warfare," as the elegant narrator of the duke's memoirs observes, "which exhilarates not only the chance partakers of spoil so innocent, but which as an anecdote mirthful to the soldiery, spreads pleasure very widely through the lines."

The remainder of the 12th, and following day, were employed in transporting the rear-guard, baggage, stores, and artillery, from the left bank of the river; and on the morning of the 13th, Murray was detached

with the Hanoverian cavalry in pursuit of the enemy; the whole army following on the same route on the 14th.

Soult had fled to Peñafiel, where, fearing that his retreat would be cut off, he destroyed his artillery and ammunition, and abandoned his baggage and military chest. Under the guidance of a Spanish pedlar, he escaped across the Santa Catharina mountains, by goat-herd paths, to Guimaraens, where he formed a junction with Loisson, (who had been driven by Beresford from Amarante); and in the course of the same night, he was joined by Lorge's cavalry, on the banks of the Sousa river. Again the artillery and ammunition of Loisson and Lorge's divisions were destroyed, and their baggage and military chests abandoned.

About four o'clock of the evening of the 16th the British army overtook the rear-guard of the French at Salamonde,* which had been stationed there to cover the passage of the army over the bridges of the Ponte Nova and the Saltador, but after a single hurried volley it fled precipitately to Ponte Nova, where, their pursuers having outflanked them, inflicted a severe loss on the fugitives. The bridge was choked with lacerated bodies, and the bed of the mountain torrent Cavado was filled with dead. Again, at the passage of the Saltador (the leaper or flying-bridge), over the gulf produced by the Misarella, another repetition of havoc and destruction attended the remorseless slaughterers of the stragglers of sir John Moore's army. At length the harassed and exhausted fugitives reached, on the 17th, Montalegre in a complete state of deroute; on the 18th they crossed the Spanish frontier, on the 19th entered Orense, and on the 23rd reached Lugo, says Jomini, (*Vie de Napoleon*,) "in a more distressed condition than that in which general Moore had, six months before, traversed the country to the same town, many of the troops being without even their accoutrements and their arms."

When the British chief was informed that the remnant of the French army had turned off from Montalegre towards Orense, he desisted from the pursuit, as it was impossible for an army encumbered with guns and baggage to continue the pursuit through the

* This place afforded a strong position, and had the enemy been inclined to display their usual propensity for battle, it, like many other localities which became invested with memorable recollections

in the Peninsular war, might have obtained a fatal celebrity; but dispirited by repeated defeat, they fled in confusion, after they had fired one single hurried volley.

rugged defiles by which the enemy had escaped; or, to adopt his own language: "When an army throws away all its cannon, equipments, baggage, and everything that can strengthen it, and can alone enable it to act together as a body, and at the same time abandons those who are entitled to its protection, but retard its progress, it must then be able to march by roads through which it cannot be followed with any prospect of being overtaken by an army which has not made the same sacrifices."

The sufferings and privations of the fleeing host had been so severe during its hurried and calamitous retreat, that, to adopt Napier's expression, "voices were calling for a capitulation, and the whole army was stricken with dismay." What a contrast to the heroic devotion of Moore's army! There the only voices heard (except those of a few craven-hearted general officers just preceding the battle of Corunna), were, "lead us to battle;" and the consequence of non-compliance with that heroic spirit was the insubordination and licentiousness which tarnished the British arms during that disastrous retreat. Soult's army had entered Portugal 25,000 strong; when it reached Orense it scarcely numbered 19,000, having, in the course of six days, sustained a much greater loss than Moore's army had in a period more than thrice as long; and that too in most inclement weather, and with the additional disadvantage, that the army was hampered with a large number of women and children. So complete had been the deroute, that the

whole line of march from Penafiel to Montalegre, besides being covered with the carcasses of horses, mules, and soldiers killed, wounded, and dying, was strewn with arms, accoutrements, and knapsacks filled with valuable stolen property. In the rocky bed of the Cavado, above 500 bodies of the fugitives, lying mingled with the carcasses of above 300 horses and mules, laden with the plunder of Oporto, and the other towns north of the Douro, were found by their pursuers; many of whom amused themselves by fishing in that stream for the French officers and privates, as about the bodies of the one they found rouleaux of gold, and in the knapsacks of the other gold and silver vases, watches, and other valuable property, all of which had been stolen from the natives.

The misery and cruelties which had been inflicted on the population of the country through which the French army had retreated were dreadful in the extreme. On the whole line of country over which its flight had extended, horror, desolation, and wretchedness, prevailed in their direst forms. The route of the retreat could be traced by the smoke and flames of the villages burning, or those already reduced to ashes. Pillage, massacre, conflagration, attended the whole course of the fleeing columns. Large numbers of the peasants were massacred, and in many places they were found hanging on trees by the road-side—a fate to which Franceschi had, with remorseless vengeance, subjected many of the ordenanzas in his flight from Albergaria Nova.

THE FIRST SPANISH CAMPAIGN.

A. D. 1809.

A FEW remarks respecting Spain and the Spaniards may not be an uninteresting introduction to the memorable campaigns about to be narrated.

Spain, the land of romance and superstition, of love and chivalry, and whose towns were founded by the Greeks, the Carthaginians, the Romans, and the Arabians, is one of the most compact political divisions of the earth, and possesses natural advantages superior to any other politico-geographical

subdivision of the known world. In form, it is nearly quadrilateral, its length being, in proportion to its breadth, as one and three quarters are to one and-a-half. Its geographical situation is unequalled by that of any other country; for, while it enjoys the luxuriance of a tropical climate, it partakes of all the mildness and salubrity of the temperate zone. Its splendid river and mountain scenery, its fertile plains, and noble ports, constitute it one of the most gifted

regions of the globe; while the superstition, bigotry, and ignorance of its government and people have morally ruined, and politically disorganized, all the advantages conferred on it by nature.

The interior of Spain, which is scorched by the burning sun in summer, and swept by frozen blasts in winter, especially Léon and Castile, forms a table-land of greater elevation than that of any other country in Europe, being from 2,000 to 3,000 feet above the level of the sea, and is nearly surrounded by mountains, rocky and almost inaccessible, its principal and secondary ranges being all, more or less, connected with one another, and descending throughout the Peninsula in a serpentine direction, from its elevated table-land in the interior, to the fertile belt of land lying on the sea coasts. The north of Spain is the most mountainous land in Europe, Switzerland not excepted. The snow-clad peaks and ridges of Switzerland slope gradually down into fertile plains, and are intersected by numerous smiling valleys; but the lofty sierras, or mountains, of the north of Spain (particularly in the Basque provinces, Navarre, and the Ronda districts of the south, which consist almost of mountains, having very little level ground), are based on table-lands, whose lateral directions are sometimes almost a perpendicular, and their summits are covered with perpetual snow. These mountains are so arid that no trees grow upon them, and even brush-wood is by no means common. The mountains of Catalonia and Valencia are, however, an exception; there, the sides being cut into terraces, and nourished by artificial irrigation, are clothed with the most luxuriant vegetation. The streams that cut their way through them fret and roar along in deep gullies, and amidst overhanging rocks. Spain possesses only three great roads; that from Madrid to Bayonne, that to Valencia, and that to Barcelona; the others are little better than sheep-walks. The north of Spain, like Portugal, presents one of the most defensible positions in Europe. The Basque provinces, Navarre, and the Ronda districts in the south, enjoy independent privileges, and an almost democratic equality.

From Spain, the natural digression is to the Spaniards.

As my limits prohibit me from enlarging on the extravagancies and eccentricities, the foibles and the follies of "Spanuolissimo Spagnuolo," with all his sombre stateliness and indomitable pride—his habitual ex-

aggeration both in speaking and writing—his lofty promises and mean performance—his inflated and bombastic hyperboles—his exalted opinion of his importance and pre-eminent valour—his presumption and bigotry—his ignorant and superstitious reverence for antiquated customs and practices; in a word, his inveterate and unyielding "Spagnuolitas," which has rendered his nation the lowest and the weakest in the scale of European countries; I will waive the ungracious task of condemnation, and confine myself to a few brief remarks on the well-trained habits, the extreme temperance, the unostentatious endurance of poverty, the devoted attachment to their religion and country, which distinguish the Spanish peasantry over that of any region of the globe. They are, in general, well-ordered and sober, moral and religious. No labourer goes to his daily toil until he has supplicated the favour and protection of heaven; and, on the completion of his allotted duty, he returns into the bosom of his family, to enjoy its home-felt delights. His diet is frugal and sparing. A bit of dry bread and a few grapes, or a slice of a water-melon, supply his breakfast; a plain dish of vegetables, generally a sort of bean, boiled with the smallest morsel of bacon to flavour it, forms his dinner; and his drink is water, or the weak common wines of the country, and that in a very moderate quantity. The lives of this interesting people are perfectly patriarchal, and form a striking contrast to the debauchery and the ruthlessness of the higher classes. Of their devoted patriotism and attachment to the land of their birth, they gave the most splendid displays in their fruitless and disastrous struggles with the veteran armies of France during the Peninsular War.

Of the surpassing beauty of the Spanish women, language furnishes no adequate medium for its description. The lovely shape, the beautiful form, the large dark eye, and its expressive glance, heightened by the soft blood-tinged olive hue of the glowing complexion, give to the Spanish beauty all the might and majesty of loveliness, and invest her with a commanding influence over the heart and the affections. Their dress—we speak of the era of the Peninsular war, and that dress is the subject of the fond recollection of old "Peninsulars"—harmonizes with the beauty of their persons. The tastefully-worked and vandyked basquina, or black silk petticoat, assuming all the grace

of Ionian elegance in its foldings and form, by means of the small pieces of lead attached to its hem, and being bordered at the bottom with black beads disposed into an open net-work, affords the eye of the observer the casual felicity of admiring the most beautiful symmetrical ankle and instep in the world. The mantilla of black or white lace gracefully thrown over the head, and as gracefully confined at the waist by the arms of the wearer, imparts an interesting and imposing effect to their fine forms. In their toilet, those periodical moultings of dress which fashion elsewhere prescribes, is unknown. The Spanish ladies dress all alike, and in the same style at all seasons of the year; a practice which tends much to leave lasting and favourable impressions on the mind of the observer, of the form and fascination of the wearer. Those who have had the happiness of eliciting the bewitchingly-endearing tattle, the pretty lisp, the affectionate smile, the love-speaking look, can never disenchant their imagination of the recollection; it cannot but endure to the last moment of existence.

I have said that the complexion of the Spanish ladies is a blood-tinged olive, but this is not invariable in Spain. Though dark hair and eyes are the general attributes of Spanish women, I have seen in the south ladies of the fairest and most delicate complexion; and in the mountainous districts of northern Spain, particularly in the town of Vittoria and its neighbourhood, where the Viejos Christianos, the old Gothic race, took refuge when their country was overrun by the Moors, the females have generally blue eyes, fair tresses, and as soft and delicate a complexion as our own lovely countrywomen.

In all parts of Spain, the dress, even of the humble classes, is picturesque, and often becoming. In some parts it is singular. At Santander and its vicinity, the peasant women wear round their necks gold chains, from which are pendant crosses and other holy trinkets, such as the figures of the Virgin Mary and certain saints. These constitute the fair damsel's dowry, who is considered of greater or more moderate fortune according to the size and splendour of her neck gear or vestiture; so that a fortune-hunting swain (for that genus of lovers abounds in all parts of the known habitable world), has never any occasion, while he is making unbounded protestations of his disinterested motives, to set on foot a few little impertinent inquiries about the amount or

quantum of "the muck and dross" to which his "adored and adorable" may be entitled.

Sir Arthur Wellesley having, with consummate generalship, both in the conception and the execution, fulfilled his instructions "to rid Portugal of the French," directed his attention to those measures by which he should also rid the entire Peninsula of the same horde of ravagers and despoilers.

Receiving intelligence from major-general Mackenzie, that marshal Victor, after his overthrow of Cuesta, at Medellin, had crossed the Tagus, and had advanced to Castello Branco; sir Arthur, stationing Beresford with 15,000 Portuguese at Fuente Guinaldo, to protect the Portuguese frontier, and directing Silveira, with some regular troops and militia, to defend the northern provinces, in case Soult should make an irruption, put the British army in motion from Oporto, and established his headquarters, on the 7th of June, at Coimbra. Here he was joined by 5,000 fresh troops, who had been drafted from militia regiments in England. At this time, sir Robert Wilson was dispatched with the Lusitanian legion, 3,000 strong, one Portuguese caçadore battalion, and two Spanish battalions, in the direction of Madrid, to act on Victor's rear, when the allied British and Spanish army should have brought him to action.

The army was now encamped on the northern bank of the Douro, but was in a very sickly state, the men being young and unseasoned, and having suffered greatly from the hardships and privations to which they had been subject during the campaign, and which were increased by their pay being much in arrear. The consequence was insubordination and marauding; which were restrained only by sir Arthur threatening to send the offending regiments home, as a mark of disgrace, and ordering the regimental rolls to be called over every hour, from sunrise to eight o'clock in the evening. Severe as the privations and distress were to which the army was subject, these measures had the effect of introducing order and discipline; and so noble a spirit quickly pervaded the army, that the men were willing to endure any hardships, bear any privation, and face any danger, if they only saw their gallant and high-minded chief in the camp: their confidence in his tutelary genius was so unbounded. "When he appeared, or placed himself near their ranks," says one who had an opportunity throughout the war of observing the conduct of the

army, "the spirits of the men were raised to a frenzy of confidence. No matter how great the peril, the opposing force, or the difficulty of the ground—he being there, all was right, and though death stared the soldier in the face—open-jawed—almost certain to devour them—still he had faith and hope, and on he rushed. God only knows how he arrived at the point of his ambition; for in front, it was through a deluge of fire, and in the rear, through a river of blood; but, nevertheless, he did arrive there." The confidence the army had in his talents and fortunes, is also well described by another witness of his glorious exploits. Wherever he was, the soldiers used to say, "Aye! there he goes, boys: all's right." And forward they rushed, careless of dangers and numbers, driving the French out of the strongest and most impregnable positions. Such was their confidence in his talents and good fortune—such their determination to conquer or perish. They well knew that where he was, the day of battle would be the day of victory. He was the life and soul of the army: it was supposed impossible but success must attend him.

But to resume the narrative. As the exhausted state of Portugal would not allow the obtaining of the necessary magazines and means of transport for the advance of the army into Spain, arrangements were entered into with the central junta, and the *alcaldes* of the villages of the fertile country in the Vera de Plasencia, for the supply of 20,000 rations of forage and provisions: and the superintendent-general, don Longano de Torres, was dispatched to sir Arthur to ratify the agreement. On the faith of that agreement, sir Arthur Wellesley, after having taken the precaution to secure his left flank from the advance of the three corps-d'armée, under Soult, Ney, and Mortier, which were on the other side of the Bejar mountains, by directing Beresford to defend the Puerto de Perales, and inducing Cuesta to order the marquess de la Reyna to adopt the same step at the Puerto

de Banos, those two passes being the only ones practicable for the passage of artillery; he, with the view of joining Cuesta on the Tietar, and combining with him an offensive movement on Madrid, on the 27th of June, marched from Abrantes, on both banks of the Tagus, towards the Spanish frontier; and on the 8th of July, established his head-quarters at Plasencia. But he had not proceeded more than seven marches from Castello Branco, before he found that no dependence was to be placed on the promises and engagements of the junta and the local authorities; who, with the characteristic faithlessness that had marked the whole of their proceedings with the British army throughout the Peninsular war, had not complied with any of the conditions of their contract for the supply of the army. He had not only to struggle with promises broken, and engagements violated by the temporizing and deceitful juntas—"his applications and remonstrances having been answered with false excuses and false statements by the government and local authorities,"—but he had also to contend with the perverseness and obstinacy of Cuesta. When he visited, July 10th, that headstrong and stolid old man,* at his head-quarters, near the Col de Mirabete, before the junction of the two armies, and recommended to him to march and seize the bridge of Almaraz, and thus, by throwing himself between the French and Spanish armies, cut off the enemy's retreat on Madrid, the brilliant and masterly conception was marred and frustrated by "the bigoted and imbecile idiot whom he had for a colleague;" whose ignorance and perverseness he thus calmly and mildly reproved in one of his letters:—"The obstinacy of this old gentleman has thrown away the finest opportunity that any army ever had."

Failing of success in this recommendation, sir Arthur proceeded to arrange with "the old gentleman" the plan of the campaign; when it was agreed that a simultaneous advance of the two armies should be made on

* The description given of this testy old Spaniard is really a caricature on the military character:—"When sir Arthur visited him at his head quarters at the Casa de Mirabete, he was lifted, for the purpose of accompanying the English general in the review of his army, on his horse by two grenadiers, while one of his aides-de-camp was ready on the other side to conduct his leg over the horse's croup, and place it in the stirrup."—*Campaign of 1809*, by the earl of Munster. Another intelligent writer

says, that his mental qualifications were on a par with his bodily weakness; and that his ignorance of military science was equalled only by his arrogance and presumption. He also informs us, that when sir Arthur visited him on the 23rd, at his bivouac on the Alberche, he presented a feature of mental and physical inability which strongly indicated his apathetic sluggishness and obstinacy. The rest of the Spanish generals, except those of Irish or Swiss descent, were equally incompetent.

the 18th, to dislodge Victor from his position at Talavera de la Reyna, to which place he had retreated, on hearing of Soult's expulsion from Oporto, and in furtherance of an arranged plan between him and Soult, that while he opposed the British army, and its feeble allies under Cuesta in front, Soult, with Ney's and Mortier's corps d'armée, should advance behind the Bejar mountains, and, at the same moment, "fall altogether," as Soult expressed himself, on the British army, and in Buonaparte's phrase, "crush it," or at least intercept its retreat into Portugal. Pending these operations, Blake had been defeated, on the 15th of July, at the village of Moria, on the Huerba, and on the 18th at Belchitte, with great loss; many of his regiments having fled without firing a shot.

It having been agreed on between the British and Spanish chiefs, that the British army, supported by that under Cuesta, should move against Victor's corps, and that Vanegas and sir Robert Wilson should threaten Madrid, in order, if possible, by this demonstration, to draw off the attention of the corps under Joseph Buonaparte and Sebastiani, and thus prevent it from making any movement in conjunction with Victor; the English army, on the 17th, broke up its cantonments from Plasencia; and, on the 20th, both armies marched in two columns on Talavera. In his march from Oropesa, Cuesta's progress was impeded by Victor's rear-guard, at the village of Gamonal. There, 2,000 cavalry, under Lantour Maubourg, brought to a halt Zayas, with 15,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, and treated them with so much contempt, that they never stirred from their position,* until the head of the British columns appeared on their right. On reaching Talavera, the allied army found that Victor had taken a position behind the Alberche, where he remained, apparently regardless of the great force in his front.

The reason that the French general apparently disregarded the large force opposed to him, was, that the arrangement which had been made at the interview between sir Arthur Wellesley and Cuesta, that the attack should be delayed till the 23rd, had been betrayed to him by some

of Cuesta's staff. "There was something more than inertness," says Napier, "in Victor's halts." At the time, secret negotiations were carrying on between the agents of Joseph Buonaparte and several of the most influential men in the patriot government, for the betrayal of the English army, while they were even receiving money and supplies from England, and that the English army was shedding its blood in the defence of Spanish independence.

As it had been arranged that the enemy was to be attacked on the 23rd, the English army was under arms at three o'clock in the morning; but when sir Arthur Wellesley went to Cuesta's camp to make the final arrangements, he was told that the Spanish general was asleep, and had given orders not to be disturbed before seven o'clock; and when he did awake, he, with his usual perverseness and dogged disposition, refused to fight that day, because it was Sunday. Thus fettered and thwarted in all his operations, and despoiled of the opportunity of advantageously attacking the French army, which remained in its indefensible position, perfectly regardless of the presence of the hostile armies, the English general was obliged to sooth and humour the pride and arrogance of his intractable colleague. He invited him to accompany him in reconnoitring the enemy's position, and the selection of the battle-field. On the morning of the 24th, the old man came in a coach, drawn by six mules, and having felt some inconvenience from the jolting of the carriage, as soon as he was removed out of the vehicle, he threw himself on the ground, and immediately fell fast asleep.

Victor having now fallen back to Santa Olalla, and thence towards Torrijos, on the reinforcements under Sebastiani and Joseph Buonaparte advancing to his assistance; Cuesta, supposing that the French army was retreating before him, determined on an immediate pursuit, and communicated his intentions to that effect to the English general. "The towers of Madrid, nay, the Pyrenees themselves," instantly flitted before his vision; and probably the stolid old man formed in his imagination a fancy picture of the march of his supercilious countrymen to Paris, and that he should

* The French had the most contemptible opinion of Spanish courage and discipline. "The whole of the Spanish forces," said Napoleon, in a communication to one of his generals, "are not capable of beating 25,000 French troops in a reasonable posi-

tion." Berthier, in a letter to Joseph Buonaparte, says "L'empereur considère qu'il n'y a de dangereux en Espagne, que les Anglais; que le rest n'est de canaille." (The emperor thinks the English alone are to be feared in Spain; the rest are mere rabble.)

have the British army the passive spectators of his victories in his French crusade, as his foolish compatriots had vauntingly boasted to sir John Moore's army. Sir Arthur warned him of the probable consequences of his quixotic expedition, and pointed out the danger of the separation of the armies; and as he could not divert the headstrong old Spaniard from his purpose, he determined to afford him an asylum or place of refuge, from his certain discomfiture. On the evening of the 23rd, he sent a letter, apprising him that, at four o'clock in the morning of the 24th, two divisions of infantry, and a brigade of cavalry, under major-general Sherbrooke, would cross the Alberche, and march to the attack of the right of the enemy's position, near the heights of Cazalegas. By this information, the self-sufficient Spaniard, finding himself under the protecting wing of the British, "in the fullness of his arrogant vanity and inflated pride," crossed the Alberche on the 24th, and established his outposts at Torrijos. Having, however, some perception, from Sherbrooke's movements, that he was likely to lose his protection, he, on the 26th, ordered a retreat, to avoid the inevitable consequences of his headlong march to ruin; but before he could withdraw his advanced guard, he was attacked, and the regiment of Villa Viciosa, which was drawn up in an enclosure, nearly surrounded by a ditch, was cut to pieces. The fugitive troops escaped to Alcabon, where, recovering from their panic, a portion of them, in number 4,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, made a stand under Zayas; but as soon as the head of the French column appeared, they again took to flight towards Santa Olalla. The whole Spanish army was saved from total destruction, by Albuquerque retarding the pursuit with 3,000 fresh cavalry, and the opportune intervention of Sherbrooke, who placed his corps between the scared fugitives and their pursuers. By this preposterous proceeding, the Spanish army lost 4,000 men, and reached the Alberche in the greatest disorder.

On the broken and bewildered columns coming to a halt, they were clustered, in the expression of their countryman, the duke of Albuquerque, "like a rabble on a pilgrimage," on a narrow slip of ground between the rivers Alberche and Tagus, and the heights of Salinas, a position so indefensible, that the first shot fired by the enemy would have been the signal of defeat. Sir

Arthur, foreseeing the consequence, had an interview, on the evening of the 26th, with his worthless and stupid ally, and earnestly conjured him, while Sherbrooke, was present to cover the movement, to withdraw across the Alberche, and take up his position at Talavera; and the headstrong old Spaniard being deaf to all entreaty, he again renewed his solicitations at daylight of the 27th, when Cuesta, having been previously informed that Sherbrooke was drawing off his corps for the purpose of recrossing the Alberche, sullenly consented; at the same time turning to his staff, and observing that sir Arthur's back was turned towards him, boasted that "he had made the Englishman go down on his knees before he had consented to change his position." As soon as the headstrong Spaniard had recrossed the Alberche, and taken up his position in the line of battle, Sherbrooke recrossed the river.

While the old Spaniard had been engaged in his quixotic expedition of pursuing the French, the British chief had been occupied in selecting his battle-ground. For this purpose he made choice of a range of steep hills, or high grounds, extending about two miles from the left of the Tagus, having the city of Talavera on the extreme right, and a commanding hill on the left; a valley of about six hundred yards across intervening, through which the Portina rivulet, a tributary of the Tagus, flowed, separating the range of hills from the opposite rocky ridge of the Sierra de Montalban. The right of the line was almost an unassailable position, its front being protected by ditches, embankments, mud walls, and other obstacles; while the rear and flank were secured by a thick wood, in which was a large mound on the left of the position, having a field-work thereon. In front of the city were many olive groves and enclosures, adapted to cover and conceal any force that might be stationed there. From the centre of the line to the hill on the extreme left, the country was naked and open. Having chosen his ground, sir Arthur assigned the securest place to the Spaniards, an almost unassailable position, and reserved the post of danger and honour for his countrymen, namely, the naked and open country to the hill on the extreme left. The approach to Talavera by the Toledo road, and all the avenues to the town, were defended by batteries. The right of the British army rested on the left of the Spanish, Campbell's division formed the right of the

British line, Sherbrooke's and the German legion the centre, Hill's division rested, *en echelon*, on the hill on the extreme left, and the cavalry in the rear, behind the mound which lay between the two divisions of the allied army; all drawn up in two lines, except Sherbrooke's division, which was in single line, it being intended that Macken-

zie's division, which was stationed in advance in the olive groves, near the Casa de Salinas, for the purpose of covering the troops while taking up their positions in the line of battle, should complete the formation. The divisions had scarcely taken up their battle-station, when the French columns were observed crowning the opposite heights.

THE BATTLE OF TALAVERA.

ABOUT two o'clock of the afternoon of the 27th, two columns of the enemy, headed by a cloud of voltigeurs, attacked one of the brigades of Mackenzie's division, which was posted, as before stated, in an advanced position in a wood on the right of the Alberche; and the attack was so sudden and unexpected that sir Arthur, who had ascended a tower at the Casa de Salinas, for the purpose of reconnoitring the enemy's position, was nearly captured.

As the advance of the enemy against Mackenzie's division, which consisted of young battalions that had never been under fire, was unperceived, one brigade was thrown into disorder, and driven from its ground; a misfortune which was further increased by some of the regiments, from their inexperience, actually firing on one another; but the second brigade, consisting of the 45th and the fifth battalion of the 60th, under colonel Donkin, advancing to their support, they recovered their order, and took up their ground in the main position, while Donkin's brigade took position on Hill's post; the enemy at the same time falling back, and taking up his original ground. A body of light cavalry, supported by a cloud of voltigeurs, following close on Mackenzie's rear-guard, now rode up to the Spanish line, to induce them to unmask their line of battle. Having discharged a few pistol-shots, and being answered by a discharge of the whole Spanish line, six thousand of the Spanish infantry, and the whole of the commissariat, being panic-struck with their own noise, threw away their arms, and took to flight; the adjutant-general, O'Donoghue, being amongst the foremost of the fugitives, and Cuesta in movement to follow the example. But sir Arthur, who was not above one hundred yards from the scene of confusion and flight, flanking the main road with a small detachment of Campbell's division, and addressing the fugitives in a soothing and encouraging

tone, rallied the greater part of the fugitives, and bringing them back to their position, removed the panic which was widely spreading through the Spanish ranks. The inefficiency, and often absolute cowardice, of the Spanish armies, are evident from the following expressions of sir Arthur Wellesley:—

"The misbehaviour of the Spanish troops before the enemy was constant and shameful." "Whole corps, officers and men, ran off on the first appearance of danger." "They have never, in a single instance, behaved as soldiers ought to do in the presence of an enemy. They made no scruple of running off in a body, and, after an action, were to be found in every village, and every shady bottom, within fifty miles of the field of battle." "We in England seldom hear of their defeats and flights; but I have heard Spanish officers talking of nineteen or twenty actions, all of the description of that of Arzobispo, an account of which has never been published." "In the battle of Talavera, in which the Spanish army, with very trifling exception, was not engaged, whole corps threw down their arms, and ran off in my presence, though they were neither attacked, nor threatened with an attack, but frightened with their own fire." "I cannot say that they do anything as it ought to be done, with the exception of running away, and assembling again in a state of nature." In another place he says, "the only safe places in which the Spaniards can be trusted are behind stone walls and strong entrenchments, and where they can neither betray nor escape." Again—"The Spaniards can do nothing but stand still; and we consider ourselves fortunate if they do not run away." In another place he ironically says, "The Spanish troops behaved *admirably*; they stood like stocks, quite immovable." In his remonstrance to the British ministry, respecting their projected design of withdrawing a portion of the veteran battalions serving in the south of France, for the purpose of



sending them on an expedition to Germany, and replacing them with drafts from the militia, the duke cautioned them on the consequences of leaving "a handful of brave men to the doubtful exertions and inefficient discipline of Spanish troops, long experience having taught me that if Spanish troops can be trusted anywhere, it is behind stone-walls and deep trenches, and remaining still there." But one of the most emphatic proofs of his opinion of the worthlessness of their military character is to be found in his sarcastic irony on their conduct at the battle of Toulouse, where, with their characteristic presumption, they requested to lead the battle; but they were no sooner in position to put into execution an honour to which they had not the slightest pretension, than they were driven by the French, panic-struck, in headlong flight, like a flock of sheep before the wolf,—a scene which drew the ironical reproof from the British chief, "that he had seen many curious sights, but never before saw ten thousand men running a race."

It may be said that the encomiums passed on the good-will and courage of the Spaniards in the official despatches published by the government are at variance with the above declarations in the English general's private correspondence; but then it should be recollected that it was wisdom to give to that "perverse people" credit for a virtue of which they were destitute, in the hope that they might thus be tempted to deserve for the future the praise gratuitously bestowed on them.

"Every action, every proceeding," says the author of *The History of the War in the Peninsula*, "during the six years that the war lasted, proved the truth that the Spanish troops were incapable of defending their country." In another part of his excellent work, the same author, speaking of their never-ending defeats, adds, "they were incapable of obtaining, and consequently incapable of losing military reputation."

When the Spanish leaders and officers gave expression to their insubordination, because the English commander-in-chief had ordered the Spanish troops to march to the Bastan, in the rear of the allied army, as a punishment for their misconduct in the forcing of the French intrenched camp in front of Bayonne, on the 9th of November, as also on account of their murder and pillage of the French peasantry on the borders of France, he told them, that he would withdraw the British

army from all union and communication with them, and that then they would not be able to remain in France a few days." Napier, when speaking of the licentiousness and outrages of the Spanish troops, under Murillo, Freire, and Mina, committed in the south of France, admits, that "they were more dangerous than useful" to the English army.

After the sorry affair of O'Donoghue and his fugitives, no movement was made by the enemy, until just as the shades of twilight began to make objects indistinct; when Victor, considering the heights on which Hill's division was posted the key of the position, and apprehending that if he could carry it the battle-ground of the English army would be untenable, ordered Lapisse to make a feint on the centre, to serve as a diversion in favour of the main object of attack; while Ruffin's and Villatte's divisions advanced under the protection of a heavy cannonade on the whole of the English line, against that part of Hill's position which was then occupied by the brigade of colonel Donkin.

These divisions, encouraged by the report of the Spanish panic, advanced to the attack with the confidence and impetuosity of men to whom war and victory had been familiar things; some of them, as they approached the English, calling out, that they were deserters from the German legion; others vociferating "Vivan los valorosos Ingleses!" and all desiring the British troops not to fire, as they were Spaniards. By this *ruse de guerre*, they turned the left of Donkin's brigade, and gained the hill in its rear; but the brigade discovering its error, and being supported by the 29th regiment, the first battalion of the 48th, and the first battalion of detachments under Hill, the whole force poured in a destructive fire, and immediately charging with the bayonet, drove their assailants down the hill with great slaughter. At midnight, the attack was renewed with increased fury, but was gallantly repulsed: the assault being made and met with the greatest spirit, the combatants were scarcely twenty yards, at any period of the fight, from each other; the hill the whole time sparkling with incessant flashes of musketry. While this attack was going forward, a false one was made as before stated, against the German legion.

Each army bivouacked for the night, which was one of watchfulness and alarm, on the ground which it had occupied during

the day; the English troops slept with their arms beside them, the cavalry with the bridles of their horses round their arms, anticipating "a fiercer and a bloodier day" on the morrow. The condition of the English army was very wretched. The men were suffering much from hunger; a few ounces of wheat in the grain forming the whole of their sustenance—and such had been their fare for some days—sir Arthur not having furnished himself with magazines, depending on the fulfilment of the contracts he had entered into with the Spanish government. "A morsel of bread, and some pure water," says one of the sufferers, "would have been considered luxurious fare on the battle-field of Talavera."

During the night, another unaccountable panic took hold of the Spanish army, which, probably alarmed by the movements of one of those animals Sancho Panza loved, while browsing among the olive trees, thinking that the French were in the midst of their unassailable trenches, poured forth a roll of musketry along the whole of their line, and immediately "three battalions, alarmed at their own noise, took to their heels." The idle "noise" was taken up by some of the inexperienced battalions, drafts from the militia, of the British army; and the consequence was, they shot several of their own officers and men who were at the outposts.

Soon after day-break, on the morning of the 28th, a cannon-shot from the centre of the enemy's line, was the signal for the advance of his columns, and the opening of all his guns. A shower of balls instantly fell in all parts of the English line; and under cover of the smoke, two strong columns of chosen troops ascended with the most resolute bearing, the hill on the extreme left. Again and again they pressed forward to within a few paces of the summit,

* While the French were advancing, the following memorable circumstance occurred. Its detail in the identical words of the original narrator will, no doubt, be the most interesting to the reader. During the second day of the battle of Talavera, a Spanish officer rode up to me, and inquired, "If I was one of the English generals?" As I was only a colonel of the staff, I said, "No; but that I commanded the brigade then engaged in our immediate front." He answered—"I am sent by the duke of Albuquerque to desire that sir Arthur Wellesley may be informed that the Spanish general will afford him no assistance in this battle, and that he is in communication with the enemy." As the enemy was at the time making repeated and vigorous attacks on our left, in which my brigade was, I was not able to communicate the intelligence to the commander-in-chief until the lapse

and struggled hard for a footing, but they were repulsed and baffled in all their attempts, by the closely delivered volleys, and rapid charges of the English, leaving the ground covered with slain.

A pause in the work of death now took place, from nine o'clock till mid-day, on account of the extreme sultriness of the weather, and that Joseph Buonaparte was engaged in a council of war with Jourdan, Victor, and Sebastiani, as to the ulterior measures they should adopt. By virtue of a sort of tacit truce, a cessation of hostilities took place; and in the interim, the French army was engaged in cooking and eating their dinner; while the English army, having none to cook, ate their very scanty modicum of nature's unsophisticated gifts; namely, a few handfuls of wheat which they bruised between stones, handed from one man to the other. During the portentous calm which had suspended the work of death and destruction, many men of both armies straggled down to the Portina rivulet, which at that season of the year was only a muddy stream, and then ensanguined with the bodies of the slain, which were lying in it. There, and at the well at the foot of the Gata chain, which was also surrounded by the men of both nations,—imitating the gentle courtesy of the heroes of the Iliad, who shook hands and exchanged weapons in the hour of contest,—they passed the interval in social intercourse and mutual good wishes, exchanging the contents of their canteens and calabashes, as tokens of good fellowship and respect, which proofs of mutual courage had inspired, and which brave men know how to value in a brave enemy, till the rolling of the drums along the whole French line, and the roar of the signal guns, recalled them to the posts of duty and allegiance.* All were again engaged in the great and glorious game of war, and the

of half-an-hour; when I found him surrounded by his own staff and that of general Hill. Sir Arthur hearing that somebody was waiting to make a report, desired that I might go to him. I found him sitting on a low stone, his elbows resting on his knees, with his two hands flat on his face, each on one cheek, and his eyes looking out sharply beyond his two little fingers. I have seen the duke in this position at table more than once since. On my going up to him he turned his whole person as he sat towards me, and in the calmest manner, but with quickness, said—"Well, what have you to say?" I then repeated to him the message I had received. Sir Arthur, without removing his hands, or showing the least sign of surprise, answered—"Oh, very well; you may go back to your brigade." Not a motion indicated the slightest agitation; but calmly turning

goddess of arms held up the dazzling prize of victory to the view of the rival combatants, as the reward of superior prowess and skill.

During the suspension of hostilities, sir Arthur remedied his omission of not having occupied the hill of the Gata chain, which was further on his extreme left, and separated from it by a deep valley; but which at the time of his taking up his position, had been deemed too distant to have any influence on the position, by stationing a body of cavalry, and Bassecour's brigade, (which he had induced Cuesta to send him as a corps of observation), on the plain or valley between the two hills. He had scarcely effected this change, when, under the protection of a furious tempest of balls and bullets from 80 pieces of artillery, and of clouds of voltigeurs, four heavy columns were observed advancing, to make a simultaneous attack on the right and centre of the English line: the first against Campbell's division; the second against Sherbrooke's; the third against Mackenzie's and the German legion; and the fourth, accompanied by a mass of cavalry, against Hill's division on the hill; each column not deploying into line, till it had gained the summit of the ridge, except that against Sherbrooke, which advanced partly in line and partly in column.

When the first column under Sebastiani was within a few paces of Campbell's division, it was received with a shattering volley, and its flanks being at the same moment assailed with a lapping fire from the flanks of Campbell's line, it was, by a firm charge of the bayonet, driven back with great slaughter; and a battery of ten guns was taken. But Campbell prudently resolving not to break his line by a pursuit, the enemy rallied on their supports, but in the act of making head for another attack, were so

vehemently battered by the English artillery and musketry, that they fell back in disorder.

While the battle was thus won on the right, Vilatte's division, supported by Maubourg's cavalry and two batteries of eight guns each, was advancing against the left of the line, to turn Hill's division, which had been already so fiercely contested; when Anson's brigade, consisting of the 23rd regiment of light dragoons and 1st German hussars, which had been posted in the valley, being ordered to charge the head of those columns, the 23rd, under major Somerset, rushing forward impetuously, fell over the brink of a deep ravine or dry water-course, which the long waving state of the grass concealed from their view, and both men and horses were precipitated over one another in dreadful confusion. Nowise discouraged by this untoward accident and the destructive fire which the French, who had thrown their columns into solid squares (partly formed against the side of a house within gun shot of the British left, and protected by sixteen guns), poured in upon them, they mounted the opposite bank "in twos" and "threes," and being reformed by major Ponsonby, dashed through the intervals of the French squares, under a deadly blaze of fire—rushed on a brigade of chasseurs drawn up in the rear—and cutting the first line in two, attacked the second line. The French being assisted by the advance of some Polish lancers and Westphalian light horse, the gallant remains of the 23rd, after having lost above the half of its men and officers, repassing through the intervals of the French columns, again formed in the rear of Fane's brigade of heavy cavalry in the valley, whose advance had been countermanded on observing the discomfiture of the 23rd.* The 1st German Hussars on seeing the calamitous condition of the

himself back, he again directed his view to the battle." (*Communication of general sir Rufane Donkin, to the United Service Journal, for 1830.*) The following anecdote, on the occasion of the battle of Waterloo, confirms this remark. At three o'clock in the morning of the 18th of June, while the troops were snatching a brief repose, the duke was employed in writing three letters (two of which were in French) to sir Charles Stewart, the duke of Berri, and the governor of Antwerp, calmly describing his situation, and expressing unshaken confidence in the result of the approaching battle. The author of *Twelve Years' Military Adventure*, says, that a cavalry officer told him that he had been sent express, one night, from a distant part of the army, with information of a sudden movement of the enemy, which was supposed

to be of great consequence. The duke received him while in bed, heard the communication, asked a few questions, and then saying "All's right," fell back on his pillow, and resumed his repose. As sir Rufane Donkin observes in his communication above stated, instances of the duke's cool and imperturbable self-possession were of daily occurrence during the Peninsular war; the feeling was habitual to him.

* The daring and desperate charge of the 23rd dragoons, says a correspondent of the *United Service Journal*, was the subject of eulogy in the French army, "who are always more disposed to give the due measure of praise to the gallant bearing of the English, than their own countrymen are." In military circles, the following anecdote is current, as the cause of the escape of the remnant of the regiment

23rd dragoons, had reined up and retired. During this exploit, the attack on Hill's position was repulsed with the same success as had attended that on the right. Both sides displayed the same undaunted courage and resolution. The French columns advanced close up to the English line, but were so vigorously encountered, that they fell back in disorder, leaving the hill covered with their dead, dying, wounded, and exhausted comrades.

While these terrible conflicts were going on in the British wings, the battle raged in all its fury in the centre, being assailed by Lapisse's division, which advanced under the destructive fire of fifty pieces of heavy artillery. Though fearful chasms were made by the tempest of cannon balls in the British ranks, the enemy was received with close and well directed volleys, and being charged with the bayonet, their whole line broke, and they were hurled in confusion down the steep. In this struggle the brigade of guards quitting their lines, in the victorious excitement, and the headlong

from the great force with which it was surrounded:—A German trumpeter, who had deserted from the enemy a few days before the battle, and had enrolled himself in the 23rd, seeing there was no possibility of escape, and aware of the punishment that awaited him if taken, rushed towards the trumpeter of the 23rd dragoons, exclaiming in the most agitated tones, "Gif me de trumpet, gif me de trumpet!" and at the same time snatching it as it hung loosely at the English trumpeter's side, blew with shrill and loud notes, "the French order to retreat." The enemy, on hearing it, supposing that some part of the army was in danger, retreated; and in the meantime the survivors of the 23rd rejoined their own army. Among the survivors was the late lord William Russell, who was murdered by his Swiss valet.

* The commanding officer of this regiment was the gallant old colonel Donellan, who, having his knee dreadfully shattered by a ball, while leading his regiment at double-quick time, beckoned the next officer in command, major Middlemore, and, though suffering excruciating pain from the wound, taking off his hat, resigned the command, as formally as if he had been on the parade of a barrack-ground. Like the rest of the wounded, he was allowed by the ungrateful Talaverans to lie in the streets; but a mortification of the limb ensuing, he was released by death from his sufferings. When, on Cuesta's disgraceful and culpable abandonment of the British hospital, the French entered Talavera, some of the French officers who had witnessed the gallant bearing of the deceased during the action, as a testimonial of their admiration and esteem, conveyed him in a cloak to the spot of his gallant exploits, and buried him with all the honours of war. That gallant soldier was as distinguished for his eccentricity as for his officer-like and gentlemanly bearing. He was styled in the army "the last of the powderers;" an appellation acquired from the circumstance of his persevering in his exhibition of the good old cauliflower head; which

passion of fight, hotly pursued the enemy into the plain, but being assailed in flank with a tempest of grape from the batteries, and at the same time attacked by the enemy, who had faced about, and their supporting columns and cavalry, they were thrown into great disorder, in which the German legion, who had followed their example, participated, so that all the mounted officers and about 500 privates were killed or wounded. Sir Arthur, to remedy the disaster, ordered the 48th regiment,* which he had kept in hand, to advance to their support, and that gallant regiment wheeling back by companies, and allowing the guards and Germans to retire through the openings, immediately wheeled into line, and delivering a well directed and closely telling fire, arrested the advance of the enemy. In the interim, the guards and German legion having recovered their formation, the re-formed line rushed forward with a loud huzza—which was answered with a thrilling cheer, "the earthquake voice of victory," by the whole of the line of the

he considered as essential a part of the soldier's costume as that of the sword and sash. Jack boots and white buckskin breeches were also the objects of his adoration; and when grey overalls and Wellingtons were ordered to be substituted, he pertinaciously adhered to his favourite costume. The eccentricities of that true son of Mars often occasioned many laughable circumstances. Among those fondly held in remembrance by the survivors of the regiment, the following is not the least interesting:—The battalion which he commanded first, and for the longest time, was the second, but he was promoted to the first on a vacancy occurring; an occurrence which occasioned him for some time to lose sight of his favourite portion of the regiment. Prior to the battle of Talavera, sir Arthur Wellesley reviewed the British army in the presence of Cuesta and his staff, in compliment to the exhibition of the Spanish army having been displayed to him on the junction of the allied forces. As the respective staffs rode down the line, every soldier stood perfectly motionless, not even a movement of a facial muscle being observable. All of a sudden, however, a bustle and a murmur were remarked in the second battalion of the 48th; its line had lost its usual statue-like appearance, and caps and heads, and tongues and hands, seemed to be undergoing an electric shock. This breach of discipline in that distinguished corps was caused by the sight of their old commander riding amongst the staff-officers, in his stiff white leathers, his cauliflower head, and square cocked hat. The men were those he had formerly commanded, and the sight of him had given rise to the murmurs of "There goes old Charley;" "God bless the old boy;" "long life to him;" and similar ebullitions of their esteem and affection. The explanation of the cause of these merited, but rather out-of-place expressions appeased sir Arthur's chagrin; and all were delighted as "Old Charley" waved his hat, in cordial salutation of his old friends, and in return for their compliment.

army—against the enemy, whose battalions in all parts of their line having been already shattered and disordered, and their slain strewn along the gallant front of the English in fearful numbers, retreated, under cover of the smoke of their artillery and numerous cavalry, to the rear of their original position; having been repulsed at all points, and leaving in the hands of the conquerors, seventeen guns, with two tumbrils and ammunition. Seventeen thousand stand of arms were found on the field of battle, and several silk standards, their eagles which had been made to unscrew, so that the standard-bearers, when hard pressed in the pursuit might pocket them, having been taken off. Near the termination of the battle, which closed about six in the evening, a melancholy scene occurred. The dry grass and leaves which lay upon the ground, becoming ignited from the cartridges and wadding that had fallen upon them, a volume of flame spread itself over hundreds of acres, involving in the conflagration many of the wounded of both armies.

The loss of the British was two generals, 31 officers, and 761 sergeants and privates killed; three generals, 193 officers, and 3,718 sergeants and privates wounded; nine officers, and 643 sergeants and privates missing. That of the French was, according to their own returns, 944 killed, 6,294 wounded, and 156 prisoners; but sir Arthur Wellesley's estimate, "about one quarter of their army," was nearer the truth, and this supposition is confirmed by the French war-office statement, of 8,794 men lost. The Spaniards returned their loss in the action as 1,200; but no credit was given to the account, as they had scarcely been engaged in the battle. The great loss which the

English army had suffered was chiefly occasioned by the murderous and overwhelming fire of the French artillery, several regiments which had been scarcely engaged having suffered nearly equal loss with those that bore the brunt of the battle. Two balls perforated sir Arthur Wellesley's coat, and a spent ball struck him on the shoulder. On the evening of the 27th a cannon-ball struck off the branch of a tree just above his head. The danger to which he had been exposed may be inferred from the following observation in a letter to the duke of Richmond:—"All my staff have either been hit, or have lost their horses."*

The English army consisted of near 19,000 men, and the French army, according to the returns of the war-office at Paris, to 56,174 men. But only 38,000 of the French and 16,000 of the English were engaged in the battle; the reserves on both sides were not brought into action. Thus, to adopt the words of the author of *The History of the War in the Peninsula*, "16,000 English soldiers," the greater part raw and inexperienced, as the 87th, the 88th, &c., a large proportion of which had just been drafted from the militia, and of which they bore evident marks on their knapsacks and accoutrements, "worsted 38,000 French, who were all hardy veterans," and who, moreover, were troops who had no misgivings from having witnessed English courage and felt English bayonets at Roliça, Vimiera, Corunna, or Oporto. Thus had the battle of Talavera been "bravely fought and nobly won," and which, according to Sarrazin's acknowledgment, "avait repandu l'effroi dans l'armée Française."

The English army bivouacked on the same requital from the municipal body of Cadiz, for his gallant and patriotic services in saving that city from the grasp of the French. When that true patriot demanded clothing for his gallant corps, the municipality of that city (though the sordid and mercenary varlets had 700 pieces of cloth in their possession), refused to grant a single suit, until an order should emanate from the regency for the purpose, as they would then be entitled to a commission on the transaction. Albuquerque petitioned the regency for the purpose, and was directed by them to publish his memorial, which so exasperated the abject-souled municipal authorities, that they resorted to every species of calumny and virulence that malice and disappointed avarice could devise. Albuquerque, in the agony of his soul at the ingratitude and baseness of his contemptible countrymen, renounced his office of governor of Cadiz, and declined to continue in his military command. That illustrious patriot and real soldier died of a broken heart in England, while he was executing the office of ambassador from the Spanish government.

* When the motion was made in both houses of parliament for a vote of thanks for the battle of Talavera, "so sternly fought, so hardly won," there were men to be found there who, to adopt Napier's indignant reproof, "considered the merits of him, who had delivered Portugal, cleared Galicia and Estremadura, and obliged a hundred thousand veterans to abandon the offensive, and concentrate about Madrid, nought; his actions silly, presumptuous, rash; his campaign one deserving not reward, but punishment." The same malignant and villifying spirit was indicated by a portion of the public press, and the cuckoo-note of ignorant and presumptuous reprehension of his military knowledge was taken up and re-echoed by the sages of the corporation of the city of London. The common council in their petition to parliament for inquiry (dated February 26th, 1810), presumptuously described his conduct as "exhibiting, with equal rashness and ostentation, nothing but useless valour." But presumption and ingratitude of the kind were not confined to English corporations. The duke of Albuquerque met with the

field of battle during the night, in a very cheerless state, being on the verge of absolute famine, and the night was very damp and chilly. In the course of the night the enemy passed the Alberche, leaving their watch-fires blazing along the whole front of their lines, and took up a defensive position on the heights of Salinas.* On the following morning the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th rifles, under major-general Robert Craufurd, reached the field of battle. In their advance, having met 6,000 of the panic-struck Spaniards, who told them that the English had been defeated and Wellesley killed, and were fleeing before the French, the gallant band, desirous of sharing in the peril of their countrymen, made a forced march of sixty-two miles in the course of twenty-six hours, without a single halt—an effort of endurance unequalled in military annals. The 29th and 30th were employed in establishing the hospitals, and endeavouring to obtain food; for, as has been just observed, the army was on the verge of famine, though plenty abounded in Cuesta's camp, and that the cellars of Talavera contained a sufficiency of corn and provisions for a month's consumption. When the wounded were carried into the town, the inhabitants inhumanly refusing to receive them into their houses, and the civic authorities to grant any medical aid for the relief of their suffering protectors, they were obliged to rest on the pavement of the streets and squares, without aid or assistance. To sir Arthur Wellesley's application to Cuesta and the magistrates of the city, to furnish rations for the troops, a positive refusal was given, until the British chief threatened to retreat into Portugal. And the inhumanity and ingratitude of Cuesta and the people of Talavera were not confined to the refusal of food and medical aid to those who had shed their blood and sacrificed their limbs in their defence, but they refused to assist in burying the dead, and soon after the termination of the battle they were actively employed in stealing the arms, ammunition, clothing, and money of the sick and wounded, and in stripping the bodies of the dead on the field of battle. To prevent their knocking out the brains of the wounded French, (which they did wherever they could), sentries were

placed on the field, with orders to fire on the offenders. But cruelty was congenial to and inherent in the nature of that people. On the retreat of the French from before the Spanish intrenchments on the 27th, their dastardly enemies were observed to be busily employed in stabbing and maiming the wounded and dying, whom they had feared to close with when unmaimed and unhurt.

"In the battle of Talavera, the Spanish army, with very trifling exceptions, was not engaged. Bassecour's corps was stationed on our left, and was kept in check throughout the day by one French battalion."* "It needed but a forward movement on the part of the Spaniards to render this hardly won, but singularly splendid victory, as decisive as any on record. Had it been possible to move them from the right of their line, so as to have gained the flanks of the French, one-half of the French army must have been sacrificed. But neither Cuesta nor his troops were capable of the change of a position in the face of an enemy; and therefore to attempt to manœuvre them, however simply, would have thrown them into confusion; and a second panic, such as that of the 27th, would have led to the most disastrous consequences." Again, while expressing his admiration of the English general's "moral courage in accepting battle with such a coadjutor as Cuesta," Thiers properly observes, that, had Jourdan's plan of carrying the key of the position (namely, the height occupied by Hill,) succeeded, the English general was prepared to neutralize the flank attack by a change in front, as by his left wing and cavalry he would have been enabled to keep the enemy in check, while his right, marching on the position abandoned by the French, would have cut the enemy off from the Alberche; and sir Arthur would have effected a junction with Vanegas and sir Robert Wilson's corps; and the results would have been, that Madrid and Toledo must have fallen into the possession of the allies; and before Soult could have united with Joseph, the allies would have obtained a new line of operations through the fertile country of La Mancha.

Cuesta now, that the fighting was over, "reared his abject head," and assuming of the toils they had been weaving for its destruction by its retrograde movement from Talavera, it was then Soult's design to intercept its retreat on Portugal by seizing the boat-bridge of Almaraz.

* The reason that Victor, with the first corps d'armée, made his stand at Salinas was, for the purpose of falling on the rear of the English army when Soult had approached its position, after having passed the Puerto de Banos, and compelled it to retreat. When they found that it had escaped out

* See sir Arthur Wellesley's letter to the duke of Richmond.—Gurwood's *Despatches*.

the part of the Roman general, began to decimate the runaways from his strong entrenchments. The victims to his unappeasable wrath were numerous; but on the intercession of sir Arthur Wellesley, he redecimated them, and limited his high and indignant sense of violated Spanish military renown to the immolation of five officers and thirty privates.

The kindly and generous feeling displayed at the rivulet Portina, and the well at the foot of the Gata Chain, by the hostile troops during the suspension of the battle of Talavera, was exhibited on several other occasions. On the morning after the battle of Busaco, the men of both armies were to be seen quenching their thirst in the same narrow stream, and even leaning over to shake hands. During the movements preceding the battle of Salamanca, while each army was on the opposite banks of the Douro, the soldiers of the hostile armies used to bathe together in the same stream, and to exchange their rations in token of amity and good fellowship. The men of both armies often passed the Douro, and held friendly intercourse in groups. During those conventional civilities, the arrangements were so perfectly amicable, that they not only made interchanges of presents, but the English took charge of the love letters of such of the French who had been prisoners of war in England, to be sent through the English army posts to their sweethearts there.* Of the friendly intercourse and generous feeling generally subsisting between the outposts of the adverse armies during the Peninsular campaigns, the following incident is an illustration. Lord Wellington, desirous to ascend a hill in possession of the French near Bayonne, ordered the riflemen who composed his escort to drive the French away. Observing them to steal up the ascent more cautiously than he thought was necessary, he ordered them to fire. "No firing," cried one of the generous soldiers, at the same time holding up the butt of his rifle towards the enemy, and tapping it in a peculiar manner understood among the initiated in the proprieties of war. At the signal, which signified, "We must have the hill for a short time," the French retired. It must, however, be recollected that the point was not capable of an effective and permanent defence, or it would not have been relinquished without a contest. And this friendly understanding and observance

of the proprieties of war was so strictly maintained between the hostile armies, that not only the sentries, but also the piquets were safe from wanton surprisal; no attack on an outpost, being, under any circumstances, thought of, unless it was meant to be followed up by a general engagement. During the whole of the continuance of Massena before the lines of Torres Vedras, the sentinels, though within musket range of each other's post, never wantonly fired; and indeed, throughout the war, neither the sentries nor videttes of the contending armies ever fired on one another, or made any attempt at the outposts, to provoke or wrong each other by feigned attacks; for in regular armies it is rivalry, not hatred, that animates the troops even when engaged in battle; therefore all useless slaughter is abstained from by the sentries and outposts of each army.

But this courteous mode of carrying on hostilities may, as the author of *The Subaltern* observes, be pushed too far. This he proves by the following anecdote:—

"Towards the close of the war, so good an understanding prevailed between the outposts of the two armies, that lord Wellington found it necessary to forbid all communication whatever; nor will the reader wonder at this, when I state to him the reason. A field-officer (I shall not say in what part of the line,) in going his rounds one night, found that the whole of the serjeant's piquet-guard had disappeared. He was, of course, both alarmed and surprised at the occurrence; but his alarm gave place to absolute astonishment, when on stretching forward to observe whether there was any movement in the enemy's lines, he peeped into a cottage from which a noise of revelry was proceeding, and beheld the party sitting in the most sociable manner with a similar party of Frenchmen, and carousing jovially. As soon as he showed himself, his own men rose, and wishing their companions a good night, returned with the greatest *sang-froid* to their posts. [The officer unwilling that the sacred character which had by the practice of both armies been tacitly conferred on the piquets, should be violated, took no notice of the affair.] It is, however, but justice to add, that the sentinels on both sides faithfully kept their ground, and that no intention of deserting existed on either part. In fact, it was a sort of custom, the French and English [out-post] guards visiting each other by turns.

* Suttree's *Twenty-five Years in the Rifle Brigade*.

"At the period of which I have spoken above, however, no such extraordinary intimacy had begun. And yet we were merely civil towards one another; and even that degree of civility was for awhile interrupted by the surprisal of a French post, by a detachment from general Beresford's division, on the river Nive. Not that the piquet was wantonly cut off, or that any blame could possibly attach to the general who ordered its surprisal. The fact was, that the out-post in question occupied a hill upon the allied bank of the stream. It was completely insulated and detached from all other French posts, and appeared to be held as much out of perverseness, as because it commanded a view of the British lines to a great extent. Lord Bresford had repeatedly despatched flags of truce, to request that it might be withdrawn, expressing great unwillingness to violate the sacred character which had been tacitly conferred upon the piquets; but Soult was deaf to his entreaties, and replied to his threats, only by daring him to carry them into execution. A party was accordingly ordered out, one stormy night, to cut off the guard; and so successful was the attempt, that an officer and thirty soldiers, with a midshipman and a few seamen who had charge of the boat by which the reliefs were daily ferried over, were taken. Not a shot was fired. The French trusting to the storm for protection, had called in their videttes, leaving only one on duty at the door of the house, and he found his arms pinioned, and himself secured ere the roar of the tempest had permitted him to detect the sounds of approaching steps. The unfortunate officer who commanded, sent, in the course of a few days, to the French army for his baggage; but the reply was, that the general would forward to him a halter, as the only indulgence which he merited."

The same feeling prevailed among the officers of each nation; besides observing all the courtesies of society and of kind and gentlemanly bearing towards one another in the friendly intercourse which took place, they often interchanged presents. During the marches and counter marches

that preceded the battle of Salamanca, while the armies were moving in parallel columns, the officers on each side made recognitions of courteous feeling towards each other, touching their shakos, and waving their hands in friendly salutation. Numerous instances of this honourable and humane mode of mitigating the austere discipline of warfare, in which civilities were exchanged, and often more substantial things, at the respective limits, are mentioned in *The Subaltern, Renimiscences of a Subaltern, Recollections of a Subaltern, The Binouac, &c.*; among them the following possess much interest.

While the light division was at Gallegos, some greyhounds belonging to an officer, strayed into the enemy's lines, and an opportunity was found, by means of the first flag of truce, to request their being returned. The answer was favourable, stating, that they should be sent on the first opportunity. A day or two after the enemy made a reconnoissance, and when the skirmishers were thrown out, the greyhounds were seen in couples in the rear, and on the first carbine being fired, they were let slip, and came curvetting through the whistling balls to their old masters.

"Many a time," says the author of *The Subaltern*, "have I waded half across the Bidassoa in fishing for trout, and the enemy's piquets posted on the opposite bank, have come down in crowds to watch my success; and have pointed out particular pools or eddies where the best sport was to be had."

The courtesies and proprieties of war are not confined to the French and English services. During the siege of Tripolitza and Mesolonghi, in the Greek war of independence, the Greek and Turkish soldiers held communications and conference with each other, sitting down in two lines, smoking and conversing together for hours. Their conversations, however were not always so amicable as those of the English and French during the Peninsular war, but occasionally had a tragic conclusion, which generally terminated to the disadvantage of those who were the most distant from their friends.

ULTERIOR OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST SPANISH CAMPAIGN, AND THE RETREAT ON THE FRONTIERS OF PORTUGAL.

WHILE sir Arthur Wellesley was contemplating a movement on Madrid, intelligence was brought on the 30th that Soult and Ney, with 54,000 men, were marching on his rear and flank, with the intention of cutting off his retreat into Portugal, the former having advanced through the Puerto de Baños (the marquis del Reyna having fled from that strong pass without firing a shot), and had entered Placentia. The English general, thinking that Soult's force did not exceed twenty thousand men, determined to march against him. Having obtained a promise from Cuesta, that he would remain at Talavera to secure his rear from Victor, and cover the removal of the wounded and stores to a place of safety, he broke up his cantonments from that city, on the 3rd of August, and began his march to Oropesa.

When Victor, supposing that the appearance of the Lusitanian legion under sir Robert Wilson, on his flank, was the advanced guard of sir Arthur Wellesley's army, had quitted the heights of Salinas, with the intention of retreating to Mostolles, heard that the British army had broke up from Talavera, he immediately retrograded on that town. As soon as Cuesta heard of his advance, forgetting his promise to cover the evacuation of the English hospital, and thinking his only safety was in his proximity to the British army, he took to his heels, and with his Spaniards, followed the English army in a rapid and hurried flight, like a flock of sheep, reaching Oropesa at day-light of the morning of the 4th. He not only left the sick and wounded*—as the faithless old Spaniard expressed himself,—“to the Almighty helper of the friendless,” but

* When colonel Mackinnon, who had been left in charge of the hospital, found that Cuesta was determined to abandon it to the enemy, he applied to him for cars for its removal; and though the selfish old man was encumbered with cars and waggons for which he had no lading, he gave only seven for the purpose. In the course of the battle he had displayed a like spirit. To sir Arthur Wellesley's application for the loan of some of his artillery, on account of the small calibre of the English guns, and their insufficiency to meet the weight of the enemy's artillery, he sent him only two out of the seventy which he had. Also, “on the very field of battle, and with the steam of English blood reeking in his nostrils,” he refused to lend his able and friendly coadjutor ninety mules,

exposed the English army to be attacked both in front and rear, by two superior armies, and also endangered the Portuguese corps under sir Robert Wilson, and the Spanish army under Vanegas. Fortunately, however, for the inmates of the hospital, they found a better friend and a more humane heart, in their adversary, Marshal Victor, than in the faithless and ungrateful Spaniards for whom they had shed their blood. That gallant officer as soon as he entered Talavera—no doubt influenced by the noble example of sir Arthur Wellesley, in his humane and generous treatment of the French prisoners that had fallen into his hands, as also in consequence of the letter he had received from the English chief, containing the noble expression, “as you found them brave, I trust you will treat them kindly,”—not only compelled the selfish and inhuman inhabitants to supply the sufferers with every requisite, but to receive into their homes the sick and wounded, who were lying on the bare stones, weltering in their blood, in the plaza, or square.

The ingratitude and inhumanity which the troops experienced at Talavera and other places in Spain, as well as the outrages frequently practised on small and isolated parties of officers and men on their way to join the army, created so much disgust and hatred in the breasts of the privates of the army, that to those causes may partly be ascribed the commission of the excesses that took place at the storming of Badajos and St. Sebastian. The men never forgot the cruel usage which the sick and wounded had received from the inhuman and ungrateful Talaverans.

As soon as Cuesta—whose fears had in the room of those that had been lost at the battle of Talavera, to draw the artillery in his advance to engage Soult, though he had hundreds in his army, employed in drawing only empty carts. Colonel Mackinnon succeeded in removing about two thousand of the wounded in forty cars, which, by sacrificing a great quantity of baggage, sir Arthur had forwarded to him; but still many hundreds were left behind. Many of the wounded, unwilling to fall into the hands of the enemy, crawled after the army, some still bleeding, many with their wounds open and undressed. Sir Arthur, when made acquainted with Cuesta's determination to abandon his wounded, remonstrated with him in strong terms against the impolicy and cruelty of the measure; but all in vain.

duced him to sacrifice the wounded at Talavera, and to leave an undisputed passage open to Victor—reached Oropesa, he assumed the same vapouring tone which he had displayed when sir Arthur Wellesley extricated him from the indefensible spot on which he had taken his position prior to the battle of Talavera; and in reply to the English general's proposal to take up a defensive position on the line of the Tagus, he talked loudly of standing his ground and fighting the French; but when he found that his skilful ally would not expose his army, which was exhausted from want of food, to the overwhelming force of the enemy (amounting to at least 70,000 men, concentrated in the valley of the Tagus, and which threatened the English army in front and rear at the same time), and had determined to secure a communication with Truxillo and Merida, before the enemy could seize the Col de Mirabete, and thus cut off his retreat on Portugal, the obstinate old Spaniard was glad to escape out of the toils the enemy had been laying for him, and to follow in the wake of the English.

In pursuance of sir Arthur's determination, the English army, by a forced march, passed the bridge of Arzobispo, and taking up a line of defence behind the Tagus, was, by two o'clock of the 4th in position; and thus the designs of the enemy were baffled, and the English army extricated from the critical position in which it had been placed in the valley of the Tagus. On the 7th the British head-quarters were at Deleytoza. On the 11th they were at Jaraicejo, and the main body of the army was cantoned in the villages, round the head-quarters. Two divisions occupied Almarez and the Puerto de Mirabete, and the cavalry the city of Truxillo, where sir Arthur halted the army in a position favourable for the defence of the passage of Almarez, and keeping open the defiles of Deleytoza and Jaraicejo, had thus a clear retreat to the frontier of Portugal. On the 8th the Spanish army crossed the bridge of Arzobispo; but the rear guard, consisting of two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, under Albuquerque, was surprised by Mortier, who took 400 prisoners, the survivors fleeing to the mountains in complete confusion, leaving their cannon behind them ready shotted. Another calamity similar to that which had occurred at Talavera, took place on this occasion. The herbage, stubble, and shrubs with which the ground was covered, took fire, from the ignited cartridges

and wadding which had fallen upon it, and communicating with the neighbouring groves of ilex and olive trees, all rendered dry and inflammable by the intense heat of the season, the blaze spread far and wide with frightful rapidity. The cries of the wounded at the same time mingling with the explosion of cartridges and cassoons, and the crackling of the flames, as the wind rolled the fiery flood from one part of the scene of conflagration to another, was heart-rending.

At this time the condition of the English army was very distressing: want and sickness assailed it in their direst forms. The soldiers were weakened for want of food, and the sick were dying for want of necessaries. "Starvation," said sir Arthur, in a letter to the duke of Richmond, dated August 8th, from Deleytoza, "has produced dire effects on the army." From July 20th to August 20th, Napier declares, that the army had not received ten days' rations. "A quarter of a pound of goat's flesh, half a pound of wheat in the grain, and a few ounces of flour twice a week, formed the sole subsistence of men and officers." During the same time, the cavalry and artillery horses had received only three deliveries of food; the consequence was, that 1000 horses had died, and 700 were on the sick list. In a letter addressed to Cuesta, dated Deleytoza, August 8th, sir Arthur Wellesley told the heartless old man, "I assure your excellency that since the 3rd the army has had no bread till yesterday, when about 4000lbs. of biscuit were divided among thirty thousand mouths. There is this day again no bread for the soldiers." In a letter dated August 11th, and addressed to Cuesta, sir Arthur tells the imbecile old Spaniard, that "while the British troops were starving on the hills, he met on the 7th of the month 350 mules laden with provisions for the Spanish army, and that General Sherbrooke, on the following day, gave a written order to another convoy, addressed to all British officers, to allow them to pass through the army unmolested. Yesterday I met on the road and passed not less than 500 mules laden with provisions for the Spanish army; and no later than yesterday, Major Campbell, my aid-de-camp, gave an order to another large convoy, addressed to all British officers and soldiers, not to impede its progress."*

The consequence of these wants and sufferings was, sickness rapidly increased. In the cantonments the troops now occupied,

* Gurwood's *Despatches*.

fever, ague, and dysentery stole upon them. In a few weeks many thousand men were in the hospital, and in a few more some thousands were in the grave; and to enhance the calamity, there was a great deficiency of the necessary medicaments. In the autumnal season the valley of the Guadarama is peculiarly insalubrious; for the river then ceasing to be a stream, noxious vapours arise from the detached pools of stagnant water that remain in the deepest hollows of the torrent bed.

And these were not the only grievances which the English army experienced from their ungrateful and faithless allies. The Spanish troops not only intercepted the provisions and forage destined for the English army, and which had been bought and paid for by the commissioners of that army, but had fired on the convoys and the foragers as if they had been enemies. Even the provisions that had been collected by the English, and put into the magazines at Ciudad Rodrigo, were seized by the cabildo of that town, under the feigned pretence of a debt due for the supply of Sir John Moore's army. When the English chief applied for a remount of six hundred mares for those lost by the British cavalry in the course of the campaign; when he demanded mules to draw his guns and ammunition, to supply the place of those which had been lost at Talavera by Cuesta's flight; when he requested the use of bullock cars to convey his sick and wounded, who had received their wounds and injuries in the defence of the Talaverans—he met with a refusal in each case, though the mares required could not be used by the Spanish troops, and the bullock cars asked for followed the Spanish army, without having any lading. The junta, also, threw every obstacle in the way of the exchange of the British prisoners (though those prisoners consisted chiefly of the sick and wounded who had been captured at Talavera in consequence of Cuesta's perfidy), and did all in their power to prevent any communication between the British chief and the enemy on that subject.

Neither did this spirit of hostility and ingratitude cease during the continuance of the British army in the Peninsula. During the whole six years it was lavishing its blood in the defence of the national independence of both countries, it experienced ingratitude, calumny, and the most heartless treatment from the governments and authorities of

both Spain and Portugal. Even at near the end of the contest, when it had driven the French from the soil that was drenched with its blood, the sordid and ungrateful cortes published a decree to prohibit the English from entering their fortresses, which had been lost by their own countrymen's cowardice and treachery, but recovered by English valour, though the blood of the gallant captors still smoked on the ramparts of those fortresses; and, in many instances, the magistrates ordered the inhabitants of the country not to furnish succour of any kind to their deliverers from thralldom and oppression, even for payment; though, at the same time, the French generals had merely to issue their orders for forced contributions, and other succours, even the muniments of war, and they were sure to be provided on the day, and ready at the place appointed. At Fuenterrabia, where a hospital had been established for the wounded of the allied army, the Spanish authorities endeavoured to burn the beds, that the English and Portuguese soldiers might not have the use of them. At Bilbao, the magistrates refused, even for payment, to allow any of the public buildings to be used as hospitals. The British hospitals at Santander, containing many thousand wounded men, with their attendants, were placed under quarantine, under the pretext of contagious fever; and consequently all vessels coming from them were prohibited from entering the waters of any other Spanish port. And to consummate the cruelty and ingratitude of their proceedings, they expressed a desire, that the English would not make use of that town and harbour as a dépôt for their sick and wounded, though the English army was, at the time, in the midst of its arduous operations on the soil of France, forcing mountain fortifications, effecting the passage of various rapid rivers, storming five strongly intrenched camps, and fighting numerous battles—and all for the safety and independence of their ungrateful and heartless persecutors. Mercenary and empiric writers were also employed to excite the people to commence a warfare of assassination against the British soldiery. Officers and men were frequently murdered on the high roads; often severely ill-treated. Those enormities ran to so great a height, that while the British army was on the frontiers of France, its chief, in one of his communications to the earl of Bathurst, says, "that it was expedient to demand

security for the British troops against the criminal disposition of the Spanish government, and those in authority under them;" and at the same period of the operations in France, he adds, "that should it be expedient, in consequence of the machinations and treachery of the Spanish and Portuguese governments, to embark the British army at Passages, it would be necessary to adopt precautions for its safety, as the Spaniards would co-operate with the French army in molesting it." That this was not unfounded and vague surmise, is evident from the fact, that the regency and Spanish generals were in communication with the duke of San Carlos and Joseph Palafox, in pursuance of the treaty that had been entered into by Napoleon and Ferdinand at Valency, for the liberation of the latter, and his return to Spain under the protection of the French armies. Copons, the conde de Montijo, and the duke del Parque, also had secretly made proposals to pass over the forces under their command; and their example would, no doubt, have been followed by others, had they not been awed into obedience by the magical influence which the British chief exercised over them. Napoleon, in his "Memoirs," speaks of secret negotiations having been in agitation for this purpose. Indeed, so imminent was the crisis to the British army, that lord Wellington had more cause to dread his insidious Spanish friends in his rear than the whole of the French armies in his front. While in the south of France, he received many secret and earnest warnings from the well-disposed part of the French population, apprising him that a great act of treachery and delusion was in agitation between his Spanish allies and the French government and its generals.

The British commander-in-chief was also the object of their most rancorous hatred and calumny. "If he was active in the field, he was more intent on the subjugation of Spain than the defeat of the enemy; if he was cautious in preparation, his delay was to enable the French to conquer; if he was vigorous in urging the government to useful measures, his design was to impose his own laws; if he did not indicate a strong concern for the Spanish armies, he desired that they should be beaten; if he meddled with them usefully, it was to gain the soldiers, in order to turn the army against the country, and thus render Spain dependent

on England."* Nor were their falsehood and malice confined to these base and unfounded insinuations; they spread reports that he had the ambition of aspiring to the crown of Spain. They hinted that he had correspondence with some of the Spanish nobility to make himself king of Spain; and that to render himself acceptable to the Spaniards for this object, he had changed his religion. The report was so accredited, that three Spanish grandees deemed it necessary to exculpate themselves, by publishing a refutation of the calumny.

Such was the conduct of the selfish and perfidious government of Spain—such that of the imbecile and presumptuous leaders of its armies; patriotism and honourable feeling were unknown to them; they were merely words in their mouths to delude their credulous and confiding countrymen. Far different, however, was the conduct of the lower classes of society; they, confiding in the deceitful professions of patriotism so loudly vaunted by their treacherous leaders, rushed in tens of thousands to the defence of their native soil, and its liberation from the thralldom of its oppressors; but they were uselessly sacrificed to the merciless and unmitigated fury of the foe, and the ignorance and treachery of their own countrymen.

Nor was the conduct of the Portuguese government (particularly that portion constituting the faction of which that odious priest the patriarch of Lisbon and the principal Souza, were the organs), and the hidalgos, or nobles, less inimical to the measures which the English general had devised for the salvation of their country. They strongly opposed all his plans for the defence of Portugal, and the protection of its inhabitants. They even refused him the permission to establish hospitals for his sick and wounded, in the rope-walk at Belem, or to make use of the hospitals in Lisbon, which had been formerly used by the British army for that purpose. Both the commander-in-chief and his troops were the constant subjects of their obloquy; and the contemptible faction carried their mischievous feeling to so high a pitch that they had concocted plans for libelling and caricaturing in England their saviours; in hopes that the factious and incendiary part of the press would excite the terror-stricken portion of the population to raise a clamour to have the army recalled. They laid a plot to raise the mob of Lisbon, seize the forts of Belem, St. Julien, and Bugio, and thus prevent, in case of retreat, the embarkation of

* Napier's *History of the War in the Peninsula*, vol. vi., p. 311.

the English army on board of the transports. A traitorous correspondence was also carried on by them with Massena during his invasion of Portugal; and in his retreat they placed large supplies of provisions and cattle within reach of the French at most critical moments. As the historian of the Peninsular War has well said, "the Portuguese government was a more evil enemy to the British general, and occasioned more mischief, than all the skill and courage of the enemy."

All sir Arthur's complaints and remonstrances to Cuesta and the junta were met with falsehood, duplicity, and inhumanity. The junta told him, that "the British army was not only well but over-supplied." Their drivelling old general said, that "the British army robbed the peasantry, plundered the villages, intercepted the Spanish convoys, and openly sold the provisions thus shamefully acquired." Sir Arthur's reply to the faithless junta was, that he should withdraw his army into Portugal, where he could be provided with subsistence; and to their falsifying old general, that it was not only unbecoming the Spanish authorities to make accusations so unfounded, but that it was unworthy an English general to refute them. He moreover briefly and sternly declined any further correspondence with the last-mentioned official, till the insolent offence offered was acknowledged and atoned for by a fit apology.

Irritated at these unjust proceedings, and apprehensive of the safety of the army, sir Arthur determined to separate himself from his Spanish connexion, and, as has just been said, fell back on the frontiers of Portugal. The junta, fearful of the consequences of the separation, now endeavoured to conciliate him. With this intent, they appointed him captain-general of the Spanish armies, and offered him the command of a body of their forces. He accepted the military rank, but declined both the pay of the appointment and the separate command; as the latter would necessarily compel the renewal of the co-operation of the English army with the Spanish, and would entail upon it that defensive system which he knew would be utterly ineffective under the present circumstances. They also, at the suggestion of the marquis of Wellesley, who had succeeded Frere as plenipotentiary, displaced Cuesta, August 12th, and appointed general Eguia to his command. But that

officer differed from his predecessor, in his transactions with the British army, only in the plausibility of his conduct, and the profusion of his professions: "the evil of incompetency and faithlessness was," says a sagacious writer, "inherent in the character of the Spanish people." He not only connived at and sanctioned the false promises of the junta, to supply the British army, but he even permitted his troops to seize and appropriate to their own use the stores which were on their way to the British cantonments.

Having by his brilliant victory of Talavera saved the south of Spain from being overrun by the enemy, and also prevented him from making a fresh irruption into Portugal, the English chief, while stationed at Jaraceijo, was actively employed in devising measures to neutralize the overwhelming force which the enemy had concentrated in Estremadura; and, if possible, to infuse something like wisdom and vigour into the councils of the Spanish government, and discipline and science into its armies and generals. For this purpose he directed the duke del Parque and Vanegas to threaten Madrid, and the guerilla bands, which at this period of the war had become formidable, to hover round the capital; and thus, by intercepting convoys, and threatening the enemy's rear, to create a diversion, and compel him to divide his force. He instructed the junta to direct their generals to shun general actions, as their destruction, and to confine their operations to taking up strong defensive positions, and acting on his lines of communication. But that corrupt and perverse body deeming his opinions heretical, and jealous of his ability, determined to adopt their own plans. The result was commensurate with their inordinate folly and self-complacent ignorance. Their generals were as imbecile and self-willed as themselves: sir Arthur wished Eguia to take, in conjunction with the British army, a post behind the Guadiana, but the Spaniard refused to co-operate, and marched to form a junction with Areizaga, at Ocaña, near Aranjuez.

The British general finding his best plans, either for defence or aggression, not only opposed, but often thwarted—at the same time threatened on every side by an enemy possessing a numerical force four times exceeding his own,—his army more worn down, more diminished in numbers,* and in con-

* "The handful of troops which he now commanded were composed of second battalions of mere youths,

sequence of hunger, long privation, sickness, and hardship, more disorganized than if it had fought an unsuccessful battle, instead of having been the victor in a contest in which it had borne the palm from the famed and dreaded legions of Buonaparte, as the crouching and awe-stricken nations of continental Europe deemed them—exposed to the most imminent hazard, and discovering that all the solemn promises of the junta to supply the army with food, were false and fallacious,—issued orders, August 20th, to break up the cantonments from Jaraceijo, and to retreat on Merida, with the intention of falling back on the frontiers of Portugal; at the same time desiring Eguia to occupy, in the course of the night, the posts in the neighbourhood of the bridge of Almarez, which the English army would evacuate. But the instant the junta and their general found that he had commenced his retreat, they assailed him with a storm of invectives and reproach, and calumniated him whom only ten days before, on his appointment as generalissimo of the Spanish armies, they had addressed with the most fulsome compliments. "The retreat," they said, "across the Tagus, was unnecessary; Soul ought to have been destroyed; and the English general must have secret reasons for his conduct, which he dare not avouch." Finding sir Arthur deaf to their idle clamour, and despising their ingratitude and calumnies, in the wildest terror and consternation they importuned him to desist from the retreat, and promised to reform their heartless system of duplicity and ingratitude; the junta promising "to apply to the nourishment of the army all the resources of the country," and their equally faithless general declaring, "that the British army should have *all the provisions*, and the Spanish army *none*." The English general, not to be deceived by the false professions and hollow promises of the junta and their general, replied in a cutting tone of rebuke to the preposterous offer of leaving the Spanish army provisionless. At the same time that that "miserable body made their ridiculous proposal, they earnestly conjured sir Arthur to adopt the offensive, and march upon Madrid, lest the enemy should escape their conquering and invincible clutches.

alone be regarded as fit for active service. One half of the army was fitter for the hospital than the field."

* This position had been carefully surveyed by sir Charles Stuart, while he commanded the British

So sure did they expect to be in possession of it (could they have induced the English general to undertake the wild project), that they actually appointed civil officers for its government, and charged two of their body to frame regulations for its internal tranquillity: verifying in this instance, as in all their other acts, the truth of the remark, that in all their deeds, "at one moment they were shrinking with fear, and at the other bursting with folly." In the beginning of October the English general established his head-quarters at Badajos, and cantoned his troops in the towns and villages of Estremadura, contiguous to the frontier of Portugal.

On the 12th of September, sir Arthur Wellesley received intimation that he had been created viscount Wellington, of Talavera, and baron Douro. In October, he went to Lisbon, to concert measures with the regency for the more complete organization of the regular army, and the militia of Portugal, and for putting the kingdom in a state of defence capable of resisting the threatened invasion of the enemy. As it was impossible to defend the extensive frontier of the country with the force at his disposal, he, at this time, selected a position, in the event of the British army retreating on that city, in which his flanks could not be turned, his front forced, or his army reduced by famine. The mountains traversing in two lofty ridges from the Tagus to the ocean, in the tongue of land in which Lisbon is situated, offered that position.* Nature had drawn a rude outline of a strong defensive position; it remained for art to perfect it. This the British chief determined to effectuate, by the most gigantic application of the principles of field fortification to defensible positions that has ever been called into practice in warfare. Having, after a careful examination of the country in front of Lisbon, selected the line of defence, and fixed the principal points for forts, redoubts, the formation of intrenchments, &c., he left the detail and execution of the works to colonel Fletcher, according to the memorandum he had drawn up, dated October 20th, and returned to Badajos about the end of the month. In consequence of the signal defeats of the Spanish armies at

troops in Portugal, from the opinion that on this ground, in the event of a hostile invasion of the country, the kingdom must be won or lost. His maps and topographical accounts were in sir Arthur Wellesley's possession.

Ocaña and Alba de Tormes, under Areizaga and the duke del Parque, he, on December 15th, removed his head-quarters from that city, and fell back on the north-eastern frontiers of Portugal; satisfied, as he expressed himself, "that no British army could, with safety, operate with Spanish troops," on account of their national infirmity and military imbecility. The main body of the army, under his own command, observed all the country between the Douro and the Tagus. The cavalry, except the brigade furnishing reliefs for the outposts, were stationed in the rear. The light division was in front of Almeida, its patrols extending as far as Ciudad Rodrigo. General Hill was posted, with 14,000 men, in Alemtejo, his main body at Abrantes, and his advance at Portalegre, to watch Mortier and Regnier, who held the Upper or Spanish Estremadura; and Beresford, with the Portuguese, was stationed at Thomar, in case the enemy should threaten Lisbon through the Alemtejo. The line of defence taken up, formed the segment of a circle, of about forty miles in extent, along the frontier mountains of Beira, its convex part being opposed to the quarter from which the invasion was expected. By that arrangement more than thirty thousand men could be assembled in two marches, on any point menaced by the enemy. The different divisions were so posted as to hold the strong and rugged line of the Beira frontier, and command the two great roads which pierce on the north and south that mountainous region. Viseu, Guarda, Pinhel, and Celerico, were its main points; the Coa, with its tributary streams flowing in front of the line, along the greater part of its extent. The defence of the extremes of the line was entrusted to the militia and the ordenanzas; and to give confidence to the Portuguese recent levies, they were brigaded with the English troops, in the proportion of one battalion to two English battalions. During the remainder of the year the active and vigilant mind of the commander-in-chief was employed in tours of inspection; in examining the state of fortresses, securing the passes of the mountains between Spain and Portugal, and in selecting the positions to be taken up on the enemy's advance.

During the operations of the British army, the affairs of the patriots had been very disastrous: defeats succeeded each other in rapid succession. Blake had been overthrown at Maria and Belchitti, January 15th,

and 18th; Venegas at Almonacid, August 11th; Areizaga at Ocaña, November 19th; the duke del Parque (who, being joined by sir Robert Wilson, had repulsed Marchand at Tamames, October 18th) at Alba de Tormes, November 27th. In this last action the Spaniards fled without drawing a sword, and that too in the very sight of Tamames. So disastrous had been all their efforts, that as it has been said, without much hyperbolic exaggeration, "they were more familiar with defeat—formed only to be broken, fighting only to be slain." Town after town had been taken—fortress after fortress had been reduced—army after army had been dispersed—every battle a defeat—and three-fourths of the kingdom in possession of the enemy. Gerona had surrendered; but it fell after a desperate defence, for the third time; its heroic defenders resembling spectres haunting a city of the dead, having been reduced to the unparalleled extremity of feeding on their own hair. The brutal rigour and contumely with which the French marshal, Augereau, treated its gallant governor, Mariano Alvarez, whom he cast, though in the last stage of a malignant fever, into a dungeon at Figueras—"a name that will live till old Gerona be a heap of ruins, and Spain a solitude"—were equalled only by his cruelty to the Catalans, all of whom taken in arms he caused to be hung up on gibbets erected along the roads of Catalonia. The Catalans met with the same fate from Suchet, when he succeeded to the chief command in their province: besides giving up several of their towns and villages to pillage, he treated all Spaniards taken in arms against the French, as banditti. The severe and savage executions of the patriots—who were all declared assassins, beyond the pale of military law—taken in arms in Murcia, Granada, and Andalusia, by Soult; and by Massena in his invasion of Portugal, and his retreat from Torres Vedras, also forcibly proved how deplorably a military despotism debases the moral feelings and all the humane impulses of the heart; he ordered no quarter to be given to the ordenanzas, or militia; and those who had been already taken, he commanded to be shot. To repress his savage cruelty, the following remonstrance, dated "Gouvea, November 9th," was addressed by Lord Wellington to the French marshal: "You call these men peasants, without any uniform," said the British chief: "I have the honour to assure you, that they are the

ordenanzas of this kingdom, military corps, commanded by officers paid and appointed by military laws. You appear to insist, that they alone are entitled to the rights of war, who are clad in military costume, yet forget that you yourself have added to the lustre of the French army, at the head of soldiers who were not dressed in any uniform. Is not a country, invaded by a formidable foe, justified by defending itself by every possible means? If so, Portugal is entitled to put its ordenanza in requisition, a body

* "To Maréchal Massena, Prince d'Esseling.

"Au Quartier Général de l'Armée Anglaise,

"Ce 9 Sept., 1810.

"Monsieur le Maréchal,—Il m'a fait la plus grande peine d'apprendre que vous avez donné des ordres à l'armée Française, de ne pas faire de prisonniers parmi l'ordenanza Portugaise, et que les troupes Françaises obéissent à cet ordre, et fusillent tous ceux de ce corps que leur tombent dans les mains.

"Il faut que je vous fasse savoir que tous Portugaise est obligé par les anciennes lois du pays de servir dans les troupes de ligne, ou dans la milice, ou dans l'ordenanza; et que les troupes des trois descriptions sont également soumises aux lois militaires, et sont sous les ordres des officiers généraux Portugais. La preuve en est, que malgré que l'ordenanza ait souffert et se plaint des ordres que vous avez donnés, et de la violation des usages de la guerre en leurs personnes, ils obéissent aux ordres qui leur ont été donnés; et ont préservé la vie, et ont bien traité tous les prisonniers qui sont tombés dans leurs mains. Monsieur le colonel Pavetti, au sort duquel vous êtes intéressé, a été fait prisonnier par cette même description de troupes, et il en a été bien traité, aussi bien que son escort.

"Comme l'ordenanza fait donc partie de l'armée Portugaise, comme elle est également sujette aux lois militaires, et comme elle agit d'une manière loyale envers les prisonniers de l'armée Française qui tombent dans ses mains, je vous prie de donner ordre que les officiers et soldats de l'ordenanza, fait prisonniers, jouissent également avec les autres soldats de l'armée Portugaise des droits et usages de la guerre.

"Depuis que j'ai commandé les troupes dans ce pays-ci, j'ai fait tout ce que a été en mon pouvoir, et j'ai réussi à faire la guerre d'une manière loyale; et j'ai fait respecter les usages de la guerre établis et reconnus parmi les nations civilisées, qui avoient été oubliés. Mais si l'armée Française continue à faire fusiller les prisonniers qu'on fera de l'ordenanza, on ne peut pas s'attendre que les soldats de ce corps, aussi bien que les autres soldats de l'armée Portugaise, ne retournent pas sur les prisonniers qu'ils feront de l'armée Française. Il ne sera en mon pouvoir de les protéger; et les ordres que vous avez donnés seront la causes des malheurs que souffriront les soldats de l'armée Française qui tombent dans les mains des troupes Portugaises.

"J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

"WELLINGTON."

"To Maréchal Massena, Prince d'Esseling.

"Au Quartier Général de l'Armée Anglaise,

"Ce 24 Sept., 1810.

"Monsieur le Maréchal,—J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre que votre excellence m'a adressée

recognised and organized by the ancient laws of the country." As a compulsory measure to induce the Frenchman to desist from his fell and cruel purpose, he further informed him, that if the outrages and excesses of the French troops were not restrained, he could not be able to extend his protection to the French prisoners who might fall into the hands of the Portuguese.*

On a review of the eventful campaign of 1809, and of the admirable plans and

le 14 de ce mois. Ce que vous appelez 'des paysans sans uniforme', 'des assassins et des voleurs de grand chemin,' sont l'ordenanza du pays que, comme j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de vous assurer, sont des corps militaires commandés par des officiers, payés et agissent sous les lois militaires. Il paraît que vous exigez que ceux qui jouiront des droits de la guerre soient revêtus d'un uniforme; mais vous devez vous souvenir que vous même avez augmenté la gloire de l'armée Française en commandant des soldats qui n'avaient pas d'uniforme.

"Vous vous plaiguez de la conduite de l'ordenanza à Nave d'Aver envers M. le colonel Pavetti. La question est seulement si un pay qui est envahi par un ennemi formidable a le droit de se défendre par tous les moyens en son pouvoir. Si ce droit existe, le Portugal est justifié en mettant en activité l'ordenanza, un corps reconnu et organisé par les anciennes lois du pays. Je peux assurer votre excellence que l'ordenanza de Nave d'Aver a bien traité M. le colonel Pavetti, et il aurait été puni s'il l'avait maltraité. Je voudrais n'avoir pas entendu que malgré cet officier fût aussi bien traité et par le capitaine de l'ordenanza et par moi, la maison du capitaine de l'ordenanza à Nave d'Aver avait été brûlée et que quelques-uns de sa compagnie ont été pris et fusillés parcequ'ils avaient fait leur devoir envers leur pays.

"Je suis fâché que votre excellence sente quelques inconvénients personnels de ce que les Portugais quittent leurs foyers à l'approche de l'armée Française. Il est de mon devoir de faire retirer ceux que je n'ai pas les moyens de défendre; et j'observe que les ordres que j'ai donnés là-dessus n'étaient presque pas nécessaires. Car ceux qui se ressouvenaient de l'invasion de leur pays en 1807, et de l'usurpation du gouvernement de leur prince en temps de paix, quand il n'y avait pas un seul Anglois dans le pays, pouvaient à peine croire aux déclarations que vous faites la guerre aux Anglois seuls; et ils pouvaient à peine trouver la conduite des soldats de l'armée Française, même sous vos ordres, envers leurs propriétés, leurs femmes, et eux-mêmes, conformes aux déclarations de votre excellence.

"Il n'est pas étonnant donc qu'ils quittent leurs foyers volontairement, brûlant et détruisant tout ce qu'ils ne peuvent pas emporter; et je n'ai nulle excuse à offrir pour l'encouragement que je leur en donne, excepté pour les inconvénients personnels qu'ils peuvent causer à votre excellence.

"Votre excellence a été mal informée sur l'affaire de la milice ci-devant partie de la garrison d'Almeida. Avant de vous plaindre de l'infraction de la capitulation d'Almeida, votre excellence aurait dû se souvenir qu'elle a été violée aussitôt que signée. Votre excellence s'est engagée que les officiers et soldats de la milice retourneraient chez eux; et malgré cet en-

combinations, as detailed in the *Despatches*, it is clear, that if the British chief's designs had been seconded by good faith and exertion on the part of the Spaniards, and to adopt his own expression, "had the junta of Truxillo fulfilled their contract to furnish 240,000 rations, the English army would have slept in Madrid on the night of the battle of Talavera,"* and the war would have been brought to an early conclusion; but all his measures were paralyzed by want of vigour and concert on the part of the Spanish government and its generals, or thwarted by the mean jealousies, and breach of right and honourable feeling on their part. Often, by their culpable conduct, his army was exposed to the hazard of total destruction, from which it had to be rescued by extraordinary efforts of skill on the part of its leader, and equally extraordinary efforts of courage on its own part; and generally at a vast expenditure of life. Thus (among numerous other similar affairs) the desertion by the Spaniards, of their post at the pass of Baños, and their conduct at the bridge of Arzobispo, exposed the British army to the most imminent danger. Indeed, the Spanish armies never behaved as soldiers ought to do in the presence of their enemies; they often took to their heels without waiting to receive their enemy's fire, or to deliver their own; their cavalry often fled before a sword was crossed; and they more than once ran away leaving their cannon ready shotted for the enemy. "The whole six years that the Peninsular War lasted taught them nothing more," as an intelligent writer observes, "than to run away, and assemble again in a state of nature." Nor were their officers "a whit braver or more skilful than their men. A few, like Albuquerque and Romana,† fought with some degree of valour, but with little skill or discipline. Many of them were traitors and poltroons. If any part of their forces behaved well they consisted of Swiss, the Irish brigades, and other foreigners; and the few of their officers who displayed any military skill were of Irish or other foreign extraction. On these accounts, the British general,

gagement, vous en avez détenu sept officiers et deux cents soldats de chaque régiment, pour en faire un corps de pioniers. La capitulation d'Almeida est donc nulle, et je suis en droit d'en faire ce que je voudrait. Mais je puis vous assurer qu'il n'y a pas un soldat de la milice que était a Almeida, au service.

"J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

"WELLINGTON."

"Le Maréchal Massena."

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from this time, never made his movements dependent on the valour of Spanish troops, on the sagacity of Spanish generals, or on the policy of Spanish juntas; all that was to be done for working out the destinies of Europe, he determined should be done by English hearts and English hands. Nor were the imbecility and inefficiency of his allies the only difficulties with which the English general had to contend. By his own countrymen and government, discouragements were thrown in his way.

On the motion for a public acknowledgment of the services which had been rendered by sir Arthur Wellesley to his country, much rancorous feeling was displayed by some of the members of each house of Parliament. Earl Grey denied that the battle of Talavera was a victory, and declared that sir Arthur had betrayed want of capacity and skill in its direction. Lord Grenville talked of "gilded disasters," and denominated the blooming laurels that hung over the graves of its gallant victors, "cypresses indicating their country's sense of its grief for the dishonour sustained." In the lower House, Ponsonby called for impeachment, and Whitbread dissolved in tears for "the blood that had been sacrificed to folly and incapacity." Tarleton was profuse in his reproof and exposition of sir Arthur Wellesley's incapacity. Banks predicted, that "all fresh levies to the army would tend only to swell the triumphs of Napoleon's invincible legions; and that if we did win a battle, every defeat of the French was to be considered a snare to draw the English farther into Spain." Calcraft denounced the hero, and foretold "ruin and defeat would be the inevitable consequence before three months passed over the British chief's head; and for these reasons refused his assent to a pension for so grievous a blunder as the battle of Talavera."

The earl of Suffolk, in the abundance of his sapience, propounded this wonderful discovery, that the reason the French artillery fell into the possession of his countrymen was, "that it had not been convenient for the French to remove it;" and, therefore, they

* *Despatches*, vol. v., p. 355.

† Perez de Hervasti, Mariano Alvarez, Julian de Estrada, and Santocildes, the governors of Ciudad Rodrigo, Gerona, Hostalrich, and Astorga, also deserve to be honourably mentioned. The memory of those brave men and true patriots will live in the recollection of the good and wise of every caste and country, when the fortresses they so nobly defended have become heaps of ruins, and Spain a solitude.

had left it as a waif of insignificant value, to be picked up by their enemies. The gloomy predictions of the factious and disaffected portion of "the fourth estate of the realm," especially during the early period of the peninsular war, and their libels against the British army and its illustrious chief were endless. They talked of "a shade having been thrown over the British arms"—ridiculed the idea of an English army being able to contend against the legions of France—laughed at our military knowledge, and prophesied disaster and disgrace.

But to all the calumny and ingratitude, the folly and presumption of the croaking and desponding tribe, the British hero's contemptuous reply was: "They may do what they please, and prate as much as they choose, I shall not give up the game here as long as it can be successfully played." . . . "I should forget my duty if I should permit public clamour or panic to induce me

to change, in the smallest degree, the system and plan of operations which I have adopted after mature consideration, and which daily experience shows to be the only one likely to produce a good end." He felt that the honour and interest, not only of England, but of the whole civilized world, required him,—notwithstanding, as he expressed himself, "the obloquy heaped upon him by the ignorant of his own country"—to maintain the struggle as long as there was a probability of a successful issue. The result produced a memorable and instructive contrast between his firmness, sagacity, and patriotism, and the craven-hearted fears and consternation, the abject pusillanimity and puny spirit of his calumniators, befooled and besotted with their stupid hallucination of French invincibility, and their fanatic wonder and idolatry of their "great and magnanimous Napoleon," and his "famed and dreaded—his terrible legions."

THE SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

ANNO 1809.

THE SPANISH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE—SIEGE (THE SECOND) OF SARAGOSSA.

WE will now resume our history of the Spanish and Portuguese war of independence, which, for the sake of chronological arrangement, was broken off at the end of 1808. At the opening of the year 1809, the siege of Saragossa raged in all its horrors.

On the 2nd of January, Junôt took the command of the besieging force, and had immediate recourse to a heavy bombardment of the town. Every day and night was now signalized by bloody combats, but notwithstanding the heroic efforts of the besieged, almost all the fortified posts outside the town were in the possession of the enemy. A second parallel was then opened, and a tremendous bombardment kept up without intermission. The parapet of the feeble wall being now levelled by the enemy's batteries, its place was supplied with bags of earth, as fast as they were shattered by the enemy's balls. But a worse and more destructive enemy now assailed the city than the shot and shells of their implacable foe.

For security from the shells that were

thrown upon the devoted city in profusion, often many hundreds in the course of a few hours, a great number of the inhabitants, especially the women and children, took refuge in the cellars, where they were crowded together day and night, and the air entered their dismal abode but scantily. The places soon became hot-beds of infection. The impossibility of recruiting exhausted strength by needful sleep, on account of the incessant bombardment to which the enemy cruelly and inhumanly subjected the city, increased the calamity and aggravated the virulence of the disease. Thus, in this ill-fated city, the horrors of disease and contagion were added to war and slaughter.

In this state of the siege, marshal Lannes assumed the command of the besieging army. To intimidate the Saragossans, he wrote a letter to Palafox, stating that the force on which the city relied for relief had been destroyed; that the English army had fled to Corunna, leaving seven thousand in the hands of the French, and that Romana had

escaped with them, his army with its officers having submitted to Bonaparte; at the same time he demanded the surrender of the city. Palafox replied, that the Saragossans were too sensible of the duty they owed their country to submit to so ignominious a condition, and that it would more redound to the French general's honour to win the place by force of manly courage with the sword, than by bombarding it.

On the day following the summons, fifty guns opened their fire upon the wall, and on the morrow three practicable breaches were made. The enemy advanced to the assault, a dreadful struggle ensued, and the combat was prolonged during the whole of the night; but though the besieged maintained the conflict with the most desperate valour, the convents of Santa Engarcia and San Joseph were possessed by the besiegers.

The enemy's efforts were now directed against San Augustine and Santa Monacha; and having effected a breach in their walls, they carried them by assault. They forced their way into the church. Every column, every chapel, every altar became a point of defence, which was repeatedly attacked, taken, retaken, and attacked again; the pavement was covered with blood, and the aisles and nave of the church strewed with the dead. In the midst of the conflict, the roof, which had been shattered with bombs, fell in; the few who were not crushed, after a short pause, which this tremendous shock, and the sense of their escape occasioned, renewed the fight with increased desperation; fresh parties of the enemy poured in; monks, citizens, and soldiers came to the defence, and the contest was continued on the ruins of the bodies of the dying and the dead. Women mingled with the combatants, distributing cartridges to them; and sometimes, when their sons, husbands, and fathers fell, they rushed on the enemy, to avenge their deaths and to die with them. The contest, however, ended in favour of the besiegers, who succeeded in keeping the undisputed position. Taking advantage of the opportunity afforded while the attention of the besiegers was directed to this point, the French entered the Rua Quemada, and obtained one side of the street to the angle which it makes with the Corso; and at the same time, the Poles in the French service obtained possession of some houses on the side of San Engracia. But the enemy had sustained so great a loss in these affairs, that they de-

termined to make no more direct attacks, but to proceed as much as possible under cover, and by sap and mine.

The deadly warfare was now, as in the former siege, to be carried on from house to house; on balcony and in chamber; in vault and cellar.

The French having established themselves in the ruins of a house, which formed an angle of the Cozo and of the Rua del Media, endeavoured to penetrate into the principal street of the Cozo, but were repulsed with great slaughter. Every house, every room now became the scene of mortal combat; and the contest was continued until the dead and the dying lay heaped upon one another, to the height of several feet above the ground; but the undaunted foemen, in nowise discouraged, mounting the ghastly pile, maintained the contest so obstinately that no progress was made on either side; and not unfrequently, while still locked fast in the deadly struggle, the whole—dead, dying, and combatants—were together blown into the air by the explosion of the mines beneath.

On the same day of this event (7th of February), operations were renewed against the suburbs on the left bank of the Ebro, where the enemy, at the commencement of the siege, had already received two severe repulses. Gazan's division attacked it with vigour, at the same time opening a fire of fifty guns from their batteries on both sides of the convent of Jesus, effected a breach in San Lazar, and possessed themselves of the convent, which was the principal point of defence on that side, at the same moment the university was rendered a pile of ruins, from the explosion of a mine charged with 3,000 lbs. of powder. The suburb being no longer tenable, its brave defenders retired in two columns; the one crossing the bridge effected its retreat into the town, the other, consisting of 1,500 men, in endeavouring to escape into the country, along the bank of the Ebro, was after a desperate resistance captured, as its powder was exhausted. On the 19th, a furious assault being made on the suburbs on the right bank of the river, the monastery of the Trinity near the university and the traverses which the besieged had so gallantly defended, were carried. At the same moment, a mine charged with 1,600 lbs. of powder, exploded with a terrific shock, near the Comic theatre.

Meanwhile pestilence was consuming the Saragossans faster than fire and sword. The

infection occurred among that part of the inhabitants who had been compelled to seek safety in the noisome cellars of the town, in order to escape the enemy's bombardment, and which having now continued more than a month, made the city one vast charnel-house, hundreds dying every day of the infectious epidemic that was raging in every quarter of the town. In this dilemma Palafox, who was labouring under the prevailing epidemic, transferred, on the night of the 18th, all his authority, civil and military, to a junta, appointing as president Don Pedro Marc Ric, the regent of the Royal Audience of Aragon. The junta immediately summoned the chiefs of the various military departments to report their state. The general of cavalry represented that only sixty-two horses remained, and those weak and unserviceable, the rest having died of hunger. From a statement of the infantry department, it appeared that there were only 2,822 men fit for service. The ammunition was nearly exhausted; and the commandant of the engineers reported that the fortifications were demolished, and that there were neither men nor materials for repairing them, all the cloth which could serve for bags of earth having been consumed. General San Marc declared that it was not possible to maintain the contest longer than four days more. While the junta were deliberating, the bombardment was renewed with additional violence, no doubt intended by Lannes to induce them to a speedy determination. Two-thirds of the city had been now destroyed, thirty thousand of the inhabitants had perished, and from three to four hundred persons were dying daily of the pestilence.

Under these circumstances, the junta dispatched a flag of truce to the French general, requesting a suspension of hostilities for three days, that officers might in the mean time be sent to ascertain the situation of the Spanish armies, and according to the intelligence obtained they would treat for a surrender, a proposal Lannes himself had made when he had summoned the city. He now resented the proposal as an insult, and vented the most ferocious threats against the city unless it were immediately delivered up. The flag of truce was sent with a second letter, to which he returned no other answer than by a shower of bombs, and by ordering the attack to be renewed.

A flag of truce was again sent to the French head-quarters soliciting a suspension of hostilities for twenty-four hours, that a

treaty of capitulation might be adjusted in the mean time. The French general requiring the junta to repair to his head quarters, Ric and some of the junta went thither, when a capitulation was agreed to, by which it was stipulated that the garrison should on the following morning march out with the honours of war, and be conveyed as prisoners of war to France. While copies of the capitulation were being drawn up, Lannes produced a plan of the city, and laying his finger upon the part which was that night to have been blown up, told Ric that 44,000 pounds of powder were already lodged for the explosion, which would have been followed by a cannonade from seventy pieces of artillery, and a bombardment from thirty mortars, at that time being mounted in the suburbs.

On the evening of the capitulation, the French troops entered the city, when a sad spectacle presented itself to their vision, six thousand dead bodies lay in the streets, and the court-yards and chambers were filled with corpses: in some instances were seen infants endeavouring to draw nutriment from the breasts of their dying mothers.

The French being now masters of the place immediately began to pillage. From the woe-struck city, 50,000 pair of shoes, 8,000 pair of boots, and 1,200 shirts, with medicines and every requisite for an hospital were haughtily demanded. Several of the officers demanded for themselves double equipage and linen, and whatever they wanted, wishing that plenty of everything should be supplied them, and the best of its kind, at the expense of the city. A service of china was required for Junôt, and this merciless oppressor, who had escaped the proper punishment of his crimes in Portugal, wished that a tennis court should be fitted up for his amusement, in a city of which two-thirds were then lying in ruins, beneath which so large a proportion of the inhabitants lay buried. Lannes rifled the church of Our Lady of the Pillar, of jewels to the amount of 4,687,000 francs, and appropriated the whole to his own use.

Lannes made his entrance on Sunday the 5th of March, and proceeded in triumph to the Church of the Pillar, where a sermon, inculcating obedience to the oppressor, was preached by the despicable traitor to his country, the suffragan bishop of the diocese. A superb entertainment followed, at which Lannes and his chief officers sat down to a table of four hundred covers, furnished at

the expense of the wretched city of Saragossa.

And the foe, not content with his spoliation and robbery, sought also victims to satisfy his vengeance. Don Basilio Bagyiero and the patriotic priest, Santiago Sass, were, by the express commands of Lannes, bayoneted, on the banks of the Ebro, and many monks were tied up in sacks and thrown at night into that river.

In the course of this siege, fifty days of which were open trenches, above fifty thousand persons had perished, and now lay buried beneath the ruins. The troops that surrendered, 2,400—though the French bulletin affirmed that seventeen thousand men had laid down their arms,*—and that number, with 2,500 taken in the suburbs and during the siege, were all that were marched off for France. Two hundred and seventy of these men, who from fatigue and weakness could not keep up the pace which their ferocious guard required, were butchered and left on the road, where their companions in the next march had to pass over their bodies. Augustina Saragossa was among the prisoners. She had distinguished herself as much in this siege as in the former. At the commencement she took her former station at the Portillo, by the same gun that she had served so well. "See, general," said she, with a cheerful countenance, pointing to the gun, when Palafox visited that quarter; "I am again with my old friend." Her husband was severely wounded, and she pointed the cannon at the enemy while he lay bleeding among his companions, by her side. Frequently she was at the head of an assaulting party, sword or knife in hand, with her cloak wrapped round her, cheering the soldiers, and encouraging them by her example; constantly exposed as she was, she escaped without a wound: yet even she was thrown into a ditch, and nearly suffocated by the dead and dying who covered her. At the close of the siege she was too well known by the French to escape notice, and they made her prisoner. Fortunately, as it proved, she had at that time taken the

contagion, and was removed to the hospital, where, as she was supposed to be dying, little care was taken to secure her. Feeling herself better she availed herself of this and effected her escape. The other Saragossan heroine, Donna Beneta, escaped the hourly dangers to which she was exposed, only to die of grief on hearing that her daughter had been killed while heroically engaged with the enemy in the streets.

The tragic story of the siege of Saragossa—a monument of heroic devotion, which will thrill the hearts of the brave and the generous to the end of time—having now reached its consummation, the junta pronounced the funeral oration of the heroic city. "Spaniards," said they, "the only boon which Saragossa begged of our unfortunate monarch at Vittoria, was, that she might be the first city to sacrifice herself in his defence. That sacrifice has been consummated. More than two months the murderous siege continued; almost all the houses were destroyed; those that were still standing had been undermined; provisions were nearly exhausted, ammunition all consumed; sixteen thousand sick were struggling with a mortal contagion which every day hurried hundreds to the grave; the garrison was reduced to less than a sixth part; the general dying of the pestilence; O'Neill, the second in command, dead; St. Marc, on whom the command then devolved, prostrated by the fever: so much was required, Spaniards, to make Saragossa yield to the rigour of fate, and suffer herself to be occupied by the enemy. The surrender was made on such terms as the French have granted to other towns: these terms have been observed as usual, by the perfidious enemy. Thus only were they able to take possession of those glorious precincts, filled only with the dead and the dying; where every street, every ruin, every wall, every stone, seemed mutely to say to the beholder, 'Go, tell my king that Saragossa, faithful to her word, hath joyfully sacrificed herself to maintain his truth.'

"A series of events, as mournful as they

* To adopt a familiar phrase, this story is of "a piece" with that told the French people of the battle of Corunna. Three regiments, the French *Moniteur* said, the 42nd, 50th, and 52nd, had been entirely destroyed in the action. That the English had lost everything that constituted an army—artillery, horses, baggage, ammunition, magazines, and military chests. Of eighty pieces of cannon they had landed, they embarked no more than twelve. Two hundred thousand pounds weight of powder, sixteen thousand

muskets, two millions (francs) of treasure had fallen into the hands of the pursuers, and treasure yet more considerable had been thrown down the precipices along the road, between Astorga and Corunna. Five thousand horses had been counted, which they had slaughtered by the way; five hundred were taken at Corunna, and the carcasses of twelve hundred were infecting the streets, when the conquerors entered the town.

are notorious, frustrated all the efforts that were made to relieve the city; but the imaginations of all good men accompanied her defenders in their dangers, were agitated with them in their battles, sympathised in their privations and efforts, and followed them through all the dreadful vicissitudes of their fortunes; and when strength failed them at last, through a continued resistance, which they had prolonged almost beyond belief, in the first moment of grief it seemed as if the light of liberty had been at once extinguished, and the column of independence overthrown. But, Spaniards, Saragossa still survives for imitation and example! still survives in the public spirit which, from her heroic exertions, is for ever imbibing lessons of courage and constancy. For where is the Spaniard, priding himself on that name, who would be less than the Saragossans, and not seal the liberty of his country, which he has proclaimed; the faith of his king, which he has promised, at the cost of the same perils and the same labours? Let the base, the selfish, and the cowardly, be dismayed by them; not the other towns of Arragon, who are ready to imitate and to recover their capital; not the firm and faithful patriots who see in that illustrious city a model to imitate, vengeance to be executed, and the only path of conquest. Forty thousand Frenchmen, who have perished before the mud walls of Saragossa, cause France to mourn the barren ephemeral triumph which she has obtained, and evince to Spain, that three cities of equal resolution will save their country and baffle the tyrant! Valour springs from valour; and when the unhappy, who have suffered, and the victims who have died there, shall learn that their fellow-citizens, following them in the paths of glory, have surpassed them in fortune, they will bless their destiny, however rigorous it has been, and rejoice in the contemplation of our triumphs.

"Time passes away, and days will come when those dreadful convulsions, with which the genius of iniquity is now afflicting the earth, will have subsided. The friends of virtue and patriotism will come to the banks of the Ebro to visit these majestic ruins; and beholding them with admiration and with envy; here, they will say, stood that city which in modern ages realised, or more truly, surpassed, those ancient prodigies of devotion and constancy which are scarcely credited in history! Without a regiment, without other defence than a weak wall,

without other resources than its courage, it first dared to provoke the fury of the tyrant: twice it withstood the force of his victorious legions. The subjection of this open and defenceless town cost France more blood, more tears, more slaughter, than the conquest of whole kingdoms; nor was it French valour that subdued it, a deadly and general pestilence frustrated the strength of its defenders, and the enemy, when they entered, triumphed over a few sick and dying men, but they did not subdue citizens, nor conquer soldiers."

This address was followed by a decree declaring that Saragossa, its inhabitants and garrison, had deserved well of their country in an eminent and an heroic degree: that whenever Palafox should be restored to liberty, to effect which no efforts on the part of the government should be wanting, the junta, in the name of the nation, would confer on him that reward which should seem most worthy of his unconquerable constancy and ardent patriotism. That every officer employed in the siege should be promoted one step, and every private soldier enjoy the rank and pay of sergeant. That all the defenders of Saragossa and its inhabitants, and their heirs, should enjoy personal nobility. That pensions, conformable to their rank and circumstances, should be granted to the widows and orphans of all who had perished there. That the having been within the walls during the siege, should be considered a claim in future pretensions. That Saragossa should be exempt from all contributions for ten years from the time when peace should be established; and that at that time the rebuilding of the public edifices, with all possible magnificence, should be begun at the expense of the state, and a monument erected in the great square of the city, in perpetual memory of the valour of the inhabitants, and their glorious defence. That in all the cities of the kingdom an inscription should be forthwith set up, relating the most heroic circumstances of the two sieges, and a medal be struck in its honour, as a testimony of national gratitude. Finally, the junta promised the same honours and privileges to every city which should resist a like siege with a like constancy, and proposed rewards for the best poem and the best discourse on this memorable event; the object being not only to uphold the Saragossans to the present generation and to posterity, but to inflame the hearts of the Spaniards with the same

ardent patriotism, the same love of freedom, and the same abhorrence of tyranny.

The consequence of the fall of Saragossa was, in a military point of view, the submission of the whole province of Aragon, commanding the principal pass through the Pyrenees from that province to France; Monzon, Benasque, and other places, immediately submitted to the invaders.

In the commencement of this year, a treaty of amity and alliance was concluded between Great Britain and the Spanish nation acting in the name of Ferdinand VII.; in which the contracting parties bound themselves to make common cause against France and its usurping government; and the British government engaged to assist the Spanish nation in its resistance against Buonaparte and his brother Joseph, the usurper, to the utmost of its power. This promise, it will be seen in the sequel, was fulfilled to its utmost possible limits. In the early part of the year, Soult, who was at St. Jago de Compostella, in Galicia, received orders from Buonaparte to leave Ney in charge of that province, and to march with 30,000 men on Oporto, while Lapisse and Victor were with their armies to menace Portugal on its eastern frontier, and thus a joint movement was to be formed on Lisbon, which Buonaparte calculated would be in their possession by the 16th of February; "so deeply was the future career of the English in the Peninsula shrouded from the Frenchman's view." On the 1st of February, Soult, in obedience to his orders, "to cut down the people with grape shot," began his march, and reached Tuy on the 10th, which he made a place of arms, leaving his artillery and all heavy incumbrances, with a garrison for its defence, and entered Orense on the 15th. On his road from this town he overtook the rear-guard (9,000 men) of Romana's army (March 6th) at Monterey, which, after a short skirmish, fled towards Puebla de Sanabria. The fleeing Spaniards were so closely pressed by Franceschi's cavalry, that a body of about 3,000 finding itself assailed in the rear by the French infantry, and headed by their cavalry, halted on some rough ground, and formed a large weak square. Against each face of this square, Franceschi directed a regiment of cavalry; the dismayed Spaniards, were broken, trampled down, and sabred without mercy, to the number of 1,200. Soult then resumed his march to the banks of the Minho. But scarcely had Soult quitted

Galicia, than the patriots blockaded Tuy and Vigo. Soult despatched a force to relieve Tuy; but Vigo, where his military chest was deposited, surrendered to the Galician peasants, though garrisoned by 1,300 men.

At Soult's departure for Portugal, Ney assumed the charge of Galicia. Hearing that Romano, after a seven days' siege, had compelled the garrison of Villa Franca, consisting of 800 men, to surrender, he marched from Corunna against him, but Romana evaded him by retreating to the valley of the Syl.

At the close of the year 1808, we have seen the unfortunate results that attended the exertions of the patriots in Catalonia—that Vives and Reding, who were posted in a strong position at Cardaden to impede the advance of St. Cyr, for the relief of Barcelona, were defeated (December 16th) by that general, with the loss of 2,000 men, and all their artillery and ammunition; and also on the 21st of the same month, Reding, who had collected the fugitives, and had increased his force to 20,000 men by the debris of the various routed and dispersed patriot armies. It was by this means, as also by the prisoners who escaped from the French escorts, and those who deserted after they had been armed and equipped for Joseph Buonaparte's service, that the Spanish armies were recruited after their disasters, with so surprising facility and despatch. When the army of Castanos arrived at Cuenca, after the battle of Tudela, it was reduced to 9,000 foot and 2,000 horse; a month after, at the battle of Ucles, it was more than 20,000 strong. After the defeat of Blake's army at Espinosa, the marquis de Romana had great difficulty in collecting 5,000 soldiers in Galicia; but as early as the beginning of December he had assembled 22,000 men in the neighbourhood of the city of Leon, was overthrown by the same general, and his army totally routed in the course of half-an-hour, when all his stores, ammunition, artillery (fifty pieces), and magazines (in which were 30,000 stand of English arms), fell into the hands of the enemy. Reding, however, in no wise discouraged by his disasters, immediately began to reorganise his fugitive troops that had fled to Tarragona, and the mountains in the interior of the province, with the intention of marching to the relief of Saragossa. In the mean time the duke del Infantado, in the indulgence of his delusive dream of relieving Saragossa, recovering Madrid, and making a diversion for the relief of sir John

Moore's army, ordered Vanegas to canton his troops at Ucles, to be ready to co-operate in the design. This ill-omened ground—for here the Spaniards had, under Alonzo VI., endured the most disastrous defeat that the Christians had ever suffered from the Moors since the declaration of the kingdom of the Goths—was to be the scene of an action as disgraceful to the Spaniards for the facility with which they were routed, as it was infamous to the French for the enormous wickedness with which they abused their victory. On the 13th of January, the French, under Victor, attacked this ill-fated army, and instantly put it to the rout; some laid down their arms, others fled wildly across the fields. The fugitives, in their panic, rushing on the enemy's artillery, were cut down with grape-shot. The victors immediately rushed into the town of Ucles, and, to compel the inhabitants to discover where their valuables were secreted, they put them to the torture. Having obtained the portable wealth of the place, they yoked the towns-people together, and loading them with their own furniture, and piling it in heaps on the castle-hill, set fire to it. They then dragged a considerable number of the inhabitants to the shambles, and there butchered them. These monsters, besides perpetrating atrocities that "cannot be hinted at without violating the decencies of language and the reverence which is due to humanity," tore the nun from the altar, the wife from her husband's corpse, and the virgin from her mother's arms, and treated them with such foul brutality, that many of their victims expired on the spot. The loss of the patriots was great in killed, wounded, and prisoners; of the latter of whom the French boasted that they had taken 300 officers and 12,000 men, though Vanegas' force did not exceed 8,000 foot, and 1,900 horse. A great number of the prisoners were massacred in cold

blood; the rest were marched to Madrid, and such as fell by the way from hunger and exhaustion were shot by their captors.

The affairs of the patriots in Catalonia were equally inauspicious. St. Cyr attacked (February 17) the Spanish troops assembled at Igualada, under Juan Baptista de Castro, as a nucleus for the formation of a *levy en masse*, which had, in obedience to the order of the central junta, been ordered to be raised for the relief of Saragossa, and quickly put them to the rout.

He immediately marched against Reding, sacking and burning, in his progress, Villarodona and La Puebla; and for the purpose of cutting off Reding's retreat to Tarragona, and intercept his communications with that fortress, he took possession of Valls.

Reding was now on his march to Tarragona, with 12,000 troops, in a state of discipline superior to that of any body of troops which the patriots had yet been able to bring into the field in that quarter. The vanguard and the centre had in the course of its night march (February 24th) passed the town of Valls, when a volley of musketry being poured in, the Spaniards, both those that had passed the town and those who had not come up, took their battle station with alacrity and precision; the artillery on both sides began to play; and at the same moment the French, descending from the heights of Valls, were met by the Spaniards, and attacked so vigorously, that they were driven back to the heights. But reinforcements arriving to their aid, Reding, on account of the exhausted state of his army from its night march, determined to retreat towards Tarragona. But the following morning forced him to a re-engagement, when, after a short combat, with the loss of 2,000 men and all their artillery and baggage, Reding was severely wounded, having received five sabre wounds, from the effects of which he shortly after died.*

* The eulogy on this brave man—the real conqueror at Baylen, whatever Spaniards may say to the contrary—by Mr. Southey, is too touching and appropriate to need an apology for its introduction here:—

"The cause for which Theodore Reding fell, was the same for which his brother Aloys had fought amidst their native mountains; it was the cause of his own countrymen, as well as of the Spaniards; the cause of all good men everywhere. The motives for which ordinary wars have been undertaken are so mean and transitory, and come so little to the heart of man, that after a few years have elapsed all interest concerning them is exhausted; and even nationality does not prevent us from feeling that they whose

lives have been expended in such contests, have died rather in the exercise of their profession than of their duty. But the struggle of Spain against Buonaparte is of the same eternal and unfading interest as the wars of Greece against Xerxes: at whatever distance of time its records shall be perused, they will excite in every generous mind the same indignant and ennobling sympathy. Not, therefore, in an ungrateful service did Reding lay down his life, for with those records his name will be perpetuated: Switzerland will remember him with pride, as one of the most honourable, though not the most fortunate of her sons; and Spain with respectful gratitude, as a soldier not unworthy of her service in its best day, and true to it in its worst."

The discomfited patriots fled to the mountains, or to Tortosa, or Barcelona.

The result of this victory was, that the French, on the following day, entered Reuss, a rich commercial city, which saved itself from inevitable destruction by voluntarily raising a large contribution for the French army. The sick and wounded Spaniards in the hospitals were sent by St. Cyr to Tarragona, who, as they amounted to several thousands, occasioned an infectious disease to break out in that city.

St. Cyr had hoped by his victory at Valls, assisted by his ruse of sending the sick and wounded to Tarragona, that the Spaniards would be convinced of their usual inferiority to their conquerors, and their hopelessness of escaping the horrors of war. But he was mistaken, so far from having that effect the spirit of the Catalans was raised, and and the central junta spoke of his victory in their proclamations as one of those defeats in which ill-fortune brought with it no dishonour, but rather hope and confidence. They never believed themselves conquered, or doubted of their overcoming their enemies. Neither did they allow themselves to be depressed by reverses. Like the Roman senate, which after the defeat of Cannæ, thanked Varus that he had not despaired of the salvation of Rome; so the supreme junta of Seville declared, by a public ordonnance, after Cuesta's signal overthrow at Medellin, that he and his army had deserved well of their country, and awarded them the like recompense as if they had been victorious. Their patriotism was a religion, as it was with the ancient Romans, who never allowed themselves to despair, or believed that they had been conquered, even in the midst of disasters. As the sacred eagles of the god of the capitol, bore aloft in battle, led the Romans on to victory, the religious sentiment of dependence on their patron saint animated and cheered on the Spaniards in their aspirations for independent nationality. The vision of "driving the enemy across the frontier," constantly flitted before their eyes, and inspired them with renewed hope.

The enemy now occupied Villa Franca and the port of Salen, and thus cut off Tarragona from all communication by sea and land with the rest of Spain. Want of provisions, however, compelled them to retreat from that city; St. Cyr accordingly retrograded towards the Lobregat and the French frontier, and took post near Vich,

for the purpose of preparing for the siege of Gerona.

On his retreat, the Somatenes and Miguelites reissued from their mountains in renewed force and vigour. These irregular troops began to acquire that superiority which this species of warfare assured them; Chabron's division, harassed by repeated assaults, fell back from Igualada on Villa Franca, and the Spaniards, pushing parties up to the walls of Barcelona, cut off St. Cyr's communication with that city, and so excited Duhesme's apprehensions of the patriots within the city gaining possession of some of the gates, and delivering them up to their countrymen, that he determined to compel all the principal functionaries and the military to take the oath of allegiance to the intruders; and on their refusal to disgrace themselves and betray their country, both civilians and military were sent as prisoners of war into France.

To so high a pitch had the spirit of patriotism risen among the rural population of the mountainous districts, that the peasants of the Vallés displayed a memorable example of the sacrifices that love of country will excite the heart of man to make. Their country lies in the line between Vich and Barcelona; and the peasants taking arms to impede the communication, occupied the heights near the church of Canovellas, about a mile from Granollers, which is the capital of that district. The district is so strong, that the invaders were desirous of opening the communication by persuasion rather than by force, and therefore communicated to the insurgents, that the French commanders had ordered their troops to make war on soldiers only, not on peasants; that if they would lay down their arms, and retire every man to his house, no injury should be done them; but otherwise, there was a division in their front, and another was coming in their rear. A written answer was returned in the name of the peasants of the Vallés. "They held it a great honour," they said, "to form a part, but a small one, of the Spanish nation; and they had seen what their requital had been from receiving and entertaining the French troops, when their government had commanded them to do so; their peaceful habitations had been invaded, their property plundered, their houses burned, their women violated, their brethren murdered in cold blood; and, above all, the religion of their forefathers outraged and profaned. Nothing remained for them but

to repel force by force. General St. Cyr and his companions might have the poor glory of beholding that country one heap of ruins; they might pass in triumph over the bodies of those whom they had sacrificed; but neither they nor their master should ever say that the people of the Vallés had submitted their necks to a yoke which the whole nation had indignantly spurned." The success with which these peasants harassed the French, and cut off some of their artillery and baggage, raised the spirits of the Catalans more than the battle of Valls had depressed them. The devoted attachment of the Spanish peasantry to their country is admirably exhibited in the following incident mentioned by M. Rocca in his *Mémoires de la Guerre Française en Péninsule*.

"Among the insurgent peasants seized by our skirmishers, was one armed with a gun, who was driving before him an ass, laden with provisions for his family. The officer of the advanced guard took pity on him, and ordered him to be set at liberty, making signs to him to escape. The peasant availed himself of the boon granted, but quickly returned and fired at his deliverer; but the ball missed. The man had hoped to die a martyr, by killing one whom he supposed to be one of our chiefs. On being brought before the colonel of the regiment, our men told him that he would be shot; he immediately, and proudly, knelt down, prayed to the Virgin Mary and the saints, and then awaited his death. Had these men," says the narrator, "have known how to fight as well as they did to die, we should not so easily have passed the Pyrenees."

The next calamity that befel the patriot cause was the defeat of the Estramaduran army, under Cartajal, at La Carolina, or as it is sometimes termed, Ciudad Real. Here general Sebastiani attacked him (March

27th), and quickly putting his army to the rout, pursued it to the entrance of the Sierra Morena, capturing 4,000 prisoners, among whom were 200 officers, 18 pieces of cannon, and sabring 3,000 of the scared troops in their flight, though, according to his official report, they had fled on the first charge, without the least resistance.

A still greater disaster awaited Cuesta's army in Estremadura. The French having crossed the Tagus, by the Puerto del Arzobispo, and dislodged the Spaniards from their position at Mesa d'Ibor, advanced against Cuesta, but in their march the chasseurs of the advanced guard were surprised at the village of Mia Casas by some squadrons of the enemy's cavalry, and lost above 150 of their party. Cuesta now apprehending, from the circumstance of a heavy train of artillery having been sent from Madrid towards Estremadura, that the object of the enemy quitting his strong position at the bridge of Almaraz, was to lay siege to Badajoz, posted his army, consisting of 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, at Medellin, for the purpose of annoying the besiegers in their operations against that city, and cutting off their communication with Madrid. At first the Spaniards occupied the heights and the town of Don Benito, but perhaps influenced by the recollection of the victory gained by their ancestors over the Moors on those plains, Cuesta drew up his army in a kind of crescent, in one line, of about a league in extent, without any reserve, or availing himself of any advantage of ground, on the wide and open plain in front of Medellin, so confident was he of the result of the contest. The French army, under Victor, amounted to 18,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry, and had been concentrated on the 21st of March, in Merida and its neighbourhood, crossing the Guadiana, advanced against the patriots on the 28th.

THE BATTLE OF MEDELLIN.

THE BATTLE of Medellin, or, as it is sometimes termed, Merida, began about eleven o'clock, on the 28th of March. The French batteries opened on the Spanish infantry, who had been ordered to charge with the bayonet, and take them; the order was bravely obeyed; two regiments of French dragoons charged the foot, but were repulsed with loss; the German division, which had been formed

in the centre of the enemy's line in close columns, being now resolutely attacked, formed itself into square, but resisted with so much difficulty, that Cuesta was in full hope of a complete victory, and Victor not without apprehensions of a defeat, till part of the French reserve succeeded in enabling their comrades to keep their ground. The Spaniards on the left had taken the first

battery, when a strong body of cavalry advancing to recover it, the whole of the Spanish cavalry on the left took panic, and, without facing the foe, or attempting to make the least stand, fled in the greatest disorder from the field, most of them to the distance of many leagues. The day being irrecoverably lost by the defeat of the left wing, the victors turned on the centre and the right, and directing the whole force of their artillery on those columns, a total dispersion of both took place, though the right wing had, while the discomfiture of the left wing was taking place, compelled the enemy to give ground, and was following up its success. A chain of cavalry now forming around the routed patriots, gave no quarter, in pursuance of the murderous system on which it had been instructed to act. The survivors threw down their arms, and took to headlong flight, pursued by the whole of the French cavalry. The infantry followed the cavalry, and despatched the wounded with their bayonets. Weariness, rather than compunction, put a stop to the carnage. The Spanish loss in killed is variously stated from 7,000 to 12,000 men. Two regiments of Swiss and Walloon guards were stretched on the field in the very line they had occupied in battle. The loss in prisoners was from 3,000 to 7,000; but of the latter not 2,000 ever reached Madrid. A wounded Spanish officer was brought into the room where Victor was at supper, when the French marshal said to him, "If my orders had been obeyed, sir, you would not have been here."* Those orders had been too well obeyed. The French dragoons were a large part of the night of the battle employed in rubbing their sword-arms with soap and spirits, to recover the muscles, from that day's slaughter. And their cruelty was not yet satiated. A peasant in one of the neighbouring villages had a son in Cuesta's army; when the army drew near Medellin, Juan's conversation induced his two brothers to join the army as volunteers. Juan was never after seen; but the father, on searching the field of battle,

* In the pursuit from Medellin, and some other battle-fields of the feeble efforts of the patriots, the savage work of pursuing and slaughtering, for several miles, the supplicating and defenceless fugitives, is spoken of in the French accounts of those battles, as a severe labour that quite exhausted the victors; in the language of the narrator, "they were worn out in the savage and merciless work." In one battle nine thousand fugitive peasants were cut down; in another, three thousand of the fleeing host were slaugh-

tered; and in neither case, did the merciless havoc cease while a fugitive could be overtaken. At Ucles, a large number of the nine thousand prisoners taken, when they could march no farther through inanition and fatigue, were shot without mercy. Nor was this an isolated instance of French cruelty. At Ucles many of the principal inhabitants were bound in pairs and massacred in the slaughter-houses, and their wives and daughters delivered over to the passions and brutality of the soldiery.

When Cuesta had collected the remains of his fugitive troops at the rallying point Llerena, he thanked them, in his general orders, for their good conduct, excepting by name the horse regiments that had disgracefully fled. Three of the colonels he suspended from their rank, and he took from the privates one of their pistols, till by some good service they should regain the honour which they had lost. The conduct of the junta was equally magnanimous and politic. They decreed pensions to the widows and orphans of all who had fallen at Medellin, in proportion to their rank and circumstances, and a badge of distinction to those corps who had distinguished themselves.

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They pronounced that the general and the body of the army had deserved well of their country. Knowing that Cuesta had been lamed, by the fall from his horse, they required him in all his despatches to report the state of his health. In the preamble to their decree they said that all the details of the battle tended to console them for its loss, and that the spirit of Herman Cortes might have beheld with joy the courage which his countrymen had manifested upon the scene of his childhood. The example of that day, they said, might make them hope that with perseverance they might form an infantry capable of defending the national independence; an infantry that should be the worthy rival and successor of those famous *Tercios*, which, under the best captains in the world, had supported the glory of Spain in Flanders and in Italy, and in Germany.

On the death of Reding, Blake having been appointed his successor in the command of the Catalonian patriot army, his appointment so raised the spirits of the soldiers and the people, that the inhabitants of Monzon, a fortification on the left bank of the Cinca, rose upon the French garrison, who were tyrannizing over the country, and levying contributions without mercy, and drove the invaders out. They had been enabled to effect this from the absence of the greater part of the garrison, being marched to the town of Albalda, which had refused to answer one of their oppressive demands, and was to be made, in French phraseology, an example of for its disobedience. In their attempt to retake the place, and punish the inhabitants, the French lost in prisoners eight companies, who were cut off in their attempt to recross the Cinca, after having being repulsed from Monzon.

To revenge the affront received on the Cinca, and repair the late reverses, Suchet, who had superseded Junôt in Arragon, advanced from Saragossa with 10,000 infantry and 800 cavalry against Blake, who was posted in the plain of Alcaniz, in front of that city. At six of the morning of May 26th, the hostile armies were in front of each other. The action began by an attack by the French on the centre of the Spanish line, which was with difficulty repulsed. Defeated in this attempt, Suchet withdrew to the heights, on which he originally took post; and after an action of seven hours, both armies stood looking at each other; but a false report being spread

by a drummer in the course of the night, the French army was so panic-struck, that it fled towards Saragossa in confusion, as if it had been utterly routed, leaving 500 dead on the field, and about as many wounded. The loss of the Spaniards was not 400.

Blake, inspired by his recent success, determined to recover Saragossa. On the 14th of June, he was in front of that city, with an army of 17,000 men. Early on the following morning, Suchet drew out his whole force from Saragossa, and the battle was fought under the walls of the town. The fire began at the advanced posts at five in the morning, and continued increasing till the same time in the afternoon, when a violent storm arising, which concealed the two from each other, the French general having during the obscurity prepared for the decisive movement of breaking the Spanish line,—no sooner had the weather cleared, than he made a rapid charge on the Spanish right, and having broken it, turned fiercely on the centre. To prevent a total rout, Blake withdrew his army, and retreated to Barrita, where he was joined by Areizaga, with 5,000 men. The loss of the Spaniards was 1,000 men and twenty guns; that of the French 800. This battle, in Spanish history, is termed *the Battle of Maria*.

On the following day he retreated to Belchite, where he was followed and attacked by Suchet. After four or five shots had been fired on both sides, and a few shells had been thrown by the French, which wounded four or five men, one of the shots falling into the middle of a regiment, the men were seized with a sudden panic, and fled; the panic instantaneously spread; a second and a third regiment ran away without firing a gun, and in a few minutes the generals were left with none but a few officers in the midst of the position. With all their efforts, they could not rally more than 200 men, and no other remedy was left to them but flight, leaving artillery, baggage, ammunition, and all the materiel of the army in the possession of the enemy. The fall of the fortresses of Tortoso, Morella, and Monzon was the result of this defeat.

The defeat was, in all its circumstances, so disgraceful and disheartening, that Blake almost sank under it. He wrote to the government, that the calamity was so oppressive to his feelings, that he was not able to enter into its details, but considered it due to the nation that a judicial inquiry should be instituted into the conduct of a

general, under whose command an army of from 13,000 to 14,000 effective men had been utterly routed and dispersed. "He knew that he had not been culpable," he said, "but after so many proofs of his unhappy fortune, he wished not to be employed any longer in command. As a Spaniard and a soldier, he was still ready to serve his country in an inferior station, and he requested that only some portion of his present pay might be continued for the support of his family, or a part of the *encomienda* which had recently been conferred on him, but which it was not fitting that one so useless should retain." The

government neither accepted his offered resignation, nor instituted any inquiry,—for the Roman senate never demeaned itself more generously towards their unfortunate general, than did the central junta of Spain—it declared that the commander-in-chief and the generals had done their duty, and retained the confidence of the country. To brand the fugitives in a body would have been useless. A religion which is contented to accept the slightest degree of contrition, and keeps short reckoning with conscience, would soon teach them to be on easy terms with themselves.

SIEGE (THE THIRD AND LAST) OF GERONA.

THE town and fortress of Gerona stand upon the side and foot of a hill, where the little river, Onar, which divides the city from the suburbs, falls into the Ter. A wall fifteen feet high surrounds the upper town, but a rampart and wet ditch protect the lower. The citadel, Monjuic, and the forts termed the Capucins, which are situated on rocky eminences, constituted the principal defence. Monjuic was a square fort about 240 yards on each face, and was situate about sixty fathoms from the city.

The reduction of this place was an object of deep interest to the despoiler of Spanish freedom and nationality, and since the last attempt of his generals to obtain its possession, they had been busily preparing for their renewed assault. The brave Geronans and their gallant governor, Mariano Alvarez, were as actively employed in their efforts for defence, and exhibiting a sacrifice of heroic duty, no less memorable than that which Saragossa had displayed; to which they were encouraged by having twice driven the enemy from before their walls. The inhabitants of the place were about 14,000,

but they were overlaid by priests and religieux, who formed more than a fourth of the number. The garrison consisted of 3,400 men. The French army numbered 30,000 men, under the command of St. Cyr, and Verdier.

Every military preparation that the circumstances permitted was taken to prepare for the contest; and as the surest reliance was to be placed on that moral resistance, of which the Saragossans had set them so glorious an example, the whole male population, without distinction of rank or age, formed itself into a corps, to support the efforts of the garrison. Women, too, even of the highest rank and station, formed themselves into an association which they called "The Company of St. Barbara," to bear away and attend to the wounded, and perform whatever duties lay in their power, as their countrywomen had done at Saragossa. The patron saint of the town, St. Narcissus,* or as he was called in the clipt language of the province, St. Narcis, and who had obtained the credit of defeating Duhesme in his attempt on the city, was de-

* The Spaniards are the most superstitious and credulous people on the face of the earth. Every town and even every village have their patrons, to whom they pray, and on whom they place their confidence. In all the towns and villages, and even on the high roads, saints and virgins are set up in niches, with the inscriptions underneath, "One thousand years"—"Two thousand years"—"Ten thousand years' indulgences for every one who will say five Paters, and five Aves before this holy image." Their lofty opinions of themselves and their nation are on a par with their superstitious notions. Such is their nature, that imagination cannot tax itself sufficiently to produce absurdities proportionately to their credulity. During the siege of Saragossa, the

extravagant report that the French were in headlong flight, and the marquis de Lazar was wasting France in his march to Paris, met with implicit credence. Several nuns, who believed themselves to be inspired prophetesses, were produced to the inhabitants of Seville, to assure them, that if ever the French should see the walls of that town, the fire of heaven would fall upon them, before they could reach the gates. In many other towns, the same prophetic inspiration descended on the nuns, who invariably predicted the destruction that awaited the invaders; and their extravagant predictions were religiously believed by the populace: so hoodwinked and stultified were that people by priestly craft and delusion.

clared generalissimo of the armies. To give effect to the appointment of his saintship, the aid of Romish superstition was invoked. A meeting was held for the purpose, of the municipality, the chapter, the heads of the religious houses, and all the chief persons of the city, Julien Bolivar presiding, as the king's lieutenant. Resolutions were passed, that seeing St. Narcissus had always vouchsafed his especial protection to the principality of Catalonia, as had been manifested during the former invasions of the French, and recently by the defeat of Duhesme, which was wholly owing to his favour; and seeing, moreover, that for the purpose of resisting the tyranny and oppression of Napoleon Buonaparte, it was necessary to appoint a commander, who should be capable of directing their operations and repulsing so inveterate and cruel an enemy, no one could so worthily fill that office as the invincible patron and martyr, St. Narcis; and therefore, in the name of Ferdinand the king, they nominated him generalissimo of all the Spanish forces, by land and sea, and confided to him the defence of Gerona, of its district, and of the whole principality. On the following Sunday, the junta, with all the clergy and persons of distinction, went in procession to notify this appointment to the saint, in his shrine in the church of St. Felix; the shrine was opened, and a general's staff, a sword, and a belt, all richly ornamented, were deposited beside the relics of the chosen commander; and the enthusiastic joy which the mummary excited was such, that the spectators said it seemed as if the glory of the Lord had descended and filled the church, manifesting that their devotion was approved and blessed by heaven. And further to animate his fellow-townsmen, and restrain by fear the few treacherous that might be waiting, when an opportunity offered, to side with the foe, and betray their country, Alvarez published an edict, forbidding all persons from speaking of capitulation, on pain of immediate death, without exception of rank, class, or condition: the noble order ran thus, and was dated May 5th:—"Whoever speaks of a capitulation or surrender, shall be instantly put to death;" and the order was received, both by the garrison and people, with acclamations.

On the 6th of May the besiegers first appeared on the heights of Casa Roca and Costarroga, on the opposite side of the Ter, and began to form their lines without op-

position. When the lines were completed, and everything ready to commence the bombardment, a flag of truce was sent (the 12th of June), requiring submission. Alvarez desired the officer who was the bearer of the summons, to tell his general to save himself the trouble of sending flags of truce in future, as no other communication would be held with him but at the mouth of the cannon. On the night of the day following the summons, about an hour after midnight, the bombardment began. Then, for the first time, the *generale*, or alarm, was beat; a sound that afterwards became so frequent in this devoted city. Roused from their sleep, the aged and the children repaired to cellars and other places of imagined security, which they who could had provided for this emergency; and the female company of St. Barbara hastened to their posts. The bombardment continued, and, among other buildings, the military hospital and those of St. Domingo and St. Martin were destroyed, so that, as the sick and wounded increased, the difficulty of providing for them was greatly augmented. About the end of the month an epidemic affection, in the shape of a bilious fever of the bowels, became prevalent, occasioned partly by the perpetual agitation of mind which the people endured, and partly by sleeping in damp subterranean places.

During these operations Palamos, a port by means of which Gerona communicated by sea with Tarragona, was carried by assault, by Italian troops under general Fontane, and the only persons found in it who were spared from slaughter, were the few who threw themselves into the sea, to escape the ferocity of the foe. This dreadful carnage was highly approved of by St. Cyr; it would prove, he said, useful as an example to other towns. The express words of the heartless soldier were: "*La gloire de defendre ses foyers domestiques, menacés par l'étranger, est grande, la plus grande de toutes, peut-être; mais la vertu qui y fait prétendre, ne serait point la première des vertus, si elle pouvait être pratiquée sans peril!*"

Verdier, in the mean time, prosecuted the siege with vigour. The suburbs were soon rendered untenable, and by the beginning of June, their batteries keeping up an incessant fire upon three sides of the fortress of Monjuic, the angle upon which the flag was hoisted fell into the ditch; Mariano Montano, who commanded at this post, instantly descended amidst a shower of balls,

brought it up in safety, and replanted it on the walls. The breaching batteries having thundered incessantly on the walls for a fortnight, a breach having been effected wide enough for forty men abreast, about three o'clock of the morning of the 8th of July, an assault, under cover of a tremendous bombardment, was made by a close column of 6,000 of the enemy. Thrice the assailants renewed the assault, and thrice they were driven back. The summit of the breach was so formidably barricaded, that it was not possible to surmount the obstacles; and the flanking fire of the half-moon and ravelin did such fearful execution among them, that their loss in killed and wounded amounted to above one thousand men. A mortar which lay masked among the ruins of the ravelin, and which discharged five hundred musket-balls at every shot, was played full upon the foe, and the havoc which it made was immense. The company of St. Barbara distinguished themselves on this occasion; covered with dust and blood, under the burning heat of July, and through the incessant fire of the batteries and musketry, they carried water and wine to the soldiers, and bore back the wounded. Throughout the whole siege those heroic women shrunk from no duty, however laborious, however perilous, or however painful. In the frequent removal of the hospitals, which the bombardment occasioned, the exertions of the company of St. Barbara were attended with the severest toil, and the most imminent danger. Three of the leaders are especially mentioned—Dona Lucia Joana de Fitzgérald, Dona Mariangela Vivern, and Dona Maria Custi, commandants of the three divisions of St. Narcis, St. Dorothy, and St. Eulalia. An instance of extraordinary heroism was displayed one day by a youthful drummer of the name of Luciano Ancio. He was stationed to give the alarm whenever a shell was thrown; a ball struck off his leg at the knee, but when the women came to remove him, he begged of them to leave him where he was, saying, "As my arms are left, I can still beat the drum, to give my comrades warning in time to save themselves." Every day produced similar acts of heroism, both among the garrison and the townspeople.

The severe loss which the enemy had received in their late attack, convinced them that Monjuic was not to be taken by assault; they therefore resorted to the operation of the sap and mine. During the mining

operations, repeated attempts were made night after night to storm the ravelin, which was now the chief defence of Monjuic, but as it was a point of contention with the garrison who should be stationed there, the defenders were always ready, and always repulsed the enemy. To harass the garrison as much as possible, marksmen and sharpshooters were thickly stationed in the trenches, and so fatal was their aim, that for any of the garrison to be seen only for a moment was certain death; and this process of destruction was carried on so effectually, that it became only possible to observe what the enemy was about, by some one in the fosse lifting up his head and taking a momentary glance, for the besiegers had pushed their parallels to the very edge of the fosse.

Monjuic had now held out thirty-seven days since the practicable breach had been made. The defences being utterly ruined, and the fort no longer tenable, the governor deemed it his duty to preserve the men still left, that they might assist in the defence of the city. On the evening of the 11th of August he abandoned the ruins, and retired into Gerona. Five hundred of the intrepid garrison, which originally consisted of nine hundred men, had been killed and wounded, but the assailants had lost six times the number. Just after the fall of Monjuic, the garrison of Gerona was recruited by the arrival of seven hundred volunteers from the neighbouring towns and villages, who had passed unobserved through the enemy's lines.

About the end of August several breaches had been made in the walls of the lower town, from the batteries which the enemy had planted on Monjuic. Every hour an assault being expected, and as strong appeals had been made by many of the inhabitants to the governor to propose terms of capitulation, he published the following order to the troops occupying the first posts:—"The troops that occupy the second line have orders to fire on any Spaniards who retreat from the first line, as enemies to their country, who, by their example, do greater injury than the foreign enemy." But the garrison was now so greatly reduced by death and wounds, that the hospitals could no longer contain the numbers that required admission; the contagion increased, and became more virulent; the magazines were exhausted, and famine was beginning to be severely felt. Still not a word of capitulation was heard within the city.

In this critical moment Blake advanced with an army of 14,000 men, and a large convoy of supplies, to the relief of the place. Having made arrangements with Claros and Roviro, two Somatene chiefs, to threaten the besiegers' posts on the north, from the side of Figueras, he advanced from the side of Hostalrich. He accomplished his purpose by diverting their attention on various points of their extensive line, and inducing them to suppose that he intended to give battle in the quarter directly opposite to that by which the convoy was to proceed. This was accomplished with complete success by general Condé and colonel O'Donnell. Those officers, having left 3,000 men to reinforce the garrison, returned successfully with the rest of their force and the beasts of burden, to Hostalrich. As the stores introduced amounted only to a fifteen days' supply, Alvarez reduced the rations one-half, resolved to meet the extremity which he saw was now to be expected. At this time the convent of N. Señora de los Angeles, the chief outpost held by the besieged without the city, and which was an important point, as facilitating both ingress and egress for the besieged, was carried by the enemy, after a brave resistance by its garrison of 500 men, when every man was mercilessly put to the sword, except the governor and three other officers, who, leaping from the windows, escaped; in retaliation, as the captors said, for the massacre of some of their sick and wounded who had fallen into the hand of Roviro and other guerilla chiefs.

The fire of the breaching batteries was now recommenced with redoubled fury, on the three points of St. Lucia, St. Christobal, and the Quartel de Alemanes, or quarter of the Germans, that the French might enter over their ruins as by a bridge. The fire was well sustained by the besieged in return; but the French had so greatly the advantage, both in the size and number of their artillery, that Alvarez ordered a sortie, for the purpose of spiking the enemy's guns, and destroying his most advanced works; but though the assailants were partly successful, they were repulsed. By the 18th of September, the batteries had effected three enormous breeches, and the engineers declared that they were all practicable. But Monjuic having taught the enemy not to be confident of success, a white flag was sent to the town, and the French officers refusing to retire on Alvarez's verbal order to do so, they were fired on. As soon as the

officers reached their own lines, a furious bombardment began on the town, and all the batteries opened on the walls and breaches; and this continued without intermission, till day-break of the 19th. Between the hours of three and four of that day, the enemy was seen advancing in force towards the three breaches. Now was to commence a struggle of unparalleled resolution and heroism.

The tocsin was rung from the cathedral and beaten through the streets. The whole of the inhabitants hurried to the posts assigned them, and calmly and silently, amidst the fire of two hundred pieces of artillery, awaited death in the service of their country. There was scarcely an interval between the alarm and attack, so near to the walls were the points of which the enemy was in possession. Under a terrific fire of artillery that swept the ramparts by which they were flanked, three massive columns of 2,000 men each marched direct to the breaches. The Geronans were prepared to receive them at each point. The company of St. Barbara was distributed among the different posts, to perform their functions, and proclamations were issued inviting the other women of Gerona to assist them in the awful hour.

"Three times did the assailants, with the most heroic courage, mount to the summit of the breaches, and three times were they repulsed, by the equally heroic firmness of the besieged." At the Quartel de Alemanes, they succeeded in forcing their way into the first quadrangle of the building, their batteries in the meanwhile playing on the walls and buildings adjoining the breach; when the Geronans, rushing forward, drove them back to the breach, the contending parties fighting hand to hand all the way. Such was the press of the conflict, and such the enthusiasm that animated the defenders of the town, that impatient of the time required for re-loading their muskets, they caught up stones from the breach, and brained their enemies with those readier weapons. After a contest of two hours' duration, the enemy withdrew hastily and in disorder, leaving the breaches covered with his slain, and weakened by the loss of sixteen hundred men. Of the besieged forty-five fell on this glorious day, and 197 were wounded. Among the former were three gallant sons of England, by name Marshall, M'Carty, and O'Donnell. Alvarez, during the whole of the assault,

hastened from post to post, wherever there was most need of his presence, providing every thing, directing all, and encouraging all: he had prepared cressets to light up the walls and breaches in case the enemy should persist in his attempt after darkness had closed.

A glorious success had been gained, but it brought the conquerors no rest, no respite, scarcely even a prolongation of hope; and after all their exertions, the only refreshment they could obtain was a scanty mess of pulse or corn with a little oil, or a morsel of bacon in its stead. For want of other animal food, mules and horses were slaughtered for the hospital and in the shambles. Fuel was exceedingly scarce; yet the heaps which were placed at the corners of the streets, to illuminate them in case of danger, remained untouched, and not a billet was taken from them during the whole siege. At the same time the fever became more prevalent.

St. Cyr now despairing of obtaining possession of Gerona by the sacrifice of his soldiers, determined to convert the siege into a blockade, hoping, to use his own heartless phraseology, to accomplish that by "time, fever, and famine," which the fervid enthusiasm and desperate valour of the besieged proved to him he could not easily obtain by force of arms. Having thus extinguished in himself all sense of humanity, he prepared to accomplish the reduction of the heroic city by the medium of famine and disease, aided by the cruel process of bombardment and the ceaseless fire of artillery.

The besieged were now looking anxiously for Blake and his army, to make another effort for their relief. On the morning of the 26th he approached the town with a force consisting of ten thousand men and a convoy of two thousand laden beasts. But St. Cyr having drawn his lines round the town more closely than they were at the time of the entrance of the first convoy, only one thousand men under O'Donnell, with 170 laden beasts, could effect an entrance; the rest fell into the hands of the enemy; and Blake was defeated with the loss of 3,000 men.

St. Cyr now was superseded, October 13th, by Augereau; and not many hours after his taking the command of the besieging force, O'Donnell, with his brave band, accompanied by a few families of the town, broke through the besieging army in the course of

the night, and reached Blake at St. Colona, with scarcely any loss. They had passed through five-and-twenty posts of the enemy, through many of which they forced their way with sword and bayonet. Souhan was surprised in his quarters, and fled in his shirt, leaving behind him as much booty and plunder as the Spaniards had time to lay hands on.

The first act of Augereau was to possess himself of Hostalrich, where magazines were collected for the relief of Gerona. After a gallant resistance, the garrison, consisting of 2,000 men, retreated into the citadel, leaving the magazines in the possession of the enemy. The French now redoubled their vigilance; they drew their lines closer to the city; stretched cords with bells along the interspaces; and kept watch dogs at all the posts. The bombardment was continued with fresh fury, and always with greater violence during the night than during the day, in the hope of exhausting the Geronans by depriving them of sleep. Augereau sent letters into the city, threatening the utmost vengeance if the defence was prolonged, but at the same time offering an armistice for a month, and to send in provisions, if Alvarez would then capitulate if relief did not arrive; an act of humanity unequalled by any other French general during the Revolutionary War of France; but the terms were sternly rejected by Alvarez and the Geronans.

The siege being now converted into a blockade, and the arrival of large reinforcements from France enabling the beleaguering force to preserve it more strictly, famine began to do the fearful work of the enemy more effectually than his arms. Both the private stores and the public magazines were exhausted; the whole garrison and population were in a famishing state; and the few mules and horses which remained unslaughtered, were reduced to so severe a state of starvation, that they gnawed the hair from each other's manes and tails before they were led to the shambles. The enemy, aware of the dire privation that prevailed in the city, endeavoured to tempt the garrison to desert, by calling out to them to come and eat, and holding out provisions. A few were tempted; they were received with embraces, and fed in sight of the walls. But notwithstanding all their privations, all their sufferings, still the people of Gerona, as a body, opposed an heroic spirit of endurance to the enemy. The only circumstance that cast a shade of

dishonour on the heroic patriotism of the Geronans, either garrison or townsmen, during the whole of the siege, was the desertion of ten officers, two of whom were of noble birth, who, failing to persuade the governor to capitulate, took this disgraceful mode of revenge. Except in this instance, the number of deserters was very small. Towards the end of November, many of the inhabitants preferring their chance of death to the certainty of being made prisoners, ventured to pass the enemy's lines, some failing in the attempt, others being more fortunate.

The siege had endured nearly seven months; scarcely a woman had become pregnant during that time; the very dogs, before hunger had consumed them, had ceased to follow their kind; they did not even fawn on their masters; the almost incessant thunder of artillery seemed to make them sensible of the state of the city, and the unnatural atmosphere affected them* as well as human kind. It even affected vegetation. In the gardens within the walls the fruits withered, and scarcely any vegetables could be raised. The pestilential vapours that arose from the stagnation of the rain-water in the streets and the sewers, was rendered more noxious by the dead bodies which lay rotting amidst the ruins. Within the last three weeks above 500 of the garrison had died in the hospitals; a dysentery was raging and spreading, the sick were lying upon the ground without food or medicine; and there was scarcely fuel to dress the little wheat and the few horses yet unconsumed. At length human nature was exhausted; but the flame of patriotism still survived: "if by these sacrifices," said the heroic Geronans, "the liberty of our country can be secured, happy shall we be in the bosom of eternity and in the memory of good men, and happy will our children be among their fallen countrymen." This melancholy picture of the sufferings of the Geronans is not in the least overcharged; it was strictly true; and the dismal wreck of destruction still continued.

The breaches which had been assaulted ten weeks before were still open, and another being now made, the enemy determined

* All dumb animals have an instinctive aversion to the smell of putrefying animal flesh. Rocca (*Histoire de la Guerre Française en Péninsule*) says that the oxen of La Mesta, which had come as usual to pasture in the neighbourhood, fled with horror from the pasture grounds, at the sight of the dead bodies of Cuesta's

on bolder operations, having learned from the ten treacherous deserting officers that the ammunition and food were almost expended. They accordingly, having obtained possession of the Calle del Carmen, the forts Merced and Paula, with the city redoubts, were close to the walls, and thus cut off the forts of the Capucins and the Constable. As those forts were of the last importance, and their little garrisons, amounting to 160 men, were without food, and had scarcely any powder, and but little water, it was resolved to make a sortie for their relief, the garrison of the town giving up for this purpose their own scanty rations, contributed enough for the consumption of three days. The men who could be allotted for this service, or indeed who were equal to it, sallied in broad day through the Puerto del Socorro, within pistol-shot of the redoubts of the enemy. The sally was so sudden, so utterly unlooked for by the besiegers, and so resolutely executed, that its purpose was accomplished, but with the loss of a third of the party.

This was the last effort of the Geronans; their animal powers were prostrated. The deaths now increased in a dreadful and daily accelerating progression; and the difficulty of interring the dead was increased, by the French keeping up a fire on the cemetery, to prevent the interment of the corpses, in the hope the contagion would thereby be promoted. The way to the burial-place was never vacant. The deaths, from fever, flux, and want, averaged from thirty to forty daily; in some days they amounted to seventy. It was at this period, that Alvarez was seized with a dangerous fever, and that the command devolved on Don Julian de Bolivar, who, with a few of the brave survivors, felt that the time was come when to capitulate would not be attended with dishonour; and that it was perfectly useless to protract the siege a moment longer. D. Blas de Furnas, an officer who had greatly distinguished himself during the siege, was sent to the enemy's camp for the purpose. Augereau, glad to gain possession of the town, granted honourable terms. The whole of the 10th was employed in adjusting the terms of capitulation; which were, that the garrison (4,300 men) should march out with the honours of war, and army, that lay on the field of Medellin, and the smell of the pestilential vapours arising from the putrefying carcasses. "Their melancholy lowings, and the long howls of the dogs that kept and guarded them, indicated the vague instinct of terror which agitated them."

should be exchanged for an equal number of French prisoners; and that the inhabitants should be unmolested in their persons and property. On the 12th the French took possession of the city, which was little better than a heap of ruins, and sent Alvarez to Figueras, where he died. The first act of the French officer who was appointed governor, was to order all the inhabitants to deliver in their arms, on pain of death; and to establish a military commission. *Te Deum* was ordered in the cathedral; it was performed with the tears of the officiating priest, and a voice which could with difficulty command its utterance. Augereau would fain have had a sermon like that which had been preached before Lannes at Saragossa; but not a priest could be found who would sin against his soul, by following the infamous example. Nine thousand persons had perished in the defence of Gerona, of whom above 4,000 were the townsmen. The loss of the enemy, by the sword or disease, was 15,000. The central junta decreed the same honours to Gerona and its heroic defenders, as had been conferred in the case of Saragossa; besides awarding honours and titles to Alvarez.

The conduct of the French officers and soldiers was marked with so much atrocity and cruelty, during the wars of the French Revolution, especially during the Peninsular War, that it is gratifying to record an instance of their exhibiting those feelings and observances by which the evils of war are mitigated. This took place while the capitulation of Gerona was going on, when many of the enemy's soldiers ran eagerly to the walls with provisions and wine to be drawn up by their brave defenders. Also, during the siege, some of those humanities of warfare appeared, which were systematically outraged in Spain by the French soldiery, in consequence of the authorized example and enjoined orders of their generals. The out-sentries of the French and Spaniards frequently made a truce with each other, laid down their arms, and drew near enough to converse; the French soldier would then give his half-starved enemy a draught from his leathern bottle, or brandy-flask; and when they had drank and talked together, they returned to their posts. Humanities like these redeem the character of the French army, and incline us to forget, for a season, that they were the instruments of the most insatiable and merciless ambition

that ever cursed the face of the earth. The same, as has already been said, was frequently the case, during the Peninsular War, with the English and French soldiers.

Thus unparalleled necessity compelled the submission of Gerona; but, to the eternal honour of its heroic defenders, be it known that the word *capitulation* never escaped their lips, or even entered their thoughts, until the last vestige of food had disappeared, and that they had been reduced to the necessity of feeding on the hair of their heads.

After the fall of Gerona, Augereau marched to the relief of the besiegers of Hostalrich, and the dispersion of the patriots who were assembled in its neighbourhood to impede the operations. Having put to the rout two bodies, of 6,000 and 5,000 each, on December 18th and 26th, he advanced against Blake, and defeating him on December 28th, at Coll-de-Sespina, drove him in confusion towards Tarragona. He then commenced the blockade of Hostalrich. From this time the only resistance the patriots could oppose to the progress of the enemy in Aragon and Catalonia was confined to a desultory guerilla warfare in the mountains. All the fortresses in the first mentioned province were in the possession of the enemy, and it was clear that Tarragona, Lerida, Tortosa, and the other fortified cities in Catalonia, still in the hands of the patriots, were about to change masters, as Suchet was making vigorous preparations for their reduction.

Calamitous as the cause of the patriots had been in the north-eastern part of Spain, their efforts were attended with more success in the north-western portion.

On re-entering Spain, Soult, in his flight from Oporto, finding that the pursuit by the English army was not continued, marched to the relief of his countrymen blockaded in Lugo by the Spanish general Mahi, with 10,000 men, having previously concerted with Ney a combined movement against Romana. Their plan of combined operations was that Ney should act against Carrera and Murillo, and having defeated them and retaken Vigo, to send a column on Orense; while Soult was to pursue Romana's army in the valley of the Sil, and disperse it, after which he was to march on the Puebla de Sanabria, and there observe the Portuguese frontier, threatening to re-enter it, and keeping up a communication with Ney by Orense, and with the corps

under Morlier by Zomora. In pursuance of this plan, Ney hastened to Corunna, and Soult having been supplied from that fortress with field-pieces and stores, marched for Lugo. As on his approach the patriot beleaguering force withdrew, he entered the town without difficulty to reorganize his troops, broken down by the hardships of their recent campaign. During the five days which they halted, wherever they bivouacked, the scene was such as might have been looked for in a camp of predatory Tartars, rather than in that of a civilised people. Food and forage, and skins of wine, and clothes and church vestments, books and guitars, and all the bulkier articles of wasteful spoil, were heaped together in their huts, with planks and doors of the habitations which they had demolished. Some of the men, retaining amidst this brutal service the characteristic activity and cleverness of their nation, fitted up their huts with hangings from their last scene of pillage, with a regard to comfort hardly to have been expected in their situation, and a love of gaiety only to be found in Frenchmen. The idlers were contented with a tub, and if the tub were large enough, three or four would stow themselves in it.

The spirit of resistance of the Galicians was now raised to the highest pitch, that the utmost efforts of the French to repress it were ineffectual. The task of burning villages, erecting gibbets, and executing, in the mockery of justice, such Spaniards as fell into his hands, was assigned to Loisson, who discharged it to the utmost of his power with characteristic remorselessness.

In the mean time, Ballasteros, who was on the eastern frontier of Asturias, attacked, May the 19th, the French garrison of Santander, or, as it is otherwise written, St. Andero, slew 800 of it, took 600 prisoners, and won the place; but that part of his army which he had stationed in the passes leading to the town, suffering itself to be surprised by the enemy, he was compelled to abandon his prize, and disperse his men to seek safety in flight. On the 23rd of the same month, Carrera, who had succeeded to the Galician army (8,000 men), under Barrios, at Vigo, marched against the garrison of Santiago, which consisted of only 2,100 men. The garrison, despising their opponents, came out of the town, and advanced to meet them at Campo de Estrella, or, as it is otherwise written, Campostello, but were now driven back into the city, and

through it, and pursued more than a league beyond it, till night came on. The conquerors did not fail to remark, that their success had been obtained on the day of Santiago's apparition, and on the field where his body had been discovered by the star that rested on his grave. These advantages were however counterbalanced by the following reverses. On the 22nd of May, Ballasteros, endeavouring to defend the passage of the river Deba, with 10,000 men, was defeated by Bonnet; and on the 11th of June he suffered a total defeat at St. Jago de Compostello.

While Soult was in his work of destruction, employed in the interior of the province, laying it waste with fire and sword, always in pursuit, but always baffled, as the patriots invariably dispersed before a superior force could reach them, and continually harassed by those whom his cruelty exasperated, Ney proceeded, with a force of 8,000 infantry, and 2,500 cavalry, to execute his part of the concerted plan of operations. On his approach to Pontevedra, the Conde de Novroño retreated to the bridge of San Payo, which had been fortified, resolving to make a stand there to cover Vigo, in which town the stores of the Galician army lay. Here Ney attacked him, but after several desperate attempts to dislodge him, retreated during the night, leaving his wounded; and 600 killed.

Ney, in his advance and retreat, put into operation the savage system of the French marshals—a system enforced by the French government, and faithfully adhered to by its generals. At Lourizon, thirty priests and forty-nine of the principal inhabitants had been hung by the French, who then set the place on fire; in retaliation for this barbarity, 130 of the prisoners taken at the bridge of San Payo were put to death. Barrios, while he commanded the Galician army, had repeatedly remonstrated with Ney on the atrocious system of warfare which he pursued; but his representations being treated with contempt by the French marshal, he executed the threats with which he had vainly endeavoured to enforce them, and threw 700 French prisoners into the Minho.

Discouraged by these reverses, and fearful of the vengeance of their outraged opponents, the French marshals determined to retreat from Galicia. Evacuating Orense, Soult retreated to Puebla de Sanabria; and Ney evacuating Corunna and Ferrol,

retreated (June 21st) through Lugo, Villafranca, and Astorga. The citadel of Ferrol, which was commanded by a treacherous Spaniard whom Ney had appointed, surrendered to captain Hothan, of the *Defiance*, on June 26th.

On the deliverance of Galicia, the Central Junta addressed one of their animated proclamations to the inhabitants of the province, which concluded, "People of Galicia, you are free! and your country, in proclaiming it, effaces with tears of admiration and tenderness the mournful words wherein, in other times, she complained of you."

After the separation of Soult and Ney, the former marched for Benavente and put his troops in cantonments on the Esla; the latter, after his repulse at the bridge of San Payo, in the valley of Soto-Mayor, set out for Asla; and Kellerman and Bonnet at the same time evacuated Asturia. The object of their concentration was to prepare for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; but in consequence of the pressing orders of Joseph, after the battle of Talavera, they united their forces near Salamanca, and by forced marches, were advancing on the rear of the British army, to intercept its line of communication with Lisbon. But the defensive policy adopted by the English general thwarted their intentions. Cuesta's Spaniards were however defeated by Mortier at the bridge of Arzobispo, with the loss of all their guns, which, in their panic, they left ready shot. The object of delivering Madrid, which was at the same time threatened on one side by Vanegas, and on the other by sir Robert Wilson, being accomplished, the French generals separated. Soult and Mortier took post at Talavera, and Ney marched for Ciudad Rodrigo.

At this time Vanegas was at Aranjuez, and threatening Madrid. Joseph ordered Sebastiani to march against him. The French army consisted of 24,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. Vanegas had about an equal force. The attack was first made by the enemy on the Spaniards posted in the gardens of the royal palace of Aranjuez, but was repulsed with the loss of 300 men. Encouraged by his success, Vanegas assembled his whole army at Almonacid, where he was attacked by Sebastiani on the 18th of August, and, though the action was contested with great spirit by the Spaniards, his army was routed with the loss of the whole of his artillery and baggage and 6,000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The loss

of the French was 2,000. The routed army fled to the Sierra Morena, leaving the whole of the province of La Mancha in the hands of the victors.

About this time the Central Junta announced the assembly of the Cortes. At the same time the necessities of Joseph and his intrusive government were so urgent that their wits were put to work to glean whatever had been spared in the former pillage. They therefore abolished the monasteries and all the ecclesiastical orders of Spain, and confiscated the revenues and property of all Spaniards in foreign countries. Among many other decrees for seizing property of different descriptions, was one commanding persons possessing plate to the amount of more than ten dollars to give in an account thereof within three days; the mint was immediately to pay a tenth of its value; the remainder was *promised* within four months. All persons whose sons were serving in the insurgent armies were required to furnish a man for the intruders' service for every son, or a proportionate sum of money; and those who had no money for procuring the substitute, or paying the fine, were to be imprisoned or sent into France. Kellerman, in the extensive tract of country of which he was governor-general, ordered all the horses and mares above a certain height to be taken in requisition for the French armies; and every horse or mare below the size named, or under thirty months' old, with every mare that should be three months gone with foal, to have the left eye put out by the owner, and to be in other ways rendered unfit for military service. And to consummate the climax of atrocious aggression, Marchant, who had succeeded to the command of the south corps on the return of Ney to France, ordered that the principal sheep-owners in the plains of Castile, should be responsible in their persons and property for the guerillas who eluded his vengeance. He declared, also, that the priests, alcaldes, lawyers, and surgeons of every village should be responsible for any disorders committed by the guerillas within their respective parishes, adding, that every village and every house which the inhabitants might abandon on the approach of the French, should be burned.

The French now began to prepare for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and the third invasion of Portugal. As a preparative they attempted to carry Astorga by a sudden attack; but they were repulsed by Santo-

cildes, who commanded there, with the loss of 200 men.

A movement of more importance was soon undertaken against the duke del Parque, who, with the army formerly commanded by the marquis Romana, had taken a strong position on the heights of Tamames, in the mountains on the northern side of the Puerto de Banos. Marchant advanced, October 18th, against him, confident of success, and anticipating an easy victory. The French were at first successful on the left of the position, but the main body of the Spanish army falling back on their strong ground, showered down a murderous fire on the assailants, when Marchant drew off his men in disorder, having lost above 1500 men and one gun. On the third day after the battle the duke del Parque advanced towards Salamanca, hoping to surprise the French there, but on his entering that city (October 25th) he found it deserted, the French having retreated during the preceding night, carrying off the church plate and abundance of other pillage.

Elated with this transient gleam of success, the Central Junta entertained so sanguine hopes of recovering possession of Madrid, that they appointed a captain-general, a governor, and a corregidor, who were to enter on the functions as soon as it should be recovered, and directed Areizaga, who had been appointed to the command of the army of Vanegas, which had been raised to fifty thousand men, of whom seven thousand were cavalry, with sixty pieces of artillery, to advance and capture it. The new commander, partaking of the blind confidence of the Junta, on the 3rd of November moved forward from the foot of the Sierra, against Sebastiani, who, with the fourth corps, consisting of 30,000 men, of whom 5,000 were cavalry and lancers, was posted so as to defend the capital. His advanced guard lay in the plain of Ocaña.

Having reached the plain, Areizaga drew up his army, consisting of 43,000 infantry, 6,600 cavalry, and sixty guns, in order of battle. His left wing was placed behind a deep ravine, and his right in front of the same, the centre in advance of the town of Ocaña. He himself took post in the church tower of Ocaña. About seven in the morning Zayas attacked the French cavalry with the advanced guard, and drove them back. Laval's division now advanced against the

Spanish centre and right, which was received with so shattering a fire that its leading ranks fell back, but being speedily reinforced by Girard's division, the Spanish right wing was broken; a charge of cavalry completed the confusion in this side. The centre was driven through Ocaña by the French cavalry, Areizaga hurrying with them from his steeple. The Spanish right following the same example, a complete rout ensued, and the whole motley crowd fled in the wildest disorder, pursued and cut down on all sides over the wild and desolate plains which extend to the south, towards the Sierra Morena, by the savage French cavalry. In this calamitous affair the Spaniards lost 4,000 in killed, 26,000 prisoners, and all their ammunition and artillery. Of the Seville regiment, which entered the action with four hundred and fifty men, only eighty of them were accounted for when the battle was over. The loss of the French was 1,700. Though the pursuit of this battle was not disgraced by the butchery that attended that of Medellin, all those prisoners who were recognised to have been in Joseph's service, were shot, and by harsh usage and bad food, 8,000 of them were forced to join the intruders' banners.

This defeat was soon followed by that of the duke del Parque, who after his repulse of Marchant, advanced towards Medina del Rio Seco, in order to assist in the contemplated general movement on Madrid; but learning the issue of the battle of Ocaña, he began to retreat, pursued by Kellerman, who came up with him at Alba de Tormes (November 25th). The French were repulsed by the infantry and artillery, but the Spanish cavalry fled the moment they were attacked by the French horse, without firing a shot or drawing a sabre. The victorious cavalry then charged the whole of the Spanish line, but were thrice repulsed. On the approach of the darkness, the infantry, forming itself into an oblong square, fell back in the direction of Tamames, but when within sight of the spot of their recent victory, a French patrol appearing, they were so panic struck that, throwing away their firelocks and knapsacks, and whatever else encumbered them, they took to headlong flight, leaving their artillery, ammunition, and baggage, in the hands of the enemy. Thus ended the disastrous campaign (anno 1809) of the Spanish War of Independence.

THE PORTUGUESE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

ANNO 1809.

At the time of the withdrawal of the British army from Corunna, sir John Cradock, the commander of the English forces in Portugal (about 8,000 men), desirous of being in a condition to embark them with safety, in case the enemy should invade the country, took post at Passa d'Arcos, close to the mouth of the Tagus; but being joined about the end of February by 6,000 men under generals Sherbrooke and Mackenzie, for the purpose of defending Lisbon as long as possible, he encamped at Sacavem, a position near that capital. Early in March, general Beresford, who had been appointed by the prince of Brazil commander-in-chief of the Portuguese army, with the rank of marshal, with the aid of a certain number of British officers, who volunteered into that service, retaining their rank in their own, proceeded to the reorganization of that army. At this time the Portuguese army was in an inefficient state; the military profession in that country, as well as in all others, had fallen to the lowest point of degradation: the government having weakened it for the miserable purpose of rendering a corrupt and a vile despotism secure.

In the beginning of February, Soult, in obedience to his orders to reduce Portugal, began to prepare for his march from Vigo,* announcing in his bulletins, that he would cross the Minho from Tuy on the 11th of February, reach Oporto by the 20th, and be in Lisbon on the 28th.

The plan that was laid down for him was well concerted. Victor was to manœuvre on the side of Badajos, and send a column in the direction of Lisbon to facilitate the

operation against that city; Lapisse was to threaten the frontier between the Douro and Almeida, occupy Ciudad Rodrigo, march on Abrantes as soon as Soult should have reached Oporto, and when he was master of Lisbon, Lapisse was to join Victor, and invade Andalusia; the conquest of the south of Spain, as well as that of Portugal, being considered certain. Ney, in the meantime, was to occupy Galicia, and communicate with the army of Portugal.

Soult, in pursuance of this plan, removed his head-quarters, in the early part of February, to Santiago, and despatched Franceschi, with the light cavalry, to take possession of Tuy. Franceschi, in his march, dispersing a body of Spaniards, took advantage of the panic he had occasioned, and sent a detachment of cavalry to summon Vigo, the treacherous governor of which surrendered. He also entered Tuy without molestation. It having been determined to attempt the passage of the river Minho, below the city, the main body of the army was accordingly assembled there. To effectuate the passage of the river, a small flotilla ferried over 300 soldiers to the Portuguese shore, but these were captured by the armed bands assembled there; and a steady fire being kept up by two six-pounders which the Portuguese general Freire had sent to that point, the other boats of the flotilla were obliged to return. Soult having thus failed in his attempt, leaving his sick and his ordnance at Tuy, marched for Orense, in order to pass by the only remaining bridge at Amarante. Loisson's division, which formed the advanced guard, after a desperate re-

* He, and his fellow marauding generals and officers, had previously caused all their pillage—plate, jewels, indigo, Peruvian bark, and whatever marketable plunder Galicia had afforded them—to be previously shipped at Corunna for France. The sequel of this narrative will show, that he was equally provident in respect of his pillage from the Portuguese, which he had taken care to despatch by carts, a day or two previous to his expected decampment from Oporto. The extent of the robberies of the French generals, their officers and troops, in Spain and Portugal is incredible. The author of this work saw in the palace of Belem, in Lisbon, a number of packages lying about on the floor of the hall, containing precious specimens of sculpture, which Junót, in his

hurry to escape the vengeance of the populace of the city, had not been able to carry off. In some of the packages were the lapis lazuli and amethyst pillars, set in gold, of the inner chapel of Raques Church, together with the silver angels and candlesticks of the altar, valued at three millions of crusadoes. Napoleon Buonaparte, by his Egyptian expedition, had feathered his nest to the tune of above thirty million of francs. His associate generals had, no doubt, not been more abstemious. The system of peculation was so universal, and so recognised as just and laudable, that Serrurier, a general in the wars of Italy, was termed "*the virgin*," on account of his abstaining from robbing the inhabitants of the country where he commanded.

sistance on the part of the Portuguese under Silveira, and Lieutenant-colonel Patrick, an officer who had volunteered into the Portuguese service, carried the bridge, and set fire to the town. In this affair all classes took a part—even females were engaged; a beautiful woman, who had raised 700 followers in the neighbourhood of Penafiel, led them on sword in hand. Even nuns were seen among those who worked the battery which had defeated the French in their attempt at crossing the Minho.

Having halted more than a week at Orense, endeavouring by force to suppress the peasants, and by allurements to seduce the higher classes from their duty, Soult resumed his march by way of Monterey and Chaves, the frontier towns of Spain and Portugal; and encountering Romana at the first-mentioned place, dispersed his army, with the loss of above 1,000 men. Chaves was immediately invested, and capitulated on the 13th. In their march, the French committed unrestrained devastation, setting fire to the little towns of S. Miguel de Zequelenos and S. Christobal de Mourentan, with their adjacent hamlets. The French having now obtained a footing in Portugal, Soult announced his appointment as governor-general of the country; and as Chaves, which was evacuated by Silveira on the 10th of March, was a fortified town, he made it the depôt of the army, leaving 1,400 sick and wounded there.

The country through which the invaders had now to pass is one of the most defensible in Europe, the road lying through a series of defiles of great strength and intricacy; nor would it be possible to find a peasantry better disposed to defend their hearths and altars. At every step, the enemy met with incessant and harassing opposition. The villages were abandoned, stragglers were cut off; sometimes a handful of peasants stood their ground with a spirit like that of their ancestors, and sometimes an individual would rush upon certain death, so as he could be sure of one Frenchman. This harassing mode of warfare so greatly impeded the march of the French army, that it did not come in sight of Braga till the 20th.

Braga was occupied by 20,000 ordenanzas, and 2,000 regulars, under general Freire. Ascertaining that the enemy had forced the pass of Ruivaens, and had won the defiles of Salamonde, having no confidence in his motley and undisciplined force, he determined to retire on Oporto; but the populace

and his tumultuous army were of a different opinion; they thought that the position at Carvalho d'Esté ought to be defended, and considered it an act of cowardice, or of treason, on the part of Freire to abandon Braga. They mutinied, and putting him to death, by acclamation elected in his stead baron d'Eben, a major in the British service, and equerry to the prince of Wales, and who at the time was in command of the second battalion of the Lusitanian legion. The bells of the churches being set ringing the alarm, the ordenanzas quickly obeyed the call, but on inspection, it was found that there were no cartridges to fit their pieces. A single mould was at length found of the just size, lead was taken from the churches, and bullets were made during the night as fast as this slow process would allow. In the meantime, the French vanguard arrived before the position of Carvalho, which a part of this tumultuary force had occupied, about five miles in front of Braga. During three days frequent attacks were made, and the Portuguese kept their ground. By this time (March 20th) the whole French force had come up, and Eben had collected about 23,000 men. The instant the French attacked, the tumultuary rabble was routed, and experienced but little mercy at the hands of their foes. The priests at Braga had embodied themselves as an ecclesiastical corps, to serve as a guard of honour for the primate, the principal part of whose military duties was to take off with one hand the hat at the Ave Maria bell, and to present arms with the other.

Soult now proceeded on his march to Oporto, and on the 28th appeared before that city, which was badly defended. Field works had been thrown up on the north side of the city, which were armed with 150 cannon. Soult sent a summons to the bishop, the magistrate, and the general, protesting, in the usual French style, that the French came not as enemies to the Portuguese, but only to liberate them from the tyranny of the English. Instantly the bells of all the churches were set ringing the alarm, and a storm of wind and rain and thunder breaking at midnight over the city, a discharge of cannon, and useless rolls of musketry, were kept up by the Portuguese along the whole line, at which the enemy gazed as at a spectacle, for not a shot could reach them. At daybreak of the 29th, a tumultuary body of 25,000 men hurried forth and occupied the redoubts.

That odious priest the bishop, whom we shall hear of in the course of this work, as the patriarch of Lisbon, and the intriguing opposer of the measures of the English commander-in-chief, having brought affairs to this awful crisis, quitted the city, and, priestlike, took his station in a convent beyond the Douro, where he could view in safety all the ensuing horrors.

At seven o'clock of the morning of the 27th, which was Good Friday, the attack commenced in three columns, which having quickly succeeded in taking all the outer defences, broke through the centre of the Portuguese. A general panic took place, and the whole force rushed in wild confusion into the town, while one portion of the fugitives fled up, and another down the Douro. In less than an hour from the commencement of the action, the French were in the town; more than 4,000 persons, of both sexes, young and old, were running in wild affright towards the bridge of the Douro, when a dastardly regiment of their own countrymen, fleeing before the enemy, rushed through the helpless crowd, at full gallop, trampling a bloody pathway to the river. At the same moment the French cavalry were charging the fleeing mass, slaughtering indiscriminately all whom they overtook, to the very edge of the river. So great was the multitude rushing on the bridge, that part of the pontoons sunk under the weight, and huge piles of carcasses rose above the surface of the water. The crowd from behind still pressing on, to escape the ruthless horsemen, forced those in front headlong into the waves; the French all the while keeping up a fire of grape-shot on the affrighted and helpless fugitives. The surface of the river was covered with dead bodies of all ages and sexes. The scenes of rape, murder, and pillage that ensued were more odious and more opprobrious to humanity, than even the horrors of the carnage. On this unhappy day, above 10,000 Portuguese are said to have perished.

On the fall of Oporto, "the worthy representative of the great emperor," having entertained the design of adorning his head with a diadem, as "Nicholas I., king of Portugal and Algarves," proceeded as "his master had done in Egypt," to endeavour to conciliate the people whom he designed to enslave, by a show of his attachment to the religion of his intended subjects. "There is a famous crucifix, known by the name of Nosso Senhor de Boucas, in the

little town of Matosinhos, on the coast, about a league from Oporto. According to tradition, it is the oldest image in Portugal, being the work of Nicodemus; and Our Lord of Boucas is in so high estimation, that on the day of his festival 25,000 persons have sometimes been assembled at his shrine, coming thither on pilgrimage from all parts. Many miraculous stories are prevalent concerning this idol; among the rest, that when it was cast up by the sea, one of its arms was wanting; but one day a poor woman, while gathering shell-fish, and drift-wood for fuel, picking up upon the beach a wooden arm, and supposing it to have belonged to some ordinary and profane image, laid it on her fire to make the pot boil. But it sprang out of the flames; and the priests hearing of the miracle, carried it in procession to the church of Nosso Senhor de Boucas, and applying it to the stump of the armless idol, a miraculous junction was immediately effected, it being the identical arm the idol had lost. To this idol Soult determined to offer his devotions, in order to qualify himself for his regal aspirations. Accordingly he and his staff visited the church, and prostrating themselves before the altar, "paid," says his servile adulator, "that tribute of respect and reverence which religion requires from those who are animated with the true spirit of Christianity." The French marshal having gone through the mummery of preparatory qualification for royal assumption, directed his attention to the measures requisite for furthering his subjugation of Portugal; but the landing of the British army at Lisbon awoke him from his reverie of aggression and royalty. The surprise of Chaves (March 20th), with the capture of the magazines of the army, and 1,300 prisoners by Silveira and his Portuguese levies, and the occupation of Coimbra by Trant, also tended to occasion him embarrassment. In retaliation, he ordered such Portuguese as he suspected of communicating either with Trant or Silveira, to be hung from the trees along the road-side, and their bodies left to putrefy there, all persons being forbidden to bury them. He moreover ordered Thomières, who had been accustomed to such services, to tie—which the French called inflicting an exemplary and necessary chastisement—twenty-four of the inhabitants of the village of Arifane in couples, back to back, and shoot them, as a punishment, for a party of disbanded militia having killed a chef-d'escadron and his escort of three dragoons

near that village. After the perpetration of this atrocity, the village was set on fire, the women and girls having been previously forced into an *ermida* or chapel, and there violated.

But "a spice" of French atrocities has been as yet presented to the reader; in its appropriate place in this work, they will be exhibited in all their horror and abomination.

THE GUERRILLA OR PARTISAN WARFARE.

THE origin of the guerilla warfare was the excessive cruelty and extortion practised by the French on the inhabitants of Spain. If you inquired into the private history of the members of any of the guerilla bands, it uniformly recounted some tale of suffering. One had his father murdered by the French soldiers, at the threshold of his house; another had seen his wife violated and massacred, or his children butchered before his eyes; a third had lost both his sons in the war; a fourth, burnt out of house and home, had joined the bands in the mountains as the only means of gaining a livelihood, or of wreaking vengeance. All had in one way or other, been driven by suffering to forget every other feeling but the remembrance of their woes, and the determination to revenge them. "Navarre" said the elder Mina, in the preamble to his counter-proclamation of retaliation for the frightful and sanguinary denunciation of Bessière's proclamation, dated June 5th, 1811, "is covered with desolation; every where tears are shed for the loss of the dearest friends; the father sees the body of his son hanging for having had the heroism to defend his country: the son witnesses with despair his father sinking under the horrors of a prison, for no other reason than that he is the parent of a hero who has fought for his native land."—Proclamation by Espoz y Mina, December 14th, 1811. The immense extent of the contributions imposed, and the excessive rigour with which they were levied on all ranks and degrees of persons, were also highly instrumental in the formation of this species of warfare. Spain had now for the space of three years been devastated by all the horrors of war; had been suffering from a system of organised rapin and plunder, enforced by the most

remorseless severity and cruelty: the consequence was, that guerilla chiefs and bands sprang up in every quarter where the shelter of mountains rendered pursuit difficult.* In Galicia, the Asturias, Biscay, Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia, Leon, the two Castiles, indeed in the whole of the northern and midland provinces, those patriot bands were denominated guerillas: in the mountain districts included under the name of the Serra de Ronda, in Andalusia, the irregular bands were termed *serranos*. The distinction was, that the guerillas acted in concert, the serrano on his own responsibility. The dress of the guerilla was a short jacket of russet brown, and leather leggings of the same dark colour; that of the serrano was velveteen, of an olive green colour, profusely ornamented with silver buttons, and his legs were incased in leather *bottinos*. A belt of short leather surrounded the waist of each, stuck full of the weapons of the French officers whom they had slain. When in small parties those predatory bands were called *partidas*.

This species of force and mode of warfare are peculiar to the Peninsula. From the days of Pompey and Sertorius, to the late contest between the aristocratic and democratic parties, it has been pursued without intermission through all the varieties of time, descent, and physical circumstances.

"To lead these guerilla and serrano bands, which were little more than semi-bandits, the priest girded up his black robe and stuck pistols in his belt; the student threw aside his books and grasped a sword; the shepherd forsook his flock, and the husbandman his home." Cooks, barbers, innkeepers, blacksmiths, and men of all callings and professions, enrolled themselves in their

* No country in the world is more favourable to partisan warfare than Spain. It everywhere abounds in excellent positions, capable of a defence by few against many. The sphere of the exploits of the guerillas was therefore usually the mountain passes

fastnesses, &c., which abound in Spain, particularly in the range of the Pyrenees. The mountain of the Salinas was celebrated for the ambuscades which Mina, Louga, and El Pastor, were incessantly way-laying convoys.

ranks, in hopes of plunder and promotion. Many females wearing male attire (a custom not unfrequent among women who are the inmates of camps) were frequently in the ranks of the guerillas and the serranos, fighting among the foremost. The most ferocious of those female warriors was named Martina. Guerilla juntas were established by the regency in each province, to collect stores and provisions for the bands.

The most distinguished of the guerilla leaders were the two Minas, uncle and nephew, Espoz y Mina and Xavier Mina, and Renovaes, in Navarre and Aragon; Porlier and Longa, in the Asturias: in Biscay, Juan Martin Diez (named El Empecinado), and Julian Sanchez, in the Castiles; Juan Paladea, in La Mancha; and Murillo Davila, in the mountainous districts included under the name of the Sierra de Ronda, in Andalusia. The curate Merino, friar Sapia, Jarregui, baron d'Erolles, Amor, Juan Abril, Sornil, Duran, Campillo, and others, acquired much notoriety in this species of warfare. Indeed each province and district had their predatory heroes, whose deeds, in the strain of Spanish bombast, were compared with those of the Cid. Their leaders were often designated from their former employments or professions, or were known by some other distinguishing appellation or kind of nick-name. Some were characterised on account of their peculiar deformity; others obtained epithets from their superior qualifications; many from their truculence, and dexterous modes of spoliation. Thus, Jarregui was styled el Pastor (the shepherd); Paladea, el Medico (the doctor); Porlier, el Marquisito (the marquis). The other *soubriquets* were, el Principe (the prince); el Manco (the left-handed); el Francisco (the Franciscan); el Frayle (the monk); el Cura (the priest); el Cantarero (the potter); el Pescador (the fisherman), &c. &c.

The first adventurers who attracted notice as guerilla chiefs, by collecting stragglers from the Spanish patriot dispersed armies, deserters from the enemy, the English, and their own fugitive forces, and contrabandists or smugglers, and men fond of a life of wild adventure, or made desperate by the ruin of their private affairs, in the general wreck which the spoliation and cruelty of the French had occasioned, were Juan Diez Porlier, in Asturias, and Juan Martin Diez, better known by his appellation of El Empecinado, in Old Castile. A lawyer, by name Gil, commenced the same course in the

Pyrenean valleys of Navarre and Aragon; but after a short career of two months he disappeared; and Egoaguerra, who renewed the attempt in the same quarter, in a short time engaged in Doyle's battalion. The third guerilla chief who at this time raised the spirits of the Pyrenean provinces, and for a while gave employment to the French in Navarre, was D. Mariano de Renovaes, by whom the convent of San Joseph had been so gallantly defended at the last siege of Saragossa. Having been made prisoner when the city surrendered, he had effected his escape on the way to France, and collected in the valleys of Roncal and Anso, a body of men and officers, who, like himself, believed that the scandalous manner in which the terms of the capitulation had been violated by the French, released them from all obligation of observing it. On March 1st, 1809, the French sending a force against him, then in the town of Anso, he defeated it and captured all the survivors; but in the following August, being attacked in the valley of Roncal, he was, after a gallant resistance, obliged to demand terms and capitulate for the valleys; himself and such of his followers as chose, being allowed to withdraw. The French, according to their own accounts, lost in this affair 500 killed and 800 wounded.

Xavier Mina, the son of a landholder who cultivated his own estate, and was deputy for one of the valleys of Navarre, was a student at Pamplona when the Spanish Patriot Insurrection began. He was then in the 18th year of his age, and during the earlier part of the war had been confined to his father's house by a severe illness, from which he recovered just after Renovaes had been compelled to withdraw from Roncal. A French commander, whose corps was encamped in the neighbourhood, sent a serjeant, requiring the father, in his capacity as deputy, to provide rations for his men. The serjeant disappeared on the road, and, in consequence, the house was surrounded at midnight by a detachment of infantry, who had orders to arrest the elder Mina, and bring him to head-quarters. The son, however, had time enough to secure his father's escape, and then in his name presented himself to the officer. The French general before whom he was carried, threatened him with death unless the serjeant were produced; but as every thing in that quarter was to be arranged by means of money, Mina obtained his liberty after having

been detained three days. The party who arrested him had plundered his father's house. This usage, the danger he had escaped, and the injustice of the whole proceeding, roused into full action those feelings which had been suspended only by disease and languor. He provided himself with a musket and cartouche-box, and in that trim presented himself in his own village, and offered to take the command of as many Spaniards as would engage with him in the good work of avenging their country on its invaders. Twelve adventurers joined him; they took to the mountains, and there, while they waited an opportunity of action, maintained themselves on his father's sheep. His first adventure was to surprise a party of seven artillery-men, who were carrying two pieces of cannon and a quantity of ammunition from Saragossa to Pamplona. This success procured him twenty volunteers, and he retired again to the mountains after sending his prisoners to Lerida. Hearing that a general officer was on the road with an escort of thirty-four foot and twelve horsemen, he laid in ambush for them in so favourable a spot, that a volley was fired on the French with sure effect, before they had any apprehension of danger. The general was shot in his carriage, some of the escort were made prisoners, and some money fell into Mina's hands. This he immediately distributed among his men, recommending them to send part to their families, and to retain no more than would be necessary to defray the expenses of their own interment, exposed as they must now be continually to death. The men were thus raised in their own esteem and in that of their countrymen wherever this was told, and volunteers now presented themselves in abundance, attracted by a success which was reported everywhere with such exaggerations as tales like these usually gather in their way. He received, however, none but those who brought arms, or whom he could supply with the spoils taken from the enemy. His party at this time amounted to about three-score persons, distinguished by a red riband in their hats, and a red collar to their jackets. He proceeded now towards the frontiers of Aragon, where a band of fifty robbers were adding to the miseries of that afflicted country. These he succeeded in surprising; the greater number were killed on the spot; the rest were sent prisoners to Tarragona. Twelve horses were taken from the party, upon which he mounted some of

his men, and armed them with lances; and every day added to his numbers and his reputation. Rations were voluntarily provided for his people wherever they were expected, and given as freely at one time as they were paid for at another, from the spoils of the enemy. He levied a duty on the passes where a considerable trade in colonial produce was carried on, and with these resources he paid and equipped his men, and kept in pay a sufficient number of intelligencers. It was in vain that the French made repeated efforts to crush their enterprising enemy; if his troops dispersed on the appearance or attack of a formidable detachment, it was only to re-unite, and by striking a blow on some weak point or distant quarter, render themselves more formidable than before. In Navarre, Biscay, and on the road from Burgos to Bayonne, he made himself the terror of the French convoys. He nearly captured Massena, in his homeward journey through Spain; but though he missed that chance, he captured his baggage and the whole convoy at the Puerto d'Arlaban, near Vittoria, on which occasion he defeated a French force of 2,000 men, who were escorting the convoy of prisoners and plundered treasure to France. On this occasion he took 150 of the enemy, and slew 600. This active chieftain was always on the watch for the enemy; passing from one province to another, at one time concentrating his forces, at another dispersing them. At this time he had about 1,200 men under his command. His chivalrous spirit had made him so formidable to the enemy that, not being able to capture him, they offered in a proclamation six thousand duros for his head. This failing, they endeavoured to seduce him from his allegiance by tempting offers. Signal as his successes were, his career was as short as his escapes were hair-breadth. Chance, however, at last put him in their power. Expecting the arrival of a convoy, he went on horseback with only one companion, by moonlight, to reconnoitre the ground, when he was surprised and taken by some of the enemy's outposts.

To supply his place, his uncle, Espoz y Mina, was elected commander-in-chief of the guerillas in Navarre. His first act was to capture Echeverria, the leader of a marauding band of guerillas, consisting of about 800 German deserters from the French ranks. He shot Echeverria and three of his principal comrades, and incorporated the

men in his own band. A gang of forty ruffians, with a woman by name Martina for their leader, infested Biscay and Alava, and committed so many murders, that there was a general outcry for her suppression; surprising the leader and her party, he inflicted summary punishment on them. He kept no man in his troop who was known to be addicted to women, lest by their means he might be betrayed. No gaming was allowed among his men; nor were they permitted to plunder.

The only chiefs among the guerillas who had belonged to the genteel rank of society were Porlier, d'Erolles, and Duran, who had been officers in the regular Spanish service.

The daring guerilla chief, Juan Martin Diez, the Empecinado, had been a soldier for a short time previous to the War of Independence, but had returned to his peaceful occupation of an agricultural labourer. When the intelligence of the detention of Ferdinand at Bayonne reached Spain, the Empecinado was the first to make war against the French. Having persuaded two of his neighbours to take up arms, they took a position on the high road from France to Madrid, near Aranda de Duero, to intercept the French couriers. This he soon accomplished, and thus obtained his first horse and arms; and this course was continued till his band numbered fifteen warriors. With these he performed the most daring exploits, cutting off convoys, intercepting supplies, treasure, &c. In a few months he found himself at the head of 1,500 men, and was thus enabled to do the enemy incalculable mischief. In vain were armies sent to surround his band; he baffled them all; shut up garrisons, destroyed depôts, &c., until his name became a terror to the enemies of his country. His disinterestedness was equal to his valour, and for this reason he became the idol of his band, so that they were ready to undertake any exploit at his bidding. Among his daring operations the following is conspicuous. A convoy was conveying in a carriage a lady, the relation of marshal Moncey. The carriage was escorted by twelve soldiers, in the centre of two columns of 6,000 men each, about a mile asunder. The Empecinado, with only eight of his followers, was concealed close to the town of Carovras. He allowed the leading column to pass, then boldly rushed on the convoy, put to death the whole of the escort, seized and carried off the carriage, which contained a rich prize

of money, jewels, &c. This, with his characteristic generosity, he partly divided among his men, and sent the greater portion for the coffers of the state. He was constantly descending from the Guadalaxara mountains, and spreading terror and alarm among the French garrisons. In one of those irruptions, he surprised and captured three battalions at Calatayud. He ultimately became a brigadier-general in the Spanish service, and on the termination of the war, retired to his native village. When the French army, under the duke of d'Angouleme, crossed the Bidassoa, to put down the constitution of 1820, the Empecinado took the field on behalf of the constitutionalists, and though included in the capitulation made by general Placentia, was condemned, at the instigation of the heartless Ferdinand, to be taken on the back of an ass to the place of execution, and hung. The more ignominious part of this iniquitous sentence he refused to submit to, but walked with a firm step to his doom; here a sentence of his hard fate stimulated an attempt to escape; his great personal strength enabled him to burst the cords which bound him, but he was quickly overtaken, and literally dragged by the rope round his neck through the streets, and afterwards suspended on the gallows.

In the other provinces the daring of the bands of the guerillas, particularly that in the Asturias, under Porlier, called El Marquisito, greatly harassed the French. That chief surprised the garrison of Santander, and fought some well-contested battles with the enemy. Don Julian Sanchez gave the foe in Old Castile no repose; he was continually surprising detachments, and making prisoners. On one occasion he drove away the cattle from under the walls of Ciudad Rodrigo, and disposing an ambush captured the French governor, who had sallied out to chastise him for his presumption.

The example of these chiefs, and the rich booty which they obtained by the capture of the church plate and that of individuals, which the intrusive government were at that time enforcing by requisition, induced guerilla parties to be on the watch. One party surprised a convoy with eighty quintals of silver, near Segovia. The French, who found themselves annoyed by this species of warfare, endeavoured to raise a counter-force of the same kind in Navarre, styled Miguelets. But that appellation, which was so popular among the Spaniards, had

no attraction for them when it was pressed into the usurper's service.

These forces rapidly increased. By the autumn of 1811, there were not less than 10,000 guerillas south of the Ebro; while to the north of that river Mina and Longa headed corps of 5,000 or 6,000 men each. A few of the other chiefs mustered bodies of 400 or 500 men each, but the majority of them led small bands of forty or fifty.

By these bands great evils were inflicted on the enemy; they cut off communications, intercepted supplies, convoys, and couriers; and destroyed the little forts, block-houses, and redoubts, which were placed midway between the towns to preserve the communication. But the government interfering, and giving these chiefs military rank, rendered them tame and indolent regulars.

These predatory bands were often the scourge and terror of the provinces in which they acted, and their outrages were so great that counter-partidas in many places were raised, both by the regency and the French, to restrain their excesses. Their feelings of patriotism were deadened by the lawless nature of their avocation: the love of country, and all the generous and disinterested feelings which it engenders, had been absorbed in the views of individual interest and selfish enjoyment.

A celebrated chief of a band of marauding guerillas, after making war on the French, turned his arms against the Spaniards. He had struck so great terror into Castile, that the Spaniards joined the French to endeavour to take him. Betrayed by one of his men, he was seized in a venta. A few days after, he was quartered by four horses in Valladolid, and his disparted limbs

were placed on wheels at the four cardinal points of the city.

It has been stated that deserters from the French and English armies were among the guerillas. M. Blazé, in his interesting work, says, the advanced guard of the French army, in the pursuit of the English army to Corunna, arrived at a village surrounded by a palisade, where the tri-coloured flag waved on the steeple, and the sentinels wore the French uniform. Some officers going up to it were informed, that for three months past 200 marauders had occupied the place, their retreat having been cut off. Their commander-in-chief was a corporal, but his excellency was out shooting with his staff.

It may be proper to state that much erroneous misconception has been entertained by all writers on the subject as to the amount of injury which the French sustained from having their convoys and supplies intercepted by the guerilla bands; that misconception will appear from the following fact.

As the French system of warfare was entirely predatory, that is, the troops were maintained by the plunder and spoliation of the countries in which their wars were carried on, the French armies did not suffer from the loss of their supplies and magazines as armies do who carry on warfare according to the civilised usages of modern Europe; and, consequently, their operations were not in the same degree cramped and retarded as is the case with those armies that conform to the accredited usages of civilised nations. The guerilla bands of the Basque provinces, marshalled under Satorius, were much more formidable to the Romans than those of "the Peninsular War" were to the French.

THE WALCHEREN AND SICILIAN EXPEDITIONS.

WHILE the English army was paralysed in the Peninsula for want of the sinews of war—men and money—by the incapacity of Castlereagh, and the intrigues of Canning, two expeditions, one to Walcheren, and the other to Sicily, were planned and undertaken by the imbecile cabinet of Great Britain. The object was to effect a diversion in favour of Austria, between which power and France war then subsisted. The Austrian government wished the attack to be made in the north of Germany; but the English cabinet, for "the capture or destruction of the enemy's ships, either build-

ing at Antwerp and Flushing, or afloat in the Scheldt; the destruction of the arsenals and dockyards of Antwerp, Terneuse, and Flushing; and the rendering, if possible! the Scheldt no longer navigable for ships of war," determined that the Scheldt should be the point of attack. In the selection of that point they were determined, because of Buonaparte's great maritime preparations there for the purpose of his contemplated descent on England. From the spring of 1807, formidable naval preparations had been carrying on by France in those waters. But both expeditions were rendered nugatory

by the procrastination of their preparations, the enemy having obtained a knowledge of their destination, and consequently took the necessary precautions to defeat them; and the first mentioned was further marred by the imbecility of the commander-in-chief, the earl of Chatham, whose name was proverbial for indolence and inactivity, and who, possessed of very slender abilities, but being a court favourite, and in embarrassed circumstances, the national interests were sacrificed to his private emolument, which would arise from the lucrative command to which he was appointed.

The armament destined for the Scheldt was the largest and the most complete that had ever left the British shores. Its preparation commenced from the beginning of the month of May. In July a fleet assembled in the Downs, consisting of thirty-nine sail of the line, thirty-six frigates, and a proportionate accompaniment of gun-boats, bomb-vessels, and smaller craft; in all, 245 vessels of war, accompanied by about 400 sail of transports, carrying nearly 40,000 troops; and on the 28th of the same month it set sail for its destination. The imposing magnificence of this mighty force, forming, together with seamen and marines, a sum-total of 100,000 men, drew thousands of spectators, among whom was its projector and his associate, Curtis the baker, biscuit baker and contractor, to witness the departure of the ill-fated multitude it contained, over whom the angel of death was hovering, who doomed them to perish, not on the glorious battle-field, but by the consuming breath of pestilence and disease. In the course of the following day, the fleet was off the Dutch coast; but it being not sufficiently provided with boats for landing the troops, ordnance, &c., Flushing was not invested till the 2nd of August; and the operations were then so slow, that the batteries were not ready for near a fortnight, so as to commence an effectual bombardment. The wind now permitted a naval blockade to be formed, when a hot bombardment began. On the 15th, the guns of the forts being silenced, and two churches, the stadthouse, and 250 houses having been destroyed, on the following morning, the governor, general Monnet, displayed the white flag, and demanded a suspension of hostilities for a few hours. On the following evening, the articles of capitulation being signed, he surrendered the place, with a garrison of about 6,000 men.

From the oversight by the incompetent military and naval commanders of the expedition, of not taking possession, or intercepting the communications, of the island of Cadzand, the only place from which the enemy could receive supplies and reinforcements, in the course of the siege 3,000 men had been transported from it to Walcheren. With the peaceable surrender of two small islands to the north of the Eastern Scheldt, the reduction of Flushing had been the virtual termination of the campaign.

Lord Chatham now talked loudly and solemnly of advancing on Antwerp and capturing that fortress, and the ships of war in its harbour; but while he was pausing and pondering for nearly another fortnight, a large force was collected there of regular troops and national guards of the Belgic provinces, and those nearest to them in France; and Bernadotte had arrived to take the command. Besides, the strong forts of Lillo, &c., on the Scheldt, were well manned, and all sorts of impediments, bars, boom chains, &c., thrown across and into the Scheldt, to impede the advance of the British fleet. The consequence was, the English offensive operations were suspended, and the French commenced theirs. On the 30th of August, opening a fire from guns and mortars from both banks of the river, they forced the English fleet to retire from its advanced position. The consequence was, that Walcheren was the only post occupied by the English in the beginning of September. Nearly a fourth part of the army being now prostrated by the endemic fever of the country, the Earl of Chatham, on the 14th September, embarked with a portion of the army for England, leaving a feeble remnant of the magnificent army which had been entrusted to his command, under sir Eyre Coote, for the purpose of demolishing the defences and basin of Flushing. Sir Richard Strachan, the admiral of the fleet, wishing to continue his command, and enjoy the perquisites it afforded, transmitted a plan of defence of the island to the admiralty, so as to render it a permanent possession by England. The British ministry now ordered the fortifications to be improved, and sent out English bricklayers, bricks and mortar, for the purpose, as if those materials could not have been procured elsewhere. But the remainder of the troops left to garrison the town disappearing with alarming rapidity in the hospitals and the grave, orders were sent out to lieutenant-general

Don, who had succeeded sir Eyre Coote, to destroy the basin and the naval defences of the island, and withdraw the garrison. Thus ended the Walcheren Expedition, which cost the nation twenty millions of money, and 10,000 of her best troops. The only trophies of that memorable exploit were a frigate and the timbers of a seventy-four, which when put together was christened the *Chatham*, as a memorial of the vigorous and prompt measures — words, namely, “promptitude” and “vigour,” in the communication of the king’s approbation of his operations during the siege of Flushing—of the commander-in-chief of the expedition.

Incapacity, and, in some instances, the want of common honesty and humanity, marked the proceedings of all the prominent persons connected with this ill-fated expedition. The ministry, among their other exhibitions of ignorance, should have known that Walcheren had been maintained in the reign of William and Anne at a fearful expense of health and life. The conduct of the medical folk, or principal officers of the army medical department, was culpable and heartless. The subterfuges of the surgeon-general, the physician-general, and the inspector-general of the forces, of the time, in evading obedience to the command to repair to Walcheren to examine the causes of the malady, and report thereon, are an eternal stigma on them.

The expeditionary force intended to operate in favour of Austria in Italy, consisted of about 15,000 English, Sicilians, Calabrians, Corsican rangers, and other foreigners

in British pay, under the command of sir John Stuart, the hero of Maida, and who were then stationed in Sicily for the protection of Ferdinand IV. and his family, the ex-king of Naples. On the 11th of June, the expeditionary force set sail; and on its passage captured the islands of Ischia and Procida, together with 100 pieces of ordnance, and 1,500 troops. On the 24th, the advanced divisions anchored off Cape Miseno, between three and four leagues from Naples, but being detained there some time waiting the arrival of Don Leopold, whose presence it was supposed would have considerable influence on his father’s late subjects, the usurper of the throne of Naples, Joachim Murat, had put the city in so complete a state of preparation, that its reduction could not have been rapidly effected but by bombardment; and as the court of Palermo was unwilling to resort to that alternative, the expedition returned to Sicily, having previously dismantled the fortifications of Ischia and Procida. Having failed in his Neapolitan expedition, sir John Stuart dispatched general Oswald, with 1,600 men, against the islands of Zante, Corfu, and Cephalonia, which lie at the mouth of the Adriatic, the first and second of which surrendered, together with Ithaca and Cergo. Corfu was too strong to be reduced by so small a force, and remained in the possession of the French till the peace of Paris, 1814, when it was surrendered to the English. Maura, the remaining Ionian isle, was reduced in April, 1810.

THE SECOND SPANISH CAMPAIGN, AND THE THIRD PORTUGUESE CAMPAIGN.

ANNIS 1810—1811.

UNDISMAYED by the series of disastrous events which closed the year 1809, and ushered in the opening of the following year, in the armies and affairs of Spain, the British chief did not relax in his exertions to prepare for the struggle in which he was engaged.

Having, as has been already stated, taken up a line of defence on the north-eastern frontier of Portugal, the divisions of the army being so disposed as to hold the strong and rugged line of the Beira frontier, on which a sufficient force could be rapidly

assembled at any point which the enemy might seriously menace, or which he himself might choose for a demonstration on the frontier, or for striking a blow should a favourable opportunity present itself; he proceeded to make his dispositions to oblige the French to move in masses, and to gain time himself; time to secure the harvests, complete his lines for retreat, and perfect the organization and discipline of the Portuguese troops.

In pursuance of his authority as Marshal-General of Portugal (so appointed 23rd

November, 1809) he caused the Portuguese regency to enforce the ancient military laws of the kingdom, by which all males of sufficient age were compelled to bear arms in its defence, under the denomination of the *ordenanzas*.

Having thus adopted every means in his power for the defence of the country, and for opposing the enemy when he could successfully resist his progress, he calmly waited the advance of the hostile force, which had three different routes of access open to it: the one on the eastern frontier, by the way of lower Beira; a second by the Alemtejo on the south; and the third on the north, through Galicia. As the first of these routes was the most practicable, the English general concluded that his adversary would select it, and consequently, that he must first effectuate the reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, as places of arms on which to base his line of operations, before he could hazard an advance either on Lisbon or Oporto, along the descent of the Sierra de Estrella, a range of rugged mountains which extend from Coimbra to Guarda, and terminate in the extensive plains of Castile; being the best defensible line between the frontier and Lisbon, and at the same time cutting off the approach by the two great roads which run to the north and south of the Sierra, and which are the only ones passable by an army moving with its *matériel* of stores and guns. In February of this year he visited the lines of Torres Vedras, to ascertain their condition, in order, as he playfully observed, that should his companions-in-arms be eventually compelled to leave Portugal, "he felt a little anxiety that they should go like gentlemen, out of the hall-door, particularly after the preparations he had made to enable them to do so, and not out of the back door, or by the area." As has been happily observed by the author of *The Military Memoirs*, the Duke was always gay and good-humoured with those about him, inspiring others with the confidence he evidently felt himself, as about him was not the slightest ostentation; "no solemn mystery; no pomp of concealment; never one look of importance."

The power of Austria having been broken by the battles of Aspern and Wagram, Napoleon Buonaparte resumed his determination of reducing Spain to subjection. For this purpose, and with the view of bearing down on all points of opposition at once, and on each with an overwhelming supe-

riority, he lost no time in pouring into the Peninsula mass after mass of his veteran troops, accustomed to war and victory, and flushed with their recent German success. In the early months of the year, one hundred and twenty thousand men of the army of the Rhine had crossed the eastern Pyrenees; and thus the French force in the Peninsula was increased to the amount of 368,000 men. From this enormous force, two grand corps d'armée were formed; the first, consisting of 65,000 men, was assembled at the foot of the Sierra Morena, for the purpose of invading Andalusia; and the second, amounting to 80,000 men, was assembled under Ney, Junot, and Reynier in the valley of the Tagus, until Massena should assume the command in chief. At this period (March, 1810) the British army effective in the field did not amount to 22,000 combatants. The Portuguese troops consisted of twenty-four regiments of the line, six of light infantry, and ten of cavalry, with the due proportion of artillery: but the effective strength did not exceed 31,000 men; and of this number many regiments, not being sufficiently trained to act with British troops, remained in garrison.

Soult opened the campaign in the early part of January, by forcing the pass of Despeña-Perros, which forms the main road from Madrid to Cadiz, and though numerous field works and entrenchments had been added to its natural strength, its defenders, amounting to thirty thousand men, under Areizaga, fled before him, even over the field of Baylen, in the greatest confusion and consternation, without firing a shot in their defence. The other passable routes (Puerto del Rey, Venta Nueva, and Venta Quemada) of the mountain chain that embraces Andalusia, were as readily forced by his lieutenants, Dessolles and Sebastiani. Thus, in less than a fortnight, the French were masters of the whole of Andalusia, except the city of Cadiz and the Isle of Leon. Cordova, Grenada, Seville, Malaga, &c., fell without the least resistance; and Cadiz would have met with a like fate had it not been for the promptitude and spirit of the Duke of Albuquerque. That patriotic soldier, knowing that Soult was pushing on from Seville with the chief part of his force to seize that important place, by a rapid march of 260 miles, from Pedroso de la Sierra, entered the Isle of Leon on the 2nd of February, having gained a day's march on the enemy, thus not only outstripping

him in rapidity of movement, but also having outmanœuvred him.

In the north of Spain, the operations of the campaign, after the surrender of Astorga to Junôt, commenced by the investment of Ciudad Rodrigo, on the 26th of April, but the siege was not prosecuted with vigour until Massena, whose advent had been vauntingly announced, arrived to take the command of the army destined for the invasion of Portugal. That officer, disapproving of Ney's operations (who, regardless of the reckless expenditure of human life, had begun his approaches where a general more sparing of his troops would have terminated them,) formally invested that city on the 4th of June. Napoleon had instructed him to proceed cautiously, and according to the rules and usages of military science. The fields of Rolica, Vimiera, Corunna, the Passage of the Douro, and the battle of Talavera, had taught the French emperor and his generals to respect the prowess of English troops, and the genius and skill of their leader. The delay that took place subsequent to the surrender of that city, before the French invaded Portugal; their feints and demonstrations, their marchings and countermarchings, prove that they had formed a just and an accurate estimate on the subject.

During the operations of the enemy preparatory to and pending the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, the duty was assigned to the light division of observing an advanced line of country extending from Escalon on the left to Nova Frias on the right, five-and-twenty miles between the Azava and the Coa. This arduous duty it performed for near three months, to the admiration of both armies, though the gallant band was distant but one hour's march from six thousand horsemen of the enemy, with fifty guns; and but two hours' march from their main army, amounting to seventy thousand men. The situation demanded and called forth a quickness and an intelligence in the troops, and a vigilance and skilful disposition in their leader, which have seldom been equalled. But the secret of this wonderful performance was the high state of discipline which they had attained. "Seven minutes," says one who shared in their perils and exploits, "sufficed for the division to get under arms in the middle of the night, and a quarter of an hour, night or day, to bring it in order of battle to the alarm-posts, with its baggage loaded and assembled at a convenient distance in the

rear. And this not on a concerted signal, or as a trial, but at all times and certain." The enterprising spirit and skilful manœuvres of their leader were equal to the bold countenance and perfect discipline of those "matchless soldiers." Where the river was full, Craufurd's infantry was disposed in small parties between Almeida and the Lower Agueda; and his artillery, consisting of six guns and a troop of horse artillery, was stationed at Fort Conception; but when it was fordable he concentrated his gallant band, to be ready for any night attack that the enemy might make; both men and officers slept accoutred, ready to get under arms in an instant.

The proximity of the enemy at length induced him to attempt the post at Barba del Puerco, which was occupied by four companies of the 95th Rifles, under the command of lieutenant-colonel Beckwith. On the night of the 19th of March, when the moon was just rising, the French general, Ferey, with six hundred chosen grenadiers, issued from the village of San Felices, situated on the opposite side of the river, and imperceptibly crossing the bridge, drove the pickets into the village, but the rifles, rallying, quickly drove back their assailants.

Craufurd's chivalrous spirit, unable to brook these interruptions, and his temerity increasing by the impunity with which he had, in his advanced position, braved the entire army of the enemy with his handful of men (3,200 British, and, 1,100 Portuguese, eight squadrons of cavalry, consisting of the 14th and 16th light dragoons, and the 1st German hussars included) advanced on the 2nd July towards Ciudad Rodrigo, displaying his troops in single rank on a rising ground, and sending a party of cavalry to the rear to raise a dust, he marched his infantry at a slow pace, within view of the besiegers, to incline them to think that the whole of the English army was advancing to the relief of the town. What his motive was for this idle and ostentatious display, whether it was to annoy the enemy, or in expectation to decoy or cut off a portion of his troops, it is not possible to divine. It however produced a *reconnaissance*, and led to the skirmish at Alameda two days afterwards.

The French having assembled a strong body of troops at Marialva, crossed the Agueda, on the 4th of July, near that village, and compelled Craufurd's advance to fall back skirmishing on Alameda. The

movement was effected in good order, being covered by two troops of cavalry and two guns.

After this brilliant skirmish, which was conducted on both sides with a dashing and emulous spirit, no movement took place on either side during the following week. But the enemy's patrols being in the habit of plundering Villa de Puerco, Barquillo, and other villages in front of the British posts; Craufurd determining to cut off their next marauding parties, placed, on the night of the 10th, two ambuscades, consisting of nine squadrons of cavalry, five companies of riflemen, a Portuguese caçadore battalion, and some horse artillery, in a wood on the banks of the Duo Casas, and Barquillo, and Villa de Puerco, contiguous to the hamlets, in the hope that before day-break he should be able to get in the rear of the enemy, and capture the whole party. At day-break next morning, two parties of the enemy being discovered, measures were instantly taken to cut them off.

"The force of the enemy did not exceed thirty cavalry and two hundred infantry, but they were advantageously posted in an open space, just beyond a long defile; and to reach them it was necessary to thread that defile in a narrow line. The consequence was, that though the German hussars, who led, formed up in succession as they got through, and charged their opponents with great gallantry, they effected nothing more than the dispersion of the handful of horse; for the infantry had time to form a square, and not all the efforts of our people could succeed in breaking it. The hussars rode bravely up to the bayonets, but were repulsed by a volley closely thrown in, which killed or wounded upwards of a dozen men. The remainder wheeled off, and pursuing the French cavalry, made way for a squadron of the 16th. These galloped forward, but also took to the left, and, leaving the infantry uninjured joined in pursuit of the cavalry. They were induced to do so, from the belief that two squadrons of Craufurd's cavalry, which were about Barquillo, were belonging to the enemy. When the last charge was made the French square was without fire, every man having discharged his piece, and none having been able to load again; but when a third attempt was made, they were better prepared to receive it. It fell to the lot of colonel Talbot of the 14th to lead this attack. It was made with daring intrepidity; but the enemy remained perfectly steady, and re-

serving their fire till the bridles of the horses touched their bayonets, gave it with such effect, that Colonel Talbot, with several of his men, were killed on the spot. The rest drew off; when general Craufurd, despairing of success by the exertions of the cavalry alone, despatched an orderly to bring up a detachment of the 43rd, which chanced to be at no great distance."

"While this was doing," continues the marquis of Londonderry, in his narrative, "the enemy's little column began its retreat, which it conducted with singular steadiness and great order. The 16th dragoons, seeing this, prepared to launch another squadron against it; and was already in speed for the purpose, when colonel Arenschild of the hussars observing cavalry advancing both in front and flank, checked the movement. It was much to be regretted that he took that step, for the horse that alarmed him proved to be detachments from our own people, on their return from pursuing the enemy's dragoons, the whole of whom they had captured. The French infantry lost no time in availing themselves of the indecision of our cavalry. They marched on, and returned to their main body, without having lost a single prisoner, or suffered in killed or wounded."

The siege of Ciudad Rodrigo was now drawing to a close. A practicable breach having been effected, and the enemy's columns ready for the assault, its brave governor, Hervasti, appeared on the ruins waving a handkerchief as a token of submission. Ney refused to accept the condition, on account of his offer, on the 28th of June, of an honourable capitulation having been refused; but Massena, with the feeling of a real soldier, granted the garrison and its brave governor honourable terms, and entered the city on the 10th of July. When all hope was over, that Rodrigo could be relieved, Julian Sanchez, in the night of the 22nd of June, with two hundred and forty of his partizans cut their way through the French posts, and joined the advanced division of the allied army.

It had been expected, and he was strongly urged to do so, that lord Wellington would have made an effort to relieve the garrison. Massena employed taunts and gasconade to induce him to it. In his proclamations he accused him of breach of honour and good faith in allowing his ally's fortresses to fall, without risking a shot to save them. Besides taunting him with cowardice, he told him that the sails were flapping, and his

ships waiting to carry him and his heartless countrymen to their island home. But the philosophic temperament of the English general was not to be diverted from his purpose by the ignorant and insulting gasconade of the vapouring Frenchman, nor the clamour and panic of his allies. "It was not a single campaign, but a terrible war," a series of campaigns dependent on vast plans, and profound combinations, that "the cause of Spain could," as the Spanish historian Torreno justly observed, "be preserved from being struck down." Besides, his force was vastly inferior to that of his opponent, not only in point of numbers, but in discipline and experience. Even Thiers affirms, that Massena's army told 79,000 or 80,000 men; while the English general could oppose no more than 25,000 British and Portuguese.

Shortly after the ill-conducted affair of the 10th at Barquillo and Villa de Puerco, the enemy's cavalry advancing in force, Craufurd, having blown up fort Conception, fell back on Almeida, and took up a position on the Coa; his right covered by some broken ground, his left resting on Almeida, within medium range of the guns of that fortress; his force extending a mile and a

half obliquely towards the river; a position faulty and dangerous, not only as having the river in his rear, over which his only line of retreat was by a narrow bridge about one mile distant from his position; but his retreat might have been intercepted, and the whole of his gallant division compelled to lay down their arms, had the French known of the existence of the bridge of Castel Bom, about two miles distant from the right of his position. Neither was Picton, who was posted at Pinhel with the third division, and who was fully aware of the perilous predicament in which Craufurd was placed, without blame, in respect of this affair; Craufurd applied to him for his aid, but he, either from jealousy or pique, refused it. Craufurd, lest his ardent temperament might lead him to implicate his division into useless collision with the enemy, had been strictly enjoined by the commander-in-chief to withdraw behind the Coa; but suffering his judgment to be blinded by a love of distinction, and a craving for glory, he determined to encounter the enemy in the faulty and perilous position he had chosen; and this led to the useless but brilliant combat of the Passage of the Coa.

THE COMBAT OF THE PASSAGE OF THE COA.

BEFORE day-light, on the morning of the 24th, the troops, drenched with rain from the storm of the preceding night, were under arms, and as the mist cleared off, the French army, consisting of 24,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, with thirty guns, were seen in full march; while a host of horsemen and a powerful artillery swept the plain, driving the English pickets, cavalry, and horse artillery before them; Loisson's infantry, at a charging pace, advanced towards the centre.

The British line was immediately contracted, and as the plain from Villamula to the Coa being intangled with vineyards, intersected with deep branches, and surrounded with high walls and inclosures, afforded a good field for light infantry manœuvres, the ground was obstinately disputed, until oppressed by numbers, its defenders reluctantly retired before the enemy.

During those operations the cavalry and guns had crossed the bridge; and as it was necessary to hold the right to the last to

prevent the enemy from approaching the bridge, the infantry retired on the left in echelon; their passage over the bridge being protected by six companies of the 43rd, and some riflemen, who were posted on two hills, covering the line of passage. As the infantry passed the bridge, they placed themselves in loose order in the rear of the bridge behind rocks on the side of the mountain, on the summit of which the artillery was already planted; the cavalry watching the roads leading from the fords and the bridge of Castel Bom. The enemy gathered fast and thickly on the opposite banks. Soon the monotonous beat of the *pas de charge* rolled sullenly; a column appeared, and rushing suddenly on the bridge, had gained two-thirds of its length, before an English shot had brought down an enemy; the depth of the ravine having deceived the aim of the troops and the artillerymen; yet a few paces onwards the line of death was traced, and the whole of the leading section fell as one man. The gallant column still pressed

forward, but none could pass that terrible line; the heap of the dead and dying rose nearly even with the top of the parapet.

To adopt the vivid language of the historian of the War in the Peninsula, "The shouts of the British now rose loudly, but they were confidently answered by their opponents; and in half an hour, a second column, more numerous than the first, again crowded the bridge. This time, however, the range of fire was better judged, and ere half the distance was won, the multitude was again torn, shattered, dispersed, or slain; only ten or twelve men succeeded in crossing, and took shelter under the rocks at the brink of the river. The skirmishing was then renewed, and a French surgeon coming down to the foot of the bridge, and waving his handkerchief, commenced dressing the wounded under the hottest fire; nor was this brave and humane man's touching appeal unheeded; every musket turned from him, although his still undaunted countrymen were preparing for a third attempt."

The third attempt was made merely as a point of honour, to cover the escape of the few men who had passed the bridge, and

had concealed themselves among the rocks. When this chivalrous object had been obtained, a shower descending, the enemy ceased making any further attempt, and at nightfall the light division retired behind the Pinhel river, to a position about three leagues from Averca.

Never did a handful of men make a more heroic resistance against an overpowering multitude, but its loss had been considerable, thirty-six killed, one hundred and ninety-nine wounded, and eighty-three missing; among whom were twenty-eight officers. But the loss of the enemy was thrice as great, amounting to above one thousand in killed and wounded. The slaughter on the bridge had been dreadful, and the line of death was traceable for a considerable distance beyond it. The loss in prisoners sustained by the division was occasioned by Craufurd's stationing some companies of the 43rd in a vineyard enclosed by a high wall, where, though the greater part effected their retreat, most of the prisoners taken in the action had fallen into the hands of the enemy.

THE ADVANCE OF THE FRENCH ARMY INTO PORTUGAL, AND THE RETREAT OF THE BRITISH.

AFTER the reduction of Rodrigo, the English general, desirous of retaining his forward position as long as possible, made no movement until the 28th of July, when he moved up the Portuguese troops that were two or three marches in the rear, and withdrew behind the Mondego, leaving the fourth division at Guarda, to observe the enemy. There he waited the result of Massena's dispositions, whether he would invest Almeida, or only mask that fortress. As soon as the French marshal had commenced his operations for the siege, lord Wellington recrossed the Mondego, for the purpose of supporting the defence, and of compelling the French army to act in a collected state during the siege, and thus protract it. Every hour he could prolong the siege was of importance, inasmuch as the time of the autumnal rains approached, and the defences of the country would be considerably strengthened by the increased difficulties of the roads, and of procuring provisions for the invading armies.

A whole month had been spent before Almeida before that fortress was invested. The interval had been employed by the

French in the commission of every kind of plunder, violation, and cruelty, though Massena had issued the following proclamation, dated from Rodrigo, promising the inhabitants "the paternal protection of the emperor." That proclamation, which bears a great resemblance in style and matter to Napoleon's braggart and bombastic bulletins and addresses, and which the French armies, and those persons who are incapable of appreciating correct composition, but are dazzled with the glare and glitter of language, admire as master-pieces of eloquence, was as follows:—

"Inhabitants of Portugal, the emperor of the French has put under my orders an army of one hundred and ten thousand men, to take possession of this country, and to expel the English, your pretended friends. Against you he has no enmity; on the contrary, it is his highest wish to promote your happiness, and the first step towards securing it is to dismiss from the country those locusts, who consume your property, blight your harvests, and paralyze your efforts. In opposing your emperor, you oppose your true

friend; a friend who has it in his power to render you the happiest people in the world. Were it not for the insidious counsels of England, you might now have enjoyed peace, and tranquillity, and have been put in possession of that happiness. You have blindly rejected offers calculated only for the purpose of promoting your benefit, and have accepted proposals which will long be the curse of Portugal. His majesty the emperor has commissioned me to conjure you that you would awake to your true interests; that you would awake to those prospects, which, with your consent, may be quickly realized. Awake, then, so as to distinguish between friends and enemies. The king of England is actuated by selfish and narrow views; the emperor of the French is governed by universal philanthropy. The English have put arms into your hands, which you know not how to use: I will instruct you. They are to be the instruments of annihilation to your foes, and who those foes are I have already shown. Use them as you ought, and they will become your salvation! Use them as you ought not, and they will prove your destruction! Resistance is vain. Can the feeble army of the British general expect to oppose the victorious legions of the emperor? Already a force is collected sufficient to overwhelm your country. Snatch the moment that virtue and generosity offer! As friends you may respect us, and be respected in return; as foes you must dread us, and in the conflict be subdued. The choice is your own, either to meet the horrors of a sanguinary war, and see your country desolated, your villages in flames, your cities plundered; or to accept an honourable and a happy peace, which will obtain for you every blessing, which by resistance you would resign for ever.—The Marshal Prince d'Essling, commander-in-chief of the army of Portugal—MASSENA."

As many of the inhabitants on the frontier had relied on the faith of the promises and had severely atoned for their credulity, lord Wellington replied to the French marshal's deceptive manifesto by a counter-proclamation, dated August the 4th, which formed a fine contrast by its temperate and manly tone, and its calm and dignified style of composition, to the vapouring and hollow gasconade of the Frenchman. In that proclamation his lordship ordered the inhabitants of that line of country, which the enemy was likely to penetrate, and the military means at his disposal could not

protect, to remove their property and cattle, lay waste the fields, destroy the mills, and break down the bridges. The following is a copy of the English general's proclamation:—

"The time that has elapsed during which the enemy has remained on the frontiers of Portugal, has fortunately afforded to the Portuguese nation experience of what they are to expect from the French. The people had remained in nine villages, trusting to the enemy's promises, and vainly believing that by treating the enemies of their country in a friendly manner they should conciliate their forbearance, and that their properties would be respected, their women would be saved from violation, and that the lives of their wives, children, and themselves, would be spared. Vain hopes! The people of those devoted villages have suffered every evil which a cruel enemy could inflict. Their property has been plundered, their houses and furniture burnt, their women have been abused, and the unfortunate inhabitants, whose age or sex did not tempt the brutal violence of the soldiers, have fallen the victims of the imprudent confidence they reposed in promises which were made only to be violated. The Portuguese now see that they have no remedy for the evils with which they are threatened but determined resistance. Resistance, and the determination to render the enemy's advance into their country as difficult as possible, by removing out of his way everything that is valuable, or that can contribute towards his subsistence, or frustrate his progress, are the only and the certain remedies for the evils with which they are threatened. The army under my command will protect as large a portion of the country as will be in their power; but it is obvious that the people can save themselves only by resistance to the enemy, and their properties only by removing them. The duty, however, which I owe to his royal highness the prince regent, and to the Portuguese nation, will oblige me to use the power and authority in my hands to force the weak and the indolent to make an exertion to protect themselves from the danger which awaits them, and to save their country. And I hereby declare, that all magistrates, or persons in authority, who remain in the towns or villages, after receiving orders from any of the military officers to retire from them; and all persons of whatever description, who hold any communication with the enemy, and aid or assist them

in any manner, will be considered traitors to the state, and shall be tried and punished accordingly.—(Signed) Wellington.”

Early on the morning of the 26th of July, the enemy opened a tremendous fire on Almeida, and continuing the bombardment all day, the thunder of the artillery had scarcely died away, when soon after dark the ground upon which the city stood trembled as if an earthquake had occurred, and a vast column of smoke and fire rising into the air, the whole town sank into a shapeless ruin; only six houses being left standing, the rampart being breached, and the guns hurled into the ditch. The dreadful event had been occasioned by the explosion of the powder magazine in the castle, a shell having fallen on a tumbril standing at the door of the magazine, and about to convey ammunition to the ramparts. Nearly the whole of the ammunition and the greater part of the artillerymen, and many hundreds of infantry soldiers, and of the inhabitants, were killed or wounded. The catastrophe was increased by a mutiny of the garrison, headed by the lieutenant-governor, Bernardo Costa, and José Bareiros, the commandant of the artillery, who for some time had carried on a secret correspondence with the enemy. The governor, colonel Cox, in vain endeavoured to defend the ruins; and being summoned next day by Massena to surrender, he, for the sake of gaining time, sent Bareiros with counter propositions to the French marshal, but his faithless deputy betraying his trust, by communicating the condition of the garrison, Almeida surrendered to the enemy on the day following the explosion. On the fall of the fortress, lord Wellington resumed his former position behind the Mondego, in the valley of the same name; stationing his cavalry in front of Celorico, and placing posts of observation at Guarda and Francoso, he established his head-quarters at Gouvea. In addition to the disappointment of the sudden and speedy fall of Almeida, the English commander-in-chief was now exposed to many other vexatious annoyances. Besides an active and enterprising enemy to contend with, he had the cabals and intrigues of false and perverse allies to counteract, desponding friends to inspirit, and the folly and fears of a timid and vacillating cabinet at home to rectify and remove. The patriarch of Lisbon and the Souza faction in the regency attempted to interfere with and thwart his measures; they encouraged dis-

obedience to his orders for the destruction of the walls and the laying waste of the country; they promoted disaffection and riot in Lisbon; and had intrigued to have the duke of Brunswick placed at the head of the Portuguese army. At home, by their fears and forebodings, the cabinet seemed to partake of the same character of awe and wonder in which all Europe had been entranced in their blind admiration of Buonaparte's genius, and their stupid hallucination of belief in French invincibility. Defeat, discomfiture, flight to their ships, by Wellington and his gallant comrades, were the daily prophecies and the awful forebodings of the factious and disaffected part of the public press of England. The same croakings and prognostics of failure were reiterated by some of his own officers (some even generals, among whom were generals Spencer and Charles Stuart), and their correspondence with their friends assumed a dismal hue. To the factious and intriguing portion of his allies, after reproving them for their folly and deception, the English general replied by informing them that he alone was responsible for the operations which he directed, and that he would not change his plans until he saw good cause, and declared “that if the civil power was not sufficient to restrain the factious and disaffected from instigating the mob to the plunder and slaughter of the respectable and virtuous classes, martial law should be proclaimed;” and that “if their intrigues did not cease, he would advise his government to withdraw the British army.” To “the obloquy that had been heaped on him by the ignorant and flippant praters and factious alarmist demagogues of his own country, as well as those of his allies,” his reply was that “the magnitude of the undertaking was too great for their minds to comprehend, and their nerves to bear.” Those spirited and well-timed rebukes silenced the conspirators as well as “the ignorant praters.” The indiscreet and desponding letter-writers in his army were so effectually reprovved in a general order, which though it carried a keen sarcasm in its very title, was couched in terms so dignified and forbearing, that the tone of despondency and “the system of croaking” disappeared in the camp as if by magic.

Two months had now elapsed since the fall of Rodrigo, and yet the designs of the enemy remained undeveloped. Several feints and uncertain manœuvres had been made to mask his intentions, and deceive

the English general as to the line of march to be adopted. The enemy had his choice of three roads to Coimbra, either by Belmonte, Celorico, or Viseu. Having concentrated the three corps under Junôt, Ney, and Regnier, amounting to 85,000 veteran troops, supported by reserves and flanking forces, namely 22,000 under Drouet, at Valladolid; 15,000 under Serras, in the Gela, and 26,000 under Bessières, in the rear, he advanced in the middle of September on Viseu, hoping to reach Coimbra before Hill could effect a junction with the main body of the English army. It was the intention of Massena to throw his whole force on both flanks of the English army, to compel its general to accept battle on ground of his choosing.

As soon as lord Wellington ascertained that the troops at Guarda formed the advanced guard of Regnier, who had moved forward from Aleuda on the frontiers, simultaneously with Massena's force, he dispatched orders to generals Hill and Leith, who had been protecting the line of the Tagus and the Zezere, to concentrate their forces on the Alva, and advance to join the main army. Hill—who had been in observation of Regnier's motions in Spanish Estremadura, as soon as he discovered his movement towards the Tagus, anticipating the intention of the commander-in chief, effected a junction with Leith, who had, with 2,000 British and 8,000 Portuguese, been laying at Thomar, ready to support Hill, or march northward, as circumstances might require—was already in motion.

As the enemy advanced, the allies fell back before them in excellent order, taking advantage of the ground, and never retaining any post so long as to be pressed into the necessity of accepting battle. While Massena was collecting his forces in front of the allied army, the English general withdrew his infantry one march into the valley of the Mondego, leaving his cavalry and outposts on their stations at Celerico and Guarda; when the enemy's forces were concentrated at Viseu, he retired by the left bank of the Mondego, leaving the light division and the cavalry in advance of Mortagoa on the Criz; and when the French marshal's passage of the Criz gave a determinate form and character to his movements, and plainly indicated his intention of marching on Coimbra, his active and skilful opponent crossed from the south to north of

the Mondego, and for the purpose of protecting that city, took up his position on the Serra de Busaco, which is in front of Coimbra, and distant from it about three leagues. During the advance of the enemy over the table-land from the Criz to the heights opposite Busaco, Craufurd obstinately maintaining possession of the position he had taken up on the morning of the 25th, after abandoning the strong ground he had held in the rear of Mortagoa, had nearly repeated his scene at the passage of the Coa, and had his division hemmed in, as it nearly had been in that affair. The French cavalry were swarming round him on every side, and the columns of infantry rapidly marching with the intent of cutting him off, when fortunately at the critical moment, lord Wellington arriving on the ground, took the command of the division, and ordering it to retire, by a succession of rapid and skilful manœuvres, effected the retreat without any important loss. On the 5th of September, colonel Trant had endeavoured to capture the enemy's military chest and reserve artillery, and though he failed in his daring exploit, he took above one hundred prisoners. On the 9th of the same month, the English commander-in-chief addressed his protest to Massena, on the subject of the French marshal's cruel treatment of the Portuguese ordenanza.

The Serra de Busaco, which presented an advantageous position for the resistance of the enemy, is a ridge or range of mountains trending from the north about eight miles to the Mondego, where it terminates abruptly with almost a perpendicular fall. Its ascent is steep and rugged; here and there covered with pine plantations, and in height about two hundred and fifty feet more elevated than the ground in its front. Its summit, to the east, is in many places pointed with sharp rocks. At the highest point of the ridge, about two miles from its northern extremity, is a table-land occupied by the Carmelite convent of La Trappe, situated in a large wooded garden, and on the left of that culminating point is the village St. Antonio de Cantara. It is intersected with a few gorges and defiles, and traversed by the three roads to Coimbra from the Beira frontier. In front of Busaco is a succession of heights, from the first of which it is separated by a wooded chasm of great depth, but so narrow that a twelve-pounder can range to the salient points over the opposite ridge.

BATTLE OF BUSACO.

THE English general had now taken up his position on the heights of Busaco; but not more than half his force was in line. The fifth division had not yet joined; Hill was behind the Alva; and the light division, on account of the delay occasioned in manœuvring to escape the consequences of Craufurd's precipitancy, did not crown the ridge till the enemy's columns were on the opposite heights; when they immediately opened a cannonade. Some smart skirmishing occurred between the light troops of the hostile armies during the day (Sept. 25); and in the course of the night, some of the enemy's skirmishers stealing up the wooded dells, endeavoured to establish themselves close to the pickets of the light division; but they were quickly driven back.

On the evening of the 26th, the English line of battle was formed; 25,000 British soldiers, and a like number of Portuguese, lay on the backward slope of the mountain; the Portuguese troops having been brigaded in the proportion of one Portuguese battalion to two of English. The second division under Hill (who had effected a junction in the course of the morning, occupied the left of the order of battle; with the fifth division, under Leith on its left, and the Lusitanian legion in reserve. Then, at an interval of two miles, Picton's division (the third,) prolonged the line of the right of the position. About a mile from the left of the third division, the first division, under Spencer, formed the centre of the position, near the convent, with Pack's brigade posted in advance on the descent. The light division was formed on the left of Pack's brigade, nearly half-a-mile in front of the convent; while higher up, and nearly under the convent wall, a brigade of German infantry was posted. The fourth division, under Cole, held the extreme left of the position; a considerable space intervening between it and the second division. The cavalry under sir Stapleton Cotton was posted in the rear of

the left of the position, on the plains in the front of Mealhada, to watch the road leading from Mortagao to Oporto. A regiment of dragoons was in reserve on the summit of the ground on which the convent stood; and the commander-in-chief's headquarters were in the convent. Above fifty pieces of artillery were placed on the most salient points, and in the embrasures of the rocks, so as effectually to range along the front of the ridge. Colonel le Cor, with his brigade, was on the Serra de Murcella, to cover the right of the position; while Fane, with the 13th dragoons, and his division of Portuguese cavalry, was posted on the left bank of the Mondego, to repel any attempt the enemy's cavalry might make in that direction; and for the protection of the left (which was the weakest point of the position). Trant had been directed to march his division of militia to Sardao, to secure that pass.

When the night of the 27th had cast its mantle over the scene* of warlike preparation and hostility, the fires of innumerable bivouacks shone on the rocky eminences of the ridges on both sides of the intervening chasm. In the English camp the veterans, accustomed to war and scenes of excitement, slept soundly on their stony beds, but the younger soldiers, who were now to witness a battle for the first time, were kept awake by the grandeur and solemnity of the scene.

As the first streaks of dawn (two o'clock) were beginning to appear over the eastern hills, a rustling noise was heard in the wooded chasm which ran up to the crest of the ridge. The allied army was instantly under arms. Presently the sharp crack of a musket, succeeded by the lengthened hiss of a spent bullet, was followed by another and another, until every bush and tuft on the face of the Serra seemed instinct with life and fire. As the light broke, and the grey mist in which the mountain was enveloped cleared off, five divisions of the enemy, covered by a mul-

* The night preceding the battle of Busaco was of a different complexion to those which usually attended lord Wellington's victories. Storms, accompanied with intense thunder, lightning, and rain were the usual precursors that ushered in the night previous to almost all his great and glorious battles in the Peninsula; and the case was the same at the battle of Waterloo. His battles also were generally fought on a Sunday. Those occurrences at length gave birth to a species of proverbial phraseology in

his army. Unseasonable nights were termed "Wellington nights," and the plea for performing any worldly occupation on Sundays, was justified by the axiomatic expression, "The better the day the better the deed." But though the night preceding the battle of Busaco was not a "Wellington night," the air was very cold and piercing. Even the hardy veteran shrunk within his scanty covering. The young soldiers endured with less patience their bleak mountain couch.

titude of skirmishers, were seen to emerge from the ravine. Two divisions under Regnier appeared in front of Picton's division, prepared to advance by the road crossing the height of St. Antonio de Cantara, while three divisions, under Ney, stood in columns of masses in front of the road which leads to the convent. Junôt's corps was in the centre, and in reserve. The distance between the two points on which Regnier and Ney's corps were preparing to advance, was about three miles.

As the clump-trees and inequalities of the ground over which Regnier had to move contributed to cover his advance, and that the English regiments in that part of the line had not completed their formation, the leading battalions being in the act of deploying into line, his columns reached the summit of the ridge, without any other opposition than the occasional fire of the artillery planted on the flanking points. Having gained that part of the crest of the ridge which formed the interval between Picton and Leith's divisions, and forcing back the right of Picton's division, they were preparing to wheel to the right, and sweep the battle-field, when they were furiously charged by the 88th and a wing of the 45th, supported by the 8th Portuguese regiment (which had suffered severely in the onset), and were driven down the declivity of the ridge in confused masses, with fearful slaughter; the whole line of their flight to the very bottom of the chasm being covered with the dead and wounded.

The battle in this quarter was, however, not yet ended. The columns of the enemy that had first gained the crest of the height, having been concealed from view by the haze that capped the mountain, had established themselves among the crowning rocks, but they were quickly driven headlong over the rocks into the valley, at the point of the bayonet, by the 9th regiment, under colonel Cameron. Thus Regnier's attempt to turn the left of the English position, and to possess himself of the road that traverses the Busaco chain from St. Antonio de Cantara, was completely frustrated. To be prepared to meet another attack, should the enemy feel inclined to try his fortune, Hill advanced his division and closed up the line between Leith's and Picton's left and right. At that moment, lord Wellington coming up, said, in a tone full of calmness, and confident assurance of success, "If they attempt this point again, Hill, you will give them a volley,

and charge bayonets; but don't let your people charge them down the hill."

Ney's attack was equally unsuccessful. The three corps commanded by him, formed in columns of mass, advanced to the attack at the same moment as Regnier's corps did. Loisson's corps rushed straight up the face of the mountain, and Marchant's inclined leftwards, as if intending to turn the right flank of the left of the allied position; while the third, under Junôt, remained as a reserve in the chasm.

Loisson's attack was led by the brigade of general Simon, who, thinking that Pack's brigade, supported by the German infantry posted on the elevated spot near the convent, was the only force to be opposed (the 43rd and 52nd, who were drawn up in line in a dip of the mountain, being concealed from view by the swell of the ground and rock in their front,) advanced up the steep with undaunted courage, never moving or flinching, or in the slightest degree slackening of pace, though a storm of bullets from the artillery swept through the column from the first to the last section. At the same moment Craufurd, who had been anxiously watching the movement, ordered the 43rd and 52nd, as soon as he observed that the enemy had crowned the heights, rending the air with the cry of "Vive l'empereur," to charge, and "the next moment a horrid shout startled the French column, and in another moment eighteen hundred bayonets, wielded 'by a fiery mass of living valour,' went, at the charge step, sparkling over the brow of the hill, and overthrew the hostile column." Instantly halting, three terrible volleys poured in at only a few yards' distance, drove the head of the hostile column on its rear, and its flanks being overlapped at the same moment, the shattered and wavering mass fled in confusion down the steep, pursued by a few of the light infantry companies, and were saved from total annihilation by Ney's moving forward his reserve to their support, and opening his guns from the opposite ridge. The expression of a French soldier who was engaged in this affair, and subsequently taken prisoner,—*"Qu'il se laissa rouler de haut en bas de la montagne sans savoir, comment il echappa"*—(That he found himself rolled from the top to the bottom of the mountain without knowing how he escaped), is a proof of the confusion of the derouted foe and the impetuous valour of their opponents. The hands of many of the victors were perfectly

ensanguined in the performance of this rather unwarlike mode of disposing of enemies.

At the very moment that Simon's brigade had been thus disposed of, Marchant's corps had obtained possession of a pine-wood, half up the mountain; where they were kept in check by Pack's brigade, and exposed to the destructive flanking fire from Craufurd's artillery, planted on the salient point of land occupied by the light division. Discouraged by the insurmountable opposition he met with, Ney at length sullenly withdrew from the contest, and by two o'clock, the battle-roar had ceased.

A tacit kind of temporary truce seemed now to have been agreed on between the combatants, and during its existence, the men of each army mixed together in amicable search for their wounded. But towards evening, this harmony was disturbed by a company of the enemy's infantry taking possession of a village, close under the brow of the Busaco ridge, and within range of half-musket shot from the light division. Craufurd sent an officer to the French commandant, requiring its evacuation, and at the same time reminded him, "that it should be his wish, as it was his duty, to follow his fleeing countrymen, while circumstances yet permitted, and that in giving him that advice, humanity alone was the source of his interference." To the irritated Frenchman's gasconade, that "he would die in defence of his post," Craufurd replied by a storm of bullets from twelve pieces of artillery, and when the place was reduced to ruins, and half of its contumacious defenders slain, he sent down a party of the 43rd, and rifles, to drive the survivors from their post of fancied honour.*

Now that the battle's roar had ceased, the horrible traces of the fight were visible along the whole face of the ridge. Long

trails of the dying and the dead—of wounded men, broken arms, and bleeding carcases marked the lines of flight of each division. The clusters of rocks presented often a curious, as well as a melancholy sight. In many of the niches were to be seen dead Frenchmen, in the posture in which they had fought, some sitting upright, others with their heads resting on the points of the rocks, apparently in the act of taking a deliberate aim; while on the other side of the bases of the rocks, and on the projecting crags, were strewn the bodies of their gallant defenders. Of the allies, 197 were killed, 1,014 wounded, and 68 missing; among whom were 74 officers. Of the enemy 2,000 were slain, about 3,000 wounded, and near 300 were taken prisoners; among whom was one general slain, three wounded, and one taken prisoner. Massena had asked permission to bury his dead, but compliance with his request was refused.

When Massena made his reconnoissance of the position of the allied army, observing that the ridge was too extensive to be effectually defended by the forces under the command of lord Wellington, he exclaimed, with anticipated triumph, to the marquis d'Alorna, general Pamplona, and the other renegade Portuguese hidalgos in his camp,—“I cannot persuade myself that lord Wellington will risk the loss of his reputation; but if he does—I have him; tomorrow we shall complete the conquest of Portugal, and in a few days more I shall drown the leopard.” On his part, the English general was equally confident. When some of his officers expressed their disappointment if Massena should not attack him, his reply was, “If he do I shall beat him.” The result proved who was the boaster, or to make use of a homely phrase, “who calculated without his host.”

* All the accounts extant in print, even those entitled to credit, of the battle of Busaco, are very meagre in description and barren of facts. The above detail of that glorious event has been drawn up from the oral description of officers who were in different parts of the field of battle; and it is hoped, that it is not only more circumstantial, but also more interesting and exact than those already before the public. To present a correct description of a battle-field is no easy part of descriptive composition. It

is not, to adopt an artistical metaphor, a mere glimmering of the outline, but the filling up of the picture that constitutes its perfection, and imparts to it real interest and usefulness. As a general picture must be compounded of detached sketches, so must the description of a battle be composed of the observations of individuals, taken at different points. The proper compounding of the particular views into an harmonious whole constitutes the character of the battle historian.

THE RETREAT TO THE LINEs OF TORRES VEDRAS.

MASSENA had felt the effects of "the fiery mass of living valour," posted on the ridges of Busaco, too sensibly and severely to incline him to repeat his empty vaunt of "driving the leopard into the sea:" he therefore prepared, by a flank movement, to avoid his adversary, and reach Coimbra; and as it would be more difficult to turn the position of the allied army by the Mondego, as his opponent could pass the river quicker than he could, he determined to turn the left of the allied position; and this he was enabled to accomplish, by the information extorted from two peasants, under the fear of death and torture, of the pass through the Serra de Caramula, a ridge running at an obtuse angle with that of Busaco, and communicating with the great road between Oporto and Coimbra, and debouching into it near Sardao; and which unfortunately was undefended. Bacellar, who commanded in the north, having sent Trant round by Oporto to occupy it, in consequence of the direct route by San Pedró de Sul being in the possession of a detachment of the enemy.

To cover his design, the French marshal renewed the skirmishing on the morning of the 28th, and drove Craufurd from the village, of which he had dispossessed the gasconading French captain on the preceding evening. In the course of the night, the French army quitted its position, and on the following day the enemy's columns were seen filing off over the Caramula mountains, along the Mortagoa road. Though the enemy's flank-march presented the English general the opportunity of assailing him, as he was distant but four hours' march from either end of the defile, which runs from Mortagoa to Sardas, through which the French army

* Coimbra is celebrated in the love legends of Portugal, for the sites of the Quinta das Lagrimas, or Garden of Tears; and the Fonte dos Amores, or Fountain of Loves—romantic sequestered spots, not far from the convent of St. Clara, and immortalised by the muse of Camoens as the residence and death scene of Inez de Castro, and the triumphs of love stronger than death.

† The stores of the principal houses and all the convents were full of corn, wine, oil, fruits, and preserved meats; and the crops of grain, pulse, and grapes on the ground were fit for gathering. And these would have been sufficient for two months' consumption of the French army, had they been collected and secured by the commissariat in magazine.

was passing, he resisted the temptation, lest any of the chances of war should mar or interrupt the plan and combinations of the grand defensive campaign he had conceived for the protection of Portugal. On the abandonment, therefore, by the enemy of his position, Hill immediately recrossed the Mondego, and marched by Espinal on Thomar; while the main body, consisting of the centre and left of the army, under lord Wellington, defiled upon Milheada, the light division covering the movement until the army reached the open country beyond Fornos, when that duty was assumed by the cavalry.

The allied army having the shorter road to advance to Coimbra, reached Mondego on the 1st of October, and crossing the fords near Martinho de Bispo, entered that city in perfect order; but the enemy pressing rapidly upon them, an instant retreat became necessary, and now a fearful scene of confusion ensued, in consequence of a large portion of the inhabitants having delayed to remove themselves and their property "till the vicinity of the foe alarmed them into flight that looks not behind." The fleeing inhabitants crowding the bridge, and the narrow road leading from it between high rocks, with all they could carry off; in a few minutes the defiles of Condeixa were so choked up by the throng of fugitives, that the light division was obliged to clear a road for itself, and the passage of the artillery. The emergency of the occasion allowed but little to be done to alleviate the sufferings, or to assist the flight of those whose folly had induced them to neglect the opportunity of complying with the wise and provident injunctions of the English commander-in-chief.

Massena, on his entrance into Coimbra,* found large resources† for his troops, who The wine stores that lay in the line of retreat were destroyed as far as possible by the allied army. In the districts of Villa Franca, Azambuja and Cartaxo, upwards of 40,000 almudes were destroyed. The fatigue parties in some instances waded breast high in the sunken adegas (wine stores) in destroying the wine, either drawing out the taps or beating in the heads of the tuns for the purpose. By frequent immersion in the crust of the red wine their bodies and limbs had assumed a fine rich mahogany tint. In some places the wine was allowed to flow in torrents down the streets; and the same was the case with the English rum at Condeixa, to prevent it falling into the hands of the enemy.



JORDEN'S VINDICATE

just at that critical moment had exhausted the fourteen days' provisions they had carried with them from Busaco. These resources, from the information of traitorous Portuguese, he expected, and really found. This fortunate occurrence for the enemy was occasioned partly by the faction of the Patriarch and Souza having prohibited the inhabitants of the country behind the Mondego from abandoning their dwellings and removing their property, and partly from the feeling inherent in human nature, which induces men to cling to their homes, and not to destroy the work of their own hands. Having established his hospital at Santa Clara, and leaving behind him five thousand sick and wounded of his army, on the fourth day after his entrance into that city, the French marshal resumed his march through the defiles leading into Condeixa and Pombal.

Scarcely had Massena left Coimbra, when his neglect of having omitted to form a base of operations in his rear, presented colonel Trant the opportunity of performing one of the most brilliant partisan exploits that occurred during the Peninsular war. That active and enterprising officer determined to capture the French hospital and stores at Coimbra by surprise. To accomplish this purpose, he suddenly galloped his cavalry into the town, and, the infantry rapidly following, captured the whole of the hospitals and a company of the marines of the imperial guard, and immediately marched them off for Oporto, under a strong escort, to protect them from the Portuguese peasantry, whose rancorous hatred of the enemy was now excited to the highest pitch by his recent atrocities and licentiousness.

While the allied army was advancing on Leiria, the French army appeared in sight. Massena immediately formed his force into three columns, and endeavoured to overwhelm the British with his centre, while he

turned their flanks with the others, but he was quickly repulsed by a portion of the artillery and cavalry of the allies, though the enemy engaged was nearly four times as many as that of their adversary.

From Leiria the allied army retreated in three columns. Hill's division, forming the right, marched by Thomar and Santarem, the left by Alcobaca and Obidos, and the centre took its route by Batalla and Rio Mayor. The enemy followed in a single column by the last-mentioned town.

The allies were now—after having performed a retreat of above two hundred miles, during which no alarm, no confusion, no precipitance, had occurred on the march, and without the loss of a single gun,* ammunition waggon, or baggage animal, and a greater number of prisoners having been taken in the skirmishing affairs at Coimbra, Pombal, Alcoentre, and Quinta los Torres, from the pursuers, than had been lost by the pursued, “an occurrence in the history of retreats without a parallel”—preparing to enter the LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS† a formidable barrier, consisting of a line of field fortification extending over a mountain-chain for above fifty miles, and which, as has already been said, exhibited the gigantic application of the principles of field fortification to a defensive position presented by nature, that no age of the world has as yet witnessed. They were constructed by lieutenant-colonel Fletcher and captains Jones and Chapman, under the direction of lord Wellington, and above 7,000 Portuguese labourers, besides English engineers, were daily employed in their construction. Neither the English army nor ministry was aware of their existence until they were ready for occupation, and Massena was in equal ignorance until he was distant not five marches from their site. Lord Wellington had determined to undertake their construction

* The six guns taken at Alcoentre had been recovered. The circumstances attending that affair were:—Just as the cavalry, under sir Stapleton Cotton, had reached Alcoentre, and were bivouacked on the plain during a tremendous thunder-storm, the third regiment of the enemy's hussars driving the English pickets into the town, obtained possession of six guns; but their triumph was but short-lived; for being charged by the 10th English hussars, the guns were recaptured, and the enemy put to flight.

† The lines of Torres Vedras derive their name from the little town of Torres Vedras (the Torres Veteres, or the Old Towers of the Romans), are situated on the Oporto road from Lisbon, about twenty-five miles N.N.W., distant from the capital, and

eight from the sea coast. They form the gorge or neck of the peninsula at the extremity of which the city of Lisbon stands. The importance of this position having been observed by sir Charles Stuart in an early period of the French revolutionary war, he caused plans to be drawn of the ground. The duke of Wellington, in his campaign against Junôt, had observed them, and was convinced that they presented the vantage ground for the defence of Portugal, should the French attempt its reconquest. “Portugal,” he said in the house of commons, “could be defended, but not on the frontier; the defence must be on the strong ground about Lisbon.” And that consideration, he added, was in his mind at the time that the convention of Cintra was signed.

from the time of the battle of Talavera. The value of Spanish co-operation having then been fully demonstrated by the utter inefficiency of their armies, from want of organization and discipline, and the unskilfulness and imbecility of their officers. The

discontented and "the croakers" in the English army had now an opportunity of witnessing the sagacity and foresight of their chief, and the possibility, if not moral certainty, of his being able to reduce his wise and comprehensive plans to a successful issue.

THE OCCUPATION OF THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS.

ON the 8th of October, the allied army entered "the lines" by divisions, conducted to the positions they were intended to occupy by officers appointed for the purpose. But the light division had not yet arrived. Craufurd having delayed his march from Alemquer till the middle of the day of the 10th, and being nearly surprised by the enemy, injudiciously ordered the division to break, and re-form on the other side of the archway of the town-gate, out of gun range, — a movement which occasioned so much disorder, that in the dark, the division mistook its route, and was obliged to make a flank march of several miles along the foot of "the lines," to gain their position of Aruda, an occurrence which occasioned the weakest part of the lines to be left open for several miles to the enemy's irruption in the meantime.

The formidable position in which the allied army was now stationed to resist the power of the enemy, was a peninsula, an area containing about twelve hundred square miles, traversed by two lofty mountainous chains, stretching from the Tagus, in a semi-circular direction to the ocean, varying in altitude and abruptness, and running in a parallel direction, at a distance from six to nine miles, and from Lisbon at the respective distances of twenty and thirty miles from the nearest points of their respective arches. Through the passes in these mountains, the five great roads (namely, two at Torres Vedras, two at Sobral, and one at Alhandra; but two of these roads uniting at Cubega, the number that pierced the second line was but four, and these passed Quintilla, Bucellas, Montechique, and Mafra, that communicate between Lisbon and the interior of the country. The mountainous nature of the country renders lateral communication between these roads extremely difficult.

Upon these heights were "the lines" constructed, which consisted of three ranges of defence, one within the other, for the

purpose of cutting off the advance of a hostile force on the capital. All the advantages of site, rock, water, rugged steep, and precipice, which the position presented, were increased by art and science, so as to render them unassailable. Triple chains of redoubts and field-works were constructed, to block up or cover every road or pass leading to Lisbon; rivers were obstructed in their course, so as to flood the valleys, and render the country swampy and impassable; mountains were scooped perpendicularly, to the height of fifteen or twenty feet; abattis of the most formidable description, either closing the entrance to ravines, impeding the approach to the works, or blocking up roads, conduced to increase the natural difficulties of the position, and render it unassailable. Across the great valley of Aruda, the weakest point of the position, a double line of abattis was drawn, composed of full-grown oaks and chesnut trees, which had been dug up with all their roots and branches on them, and reset in a cross position; and across the ravine on the left of Aruda, a loose stone wall, six feet thick, and sixteen high, was erected. From the chains of redoubts and other batteries (in number 150,) 600 pieces of artillery swept all approaches, and with a concentric fire, commanded or enfiladed every practicable point. The right of the lines was flanked by the Tagus and a division of gun boats stationed on its waters, at Villa Vella; its left by the Atlantic. The bridges were mined and prepared for explosion; and telegraphs were erected on the Socorro rock, and at Alhandra, Monte Agraça, Torres Vedras, &c., so as to preserve an instant communication between the centre of the position and every part of the lines. A paved road was parallel to the foot of the hills through Torres Vedras, Runa, Sobral, and Aruda, to Alhandra, for the purpose of expediting the necessary movements of the troops.

The first line of defence, or advanced

position, which consisted of thirty redoubts placed on a ridge of heights, on which were mounted 140 guns, following the inflection of the hills, extended twenty-nine miles; and its right rested on Alhandra, on the Tagus, and its left on the mouth of the Zizandre, on the sea-coast. When first constructed, this line was not intended for permanent occupation, but merely as an advanced post to protect the army, while taking up its position in the second line. But Massena's inactivity on the frontier had afforded so much opportunity of increasing its strength, that it afforded time for converting it into a sufficient outwork, upon which the first fury of the enemy might burst and expend itself. The right of the second line, which was twenty-four miles in length, and about eight miles in rear of the front line, rested on Quintilla, on the Tagus, and its left on Ericeira, at the mouth of San Lorenzo. It was in this position that the grand stand was to be made. The third line extended from Passo D'Arcos on the Tagus, to the tower of Junquera on the coast. An intrenched camp was also formed near Fort St. Julien, and occupied by a corps of English marines, so as to cover the movements of an embarkation, should such an operation be necessary, and be delayed by bad weather; and that fort was so armed and strengthened, as to enable a rear-guard to resist an army. Such was the position which British genius had devised, and on which British valour and patriotism were to foil and render nugatory all the devices and power of "the common enemy of mankind," to subjugate the whole of the human race, and make them the sport and gratification of his restless and insatiable ambition: here were to be stationed those slandered, but really dreaded soldiers, who, in the foolish, insolent, and vapouring language of his minion, Lacépède, the president of his obsequious senate, "were to furnish feeble glories to our (i.e., the French) arms, and disgrace to themselves." The sequel proved the prophetic spirit of the inflated and vapouring Frenchman.

In the occupation and defence of this vast fortress and spacious camp (for to both purposes it was converted,) nearly 100,000 men, 55,000 of whom were regular troops, about half being Portuguese,* and 5,000

Spaniards, under the marquis Romana, were concentrated. The irregular troops consisted of the militia, the ordenanzas, and the civic guard. The last mentioned species of force, with the native artillery, and the least disciplined of the native regular troops, garrisoned the forts and redoubts, and occupied the intrenchments on the second line. The British troops, with the *élite* of the Portuguese regular force, were held ready to meet the attack, or assail the enemy, should a favourable opportunity present itself; and they were so judiciously posted, and the communications so ready of access between the respective positions, that the enemy could not assemble a force sufficient to bear on one part of "the lines," with any probability of success, before the English chief could make a correspondent movement of concentration to meet the attack.

The British force was posted where the peculiar talent of the leaders would be most likely to correspond with the peculiarity of the respective positions.

Hill, on whose calm courage the firmest reliance might be placed, was posted, with the second division, on the extreme right of the advanced line, which was the most remote from head-quarters, and the most exposed to the enemy; the ground entrusted to his defence extending from Alhandra to the head of the valley of Calandria. Craufurd, with the light division, continued the line on Hill's left, and, on account of the fiery courage of the leader, and the ardent spirit of his troops, the weakest part of the line, namely, from the head of the vale of Calandria to the Pé de Monte, was entrusted to their defence. Spencer, with the first division, garrisoned the heights over Zebreira. Picton, with the third division, occupied Torres Vedras, and watched the line of the Zizandre. Cole's division (the fourth), continued the line along the mountain's brow; and Campbell formed the extreme left. Pack's Portuguese brigade was posted on Monte Agrafa, above Sobral; and the fifth division, under Leith, was posted in reserve on the reverse slope; Romana's force took post at Enaxara dos Cavalleros. The cavalry were cantoned along the second line, and among the villages to the left. The English marines occupied the third line. The head-quarters of

* On account of the neglect of the Regency to provision and pay their countrymen, above 10,000 of the Portuguese regular troops had deserted within

the last nine months; two-thirds of the militia had abandoned their colours; and the *ordenanza* disbanded themselves by whole companies.

lord Wellington were at Pero Negro, under the Socorro Rock.

The cavalry and advanced-guard of the French army came in sight of "the lines" on the afternoon of the 10th, and dislodged general Spencer from Sobral, who fell back on the 'great redoubt of the same name, about a mile in the rear. Massena, who had no knowledge of the existence of so formidable a defence until within four or five marches of its site, occupied several days in examining the nature of the position. The valleys of Callandria and Aruda at first seemed to him to offer an assailable point, and he made several attempts, by throwing out his skirmishers, to discover their mode of defence, and the number of the defenders. On the 14th, while engaged in the reconnoissance, a strong detachment of infantry, supported by artillery, attacked a party of the 71st in a breast-work thrown up near Sobral, but they were quickly driven back at the point of the bayonet, on a field-work of their own. The loss of the English, who at sunset took a more retired line of works, was about 150 men; that of the enemy nearly double that number.

The French general, after a careful reconnoissance, being convinced that the position was unassailable, that it could neither be turned nor carried,* determined to blockade the allied army in their stronghold, hoping that the many thousands of inhabitants of the neighbouring country for miles around, that had poured into the capital, would occasion embarrassment to the English commander-in-chief. He therefore disposed his troops between Villa Franca and Sobral, so as to menace all the weak points in his front, the second corps holding the heights opposite Alhandra, and its right extending to Aruda. The peculiarity of the position (namely, the pass of Runa being commanded by the heavy redoubts on Monte Agraça), compelled him to dispose his forces on one side or other of the Baraqueda—the spur of the Monte Junta which was nearly opposite the centre of the first line, and which divided the country between the Tagus and the sea into nearly two equal parts—and which, therefore, afforded the facility to the besieged to fall on the front and rear of


any force the enemy might detach to the other side.


Massena's situation was very critical. The country had to a considerable extent been laid waste and devastated on his line of march, and the militia of the north, the ordenanzas, and the partisan corps under Trant, Fenwick, Wilson, Carlos d'España, &c., were hanging on his rear from Abrantes to Peniche. He was not, however, to be scared or discouraged by difficulties. He therefore caused a wide extent of country to be ravaged by his foragers. From this source, and the culpable negligence of the regency in enforcing the orders for the devastating of the country, he found abundance of stores and provisions in the country lying between the Mondego, the Tagus, and the lines. Corn and cattle abounded on both banks of the Tagus, and on the numerous islands and alluvial lands in that river in the neighbourhood of Santarem. With these resources he formed depôts and magazines at Santarem, Barquina, and other places. And, for the purpose of cutting off all communication between Lisbon and the neighbouring districts, and operating on the flank of the lines, he seized forty boats which had been collected near Santarem, and left to his mercy by the criminal supineness of the government and the local authorities.

Nor were these untoward circumstances, and the criminal negligence of the regency, the whole of the difficulties with which the English general had to contend. So inveterate and systematic were the intrigues and machinations of the faction of the Patriarch and Souza, that besides taking every opportunity to endeavour to thwart and mar the plans of their able and magnanimous ally for the salvation of their country, they exerted all the influence they possessed over an ignorant and bigoted community, to bring him and his measures into disrepute. In the bitterness of his resentment for their perverse and culpable conduct, he exclaimed, "It is heartbreaking to contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly." Even in his defensive attitude, "the follies and intrigues of the Portuguese government," says the author of the War in the Peninsula, "were a more dire enemy to

* No one who was acquainted with the nature of "the lines" can agree with the marquis of Londonderry, that had the French general assailed them before the English generals of division "had learned their grammars of defence," he would have forced them, and been enabled to march to Lisbon. The

marquis's precise words are, "That he shall ever be of opinion, that by a well-constructed assault, Massena might have effected his purpose of penetrating the lines and marching on Lisbon." The marquis seems not to have had his grammar by heart.





Engraved by R. Robinson

ROBERT BANKS JENKINSON, EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

OB 1828

FROM THE ORIGINAL BY SIR THOS LAWRENCE, P.R.A. IN THE COLLECTION OF

THE RT HONBLE THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

the English general than the whole French army was."

And he was not only annoyed and harassed by the perverse and vexatious proceedings of his allies, but the ignorant and disaffected part of the London press exerted all its influence to render him unpopular in England. They daily predicted that, "with famine in its rear, and an overwhelming enemy in its front, the army must take to its shipping"—"that it was Wellington, and not Massena, who was in danger of famine"—"that the French general could remain in his position as long as he pleased, and would drive into the lines the population of the surrounding country, and thus compel the English general to take to his shipping, or surrender." The scribe of the *Morning Chronicle*, in the superabundance of his military knowledge, and the excess of his genuine patriotism, in his critical strictures on lord Wellington's selection of his position, condemned "his erroneous judgment" in its selection; which the aforesaid critical and patriotic worthy pronounced to be "a violation of the most essential principles of military positions!" The ministry even participated in the alarm, and intimated a wish that the army should return.

Beset on every side with difficulties, thwarted by perverse allies, and discouraged by lukewarm friends, the English general "rose as a giant," and, disregarding the follies of the one, and the fears of the other, adopted the heroic resolution of persevering in those measures which had hitherto baffled the designs of the enemy. In reply to the English minister's expression of his fears as to the result of "the fearful struggle" in which the British army was engaged, he addressed the celebrated dispatch, dated the 3rd of November, from Pero Negro, in which he took an historical review of the circumstances, military and political, which had induced him to undertake the defence of Portugal, and which, for its spirit of sagacity, and the subsequent extraordinary fulfilment of all his predictions respecting the result of the campaign, would, "were all other records of his genius lost, alone suffice to vindicate his great reputation, [his foresight and sagacity] to posterity." This dispatch was as follows:—

"TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

"Pero Negro, 3rd Nov. 1810.

"My lord,—I wish it was in my power to give your lordship an opinion of the pro-

bable course of the enemy's operations, founded on the existing state of affairs here, considered in a military point of view; but from what I am about to state to your lordship, you will observe it is impossible to form such an opinion.

"The expedition into Portugal was, in my opinion, founded originally on political and financial, rather than military considerations. It is true, that with a view to the conquest of Spain, there were advantages purely military to be derived from the removal of the British army from Portugal; but I think I could show that it was not essentially necessary to effect that object, particularly after the door into Castile had been closed on us, by the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida.

"The political object, therefore, in removing us from Portugal, which was the effect that our evacuation of the Peninsula would have had on the inhabitants of Spain in general, and on those of Cadiz in particular, and the financial object, which was the possession and plunder of Lisbon and Oporto, were the principal motives for the perseverance of the expedition into Portugal. I believe the latter to have been more pressing even than the former.

"It is impossible to describe to your lordship the pecuniary and other distresses of the French armies in the Peninsula. All the troops are months in arrears of pay; they are in general very badly clothed, their armies want horses, carriages, and equipments of every description; their troops subsist wholly on plunder, whether acquired individually or more regularly by the way of requisition and contribution; they receive no money, or scarcely any from France; and they realize but little from their pecuniary contributions in Spain. Indeed, I have lately discovered that the expense of the pay and the hospitals alone of the French army in the Peninsula, amounts to more than the sum stated in the financial *exposé* as the whole expense of the entire French army.

"This state of things has very much weakened, and in some instances destroyed, the discipline of the army; and all the intercepted letters advert to acts of malversation and corruption, and misapplication of stores, &c., by all the persons attached to the army.

"I have no doubt, therefore, that the desire to relieve this state of distress, and to remove the consequent evils occasioned by

it, by the plunder of Lisbon and Oporto, was the first motive for the expedition into Portugal.

"The expedition not having been founded on any military necessity, has been carried on and persevered in against every military principle. We know that Massena could expect no immediate reinforcements; and without adverting to the various errors, which I believe he would acknowledge he had committed in the course of this service, he has persevered in it, after he found that he was unable to face the troops opposed to him, when posted in a strong position, and when he knew that they had one still stronger in their rear, to which they were about to retire; and that they were likely to be reinforced, while his army would be still further weakened by sickness, and by the privations to which he knew they must be liable on their march. He knew that the whole country was against him; that a considerable corps was formed upon the Douro, which would immediately operate in his rear; that at the time of the battle of Busaco he had no longer any communication with Spain; and that every step he took further in advance, was a step towards additional difficulty and inconvenience, from which the retreat would be almost impossible.

"If the expedition into Portugal had been founded on military principle only, it would have ended at Busaco; and I do not hesitate to acknowledge, that I expected that Massena would retire from it, or at all events would not advance beyond the Mondego. But he has continued to advance, contrary to every military principle, and I therefore conclude that the pressure of financial distresses, which was the original motive for the expedition, was that for persevering in it, and may operate on the measures of the present moment.

"In this view of the case, it is probable that Massena may endeavour to maintain his position, as long as he can keep alive any sufficient proportion of his troops, being certain that the same difficulties that induced the emperor to undertake the expedition without any military necessity, would induce him to make every effort to reinforce him at the earliest possible period of time, and therefore that he will remain some time longer where he is.

"Your lordship is already acquainted with the means of reinforcing him. There is no doubt, by raising the siege of Cadiz, and abandoning other attainable objects,

Massena may be reinforced to a very considerable extent.

"Under these circumstances, I have frequently turned over in my mind the expediency of attacking the French army now in my front, before it should be joined by its reinforcements; and, on the whole, I am inclined to be of opinion that I ought not to do so.

"I inclose your lordship an account of the number of battalions, squadrons, &c., which entered Portugal with Massena, and I cannot believe that they composed an army of less than 70,000 men at the battle of Busaco. I calculate their loss, including sick, since that time, at 15,000 men, which would leave them with 55,000 men, of which 6,000 or 7,000 are cavalry, at the present moment.

"The effective strength of the British army, according to the last returns, was 29,000 infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and one regiment at Lisbon, and one at Torres Vedras, which, in the view of the contest, ought not to be taken into the account; and I inclose a statement of the Portuguese force, according to the last returns.

"Besides this force, the marquess de la Romana's corps consists of about 5,000 men, making a total of 58,615, of which I could command the services, in case I should act offensively against the enemy, of which about ——* would be cavalry.

"Besides these troops, there are different bodies of militia, infantry, and artillery, in our positions; but I should deceive myself if I could expect, and your lordship, if I should state, that any advantage would be derived from their assistance in offensive operations against the enemy.

"Although the enemy's position is not so strong as that we occupy, there is no doubt but that it has its advantages; one of which is, that in attacking it, we could hardly use our artillery. I would also observe, that in every operation of this description, by the British army in Portugal, no attempt can be made to manœuvre on the enemy's flank or rear; first, because the enemy show, that they are indifferent about their flanks, or their rear, or their communications; and secondly, because the inevitable consequence of attempting such a manœuvre, would be to open some one or other road to Lisbon, and to our shipping, of which the enemy would take immediate advantage to attain his object.

* Blank in the original.

"We must carry their positions, therefore, by mere force, and consequently, with loss; and, in the course of the operations, I must draw the army out of their cantonments. I must expose the troops and horses to the inclemencies of the weather at this season of the year, and must look to all the consequences of that measure, in increased sickness of the men, and in loss of efficiency and condition of the horses.

"I observe that, notwithstanding the length of time that has elapsed since the greatest and most efficient part of the French army has been employed against us; there is as yet no other military body in the Peninsula, which is capable of taking, much less of keeping, the field; and the relief of Cadiz, which appears to me to be the probable consequence of the state of affairs here, would not give us the assistance of an army from that quarter, either in the way of co-operation or diversion; nor would the removal of Sebastiani from Granada, which would be the consequence of the relief of Cadiz, enable Blake to make any progress beyond the Sierra Morena towards Madrid. We should still stand alone in the Peninsula as an army; and if I should succeed in forcing Massena's positions, it would become a question whether I should be able to maintain my own, in case the enemy should march another army into this country. But when I observe how small the superiority of numbers is in my favour, and know that the position will be in favour of the enemy, I cannot but be of opinion, that I act in conformity with the instructions and intentions of his majesty's government, in waiting for the result of what is going on, and in incurring no extraordinary risk.

"Every day's delay, at this season of the year, narrows our line of defence, and consequently strengthens it; and when the winter shall have set in, no number, however formidable, can venture to attack it; and the increase of the enemy's numbers at that period will only add to their distress,

* The English general had drawn his information of the condition of the enemy from the French private and official letters, and the Parisian journals which had been intercepted.

† This was not the only instance in the course of the war, in which the English army contributed a portion of its pittance of pay, and even a share of its rations to alleviate the distress which the people of Spain and Portugal suffered from the rapine and violence of the French soldiery. At Fuentes d'Onor, the English army raised £8,000 to relieve the inhabitants from the miseries they were suffering in

and increase the difficulties of their retreat.*

"I have thought it proper to make your lordship acquainted with the cause of my reflections on this subject, and my present determination, which I hope will be consistent with the wishes of his majesty's government. Circumstances may change: the enemy's distresses for provisions, and the operations of our detachments in his rear, may induce him to detach to such a degree, as to render a general attack on him a measure of positive advantage, in which case I shall alter my determination. But adverting to the necessity of placing the troops in the field in this season if I should make any attack, the advantage must be very obvious before I adopt a measure which must be attended by the consequences of losing the services of my men by sickness.

"I have the honour to be, &c.

"WELLINGTON."

Nor was he indifferent to the sufferings of that portion of the Portuguese population which, to escape the deadly visitations of the enemy, had taken refuge within the lines. As far as circumstances would possibly permit to mitigate the evils of war, he availed himself of all feasible measures. He caused Peniche, Setuval, and Palmela, to be fortified as places of refuge for those who wished to emigrate, should the enemy's invasion be successful. To support the starving population of Lisbon, he collected corn and other provisions from Spain and the coast of Barbary; and, in a letter addressed to the earl of Liverpool, he recommended the unfortunate portion of the Portuguese population to the consideration of the benevolent disposition of the British public. "I propose," said he, "to have a subscription for the purpose in the British army, and I have no doubt but that every soldier in the army will contribute."†

While the French, notwithstanding all their rapine, and ingenious devices to obtain subsistence, were suffering from want and privation of the injuries sustained during the contest between the French and English armies when in occupation of that place. The like humanity had been exhibited by the British soldiery in sir John Moore's retreat. The instances in that retreat were not unfrequent in which the famished soldiers shared with the wretched inhabitants their own scanty pittances doled out to them on the march; proving that liberal and generous feelings are as much the characteristics of the British soldier as indomitable courage and unsubduable spirit.—*Vide* Lord Wellington's letter, at page 176—*post*.

vation, all was comfort and even gaiety within "the lines." Provisions of every kind were abundant. Field sports and amusements went on among the officers of every rank in the intervals of relaxation from military duties. The men, too, had their pastimes and recreations. Never were the toils of war more harmoniously blended with the pleasures and amusements of peaceable life. Little fêtes and galas occurred from time to time. At Mafra, on the 7th of September, the commander-in-chief gave a grand dinner and ball for the purpose of formally investing Marshal Beresford with the order of the Bath. On the same occasion were distributed medals to those who had distinguished themselves at the battle of Busaco; as also the ten ensign-commissions which the government had sent out for deserving non-commissioned officers, in consequence of lord Wellington's letter of remonstrance on the subject. In his instructions for the preparation of the festivities on that occasion, and providing fit accommodation for his female guests, lady Emily Berkeley and her daughters, the commander-in-chief gave expression to his usual good-natured tone of humour. Sliding in a half apology for the indifferent appearance which the wear and tear of warfare had occasioned in the wardrobes of his officers, he observed, "we shall all appear in our best attire, but I fear that with many of us bad will be the best." Seldom has an army occupying ground in the face of its enemy, enjoyed so many hours of relaxation, or continued to unite so completely the pleasures of country life, with the serious business of war. And this feeling of security not only prevailed in "the lines," but also in the city of Lisbon. The public theatres were never more crowded, or the assemblies more gay and brilliant. This fearless and inconsistent gaiety among a people, under whose walls a licentious army of above seventy thousand men lay burning with revenge and panting for plunder, can only be accounted for by the fact, that custom and necessity reconcile to the prospect of the most dreadful visitations. Hence it is that the inhabitants of Portici sleep tranquilly under the burning Vesuvius, and that mariners sing jovially while rocked upon the restless waves, in which the starting of a single plank might engulf them for ever.

The crisis was now approaching in which the English general was to reap the reward of his skill and perseverance; and it is

worthy of recollection, that in the whole of his correspondence and intercourse while in this trying situation, as also on all occasions throughout the Peninsular War, he never, in a single instance, gave expression to a distrust of success or a possibility of failure. As he made all the provisions that human wisdom and foresight could devise, from the spirit of sagacity in which his plans were conceived, he felt confident of success. Convinced of the fallacy and futility of the doctrine of chances or destiny in guiding and influencing human affairs, he relied little on the mere accidents of fortune for his results: he more wisely trusted to his own exertions and prudence.

For some time the movements of the enemy indicated they were on the eve of change of their position. Towards the end of October, the hospitals, stores, and other incumbrances of the army had been removed to Santarem, and a number of boats, in addition to those that had fallen into their hands by the wilful negligence of the regency, were in process of construction. Ney, with his corps, and Montbrun, with the cavalry, had fallen back on Thomar and Leyria, and had put their troops into cantonments in the neighbourhood of those towns.

At length, though the twilight showed the French sentries as usual in front at Aruda, daylight proved that the slopes of Monte Jura, Torres Vedras, and Alhandra were evacuated, and that the sentries were motionless men of straw, each in full military costume, with a pole by his side as the representative of a musket. Under cover of the darkness of the night of the 14th, and during a thick mist that enveloped the slopes of the mountains, the French army had broke up their position from Sobral, and commenced their retreat from the right of the line, and were now seen retiring through the defiles of Alemquer, by the great road on the Tagus, and marching under cover of a strong rear-guard on Torres Novas, a strong detachment only having been left to protect the road which leads to Santarem by Rio Mayor and Alcantara, for which town the second corps had made a simultaneous retrogressive movement, as the main body of the army had done for Torres Novas.

Immediately that lord Wellington ascertained that the enemy had retreated, he issued orders to the respective generals of division for counteracting the movements of

the enemy. Hill, with the second division, was directed to pursue by the road of Villa Franca; Craufurd was instructed to feel his way with the light division, to Santarem; and sir Brent Spencer, with the first division, advanced towards Alemquer. The boats of the fleet, under admiral sir Thomas Williams, were sent up the Tagus as far as Alhandra, to wait orders to transport the troops across the river, to oppose the enemy should he threaten an irruption into the Alemtejo. General Fane,—who, in the beginning of November, had been detached with a brigade of Portuguese cavalry and several guns, to the left bank of the Tagus, to endeavour to destroy the incipient flotilla of the enemy, and, if possible, to prevent his crossing the river should he make the attempt—deceived by the false movements to which Massena had erroneously subjected the second and eighth corps d'armée,—having reported that the main body of the French army was in full retreat, and that Santarem was occupied only by a strong rear guard, the troops were already formed and in motion, when the military eye of Wellington discovered the fallacy of the report, and the powerful means of resistance the enemy had prepared.

As it was not possible to divine whether the retreat of the enemy was not a ruse or feint to draw the English from their intrenched position, and by a forced and rapid march on the right of the lines turn the Monte Junta, and push the head of his columns on Torres Vedras, the utmost caution was necessary on the part of the English general that he did not afford the enemy an opening to his position. The principal part of the army was therefore kept stationary until the design of the enemy—whether a feint or a retreat—was developed. This was fully indicated on his reaching Alcoentre, by the division of his force into two columns, one taking the line of Rio Mayor, and the other Santarem. The cavalry and the light division now formed the advanced guard of the pursuit; and in its execution took four hundred prisoners. At the village of El Vallé, Craufurd's impetuosity of character and love of battle would, on the 16th, have provoked an unequal engagement, similar to that of the Coa, had it not been for the opportune arrival of lord Wellington.

When a sufficient body of troops to support the advanced guard had arrived, a

demonstration was made on the 19th, on Santarem, the head of the enemy's position, to endeavour to make him disclose his strength, and discover how far the post itself was assailable—a measure lord Wellington was desirous of putting into immediate execution; but the columns of attack were recalled, and the troops were placed in cantonments at Cartaxo, Alcoentre, Azambuja, Alemquer, and the surrounding villages. Hill, with the second division, was stationed on the left bank of the Tagus, at Barcos and Chamusca, to defend the passage of the river and prevent the enemy from making an irruption into the Alemtejo, keeping up his communications with the ferry opposite Alhandra by means of floating bridges, that he might be enabled speedily to re-enter the lines should occasion require the movement. To prevent communication between Soult and Massena, Beresford, with two brigades of cavalry and two divisions of infantry, was stationed along the left bank of the Tagus, from Almeirim to the mouth of the Zézere, to defend the passage of that river, and in the event of Massena's retreat to be in early motion on the line of pursuit. All the routes leading to the lines between the Tagus and the Monte Junta were secured by the heads of cantonments, and the works additionally strengthened and garrisoned by two divisions; an amount of force necessary, as the French at Alcanhete were nearer to Torres Vedras than the English were at Cartaxo. As the heights of Almada commanded the anchorage and the city of Lisbon, they were strongly retrenched, and a chain of fortifications was constructed parallel to the Tagus, from Aldea Gallega to Traffaria, in case the enemy should transfer his operations to the south bank of the Tagus. And to prevent any sudden irruption from Santarem, a battery was erected on a hill which looked down the causeway; the bridge at its extremity was mined; and the light division, supported by a cavalry brigade, was posted on the heights that overlooked the marshes which surrounded Santarem. Thus, every precaution that human foresight could devise, was taken to prevent the enemy's finding an opening to the lines, and enable the English general to avail himself of every favourable opportunity that might present itself to operate on the enemy.

The ground which Massena had taken up presented a defensive position of great strength at any season of the year, but

it was now rendered extremely difficult of access, from the long-continued rains and the overflowing of the river.

The town of Santarem, which formed the head of his position, affords, by its natural peculiarities, one of the strongest defensive positions in Portugal. It stands on a mountain of considerable elevation, rising almost precipitously from the banks of the Tagus, and trending northwards about a league. In front of this height, stretches a lower range of acclivities, covered by the waters of the Rio Mayor, and furnishing the facility of excellent outposts. The ground in front, on the Lisbon road, is an open flat, inclosed by the two streams of the Rio Mayor, and traversed for the last half mile by a raised causeway, called the Ponte Seca, by which alone the town can be approached; for, on one side of the Ponte Seca, a flat, sedgy marsh, which, though not impassable, was, from several deep water-cuts, extremely difficult of access, especially for artillery and cavalry, and thus secured the left of the French position; while, on the other side, the overflow of the river occasioning a deep pond or lake, their right was protected. And in addition to its natural difficulties, the position was strengthened by an abattis, and a battery placed on a gentle eminence beyond it, swept the whole extent of the causeway. Thus, before Santarem could be gained, three formidable barriers of defence were to be carried.

By his judicious choice of position, the French marshal had secured to himself great military and political advantages. He was enabled to remain in the heart of Portugal, and while he preserved his passage open to the Spanish frontier by means of his bridges over the Zezere, he retained the power of offensive operations by crossing the Tagus on his left, or by turning the Monte Junta on his right. His cavalry and foragers ranged over an immense tract of fertile and abundant country, from Santarem to the Zezere, and to the eastward of that town. To second the operations of the army of Portugal, general Foy brought orders from Paris for all the disposable forces in the south of Spain to march for the Alemtejo frontier. In the north, Bessieres was preparing to co-operate with Massena; and Drouet, leaving Claparède with eight thousand men at Guarda, to keep Silveira and the ordenanza in check, reached Leyria with the ninth corps on the 24th of December; and taking post on the right flank of

the French army, by the extension of forces seawards, cut off the communication of the English army with the northern provinces. Silveira, flushed with a trifling success he had obtained over Claparède at Ponte d'Abade, presumptuously venturing to attack him at Trancosa, was repulsed and driven across the Douro with great slaughter.

Towards the end of November, Gardanne, in his advance from Ciudad Rodrigo, with a convoy of stores and ammunition, escorted by five thousand men, was attacked by the ordenanza of Upper Beira, under the command of colonel Grant, at Cardijos, in the Sierra de Citrella, when the French, falling into disorder from the suddenness of the attack, abandoned their convoy, and lost all their baggage, with several hundred men. Grant also subsequently executed a very dashing exploit against a portion of Claparède's force detained at Belmonte.

Ascertaining that it was their intention to sack and destroy Covilhaens, a considerable village and a post of some importance, as they had treated all the villages around Belmonte, he secretly marched with 400 ordenanza from Sardao to Covilhaens, and there concealing his force, on the arrival of two columns of the enemy, consisting of 1,500 men, as soon as they came within range of grape-shot, he opened so biting a fire on them from his single six-pounder, that they quickly took to their heels in the utmost confusion.

"While," to adopt the graphic language of an eloquent historian, "the two great leaders stood thus opposed to each other, like the contending spirits of light and darkness, the one earnest to save, the other no less eager to destroy," but neither venturing to strike till a favourable opportunity, or some oversight of his adversary, should give him the chance of preponderance, the hostile armies continued inactive, in observation of each other, as all the country between Alcanhete and Ponte Seca was impracticable for military operations, from the heavy rains and the broken state of the roads.

But while the English general and his army were straining every nerve to rid the Portuguese of the yoke of their tyrant, and save their lives and property, the Patriarch and the Souza faction at Lisbon continued to exert all their influence to thwart the measures of their ally, and render him and his army odious to the unthinking and uninformed part of the Portuguese population.

In order to put an end to the "miserable intrigues," as the English general emphatically termed them, of this faction, and the meddling insolent spirit of that odious priest, the patriarch, Lord Wellington denounced their insidious practices and interference in the following letter to sir Charles Stuart, the English ambassador at Lisbon:—"You will do me the favour to inform the regency, and above all the principal Souza, that his majesty and the prince regent having entrusted me with the command of their armies, and likewise with the conduct of the military operations, I will not suffer them, or anybody else, to interfere with them; that I know best where to station my troops, and when to make a stand against the enemy; and I shall not alter a system formed on mature consideration, on any suggestion of theirs. I am responsible for what I do, and they are not; and I recommend them to look to the measures for which they are responsible, and which I long ago recommended to them, namely, to provide for the tranquillity of Lisbon, and for the food of their own army and of the people, while the troops will be engaged with the enemy. As for principal Souza, I beg you to tell him from me, that I have had no satisfaction in transacting the business of this country, since he has been a member of the government; that being embarked in a course of military operations, of which I hope to see the successful termination, I shall continue to carry them on to the end, but that no person on earth shall induce me to remain in the Peninsula one moment after I shall have obtained his majesty's leave to resign my charge, if principal Souza is to remain a member of the government, or to continue at Lisbon; either he must quit the country, or I will; and if I should be obliged to go, I will take care that the world, or Portugal at least, and the prince regent, shall be made acquainted with my reasons. From the letter of the 3rd, which I have received from don Miguel Forjaz, I had hoped that the government was satisfied with what I had done and intended to do; and that, instead of endeavouring to render all further defence fruitless, by disturbing the minds of the populace of Lisbon, they would have done their duty by adopting measures to secure the tranquillity of the town; but, I suppose that, like other weak individuals, they add duplicity to their weakness, and that their expressions of approba-

tion, and even gratitude, were intended to convey censure."

"P. S.—I have but little doubt of success; but as I have fought a sufficient number of battles to know that the result of any one of them is not certain, even with the best arrangements, I am anxious that the government should adopt preparatory arrangements, and take out of the enemy's way those persons and their families, who would suffer if they were to fall into their hands."

In relation to the interference of the same faction with marshal Beresford's management of the Portuguese troops, the English chief thus expressed his opinion in another letter addressed to Mr. Stuart:—"In order to put an end at once to these miserable intrigues, I beg that you will inform the Portuguese government, that I will not stay in the country, and that I will advise the king's government to withdraw the assistance which his majesty affords them, if they interfere in any manner with the appointments of marshal Beresford's staff, for which he is responsible; or with the operations of the army; or with any of the points which, under the original arrangement with marshal Beresford, were referred exclusively to his management. I purpose, also, to report to his majesty's government, and refer to their consideration, what steps ought to be taken if the Portuguese government refuse or delay to adopt the civil and political arrangements recommended by me, and corresponding with the military operations which I am carrying on."

And in reference to the vexatious misrepresentations and unfounded complaints made by the Portuguese government concerning the British troops, who were the constant subjects of the obloquy of the faction, his remonstrance to the English ambassador was—

"Louzao, 16th March, 1811.

"SIR,—I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 9th instant, on a complaint said by don Miguel Forjaz to be made of the conduct of the British troops at Salvaterra, which complaint you will observe refers not to the conduct of the British troops, but to that of the Portuguese regiments, Nos. 4 and 10.

"In respect to the charge of cutting barren firewood in the royal parks for firewood, I have to reply, that I suppose his royal highness does not propose that his majesty's troops shall want firewood in Por-

tugal. It is reasonable that his royal highness, as well as other proprietors, should be paid for the wood cut upon his demesnes; but either the troops must be allowed to cut firewood, paying for the same, wherever the defence of his royal highness' dominions renders it necessary that they should be stationed, or they must be removed to the places where they can cut firewood, by which his royal highness' interests must suffer.

"I cannot avoid adverting to the disposition recently manifested by the government to complain of the conduct of the British troops, certainly, in this instance, without foundation.

"Acts of misconduct, and even outrage, I admit, have been committed, but never with impunity in any instance in which the complaint could be substantiated; and I have not yet been able to obtain the punishment of any individual in this country, be his crimes what they may.

"If the British soldiers have committed, as all soldiers do commit, acts of misconduct, they have at least fought bravely for the country. They have, besides, recently shown that commiseration for the misfortunes of the people of this country—which I am convinced will be equally felt by their countrymen at home—and actually fed the poor inhabitants of all the towns in which they were cantoned, on the Rio Mayor river. Yet I have not heard that the Portuguese government have expressed their approbation of this conduct, very unusual in people of this class and description; nor do I find that either their bearing in the field, or their humanity, or their generosity, can induce those whom they are serving to look with indulgence at their failings, or to draw a veil over the faults of the few, in consideration of the military and other virtues of the many.*

"I have the honour to be, &c.,

"WELLINGTON."

* This was a poor requital to the English army for the humanity it had displayed towards the Portuguese population. The British soldiery had shown their commiseration for the misfortunes of the people of Portugal, not only by a liberal subscription of their pay, but had actually fed with their own rations the poor inhabitants of all the towns in which they were cantoned on the Rio Mayor river. In a letter addressed to Mr. Perceval, thanking him for attending to his recommendation of the people of Portugal to the humane consideration of the British public, in consequence of which, money, stores of every kind, seed, cows, oxen, and agricultural implements, were abundantly supplied to relieve the misery and desti-

The factious and disaffected part of the periodical press of his own country also again raised its "inauspicious and incendiary voice," and "in its exultation of its supposed disastrous aspect of affairs in the Peninsula," and "the predicament into which Wellington had brought himself and his army by the unwise prosecution of his scheme for the deliverance of Portugal," and "his folly in presuming to oppose himself to 'the redoubted Massena,'" prophesied that "the protection even of Lisbon was hopeless, much less the deliverance of the Peninsula;" and in the supposed verification of its silly and presumptuous prophecies "of his erroneous judgment, and the utter impracticability of his plans," the unnatural and craven-hearted scribes called on the government to recall the English army, and save it from absolute destruction, by "the invincible legions of France, and the superior genius of the redoubted Massena." Their unnatural and unpatriotic attempts to break and humiliate the spirit and bearing of the soldiery, and depreciate the military character of the country, were deemed by Buonaparte so admirably adapted to reconcile the French nation to the unpopularity of his Spanish war, and to prove the incapability of England contending with him, that he caused the various papers containing the heartless and disgraceful calumnies to be reprinted at the "imperial" press, and circulated throughout France, and the states subject to his control and influence. From the same sources also of disaffection and treachery, the French generals derived better information of the position and resources of the English army, and the intended operations of the English general, than they were able to obtain by the agency of their spies and the traitorous hidalgos, or nobles who conspired with them for the enslavement of their country. "I enclose," says the English general, in a letter addressed to the earl of Liverpool, dated Cartaxo, January the

tution of the Portuguese population, which had been occasioned by the French invasion—the words of the British chief are, "My soldiers have continued to show every kindness in their power, as well to the Spaniards as the Portuguese. The village of Fuentes d'Onor having been the field of battle the other day, and not being much improved by this circumstance, they immediately and voluntarily subscribed to raise a sum of money, to be given to the poor inhabitants as a compensation for the damage which their properties had sustained in the contest." Lord Wellington frequently had occasion to report the efforts of his troops to mitigate the sufferings of the Portuguese population.

19th, 1811, "a newspaper giving an account of our works; the number of guns and men in each, and for what purpose constructed. Surely it must be admitted, that those who carry on operations against an enemy possessed of all the information which our newspapers give to the French, do so under singular disadvantages."*

And at this critical moment, with a powerful enemy in his front, the intrigues and faithlessness of his allies, and the calumny of the ignorant and disaffected part of his own countrymen, conjoined with the timidity and lukewarmness of the English cabinet, were not the only evils with which the English general was beset. These vexatious annoyances drew from the English general, in a letter addressed to marshal Beresford, and dated 24th of January, 1811, this indignant reprehension:—"The obstinacy and perverseness with which the Portuguese and Spanish governments persevere in opposing and rendering fruitless all measures to set them right, and save them, and the difficulties thrown in our way by our own government and its officials, cross and thwart our operations, and create great difficulties in carrying on the service."† Even his own officers occasioned him disquietude and annoyance. His generals of division had either gone or were preparing to go home. As Hill and Fane were compelled by sickness to retire, the commander-in-chief acceded to their request in the most ready and affectionate manner. To those who had not so strong a plea for absence, while consenting to their requests, he replied in terms that conveyed any other meaning than his approbation. To general Leith's request, he says, "I sincerely wish that the war was over, that I might take leave myself, and give leave to all those who are desirous of taking it. But as that is not the case, I have been obliged to regulate my own discretion, and to make rules by which I am guided in the grant of leaves of absence. Those who are obliged to go for the recovery of their health, are compelled to appear before a medical board, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will go through that ceremony, and I shall be happy to comply with your wishes."

In the same tone, though the edge of the rebuke was more fine and delicate, is the reply to sir Stapleton Cotton's application: "It is certain that the enemy will take a decided line of action one way or the other, as soon as his reinforcements join, which

will be in a day or two. Under these circumstances you will judge for yourself whether to go or stay, without further reference to me, and will act accordingly." The quiet manner of allusion to the probability of the eve of an action, could not be mistaken by sir Stapleton Cotton more than it could in the commander-in-chief's reply to General Craufurd. To the application of that gallant soldier, who, like the war-horse of Scripture, loved the scent of battle, the reply was: "I cannot believe that having twenty thousand men on the Guadiana, and from seven to ten thousand men upon the Coa and the sources of the Mondego, which the French can draw in, they mean to leave Massena where he is till death shall have swept away his army; and therefore my opinion is, that they will attack us. However, you are as capable of forming an opinion on this subject as I am; and, as I have often told you, when an officer in your situation tells me that he has business to settle in England of paramount importance to him, I cannot object to his going there if he thinks proper; and you will therefore go if you wish so, by the packet, and take captain Cotton with you."

Craufurd's answer to this gentle but significant remonstrance, produced the following reply: "I have received your letter of the 27th, and I see no reason why I should depart from the rule which I have laid down for myself in these cases. Officers (general officers in particular) are the best judges of their private concerns; and although my opinion is that there is no private concern that cannot be settled by instruction and power of attorney, and that after all is not settled in this manner, I cannot refuse leave of absence to those who come to say that their business is of a nature that requires their personal superintendence. But, entertaining these opinions, it is rather too much that I should not only give leave of absence, but approve of the absence of any, particularly a general officer, from the army. It is certainly the greatest inconvenience to the service that officers should absent themselves as they do, each of them requiring at the same time, that when it shall be convenient to return he shall find himself in the same situation as when he left the army. In the meantime, who is to do the duty? How am I to be responsible for the army? Is colonel ——— a proper substitute for general Craufurd in the command of our advanced posts? or general ——— for sir

* *Wellington Despatches.*† *Ibid.*

Stapleton Cotton, in command of the cavalry? I may be obliged to consent to the absence of an officer, while I cannot approve of it. I repeat, that you know the situation of affairs as well as I do; and you have my leave to go to England if you think proper."

The absence of the duke's home-sick generals gave to the factious part of the public press an opportunity to exercise their spirit of virulence, and to create in the public mind a discontent of that absence. The secretary of war communicated to lord Wellington the public opinion on the subject; to which communication the following answer was returned to Lord Liverpool:—

"Santa Marinha, 23rd March, 1811.

"MY DEAR LORD,—I assure you that the departure of the general officers of the army was as much against my inclination, as their arrival in England was injurious to the public interests. I did every thing in my power to prevail on them not to go, but in vain; and I acknowledge that it has given me satisfaction to find that they have been roughly handled in the newspapers. The consequence of the absence of some of them has been, that in the late operations I have been obliged to be general of cavalry, and of the advanced guard, and the leader of two or three columns, sometimes on the same day.

"I have requested colonel Torrens not to allow any general officer to come in future who is not willing to declare that he has no private business to recall him to England, and that he will remain with the army as long as it shall stay in the Peninsula.

"Believe me, &c.

"WELLINGTON."

"The Earl of Liverpool."

This letter and "the handling of the newspapers," occasioned several of the home-sick truant officers to return to the army before their leave of absence had expired.

During the period of inaction, while the hostile armies were in front of each other, many points of the highest importance,

* The humanity of his suggestions for economical reform in the government departments is no less worthy of admiration than the wisdom with which the idea was conceived:—"Adverting to the discontent which always follows reform of expenditure, I recommend to you to proceed with caution in the reform of the different juntas and boards. Let no man, or, at all events, a number of men, be discharged from the service without having some visible means of livelihood left. There are, I believe, some members of those juntas and boards, who have fortunes besides their salaries, of which last they may be de-

besides his military duties, occupied the attention of the English commander-in-chief, and elicited the powers of his vigorous and capacious mind. To enable the Portuguese government to meet the exigencies of the war, he suggested the necessity of new modelling and improving the revenue, and the introduction of reform into the various departments of the government,* for the purpose of diminishing the expense in that branch of the government. The increasing inefficiency of the Portuguese army, on account of the neglect and ill-treatment of it by the regency, required his utmost care and attention. During the last nine months above ten thousand regular forces, and near two-thirds of the militia, had been driven by want to desert their standards and return home. The ordenanza disbanded themselves by whole companies at a time. Two regiments of the line, the 9th and the 21st, had dwindled down from more than 2,400 men, to less than 1,300, and the Lusitanian legion, which had numbered upwards of 1,700, scarcely exceeded 1,000 men. "At this moment," (January 18th, 1811) says lord Wellington, in his celebrated letter addressed from Cartaxo to the English envoy at the court of Lisbon, and which contained truths so condemnatory of the intrigues and machinations of the patriarch and the Souza faction in the regency, that, in the expressive language of the writer, it placed "the patriarch's conduct in such a light that he would tremble at the sight of a lamp-post,"—"the Portuguese troops are frequently in want of provisions; and all the departments of the Portuguese army, including the hospitals, are equally destitute of funds to enable them to defray the necessary expenditure, and to perform their duty. These deficiencies and difficulties have existed ever since I have known the Portuguese army; and it is well known that it must have been disbanded more than once if it had not been assisted with the provisions, stores, and funds, destined for the maintenance of the British army." To remedy this grievance, and prevented, and still continue members of the junta. In the inferior departments of the customs, also, from which it may be necessary to discharge many officers, either a half or a third of their salary should be continued to those not otherwise provided for. If these measures are not adopted, there will be serious discontent in Lisbon, which will be encouraged by these people [namely the intriguing priest, the patriarch, and the Souza faction], and will be worse than an additional twenty thousand men to the enemy."—Letter to the British envoy, Mr. Stuart Wellington Despatches.

vent the total abandonment of their colours by the Portuguese army, the English general was obliged to take active and efficient measures to feed the Portuguese troops from the stores of the British commissariat. But while devising means of saving the Portuguese army from starvation, and enforcing its efficiency, the factious and intriguing Souza and the patriarch were vilifying his character, and undermining his influence in the regency. In a private communication to marshal Beresford on the subject, the words of the English general are :—"Baron Eben has made some curious discoveries at Lisbon, and has given Mr. Stuart some papers written by these personages, which tend to show their folly equally with their mischievous dispositions. Among other plans they have one for libelling and caricaturing me in England ! I have this day discovered that some of the anonymous letters to me are written by the principal Souza ; and others by the bishop. These are men to govern a nation in difficult circumstances !"

Notwithstanding this ingratitude and enmity of the regency, the destitute state of the Portuguese troops and the inhumanity of the regency in disregarding their destitution and sufferings, were the subject of the English general's earnest solicitude. In a remonstrance to the British envoy, Mr. Stuart, after severely censuring the inhumanity of the Portuguese regency towards their countrymen, he adds, the Portuguese troops "are patient under privations to an extraordinary degree. But men cannot perform the labour of soldiers without food. Those of general Pack's brigade died of famine on their march, and above 100 men have fallen from inanition, many of whom must have died from the same cause. The government neglected both establishments and troops when they were on the Rio Mayor river, and neither are in a state in which they ought to be at the commencement of a campaign." Again, July 15th, 1812, in reply to a dispatch from marshal Beresford, while describing "the wants and serious distress" in which the British army was, on account of the defalcation of its pay, and the deficiency of the military chest, he says, "the arrears and distresses of the Portuguese troops are a joke to ours."

As among large bodies of men assembled together, a state of inaction and the absence of sufficient excitement, are often introductive of irregularity, and subversive of subordination ; so it occurred with the

British army in their cantonments. A sectarian spirit began at this time to be prevalent among the troops. Two Methodist meetings, of which one belonged to the Guards, were held in the town of Cartaxo. The men met in the evening, and sang psalms ; a serjeant, of the name of Stephens, occasionally preaching to them after the fashion of the military saints in the time of Cromwell. Meetings of the kind were also held in other cantonments. In the 9th regiment there was one, at which two officers attended. To suppress these irregularities, which were occasioned by the insufficiency of the military chaplains, application was made to the commander-in-chief, who declined any forced interference with the religious sentiments of the army, as the act would be a violation of the principles and policy of religious toleration. "The meeting of soldiers in their cantonments, to sing psalms, or to hear a sermon read by one of their comrades," said the enlightened and liberal-minded Wellington, "is in the abstract, perfectly innocent, and is a better way of spending their time than many others to which they are addicted ; but it may become otherwise." "Religious instruction," adds the high-minded and sagacious soldier, "is the greatest support and aid to military discipline and order." "We want the assistance of a respectable clergyman," he continues. "By his personal influence and advice, and by that of true religion, he would moderate the zeal and enthusiasm of these gentlemen, and would prevent their meetings from being mischievous, if he did not prevail on them to discontinue them entirely." By the diffusion of this wise and temperate counsel throughout the army, and the noble sentiments it contains, the sectarian spirit which had obtained favour among the troops during the period of inactivity, became extinct on the resumption of active service.

But among all the various difficulties and discouraging circumstances with which the English general was beset, none gave him more uneasiness than the folly and perverseness of the Spanish government, and the inefficiency and uselessness of its generals and armies. "I am afraid," says he in a letter, dated Cartaxo, December 2nd, 1810, "the Spaniards will bring us all to shame yet. The Cortes appear to suffer under the national infirmity in as great a degree as the other

authorities; that is, boasting of the strength and power of the Spanish nation; till till they are seriously convinced they are in no danger, and then sitting down quietly, and indulging their natural indolence.* That the English chief had not formed an inaccurate estimate of his allies appears from this circumstance. When that body was assembled in September, 1810, instead of addressing itself to the measures best adapted for carrying on "a war of deeds," and the improvement of the Spanish armies, and the direction of the energies of the people, it employed its time in the "war of words," and idle boasting;† in declaring in inflated speeches all that Spaniards would endure and effect; and, in the ridiculous badinage of one of its members, "prove to the world that Spain was about to tread upon Greek and Roman name." To endeavour to provide a remedy for these grievances, the general addressed the following letter, which, for profound exposition of the subject, will remain a memorial of his extraordinary sagacity and penetration, to his brother the marquis Wellesley, who was then a member of the ministry. In that invaluable document, which is extant in the *Despatches*, he says: "Another object to which I wish to draw your attention, is the state of the Spanish government and army. I do not know what the agents of government, in different parts of Spain, may represent to them; but I assure you the cortes have got nothing, either to raise, discipline, pay, or support an army. The distresses of the Spaniards are worse even than those of the Portuguese. The army of the poor marques de la Romana has not a shilling, except what I gave them; nor a magazine, nor an article of any description, that is to keep them together, or to enable them to act as a military body. The operations of these troops are approaching to the Portuguese frontier; and I foresee what is going to happen, viz., a war between them and the inhabitants of Portugal, for the provisions, clothes, doors, windows, and beams of the houses of the latter. This will be a new era in this extraordinary war. Then the corps of Mahy, in Galicia, either from similar deficiencies, or disinclination on the part of Mahy, does nothing.

* *Wellington Despatches.*

† Its injustice and insolence, at this time, to the South American colonies, caused those states to declare themselves independent of Spanish rule; and

"All this forms a subject for serious consideration. Either Great Britain is interested in maintaining the war in the Peninsula, or is not. If she is, there can be no doubt of the expediency of making an effort to put in motion, against the enemy, the largest force which the Peninsula can produce. The Spaniards would not, I believe, allow of that active interference by us in their affairs, which might effect an amelioration of their circumstances; but that cannot be a reason for doing nothing. Subsidy given, without stipulation for the performance of specific services, would, in my opinion, answer no purpose; but I am convinced that in the next campaign I may derive great assistance from general Mahy, as I should in this, if I could have put his troops in movement; and I am also convinced that I may derive great assistance from the corps of the marquis de la Romana, and shall prevent its being mischievous in the way in which I have above pointed out, if I am allowed to assist with provisions and money occasionally. But then I must have the power to tell the Spanish government, that unless these troops co-operate strictly with me, the assistance shall be withdrawn from them.

"The amount of the expense of this assistance may be settled monthly, and may be in the form of a loan, to be paid by drafts on the government of Mexico, or in any other manner that government may think proper. Upon this a question may be asked, viz., what good it will produce? I shall answer, for nothing but to maintain the war in the Peninsula.

"I have seen too much of the troops of the Peninsula, even the Portuguese, when not united with our own, to form any calculation of the effect of any operation of theirs. Even when the troops are encouraged, and incline to behave well, the impatience, inexperience, and unconquerable vanity of the officers, lead them into error, as appears strongly in —'s recent operations, who, if he had obeyed his instructions, and have remained quiet, would have kept Claparède in check; but he chose to attack him, even with an inferior force, and was defeated; and Claparède was enabled to overrun Upper Beira, even to Lamego.

"It may also be asked why we should

the injustice of the act was aggravated by its ingratitude, the colonies having contributed ninety millions of dollars to enable the mother country to maintain the war against French oppression.

spend our money, and why these troops should not go on as the French troops do, without pay, provisions, magazines, or any thing? The answer to this question is as long as what I have already written. The French army is certainly a wonderful machine; but if we are to form such a one, we must form such a government as exists in France, which can with impunity lose one half of the troops employed in the field every year, only by the privations and hardships imposed upon them. Next we must compose our army of soldiers drawn from all classes of the population of the country; from the good and middling, as well in rank and in education, as from the bad, and not as other nations, and we, in particular do, from the bad only.

"Thirdly, we must establish such a system of discipline as the French have; a system founded upon the strength of the tyranny of the government, which operates upon an army composed of soldiers, the majority of whom are sober, well-disposed, amenable to order, and in some degree educated.

"When we shall have done all this, and shall have made these armies of the strength of those employed by the French, we may require them to live as the French do, viz., by authorized and regulated plunder of the country and its inhabitants, if any should remain; and we may expose them to the labour, hardships, and privations which the French soldier suffers every day; and we must expect the same proportion of loss every campaign, viz., one-half of those that take the field.

"This plan is not proposed for the British army, nor has it yet been practised in any great degree by the Portuguese; but I shall state the effect, which, in my opinion, the attempt has had upon the Spaniards.

"There is neither subordination nor discipline in the army, among either officers or soldiers; and it is not even attempted (as, indeed, it would be in vain to attempt) to establish either. It has, in my opinion, been the cause of the dastardly conduct which we have so frequently witnessed in the Spanish troops; and they have become

odious to their country; and the peaceable inhabitants, much as they detest and suffer from the French, almost wish for the establishment of Joseph's government, to be protected from the outrages of their own troops. These armies, therefore, must be paid and supported, if any service is expected from them; and at present, at least, I see no chance of their being paid, except by British assistance."

The hostile armies had now been in presence of each other for the space of near four months, and the only movement that had been made on either side was that of a strong reconnoissance under the command of Junôt, January 19th, on Rio Mayor, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the allied forces were being concentrated at Alcoeuvre. But Massena receiving information, by the medium of the renegade hidalgos, or Portuguese nobles, that the English general was meditating an attack and the relief of Badajos, apprehensive that he would not be able to maintain his intended positions against that attack, determined to retreat. Disease, famine, and desertion,* from the combined effects of which his army was gradually mouldering away, also forced him to that determination. Another cause that inclined him to retreat was the arrival in the Tagus of a fleet of transports, having the long-expected reinforcement of 7,000 men on board, on whose junction he well knew that lord Wellington would commence offensive operations. For these reasons the greater part of his general officers were urgent for a retreat. He accordingly commenced his arrangements for retreat in the end of February. Having gradually passed his sick and baggage upon Thomar, and destroyed all his ammunition and guns that could not be horsed, he maintained a bold front, and made a show of intending to pass the Zézere. When the impediments of the army had gained two marches, so that the progress of the troops might not be impeded, they made a bold movement with the sixth corps on the Lys, near Leyria, as if with the intention of advancing on Torres Vedras, but for the real purpose of com-

* The number of the deserters was so great, that they formed themselves into a little army, which they organized into regular companies, and, in conformity to the characteristic deeds of the French army, denominated themselves "the eleventh corps;" electing general officers and subalterns. It consisted of more than 1,600 men, who frequently attacked the foraging parties of the French, and made the prisoners join them. They occupied the country about Caldas and

Alcobaga in full sovereignty, as an established army of avowed professional robbers. Their influence and power at length became so predominant, that Massena sent two detachments against them; they fought desperately, but at length being surrounded and overpowered, they laid down their arms. Their leaders being shot, the men were again incorporated in their regiments, not being deemed the less eligible for the service in which the French army was engaged.

PELLING the English general to abstain from any active operation lest he should lay open his lines to his adversary.

Matters having thus been prepared, the French army retired, on the night of the 5th of March, from Santarem and its neighbourhood. On the following morning the appearance of motionless sentinels foretold the usual French ruse, and that the position had been abandoned.* The English army was in instant pursuit. Hill's division was sent across the Tagus for the purpose of protecting Abrantes, and embarrassing Massena's movements, should he attempt to retire by the Alemtejo, or take the route by Punhete. Beresford was ordered to advance to the relief of Badajos with the Portuguese and the fourth division, and a body of cavalry; and the third and fifth divisions directed to join from the Lines.

Massena's first movements indicated an intention of concentrating a force at Abrantes, and of attempting the passage of the Zezere. On the 8th his intention was more evidently developed; his line of retreat being directed through the valley of the Mondego, with the design of crossing the river of that name for the occupation of Coimbra. Leaving the second corps on the route to Espinal, and Loisson's division taking the road to Angiaio, the main body of the hostile army retreated in concentric lines on Pombal. That portion of the army was followed, and never lost sight of by the light division, the royal dragoons, and the first German hussars, who took above 200 prisoners.

On the 9th, the third and eighth corps-d'armée, and Montbrun's division of cavalry, were found posted on a table-land in front of Pombal. Some smart skirmishing took place between the cavalry of the hostile armies; but as the English general had not a sufficient body of troops in hand to commence a serious attack, and as he was informed by letter that Badajos was in a

state to hold out for a month, he recalled the fourth division and heavy cavalry already on its march to the Alemtejo. Before their arrival Massena had made, on the night of the 11th, a hasty retreat through the town of Pombal, leaving a body of troops in the castle; but on the following morning the 95th rifles and the 3rd caçadores drove the enemy out of the castle with so much spirit and impetuosity, that they had not time to destroy the bridge, though it was ready mined.

On the 12th, Ney, with the rear-guard, took up a strong position on a ridge of heights at the extremity of a defile between Pombal and Redinha, and he made so skilful a disposition of that force as to give it the appearance of a powerful force. Immediate orders were given for the attack of the enemy, and in less than an hour his right, which was covered by a wooded slope, was carried by the 52nd, the 95th rifles, the 3rd caçadores, and a company of the 48rd. In the mean time, Picton, with the third division, had seized the wooded heights that protected his left. But though his position was thus laid open, he maintained his ground, from a conviction that the English general was deceived as to his real strength; and such was really the case, so skilfully had he masked his force.

A lull therefore took place for about an hour, until a sufficient force could be concentrated to ensure success. Then, to adopt the vivid language of the author of *The War in the Peninsula*, "three shots from the British centre gave the signal for advance, when, in an instant, the green woods sparkled with bayonets, and the whole army was in full march across the plain; while horsemen and guns, starting simultaneously from the left wing and the centre, charged under a general volley from the French battalions. A dense cloud of smoke enveloped the enemy for a few moments, and when it rose upon the wind, and

* The French marshal has been reprehended by some writers, and accused of having committed a serious error in wasting the campaign in inactivity, in his cantonments at Santarem. But the following, among other causes, encouraged him to that measure:—1. The destitute state of the Portuguese army, numbers of whom had died of inanition, and a large portion had abandoned their colours, or deserted. 2. The distressed condition of that part of the population that had taken shelter within the lines of Torres Vedras. 3. The machination of the renegade hidalgos in the French party at Torres Novas, and their correspondence with the disaffected part of the Lisbon population. 4. The general disinclination of

the people of England to the continuance of the English army in Portugal—this information he obtained from the factious English newspapers. These causes he hoped would break up the alliance between England and Portugal. He also calculated, that the whigs, on their accession to office on the appointment of the regency, would recal Lord Wellington, and substitute in his place some "antiquated tactitioner;" and this opinion he caused to be disseminated among his troops, as an encouragement to bear up against their difficulties. In this respect he displayed that greatest of military qualifications—calculation of moral causes; and he who is not capable of the act, is "but half a general."

was scattered, no enemy was longer visible." The French had rapidly and skilfully withdrawn, and gained the village of Redinha before the English cavalry could reach them, and neither the utmost efforts of Picton's skirmishers, nor of the horse-artillery, could enable the pursuers to do more than slightly gall the rearmost of the fugitives with their fire. At length they were compelled to fall back upon the main body at Condeixa; but by this daring halt, a start had been gained of many hours, for the sick and wounded who were moving on Condeixa, with the baggage and field-equipage of the army, to cross the river with the main body of the army.

On the following day the pursuit was resumed, and the English advanced guard reached Condeixa* about ten o'clock in the morning of that day; but as the position the enemy had taken up was impassable in front, being covered by a marsh, and that the right of the heights on which he was posted was protected by a palisade, and breast-works thrown up on either side of the hollow, by which it could be approached, Picton was detached with the third division, by a circuitous path through the mountains of the Sierra de Anciao, for the purpose of turning the left flank of the enemy. As soon as Massena observed Picton winding round the bluff end of a mountain about eight miles distant from this position, the whole camp was thrown into confusion. A thick cloud of smoke was soon seen to rise from Condeixa, and their columns were at the same time observed hurrying towards Casal Nova, a village about three miles distant from Condeixa. The English advanced guard pursued with eagerness, but their advance was greatly impeded by the conflagration of the town, as also by the trees that had been felled and thrown across the road, and the block of rock that had been rolled down from the heights into the line of march. A multitude of fires were also simultaneously kindled to cover and conceal the flight of the fugitives with volumes of smoke. Yet the desire of the pursuers was so eager to close with their adversaries, that the few skirmishers and cavalry who had surmounted the obstacles, closed with the rear of the French, penetrated between the corps at Fonte Coberta (Massena's

head-quarters), and the rest of the retreating army, and nearly captured the French marshal, who escaped by disguising himself, and scrambling over the mountains by night to regain the army.

In the night the French divisions at Fonte Coberta "stole away" (as they had done in all the positions they had successively taken up), and favoured by the extreme darkness of the night, made for Miranda de Corvo. Sir William Erskine (who had been appointed to general Craufurd's command during the absence of that officer in England), put the light division in pursuit, at day-break of the 14th, without a vanguard or calling in his outposts. The ground was covered with so dense a fog that it was not possible to discern objects at many paces distance; but from the hills in front came the dull buzz of a great multitude. Uninfluenced by that ominous sound, Erskine sent forward the 52nd, without adopting any of the necessary and customary precautions. The road taking a sudden dip into the valley, that gallant regiment ("soldiers that had never met their match") was soon lost to sight in the mist, and passed the enemy's outposts without being observed, on account of the dense haze; but the fog clearing up, it was seen fiercely engaged in the midst of the hostile rear-guard.

At this critical juncture, lord Wellington came up. The whole of the light division was immediately pushed forward to succour the 52nd. Gradually, Picton and Cole, with the third and fourth divisions, were turning the enemy's left flank; and the first, fifth, and sixth divisions, with the heavy cavalry, and Ross and Bull's horse artillery advancing against his centre, he was driven from ridge to ridge, and at length flung back in great disorder on the main body at Miranda de Corvo, with the loss of one hundred prisoners. The casualties of the allies, in killed and wounded, were eleven officers, and one hundred and fifty privates; that of the enemy much greater. The "astounding indifference" to the safety of the troops and the violation of the rules of his art, by Erskine, having disconcerted the design of the commander-in-chief to turn the enemy's left flank, and for which object the third and fourth divisions were in march at of the 13th, in consequence of the information he received that Badajos had not surrendered, the fourth division marched for the same destination, in order to enable Beresford to relieve that fortress, and compel the enemy to break up the siege.

* Soon after the evacuation of Pombal, the English general being convinced that Massena would not deliver a general battle, detached from Condeixa a brigade of cavalry, and a division of Portuguese infantry, for the Alemtejo; and again, on the night

the moment, it was necessary to adopt the disadvantageous measures to extricate the 52nd from the perilous condition into which Erskine's culpable negligence had thrown them at Casal Nova.

The result of these operations was, that the rich districts of Upper Beira were saved from the invader's ravages, the English general having, by his skilful movements, compelled the enemy to the line of retreat between the Mondego and the mountain range of Anciao. The communication with the north provinces was also again opened. In the furtherance of these objects, colonel Trant had materially contributed.

That enterprising and indefatigable officer, ascertaining from the intercepted dispatches, that Montbrun was advancing with the cavalry to siege Coimbra, evacuating the suburb of Santa Clara, which is on the left bank of the river, and destroying an arch of the Coimbra bridge, on the city side, so actively saluted the French, on their approach, with a discharge from six pieces of artillery, that the French leader, supposing the city to be strongly garrisoned with the reinforcement that had long been expected from England, abandoned the attempt, and rejoined Massena at Miranda de Corvo.

Lord Wellington, now desirous to prevent the enemy's passage of the Mondego, as that line of march would present him with a country whose supplies were inexhaustible, he was again in active pursuit of the foe; and as, by the junction of Cole's division with Nightingale's at Espinhal, he had the power of turning the strong position of Miranda de Corvo, the enemy abandoned it, rapidly retreating to the bold and formidable line of mountains behind the Ceira, leaving Ney's corps on the left bank of the river, in a rugged and defensible position in front of the village of Fons d'Arence, to cover the retreat.

Again his pursuers were up with the foe. Late in the afternoon of the 16th, arrangements were made for driving in his rear-guard, preparatory to the movements for crossing the Ceira on the following morning. The light division and Pack's brigade were ordered to hold his right in play, and the third division to make a vigorous charge on his left, while a battery of horse artillery opened from an eminence a destructive fire. At the first charge, the left wing of the enemy was overthrown; and the panic-stricken troops, fleeing in confusion to the river, many were drowned by missing the

ford, or were crushed to death in a disorderly attempt to pass the bridge. The action on the right, on account of the ruggedness of the ground, had resolved itself into a number of desultory skirmishes, which enabled Ney in some measure to check the pursuit of his routed wing. Night, too, coming on, favoured his escape, and afforded him the opportunity of blowing up the bridge. His loss in killed and wounded exceeded five hundred men; that of the English, four officers and sixty privates. Ney, in consequence of the reproaches of Massena as to the slow march of the rear-guard, indignantly ordered the whole of the plunder which had been collected by the French army in its retreat to be burned, and the execution was begun on Massena's own share. Here, as at Condeixa, Redinha, and Casal Nova, having driven in the rear-guard, a direct attack on the main body would have been fatal to the army of the enemy, and would have compelled him to abandon his artillery and baggage; but as the attack in each case might have been attended with material loss, the English general preferred acting on the flanks, in order to reserve his men, to meet the additional force they would have to encounter on the frontiers. This was the reason that, in each case, as also in those in which opportunities presented themselves, that lord Wellington did not avail himself of those opportunities. He was not like Buonaparte, a general, as Kleber said, who "used up ten thousand men a-week." Besides, his force was, during the whole retreat, much inferior to that of his adversary, and he had not the means of replacing the casualties as his adversary had.

The allied army was constrained to halt for a day, partly on account of the destruction of the bridge, and partly from want of the necessary supplies of provisions, and the destitute state of the Portuguese troops, many of whom had perished from inanition, and a large portion of whom were unable to follow the army after passing Pombal. "I had," says the English commander-in-chief, in his statement to the British minister, "repeatedly urged the governors of the kingdom to adopt measures to supply the [native] troops with regularity, and to keep up the establishments while the army was in cantonments on the Rio Mayor river; which representations were not attended to: and when the army was to move forward, the Portuguese troops had no provisions,

nor any means of conveying any to them. They were to move through a country ravaged and exhausted by the enemy; and, it is literally true, that general Pack's brigade and colonel Ashworth's had nothing to eat for four days, although constantly marching or engaged with the enemy.

"I was obliged either to direct the British commissary-general to supply the Portuguese troops, or to see them starve for want; and the consequence is, that the supplies intended for the British troops are exhausted, and we must halt till more come up, which I hope will be this day."*

In the night of the 16th, a bridge of tressels was constructed, and on the following morning the army passed the river in pursuit. Again the enemy was, on the 19th, driven from the strong position he had taken behind the Alva, on the Serra de Moita; his antagonist having, with consummate skill, turned the French left by the Serra de Santa Quiteira, with the first, third, and fifth divisions, while the light and sixth divisions manœuvred in front from the Serra de Murcella. These movements compelled the enemy to concentrate his forces on the Moita, and being thus out-manceuvred, to push forward for Celerico and Guarda. As the utmost speed was necessary with such a pursuer, he was compelled again to destroy more baggage, ammunition, and stores, as also all his guns that could not be well horsed; and to abandon his foraging parties that had been sent towards the Mondego, of whom above eight hundred were intercepted and taken prisoners on their return to the Alva.

As the allied army had again outmarched its supplies, it was compelled to halt till those that had been sent round from Lisbon to Coimbra should arrive. This halt was absolutely unavoidable; food of no kind was to be found in the country, the enemy having devastated it on both flanks of his march, and every day's march increased the distance from the magazines on the Tagus and those which had been conveyed to Coimbra, thereby rendering the supply of the troops more difficult and precarious. But the case was not so with the French. When they left Santarem each man was provided with bread for fifteen days' march. They also collected large supplies by pillage, in the course of their march, and were aided more by the treachery of the renegade hidalgos, and the faction of the patriarch and

Souza; for that faction not only neglected to supply their own countrymen with food, but their agents were discovered to have placed large supplies at Coimbra and on the Alva, within reach of the enemy at most critical moments.

The pursuit of the enemy towards Celerico was, however, prosecuted by the commander-in-chief at the head of the cavalry and the light troops, supported by the sixth and third divisions, and the militia, under Trant and Wilson, on the right of the Mondego. Here above one hundred prisoners were taken, and about the same number of the fugitives slain.

Massena had now taken post at Guarda, a town situated on the summit of a steep hill, forming part of the Estrella range. In this strong position he hoped to be able to maintain himself until he could by a counter-march to the Elga, through Subugal and Peña Maçor, establish his communications with Soult across the Tagus, and with the intrusive king, Joseph Buonaparte, by the valley of that river. But on the morning of the 29th he found his dream of security dispelled. Five columns of attack, consisting of three divisions of infantry and two regiments of cavalry, supported on the wings by the fifth division and the Portuguese militia under Trant and Wilson, and in the centre by the fifth and seventh divisions, were seen simultaneously ascending by as many routes, the Guarda mountain, in the form of a semicircle, and all converging to one given point on the citadel, and at the same time overlapping both of the enemy's flanks. At the apparition of the attacking columns, the enemy, in the greatest hurry and confusion, abandoned this almost impregnable position, and fleeing with the utmost precipitation, he did not halt until he had placed the Coa between himself and his pursuers. Several brigades were nearly cut off, and baggage, ammunition and stores, as well as a portion of the property of which the Portuguese had been robbed, fell into the hands of the pursuers. The light division regaled themselves with the provisions, which were in a state of preparation on the fires of the enemy's bivouac.

Still followed and harassed by his unweariedly active pursuer, whose vigilance and activity allowed him no rest, and whose sagacity seemed to divine his plans at the very first movement he made to put them into execution, he was obliged to seek safety in constant flight. In his retreat to Subugal, his pursuer was quickly upon his track; and,

* *Wellington Despatches.*

—although Massena had taken up a strong position, the ground being admirably calculated for defence, and approachable only by its left, the river Coa, which makes a considerable elbow near Subugal, covering two sides of the triangular position, and its banks being very steep and rugged throughout its course—Wellington quickly dislodged him from his stronghold.

Here the French marshal determined to make a last effort to maintain his hold of Portugal, and avoid the disgrace of being foiled by his adversary, whom, in his boastful and bombastic proclamation, he had threatened to drive into the sea in less than three months from the time of his invasion of Portugal. His head-quarters were at Alfayates; his left, consisting of the second corps, had one flank upon a height immediately above the bridge and town of Subugal, and the other extended along the road to Alfayates as far as a lofty ridge, which commanded all the approaches to Subugal from the fords of the Coa above the town. The sixth corps was at Roveria, and communicated with the second by Rendo. The right wing was at Ponte Sequeiras. The eighth corps was under the immediate command of Massena at Alfayates.

On the 1st of April, the English army was concentrated on the right bank of the Coa; and at break of day of the 3rd was in motion to drive the enemy from his position. It was the object of the English commander-in-chief to cut off the sixth corps at Roveria before it could be succoured. For this purpose his dispositions of attack were that different divisions should simultaneously pass the Coa at three several fords, and by the bridge at Subugal, and attack the enemy in front, flank, and rear, at the same moment. The cavalry, which formed the extreme right of the British position, was directed to ford the Upper Coa; the light division a little lower down above Subugal; the third still lower; and the fifth with the artillery, by the bridge at Subugal, all to converge on the position of the sixth corps. The first and the seventh were kept as a reserve, and the sixth to observe the corps at Roveria. But this well-concerted plan was marred in its execution by the untowardness of the weather and the unskilfulness of the commander (Erskine) of the light division, who, the author of *The War in the Peninsula* says, “did not put the columns in a right direction; nor were the brigades held together; and

he carried off the cavalry.” The untowardness of the weather consisted in the morning breaking in a mist and fog, which soon turned to a dark heavy rain, making it impossible for the troops to gain their respective posts of attack with that simultaneous regularity which is essential to decisive success.

Beckwith's brigade, consisting of the 43rd, four companies of the 95th, and three companies of the 3rd caçadores, first forded the river, and, by some unaccountable miscalculation of Erskine, was ordered to attack before the other columns had advanced far enough to their respective battle stations to support him. By that injudicious order the little band was unconsciously advancing against more than 12,000 infantry, supported by cavalry and artillery.

No sooner had the rifles driven in the enemy's pickets, and reached the top of the hill, than they were forced back upon the 43rd by overwhelming numbers; and at the same moment, the fog clearing off, exhibited to Beckwith the magnitude of his peril. But he resolved to meet it. Heading a fierce charge, he beat back the enemy, and gained the summit of the hill, when he was attacked in front and flank by fresh troops, supported by cavalry, while the fire of two guns at musket range poured in a deadly discharge of grape-shot on his little band; and at the same time the fire of the French musketry was increasing to a perfect storm of bullets. To protect himself he posted his men in a small stone enclosure, which was fortunately at hand, where he maintained the unequal combat, and repelled all the assaults of the enemy till the 52nd advanced to his aid. The French now began to fall fast. A howitzer was taken from them, and the English skirmishers of the 52nd falling back on the main body of the regiment, the whole of the men instantly forming line behind a stone wall, overthrew with their rolling fire everything that ventured to attack them.

Regnier at length, perceiving the insufficiency of his partial attacks, advanced a column of 6,000 men, supported by cavalry and artillery; but captain Hopkins, with a company of the 52nd, seizing a small eminence, commanding the ascent by which the enemy was advancing, with two volleys throwing them into confusion, immediately charged them with the bayonet. At the same crisis, the leading brigade, under general Colville, of the third division, issuing out of the woods on the enemy's right, opened a

destructive fire on that flank; while the 5th, having carried the bridge, was ascending the heights on the same flank; and at the same moment the cavalry was advancing on the high ground on the left of the enemy. Regnier, finding himself nearly surrounded, availing himself of a violent storm of hail, which prevented the armies from seeing each other for a time, retreated rapidly on Rendo; where, being joined by the sixth corps, he fell back upon Alfayates. Besides leaving the field of battle in possession of the victors, he lost about 1,500 men, of whom above 300 were taken prisoners. The loss of the allied army scarcely amounted to 200 men. The great loss of the French in killed and wounded, was occasioned in their endeavours to recapture the howitzer, which, on the termination of the battle, stood on the brow of the hill, guarded by Death itself, every brave soldier who had attempted its rescue having fallen a victim to the unerring fire of his opponents. Had Slade pursued vigorously with the cavalry, the retreat of the enemy would have been disastrous. To remedy his insufficiency, the light division was detached in the route of Valdesperna, to feel for the enemy on the side of the passes leading on Coria. On this eventful day, individual courage had served to equalize the fearful disparity of numbers, and the result was proportionate. Though the whole affair had not occupied an hour, the loss of the enemy exceeded 1,000 men, while that of the allies amounted scarcely to 200. Its approbation by the English general was commensurate. In his despatch he says, "although the operations of this day were, by unavoidable accidents, not performed in the manner I intended they should be, I consider the action that was fought by the light division, by colonel Beckwith's brigade chiefly, with the whole of the second corps, to be one of the most glorious that British troops were ever engaged in." Or, as he afterwards observed in a lighter vein, in a private letter, "we have given the French a handsome dressing, and I think they will not again say that we are not a manœuvring army. We may not manœuvre so beautifully as they do, but I do not desire better sport than to meet one of their columns *en masse* with our lines. The poor second corps received a terrible threshing from the 43rd and the 52nd on the 3rd."

During the night that followed the combat of Subugal, Massena continued his retreat, and on the 5th of April crossed the

frontier of Spain, having in the various combats sustained a severe loss in killed and wounded, and near 3,000 prisoners. Wellington now stood victorious on the confines of Portugal, having achieved that which to some seemed "incredibly rash and vain even to attempt," and proved that there was one "whose consummate genius and comprehensive plans could overwhelm Napoleon and his generals;" and that though a "*homme borne*," "a man of confined ideas and the plodding pupil of the old system," as Napoleon and his fellow-scribes of the imperial press denominated him, that "his happy blunders and hair-breadth escapes," as they termed them, could foil and frustrate "the mighty projects of the master-mind of Napoleon, at the touch of whose hand the military power of England, and the reputation of her generals," was "to be dissipated and vanish as a mist before the sun."

But sneers and taunts, defamation and calumny, respecting the military character of England, and the skill of her generals, were not confined to the French press; the factious (or, in more correct terms, the un-English and unnatural) journalists of England were busy in lauding the French general's military talents. To disparage the exploits of their glorious countryman, and exalt the generalship of his antagonist, they said that "Massena had the credit of paralyzing the *superior* forces of lord Wellington until he could bid defiance to their utmost efforts;" and, adopting the Frenchman's subterfuge to give a false colouring to his flight, they described the retreat from the Zezere to the Agueda as "a manœuvre of Massena to lead the English from their resources, and to approach his own supplies."

All Wellington's masterly plans and combinations, by which, with an inferior force, he had manœuvred his adversary out of every position he had attempted to defend, all of which were with difficulty assailable by any superiority of numbers (for the country afforded many advantageous positions to a retreating army), were said by the chief organ of the party, who, from interested and corrupt motives, felt disposed to calumniate the reputation of the English general, and depreciate the military character of their country, to be "the movements of an idle game, which would be disconcerted at the touch of the master hand who ruled the destinies of Europe; that it was insanity itself, and deceiving the

nation, to assert that any British army could ultimately succeed in arresting the progress of Napoleon's arms, and preventing the accomplishment of his gigantic views." In another of the calumniating publications they accused him of having, in the noble prosecution of his measures, "lapsed into unjustifiable want of intelligence and erroneous judgment." Among the alarmists and despondents of the times, lord Holland was eminently conspicuous for his prophetic spirit respecting the result of his illustrious fellow-countryman's exertions for the salvation of the freedom of Europe. His precise words were—"That he believed the peninsula might be rescued, if some great master spirit in the art of war should arise, whose mighty genius and comprehensive plans would overwhelm Napoleon and his generals; but he regretted, that at the commencement of the year 1811, he saw no prospect of any genius of that sort arising amongst his countrymen." Unfortunately for the credit of the sagacious seer, the refutation of his calumny was on its passage to England while he was giving birth to his twaddle. The just and generous rebuke which M. Thiers, in his *History of the Consulate and the Empire*, gives those prophetic worthies, the scribes of the press, and the members of the senate, for their unworthy and unnatural slander of the military character of their country, reflects equal honour on his candour as a man and his credit as an historian.

The only French force that now remained in Portugal was the garrison of Almeida, and a brigade of the ninth corps, which was employed in covering the march of the battering train from Almeida to Ciudad Rodrigo. To intercept this last-mentioned force, ten squadrons of cavalry, and a troop of horse-artillery were despatched under the command of sir William Erskine, whom we have already seen not competent to the trust confided to him; and on their attacking the enemy near Fort Concepcion, he rapidly formed his force into squares, and bravely retreated over the plain, without sustaining any loss from his incompetent opponent.

Massena had invaded Portugal with one of the finest armies that ever had been marshalled under the standard of France, and was supplied with every description of warlike muniment necessary for the undertaking. He had been re-enforced while at Santarem with 10,000 men under Drouet,

and with 9,000 convalescents, &c., during his retreat. Belmas says, that when he recrossed the frontiers, he "could hardly number 35,000 broken and dispirited troops."* And all this waste of human life had served no other end, than to fix an eternal blot of dishonour on the escutcheon of France—an imperishable disgrace to the French people, both as men and soldiers. The name of the French chief was not only infamous for his ruthless cruelties and wanton barbarity, but was equally conspicuous for the want of good faith. So absolutely incapable was he of honourable and soldierly feeling, that the English commander-in-chief declared, that he could not even treat with him for an exchange of prisoners; and when earnestly entreated to do so by his friends, his reply was—"He (Massena) executed with so little good faith the only agreement for an exchange that I ever made with him, that it is impossible to propose another to get out of his hands the few prisoners he may have." How deeply he felt and resented the dishonourable conduct of the French marshal appears also from the following reply to Marmont when he succeeded Massena in the command of the French army:—

"Au Quartier Général de l'Armée, Anglaise,
Ce 25 Mai, 1811.

"MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,—Je n'ai reçu que le 22me la lettre que votre excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 16me de ce mois; et j'ai tardé d'y envoyer une réponse jusqu'à ce que j'aie pu savoir si le colonel La Motte était toujours à Celerico, où on l'avait envoyé. Je suis fâché de vous faire savoir qu'il était déjà parti pour Lisbonne, mais si vous voulez avoir la bonté d'envoyer Monsieur le lieutenant-colonel Hill aux avant-postes de l'armée, j'aurai soin que Monsieur le colonel Motte soit tout de suite renvoyé à l'armée Française.

Peu de jours après que M. le Prince d'Essling eut pris le commandement de l'armée qui est à présent sous les ordres de votre excellence, je lui avais proposé que les chirurgiens et les officiers des autres départemens civils des armées fussent considérés comme non-combattans, et que s'ils étaient pris, ils seraient rendus des deux côtés. Mais son excellence ne m'a donné aucune réponse sur cette proposition, malgré quelle fait accompagnée par l'offre de rendre quelques officiers de santé de l'armée Française qui avaient été pris. Après, quand

* *Journal des Sieges.*

tout l'ambulance de l'armée Française fait prise à Coimbra, son excellence m'a proposé que les officiers de santé seraient censés non-combatants, et que les non-combatants seraient rendus de part et d'autre. Mais c'était alors trop tard ; cars dans le temps qui était passé, depuis que je lui fis la même proposition, j'avais reçu la copie des pièces d'une négociation entre les gouvernemens Anglais et Française pour l'échange des prisonniers de guerre, par lesquelles j'ai vu que les non-combatants de toute espèce, des voyageurs, des marchands qui suivaient leurs affaires, des personnes qui n'avaient rien à faire avec la guerre, détenus en France quand elle a malheureusement commencée, étaient censés prisonniers de guerre, et devaient être changés comme tels en cartel, pour des officiers et des soldats de l'armée Française.

" Il n'est plus donc dans mon pouvoir de mettre en liberté quelque prisonnier que ce soit, comme non-combatants ; et je le regrette d'autant plus, que j'aurais eu le plus grand plaisir à me rendre au désir de votre excellence en faveur de Monsieur le sous-inspecteur ville sur Ance.

" Je l'honneur d'être, &c.,

" WELLINGTON."

" Le Maréchal Marmont, duc de Raguse."

And the liberation of Portugal was not the only good accomplished by the expulsion of Massena and his horde of marauders. From it originated that point of reaction in the career of French conquests from which all the subsequent reverses of "the common enemy of the human race" may be dated, and the emancipation of Europe from his galling and ignominious yoke effected. It shook the belief and stupid hallucination of the continental nations of Europe, and the alarmists and factious of our own country in the invincibility of French arms, and "the mighty and overpowering genius of Napoleon ;" taught Russia in what spirit of constancy his lawless and gigantic power might be resisted ; and awakened the subjugated nations of Europe to the hope of deliverance from their thralldom and oppression.

At this period of the war, the marauding spirit of the enemy was in its full vigour and activity. The conduct of the enemy during their continuance in Portugal, and throughout the retreat, was one universal scene of outrage and violence. "Their conduct," says the English commander-in-chief, "throughout the retreat was marked

by a barbarity seldom equalled, and never surpassed."* Nor was the English commander-in-chief singular in this opinion. Numerous other authorities might be readily cited. "Having paid the tribute of praise which is due to marshal Massena," says colonel Jones, "as a general, it is but proper to notice his conduct as a man, and to endeavour to hold him up to the execration of his fellow-men, by stating, as an eye-witness, that the inhuman cruelties which marked every step of his retreat, rank him as one of the greatest monsters that ever disgraced the human form." "The deplorable scenes of havoc and devastation—the terrible spectacles of bloodshed and cruelty continually before our eyes," says one of the pursuers, "are such, that to see the country is to weep for the horrors of war, and enough to make one's blood curdle in one's veins to think that man can inflict so demoniac deeds on his fellow-men." "Nothing," says General Picton, in a letter addressed to colonel Pleydel, dated the 24th of March, 1811, and published in his *Life* by the late Theodore Hook, "can exceed the devastation and cruelties committed by the enemy during the whole course of the retreat ; setting fire to all the villages, and murdering all the peasantry for leagues on each flank of his columns. Their atrocities have been such and so numerous, that the name of Frenchman must be execrated here for ages." Even the author of *The History of the War in the Peninsula* says—"Every horror that could make war hideous attended that dreadful march. Distress, conflagration, death in all modes. On every side unlimited violence, unlimited vengeance." In a word, the whole line of retreat was marked by fire, desolation, and blood ; and the most ruthless and vindictive spirit of revenge by the humbled and baffled foe. In many extensive districts neither a living animal nor an article of subsistence was to be found ; and to adopt the mock philanthropic lament of the foe when he beheld the wise precaution of his opponent on his invasion of the country, "near 2,000 square miles of country were reduced to the state of a desert." Not only towns and villages had been pillaged and set on fire, and even churches and hospitals destroyed, but the inhabitants wantonly massacred. In the district of Coimbra alone, above 8,000 of its inhabitants were massa-

* *Wellington Despatches.*

cred by the cruel and ruthless foe as they passed in their retreat. And so bitter and unappeasable was his vindictive spirit of revenge, that he shot by the wayside the inhabitants of Miranda de Corvo whom he had compelled to accompany him as guides, when their services were no longer required. Along the whole line of their retreat, the peasants were to be seen hanging on the trees by the roadside, blackened in the sun. The priests were impaled by the throat on the sharpened branches of the trees, as an indication of the rancour and revenge of the baffled foe for their exhorting their countrymen to resistance. Even in the towns which had been the head-quarters of some of the corps for four months, namely, Torres Nova, Thomar, Leyria, &c., and in which the inhabitants had been induced by promises of good treatment, and the proclamation of Massena, to remain, had to lament their credulity amidst scenes of plunder, violation, blood, and conflagration, and that too even on the very night of the enemy's flight. His vengeance and cruelty extended even to the brute creation. The horses, mules, asses, and oxen employed in the conveyance of his artillery, ammunition, and stores, as they became exhausted, were hamstringed, and left to perish from famine. To those who wish to know the full measure of French atrocity and French outrages in the conquered countries, we recommend the perusal of a work entitled *Galli in Hispania; seu Napoleonis Rapacitatis Descriptio, Duo Partes, Romaicæ Persepoli*, 1814. Among many other trustworthy publications, general Foy's *History of the Peninsular War*, and M. Thiers' *History of the Consulate and Empire of France*, contain some just and true acknowledgments on the same subject; and form a striking contrast to some works published by our own countrymen, which are either studiously silent on the subject, or attempt to cast a veil over those hideously criminal acts.

As a relief from the above disgusting detail of French ferocious atrocities, it is but right to say, that no doubt a large and gallant proportion of the French army, both officers and privates, viewed with abhorrence and contempt the acts of ruffians who disgraced the name of soldier, though those acts were approved and sanctioned, and even commanded by orders from head-quarters.

On the riddance of the soil of Portugal from Massena and his Gallic horde, the

English general caused the following proclamation to be published:—

“PROCLAMATION.

“10th April, 1811.

“The Portuguese nation are informed that the cruel enemy who had invaded Portugal, and had devastated their country, have been obliged to evacuate it, after suffering great losses, and have retired across the Agueda. The inhabitants of the country are therefore at liberty to return to their occupations.

“The marshal-general refers them to the proclamation which he addressed to them in August last, a copy of which will accompany this proclamation.

“The Portuguese nation now know by experience that the marshal-general was not mistaken either in the nature or the amount of the evil with which they were threatened, or respecting the only remedies to avoid it, viz., decided and determined resistance, or removal and the concealment of all property, and everything which could lead to the subsistence of the enemy, or to facilitate his progress.

“Nearly four years have now elapsed since the tyrant of Europe invaded Portugal with a powerful army. The cause of this invasion was not self-defence; it was not to seek revenge for insults offered, or injuries done by the benevolent sovereign of this kingdom; it was not even the ambitious desire of augmenting his own political power; as the Portuguese government had, without resistance, yielded to all the demands of the tyrant; but the object was the insatiable desire of plunder, the wish to disturb the tranquillity, and to enjoy the riches of a people who had passed nearly half a century in peace.

“The same desire occasioned the invasion of the northern provinces of Portugal in 1809, and the same wish for plunder the invasion of 1810, now happily defeated; and the marshal-general appeals to the experience of those who have been witnesses of the conduct of the French army during these three invasions, whether confiscation, plunder, and outrage, are not the sole objects of their attention, from the general down to the soldier.

“Those countries which have submitted to the tyranny have not been better treated than those which have resisted. The inhabitants have lost all their possessions, their families have been dishonoured, their religion destroyed; and, above all, they

have deprived themselves of the honour of that manly resistance to the oppressor of which the people of Portugal have given so signal and so successful an example.

"The marshal-general, however, considers it his duty, in announcing the intelligence of the result of the last invasion, to warn the people of Portugal, that although the danger is removed, it is not entirely gone by. They have something to lose, and the tyrant will endeavour to plunder them: they are happy under the mild government of a beneficent sovereign; and he will endeavour to destroy their happiness: they have successfully resisted him, and he will endeavour to force them to submit to his iron yoke. They should be unremitting in their preparations for decided and steady resistance; those capable of bearing arms should learn the use of them; or those whose age or sex renders them unfit to bear arms, should fix upon places of security and concealment, and should make all the arrangements for their easy removal to them when the moment of danger shall approach. Valuable property, which tempts the avarice of the tyrant and his followers, should be carefully buried beforehand, each individual concealing his own, and thus not trusting to the weakness of others to keep a secret in which they may not be interested.

"Measures should be taken to conceal or destroy provisions which cannot be removed, and everything that can tend to facilitate the enemy's progress; for this may be depended on, that the enemy's troops seize on everything, and leave nothing for the owner.

"By these measures, whatever may be the superiority of numbers with which the desire of plunder and of revenge may induce, and his power may enable, the tyrant again to invade this country, the result will be certain; and the independence of Portugal, and the happiness of its inhabitants, will be finally established to their eternal honour.

"WELLINGTON."

The English general having, by his consummate stratagetic plans and combinations, baffled his opponent, and proved to him that he was too powerful for resistance, disposed his army in cantonments between the Coa and the Agueda, and established his headquarters at Villa Formosa. Two causes prevented him from continuing the pursuit of his baffled and humbled foe, and taking a position beyond the Agueda. First, the

deplorable condition of the Portuguese forces, their destitution being so great that daily desertion took place from their ranks; and, secondly, to restore the equipments and reorganization of the troops, which the rapidity of the pursuit had greatly disarranged. Almeida was blockaded, it not being possible to undertake its siege for want of battering artillery, and the requisite siege stores; so apathetically indifferent were the authorities at home, and the Portuguese government, to the interests of the army, and the successful issue of the war. Lord Liverpool, quailing under the heartless and insidious clamour of the Whig faction in parliament for economy, even required the return of many battalions to England, to join the misjudged and calamitous expedition to Walcheren. So limited and short-sighted were the views of the timid and inefficient cabinet of the day!

The English general being relieved from an immediate surprise on the frontier of Beira, surrendered the command of the army to sir Brent Spencer, and proceeded to the Alemtejo to arrange measures with Beresford for the recovery of Badajos, the disgraceful surrender of which fortress had occasioned him much disappointment.

The episodal military operations of this campaign were the expedition, under general lord Blaney, to the southern coast of Spain, and the battle of Barossa.

The object of the expedition under Blaney was to make a feint attack on a depôt of artillery and stores collected in the castle of Fuengirola, distant about twenty miles west of Malaga, in the hope that Sebastiani would hasten from that city to the relief of the castle; and, in the event of his doing so, Blaney's instructions were to re-embark his force, and attempt the surprise of Malaga. The expedition sailed early in October, 1810, for the purpose; and consisted of a battalion of the 89th, a corps of Italian and German deserters from the French army, and the Spanish regiment of Toledo, drawn from the garrison of Ceuta; in all about fifteen hundred men. Sebastiani gaining intelligence of the design, advanced to the relief of the place. Blaney, strangely mistaking his advanced guard for Spanish troops coming to his assistance, was captured, with two hundred of his men; and the whole detachment would have been taken prisoners had not the Rodney, with the 82nd regiment on board, hove in sight

at the critical moment; when the flank companies of that regiment being disembarked, checked the enemy, and enabled the remainder of Blaney's force to regain their shipping. The ultimate of this untoward affair was, that Blaney acted with but little skill and prudence through the affair. He fruitlessly occupied himself for two days in attempting to batter the place with a few twelve-pounders; instead of which foolish act, he should have re-embarked his force, as it was morally certain that the enemy would, in the course of that time, obtain intelligence of his presence; and therefore the attempt at surprise would be rendered nugatory. But Blaney's tarriance until his adversary was prepared for him, formed a contrast to sir John Murray's rapidity of movement on the north coast of Spain some time afterwards, who was in so great a hurry to get out of Suchet's way, that he left all his baggage behind him. Or the funny freak of the same gentleman—he "who was afraid of being pushed into the Douro," at the passage of that river—when he abandoned "the time-honoured battering train of Badajos" to the same "fearful Frenchman," from a supposition that "*it was not worth carrying away, as other cannon could be manufactured.*"

The battle of Barrossa originated out of the following transaction:—The French having forced the extraordinarily strong pass of the Sierra Morena, and overrun Andalusia, quickly advanced from Seville on Cadiz.* Early in February, 1811, Victor reached that city just in time to see the troops of Albuquerque (who had, by forced marches, traversed the distance of 260 miles in nine days, and thus opportunely saved that city from the grasp of the enemy) on the walls, and manning the works of the Isle of Leon. Soult soon arrived to direct, in person, the operations of the siege. For that purpose, a line of contravallation was formed around the bay, from San Lucar to Chiclana; to the extent of twenty-five miles. The line was composed of three grand positions at Chiclana, Puerto Real, and Santa Maria, strongly fortified and connected by intrenched camps, which cut off all commu-

nication with the country. His conduct here even surpassed his savage cruelties in Portugal. There, besides the most unbounded plunder and rapacity, he caused all persons suspected of holding communication with the English colonel, Trant, or the Portuguese general, Silveira, to be hung from the trees along the road-side; and not only left them hanging there, but forbade them to be buried. A party of militia, under the command of a lieutenant-colonel, having surprised a chef d'escadron near the village of Arrifana, and slain him and three of his escort, Soult ordered general Thomières to seize twenty of the inhabitants, and having tied them back to back, to shoot them in the presence of the whole village, and then to set fire to it.

For the defence of the place, lord Wellington detached general sir William Stewart, with 2,000 men from Lisbon; and the governor of Gibraltar sent one thousand more for the same purpose. The English general, immediately on his arrival, prepared to restore and reoccupy the insulated outwork of Fort Matagorda, which, with the Trocadero, though both important posts, had been abandoned and dismantled by their timid and ignorant defenders. The former is an insulated outwork, situated on a rocky islet, a short distance from the Trocadero, and about 4,000 yards distant from Cadiz.

For the re-possession of that post, 150 men, consisting partly of soldiers and sailors, pushed, under the command of captain Mac Lean, of the 94th, on the night of the 22nd of February, across the channel, during a storm, and, taking possession of it, made a lodgment. As the operations of the little garrison, with their seven guns, interrupted the progress of the enemy's works for near two months, the fire of fifty pieces of heavy ordnance was now concentrated on it. After the iron tempest had raged thirty hours, the fort being reduced to a mere pile of ruins, and above half of its gallant garrison down; the survivors were, on the night of the 22nd of April, withdrawn, bearing with them the colours, which had been six times shot away and as often re-hoisted, amidst the cheers of the brave

* Cadiz, which is the great arsenal of Spain, and the principal rendezvous of the Spanish navy, and, until the defection of the South American colonies, was the great emporium of the commerce of that region of the earth, is situated on a ledge of rocks placed at the extremity of a narrow tongue of land, projecting five miles north-north-west from the Isle of Leon,—which island is separated from the main-

land by the river Sante Petri,—and has two of its sides washed by the sea, the right one looking on the harbour. The isle covers the fortress and the harbour, which is a vast basin of from ten to twelve leagues in circumference. The strongholds of the Trocadero and Matagorda, and the three other forts of St. Sebastian, St. Catherine, and Louis, defend the bay.

band that had so gloriously defended them. At the same time the works of the fort were blown up. By their heroic defence of this little post, this little band of heroes had not only prevented, by their persevering gallantry, any attack being made on other quarters of the panic-stricken city, but eventually proved its salvation.

While the crashing flight of metal was playing on the devoted garrison from the guns and mortars, the following display of female heroism took place. A serjeant's wife observing a drummer-boy hesitating, in consequence of the terrible shower of shot and shell which was falling, to fetch water from the well of the fort, took the bucket from him; and though a shot cut the cord of the bucket short from her hand, she recovered the vessel, and returned to her quarters with the water. Another memorable occurrence took place at the siege of this fort. When the retention of the place was no longer possible, major Lefevre, of the engineers, carried the order to the governor to withdraw the garrison. When the whole garrison had descended the ladder, a point of etiquette arose between the major and captain Maclean, who should quit the

scene of danger last. Captain Maclean politely offered the precedence to the major, who, while as politely conceding it to the commandant, had his head struck off by a 32-pounder, discharged from the enemy's batteries.

The siege of Cadiz still continued. But Soult having received directions from Paris to take a strong draught of the army, and having laid siege to and captured Olivenza and Badajos, to advance to the relief of Massena at Santarem, the prosecution of the siege was committed to Victor. As soon as general Graham arrived at Cadiz, which was in the early part of February, to take the command of the English forces then co-operating in the defence of that city, he concerted a plan with the Spanish general, Lapeña, then governor of Cadiz, to surprise the French besieging army under marshal Victor; and, by driving the French general out of his lines, to raise the siege of Cadiz. That noble and spirited conception he proposed to put into execution by an expedition sailing from Cadiz to Tariffa, where it was to be joined by a Spanish force from St. Roque, the 28th* English regiment, and the flank companies of the 9th and 82nd regiments,

* The presence of the gallant 28th, in the memorable battle of Barossa, presents a favourable opportunity of introducing to the reader's notice the soubriquets, or nick-names, of certain distinguished regiments, &c.; of which distinctions those regiments are proud and tenacious. The 28th of the line enjoys a distinction which no other regiment in the service, perhaps in any service in the world, possesses:—viz., the privilege of wearing a badge on the *back* as well as on the front of their shakos; being thus doubly decorated, both prospectively and retrospectively, or as their mates and brothers-in-arms of the *aqualiquid* profession would phrase it, "fore and aft." This distinction that gallant corps obtained for their conduct in the battle under the walls of Alexandria, Egypt, where, under the command of sir Edward Paget, they performed the prompt and decisive manœuvre of facing the rear-rank to the right about; thus repulsing, when attacked in front by a formidable force of infantry, and assailed at the same moment by a body of cavalry in the rear, while posted in a ruined and open intrenchment. For this exploit, "the slashers," as the regiment was afterwards familiarly termed in military parlance, acquired the emblem of the double decoration. Other regiments, as well as the 28th, have their cognomens, and have similar or equal distinction, obtained for some particular conduct displayed in a course of honourable service. But as qualifications of the kind are too numerous in the British army, when properly officered and properly led, to allow enumeration, and too well known to require repetition, we shall confine our statement to the matter of cognomens, or, as our friends, and when unfortunately we are at loggerheads together, truly-gallant enemies, on the other side of the water, express themselves,

soubriquet, but which downright, plain-speaking Mr. Bull would, in his lingo, term *nicknames*, *crack palaver*, &c. Thus the 57th regiment, for their gallant and enduring spirit at the battle of Albuera (where only one officer was left standing out of twenty-four, and 168 privates out of 584), bear the significant and honourable distinction of *The Die-hards*, a title the 27th are as justly entitled to for their conduct at Waterloo, where the principal part of them covered with their lifeless bodies the ground upon which they had maintained the honour and glory of their country. The 87th, for their capture of the French eagle at Barossa (a task of no easy performance, as the French, whenever they were hard pressed, or took to their heels, unscrewed their eagles, and pocketed them, throwing away the banner staff and bit of tawdry silk, as a waif to their pursuers, and even as a *ruse de guerre* for the retardment of the Johnny Raws in the English service,) are termed, in the true and native phraseology of the Emerald Islanders, "Sure arn't they the aigle-ketchers." The Royals, from their boasted antiquity (their enrolment dating from the year 1633; being the oldest regiment in any European service, except the Austrian regiments, the 24th and the 36th of the line, which had been raised the preceding year; and the Spanish regiment, *Immemorial del Rey*, the date of whose establishment is beyond memory,) are styled *Pontius Pilate's Guards*. The Queen's, from the effigies of the Agnus Dei appearing on their appointments, and, satirically, in allusion to their accompanying, under the infamous colonel Kerke, and the no less infamous and savage judge Jeffreys, during "the bloody assizes," *Kerke's Lambs*. The 89th are christened, *The Yorickers*. The 50th, from their black facings and numerical standing in the regiments of the line, were termed *The Dirty Half*

already there, in order that a combined attack might be made on the rear of the enemy's lines; while, at the same time, the Spanish divisional general, Zayas, with 6,000 Spanish troops from the Isle of Leon, (which is a narrow tongue of land, of about five miles in length, and at the extremity of which stands Cadiz,) should, by means of a pontoon bridge thrown across the San Petri canal, at its sea-mouth, open a communication with the assailants. Thus, by taking the enemy by surprise, it was hoped the siege would be raised; but events proved how little the sluggish and arrogant Spaniard, Lapeña, understood of the meaning of the word.

On the 21st of February, 1811, the weather being favourable, the British contingent part of the expedition (consisting of 3,000 men, including 180 German hussars,) sailed from Cadiz; but being driven by a gale past its port of destination, it landed at Algeiras on the 23rd, and on the following day marched across the mountains to Tariffa. On the 27th, Lapeña arrived with 7,000 men. For the sake of conciliating the vain and arrogant Spaniard, the brave old English general, and really accomplished scholar, ceded the command-in-chief to his Spanish coadjutor, though he had been counselled by that perfect master of the science of war, and most successful, aye, and immaculate of generals, either ancient or modern, lord Wellington, to retain the chief command: but real talent is ever unassuming; and of

Hundred, a soubriquet which their gallant bearing in the Peninsula ought to have transformed into one of the most honourable that any regiment in any service has ever acquired. Some regiments have their cognomens from the places where they have been originally raised; as the 88th, having been raised in Connaught, and the 27th in Enniskillen, are termed *Connaught Rangers*, and *The Enniskilliners*. Again, regiments are distinguished by the colour of their facings, that of their uniform, or that of their horses; as—the *Pompadours*, the *Bufs*, the *Oxford Blues*, the *Scotch Greys*, &c. Even divisions of armies have, according to peculiar circumstances, been distinguished by soubriquets or cognomens. During the Peninsular war, the 3rd division, having had a large share of the hard knocks and other pleasantries of warfare, was emphatically entitled, *The Fighting Division*: the 4th, from lord Wellington's mode of expressing himself, in his despatch respecting their conduct at the battle of Pamplona, *The Enthusiasts*; the light division, consisting of "the matchless soldiers" of the 43rd, the 52nd, and the 95th rifles, were, on account of their constant employment, and forming the advance and rear guards of the army; or being, as the motto of the artillery expresses the services of that distinguished corps—"ubique"—(everywhere), *The War Brigade*; and another division (we shall avail ourselves, for the sake of courtesy

this indubitable axiom of moral philosophy, and almost sure criterion for ascertaining a true and correct judgment of the capacity and power of the human mind, Graham gave a splendid and an instructive example.

The next day, the allied army passed the mountain-ridges that separate the plains of St. Roque from those of Medina and Chiclana, at which time they were within four leagues of the enemy's posts of Vejer and Casa Vieja. There the army was distributed into three divisions; the vanguard under Lardizabel; the centre was led by the prince of Anglona; and Graham commanded the reserve, consisting of the British contingent, the 20th Portuguese caçadores, the two Spanish regiments of the Walloon guards, and Ciudad Real. The united cavalry of both nations was under the command of Whittingham, who was then in the Spanish service.

From the first movements of Lapeña, Medina Sidonia seemed to be his object; but hearing that it was fortified, after many circuitous and eccentric movements over mountains, and through lagunes and by-roads, he reached, at noon of the 5th of March, the Cabeza de Puercos, more familiarly known to the English, in the events of the Peninsular War, under the memorable name of *The Heights of Barossa*, which is a mountain-ridge, about four miles distant from the Isle of Leon, rising gradually from the coast on one side, and on the other overlooking a high and broken plain of con- and respect for that gallant corps, of a rhetorical figure, leaving the reader the labour of tasking his ingenuity to supply the vacuum), having from accidental circumstances been prevented from being so much engaged in the perilous business of warfare as the other corps, *The Immortals*. Regiments and divisions in the French army have also their soubriquets, and with as just a title to them as any of the English regiments, for that nation is truly a nation of warriors: they are born for soldiers, and would be invincible did they possess the enduring spirit and calm and temperate courage of the English. Thus the 4th demi-brigade, and the 57th demi-brigade of the line of the army of Italy, were styled, *The Impetuous*; and, *The Terrible*. The column of grenadiers that formed the advanced guard of the army of the western Pyrenees, was surnamed, *The Infernal*. The chasseurs of the imperial guard were styled, *The Invincibles*; and the 45th of the line, *The Immortals*. The same practice prevails in most of the services of Europe. The entire service of nations have received soubriquets. Thus the English soldiers term those of France, *Johnny Crapauds*, while the French designate the fellows in red jackets, who were so stupid as never to know that they were beaten—*les Godams*. Our troops in the Peninsular war termed the Spaniards, *los Curajos*, from their terrible swearing, and no less terrible runnings away.

siderable extent, bounded on the left by the coast cliffs, and on the right and the front by the pine forest of Chiclana, which skirts the plain, and circles round the height at some distance, terminating down towards San Petri. Beyond this locality, the space between the sea and the Almanza creek is filled by the narrow ridge of the Burmeja, which is accessible by the sea-shore under the cliff, or by the forest of Chiclana. Prior to reaching this position, the vain-glorious Spaniard, like the heroes of old, as they are pourtrayed in the immortal verse of Homer, harangued his soldiers with divers specimens of Spanish military eloquence, to keep "their courage cheery" and up to the mark.*

While the combined army was leisurely

advancing in its rambling round-about pilgrimage to take the enemy by *surprise*,† and its leader "spouting" to "keep its courage cheery," Victor and Zayas were actively employed. The French general leaving his works garrisoned with 10,000 chosen troops, took up a position between Chiclana and Medina Sidonia, till the movements of the allies should disclose the object of their operations. Zayas, in pursuance of his orders, had thrown the bridge across the San Petri, and had established there a *tête du pont*. But as this was a post of too much consequence to leave unmolested, it was attacked in the nights of the 3rd and 4th, and Zayas driven back into the Isle.

BATTLE OF BAROSSA.

LAPENA, on taking up his position on the heights of Barossa, detached his vanguard under Lardizabel to open the communication with Zayas; but in effecting the junction Lardizabel suffered great loss, and was exposed to imminent danger. At the same time he directed Graham to march through the pine wood, and take possession of the Burmeja ridge, for the purpose of securing the communication of the San Petri; and from which it is distant about two miles.

* Among "the vain-glorious" Lapena's bobadil and bombastic orations, the reader may probably feel entertained with the following specimen of Spanish military rhetoric:—"Soldiers of the Fourth! The moment for which you have a whole year been longing, has at length arrived; a second time Andalusia is to owe to you her liberty, and the laurels of Mengibar and Baylen will revive upon your brows. You have to combat in the sight of the whole nation, assembled in its Cortes; the government will see your deeds; the inhabitants of Cadiz, who have made so many sacrifices for you, will be eye-witnesses of your heroism; they will lift up their voices in blessings, and in acclamations of praise, which you will hear amidst the roar of musketry and cannon. Let us go, then, to conquest! My cares are directed to that end." This precious bit of braggadocioism, the reader will perceive, is a sorry as well as a mawkish travesty of Napoleon's spirit-stirring, soul-entrancing, though inflated and bombastic, addresses and proclamations to his armies, which were so calculated to dazzle the fervid imaginations of warriors—that they "shot like fire to the heart of the real soldier,"—and to a nation like the French, thirsting for military glory, and insatiable in its acquisition, produced that frenzied enthusiasm, that intoxication of pleasure and delight in warfare which enabled them to overcome all difficulties, and reduce all the states of Europe to the subjection and dominion of their worshipped leader. That extraordinarily talented but mischievous man, was endowed with all the elements and characteris-

Graham obeyed the mandate, though at the same time he pointed out the impolicy of the measure, observing, that no general acquainted with the science of war, would expose his flank by attacking the Burmeja, while the heights of Barossa were held in force. But as the headstrong Spaniard was not to be diverted from his purpose, Graham began his march, in full persuasion, that Lapeña would retain the preservation of the heights with Anglona's division and

ties of the orator, and had he followed literature as a profession, would, no doubt, have obtained a distinguished station in her ranks; but his restless temperament and insatiable ambition, rendered all the gifts of intellect that nature had so profusely bestowed on him, vain and valueless.

† Lapena, and his concoctors of the notable scheme of "*taking the enemy by surprise*," certainly adopted an odd way of *surprising* their adversary, by beating up his outposts, and thus *apprising* him of their approach. Their rambling movements, or exploratory pilgrimage, over mountains, through lagunes and by-roads, for the distance of above ninety miles, also afforded the enemy no trifling opportunity of getting ready for their reception. Even the distance of sixty miles, which the direct march from Tarifa to Barossa required, might have been avoided by the very means that Zayas adopted of throwing the pontoon bridge over the San Petri; and thus the troops would have been saved the harassment to which they were subjected; and the chance would have been greater of surprising the enemy, as he would have had less opportunity and time of becoming cognizant of their designs, and it was by no means improbable that the battle of Barossa would have not then been unproductive in its results, as the British contingent force would not have been disabled from pursuing the fleeing enemy, from the exhausted state they were in after that battle; having not only been worn out with the length and tedium of the march, but having also suffered much from want of provisions.

the united cavalry. No sooner had the English entered the pine wood, than the imbecile Spaniard began his march, by the sea-road for San Petri, leaving five battalions to protect his baggage on the heights.

The French general having been informed by the fugitives who had escaped from his outposts of Vejer and Casa Vieja, that the allied army was advancing, and that Lapeña was the commander-in-chief, was anxiously on the watch to avail himself of Spanish error and inefficiency; therefore, as soon as he observed Lapeña's false movements, and that the English were fully involved in the wood, he rushed forward to seize the heights which his opponent had so unwisely abandoned. Lieutenant-colonel Brown, who had been left with a battalion of the light companies of the several regiments, to guard the English baggage, unable to stem the torrent, sent to Graham for orders. The English general's situation was now truly desperate. Laval's division was advancing along the edge of the forest, within cannon-shot of his left flank; Ruffin's was rapidly ascending the left side of the Barossa hill, from which the Spanish rear-guard was fleeing on the opposite side towards the sea, in the most indescribable confusion; the English battalion, under colonel Brown, alone remained on the heights, and having been formed into square, was making a gallant resistance; but Lapeña and his force had vanished. To have retreated on the Burmeja would have brought the enemy pell-mell with the allies upon that narrow ridge, where defeat must inevitably have been the consequence, as the whole army would "have been driven like sheep into an inclosure; the Almanza creek being on one side, the sea on the other, the San Petri to bar their flight, and the enemy hanging on their rear in all the fierceness of victory." With decision, therefore, as heroic as it was sudden, and which partook more of the nature of an inspiration than a resolve, the English general determined to encounter with his little band the host of the enemy, and recover the key of the field of battle.

As it was not possible, in the thick forest and the difficult and intricate ground on which he was, to countermarch his columns, he simply faced it to the right-about, by which evolution the rear-rank men of the respective companies occupied the place of front-rank men; and in this state being formed into line, as they issued from the wood, they were immediately pushed for-

ward to the attack; the right wing (consisting of a battalion of the guards, lieutenant-colonel Brown's flank battalion of the 28th, lieutenant-colonel Norcott's two companies of caçadore-rifles, the 28th and part of the 67th, led by lieutenant-colonels Betson and Prevost) bearing away, under the command of brigadier-general Dilkes, to assail Ruffin's corps on the heights; and the left wing (consisting of three companies of the Coldstream guards, under lieutenant-colonel Jackson, the 87th regiment, and lieutenant-colonel Barnard's flank battalion, consisting of two companies of the 47th, two of the 20th Portuguese, and four companies of the 3rd battalion English rifles), under the command of lieutenant-colonel Wheatley, to make head against Laval's division. In the opening, major Duncan drew up his artillery, consisting of ten guns, and opened a furious cannonade on Laval's column. The enemy's guns, in reply, threw a tempest of grape and canister over the field.

The English little band was received with a courage and determination scarcely inferior to their own undaunted bearing. The artillery on each side did fearful execution, while the musketry kept up a withering and an exterminating fire. The British left wing now advanced, firing, when the three companies of guards, and the 87th, fixing their bayonets as they advanced, made a fierce charge on the first line of Laval's division, and forcing it back on the second, both were broken by the shock. Nor was the right wing less successful. On that side, the enemy, confident of victory, descended the hill half-way to meet Dilkes's division. With loud shouts the combatants engaged in desperate conflict; but the struggle was not of long duration. The vigour of the attack was irresistible, and Ruffin's division was forced back, and driven down the other side of the heights in confusion, leaving two pieces of cannon in possession of the victors.

The discomfited divisions retreating concentrically, attempted to rally at the point where their disordered masses united, and renew the action; but the English artillery rendering all exertion to regain their formation unavailing, they fled precipitately to their lines. The British troops, who had been twenty-four hours (the greater part of which occupied in a night march) under arms without food of any kind (an occurrence which frequently happened during

the glorious struggles in the Peninsula, through the culpable conduct of the Spanish juntas, and the ingratitude and inhumanity of the Spanish people, and which often tended materially to deteriorate the effects of the victories of the British army), and weary with the rambling and harassing march to which the Spanish general had subjected them, were incapable of an effectual pursuit; they, however, followed the foe "as far as their exhausted limbs would carry their gallant hearts."

* After the battle the wounded of both armies were, from want of means of transport, necessarily left upon the field of battle during the whole night, and part of the following day. Rousseau was of the number. His dog, a white one of the poodle kind, which had been left in quarters on the advance of the French force, finding that the general did not return with those that escaped, set out in search of his master, and finding him in his dreary resting-place of death, expressed his affliction by moans and affectionately licking the hands and feet of the dying general. When the fatal crisis took place, he attached himself closely to the body, and for three days refused the sustenance offered him. Arrangements having been made for the interment of the dead, and the body of the general having been committed to its honourable grave, the dog laid himself down upon the sod that covered the beloved remains of his master, and evinced by silence and dejection his sorrow for the loss he had sustained. General Graham observed the friendless mourner, drew him from the spot of his affliction, and gave him his protection, which he continued to him till his death, which happened many years afterwards at the general's residence in Perthshire. Other instances of canine attachment, that occurred in the French armies (for it is no unusual thing for the French soldier to be accompanied by his dog, and almost every regiment in the service has its staff dog, which is the favourite of the whole regiment, and considered its common property), are no less memorable and interesting. On the night following the battle of Bassano, Napoleon, accompanied by some officers, took a survey of the field of battle—a practice he adopted for the purpose of ascertaining the nature of the contests, and the points on which success had depended. The moon shed her light upon the scene, and the profound silence of the night was disturbed only by the cries of the wounded and the groans of the dying. Suddenly a dog which had been lying upon a dead body, came forward moaning, alternately advancing and receding, as if hesitating between the desire of avenging the death of his master, and the apprehension of allowing the body to become cold, which he was desirous of preserving. Napoleon checked his horse, and after remaining for some minutes absorbed in profound meditation, exclaimed, "What a lesson for man!" The occurrence made so strong an impression on his feelings, that he reverted to it during his abode in St. Helena. The author of *The Subaltern* tells us, that when the British army was in the south of France, he observed a dog close by the side of the dead body of a French soldier, lying in a garden on the banks of the Nive, howling in a very piteous manner, and that he could not induce him, either by force or kindness, to desert the post he had taken,

The English general having remained several hours on the field, withdrew to the Isle of Leon, with his wounded prisoners, six guns, and one eagle, leaving a detachment of the 95th, under major Ross, in possession of the field of battle; thus removing all possible surmise that the retrograde movement was a retreat. The loss of the enemy, in killed and wounded, was about 2,000. The generals of division and brigade, Ruffin and Rousseau*, were mortally wounded. The loss of the English, in

for the purpose of defending his dead master from the wolves and vultures which were hovering round the body. Hennekin, in his *Seven Years' Campaigning*, relates an equally interesting anecdote of canine attachment. He says, that while pacing the battlefield of the Nivelle, he saw a black poodle dog lying by the side of a wounded officer of chasseurs (an Irishman who had entered the French service) for the purpose of watching his master. A soldier in the Italian regiment of the Veliti, of the guards, had, when at Milan, a dog that was much attached to him, following him to all his various military duties, and invariably mounting guard with him, and sharing his sentry-box whenever he stood sentry at the gate of the vice-regal palace. In 1812, at the time of the disastrous Russian campaign, among the numerous regiments composing the fine Italian army that marched with the viceroy of Italy, Eugene Beauharnais, went the Veliti, and with them the master of the dog. Tofino, who was already well known to the soldiers, marched after his master, and having crossed the Alps, and traversed a great portion of the European continent, finally arrived at Moscow, where he closed his career by dying upon the body of his slain master. But among all the instances of canine attachment, whether in military or civil life, the following is the most remarkable:—A few days before the overthrow of Robespierre, the revolutionary tribunal had condemned M. Roulet, who, participating in that holy enthusiasm that gave birth to the immortal prodigies of military valour and devotion in the early periods of the French republic, had served with distinguished reputation in the army commanded by Jourdan, but had unhappily incurred the vengeance of the French dictator, as having been guilty of a conspiracy. His faithful dog, a water-spaniel, was with him when he was seized, but not being suffered to enter his prison, he took refuge with an old comrade of his master, and every day, at the same time, returned to the prison door, and passed some time there, but was always refused admittance. His unremitting fidelity at last won on the keeper, who daily admitted him to his master's presence. When the day of trial arrived, the dog, notwithstanding the endeavours of the officers of justice to prevent him, penetrated the hall, and lay crouched beneath the legs of his master. Again, at the hour of execution, he was there; nor could he be separated from the lifeless body of his master; and after the body was committed to the grave, he lay stretched upon it. Being found there by his master's friend, he was taken home by force, but he returned again to the grave, and this he continued to do for three months. At length he refused food altogether, and commenced tearing up the earth which covered the remains of his much loved master

killed and wounded, exceeded one-fourth of the army; 61 officers, and 1,180 rank and file being killed or wounded. An eagle, six pieces of cannon, and 440 prisoners remained in the hands of the victors, who did not lose a single prisoner. The eagle belonged to the 8th regiment of the line, which, for its conduct at the battle of Talavera, was honoured by Napoleon placing, with his own hand, a golden wreath of laurel round the neck of the eagle. The first attempt made to seize the eagle was by ensign Keogh, of the 89th; but that officer being run through the body by several men who surrounded the standard, serjeant Masterman, of the same regiment, made a dash at the prize, and secured it.

While these prodigies of valour were performing, Lapeña, who had taken post on his favourite Bermeja, though at the head of 12,000 infantry, and 800 cavalry, remained a quiet and cold-blooded spectator of deeds, the bare recital of which should have been enough to warm him into a hero, without lending the least assistance to his gallant ally, whom his own commands had involved in this terrible conflict; not even menacing the right of the enemy, which was close to him, and too weak in numbers to have resisted his attack; nor did he attempt to pursue the wreck of the beaten brigades as they were hurrying in disorder from the heights of Chiclana. Had he detached his cavalry and horse-artillery, who, by sweeping round the left of Ruffin's division, would have rendered the defeat ruinous, the siege would have consequently been raised. The three troops of German husars, under colonel Ponsonby, however, impatient of the shameful inactivity, burst away from the useless mass, and reaching the field just as the defeated divisions were attempting to unite, rapidly rode in upon them, and threw them into still greater confusion.

Victor, astonished at his escape from a fate that seemed inevitable, had the imbecile Lapeña done his duty, resuming his offensive attitude, reoccupied his posts round the bay of Cadiz; and prepared to prosecute the siege. The reason that he halted so near the field of battle as he did, was merely to afford Latour Marbourg (who had been

detached with 2,000 cavalry to Vejer, for the purpose of cutting off the retreat of the English army on Gibraltar, had the fortune of the day turned in favour of the French) a chance of escape from the perilous enterprise on which he had been sent. Thus ended the battle of Barossa, which though unproductive of any beneficial result, from the shameful conduct of the Spanish general, will ever remain on record as one in which English valour was pre-eminently successful. Had Graham possessed "a worthy colleague instead of the dastard Lapeña," it would have been as beneficial in its results as it was glorious in its issue.

The doughty Spaniard, now that the fighting was over, raised his recreant head, and sent an address to the cortes, arrogating to himself the victory. The English general, justly exasperated, exposed this delusion in a public letter to the British envoy. The cortes, to appease the indignation of the English army and its general, brought Lapeña to trial; but his judges exculpating him, he published his "Justification," as he called his falsifying defence, in which he insinuated that the victory of Barossa was the result of his plans, and that the failure of breaking up the siege was owing to Graham's retreat. His subordinates, Lacy and Cruz Murgeon, united in the accusation, publishing false accounts and plans of the battle. Graham, incensed at their duplicity, and the apparent sanction it had received by the exculpation of the Spanish court-martial, refused, with disdain, the title of grandee of the first class, that had been voted to him by the cortes; and, besides re-exposing the duplicity and falsehood of his Spanish calumniators in a second letter to the British envoy, enforced an apology from Lacy with his sword. Eventually dissatisfied with the disingenuous treatment he had received, having previously caused a military survey to be made of the Isle of Leon, and materially strengthened the works from the sea on the right to the Caraccas on the left (the batteries having been ill-placed, the intrenchments contemptible, and the interior defences neglected by the Spanish authorities), he relinquished his command to general Cooke, and proceeded to join the army under lord Wellington, where, on account of the absence of many of the generals of division, who had gone home on leave, his services were much required.

The strength of the mourner not being equal to the display of his long-trying and unexhausted affection, he shrieked in his struggles to accomplish his purpose, and with his last look fixed on the grave, ceased to breathe.

THE SPANISH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

ANNIS 1810—1812.

THE experience of 1809, "the never-ending defeats," the panics and flights of the scared troops of Spain, had not taught either its perverse and foolish government, or its imbecile generals, wisdom, moderated their rashness and presumption, or improved their military skill and discipline. Their armies still continued to be overthrown and scattered as the timid and unresisting flock before the fierce and raging tiger. Town after town still continued to fall into the hands of the enemy, and army after army to be scared and scattered. In the early part of 1810, Olivença, Cordova, Granada, and Malaga, fell without a struggle; Lerida, Mequinza, Hostalrich, and Astorga, after a gallant defence. O'Donnel was defeated at Vich in February, and at Mugalet in April. The strong passes of the Sierra Morena were forced, and the 25,000 men, under Areizaga, stationed there to defend them, utterly routed. The remnants of the scared patriot armies were, to adopt a significantly expressive term, employed by one who was well acquainted with their merits and demerits, "discussed by the French generals at their leisure." The brave and zealous Romana was defeated at Bevenida in August, and at Fuentes de Caubos in September; as was also Cupons at Tinto on the same day, and at Castillejos in October. On the 4th of November Blake's army was routed at Velez Malaga, on the Almanzor River; and on the same day Bassacour was overthrown at Undecono, and on the 27th of the same month at Beniearlo. These untoward events forcibly demonstrated the policy of lord Wellington's "divorcing" his operations from the folly and feebleness of Spain; from the intrigues and bad faith of the junta, and the imbecility of its generals. To counterbalance those great and signal disasters,

the only advantage the Spaniards had gained, was the capture, by O'Donnel, of two battalions of the enemy's infantry, and five squadrons of cuirassiers, by surprise, at Santa Perpetua and Mollet, in February; and of 1,500 men under Schwartz, in September, at La Bispal. The full detail of these operations is as follows.

As soon as Buonaparte had concluded his Austrian alliance, he ordered 120,000 of his troops, who had been engaged in the campaign at Wagram, to cross the Pyrenees; and on the 3rd of December he announced to his obsequious senate his intention of following them: "When I shall show myself," said the braggart, "beyond the Pyrenees, the leopard in terror will plunge into the ocean to avoid shame, defeat, and death."* The French force in the Peninsula was thus increased to 366,000 men. Out of this force two armies were formed, each composed of three corps. The first, destined for the conquest of Andalusia, consisted 65,000 men, under the command of Soult; who, towards the close of the year 1809, had been appointed the chief of Joseph's staff, and his principal military adviser, and comprised the corps of Victor, Sebastiani, and Mortier; the second, charged with the reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo, and ultimately with the conquest of Portugal, consisted of 80,000 men, under the command of Massena, and comprised the corps of Regnier, Ney, and Junot. For the sustentation of the immense French force in the Peninsula, distinct military governments were constituted to collect the resources of the country, for its clothing, food, pay, and equipments, except to the extent of two millions of francs drawn monthly from the exchequer of Paris.

To compete with this formidable force, the Central Junta were wholly unequal.

* Allusion has been already made to the empirical manœuvres by which Buonaparte contrived to delude the understanding of his idolatrous adherents and worshippers. M. Blazé, in his interesting work, confirms the truth of these statements. "In the proclamations and orders of the day," says that gentleman, "he (namely Buonaparte) detailed his exploits, the number of soldiers, cannon, and carriages that he had taken; it was exaggerated, but it was high-sounding, and had an excellent effect." It is, as the

author of *Imaginary Conversations* has observed, astonishing that so much power with so small an exertion of genius, and so little of anything that captivates the affections, should have been maintained so long unbroken in a succession of enormous faults, so scandalous disgraces, and so disastrous fortunes; and that too "after the loss of seven armies, and which, in every instance, he abandoned to destruction." This truthful and sensible observation is deserving the reflection of all Buonapartean idolators.

After the fatal battle of Ocaña they had neither troops nor resources. To provide the last mentioned, they called for half the plate and jewels of every family and individual in the nation. This measure, in conjunction with their incapacity, excited the people of Seville to rise in insurrection and depose them. The displaced members fled to Cadiz; but the inhabitants of that city disclaiming their authority, they transferred it to a temporary regency until the cortes, or representatives of the whole nation could be assembled. Previous to their flight, the junta had ordered Areizaga, who had collected 35,000 of his fugitive troops, to take post in the strong defiles or passes of the Sierra Morena.

The French now advanced to take possession of the kingdom of Andalusia; and for the purpose of breaking the spirit of its population, and intimidating them, Soult issued a proclamation—which he mercilessly carried into execution—declaring, that all persons found in arms, “whatever might be their number, and whoever might be their commander, should be treated as banditti, who had no other object than robbery and murder; and that all the individuals of such parties who might be taken in arms should be immediately condemned and shot, and their bodies exposed along the highways.” When the regency found that this decree was actually carried into effect, they reprinted it, with a counter decree by its side, in French and Spanish, declaring, in imitation of their former decree, “that every Spaniard capable of bearing arms was in these times a soldier, and that for one who should be murdered by the French in consequence of the edict of the ferocious Soult, who called himself the duke of Dalmatia, the first three Frenchmen taken in arms should be infallibly hanged; three for every house which the enemy burned in their devastating system, and three for every person who should perish in the fire.” Soult, himself, they declared unworthy of the protection of the law of nations, while his decree remained unrepealed. They gave orders, that if he were taken he should be punished as a robber; and they took measures for circulating both decrees throughout Europe, to the end that all persons might be informed of the atrocious conduct of those enemies of the human race, and that those inhabitants of the countries which were in alliance with France, or more truly, which were enslaved by her, who were unhappy

enough to have children, or kinsmen, or friends, serving in the French armies in Spain, might see the fate prepared for them by the barbarity of a monster who thought by such means to subdue a free and noble nation. The decree made on the occasion was founded on the decree made at the time of the surrender at Saragossa, and was dated February, 1809. In that decree the supreme junta addressed an order to their generals, requiring them to apprise the French commanders, to whom they might be opposed, that every Spaniard who was capable of carrying arms was a soldier, and that so their duty to their country required them to be, and such the supreme junta declared them. “This,” they said, “was not a war of armies against armies, as in other cases, but of an army against a whole nation, resisting the yoke which a tyrant and an usurper sought to force upon them; every individual, therefore, of that nation, was under the protection of the laws of war; and the general who should violate those laws was not a soldier, but a ruffian, who would provoke the indignation of heaven, and the vengeance of man. The junta well knew,” they said, “that the French, when victorious, ridiculed principles which the observance and respect of all nations had consecrated; and that they did this with an effrontery and an insolence equal to the affectation with which they appealed to them when they were vanquished.” They added, that “the Spanish nation was, however, in a condition to enforce that justice which it demanded; that three Frenchmen should suffer for every Spaniard, be he peasant or soldier, who might be put to death. Europe would hear, with admiration, as well as horror, that a magnanimous nation, which had begun its struggle by making 3,000 French prisoners, was forced, in opposition to its natural character, to decimate those prisoners without distinction, from the first general to the lowest in the ranks.” That it would be the chiefs of their own nation who condemned the unfortunate persons on whom this vengeance might be inflicted; who, by imposing on Spain the dreadful necessity of retaliation, signed the death-warrant of their own countrymen when they murdered a Spaniard.

On the 20th of January, 1811, the French drove the Spanish troops from Despeños Peras, and Puerto del Rey, with scarcely a show of resistance, and on the next day the victors passed over the field of Baylen, in pursuit of the fleeing foe. Jaen, Granada, and

Cordova, were then taken without resistance, Areizaga's army, which was posted in the neighbourhood of the first-mentioned town, taking to flight on the first appearance of the enemy. On the 31st the enemy entered Seville, and took possession of its foundry of cannon and immense arsenals, which had been abandoned by the junta.* The people of Alhama were the first who opposed the enemy; but their town, which had only the ruins of Moorish works to protect it, was carried by storm. Sebastiani then fought his way from Anquera to Malaga, through armed citizens and peasantry. The inhabitants of this last-mentioned city bravely formed an exception to the ignoble manner in which the Andalusian cities had submitted to the invader; they resisted the enemy until 500 of their fellow-townsmen were slain. While Sebastiani thus overran Granada, Mortier was detached to occupy Estremadura; but Albuquerque—disobeying the express commands of the government to move to Alamada, and support the Spanish left in the mountains there—had garrisoned Badajoz, and Romana was present, so that the designs of the enemy were, in that quarter, for a season baffled.

Victor now hurried on to seize Cadiz; but that important prize was saved from his grasp by the duke of Albuquerque. That true patriot having garrisoned Badajoz, proceeded with the remainder of his army from Utrera, consisting of 8,000 infantry and 600 cavalry, by forced marches, by Llerena, Labreja, and Guadacanal, to Cadiz, where he arrived late in the evening of the third of February, having performed a march of 65 leagues, or 260 English miles, in nine days. Having saved this all-important place by his presence, he made the greatest exertions to put it in a state of defence. Next morning the French appeared in great force on the opposite shores of the straits. The junta, though they had rejected the offer of lord Wellington the preceding autumn to strengthen the garrison with an English force, now implored aid to be sent with all speed. Three British regiments, the 79th, the 94th, and the second battalion of the

87th, with the 20th Portuguese regiment, amounting in all to 5,000 men, under major-general W. Stewart, were dispatched thither from Lisbon. Other British forces were sent from Gibraltar, so that the British and Portuguese contingent soon amounted to 8,000 men; and lieutenant-general Graham arrived to assume the command. Victor now sent a summons to the junta, telling them that he was ready to receive their submission to king Joseph. They returned an answer that they acknowledged no king but Ferdinand VII. Soult, who arrived in the French camp on the 15th of February, sent another summons to Albuquerque, insinuating that the English intended to seize Cadiz for themselves. Albuquerque's answer was that that great and brave nation was too generous for the design. The French army consisted of about 25,000 men, and occupied the neighbouring ground from the village of Rota on the coast, on the north of the bay of Cadiz, to Chiclana, which is three leagues to the south of Cadiz, thus forming a chain of forts within a circle of ten leagues, and resting at each extremity on the sea. On these works 300 pieces of artillery, and cannon-mortars (or villantrops, so named after the inventor) of a prodigious size, were planted before the end of the year 1810. These huge pieces of ordnance being placed in slings, threw shells with a force so prodigious as to range over Cadiz, a distance of more than 5,000 yards; but as they were partly loaded with lead, and their charge of powder was too small for an effective explosion, they produced more alarm than mischief in the city. In March of this year a violent storm arising in the bay of Cadiz, three line of battle ships, one frigate, and about forty merchantmen, were driven to the side of the bay which was in the occupation of the French. The men were taken out in British boats, and the ships were set on fire by the enemy's red-hot shot; but no small part of the lading fell into their hands. Soon after this storm 1,500 French, on board of two of the hulks,† who had been detained there since the battle of Baylen, cut their

* This ignoble conquest was obtained without the least resistance, though it contained a garrison of above 7,000 men; and that the people, especially the working classes, with "that ardent patriotism which in a great crisis distinguishes the humbler ranks in society, and forms a striking contrast to the selfish timidity of their superiors," indicated a desire to resist the enemies of their country.

† The usual place for the detention of the French

prisoners was the island of Cabrera, a desert rock in the Mediterranean, in the neighbourhood of Majorca and Minorca. The island was about 15 miles in circumference, and with no other inhabitants than a handful of soldiers, who were stationed there to prevent the Barbary cruisers from making it a place of rendezvous. Here about 10,000 French prisoners were detained, but their treatment was so severe, and their supplies from Palma so irregularly

cables, and being drifted to the French side of the bay, rejoined their countrymen. About the same time the peasants of the Sierra de Ronda offering a determined resistance to the spoliating columns of the enemy, Soult ordered several of the villages of that district to be burned, and their inhabitants executed; and though general Lacy advanced to their assistance with 3,000 men, he sustained so severe a loss in his conflicts with the foe, that he was compelled to re-embark for Cadiz.

After the French had overrun Andalusia, having falsely proclaimed in their Spanish gazettes, that "the Napoleonic throne" was established in Cadiz, they prepared for the invasion of Portugal by the northern line. To ensure success, it was necessary to reduce Ciudad Rodrigo; but before they entered on their operations in that quarter, they deemed the complete possession of Leon necessary, that their communications might be open with Valladolid; for this purpose, Junôt, on the 22nd of March, invested Astorga with 12,000 men. The vigorous operations of Santocildes obstructed his proceedings so much, that a month elapsed before he opened his batteries. On the 20th of April, a breach being effected, the garrison was so distressed for ammunition, that Santocildes offered to capitulate, but Junôt refused the terms demanded. On the evening of the 21st, the bombardment was recommenced, and an assault made by 2,000 men; but after a desperate struggle, they were repulsed with the loss of three-fourths of their number; but as only thirty rounds of cartridges remained for the troops, and eight for the artillery, and that the enemy's working parties had cut through the stockade into the town, the governor surrendered on condition that the garrison should be entitled to the honours of war, and the inhabitants be secure both in person and property.

From the 25th of April, the French had been assembling troops before Ciudad Rodrigo; by the 4th of June, a sufficient number having been collected, the city was

sent, that scores and hundreds of them died of hunger and thirst, and many of them were in a complete state of nakedness. Such was their destitution that with no other tools than a single knife they obtained their water by breaking the surface of the ground to the depth of six feet; and some of them used the skulls of their own dead for want of other vessels.

* This guerilla chief was the son of a farmer, near

invested. In the intervening time, repeated skirmishes had taken place between the garrison and the enemy; and in these Julian Sanchez* was particularly conspicuous. That enterprising leader made repeated assaults on the enemy, not hesitating, at the head of sixty, eighty, or a hundred of his lancers, to attack three or four times his own number; and the French suffered daily losses from his indefatigable activity, as well as that of Antonio Carnargo, the commandant of the volunteers of Avila, and of Jose Puente, the commandant of the cavalry regiment of Ciudad Rodrigo. The circle of the enemy's investment being now contracted, Sanchez, on the night of the 22nd, pierced, with 200 of his horsemen, through the enemy's line, and reached the English light division, then six miles from Ciudad Rodrigo. On the 24th, Massena arrived and took the command, and again summoned the governor to surrender. Hervasti replied with the dignity and spirit becoming a soldier and a patriot. The fire on the town now continued with increased violence; and the convent of Santa Cruz was carried after a fierce resistance, and with great loss on the part of the enemy. At this time an exploit of singular intrepidity was performed. The governor expressing a wish to drive the enemy from the convent of St. Domingo, a serjeant, by name Manuel Martin, with twenty-five of his comrades, offered to undertake the hazardous enterprise. This he accomplished, though the enemy's troops in the convent were of greatly superior numbers; and they were so terrified at his daring exploit, that they took to flight, leaving their knapsacks and muskets behind them. By the 9th of July, the guns of the garrison were nearly silenced, part of the town was in flames, and the ditch was so filled with the ruins of the counterscarp, that a broad way lay open to the breach. The columns of assault were immediately assembled, and 30,000 men were ready to perpetrate all the unrestrained vengeance and brutality of French soldiers. To preserve the helpless inhabitants, 5,000 in number, from the hor-

the banks of the Guebra. Till the invasion of his country, he had cultivated his father's lands; but when his father, mother, and sister, had been murdered by the French, he made a vow of vengeance. On one occasion, he surprised in his father's house a French colonel, infamous for his atrocities, and put him to death, first telling him who it was that inflicted his merited punishment in this world, and sent him to render account of his crimes in the next.

rors of an assault, the brave Hervasti appeared on the rampart waving the white flag. Massena promised that the garrison should march out with the honours of war, and agreed to all the other conditions which are usual in the like circumstances. Loisson immediately marched through the breach, and took possession of the town, and, in violation of Massena's promise, made the garrison deposit their arms in the arsenal. To Hervasti's request, on the following day, that the articles of capitulation should be observed, Massena's reply was, that he ought not require more than had already been complied with. The civil officers, whose liberty had been stipulated for, were declared prisoners of war; the members of the junta were thrown into a dungeon; a contribution of near two millions was imposed on the inhabitants, and they were compelled to labour in the reparation of works, the destruction of the batteries, and the filling up of the trenches, without provisions, and but little rest.

While Soult was preparing to fix his army between the Isle of Leon and Cadiz, he received orders to leave Victor to blockade Cadiz, and to prepare for the siege of Olivenza and Badajos. Collecting all his disposable forces, to the amount of 20,000 men, he proceeded from Seville to Estremadura. Olivenza, garrisoned by 4,100 men, was invested 11th of February, 1811, and on the 20th the breaching-batteries opened their fire. On the 21st the governor, Manuel Herk, received advice that Romana had despatched a large force to his relief, and though he had in reply said that he would maintain the place to the last moment, capitulated, though the fortress was unimpaired. On the 26th Soult marched against Badajos. On the 28th Badajos was invested. In consequence of a plan concocted with lord Wellington, the marquis Romana was, for the protection of that fortress, to occupy the strong position on the heights of San Christoval, between Gebora, the Caya, and the Guadiana; but that true patriot dying, the command devolved on Mendizabel. A few shells thrown from the mortar batteries on his position so discomposed the Spanish general, that with astonishing fatuity, he withdrew his army, consisting of 10,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry, from his impregnable post, when, being attacked by Mortier, he was overthrown (February the 19th), with the loss of 850 killed, and 5,000 prisoners. The next day the

siege was carried on with renewed vigour. The sallies of the garrison were frequent and vigorous. In that made on the 2nd of March, Don Rafael Menacho, the governor, being killed, the command devolved on one Imaz, the lieutenant-governor, and who had served with the Spanish troops which had escaped from Denmark. On the 10th he was summoned to surrender, and on the 11th the garrison laid down their arms, and were made prisoners of war, though it consisted of 7,500 effective men, and the town was well stored with provisions and ammunition, and that on the 9th intelligence had been conveyed to him that Massena was in full retreat from Portugal, and the British army was on its march for his relief. The empty stipulation of the treacherous dastard, that his garrison should march out by the breach, which was so insignificant in width that he was obliged to enlarge it himself, he supposed redeemed his honour. The surrender of Campo Mayor, Albuquerque, and Valencia d'Alcantara, immediately followed the fall of Badajos, when Soult, in consequence of the battle of Barossa, returned with the greatest speed to Andalusia. While Soult was occupied in his operations in Estremadura, the junta assembled in Cadiz, and assuming the title of majesty, proceeded to form a constitution worded in the spirit of republican freedom, and to the abolition of the inquisition. These innovating projects not being acceptable to the nobles, the ministers, and the regency, who were displeased with the inferior title of highness accorded them, the old system of intrigue, folly, and procrastination, became predominant. In one point, however, all parties agreed—the determination to suppress the rising spirit of liberty manifested by the transatlantic provinces. As soon as the colonial rights were agitated in the cortes, eternal slavery was declared to be the only lot of the colonists. Having been declared traitors, their ports were blockaded. Two parties now arose in Spanish America: the loyalists, who submitted to the regency, and the independents, who insisted on governing themselves.

While these events were occurring at Cadiz, important transactions were taking place in Aragon and Catalonia. The fall of Girona had enabled the besieging army to undertake farther operations; but the Catalans, as well as the French, had changed their commander. O'Donnell superseded Blake, but in the middle of February he was de-

feated in the neighbourhood of Vich, with the loss of 3,000 men.

Suchet having received considerable reinforcements from France, and having concerted a plot with several influential persons in Valencia for its surrender, reappeared, March the 3rd, before that city; but the plot having been discovered, after remaining five days before the place, he retraced his steps to Saragossa, severely harassed by the guerillas. This success of the patriots was enhanced by the destruction of a detachment of 600 men, who were posted at Santa Perpetua, to keep up the communication between Barcelona and Hostalrich. The Valencians imputed their deliverance to their patroness and generalissimo, the Virgin, and to the saints who were natives of Valencia.

The enemy now prepared to reduce the fortress of Hostalrich, which is situated seven leagues from Gerona. The castle still remained in the possession of the Spaniards, but a division of the enemy, under Mazzuchelli, occupied the town. The garrison of the castle were prepared for a Spanish defence—for though, according to the old saying, the Spaniards are women in the field, they are lions behind their walls. "This fortress," said the governor, Julian de Estrada, "is the daughter of Gerona, and ought to imitate the example of its mother."

The siege began on the 13th of January, but it was carried on with little vigour till the 20th of February, when the French began to bombard the town. The men who defended it showed themselves worthy the cause in which they were engaged; and here, as at Gerona, the enemy found that the strength of a fortress depends less on its walls and bulwarks, than on the virtue and valour of those who defend it. The blockade having now lasted two months, and the garrison being reduced to the last extremity from want of provisions, its brave governor sallied forth, at midnight on May 12th, at their head, and cut his way through the blockading forces; and though he, with 300 of his brave men, fell into the hands of the enemy, above 800 of the garrison escaped to Tarragona. The French, on their entrance, stripped the clothes and blankets from the beds of the wounded, who would, no doubt, have been all massacred, had not the comptroller of the hospital previously made terms for their safety with the French commandant of the town.

About this time large desertions took

place from the French armies. Eight hundred Austrians, who had been taken prisoners in the late war, had been forced by Buonaparte into the French service. These men went over to the Spaniards in a body, stipulating only that they might keep their arms, and remain together, till they should be distributed among the regiments of the line. General Doyle had addressed proclamations to the soldiers in the French service, not only in the French and Spanish languages, but in the Italian, Dutch, German, and Polish also, setting before them the real cause of the war, the nature of which they saw and felt. The Catalans, too, had learned the good policy of distinguishing between the French and the foreigners in the French army, treating the latter, when they were taken, with kindness, as men who had been brought against them by compulsion. The effect of this system and of the proclamations was such, that in a short space of time the enemy lost more than 6,000 men.

Lerida, a fortress situated among the mountains of Catalonia, had been invested in the beginning of April during the siege of Hostalrich. Its garrison consisted of 9,000 men, and the governor, Garcia Conde, when summoned to surrender, replied in the usual lofty style of the Spaniards. O'Donnell, who commanded the Spanish troops in the province, advanced (April 23rd) to its relief, with 8,000 infantry and 600 horse, but was repulsed with the loss of 1,000 killed, and 5,000 prisoners. Three practicable breaches having been at length effected, a general assault was made on the 13th of May, and the city was soon in the hands of the assailants. A scene of horror now ensued. Suchet ordered his troops by a concentric movement to drive at the point of the bayonet the citizens of every age and sex toward the citadel. The shrieking and terrified multitude rushed into the fortress with the retiring garrison. As soon as the helpless crowd were shut in, a powerful fire of howitzers and bombs, and other destructive projectiles, was kept up the whole of the night on the crowded place. The governor, overpowered by the cries and sufferings of the helpless multitude, surrendered the fortress on the following morning,—on the same day Hostalrich having fallen—with the garrison, amounting to above 8,000 men and 130 pieces of artillery, and an immense quantity of stores. Suchet deeming the frightful vengeance he had inflicted on the Leridans likely to favour the prosecu-

tion of his projects, invested (May 19th) Mequinenza, a fortress situated on a steep rock, at the confluence of the Cinca and the Ebro. On the night of June 4th, the town was carried by escalade, and on the 8th the garrison of the castle, consisting of 2,000 men, surrendered, at the very moment general Doyle was within sight of the town with succour for its relief. The day after the fall of Lerida, Villa Campa attacked 400 men conducting a convoy of prisoners from Calatayud to Saragossa, captured the convoy and slew its guard. About this time Augereau was superseded by marshal Macdonald. The cause of Augereau's supersession was, that, though at the head of 20,000 men, he had been obliged by O'Donnell's successes at Villa Franca and Manresa, to take refuge in Gerona, with the loss of 3,000 men. Great as the success of the enemy had been, Cordova, Urgel, San Felipe, Balaguer, Tortosa, and Tarragona, which formed the link of connection between Valencia and Catalonia, were still to be reduced to establish the invader's power in the east of Spain; and as the French could not in Catalonia, as they had done in other parts of Spain, press forward, and leave defensible towns behind them, it was necessary to reduce those places.

Macdonald, to revive the lost lustre of the French arms in Catalonia, now advanced to the relief of Barcelona; and in his march thither he attacked Cordova, which stands at the foot of a rugged hill, on which frowns a strong castle on a mountain above. Here the Spanish army under Campoverde, was drawn up, and when attacked by Macdonald, drove his forces down the hill with the loss of several hundred men. The French general being thus foiled, proceeded to the relief of Barcelona, which was then closely pressed by the patriot forces.

Suchet now began to execute his orders to besiege Tortosa, which is situated on the left bank of the Ebro, and about five leagues from the sea. The city though a place of great strength, and considered the principal bulwark of Catalonia and Valencia, was in a very inefficient state of defence, until strengthened and stored by the English general Doyle, who had generously surrendered up his pay for the use of the place. To aid Suchet in his operations, Macdonald, having revictualled Barcelona, approached from the north. During these operations the Spanish general Bassecour, attacking the covering force at Uldecana, was defeated

with the loss of 3,000 men. A sort of nominal blockade of the city had been kept up since the middle of August. On the 4th of July the enemy had appeared on the right bank of the river, and had occupied the suburbs of Jesus, and Las Roquetas. On the 8th they attacked the tête-du-pont, expecting to carry it by a sudden and vigorous attempt; they were repulsed, renewed the attempt at midnight, were again repulsed, and a few hours afterwards failed in a third attack. They were now satisfied that Tortosa was not to be won without the time and labour of a regular siege. They had seen also a manifestation of that same spirit which had been so eminently displayed at Saragossa and Gerona: for the Tortosan women had passed and repassed the bridge during the heat of action, regardless of danger, bearing refreshments and stores to the soldiers; two who were wounded in this service were rewarded with medals and a pension. In imitation of the Saragossan and Geronan women, they enrolled themselves in companies to attend on the wounded. There was one woman who during the whole siege carried water and cordials to the troops at the points of attack, and frequently went out with them in their sallies; the people called her La Titaya. In the course of the siege she was made a serjeant for her services. During these operations Doyle's address to the foreigners in the French service, in their respective languages, and which were fired from the town in shells, and by that means scattered among the besiegers, had produced no inconsiderable effect. At the same time the bodies of some peasants were taken out of the river with many bayonet wounds and their hands tied together, who had been massacred in pursuance of the savage system in which the intrusive government required its generals to act: they were interred by their countrymen with much solemnity, and the circumstance made a strong impression on the Tortosans.

The investment being completed, and all the posts of the besieged driven in, the trenches were opened on the 19th, and the operations were carried on with so great vigour, that by the night of the 31st, the besiegers' guns were on the edge of the counterscarp. In a state of alarm, the governor, Lili, "an imbecile man," displayed three white flags from different parts of the fortress. The conduct of the governor, however, in consequence of the desire

of the officers to renew the defence, appearing indecisive, Suchet, riding up to the gates with a considerable staff, and escorted by a company of grenadiers, informed the Spanish officer on guard that hostilities had ceased, desired to be conducted to the governor, and on his admission, assuming an imperious tone, and menacing the garrison with military execution if any further delay occurred, the garrison, consisting of nearly 8,000 men, laid down their arms, and surrendered at discretion, to 10,000 French. The strong fortress of Col de Belaguer, which commands the pass over the mountains of the same name, between Tortosa and Tarragona, was escaladed a few days after Lili's surrender of Tortosa; which had excited so great indignation at Tarragona, that the inhabitants of that city beheaded his effigy in the market-place. After the fall of Tortosa, Suchet was engaged for several months in preparations for the siege of Tarragona.

After lord Blaney's unsuccessful attempt at the castle of Frangerola, general Rey attacked, November 2nd, the central* army under Blake, at Velez el Rubio, with one regiment of dragoons, a regiment of Polish lancers, and a detachment of infantry, and broke it at the first charge, the men throwing down their arms, and crying for quarter. About 1,500 of the Spaniards were slain, and about the same number taken. On June 30th he was repulsed by Niebla, which he attempted to take by escalade, with considerable loss. On the 19th of March, Campoverde having assembled 1,500 men at Moliños del Rey, with the intention of surprising the city and forts of Barcelona, detached in the night a chosen body of 800 grenadiers, to possess themselves of Monjuic, whose town major he had corrupted. While the detachment was waiting in the ditch, in expectation of having the gate opened, the greater part of the column was in an instant overwhelmed with fire. This failure, however, was shortly after compensated by the surprise and capture of Figueras, a little town situated in the midst of the fertile plains of Ampurdan, and about eighteen miles distant from the French frontier. Martinez, a leader of the Mique-

lets, formed, with the aid of some citizens in the town, the design of surprising the gates. He entrusted the execution of the design to Rovira, who had been a doctor in theology, now a colonel in the Spanish army. In the night of the 9th of April, Rovira, with 1,054 chosen volunteers, approached the ditch; when three Spaniards in the French service opened the gate which leads into the ditch to receive them. Rovira and his companions rushed in, and Figueras and its garrison, amounting to about 1,000 men, were in their hands before the astonished Italians could make any preparation for their defence. This event so elated the Spaniards, that *Te Deum* was sung in all the churches of the Peninsula not under the control of the enemy. As an appropriate testimony of national gratitude for this exploit, the regency conferred the dignity of *maestre-escuela* in the cathedral of Vich, a dignity equivalent to that of prebend in the English church, on the brigadier doctor Renovales—for to that rank he was presented—for his recovery of Figueras.

As the French generals were making active preparations for the recovery of Figueras, Eroles, with that promptitude and vigour for which he was distinguished, hastened with all the force he could collect, from Martorell, to reinforce the garrison, and on his march took the forts which the French had erected in Castelfellit and Olot, and made above 500 prisoners there. Though 8,000 troops, under Baraguay d'Hilliers, had been collected before the place, he entered it on the sixth day after its capture, with 1,500 infantry, 150 horse, and about 50 artillerymen. About the same time a convoy of stores arrived in a frigate from Tarragona. On the 30th of March, Manresa, which had been marked for vengeance, because it had been the first place in Catalonia which had declared against the French, and that one of those journals was printed there which had contributed to keep up the national spirit, was burned by Macdonald's order, and the inmates of its hospitals driven from their beds and plundered. To restrain the like excesses, Campoverde issued orders to his troops to give no quarter to any Frenchmen who might be taken in the vicinity of any place which had

* In December of this year, the regency had re-organized the Spanish military force, distinguishing the armies by numbers, instead of that of *the centre, the left, and the right*. Thus the Catalonian forces, previously called *the army of the right*, was now called *the first army*. The Valencians, with the *partidas* of the Empecinado and Duran, *the second*

army; the Mercian force, *the third*; the troops at Cadiz and Algeiras, *the fourth*; the remnants of Romana's Galician division, *the fifth*; the new raised troops of Galicia and those of the Asturias, *the sixth*; and the *partidas* of the north, namely, those of Mina, Longa, Campillo, Porlier, and other smaller bands, formed *the seventh army*.

been burned and sacked, or in which the inhabitants had been murdered. During these operations, Espoz y Mina was so actively engaged in Navarre against the enemies of his country, that, to adopt his own hyperbolical expression, "reams of paper would not suffice for the details of all the skirmishes in which he and his party were engaged; for every day, and sometimes twice and thrice in the day, they were occurring."

Suchet, having completed his formidable preparations for the siege of Tarragona, on the 4th of May invested that city with an army of 20,000 men, and 100 pieces of artillery, and on the 28th the fire from the French batteries was opened. During the operations several sallies had been made by the besieged. On the night of the 29th, the garrison of Fort Olivio, one of the outworks, was to be charged; but "a wretch, who was wicked enough to sell the blood of his comrades and the interests of his country," betraying the circumstance to the enemy, the French presenting themselves at the same time with the new garrison possessed themselves of the fort. Meanwhile, the siege being pressed with the utmost skill and exertion, and three practicable breaches being declared in the rampart of the lower town, the enemy prepared to make the assault. At seven o'clock at night of the 27th of June, 1,500 chosen men marched in three columns on the breaches, and after a desperate resistance the ramparts were won, and the fleeing Spaniards were pursued and massacred. When the morning dawned, amidst a terrific carnage of soldiers and citizens, the French remained masters of the harbour and the lower town.

The upper town, still, with wonderful resolution, maintained the contest. A flag of truce sent by Suchet, on the day following the capture of the lower town, was sternly rejected. Undismayed, the besieged still held out, in hopes that Campoverde would advance for the relief of the place. These hopes were increased by the arrival in the harbour of 2,000 English from Gibraltar, under colonel Skerret, but which were not landed, the English engineers reporting that the wall of the town was shaking under the French fire. At this time nearly half the town was in possession of the enemy, and on the breach being reported practicable, on the evening of the 28th 1,500 men, rushing forward towards the rampart, supported by 8,000 in reserve, the whole body speedily "streamed over the breach, and spread like

a torrent along the ramparts on either side," and in a moment the place was in their possession. The heroic governor, Contreras, who had received a bayonet wound in the breast at the siege, was, while the carnage was reeking in every quarter, carried into the presence of the French general. When told that he deserved instant death for continuing resistance after the breach was practicable, he replied, "I know of no law which compelled me to capitulate before the assault was made." Gosales, the second in command, had fallen, pierced by more than twenty wounds. The savage cruelty displayed by "the invincible conquerors" towards the inhabitants was unequalled among even French atrocities. To use Suchet's own words, "a horrible massacre had been made," and in the expression of the journalist (Belmas) of the siege, "the blood of the Spaniards inundated the streets and the houses." The French field-pieces kept up an unceasing fire on the thousands of the fleeing multitude on the one part; and on the other, the cavalry charged among them, sabring women and children, and trampling them down. A heavy fire was kept up on the group of women and children who were crowding into the English boats at the landing place, and every endeavour was made to sink the boats employed in this service of humanity. More than six thousand unresisting persons were butchered on that dreadful night, old and young, men and women, mother and babe; and when "the execrable conquerors" had satiated their thirst for blood, they even indulged in the perpetration of the most revolting crimes. In the streets and in the churches, they violated women, who had escaped their first fury only to suffer more horrors before they died. Nuns and wives, and widows, in the hour when they were widowed, girls and children, were seized on by these monsters; and retaining their cruelty, when their rage and lust were palled, they threw those of their victims, and of the wounded Spaniards, into the burning houses. In the course of this siege above 20,000 Spaniards had perished; the loss of the enemy had been 5,000 in killed and wounded; 9,000 prisoners, 320 cannon, and an immense quantity of stores, fell into the hands of the victors. On the morning following this dismal tragedy, the French general ordered the alcaides and corregidores of the surrounding country to be brought into the town and led through its streets, that they might see the slaughtered

bodies which were lying there, and report to their countrymen what they might expect if they dared attempt resistance to the French.

Suchet having made himself master of Tarragona, marched against Campoverde's army, the only remaining force of any consequence in the province of Catalonia. That general, unwilling to meet him, proposed to captain Codrington to embark his forces from Arens deguer, leaving their horses on the beach; but Codrington, refusing to receive any forces on board, except the 2,400 Valencians whom he had conveyed to Catalonia, Campoverde retired to the mountain ridges on the frontier of Aragon, where he was superseded by general Lacy, who assumed the command of an army which he said was non-existent: "Bad as I expected to find things," said he, "they are infinitely worse; and my only consolation must be, that there is absolutely nothing left for me to lose." But, undismayed, he gave a new organization to the army, re-forming it into guerrilla bands, with permission to select their chiefs. At the same time he issued a proclamation in which he called on his countrymen to join the patriotic standard: "Every father of a family has wrongs to avenge," said the gallant chief; "war and vengeance must now be our only business; and those who have not spirit to follow this resolution, let them abandon us and join the enemy, that we may know whom to treat as enemies and whom as friends. By a subsequent decree of the cortes, the guerrilla parties were attached to the armies of their respective districts, and military rank was given to their leaders, leaving them to pursue their own system of warfare at their own discretion, but subjecting them to a military superior when they should be called on for the purpose.

The fortified points which the Catalans still retained were, Berga, Monserrat, Figueras, Cordova, and the Seu d'Urgel. Berga was dismantled by Lacy because he was unable to defend it, and orders having been received from Paris to dismantle Tarragona, forming only a redoubt there, and to reduce Monserrat, Suchet proceeded to the execution of his orders.

Montserrat, which is a mountain fastness, about seven leagues from Barcelona, and celebrated for its convent of the Lady of Montserrat, was now attacked. Its peaceful inhabitants, the monks, dreading French spoliation, had removed all the treasures of

their sanctuary to Majorca. Its garrison, confiding too much in the natural strength of the mountain, suffered themselves to be surprised from its heights. D'Erolles, with the greater part of the garrison, however, throwing themselves down the ravines, escaped to the Lobregat. The last calamity in this series of misfortunes was the fall of Figueras. When it had been blockaded by a force occupying a circuit of lines eight miles in length round the town, between four and five months, and all the horses had been eaten, the garrison sallied, and attempted to force their way through the besiegers. An aid-de-camp of the governor had deserted, and given information of their purpose; the enemy, therefore, were prepared to receive them; nevertheless they made their way to the abattis, formed of trunks of trees, which they found impenetrable, and after three attempts in the course of one day (August 19th), they were compelled to capitulate. Honourable terms were obtained. It had been stipulated that the garrison should march out with their baggage, and deliver their arms on the glacis. But no sooner had they given up their arms than they were marched into France in a state of so great destitution that they were indebted for needful covering to the humanity of the towns through which they passed. The garrison, which originally consisted of 4,000 men, had lost 1,500 in their ineffectual sorties. On October 7th, D'Erolles captured Cervera, with its garrison, amounting to 630 men; and in his pursuit of the enemy captured the corregidor of Cervera, who had joined the French, and with the malevolence of a traitor, persecuted his own countrymen. He had invented a cage in which to imprison those who did not pay their contributions for the support of the French army, or were in any way obnoxious to him; it was so constructed as to confine the whole body, leaving the head exposed to be buffeted and spat upon, and sometimes "the devilish villain" anointed the face of his victim with honey to attract the flies and wasps. "To-morrow," said D'Erolles, in his despatches, "the señor corregidor will go out to parade the streets in this same cage, where the persons who have suffered this grievous torment may behold him. *Discite justitiam meritis, et non temnere Divos.*" In the course of the same month, D'Erolles entered France by the pass of the Valle de Luerol, and levied, in Languedoc contributions of some thousand

sheep, a large quantity of corn, and specie to the amount of 50,000 dollars. On the 8th of August Soult had defeated the patriots under general Quadra, at Baza, in Murcia, with great loss.

Suchet having completed his preparations, in the beginning of September marched against Valencia. In his line of march lay the fortifications of Peniscola, Oropesa, and Murviedro, which last mentioned fortress stood on the site of the ancient Saguntum, famed for its resistance against Hannibal.

Murviedro, is an open town, twelve miles east of Valencia, and its fortress, called the castle of San Fernando de Sagunto, and which stands on the summit of a steep and rocky hill, was, for its natural strength and artificial defences, a formidable post. Luis Maria Andriani commanded its garrison of 3,500 men. On the 21st the French arrived before the place, and on the following day assaulted the fort at old breaches discovered in the walls, but were repulsed with the loss of above 400 in killed and wounded. As the French artillery had not yet arrived, and that the little fort of Oropesa commanded, in a narrow defile, the road by which it was to be brought from Tortosa, that fort was attacked and carried. On the arrival of the artillery, the approaches were carried on with vigour; and on the 18th of October a practicable breach having been made, twice in the course of that day, and the following night, the enemy attempted to storm it, but were repulsed with great slaughter. During these operations, Blake was advancing from Valencia, to the relief of the place, with an army consisting of 22,000 infantry and 2,500 horse. Suchet, with the intention of preventing his enemy arriving on the ground where he designed to give battle, leaving six battalions to continue the siege, marched against him with 17,000 men, and took post in a pass, about three miles broad, through which the Spanish army must pass to reach Murviedro. On the morning of the 25th, Blake approached the French position, and immediately began the attack, but was, after a desperate contest, compelled to retreat, with the loss of 1,000 in killed and wounded, 2,500 prisoners, and sixteen guns. On the same night the garrison of Murviedro, consisting of 2,500 men, capitulated. During this siege the Empecinado and Duran, uniting their guerilla forces, amounting to 4,000 men, had laid siege to Calatayud,

which, on the sixth day (October 3) of the siege, capitulated, an event which caused great joy to the patriots.

About six weeks after the fall of Murviedro, Suchet having been reinforced by the divisions of Sevole and Reille, advanced to complete the conquest of Valencia by the siege of its capital, which stands in an open plain, upon the right bank of the Guadalaviar, about two miles from the sea. "In no part of Spain," says the historian of the Peninsular War, "nor perhaps of Christendom, were there so many religious puppet-shows exhibited; nowhere were the people more sunk in all the superstitions of Romish idolatry, and, if the reproaches of even the Spaniards themselves may be credited, there was as little purity of morals as of faith." But if the Valencians were, as a censor has said of them, light equally in mind and body, the cause has been wrongly imputed to their genial and delicious climate; the state of ignorance to which a double despotism had reduced the nation, and the demoralizing practices of the Romish church, sufficiently account for their degradation. On the day subsequent to his victory over Blake's army at Murviedro, Suchet summoned Valencia, offering the people his especial protection, and assuring them the French would make them happy, and relieve them from the evils with which they were oppressed. The Valencians relying on their intrenched camp, occupied by Blake's army exceeding 20,000 men, and which contained, within its extensive line, the city and the suburbs on the right bank of the river, did not deign to reply to the gasconade.

On the 25th of December, the enemy appeared before Valencia. They soon closed upon the city, and established themselves in the suburb called Serrano, on the left bank of the river, not, however, without considerable opposition. Having gained the suburb, they formed a contravallation of three strong redoubts. Next they occupied the Grayo, which is the port of Valencia. The French general had now, by a semicircular march of above fifteen miles round the southern side of the city, interposed the main body of his army between it and the Spanish intrenched camp, so as to cut off its retreat towards Alicante and Murcia, the Spaniards abandoning their intrenchments and artillery almost on the first fire. Blake now, at the head of 15,000 men, endeavoured to force his way out of the town by the left bank of the Guadalaviar, but was forced to

fall back on Valencia,—about 4,000 men, under Mahi, to whom the order to return could not be communicated, escaping, reached Alicante.

The investment of Valencia, and the intrenched camp, was completed before the close of the day. On the 28th, Blake, at the head of 15,000 men, attempted to force his way out of the town by the left bank of the Guadalaviar, but was driven back with the loss of above 600 men. A few days afterwards a similar attempt was fruitlessly made, when, taking with him his field artillery, and leaving in the deserted lines about eighty pieces of heavy ordnance, he retired into the city. The next morning the French general resummoned the city, but his terms being rejected, he proceeded to bombard it. The bombardment having been continued some days, Blake proposed to capitulate, and thus about 16,000 troops, and nearly 400 pieces of cannon, and an immense quantity of military stores, fell into the hands of the enemy, January 12th, 1812. Suchet, on his obtaining possession of the place, executed, in the public square, some of those persons who had been most distinguished for their zeal in the national cause, though he had promised that no man should be molested, and the inhabitants should be protected both in person and property. During the siege, St. Philippe, a town situated midway between Valencia and Alicante, surrendered, by which the enemy obtained a vast quantity of provisions, and more than a million of cartridges. At the close of the campaign, a contribution of fifty millions of francs was imposed on the city and province of Valencia for the benefit of the French exchequer.

A few days after the fall of Valencia, the little town and port of Denia surrendered without resistance; and on February 5th, Peniscola, a fort so strong by nature, and so well secured by art, that it had obtained the name of Little Gibraltar, was betrayed by its treacherous governor, Navarro. An attempt was made on Alicante, but was repulsed by the gallantry of the garrison and the inhabitants; and thus it had the honour of sharing with Cadiz and Carthagena the glory of being the only Spanish cities which were never sullied by the presence of the enemy. On March 18th, Duran scaled the walls of Soria, which stands on the Douro, near the supposed site of Numantia, and obtained possession of the city. Levying a contribution, and seizing a large quantity of

grain and biscuit, he retreated without loss. In retaliation the French seized the junta of Burgos, and putting them to death, suspended their bodies from the gallows. The bodies being removed and buried, the French compelled the attendants to carry back the bodies to the gallows, and hang them there again in their shrouds. The guerilla chiefs resorted to retaliatory measures, and so furious was the enmity on both sides, that since the religious wars in France, no contest had been carried on with so ferocious a spirit on both sides. By the French heads were exposed on poles, bodies left hanging on the gallows, or the trees, and in the market-places of large towns, the walls, against which the victims were shot, were pierced with bullets, and the ground blackened with blood. The reprisals of the Spaniards were characteristic of a vindictive people, capable of inflicting as well as enduring anything; but they were evidences also of that high-mindedness which they retained in their lowest fortune, never abasing themselves, never submitting to the insolent assumption of authority, nor for a moment consenting that might should be allowed to sanction injustice.

From this period the hostile collisions between the patriots and the invaders may be considered to have mainly ceased. The results which the act of aggression on the mother country produced in the colonies may now be appropriately mentioned.

Buonaparte having succeeded in his hypocritical designs at Bayonne, immediately despatched messengers with secret instructions to the captain-general of the Caraccas, and the governor of Mexico, to induce those officers to yield obedience to the intruder Joseph, who had modestly proclaimed himself Joseph I., king of Spain and the Indies, (*Jao Primero*, &c.); but the Spanish colonists, who were already inclined to proclaim their independence, as they considered their connexion with the mother country virtually dissolved, by the dissolution of its legitimate authority, spurned the proposal of submission to the usurper. To meet the emergency, juntas, formed in imitation of those of the mother country, assumed the direction of affairs; and on the 19th of April, 1810, the Caraccas, with six other provinces, declared themselves united as a federal government, by the name of the American Confederation of Venezuela. The regency of Cadiz, and the merchants of that city, indignant at the proceedings of

the colonists, and unwilling to relieve them from the monopoly of the whole of their commerce being confined to Cadiz, fitted out an expedition against the insurgent colonies. Hostilities now commenced on the 5th of July 1811, Venezuela proclaimed its independence, and Mexico, Carthagená, Buenos Ayres, Potosí, Paraguay, Chili, Peru, and other provinces soon followed the example. The war between the contending parties was carried on with various success, and in its prosecution unparalleled atrocities

were practised by both sides. The independence of the whole of the insurgent colonies was ultimately acknowledged in consequence of the decisive battle of Ayacucho, fought December 9th, 1824, and obtained by the valour of the British auxiliary force in Bolívar's army, and which had been insidiously enlisted on behalf of the south American colonists, by the English capitalists, who had advanced loans to a considerable extent to the insurgent authorities.

THE THIRD SPANISH CAMPAIGN.

ANNIS 1811—1812.

THE third Spanish campaign,—the most glorious and memorable in the annals of warfare, both for its great results on the contemporary and the future destinies of Europe, as well as for the consummate talent and judgment displayed by its principal actor, and the indomitable courage, and unequalled discipline of his companions-in-arms, in which sieges and battles had ever been carried on and fought, or which had ever been fancied, or even dreamt of, by Vauban and Folard, by Marlborough or Turenne,—began with the usual inauspicious aspects attending on, and inseparable from, Spanish and Portuguese affairs during the whole of that great and arduous struggle, THE PENINSULAR WAR. But time, the great improver of all things, the radical regenerator of ignorance, superstition, and bigotry, and all the errors and phantasies that man falls into by his disobedience to the dictates of reason, the monitions of conscience, and the laws of nature, had made no improvement, no amendment, in the policy, administration, and warlike character of that strange and wayward people, the Spaniards. The opening of "the third Spanish campaign" was attended with the same disasters, the same discomfiture and loss, as had invariably attended the preceding campaigns. Tortosa surrendered on the 2nd of January, 1811. The army under Mendizábal had been routed and dispersed on the Gebora on the 18th of February; Badajoz had surrendered on the 9th of March; Oli-

venza, Valencia, d'Alcantara, and Albuquerque, made a show of resistance; but, on the first discharge of the enemy's artillery, the courage of their garrisons being completely paralyzed, they submitted. Campo Mayor acquired a nobler name by its brave resistance; but its garrison would have imitated the craven conduct of its Castilian neighbours, had it not been for the noble spirit of major Tallaia, a Portuguese engineer. That brave man heroically defended his trust as long as there was a possibility of resistance; and his heroism met with a proportionately honourable treatment from the enemy. Tarragona, with a garrison of 10,000 men, surrendered on the 28th of June; and though but a very feeble resistance had been made, the excesses of the French troops were terrific. *Long after resistance had ceased*, the batteries were discharged on the fleeing and affrightened inhabitants, and the French cavalry rode among the fugitives, sabring with ruthless ferocity, and savage exultation, those who had outstripped the infantry. The British seamen gallantly rescued many within reach of the very sabres of the dragoons. The frightful massacre was continued for many hours; and "a licentiousness of the most brutal nature, was acted with all its most wanton and heartless atrocities amid flaming edifices, and bleeding victims." "At the storming of Tarragona," says an eye-witness of the dismal scene, and one, too, who is disposed to speak leniently of French outrage, and

to find plausible palliations for the excesses of war, "above 6,000 human beings, all defenceless and unarmed, men and women, gray hairs and infant innocence, attractive youth and wrinkled age, were, with the most infernal spirit of implacable vengeance, butchered by the infuriated troops in one night, and the morning sun rose upon a city whose streets and houses were inundated with blood. Beauty and innocence, after satiating the passions of a licentious soldiery, were mercilessly sacrificed;" and yet for these terrific transactions, as well as for the cruel and contumelious usage of its governor, the brave Contrera, Suchet, "the servant of a warlike tyrant," was not only elevated by his heartless master (for the gratification of whose insatiable ambition, and ruthless violation of the rights and well-being of mankind, all this slaughter had been occasioned) to the rank of marshal of France, created duke of Valencia, and endowed with rich possessions in that ill-fated and desolated province; but the character of the butcher of his species rose in the estimation of his countrymen. The strong and almost impregnable fortresses of Murviedro, Monserrat, Mesquinenza, and Figueras, had all fallen into the enemy's hands, after very feeble resistance; and the Spanish armies, under Campoverde, D'Erolles, Quadra, Freire, Ballasteros, and Blake, had been routed at Figueras, 29th of April, and scattered at Villa Nueva (June 29th), at Buza, and Lorca, in August; at Puzol, Tache, and Santa Maria, near Valencia, on the 25th of October; at Casteblejos in the mountains of Santander, and on Guadalaviar in December. The only advantages gained over the enemy, that could be produced as a set-off for these tremendous losses and discomfitures, were the surprise of Figueras by Martinez and Rovira, with the capture of 1,000 prisoners; that of Igualada by Lacy; that of Calatayud by Duran and the *empecinado*; that of Ayerba by Mina; the combats of Vals under Sarsfield, and of Godinot under Ballasteros. Some idea and estimate of the immense loss of men, artillery, and the munitions of war, sustained by the Spaniards in their disastrous discomfitures just stated, may be formed from the facts, that by the surrender of Tortosa and Tarragona, above 18,000 prisoners were taken, and in the defeat of Mendizabel, on the Gebora, above 7,000 men, all the artillery and munitions of war, fell into the hands of the enemy.

To meet the mighty contest, the British commander-in-chief, invoking all the energies and resources of his vigorous and comprehensive mind, adopted the following plan of operations:—

To provide for all contingences, he determined to act on two lines of operations, that according as circumstances might render it expedient, he might adopt that which was likely to be productive of the best results. For these purposes he directed the mass of his forces to the south for the relief of Cadiz, and the protection of Portugal on the south-eastern frontier, while he remained in Beira on the defensive, and was prepared to undertake the reduction of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo; and on the fall of those fortresses, to push his operations into the heart of Spain, and open a communication with the Anglo-Sicilian army, then present in Valencia, under the incompetent command of sir John Murray. This brilliant and masterly conception, by concentrating the British and Spanish forces, and cutting asunder the northern and southern armies of the enemy, would have relieved Cadiz and the south of Spain, as effectually as any direct operation; and, besides opening the communication between the Spanish government in that city, would have delivered Portugal from the possibility of invasion on that side; and, at the same time, the British army would have obtained a new base of operations on the shores of the Mediterranean. Never did a brighter and a more profound conception enter the mind of a military genius. Let the minions and worshippers of Buonaparte's "superlative genius" adduce a similar example.

To carry that part of his project for the relief of Cadiz, and the freedom of the south of Spain, into execution, immediately after the successful termination of the combat of Fons d'Oronce, he had despatched Beresford into Estremadura, with 14,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and eighteen guns, with directions to relieve Campo Mayor, and besiege Olivenza and Badajoz.

The English commander-in-chief, sensible of the great importance of the possession of the fortress of Badajoz to his future operations, had arranged with the marquis Romana, that the Spanish army should take up a strong position behind the Gebora for its defence, in the event of its being assailed by the enemy. For this purpose he amply detailed the measures by which he was of opinion that

the attempt might be frustrated, until he was in a condition to act on the offensive by the junction of the reinforcement of the 5,000 troops who were daily expected to arrive at Lisbon. He directed Mendizabel to secure the passage of the Guadiana by the mining of the bridges of Medellin and Merida, ready for explosion should the enemy attempt the passage of that river. To increase the great natural strength of the position, he was directed to fortify it with intrenchments, the duke being convinced that if the Spaniards were to be trusted anywhere, it was behind stone-walls and deep trenches, and that at best it could only be expected of them that they should stand still. Instead of adopting this salutary counsel, Mendizabel, a man utterly incapable of originating any plan for himself, and, like his countrymen, possessed of too much pride and self-conceit, to adopt the counsel of those who were competent to advise him, lingered on the heights of San Christoval, till, alarmed at the fall of a few shells, thrown by the French from the opposite bank of the river, into his encampment, he hastily deserted his post, and being suddenly and furiously attacked by the enemy, his huge mass of fugitives was divided and slaughtered, and leaving in the hands of the victors 8,000 prisoners, with all his artillery and ammunition, he abandoned Badajoz to its fate. On the evening of their easy conquest, the French broke ground before Badajoz.

The fort was nobly and gallantly defended by Rafael Menacho, until that brave and honourable man was slain in an unsuccessful sortie on the French batteries; when the command devolved on "one Imaz, who, like a poltroon and a traitor," determined to surrender the fortress to the enemy. At the very crisis of putting his treachery into execution, he was informed by three different channels (namely, by letter, a messenger, and a telegraphic communication from Elvas), that Massena was in full retreat, and that the British army, under Beresford, was in actual march to raise the siege; yet he did not hesitate to surrender, though his garrison consisted of 8,000 men, his stores of every kind abundant, the breach still impracticable, the streets were retrenched, and the besiegers greatly reduced by sickness and fatigue. To the honour of his lieutenants, Garcia and Juan Mancio, be it said, that they scornfully opposed the dishonourable measure.

To serve as a cover to his treachery and cowardice, the dastard had made a condition with Soult, that the garrison should march through the breach for the purpose of laying down their arms; but before that display of mock heroism could be executed, he was obliged to enlarge the breach himself. The bridges of Medellin and Merida had been neglected to be mined by the ignorant Spanish engineers to whom the task had been intrusted.

By those acts of treachery and ignorance the plans of the English commander-in-chief were greatly frustrated. The communication between Andalusia and Castile was thrown open to the enemy; the Alemtejo made easy of entrance, facilities of aiding Massena created, and the fate of the Peninsula again endangered. Had Mendizabel occupied the almost impregnable position pointed out for him, he would have possessed a decided advantage in harassing the enemy, and impeding the progress of the siege. The consequences involved in the fall of Badajoz, are most appropriately described in the following expression of lord Wellington: "If it had not been for the treachery of Imaz, Spain would have been out of the fire, notwithstanding former treachery, blunders, and cowardice."*

Beresford, putting his troops in motion on the morning of the 23rd of March, his advanced guard, consisting of 2,000 cavalry and a brigade of infantry, under colonel Colborne, came up with the enemy, who, having heard of the advance of the British, were in the act of evacuating Campo Mayor. The French retreat was covered by a strong detachment of hussars, but these not being sufficient to beat off their pursuers, four regiments of dragoons advanced to their support. The 13th light dragoons and the French cavalry, then charging with loose reins, rode so fiercely up against each other, that numbers on both sides were dismounted by the shock. The combatants pierced through on both sides, then re-formed and charged again, when the 13th, galloping forwards, cut down the gunners who were conducting the battering train, continued their course till they headed the French column of march, and made themselves masters of a convoy of goods, stores, and ammunition. But the gallant captors were not able to retain possession of their booty, from the unaccountable want of support from the brigades of heavy cavalry in reserve.

* *Wellington Despatches.*

Some of these formed in front of the French column, and returned by cutting their way through it; while others, hurried on by extreme ardour and impetuosity, kept up a running and an irregular combat with the horsemen of the enemy, to the very mouths of the guns on the ramparts of Badajos, and even made some prisoners at the bridge of that town.* But the consequence of that hot and uncontrollable conduct was that about seventy of those heroic horsemen were captured close to the gates of Badajos. The enemy lost three hundred men in killed and wounded, one hundred prisoners, and one howitzer. The loss sustained by the 13th in their gallant and chivalrous exploit, was occasioned by marshal Beresford ordering the heavy cavalry brigade, consisting of the 3rd dragoon guards, and the 4th dragoons, who were advancing to their aid, to halt, in consequence of the hasty and erroneous report of one baron Trip, a Hanoverian belonging to his staff, who, seeing the 13th gallop through the French cavalry, and the enemy's columns close up, concluded that the 13th was cut off. While this chivalrous exploit of the 13th excited the unbounded admiration of the army, it met with the following severe reprimand from the commander-in-chief:—"I wish you would call together the officers of the dragoons, and point out to them the mischiefs that must result from the disorder of the troops in action. This undisciplined ardour of the 13th dragoons, and 1st regiment of Portuguese cavalry, is not of the description of the determined bravery and steadiness of soldiers confident in their discipline and in their officers. Their conduct was that of a rabble galloping as fast as their horses would carry them over a plain, after an enemy to whom they could do no mischief when they were broken, and the pursuit had continued a limited distance; and sacrificing substantial advantages, and all the objects of your operation, by their want of discipline. To this description of their conduct I add my entire conviction, that if the enemy could have thrown out of Badajos only 100 men, regularly formed, they would have driven back these two regiments in equal haste and disorder, and would pro-

* At Fuentes d'Onor a similar exploit was performed by the 1st regiment of heavy dragoons. They charged a French regiment of cavalry, and the shock was so tremendous, that many men and horses were overthrown on each side. They rode through and passed each other, and then wheeling round, reformed and came again to a second charge.

bably have taken many whose horses had been knocked up. If the 13th dragoons are again guilty of this conduct, I shall take their horses from them, and send the officers and men to do duty at Lisbon." Notwithstanding this judicious reprimand, the chivalric exploit of the 13th excited the boundless admiration of the whole army.

To restrain all undue impetuosity on the part of officers and men, which might endanger the safety of the troops and derange the plan of operations presented for their guidance, the English general, after the untoward affair of the escape of the garrison of Almeida, caused copies of the following admonition to be distributed among the officers of the army:—

"The frequent instances which have occurred lately of severe loss, and, in some instances, of important failure, by officers leading the troops beyond the point to which they were ordered, and beyond all bounds, such as the loss of the prisoners taken in front of the village of Fuentes; the loss incurred by the 13th light dragoons, here and at Badajos; the severe loss incurred by the troops in the siege of Badajos, on the right of the Guadiana; and the still more recent loss at Almeida, have induced me to determine to bring before a general court-martial, for disobedience of orders, any officer who shall in future be guilty of this conduct. I entertain no doubt of the readiness of the officers and soldiers of the army to advance upon the enemy; but it is my duty, and that of every officer in command, to regulate this spirit, and not to expose the soldiers to contend with unequal numbers in situations that are disadvantageous to them; and above all, not to allow them to follow up trifling advantages to situations where they cannot be supported, from which their retreat is not secure, and in which they incur the risk of being prisoners to the enemy they had before beaten. The desire to be forward in engaging the enemy is not uncommon in the British army; but that quality which I wish to see the officers possess, who are at the head of the troops, is a cool discriminating judgment in action, which will enable them to decide with promptitude, how far they can and ought to go with propriety; and to convey their orders, and act with such vigour and decision, that the soldiers will look up to them with confidence in the moment of action, and obey them with alacrity."

On obtaining possession of Campo Mayor, Beresford cantoned his troops at Elvas and the adjoining villages, while the means of bridging the Guadiana at Jurumenhu were obtained, the requisite materials having, as usual, been promised by the Portuguese government, but not supplied. On the 3rd of April a bridge was constructed, consisting of trestle piers in the fordable places, and in the deep parts, of the five Spanish boats that had been saved from the stores at the capture of Badajos by the French; but in the course of the night it was carried away by a sudden rising of the river. No materials being at hand, a narrow viaduct, consisting of pontoons and casks, collected from the neighbouring villages, being speedily formed for the infantry, and the five Spanish boats being converted into flying bridges for the cavalry and artillery, on the evening of the 6th the whole army effected the passage of the river, and took up its position on the left bank. In the course of the night, Latour Maubourg, who had succeeded Mortier in the command of the French troops in Estremadura, passing, with 3,500 infantry and 500 cavalry, unobserved through some Portuguese videttes, surprised and captured a squadron of the 13th light dragoons, and penetrating the village in which Beresford's head-quarters were established, was allowed to escape without a shot or a sabre being employed against him.

On the morning of the 9th, Beresford advanced on Olivenza, and after a halt of two days, left Cole, with the fourth division and Madden's Portuguese cavalry to reduce the place. A sufficient battering train being collected from Elvas, the town was invested on the 12th, and the wall being breached on the 14th, the governor surrendered the place on the following morning. On the 16th, Cole joined Beresford at Zafra; and on the same day, the 10th light dragoons intercepting, between Los Santos de Maquira and Usagre, two regiments of French cavalry (the 4th and 16th hussars), who had been raising contributions in the neighbourhood, and had succeeded in collecting considerable stores, attacked them, and pursuing them for the distance of six miles, slew above 300, took many prisoners, and recaptured part of the plunder. Had Beresford, according to his instructions, been enabled to invest Olivenza and Badajos, instead of cantoning his troops at Elvas and its neighbourhood, the war would have soon been transferred from the frontiers of Portugal into

the heart of Spain, and "the History of the Peninsular War" might have been shortened by several years. The secrecy and promptitude with which Wellington marched his army on Estremadura, and the moral effect of the late chivalrous daring of the 13th light dragoons, would have tended materially to the reduction of Badajos. But the failure in the attempt delayed the English chief for one year on the frontiers of Portugal, and enabled the enemy to prepare his plans. And it may be confidently said, that had the British government thrown at once on a proper part of the European continent, a force deserving the name of an army, instead of the pitiful dribbles they had ever done, and the temporary measures they had adopted, until they had determined on the descent on the Peninsula, the career of Buonaparte might have been checked, and his fate determined many years earlier.

The English commander-in-chief having given instructions for the blockade of Almeida, delivered the command of the allied army in Beira to sir Brent Spencer, *ad interim*, while he proceeded to Estremadura to inspect personally the condition of the army under sir William Beresford, and to decide on the means of carrying on effectually the siege of Badajos, which had been surrendered on the 11th of the preceding month to the enemy. He reached the camp on the 21st, and on the following day, with a strong escort of German light troops which had recently joined the army, and two squadrons of Madden's Portuguese cavalry, he reconnoitred Badajos for the purpose of making the enemy indicate his force. At that moment, a convoy, under escort, was coming in from the country, and an effort being made to cut it off, the assailants were beaten off, with the loss of 100 men, by a sally of the garrison, under the command of the governor.

Orders were now issued for active operations against Badajos; but when the preparations for the siege were nearly completed, the floods again carried away the bridge which had been thrown across the Guadiana at Jurumenhu, the water rising nearly nine feet in the course of twelve hours. That untoward accident put a stop to all offensive operations for the present; as the army could not not be subsisted without having a constant communication with Elvas, and in the event of Soult's advance to relieve the fortress, a battle would be very hazardous with such a river

in the rear, without a facility of transit for a retreating army. Beresford was therefore directed merely to blockade Badajos as closely as possible, till the bridge was re-established, and to post his army so as to command the communication with the right of the river by the Merida bridge. To insure a successful issue to the siege, the English commander-in-chief determined to require the assent of the Spanish generals (Blake, Castanos, and Ballasteros), to a combined plan of operations, which he detailed in the following "Memorandum:"—

"To the officers in command of corps in Estremadura.

"Elvas, 23rd April, 1811.

"The corps of allied British and Portuguese troops, under marshal sir William Beresford, being about to be employed in the siege of Badajos, it is desirous that the troops in Estremadura, the Cencilado de Niebla, and Andalusia, should co-operate in and protect that operation.

"It has been reported, and there is reason to believe that it is true, that the enemy have fortified their magazines and establishments at Seville, and therefore no diversion that might be threatened, or even attempted on that city, will have the effect of drawing off the enemy's attention from the measures he must adopt to relieve Badajos. If that relief should be attempted, therefore, it will be by the whole force which the enemy can bring from the blockade of Cadiz, and from his several corps in Andalusia, Granada, &c., and it must be resisted by the whole force of the allies *en masse*; and the following plan is proposed for the consideration of the Spanish general officers.

"Sir William Beresford's corps will carry on the operations of the siege; and it is requested that general Castaños will aid him with three battalions to work in the trenches.

"In case the enemy should endeavour to interrupt the siege, and sir William Beresford should think proper to fight a battle to save it, he will probably collect his troops in the neighbourhood of Albuera. It is proposed, that the troops under the Conde de Penre Villemeur should observe the enemy towards Guadalcanal, reporting all that passes daily to marshal sir William Beresford. In case the enemy should advance in force, the Conde de Penre Villemeur should retire by the road of Usagre, Villa Franca, Almendralejo, and to the left of the position of the allied British and Portuguese

army, ascertaining, and sending daily, intelligence of the enemy's force and movements.

"It is proposed that the troops under general Morillo shall continue to occupy Merida, and observe all that passes towards Almaraz and the passages of the Tagus. In case of the advance of the enemy, general Morillo should break up, and march by Lebon, and be prepared to join the allied British and Portuguese army, either by Talavera, or by a more direct route.

"It is proposed that, during the siege of Badajos, general Ballasteros shall have his quarters at Burguillos, and communicate by his left, with the Conde de Penre Villemeur, and observe the roads through the Sierra by Fregenal and Monasterio, taking care to involve himself in no serious affair, and sending daily information to sir William Beresford of all that passes.

"In case the enemy should advance, general Ballasteros should retire by the road of Barcarrota upon Valverde, in order to join on the right of the army.

"When general Blake's corps shall land, it is proposed that it should take its station at Xeres de los Caballeros; and, if the enemy should advance, it should fall back by the same road as that pointed out for general Ballasteros.

"It is proposed, that the troops of the several nations shall carry on these operations under the command of their several chiefs, of course communicating with each other constantly, as above proposed; but, in case of joining for the purpose of giving battle to the enemy, it will be necessary that the whole should be under the orders of the officer of the highest military rank.

"The Spanish general officers are requested to state to sir William Beresford whether they will or not co-operate with him in the manner above proposed, in carrying on the siege of Badajos; and what the number is of the effective men of the cavalry, infantry, and artillery, under their several commands.

"WELLINGTON."

Before the pride and the perverseness of the Spanish generals conceded to these wholesome and judicious suggestions, intelligence being received from sir Brent Spencer, that Massena was again in force on the Agueda, having established his head-quarters at Ciudad Rodrigo, the English commander-in-chief instantly repaired to Beira, and arrived at Villa Formosa on the 28th of the month. Previous

to his departure, foreseeing the probability of Soult's advance to raise the siege of Badajos, he instructed Beresford that Albuera was the best battle-field that could be selected in the neighbourhood of that fortress.

With the broken and dispirited band with which Massena had re-crossed the frontier of Portugal, he had fallen back to Salamanca, where he made the most strenuous exertions to refit and reorganize his shattered forces. Being reinforced by two divisions of the 9th corps, which on account of Joseph Buonaparte's flight from Madrid was no longer necessary in that locality, as also by the cavalry and artillery of the imperial guard under Bessières, from the army of the north, he advanced to the frontiers of Portugal; and on the eve of the invasion he addressed a proclamation to the French army, couched in the usual inflated and bombastic Napoleonic phraseology; in which, among much braggadocioism and

exaggeration, the following startling declaration appeared: "Soldiers of the army of Portugal! After six months of *glorious* and *tranquil* operations you have returned to the first scene of your *triumphs*." As the river Agueda was not as yet fordable for infantry, no movement was made, except two of reconnoissance towards the bridge of the Azava, near Marialva, in both of which the French sustained considerable loss. On the 2nd of May, however, the whole of the army, consisting of the 2nd, 6th, and 8th corps, amounting to 41,000 infantry, and 5,000 cavalry, crossed the Agueda at Ciudad Rodrigo, escorting a convoy of stores and provisions for the relief of Almeida. The English commander-in-chief immediately concentrated his force, amounting to 32,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry, to deliver battle, though both the ground and the circumstances were unfavourable, and opposed the entry of the supplies.

THE BATTLE OF FUENTES D'ONOR.

As the great object of the English general was to keep up the blockade of Almeida, and prevent the enemy from having any communication with the garrison, he was compelled to take up a position with the river Coa in his rear. To make provision for this disadvantage, it was necessary to keep open the communication with the bridge of Sabugal; and thus was imposed on him the necessity of occupying a position of not less than six miles from flank to flank, the ruins of Fort Conception being on the extreme left, Fuentes d'Onor (a "fair" and beautiful village situated on an eminence on the left bank of the Duas Casas, near its source, the river dividing Portugal from Spain at an equal distance from the two frontier lines,) towards the centre, and Nave d'Aver on the extreme right. The position included the tableland between the Turones and the Duas Casas. This was the position selected by the English general for the battle, and though somewhat similar to those of Assaye and Vimiero, he had confidence in the resources of his genius and the spirit of his troops. The event proved that his estimate was correct.

To anticipate the enemy at whatever point he might direct his attack, the 6th

division, under general Campbell, observed the bridge opposite Alameda; sir William Erskine, with the 5th, covered the passage of the Duas Casas at Fort Conception and Aldea del Obispo; while the principal part of the army, consisting of the 1st, 3rd, and 7th divisions, was massed on Fuentes d'Onor, within cannon-shot, behind the village, ready to meet the enemy's attack on whatever point it might be directed; the village itself being occupied by a battalion of chosen detachments of light infantry, taken from the 1st and 3rd divisions, and placed under the command of lieutenant-colonel Williams. Park's brigade, with the queen's regiment from the 6th division, kept up the blockade of Almeida. The partisan Julian Sanchez had been prevailed on to occupy Nave d'Aver with his guerilla horse and infantry. The light division was in observation on the banks of the Duas Casas.

On the evening of the 2nd, the enemy passed the Azava, and on the next morning, continuing their march towards the Duas Casas, the light division, with its cavalry, fell back on Fuentes d'Onor. Towards the evening of the 3rd, Loisson having formed the 6th corps on the right bank of the river, with the intent of forcing the centre of the

British position, under the cover of a hot cannonade, made a fierce attack on the village, but the assault was successfully resisted by colonel Williams, who was reinforced in succession by the 71st, 79th, and a battalion of the 24th; when a vigorous charge being made on the enemy, he was driven from the lower part of the village of which he had obtained a momentary possession; and night closing the scene of the angry and deadly strife, he withdrew across the Duas Casas. Colonel Williams was severely wounded in this honourable and well-contested conflict.

Massena having failed in his attempt to pierce the British centre, determined to make a simultaneous attack on any other part of the line which should appear to present a weak point. For this purpose, he occupied the whole of the 4th in carefully reconnoitring the British position. From the course of the reconnoissance, lord Wellington being of opinion that he would endeavour to turn his right by crossing the river at Poço Velho, which stands midway between Fort Conception and Fuentes d'Onor, for the purpose of counteracting his attempt, moved the 7th division, under major-general Houston, to that point, with orders to defend to the utmost the passage of the river.

The anticipations of the English general were realized. At daylight of the 5th (Sunday), the 8th corps, under Junôt, appeared in two columns, with all the cavalry, on the opposite side of the valley of the Duas Casas, and advancing against the village of Poço Velho. Houston's advanced guard was driven back, and the right of his division being turned in consequence of Julian Sanchez—who had imprudently taken alarm—abandonment of Nave d'Aver, the right of Houston's division being uncovered, the village was carried by the enemy, Houston's advanced brigade retiring in good order.

The light division, the cavalry, and a troop of horse artillery, were sent to Houston's assistance; but whilst the British cavalry were moving up to his support, they were furiously charged by the whole of the French horse, supported by the infantry; and though the weak squadrons unflinchingly maintained the shock of the overpowering numbers of the enemy, they were compelled to retire behind the light division, which, forming itself into squares, and at the same time the 7th division taking ad-

vantage of the ground, which was in some parts intersected by stone walls, while in other parts the rocks stood several feet above the surface, the united force poured in so destructive a fire, that the whole force of the enemy at once recoiled, and fell back in disorder.

In the mean time, the enemy was gaining ground in the wood of Poço Velho, and his numerous cavalry was observed to be collecting on the right flank, while large masses of infantry were forming on the front. This movement determined the English general to take up a more concentrated position towards his left, by forming a new alignment at right angles with his former position, from the Duas Casas to the Turones, and relinquishing his communication with Sabugal.

To accomplish his purpose, the 7th and light divisions were ordered to a commanding ground beyond the Turones, which protected the right flank and the rear of the 1st division, and covered the communication with the Coa, while it prevented that of the enemy with Almeida by the road between the rivers. The 7th division was directed to take post on the height beyond the Turones, which commanded the whole plain of Frenada, and the cavalry and the light division were ordered to form in reserve, in rear of the left of the 1st division. The enemy viewing this movement as a general retreat, pressed on with the confidence of victory. They had at one period cut off and surrounded, with their cavalry, captain Ramsay's battery of horse-artillery. "In a moment," to adopt the vivid language of the historian of *The War in the Peninsula*, "great confusion and tumult, with sparkling of blades, and flashing of pistols, in the locality where the gallant band stood, was observed, when an English shout peeled high and clear; the mass was rent asunder, and Ramsay burst forth, sword in hand, at the head of his battery, his horses breathing fire stretched across the plain, the guns bounded behind them like things of no weight, and the mounted gunners followed close, with heads bent low, and pointed weapons, in desperate career." The gallant band had broke its way through the astonished squadrons of the enemy, and brought off the battery. At the same moment, captain Brotherton advanced to their relief with a squadron of the 14th dragoons, and checked the head of the pursuing troops.

The retrogressive movement of the 7th and light divisions was executed for near two miles with great regularity and firmness, in the face of the enemy's numerous cavalry, which, strongly supported by artillery, made repeated charges on the retiring divisions. The light division, having covered the passage of the 7th division across the Turones, commenced its own retreat over the plain in squares, slowly and in good order, followed and continually outflanked by the French cavalry, one moment lost to sight, and the next emerging from the confused crowd, till they at length reached the ground appointed them, having been protected by the occasional charges of a few squadrons of their own cavalry, through the intervals of the squares. On the divisions taking up their battle-stations, the cavalry, in passing through the intervals of the new alignment, having occasioned some confusion, Montbrun ordered a charge of the whole French cavalry; but his force was received with so destructive a fire, that it retreated in confusion; from which time, the efforts of the enemy on the right were confined to a cannonade, and some charges of horse on the advanced posts.

But the storm of battle throughout the whole day was at Fuentes d'Onor. There the principal effort of the enemy was directed. Drouet made a desperate attack on the village, which was as desperately defended by the three British regiments, the 71st, 79th, and 34th infantry. Infantry, cavalry, and artillery, were all brought to bear, and at nine o'clock in the morning, on a given signal, a tremendous cannonade opened on the devoted village, and the assault was made in front and flanks at the same time. The struggle was at one time on the banks of the stream, and amongst the houses in the lower town, and at another among the rugged heights, and about the chapel. Every house in the lower town was taken and retaken in the course of the day, and one by one abandoned as the entrances were choked up with the dead. So hotly and stiffly was the contest maintained by the gallant defenders of the village, that the numbers of the enemy brought in to reinforce Drouet produced but little effect. But the French guns played with so much fury, and the assailing columns became so powerful and impetuous, that the defenders were compelled to withdraw to the upper part of the village, when one tremendous inundation of Frenchmen pouring into the chapel,

passed out on the opposite side, and they were about attempting a formation to assail the plateau, or table-land, between the Turones and the Duas Casas, when the 74th, 83rd, and 88th, under general Mackinnon, advanced to the charge, and drove them back into the village at the point of the bayonet, where the contest recommenced, and was kept up with great vigour and obstinacy till nightfall, when the enemy retired about a cannon-shot from the stream, leaving the English in possession of the upper part of the village, and the lower part in the "silent occupation of the dead." In this desperate affair, bayonets were repeatedly crossed.

Never was national rivalry and heroism more conspicuously shown than in the battle of Fuentes d'Onor. Each army performed prodigies of valour. Never were the gallantry and devotion of every regiment engaged, in that part of the contest which was about the village, exceeded. But the conduct of the French 45th of the line was eminently conspicuous. It came on to the sound of music, in all the regularity of a field day, and planting its eagle on the wall of the village nearest to the British position, maintained it floating there, till forced to retire, when near 100 dead were found piled on one another, near the pole of their favourite banner, all slain in their heroic attempts to rescue it from the foe. The loss of the British was 1,776 in killed, wounded, and missing—that of the French is said to have exceeded 5,000. Intercepted letters stated, that between 3,000 and 4,000 had been wounded.

At daylight of the 6th the whole French army was in motion, and on the 10th retired across the Azava, in full retreat for Ciudad Rodrigo, Massena having previously transmitted orders to the governor of Almeida to blow up the fortifications and withdraw the garrison to Barba del Puerco, whence he was to march to San Felices, where a strong force would be ready to cover his retreat. "He had recourse to this artifice," says general Sarrazin, "to repair as much as possible the reverses he had experienced, and to cover or gloze over his disgrace," after all his vaunting and boasts. He carried his boastful spirit and disposition for misrepresentation so far as even to arrogate to himself the victory just obtained at Fuentes d'Onor, representing that the evacuation and not the relief of Almeida, was the object for which the battle of Fuentes d'Onor had

been fought; adopting the usual Napoleonic jesuitical phraseology:—"The operation," said he, "which had put the army in motion, was thus terminated." In conformity with his orders, general Brennier, the governor of Almeida, mined the principal fortifications in the course of the day of the 11th, and at 11 o'clock of the night of that day, having given the watchword, "Buonaparte and Bayard," to his brave and intrepid followers, and marshalling the garrison into two columns, placing the baggage in the rear of each to allure and detain his pursuers, evacuated the place. His advanced guard came up with the English posts at the moment the mines exploded and blew up the ramparts. The spirit of the attack, and the superiority of numbers, easily opened a passage for the head of the column, through the pickets, who were all bayoneted. The queen's regiment, and the other troops employed in the blockade, believing the explosions were of the same kind as those they had heard on the preceding nights (the gar-

rison, while Massena was between the Duas Casas and the Azava, having been in the habit of firing cannon during the night, and of making constant attacks on the pickets; measures no doubt preparatory to the intended evacuation, and designed to beguile the attention of the besiegers,) remained at their posts and cantonments till the cause had been actually ascertained. The negligence, too, of some of the British officers, particularly Erskine and Campbell, not a little aided Brennier in his bold and daring attempt. But though the garrison escaped, and formed a junction with Regnier, who was waiting for them at the bridge of San Felices, it was much harassed on its flanks, and lost all its baggage and 300 prisoners, and the whole of its rear-guard was cut to pieces. Great, however, was the mortification of the English commander-in-chief, that a single Frenchman escaped, and he angrily declared, that he looked on it as "the most disgraceful event that had occurred during the war."* Had the mere precaution of

* In his official letter to Lord Liverpool, he expressed the same sentiments, and with scarcely less acerbity; and candour must allow that the honour of the service, and the interests of his country, demanded the severity of his just and judicious rebuke:—

"To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

"Villa Formosa, 15th May, 1811.

"MY DEAR LORD,—You will receive by this post the account of the blowing up of Almeida; and although I believe that we have taken or destroyed the greater part of the garrison, I have never been so much distressed by any military event as by the escape of even a man of them.

"The enemy having retired across the Azava, during the night of the 9th, I went forward in the morning to observe their subsequent movements. About one o'clock of the day of the 10th, having seen their whole army across the Agueda, I sent orders for the right of the army to remove their cantonments on the Duas Casas; the advanced guard and cavalry upon the Azava and the Upper Agueda; the 5th division (Sir W. Erskine) to send a regiment to Barba de Puerco; and the 6th division (major-general Campbell) to resume the blockade of Almeida.

"Sir W. Erskine was dining with sir Brent Spencer at head-quarters, and received his orders about four o'clock; and he says he sent them off forthwith to the 4th regiment, which was stationed, under former orders, on the Duas Casas, half-way between Aldea de Obispo and Barba de Puerco. General Campbell called on me about half-past five or six o'clock, and told me that before dark his division would have resumed their positions for the blockade.

"At about half-past twelve the place was blown up; and the garrison had about fourteen miles to march to Barba de Puerco, and nearly the same distance to the only fords on the Agueda, the whole of which were occupied by our dragoons.

"General Pack and general Campbell both expected that the garrison would attempt to escape,

and were both at Malpartida, about four miles from Almeida, on the road towards the Agueda and Barba de Puerco. General Pack joined the pickets, and followed the enemy with ten men, and kept a fire upon them, as a guide to the other troops, which he supposed were following. General Campbell did follow, with eight companies of the 36th regiment. The 8th Portuguese regiment, under lieutenant-colonel Douglas, which was at Junga, on the south-west side of Almeida, marched when the explosion was heard, and arrived at Barba de Puerco before the French; but finding nobody there excepting a picket of cavalry, they passed the Duas Casas again, and thus misled them.

"The Queen's regiment, which was within a mile of Almeida on the road to Malpartida, were not aware that the place was blown up, and did not march at all; and the 4th regiment, which it was said did not receive their orders before midnight, and had only two and-a-half miles to march, missed their road, and did not arrive at Barba de Puerco till after the French, and with general Campbell and general Pack; and the flank battalions of the 5th division, which sir W. Erskine had detached from Aldea del Obispo (so long after he had heard the explosion, that he sent an officer to Almeida, between five and six miles, to ascertain what it was, and this officer had returned), arrived nearly at the same time.

"The other corps of the 6th division had marched different distances in pursuit of the enemy; but, excepting the 39th and the 8th Portuguese, none had crossed the Turones.

"Thus your lordship will see that, if the 4th regiment had received the orders issued at one, before it was dark, at eight o'clock at night; or if they had not missed their road, the garrison must have laid down their arms; and the same would have occurred if lieutenant-colonel Douglas had remained at Barba de Puerco; and possibly the same would have occurred, had the pursuit been judiciously managed.

"Possibly I have to reproach myself for not hav-

drawing lines of circumvallation round the fortress, been adopted, the misfortune might have been obviated, as the delay which the attack upon such lines would have occasioned, would have given time to collect the blockading troops, and of giving Brennier that chastisement for having put himself without the pale of the accustomed laws of war, by the wanton and unwarrantable destruction of the fortifications and warlike stores of the fortress.

One of the early consequences of the victory at Fuentes d'Onor was the advance of the British rear on the Azava and the lower Agueda, while the main body occupied cantonments on the Duas Casas. Having been thus far successful in the north, the British chief was preparing to proceed to the south to direct and prosecute the siege of Badajos, when, on the 15th, he received advice from marshal Beresford, that Soult had broken up from Seville, and was advancing for the relief of Badajos. Transferring the command of the army to general Spencer, he immediately set off for Elvas, and there on the 19th ascertained at the same time that Beresford had been obliged to raise the siege of Badajos, and the issue of the battle of Albuera.

Beresford had been directed to endeavour to retake Badajos before the French had had time to repair the breaches and fill up the trenches. The causes that prevented him from putting his orders into immediate execution have already been stated. Much valuable time was also lost before the Spanish generals acceded to the plans which lord Wellington had enjoined on Beresford as the indispensable condition of laying siege to that fortress.* At length operations were commenced against the fortress. On the 8th of May the investment commenced on the left bank of the Guadiana; and on the 11th a breaching battery was constructed against it, being on the spot; but really, when the enemy's whole army had crossed the Agueda, with the exception of one brigade of cavalry, in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, I did not think it probable that the attempt to escape would be made; and having employed two divisions and a brigade, to prevent the escape of 1,400 men, who I did not think it likely would attempt to escape, the necessity of my attendance personally to this operation, after I had been the whole day on the Azava, did not occur to me. However, it is that alone, in the whole operation, in which I have to reproach myself, as everything was done that could be done, in the way of order and instruction.

"I certainly feel, every day, more and more the difficulty of the situation in which I am placed. I am obliged to be everywhere and if absent from any

Fort St. Christoval; but the siege *matériel* was perfectly inadequate to the undertaking. The guns being small, and brass, were ineffective, and soon silenced by the superior fire of the enemy. On the 12th, intelligence being received that Soult was in full march from Seville to relieve the place, the progress of the works was arrested, the gabions and fascines burned, the siege *matériel* conveyed across the river; and the flying bridge drawn ashore, seven hundred men having perished in the fruitless undertaking. On the breaking up of the siege, the whole of the allied army, except the fourth division, which remained to maintain the blockade of the place, marched for Albuera, to give the enemy battle. At a conference held at Valverde on the 13th, with the Spanish commanders, Blake, Castanos, and Ballasteros, the command in chief was ceded to Beresford, and Blake engaged to bring up the Spanish army into line by 12 o'clock on noon of the 15th. The Anglo-Portuguese reached the field of Albuera on the 15th, where they found their cavalry had already taken post. At this time Massena was superseded by Marmont in the command of the army of Portugal, as that division of the French force in the Peninsula was, in Napoleonic phraseology, pompously termed. "*L'Enfant gâté de la victoire*," "*the favourite child of victory*," or as some versions have it—*the spoiled child of fortune*—having been foiled by the superior strategics of his opponent; and seeing his reversionary hopes of having the crown of Portugal perched upon his pate dissipated—pleaded ill health and returned to Paris, having narrowly escaped capture by Mina at the Puerto de Arlaban, near Vittoria, who took the whole of his baggage and plunder. He was not the only Frenchman baffled by Wellington, who in his aspirations had been alike frustrated and disappointed of their "high degree."

operation, something goes wrong. It is to be hoped, that the general and other officers of the army will at last acquire that experience which will teach them that success can be attained only by attention to the most minute details; and by tracing every part of every operation, from its origin to its conclusion, point by point, and by ascertaining that the whole is understood by those who are to execute it.

"Believe me, &c.,

"WELLINGTON."

* Some writers have accused Beresford of unnecessary delay. The following observation, which occurs in a letter dated "Elvas, April 21st," seems to justify the accusation:—"I am afraid," says the English commander-in-chief, "that we have lost much valuable time here; and I have come here principally to put matters in the right road."

THE BATTLE OF ALBUERA.

THE battle of Albuera, one of the fiercest on human record, derives its name from the village of Albuera, or as it is otherwise written, Albuhera; which is about five Spanish leagues distant from Badajos, and situated on the river Albuera. At the time of the battle it contained a church and about one hundred houses, which had been deserted by the inhabitants; the only living animals in it were an old man and his dog. On the right and left of the village were two bridges. Over that, to the left, the great road from Seville runs, and then divaricates to Badajos. It was for this reason that lord Wellington had selected Albuera as a battle-field, should an action be necessary, in preference to receiving the enemy at Valverde, which, though it presented a stronger position, Badajos would have been left open to the enemy's advance.

The position was an undulating ridge about four miles in extent, having the Albuera in front and the Arroya in its rear, both running nearly parallel. The right of the position had no *point d'appui*, the range of heights being prolonged in that direction to an extent it was impossible to occupy. A little above the bridge, a rivulet called the Ferdia joins the Albuera, and the banks of these streams and the ground between them were thickly covered with ilex trees, a species of wood which, though calculated to conceal the formation of bodies of men, did not impede the movements of an army.

On the morning of the 15th the Anglo-Portuguese army occupied the left of the position; the right, which was elevated, and consequently less assailable, was left open for Blake's army; but as Blake had failed to bring up his corps, the English marshal formed a temporary right wing with his cavalry and artillery, and dispatched officers to hasten Blake's movements, who, though he had but a few miles to march, and that the roads were good, the head of his columns did not reach the ground till midnight, and the rear at 3 o'clock of the day of battle. The army was then marshalled in two lines, the Spanish on the right, on the heights, the British in the centre, and the Portuguese on the left. The two battalions of German riflemen occupied the village of Albuera; and a strong artillery battery protected the bridge. The cavalry, under Lumley, was

posted in the rear of the Spanish line. The fourth division, under general Cole (which had come up from Badajos after the action had commenced,) and one brigade of the Portuguese division, formed a second line in rear of the centre. The amount of the Spanish force was 16,000 men; that of the Portuguese 8,000; and that of the English between 6,000 and 7,000. Lumley's command consisted of 17 squadrons of cavalry, amounting to near 2,000 men, Portuguese and English inclusive. Thirty-two guns constituted the whole of the artillery.

About three o'clock on the evening of the 15th the whole of the French army, consisting of above 19,000 chosen infantry and 4,000 veteran cavalry, with fifty guns, took their station in the wooded ground on the opposite side of the Albuera. The French general, Soult, in reconnoitring the position of the allied army, and observing its weak points, made his disposition of attack accordingly.

As on the right of the allies there was a kind of table-land trending backwards towards the Valverde road, and looking into their rear of the line of battle; and that their right wing was composed wholly of Spanish troops, whom the troops he commanded had repeatedly and recently put to the most fearful rout and flight, the French marshal expected, by dispersing its disheartened and dispirited occupants, he would roll up the right wing of the allies upon their centre, and drive them into the narrow ravine of the Arroya. Success in that quarter would give him possession of the Valverde road, and thus the retreat of his adversary would either be cut off, or it would be disastrous in the face of his numerous cavalry. If he failed in this point, an attack on the bridge and village of Albuera would sever the wings of the allies, and enable the attacking force to compete with them separately; as also to serve as a feint to prevent the enemy from divining the principal part of the attack, and making the necessary disposition to meet it.

For each of these movements great facilities were afforded the French marshal for the formation of his columns to remain unseen by the enemy until the moment of their debouchment, and for concealing their strength and direction until the moment

they were in action. For the attack on the bridge and the village, which were in advance of the centre of the British line, the wooded nature of the right banks of the Albuera effectually concealed the force and its disposition for that service. Beresford having neglected to occupy the wooded hill between the two positions, and about a cannon-shot distant from either, but separated from the right of the allies by the Albuera, and from the left of the French by the Ferdia, favoured his attack on the right flank. For his grand and principal attack, Soult, in the course of the night of the 15th, concentrated, behind the wooded hill, the 5th corps, under Girard, Lautour Maubourg's heavy cavalry, and the greater part of the artillery under Ruty. Thus, unseen and unsuspected, were 15,000 veteran troops, with forty pieces of artillery, within ten minutes' march of the right wing of the allies; while the remainder of his force, consisting of Godinot's brigade, the division of the 1st corps under Werle, the light cavalry, and the ten remaining pieces of artillery, were formed in the woods that extended along the banks of the Ferdia, towards its confluence with the Albuera.

A little before 8 o'clock in the morning of the 16th of May, the ever-memorable battle of Albuera began, by a heavy column, consisting of Werle's division and Godinot's brigade, preceded by a battery of ten guns, and flanked by light cavalry, debouching from the wooded ground between the Ferdia and the Albuera, and making for the bridge; while the 5th corps, with Maubourg's cavalry and Ruty's artillery, rushing from behind the wooded hill, were preparing to ascend the heights on the right. Beresford, observing that Werle's division, and the light cavalry, did not follow closely on Godinot's brigade, but countermarched, and soon gained the rear of the main body advancing to the attack on the right, concluded that the village was not the real point of the attack, but the heights on the allied line; he therefore ordered Cole's division, which had just taken up its battle-station, to form obliquely to the rear of the right; and at the same time he dispatched major Hardinge to Blake to request him to form part of his first line, and all his second at right angles, or in a perpendicular direction to his original position, that the right wing might correspond to the new front assumed by the centre, in order to enable it to meet the flank movement of the enemy's principal

attack, which was now completely developed.

Blake doggedly refusing to comply with the commander-in-chief's orders, on the ground that the principal attack was on the village, Beresford was obliged personally to obtain his compliance; but the surly and dogmatic Spaniard setting about the movement with the pomposity and pedantic slowness characteristic of his countrymen, the British general assumed the command, and attempted to wheel the sluggish force into the new front; but he was not able to push forward the first line sufficiently to allow room for the second to support it, before the French artillery began to play among them; while the fifth corps and Werle's division, advancing close to their position, poured in volleys of musketry, and the cavalry outflanking them in front, sabred them as they gave way under the rolling fire of grape and musketry. Beresford, placing himself in the very front of danger, used every mode of authority and persuasion, to induce the disheartened Spaniards to advance to meet the enemy's attack. Seizing a colonel in one hand, and an ensign with the colours in the other, he thrust them forwards, in hopes that the line would follow—but all in vain; the dastard officers slunk back to the ranks, and the panic-struck troops rushed, in wild and tumultuous confusion, towards the centre, breaking through, and, in their terror, firing upon the very troops that were advancing to their assistance.

The French now establishing themselves upon the ground abandoned by the Spaniards, Soult formed his force in line, extending to the Valverde road, and as the ground of which he had possessed himself rather commanded the rest of the position of the allied army, he would have been able to sweep with his artillery the whole of the allied line. So sure did he now calculate on victory, that he detached his heavy cavalry, under Maubourg, beyond the right of the allies, to take advantage of the first signal of retreat, and intercept or harass the allies in their retrograde movement.

To dislodge the enemy from the commanding position, and make an effort to retrieve the fortune of the day, major-general William Stewart was ordered to bring up from the centre, colonel Colburn's brigade, consisting of the buffs, the 66th, the 2nd battalion of the 48th, and the 31st; but that officer leading his command up the lost position by columns of com-

panies, while they were in the act of deploying into line, as they crowned the height (the two leading battalions having completed the manœuvre, and the 31st remaining in column), they were assailed by a large body of Polish lancers, and some squadrons of French hussars, who had galloped round on their rear, and whose approach had been concealed by a mist and heavy fall of rain, that had obscured the whole horizon. Even when seen, being mistaken for Spanish cavalry, a mistake occasioned by the dishonourable ruse of the enemy calling out as they advanced, "Vivan los Ingleses," "Vivan los amigos de España,"—a dastardly subterfuge often adopted by the enemy in the course of the Peninsular War—they were allowed, without a shot being fired, to approach the ranks, and the next moment they were within them. The result was, the whole brigade, except the 31st, was either slain or driven forward into the enemy's lines, and made prisoners, whole companies being cut down without having fired a single shot, or made the smallest resistance. At this moment, a gust of wind succeeding the rain, and clearing off the mist, general Lumley detached some squadrons of the heavy brigade against the merciless lancers and hussars, who did considerable execution among them, while they were riding over the field, spearing the wounded as they lay upon the ground.

The 31st having been on the left of the ill-fated brigade, and having remained in column, was the only regiment that had escaped the destructive charge of the enemy's cavalry. That gallant regiment having managed to maintain its ground, general Stewart, who had escaped the carnage, advanced with the same impetuosity, but in a more judicious order of battle, with the third brigade of his division, consisting of the 29th, the 57th, and the 1st battalion of the 48th, under major-general Houghton, for the purpose of restoring the

battle. A contest of the most bloody and pertinacious character now ensued.

The leading regiment, the 29th, no sooner reached the summit of the disputed heights, than it was exposed to a murderous fire of musketry and artillery, which spread havoc and destruction through its ranks. But undaunted, it persevered in its course, till, being prevented by a steep gully from reaching the enemy with the bayonet, it halted, and opened fire. The 48th and 57th rapidly taking their position in the line, the struggle was maintained on both sides with the most desperate courage. It was an incessant fire, or rather a perfect hurricane of grape and canister, very often at the distance of but twenty paces, only interrupted by partial charges of the bayonet by the British. Of the 57th, which amounted to 570 privates, and twenty-four officers, only one officer remained standing, and above 400 of the privates had fallen. The 29th and the 48th were in a more calamitous condition.

Still the enemy maintained the struggle; and with so great effect, that "the inauspicious thought of retreat," arising in the agitated mind of the commander-in-chief, he sent orders to Alten to abandon the bridge and the village of Albuera, and to general Hamilton to assemble the Portuguese and the artillery in a position to cover a retrograde movement by the Valverde road. Having also ordered part of the Portuguese brigades, under Hamilton, to advance to restore the fight, as he could not prevail on the Spanish troops to move up to the right of Houghton's brigade, he galloped to the left to hasten their advance. In the interim, the battle-field having assumed its worst aspect of havoc and destruction, major Hardinge, not being able to find marshal Beresford to receive his orders for the advance of sir Lowry Cole's division, which constituted the reserve, rode to that distinguished officer, represented to him the state of affairs, and strongly urged* him to reinforce the battle.

* Much erroneous misapprehension exists on this subject. Not only the public, but *all* the books that treat of the battle of Albuera, attribute the merit of ordering the 4th division to restore the battle to major Hardinge. Never was there a greater error, and a greater act of injustice to the man who had the sole merit of gaining the battle. But both the error and the injustice are mainly attributable to the author of *The History of the War in the Peninsula*. "While the commander-in-chief was thus preparing to resign the contest," says he, "colonel Hardinge, using his name, ordered general Cole to advance with the 4th division, and then riding to the 3rd brigade of the

2nd division, under colonel Abercrombie, directed it to push forward into the fight." Of course the misrepresentation has been religiously adopted by all the copyists of the eloquent historian of the Peninsular War; and the necessary changes rung of "happy assumption of command," "well-timed piece of boldness," and the rest of the twaddle, that those who never exercise their understanding, but take everything on faith, without inquiring into its truth or falsity, adopt. But how unjust has this conduct been to the man to whom is attributable all the merit of the act—sir Lowry Cole. From his letters in the *United Service Journal* the truth is best seen.

General Cole immediately advanced with his division, the fusilier brigade, consisting of the 7th royal fusiliers and the 23rd Welch fusiliers in the van, under the command of sir William Myers, on the right of the 31st and Houghton's brigade, which had already lost two-thirds of their number. At the same moment, the reserve brigade of the 2nd division, under Abercrombie, pressed forward on the left, under cover of Dickson's guns. The British reliefs, on crowning the heights, were received with a fire so terrific, that at first the fusilier brigade recoiled; but instantly recovering its ground, it advanced, together with Abercrombie's reserve, to the aid of Houghton's brigade, which, in its shattered state, with the standards of the respective battalions all flying near to each other in the centre of the weakened line, still remained unbroken, defending with desperate valour every inch of ground, and baffling every attempt of their powerful opponents to dislodge it. Withering volleys were instantly exchanged between the contending hosts; but the front, as well as the flanks and rear, of the deep columns of the enemy being exposed to the rapid fire of the English infantry, the discomfited and shattered battalions of the foe were driven down the hill in so utter confusion, that Girard's corps threw away their arms to expedite their flight, and the reserve, under Werle, was overwhelmed in the confusion. Had not Rutly, emerging through the throng of the fugitives, arrested, with his artillery, the advance of the victors, the whole French army would have been annihilated. Thus Cole, converting a defensive battle into an offensive one, at a critical moment obtained a decisive victory.

During the struggle of the fusiliers on the right for victory, Beresford, perceiving that Cole's division had brought on the crisis of the battle, ordered Alten's brigade to retake the village, and Blake's first line to move on the same point, to enable the Portuguese under Hamilton to move up to the aid of the fusiliers; but before either movement had been executed, the fusiliers were victorious.

While the deadly struggle had been enduring on the right, the contest was maintained with spirit and vigour on the key of the position. Many attempts had been made by Godinot to obtain possession of the bridge and village; but they were all gallantly repulsed. At length the enemy retreated under cover of Rutly's guns,

and the battle ceased a little before three o'clock.

The stage at which the fusilier brigade came into action is described by the historian of *The War in the Peninsula* with so much force and fervid eloquence, that the passage containing it should be known to every Englishman proud of his language and country—should be engraven on his mind as one of his fondest and proudest recollections, and be the constant theme of recital and admiration to his children and acquaintance; it is one of the most vivid and glowing passages to be found either in ancient or modern composition:—

“Such a gallant line, issuing from the midst of the smoke, and rapidly separating itself from the confused multitude, startled the enemy's heavy masses, which were increasing and pressing onward as to an assured victory; they wavered, hesitated, and then, vomiting forth a storm of fire, hastily endeavoured to enlarge their front, while a fearful discharge of grape from all their artillery whistled through the British ranks. Myers was killed; Cole (with almost all his staff) and three colonels, Ellis, Blake, and Hanshawe, fell wounded; and the fusilier battalions, struck by the iron tempest, reeled and staggered like sinking ships. Suddenly and sternly recovering, they closed on their terrible enemies, and then was seen with what a strength and majesty the British soldiers fight. In vain did Soult, by voice and gesture, animate his Frenchmen; in vain did the hardiest veterans, extricating themselves from the crowded columns, sacrifice their lives to gain time for the mass to open out on so fair a field; in vain did the mass itself bear up, and fiercely striving, fire indiscriminately on friends and foes; while the horsemen, hovering on the flank, threatened to charge the advancing line. Nothing could stop that astonishing infantry. No sudden burst of undisciplined valour; no nervous enthusiasm weakened the stability of order; their flashing eyes were bent on the dark columns in their front; their measured tread shook the ground; their dreadful volleys swept away the head of every formation; their deafening shouts overpowered the dissonant cries that broke from all parts of the tumultuous crowd, as foot by foot, and with a horrid carnage, it was driven by the incessant vigour of the attack to the farthest edge of the hill. In vain did the French reserves, joining with the struggling multitude, en-

deavour to sustain the fight; their efforts only increased the irremediable confusion, and the mighty mass giving way like a loosened cliff, went headlong down the ascent. The rain flowed after in streams, discoloured with blood, and 1,500 unwounded men, the remnant of 6,000 unconquerable soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal hill."

The loss on each side in this fierce and bloody battle was great. On the side of the allies the killed, wounded, and missing, amounted to 7,000: of whom all were English, except 2,500 Spaniards, Germans, and Portuguese. The precise loss on the part of the English, was 984 killed, 2,993 wounded, and 570 missing; but of the prisoners, near 300 joined their columns, having in the course of the night escaped from the French bivouac, on account of the great disorder which prevailed in their camp, owing to the disorganized state of the brigades and regiments that had fled from the field. The first and second brigades of the second division had consisted of 1,400 hundred men each, and had each sustained a loss of above 1,000 men. Fifteen hundred rank and file were the complement of the fusilier brigade; at the termination of the action its loss was 953 rank and file, 47 serjeants, and 45 officers. The casualties in Houghton's brigade were appalling. Of the 29th, only 96 privates, two captains, and a few subalterns, remained standing. The 57th lost above 400 men, and 23 out of 24 officers. Both the battalions of the 48th were not much more fortunate. Every field officer of the brigade was either killed or wounded, so that at the close of the action the brigade remained in the command of a captain of the 48th; and what rendered the circumstance more singular was, that that officer was a French refugee—captain Cemetière. The contingencies in Colburne's brigade had been equally great. A few days after the battle, the five regiments that had suffered most (namely, the Buffs, one company; 66th, one company; 29th, two companies; 57th, three companies, and 31st, three companies) were embodied into one, forming a provisional battalion, under the command of colonel L'Estrange. Soult stated that his loss in killed and wounded was 2,800; but this estimate was untrue, for he left 800 wounded when he retreated, as they were not able to be removed; and by intercepted letters it was ascertained that he had 4,000 wounded under medical treatment, and

subject to the command of general Gazan. Marshal Beresford also, in his pursuit, captured a large number of wounded at Al-mendralejos. From these facts the enemy's loss could not have been less than between 8,000 and 9,000.

Both sides claimed the victory. Soult's pretensions were, that 500 prisoners, a howitzer, and six stand of colours, remained in his hands. Beresford preferred the more substantial claim. He maintained his ground, and "the horrid piles of carcases within his lines told, with dreadful eloquence, who was the conqueror." He had also frustrated Soult's attempt to communicate with the garrison of Badajoz.

A tempestuous night closed the fatal day. The rain, which during the day had fallen at intervals, became, in the course of the night, so heavy, that the streams that rolled down the heights occasioned the rivulets literally to run red with blood. All night long the hills and the woods on both sides of the river resounded with the groans and dismal cries of the wounded. Beresford had applied to Blake for assistance to remove the wounded, which the shattered and exhausted condition of the surviving remnant of the British army disabled them from performing; but the heartless and ungrateful Spaniard, notwithstanding the thousands of English lives that had been sacrificed on the battle-field of Albuera, in the defence of his country, to which the "hero of a hundred defeats and his scared runaways," his sluggish and awe-spell bound countrymen were unequal, refused; morosely replying that it was usual in allied armies for each nation to attend to its wounded and bury its dead.

The instances of heroic courage in this battle were countless; every man, whether friend or foe, performed prodigies of valour, except the sluggish and terror-stricken Spaniards, and they were dastards. Among the numerous instances of noble devotion and patriotism of which the battle-field of Albuera was so prolific, the following claim particular mention:—

In the *mêlée* between the Polish lancers and the Buffs, ensign Thomas was ordered to surrender the colours he carried, and refusing to comply, he fell a victim to the infuriated foe. The colour-staff having been broken in the hand of ensign Welch, and he falling wounded on the field, in the agonies of death, the gallant youth, mindful of his country's honour, tore the colours from the

broken staff and thrust them into his bosom ; in which hallowed depository they were found dyed with his blood after his death. Lieutenant Latham, who carried the colours of the Buffs, being attacked by several French hussars, one of them seized hold of the staff, and at the same time rising in his stirrups, aimed a stroke at the lieutenant's head which severed one side of the face and nose. Still continuing struggling with his adversary for the sacred deposit confided to his trust, the high-spirited youth exclaimed, "I will surrender it only with my life." A second stroke severed his left arm and hand, when, throwing away his sword, he seized the colours with his right hand, and continuing to struggle with his remorseless foe, he was thrown down and pierced by the spears of some lancers who had joined in the fray. The enemy being driven off by the advance of Houghton's brigade, Latham's last effort was to tear the flag from the staff and thrust it partly into the breast of his jacket. After the battle, the colours being found where he had placed them, they were sent to the head-quarters of the Buffs ; but life being supposed to be extinct in the body of their gallant defender, he was left on the field. Shortly recovering his senses he crawled on his knees and his right hand, to the Albuera, to slake his fevered and parched throat ; where, being found by one of the orderlies of the regiment, he was removed to the convent, and the stump of the shattered arm being amputated, in the course of a short time he was restored to health. For his noble devotion he was promoted to a company in the Canadian fencible infantry ; but a vacancy soon occurring in his own beloved regiment, he rejoined that distinguished corps. As a testimony of their esteem and admiration of their comrade, the officers of the regiment presented him with a gold medallion, on which his gallant action was represented in high relief. The battle also presented sir William Beresford an opportunity for the display of the most exalted forbearance and humanity. Being attacked by a Polish lancer, and thrusting aside the weapon of his adversary, he seized hold of him and threw him upon the ground. Sir William offered his antagonist quarter, but the Pole, refusing to yield, was dispatched by an English orderly.

Such was the battle of Albuera, one of the fiercest on record, and one of the most destructive ever fought, considering the comparative amount of force engaged.

Both generals have been severely censured for engaging in it ; but truth and candour must allow, that Beresford has been stigmatized with much unnecessary acrimony, and no small degree of injustice. Let his faults have been what they may, "his fame will go down to posterity, associated for ever with that of those invincible soldiers who upheld the fame of England upon the bloody field of Albuera." He has been blamed, among many other idle imputations, for not drawing lines of contravallation and circumvallation around Badajos, and there waiting to deliver battle to the enemy. The allegation, also, that he should have pursued the enemy into the wood on the opposite side of the Albuera, into which they had retreated in confusion and disorganization, as "then the whole French army might have been destroyed, and its entire *matériel* captured," is as ridiculous as the execution of the quixotic project would have been calamitous to its equally quixotic undertaker. What ! with a few hundred exhausted men, attack as many thousand veteran troops, with a strong and overpowering force of cavalry, in a position favourable for defence, and calculated for the action of cavalry ! No, Beresford was no such Quixote. His errors and oversights were (and even those should be spoken of leniently and respectfully)—1st, that he omitted to occupy the wooded hill in front of his right flank, and to intrench it ; 2ndly, his right flank should have been strengthened by field-works ; and, 3dly, instead of displaying his whole line to the view of the enemy, he should have adopted the plan of that master-spirit in the art of war (Wellington), and have kept his line concealed a few yards behind the crest of the heights, which would have disabled Soult from choosing his point of attack, and ascertaining the vulnerable part of the position ; a knowledge which the colour of the Spanish uniform readily furnished him.

On the 17th Soult reorganised his shattered forces, who had fled from the battlefield in so great confusion, that the brigades and regiments were intermixed. He retained his position, well-knowing that the remnant of the British force was too crippled to attempt any operation against him ; but ascertaining that the 3rd brigade of the 4th division, which had been employed on the right bank of the Guadiana, had, on the 17th, come up by a forced march

from Jerumenhu to the aid of their countrymen, and having wofully known the efficiency of an English brigade, animated by English hearts,—on the following day, destroying the contents of his tumbrils and baggage-waggon, to furnish conveyance for his wounded, he began his retreat on Seville. Other reasons were, the extreme despondency and discontent of his troops, and the information that lord Wellington was expected at Albuera. It was in a full comprehension of the value of that name, that he had resolved on attacking “the legion while it lacked the charm of Cæsar’s presence.”

On the day following the retreat of the French, Beresford ordered general Hamilton to reinvest Badajos with the three brigades of Portuguese which he commanded; and on the same day lord Wellington reached the field of battle. So great was his desire to be present at the approaching action, that he rode sixty miles daily, and the bridge which he had desired to be constructed not being ready, in the attempt

to pass the river both the orderlies and horses were drowned, the commander-in-chief being saved merely by the superior strength of his horse. Inspecting the field of battle, and approving of Beresford’s conduct, he observed, that the battle would have been more easily won, and the loss would, by no means, have been so great, had the Spaniards done their duty. Ordering Beresford to pursue the enemy cautiously, he directed the 3rd and 7th divisions to come up from Elvas, to complete the reinvestment of Badajos. In the prosecution of Beresford’s commission, who advanced by the Solano road to Almendralejos, General Lumley, with the 3rd and 4th dragoons, charged a brigade of heavy cavalry under general Bron, at Usagre, on the 25th, and occasioned a loss to the enemy of 200 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. General Hill having now returned to the Peninsula, to the great joy and contentment of the troops, was reinstated in the command of the 2nd division, and sir William Beresford resumed his Portuguese command.

SECOND ENGLISH INVESTMENT OF BADAJOS.

LORD WELLINGTON having ordered the 3rd and 7th divisions to move up from Elvas, and directed Spencer, who had been left in command of the 1st, 5th, 6th, and light divisions, with a brigade of cavalry behind the Agueda, to move his divisions towards Villa Vella as soon as he should ascertain that Marmont’s army was in motion towards Almaraz, vigorously prepared for the second siege of Badajos, as that town and Ciudad Rodrigo were the keys of Portugal, closing the doors of Beira and the Alemtejo on the enemy, as also affording time for laying a secure basis for his projected operations in Spain. At the same time, he instructed general Hill to take post at Almendralejos for the purpose of holding in check Soult, who occupied Llerena, and for covering the operations at Badajos. In the meantime Philippon availing himself of the absence of the besiegers, had not only levelled the trenches, and destroyed the approaches of the besiegers, but had repaired his own works, and had constructed strong interior intrenchments.

The partial reinvestment began by Hamilton with the Portuguese on the 19th of May, was completed on the 25th, by the

3rd and 7th divisions under Picton and Houston; and the investment was made on the right as well as the north bank of the river, siege being thus laid to the town and the fort of San Christoval simultaneously, instead of confining the incipient operations to the fort, as had been the case in Beresford’s investment.

As the siege would require longer time and better means than the English general possessed, and lest his operations should be disturbed by the sudden appearance of the enemy for the relief of the place, he determined to adopt a more compendious mode than the usual and prescribed rules of regular and sure approaches. He had received information that about twenty battalions, and a body of cavalry, of the 9th corps, were on their march to join Soult; and, by an intercepted despatch of Soult to Marmont, he learned that that marshal and Marmont had arranged the junction of their armies, preparatory to their contemplated movement for the raising of the siege. He was also aware, that in every requisite *matériel* for the undertaking, he was sadly deficient. No army was ever worse provided for so arduous an enterprise in the engineer

and artillery departments; it was in utter destitution of everything that was requisite for the service. It had no corps of sappers and miners, and without a single private who knew how to carry on an approach under fire. It had no guns fit for the service; those it did possess were Portuguese ones, consisting of soft brass or bronze, false in bore, worn out by previous service, and the shot of all shapes and sizes; the howitzers taken from the Portuguese arsenals were of larger calibre than any shot that could be obtained; and the shells did not fit the bore of the mortars, both giving a windage that rendered the fire vague and uncertain, and often nullified its effect; whereas the enemy's mortars threw his shells with a precision that threatened to ruin everything within their range. The siege tools were also so worthless, that the engineers seized with avidity the French tools wherever they could lay hands on them. Thus crippled in every requisite, no other resource was left the commander-in-chief than to overcome the difficulties he had to contend with by energy and daring; and the consequence was, that a great sacrifice of life was necessary to be made to compensate for the negligence of the government, and the incapacity of its home officials.

At length operations commenced on the night of the 29th, by breaking the ground for a false attack on the Pardaleras; and on the following night, the first parallel, extending 1,000 yards in front of the town, was completed by 1,600 workmen; while 1,200 workmen commenced a parallel before the fort of San Christoval, each working party being covered by three-fourths of its amount of men under arms. The batteries opened both on the town and the fort on the morning of the 3rd of June; but several of the guns were soon rendered unserviceable by a few discharges, and the windage was so great in the others, that their service was very indifferent; in fact, so defective was the ordnance, that though the batteries had played for three days, and at the distance of only 500 yards, the breaches were scarcely practicable. However, on the 6th, though the breaches were reported practicable, both in the town and the fort, yet, as the artillery from the fort San Christoval swept along the foot of the castle wall, and over the ground in its front, the capture of the fort was a necessary precedent condition to the attempt to storm the castle. Major Mackintosh was therefore ordered, with 180

of the 85th, to storm the San Christoval breach; ensign Dias, of the 51st, volunteering to lead the forlorn hope. At midnight the storming party advanced to the attack, but finding that the enemy had cleared the rubbish from the bottom of the escarpe, after above an hour's unavailing effort to ascend the breach, they were obliged to retire with the loss of near three-fourths of their party; a loss occasioned by the numerous shells, hand-grenades, stones, bags, barrels of powder, and other combustibles, hurled down upon them by the besieged, and by their repeated explosions destroying all within their reach. The loss was also aggravated by the enemy being enabled to mount on the top of the parapet, and take a deadly aim at their assailants, there being no fire from the trenches to prevent them, on account of the unserviceable nature of the guns. Notwithstanding all this carnage and discouragement, and that seven feet of the wall of the breach stood clear before the gallant assailants, they applied their ladders to every face and flank of the work, but all their heroic efforts were fruitless, and the fragment of the storming-party was obliged reluctantly to retire.

After a continual cannonade from a few iron ship-guns, which had been expedited to the army, the breach having been much widened, and reduced in height, being again deemed practicable, at nine o'clock of the night of the 9th, the storming party, under major M'Greachy, of the 17th Portuguese regiment, Dias again leading the forlorn hope, advanced to the breach, and were again repulsed with a severe loss, from the same causes as those of the night of the 6th. The enemy had again cleared away the rubbish from the foot of the breach; the ladders were again too short; and the enemy assailed the storming party from the top of the ramparts, with every form of missile and combustible as they had on the first assault. The intrepid stormers made every effort to mount the breach; and could only be induced to give up the contest by the peremptory command of general Houston. The total loss that had been sustained during the siege was, 118 killed, and 367 wounded.

The commander-in-chief having now ascertained that Soult, who had been reinforced by Drouet's corps, on the 14th, was in communication with Marmont at Merida, and that they were simultaneously advancing, by rapid marches, towards Badajoz; on the

night of the 10th ordered the guns and stores to be removed from before the town, and took a position in front of Albuera, in the hope of bringing Soult to action before he could effect a junction with Marmont. There he concentrated his forces, and caused the position to be intrenched, not forgetting to occupy the wooded hill on the right of the Albuera. Here Hill joined him with the covering force. But the prestige of the battle of the 16th of the last month disinclined the French general to accept the challenge.

The approach of the French marshal rendering it prudent to give up the blockade of Badajos, the English commander-in-chief retired across the Guadiana; the British troops passing by the pontoon bridge near Badajos; and the Spaniards, under Blake, withdrew to Jerumenhu. On the 19th, the British army encamped in the woods, and among the gardens, on the banks of the Caya, about Torre del Mero, its right and left flanks extending from the Ponte de Caya to Campo Mayor. Here, Spencer,

who had been left in command of the divisions on the frontiers of Castile, joined the main army; and here Wellington was determined to give the enemy battle, should he attempt to penetrate into Portugal. In expectation of raising the siege of Cadiz by the diversion, Blake had been ordered to march rapidly down the right bank of the Guadiana, recross that river at Mertola, and surprising Seville, destroy the arsenal, foundry, and magazines collected there for the siege of Cadiz; but the self-sufficient Spaniard, instead of obeying his instructions, wasted three days in an abortive assault on the old castle of Niebla, garrisoned by 300 Swiss, who were in the service of the usurper; and thus lost the opportunity of surprising Seville, which was but slightly guarded by a mixture of French and Spaniards in the service of Joseph. Hearing of a detachment, under general Coureux, having been sent against him, he precipitately fled into the island of Canelas, whence he and his fugitives were conveyed in boats to Cadiz.

OPERATIONS FROM THE TERMINATION OF THE SECOND SIEGE OF BADAJOS TO THE SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

WHILE Spencer was posted behind the Agueda, in observation of Marmont, he had been directed to move towards the Tagus by parallel movements, should the French marshal make that river the object of his march, or to take up the line of the Coa, if assailed. Marmont, by an able flank movement, deceived him as to his intentions. Dispatching Regnier, with two divisions, through the pass of Baños, while he advanced, protecting an immense convoy destined for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, he pushed forward the greater part of his force on Truxillo, and on the 18th effected a junction with Soult at Merida; their united forces amounting to 70,000 veterans, 8,000 of whom were cavalry, familiar with war. The French marshals having re-victualled the two fortresses of Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo on the 22nd, reconnoitred on the side of Campo Mayor, the position of the British army; but not being able to discover its dispositions on account of the nature of the ground, which masked the allied brigades from observation, after continuing a month in front of the allies, they made a retrograde movement to their original posi-

tions; the former returning to Seville, and the latter taking up a position in front of Salamanca.

As the possession of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos afforded the French great facilities in their operations against Portugal and the south of Spain, and at the same time presented a base for those of the English general, in the execution of his plan for the liberation of the Peninsula; as soon as the French marshals had retreated, Wellington advanced to the vicinity of the Coa, August the 10th, preparatory to his attack on Ciudad Rodrigo. For this purpose the advanced corps of the allied army was so distributed as closely to observe the enemy, and at the same time a defensive position was prepared at Fuente Guinaldo for its retreat, if closely pressed by the enemy. The right of the army was encamped in the woods about Torre del Moro, having its flank on the mountains that divide Castile and Estremadura; its left was on the lower Azava, and the cavalry was upon the upper Azava. The 3rd division was posted on the heights of El Bodon, supported by the 11th dragoons and a few troops of

German hussars. The 4th, at Guinaldo, and the 1st in rear of the right, observed the road leading from Perales, from which point it could intercept Marmont at Morvao, or Castello de Vide, if he should attempt to turn the allies at Albuquerque, and was equally ready to oppose Soult if he should move between Elvas and Estremos. The Spaniards of Julian Sanchez and Carlos d'España watched the lower Agueda.

At this period of the war, the situation of the English commander-in-chief was highly critical; not only half his army being in hospital, and impediments thrown in the way of his operations by the regency of Portugal, but he was left to his own resources for the feeding and paying of his troops, lord Liverpool having hinted that neither corn nor specie could be had from England. To remedy this last-mentioned grievance, the English general purchased corn in Africa with commissariat bills, and selling it at an advanced price at Lisbon, not only replenished his military chest, but furnished a supply of food for the Portuguese population. At this period of the campaign, the troops were often for three days consecutively without bread; half and quarter rations were often served; and their clothing was so patched, that scarcely a regiment could be known by its uniform.

The garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo being again straitened for provisions, Marmont advanced to its relief. Having thrown his convoy into the place, he advanced against the British position, capturing in his march a picket of sixty men of the 11th light dragoons, its commander having mistaken the enemy for Portuguese, from the similarity of uniform. On the morning of the 25th of September, Marmont directed Montbrun, with fourteen battalions of infantry, between thirty and forty squadrons of cavalry, and

twelve guns, to cross the Agueda, and turn the left of Picton's division, which was posted in advance, on the heights of El Bodon and Pastores. The French cavalry, confident in their numbers, ascended with intrepidity the heights on the left, where the 5th and 77th, numbering about 700 bayonets, were posted, and gaining the battery, cut down the Portuguese gunners; but their victorious squadrons were now to witness a new manœuvre. The 5th infantry and 2nd battalion, under major Ridge, rapidly advancing in line, and delivering a shattering fire upon the French horsemen, drove them down the heights, and, at the point of the bayonet, recaptured the guns, pursuing the fugitives with a volley in their flight.* In the same moment, a column of great strength having advanced unnoticed round the rear of the right of Colville's brigade, in consequence of which its communication with Picton's right brigade was cut off; and as the position was no longer tenable, Colville's brigade, consisting of the 77th, the second battalion of the 5th, the 21st Portuguese, and about 300 cavalry, descended the heights in retreat, rapidly pursued by the French cavalry. To resist the attack in their retreat over the plain, the three regiments formed two solid squares. The Portuguese and the cavalry were the foremost. Repeatedly was the British square furiously charged on three of its faces at the same moment by the French cavalry and horse artillery, but the gallant band halting and delivering a shattering fire, which intimidated its foes, as each repulse was given, resumed its retreat with perfect regularity, and being joined by the right brigade, which had extricated itself from the rugged grounds and vineyards in the rear of El Bodon, the united force, under general Picton, presented so bold an athletic man, he strongly impressed the beholders with the belief that he would defend himself against both the hussars. At this time, ensign Canch, of the 5th, ran out of the square, in the of hope inducing the officer to surrender himself a prisoner; but the hussars, finding they were baffled, and could not subdue this brave man with the sword, had recourse to the pistol, with which they killed him, to the great regret of the British regiments that were looking on. This affair took place about half way between the square already mentioned and the French cavalry, who were hovering about after having been repulsed by the 5th and 77th regiments." The author of *The Reminiscences of a Subaltern*, from which work this extract is made, says that a prisoner, who had been captured in the affair, gave information that the officer was an Irishman, and the major of his regiment.

tude in its retreat across a plain of six miles, as to meet with but little interruption and loss from the enemy's cavalry and artillery, until it met a support of infantry and cavalry detached from the 4th division at Guinaldo. Thus the little band reached the position of the main army in safety, though its total annihilation at one moment seemed inevitable. The 60th and 74th, commanded by colonels Williams and French, having been cut off in their position at Pastores, forded the Agueda in the night, and marching along its right bank, joined the army by a circuitous route; and the light division, posted for the purpose of watching the passes over the Sierra de Gata, on the enemy's side of the Agueda, reached the camp on the following day; a delay occasioned by not having received its orders in time to fall back on Fuente Guinaldo; and Craufurd having adopted a circuitous march, fearful of being intercepted in his passage of the river.

While these operations were in execution, Marmont had, on the morning of the 26th, assembled 35,000 infantry, including twenty-two battalions of the imperial guard, with his numerous cavalry, in front of Guinaldo, and for several hours occupied his troops in the performance of evolutions within little more than cannon-range of the British position, until his whole force, consisting of 60,000 men, was collected, thinking that the wide disposition of the allied force presented him with a favourable opportunity of attacking them. In the meantime, lord Wellington formed his two weak divisions, consisting of 15,000 men, ready for battle, in front of the enemy's post, waiting the arrival of his right and left wings.* Before sunset, the infantry of Marmont was augmented to 60,000 men; and he had 120 guns on the field. But, in the mean time, the light divisions had effected a junction with the main body of the British army.

The army being now concentrated, Wellington retreated, in the course of the night of the 26th, on Alfayates. Two columns of the enemy on the following morning at-

tacked the rear guard at Aldea da Ponte. Twice the village was carried; but both times the enemy was driven out by Cole's division. On the same evening, the British army was concentrated on the heights, behind Soito, a strong position, about twelve miles in the rear of Guinaldo, being the chord of an arc formed by the Coa; thus both flanks were protected; but not a single line of retreat presented itself, as the river was in the rear. Here Wellington, confident in his own provident genius, and the indomitable valour of his troops, determined to receive battle; but Marmont declined the challenge, and withdrew to Ciudad Rodrigo. The allied army was now cantoned on both banks of the Coa; and headquarters were established at Frenada. During these operations, which closed the third Spanish campaign, two episodic events occurred of great moment and brilliance.

When Soult and Marmont separated their forces, Girard had been detached, with a flying column of a division of infantry and a numerous detachment of cavalry, into Spanish Estremadura, to narrow the English general's line of action, and cripple the Spanish supplies and the new levies, with which Castaños, who had established himself at Caceres, was endeavouring to recruit his battalions. Hill, who had resumed his cantonments at Portalegre, was ordered to drive Girard from the northern district of the province. For this purpose he marched, with 6,000 men, on October 22nd, and on the night of the 27th reached the neighbourhood of Arroyo de Molinos, whither Girard had retreated. At two o'clock on the morning of the 28th, drenched with rain, and amidst darkness and wind, the English battalions moved simultaneously from Alcuesca, where they had bivouacked during the night, and rushing from behind a low cover, about half a mile distant, entered the town in three columns, to the point of attack. At the moment the French were filing in retreat through the streets, a terrible shout came mingling with the blasts of a boisterous wind, and the British columns were in the

* "It was at this moment, a Spanish general (general Alava), remarkable for his zeal and gallantry, and a great favourite of Wellington's, observed to him as he sat cool and quiet upon the grass, 'Why, here you are, with a couple of weak divisions, in front of the whole French army, and you seem quite at your ease;—why it is enough to put any man in a fever.' 'I have done according to the best of my judgment, all that can be done,' said Wellington, 'therefore I care not for the enemy in

front, or for anything they may say at home.' There was the golden secret of his calm unalterable demeanour. Duties were his—and he did them. Events were not his—and to the Great Disposer of all he left them. It was no fault of his that he was thus dangerously exposed. He could not, and he would not, abandon his light division, without such a struggle as might and must have ensued had the French attacked."—*Sherer's Military Memoirs of Wellington.*

town. The enemy's infantry formed in two squares, supported by their cavalry outside the town; but being quickly thrown into disorder, they threw down their arms, and rushing towards the Sierra de Montanches, sought, in confused crowds, to scramble up its steep acclivity. Fourteen hundred prisoners, among whom were 35 officers, and all their artillery, ammunition and commissariat stores, together with the magazines of corn and the contributions which had been just levied, fell into the hands of the captors, and several hundreds were slain in and near the town, and on the mountains, while the loss of the victors did not amount to 70. The brass drums and drum-major's baton of the French 34th of the line, fell into the hands of the English 34th, by whom they are still preserved as trophies of their prowess. An anecdote is current, that when Girard was told that his assailants were the English, he observed that it could be a party only of Spaniards, as the English were too fond of their beds to be out on so bad a morning; but at the very moment of expressing his doubt, his ears were saluted from the Highland bagpipes with the tune of "Hey, Johnny Cope, are you wauking yet," and at the same moment, the 71st and 92nd Highlanders charged into the town with three cheers. Having achieved this brilliant exploit, Hill returned to his cantonments in the vicinity of Portalegre.

This brilliant affair, so creditable to all concerned in it, was so much approved by the duke as to cause him to write the following note to the earl of Liverpool:—

"Freneda, 6th Nov., 1811.

"It would be particularly agreeable to me, if some mark of the favour of H.R.H. the prince regent were conferred upon general Hill; his services have been always meritorious, and very distinguished in this country, and he is beloved by the whole army. In recommending him, as I do most anxiously, I really feel that there is no officer to whom an act of grace and favour would be received by the army with more satisfaction than on general Hill."

Lord Hill's despatch, descriptive of this attack, is so characteristic of that able general of division, that at the risk of repeating what has already been stated, but in more abstract expression, we lay it before our readers.

"To General Viscount Wellington, K.B.

"Merida, 30th Oct., 1811.

"MY LORD,—In pursuance of the in-

structions which I received from your excellency to drive the enemy out of that part of Estremadura which lies between the Tagus and the Guadiana, and to replace the corps under the command of brigadier-general the Conde de Penne Villemur, in Cáceres (from which town it had been obliged to retire by the superior force of the enemy), I put a portion of the troops under my orders in motion on the 22nd instant, from their cantonments in the neighbourhood of Portalegre, and advanced with them towards the Spanish frontier. On the 23rd the head of the column reached Albuquerque, where I learned that the enemy, who had advanced to Aliseda, had fallen back to Arroyo del Puerco, and Cáceres, and that the Spaniards were again in possession of Aliseda. On the 24th I had a brigade of British infantry, half a brigade of Portuguese artillery (6-pounders), and some of my cavalry at Aliseda, and the remainder of my cavalry, another brigade of British infantry, and half a brigade of Portuguese 6-pounders at Casa de Castellana, about a league distant. On the 25th the Conde de Penne de Villemur made a reconnaissance with his cavalry, and drove the enemy from Arroyo del Puerco; the enemy retired to Malpartida, which place he occupied as an advanced post with about 300 cavalry and some infantry, his main body being still at Cáceres. On the 26th, at daybreak, the troops arrived at Malpartida, and found that the enemy had left that place, retiring towards Cáceres, followed by a small party of the 2nd hussars, who skirmished with his rear-guard. I was shortly afterwards informed that the whole of the enemy's force had left Cáceres, but the want of certainty as to the direction he had taken, and the extreme badness of the weather, induced me to halt the Portuguese and British troops at Malpartida for that night. The Spaniards moved on to Cáceres.

"Having received certain information that the enemy had marched on Torremocha, I put the troops at Malpartida in motion on the morning of the 27th, and advanced by the road leading to Merida, through Aldea del Cano and Casas de Don Antonio, being a shorter route than that followed by the enemy, and which afforded a hope of being able to intercept and bring him to action, and I was here joined by the Spaniards from Cáceres. On the march I received information that the enemy had only left Torremocha that morning, and that he had

again halted his main body at Arroyo Molinos, leaving a rear-guard at Albala, which was a satisfactory proof that he was ignorant of the movements of the troops under my command. I therefore made a forced march to Alcuescar that evening, where the troops were so placed as to be out of sight of the enemy, and no fires were allowed to be made. On my arrival at Alcuescar, which is within a league of Arroyo Molinos, every thing tended to confirm me in the opinion that the enemy was not only in total ignorance of my near approach, but extremely off his guard; and I determined upon attempting to surprise, or at least to bring him to action, before he should march in the morning, and the necessary dispositions were made for that purpose.

"The town of Arroyo Molinos is situated at the foot of one extremity of the Sierra de Montanches, the mountain running from it to the rear in the form of a crescent, almost everywhere inaccessible, the two points being about two miles asunder. The Truxillo road runs round that to the eastward. The road leading from the town to Merida runs at right angles with that from Alcuescar, and the road to Medellin passes between those to Truxillo and Merida, the grounds over which the troops had to manœuvre being a plain thinly scattered with oak and cork trees. My object, of course, was to place a body of troops so as to cut off the retreat of the enemy by these roads.

"The troops moved from their bivouac near Alcuescar about two o'clock in the morning of the 28th, in one column, right in front, direct on Arroyo Molinos, and in the following order: major-general the Hon. K. Howard's brigade of infantry (1st battalion 50th, 71st, and 92nd regiments, and one company of the 60th); colonel Wilson's brigade (1st battalion 28th, 2nd battalion 34th and 39th regiments, and one company of the 60th); 6th Portuguese regiment of the line, and 6th caçadores, under colonel Ashworth; the Spanish infantry under brigadier-general Morillo; major-general Long's brigade of cavalry (2nd hussars, 9th and 13th light dragoons); and the Spanish cavalry, under the conde de Penne Villemur. They moved in this order until within half a mile of the town of Arroyo Molinos, where under cover of a low ridge the column closed, and divided into three columns. Major-general Howard's brigade and three 6-pounders under lieutenant-colonel Stewart, supported by brigadier-general Morillo's infantry, the

left; colonel Wilson's brigade, the Portuguese infantry under colonel Ashworth, two 6-pounders and a howitzer, the right, under major-general Howard; and the cavalry the centre. As the day dawned, a violent storm of rain and thick mist came on, under cover of which the columns advanced in the direction and in the order which had been pointed out to them. The left column, under lieutenant-colonel Stewart, marched direct upon the town. The 71st, one company of the 60th and 92nd regiments, at quarter distance, and the 50th in close column, somewhat in the rear, with the guns as a reserve. The right column, under major-general Howard, having the 39th regiment as a reserve, broke off to the right so as to turn the enemy's left; and having gained about the distance of a cannon-shot to that flank, it marched in a circular direction upon the further point of the crescent, on the mountain above mentioned. The cavalry, under lieutenant-general sir W. Erskine, moved between the two columns of infantry, ready to act in front, or move round either of them, as occasion might require. The advance of our column was unperceived by the enemy until they approached very near, at which moment he was filing out of the town upon the Merida road; the rear of his column, some of his cavalry, and part of his baggage being still in it. One brigade of his infantry had marched for Medellin an hour before daylight. The 71st and 92nd regiments charged into the town with cheers, and drove the enemy everywhere at the point of the bayonet, having a few men cut down by the enemy's cavalry. The enemy's infantry, which had got out of the town, had, by the time these regiments arrived at the extremity of it, formed into two squares, with the cavalry on their left; the whole were posted between the Merida and Medellin roads, fronting Alcuescar; the right square being formed within half-musket-shot of the town, the garden walls of which were promptly lined by the 71st light infantry, while the 92d regiment filed out and formed line on their right, perpendicular to the enemy's right flank, which was much annoyed by the well-directed fire of the 71st. In the meantime one wing of the 50th regiment occupied the town, and secured the prisoners, and the other wing, along with the three 6-pounders, skirted the outside of it; the artillery, as soon as within range, firing with great effect upon the squares.

"Whilst the enemy was thus occupied on his right, major-general Howard's column continued moving round his left, and our cavalry advancing and crossing the head of the column, cut off the enemy's cavalry from his infantry, charging it repeatedly, and putting it to the rout. The 13th light dragoons, at the same time, took possession of the enemy's artillery: one of the charges made by two squadrons of the 2nd hussars and one of the 9th light dragoons was particularly gallant; the latter commanded by captain Gore, and the whole under major Busche, of the hussars. I ought previously to have mentioned, that the British cavalry having, through the darkness of the night and the badness of the road, been somewhat delayed, the Spanish cavalry, under the conde de Penne Villemur, was on this occasion the first to form upon the plain and engage the enemy, until the British were enabled to come up. The enemy was now in full retreat; but major-general Howard's column having gained the point to which it was directed, and the left column gaining fast upon him, he had no resource but to surrender, or to disperse and ascend the mountain. He preferred the latter; and ascending near the eastern extremity of the crescent, and which might have been deemed inaccessible, was followed closely by the 28th and 34th regiments, whilst the 39th regiment, and colonel Ashworth's brigade of Portuguese infantry, followed round the foot of the mountain by the Truxillo road, to take him again in flank. At the same time, brigadier-general Morillo's infantry ascended at some distance to the left with the same view.

"As may be imagined, the enemy's troops were by this time in the utmost panic; his cavalry was fleeing in every direction; the infantry threw away their arms; and the only effort of either was to escape. The troops under major-general Howard's immediate command, as well as those he had sent round the point of the mountain, pursued them over the rocks, making prisoners at every step, until his own men became so exhausted and few in number, that it was necessary for him to halt and secure the prisoners, and leave the further pursuit to the Spanish infantry, under brigadier-general Morillo, who, from the direction in which they had ascended, had now become the most advanced; the force general Girard had with him at the commencement, which consisted of 2,500 infantry and 600 cavalry, being at this time

totally dispersed. In the course of these operations, brigadier-general Campbell's brigade of Portuguese infantry (the 4th and 10th regiments), and the 18th Portuguese infantry, joined from Casas de Don Antonio, where they had halted for the preceding night; and as soon as I judged they could no longer be required at the scene of action, I detached them with the brigade, consisting of the 50th, 71st, and 92nd regiments, and major-general Long's brigade of cavalry, towards Merida; they reached San Pedro that night, and entered Merida this morning; the enemy having in the course of the night retreated from hence in great alarm to Almendralejo. The conde de Penne Villemur formed the advanced guard with his cavalry, and had entered the town previous to the arrival of the British. The ultimate consequences of these operations I need not point out to your lordship; their immediate result is the capture of one general of cavalry (Brun), one colonel of cavalry (the prince d'Aremberg), one lieutenant-colonel (*chef d'Etat Major*), one aid-de-camp of general Girard, two lieutenant-colonels, one *commissaire des guerres*, 30 captains and inferior officers, and upwards of 1,000 men, already sent off under an escort to Portalegre; the whole of the enemy's artillery, baggage, and commissariat, some magazines of corn, which he had collected at Caçeres and Merida, and the contribution of money which he had collected on the former town, besides the total dispersion of general Girard's corps. The loss of the enemy in killed must also have been severe, while that on our side was comparatively trifling, as appears by the accompanying return, in which your lordship will lament to see the name of lieutenant Strenuwitz, aid-de-camp to lieutenant-general sir W. Erskine, whose extreme gallantry led him into the midst of the enemy's cavalry, and occasioned his being taken prisoner. Thus has ended an expedition which, although not bringing into play to the full extent the gallantry and spirit of those engaged, will, I trust, give them a claim to your lordship's approbation. No praise of mine can do justice to their admirable conduct, the patience and goodwill shown by all ranks during forced marches in the worst weather, their strict attention to the orders they received, the precision with which they moved to the attack, and their obedience to command during the action. In short, the manner in which every one has performed his duty,

from the first commencement of the operations, merits my warmest thanks, and will not, I am sure, pass unobserved by your lordship.

"To lieutenant-general sir W. Erskine I must express my obligations for his assistance and advice upon all occasions. To major-general the hon. K. Howard, who dismounted and headed his troops up the difficult ascent of the Sierra, and throughout most ably conducted his column; and to major-general Long, for his exertions at the head of his brigade, I feel myself particularly indebted. I must also express my obligations to colonel Wilson, colonel Ashworth, and lieutenant-colonel Stewart, commanding brigades, for the able manner in which they led them. Lieutenant-colonel Cameron, lieutenant-colonel the hon. H. Cadogan, lieutenant-colonel the hon. A. Abercromby, and lieutenant-colonels Fenwick, Muter, and Lindsay, majors Harrison and Busche, major Park (commanding the light companies), and captain Gore, commanding the 9th light dragoons, major Hartman, commanding the artillery, lieutenant-colonel Grant and major Birmingham, of the Portuguese service, captain Arriaga of the Portuguese artillery (whose guns did so much execution), severally merit my warmest approbation by their conduct; and I must not omit to mention the exertions made by brigadier-general Campbell and his troops to arrive in time to give their assistance."

The second episodic event which occurred at this period of the war, was the siege of Tarifa, and the repulse of the French in their endeavour to storm that fortress.

With the view of supporting Ballasteros, who had assembled a force of 8,000 men in the mountain district of the Ronda, strong detachments of English and Spaniards had been sent from Gibraltar and Cadiz to occupy that fortress. Soult, fearful lest his operations against Cadiz should be impeded by that force, dispatched 10,000 men, under general Laval, to reduce the place. Laval invested the fortress on the 20th of December, and on the 31st of the same month, a practicable breach of 60 feet having been effected, the French advanced to the assault; but being repulsed by the 87th and 47th regiments, Laval, having destroyed part of his artillery, and buried the remainder in the sands, hastily retreated towards Seville.

Thus ended *The Third Spanish Campaign*. As an eloquent biographer of the Duke has

said, "when it is considered that the effective strength of the British army did, at no period of 1810, exceed 26,000 men, did never in 1811 amount to 34,000 men, and fell below that state considerably after the battles of Fuentes d'Oñor and Albuera, and that during that time the French had employed in their efforts to establish and maintain themselves in Portugal, at the lowest calculation, 100,000 of their choicest troops, the reader will be assisted in forming a right estimate of the genius, the judgment, and the efficiency with which that army was commanded. The result was proportionate. At the invocation of the hero of Assaye, the military spirit of England had been awakened under his guiding genius, the martial qualities of the British soldier had been shown upon the open field, and the charm of French invincibility was gone."

It may not be misplaced to enumerate the difficulties the English commander-in-chief had to contend with in the performance of his arduous duties in the Peninsular war, and incidentally to allude to the inapplicability of comparative parallels between him and Napoleon Buonaparte, than whom no two persons were ever more dissimilar in all the characteristics of head, heart, and temperament.

It has been customary with interested partisans and those who wish to place the duke's character in an unamiable light, to compare him with Napoleon Buonaparte, in representing both as stern and un pitying soldiers, working their purposes out, reckless of the sufferings they occasioned, and dead to the kindlier feelings of humanity. But in the rare exhibition of the softer feelings, no men differed more. Napoleon's was a public display, and strongly partook of an empirical character. The duke's was a secret offering, and resembled the equal justice of paternal affection. An ostentatious visit to his hospitals, a consolatory address to a passing ambulance, bearing the wounded from the field, the parade of sorrow beside a dying friend,—all with Buonaparte assumed the semblance of acting, and seemed intended rather to elicit applause from the lookers-on, than to give expression to heartfelt sympathy. Wellington made no *open show* of sorrow. He saw old friends fall, he rode past the dying and the dead, the same stern calmness in his look, the same firm and unalterable determination in his bearing. For the sufferers he had no empty words, but

when others slept he was toiling in his bureau to obtain means for their relief; and when none expected him he visited his hospitals in private, and from personal inspection assured himself that those to whom the sick and wounded were committed, had not neglected their trust.* It is not possible to believe that it was in his nature to put into practice the chicanery and charlatanism of Napoleon Buonaparte, who, when intending to inspect the troops, despatched his aides-de-camp to the respective commanders of regiments, to desire information whether any of the men to be inspected had served with him in Italy, Egypt, or Germany; and in what victories they were, as also their numbers. Furnished with this information on bits of card put into his hand as he passed through the ranks, he would suddenly stop opposite the designated man, as if some recollection occurred to his mind, and looking earnestly at the party, ask him whether he had not served with him in Italy, Egypt, or Germany, (as the case might be,) and being informed that he had, the charlatan "emperor" would exclaim, "And not the cross!"—i.e. the Legion of Honour—at the same moment presenting the party with the decoration; and if his card told him that the man had a father—saying, "How is your father—is the old man alive?" Even in civil affairs he practised the same empiricism. He was, by his minions, much extolled for his supposed knowledge of the liberal arts, manufactures, &c. He obtained that reputation by the following means. Whenever he visited exhibitions of

the kind, he was attended by confidential prompters, while all other persons were kept at a distance. The exhibitors were taught beforehand what objects to produce, what observations to make, what questions to propose; when the mountebank visitor delivered by rote his opinions, which he previously conned over from his prepared papers. It was by manœuvres and charlatanry of this kind that Buonaparte obtained the idolatry of the French army. The inquiry after the "old man" implied that he was acquainted with the circumstances of every soldier who fought under his banners, and felt an interest in his welfare and that of his family. But "the duke" scorned so paltry artifices, so studied in trickery and charlatanism; he trusted to his merits alone to acquire the good will of his army, and secure their confidence. The duke never cared for the comfort and welfare of his army! Never was there a falser assertion, a more unfounded calumny. Look at the "Dispatches," and read there his numerous remonstrances, not only with his own government, but also with the faithless and ungrateful juntas of Spain, and their imbecile and ignorant generals. The complaint also, that the duke was not able to excite in his troops that enthusiastic and idolatrous devotion which the French soldiery evinced for Napoleon Buonaparte, is equally unreasonable. What was the cause that produced that diversity of devotion of the two armies to their respective leaders? Was it not the difference of position in which their leaders were placed? Buonaparte had not only the

* While the duke's head-quarters were at Fuente Guinaldo, sir Arthur Wellesley, according to his custom, visited the sick and wounded. He spoke with his usual laconism to some of the sufferers: "Wounded?" "Yes, my lord." "Badly?" "Smartish." "Been attended to?" "No, my lord." "How long have you been here?" "A day or two." "How is this?" "Don't know, but there are more worse wounded than I am; but now that you have come it will be all right." The commander-in-chief's eye sparkled, his lip contracted, and the sharp expression "Ah!" was uttered. Then turning round, he said, "Let these poor fellows be put under cover [they were then lying in the streets, on or under bullock-cars], in the houses of the Juiz de Fora, or of the magistrates. I will see whether they will leave my men to rot in the streets." Then sending for the principal functionary, he rated him in such terms as made the man wish the earth would open to hide him; and turning on his heel, walked towards the hospital. At this juncture, came up the medical superintendent, a smart tall Irishman, with well-polished boots, snow-white linen, and an umbrella sheltering his best coat from the showers. The contrast between the drenched and mud-splashed chief

and the spruce man of physic was striking. The duke eyed the son of Æsculapius, and said nothing—he had not made up his mind how to deal with him. As the party advanced, a bullock-car obstructed the narrow street. The son of the Emerald Isle raised his umbrella, put his hand on the crupper of one of the oxen, vaulted over with great agility, seized their heads, and turned them so as to obtain a passage. This feat was not lost upon the duke, who, having finished his inspection, and finding everything rather in a state to augment than to allay his anger, administered no very honied admonition to the medical superior attendant, mounted his horse, and returned to head-quarters. On his arrival there, the inspector-general of hospitals was sent for, to whom he expressed his displeasure at the condition he found his men in, and ordered the unfortunate superintendent to be sent in disgrace to England. The inspector-general ventured to deprecate the duke's wrath, and added, "I regret most sincerely your lordship's displeasure, as I always considered M—— to be one of the most active men in the department." "Active enough by G——," retorted the duke, "for he jumped over a car and pair of bullocks with an umbrella in his hand. But he is not active enough in the discharge of his duty."

wealth and honours, military and civil, of France, but also of the conquered countries, at his disposal and control. He could reward with rank, honour, and riches, his followers of every caste and grade, from the marshal's baton to the drum-major's stick; from the possessor of the highest and most cultivated mind to the boorish and insensate peasant; whereas the duke's power in that respect was a perfect nullity. As he indignantly remarks, in his letter of remonstrance to the military secretary at the Horse Guards, after prefacing, that feeling ashamed of letting it be known to the army how little were his means of rewarding their devotion and gallantry, he adds, "Though I command one of the largest armies that ever left England, I have not the power of making a corporal. I am almost ashamed of acknowledging the small degree (I ought to say nullity) of power of rewarding merit."

The comparisons drawn between the duke and his opponent, by interested partisans, and adopted by party and partial writers, and those who form opinions at second hand, in respect of the genius, the sagacity, the mental resources, and the military talents of the two chiefs, are equally idle and unfounded. The following observations will prove this assertion.

The duke was only a subordinate in the great game that was played on the theatre of Spain; but Buonaparte was a principal in it. The duke's calculations of his resources, and his employment of them in his operations, were dependent on the ill-judged measures of men over whom he had but little influence, and no control; in abstract terms, he, was subject to the control of others. First, he was subject to the shallow and short-sighted policy of the ministry at home; secondly, he was dependent on the caprice and obstinacy of the Spanish and Portuguese governments. His patience and temper were often put to severe trials, and his measures frustrated by the factious disposition of the Portuguese, by the intractable pride and perverseness of the Spaniards, and the negligence and lukewarmness of his own government. How often were his admirable projects thwarted by the intrigue and incapacity (often the faithlessness and treachery) of the Spanish rulers and military chiefs; and thus the fruits which would have been produced by his genius and talents were often blighted in the bud, or not allowed to reach maturity; and even when his allies did co-operate

with him, how often did he find his measures fettered and hampered by the imperfect and apathetic compliance with them? Nor did he meet with less difficulties and impediments from the timid and imbecile counsels and instructions of the Canning and Perceval administrations. The consequence was, as has been happily and forcibly observed, "his successes were often snatched from the midst of conflicting political circumstances; they were as gems brought up from the turbulence of the whirlpool." How different was the case with Napoleon Buonaparte! He was dependent on no one, subject to no control—knew no other law in the choice and furtherance of his designs than—*sic volo, sic jubeo, stet pro ratione voluntas*: he willed his measures at his pleasure, and compelled his crouching subordinates to carry his mandates into execution, in the most literal and unscrupulous manner, under fear of incurring his uncontrollable displeasure, or of losing their heads for their miscarriage.

Secondly, Wellington was limited in his means, not only in the amount of his forces, but also in the extreme deficiency of his magazines, and the poverty, nay absolute bankruptcy of his military chest. His army never exceeded in English and German soldiers, one-third (and sometimes was much less) of the numerous corps d'armée of the French, which were in immediate co-operation on his front and flanks in the Peninsula; and had he, in any bold and adventurous exploit, lost a single division of his army, he was aware that the feeble and vacillating policy of the Canning and Perceval cabinets would be so influenced by the brawlings and croakings of the factious part of the public press, and the anti-English members of both houses of parliament, that they would be inclined to withdraw the English army from the Peninsula, and leave it to the ravages and oppression of the French. Napoleon was subject to no such restraints, to no such motives, to influence his conduct. He had the lives of the whole of the male population of France, as also of almost all the states of central Europe (which were under his direct dominion, either by conquest or by the influence which he exercised over their cabinets) at his beck and command. It was his boast that he could bring a million of infantry and one hundred thousand cavalry, into the field at his pleasure; and he proved that this was not assertion, for he led half a million of men to slaughter and destruction

in his Russian campaign, and in less than two months of the Leipsic campaign, 600,000 men were demanded and granted by his obsequious satellites. Both Buonaparte and his generals were indebted more for their success to the ready and abundant means they possessed of supplying the losses occasioned by the profuse, profligate, and unprincipled sacrifice of the lives of their troops, than to any other cause, which, as the duke of Wellington correctly said, "was in every campaign one-half of those who took the field;" and his assertion is confirmed by even French writers. M. Rocca, in his *Mémoire de la Guerre Française en Péninsule*, says, that during that war of destruction, "battalions, and even whole regiments, reduced to skeletons, that is, to two or three men only, were constantly carrying back their eagles and banners to recruit in France, or Italy, or Switzerland, or Holland, or Germany, or Poland." With what a contrast does the same gentleman present us in a subsequent part of his work, when, speaking of the duke's position on the lines of Torres Vedras, he says, "Wisely economical of the blood of his soldiers, he refused to shed it for his personal glory, or to risk the fate of his country, which he had undertaken to defend, in a single battle." This is the highest eulogium that can be passed on the late duke, and cannot be surpassed in truth and beauty. Wellington's escutcheon is unstained by any wickedness, or injustice; any reckless slaughter of his fellow-creatures, or wanton sacrifice of human life; his blaze of victories is undimmed by cruelty or crime: as has been beautifully said, "No tears of desolated provinces dim the lustre of his laurels." When in India, after the storming of Seringapatam, he went, individually, among the inhabitants of that city, to calm their fears and sooth their sorrows, and protect them from the violence and licentiousness of the soldiery. When, after the retreat of Soult from Oporto, the enraged inhabitants were about to massacre his sick and wounded he had deserted, his noble-hearted conqueror issued the following humane proclamation: "I call on the inhabitants of Oporto to be merciful to the wounded and prisoners. By the laws of war they are entitled to my protection, which I am determined to afford them." When the ruthless Massena, in his irruption into Portugal, was massacring the peasants and the ordenanzas (militia) with the most savage barbarity, his illustrious opponent told him that if he per-

severed in his cruelty he could not save the French prisoners from the just vengeance of the Portuguese. When he entered the territory of France he prohibited the Spaniards from retaliating the atrocities to which their countrymen had been subjected by the French armies; and his treatment and protection of the French population were such that the peasantry brought their property within the British lines, in preference to those of their own countrymen. When the marquis of Londonderry required him, during the occupation of France by the British army, to maintain that army by requisition, he remonstrated on the injustice and impolicy of the act, and saved that country from the penalty of confiscation. His celebrated declaration on the debate respecting the removal of the Roman catholic disabilities, would be a sufficient proof of his humanity, were all other instances wanting. And to his eternal honour be it mentioned, he never bombarded a town in any of his sieges, that is, threw bombs, red hot shell, &c., from mortars and howitzers, as by that mode of procedure in sieges the inhabitants are the sufferers, not the garrisons. The truth is, his earnest and unceasing endeavour was to mitigate and alleviate the evils and asperities of warfare, no less by setting an example of justice and clemency, than by recommending and enforcing, whenever he could, moderate and humane measures among his allies. His despatches, both Indian and European, furnish numerous proofs of his humane and merciful disposition. When the Peishwa, whom he had contributed to restore to his throne, indicated a wish to execute his vengeance on some of the Mahratta chiefs who had opposed him, the duke interposed to save them. "The war," said he, "will be eternal if nobody is forgiven; and I certainly think that the British government cannot intend to make the British troops the instruments of the Peishwa's revenge." This measure saved the devoted chiefs.

Thirdly, Nor was the state of destitution of his army in respect of food and the necessaries of life, the only untoward circumstance the English chief had to contend with during the Peninsular War: the military chest was frequently in as destitute a condition. Napier tells us (and he tells only the bare truth) that it "sometimes did not contain a halfpenny;" at other times "it was quite bankrupt." Such was not the case with Buonaparte and his generals. They ex-

acted, at their will and pleasure, all the necessary succours for furthering their operations, from the inhabitants of the countries in which they were carrying on their schemes of violence and aggression, and that too under the terror and pains of military execution. This practice was enjoined on all his subordinates by the express command of Buonaparte. Among Joseph Buonaparte's papers captured at Vittoria, a letter was found addressed to him by his brother Napoleon, in which he tells him that "he had always supported his wars by the resources of the territory in which they were carried on." In his first Italian campaign, besides maintaining the army, he remitted fifty millions of francs to the French exchequer. The French armies were supported by authorized and regulated plunder of the countries and their inhabitants which were for the time the scenes of their operations. Every article, whether of food or raiment, every animal, and every vehicle, were considered to belong of right to the soldier, and without payment. But it was very different with the English army. In all its dealings and intercourse with the natives of the Peninsula, the national character for good faith and disinterested honour, was maintained pure and sacred. And yet, as the duke said, in a letter dated December 21st, 1810, addressed to the earl of Liverpool:—"With all our money I could not maintain one division in the district in which the French have maintained not less than 60,000 men and 20,000 animals, for more than two months. This time last year I was obliged to move the British cavalry from the district which the French now occupy with their whole army, because it could not be subsisted. But [*the secret was*] they take every thing, and leave the unfortunate inhabitants to starve:" thus confirming General Foy's pointed contrast, of "10,000 English with money in their hands," with an army of 20,000 French, though moneyless.

Fourthly, Even in the power of provisioning his army, Wellington was shackled and hampered—often reduced to the greatest straits and difficulties. His commissariat was vicious and defective; not unfrequently selfish and peculating: faults arising from the pernicious influence exerted by the

government in the selection of persons for that employment. The opinion of general Foy on that subject furnishes a sufficient explanation of the difficulties and disappointments to which the duke was subject in that respect: "The British commissariat," says the French general, "was composed of the class of petty tradesmen and greedy speculators who contrived to get rich by irregular means."* To those acquainted with the influences which abject birth and low occupation have on the conduct and motives of men, the declaration of the French general affords a solution of the difference resulting to the French and English armies from their respective commissariats, and the impediments consequently resulting to the plans and operations of the duke of Wellington, as he was under the unavoidable necessity of being dependent for his supplies on his commissariat. But Buonaparte's power in that respect was lawless. He maintained his armies by forced contributions and unrestrained pillage in the invaded countries; and moreover compelled his commissariat to execute their duties faithfully and zealously, from the fear of the certainty of punishment which would attend their fraud or malversation. In Italy, Egypt, Germany, Russia, Spain and Portugal, he and his generals put that system into full and effective operation, and they made the clergy and magistrates responsible for the fulfilment of the requisitions, or forced contributions, and the supply of the requisite succours and means of transport for the French armies.† It was one of the maxims of the French chief's military economy, "that a general at the head of 20,000 men, who could not, in a civilised country, procure subsistence for his troops, was ignorant of his trade." His generals proved themselves no dull scholars. Foy, in his *History of the Peninsular War*, says, "that a French army consisting of 20,000 men, without a military chest, would find abundant subsistence in a country in which an army of 10,000 English, with money in their hands, would die of famine." In another part of his interesting work, when speaking of the great change that Buonaparte introduced into the French armies in their conduct and treatment of the conquered countries, he obliged them to have, in a great measure, recourse to the resources of France, or, as he emphatically expressed himself, "of maintaining themselves," by carrying on a war of magazines. As he, with his usual foresight, said, "this soon made the French people discontented with warfare."

* *Histoire de la Guerre de la Péninsule sous Napoléon.*

† The Duke of Wellington, in the course of the Peninsular War, compelled the French to have recourse to a new system of subsisting and paying their armies. Instead of requisitions and exactions on the

quered or invaded countries, to what it had been in the pure times of the republic, he exclaims: "Woe, then, three-fold woe to the soil traversed by the car of victory. From the period of Napoleon's ascendancy, no more magazines on unforeseen lines of operation, no more convoys of provisions organized in continually variable directions, were ever thought of. Like the avalanche rushing from the summit of the Alps into the valleys, our innumerable armies, by mere passage, destroyed in a few hours the resources of a whole country. Wherever they halted they demolished houses that had stood for half a century." Even one who is no cold and apathetic eulogist of the French and their leaders, admits that the French generals enforced their exactions on Spain, "by executions and burnings." "How different was the conduct of the republican armies of France, in the pure times of their revolutionary austerity and sublime devotedness to patriotism, when masculine virtue and the fiery independence of a truly republican soul actuated our soldiers," exclaims the high-minded Foy: "During the first years of the republic the conquered nations were protected from the licentiousness of arms. The old soldiers long remembered St. Just and Lebas, representatives of the people, who, during the campaign of 1794 caused some volunteers to be shot for having stolen a few eggs from the poultry yard of a peasant of Brabant. Again, later, the brigade of Lautour D'Auvergne was encamped in cherry orchards in Biscay, and the grenadiers durst not pick the cherries from the boughs which hung over their heads. But then," the general emphatically observes, "the French generals made war with an austerity and a moderation befitting the noble cause for which they had taken up arms. The pay was then eight francs per month for the higher ranks. At head-quarters the generals ate at table no other bread than the soldier, and no other meat than the kind which he received." What a contrast to the Napoleonic system! According to that system of regulated and systematic robbery, Buonaparte and his generals became possessed of a great part of the riches of the plundered countries. "How many saints of gold and silver," says M. Blazé, "how many pyxes and cups, were transformed into ingots, to be afterwards exchanged for hotels in Paris! How many diamonds and rubies, after adorning for ages the pompous ceremonies of the

Roman catholic church, were utterly astonished to find themselves on the bare bosom of an opera dancer! The magnificent pictures which decorated the churches of Spain, now adorn the galleries of their generals, and their vacant places are covered with a piece of black cloth." Well may the duke of Wellington have declared at the wholesale removal of the robberies of the Portuguese by Junot and his associate thieves, that it was to be regretted that no means could be devised "to make the French generals restore the property they had *stolen*."

Fifthly,—The medical department of the British army was equally as vicious and defective as that of the commissariat. When the British chief demanded a reform, the medical board in London disregarded his complaints, and even thwarted the arrangements he had made for improving the disgraceful condition of the hospitals, and rendering their officers more efficient. The French hospitals were well regulated and furnished with all things necessary, even with luxuries and superfluities, while the British were even destitute of the commonest necessities. The French medical staff was skilful and efficient; the English, inefficient and without capacity. Even in the removal of the wounded off the field of battle, the facilities of the French plan were admirably contrasted with the clumsy and bungling contrivances of the English. The French wounded were removed with rapidity off the field, and by the medium of the hospital ambulances, without the infliction of unnecessary pain on the sufferers; but the fallen English soldiers were often left for many hours, and when removed were transported in clumsy bullock-carts, which often occasioned the most excruciating pain and agony to the sufferers. These defects frequently produced in the English army the most doleful scenes after a battle, or when an hospital was to be removed. They also tended greatly to impede the plans and operations of the English chief, on account of the length of time the sick and wounded were prevented from joining the ranks. On the other hand, the French sick and wounded, from the superiority and efficiency of the French medical staff, and the full and constant supply of the necessities requisite for the restoration of the patients to health and activity, quickly rejoined their regiments. For this reason the operations of the French armies were not impeded or retarded by the obstructions which the presence of large

hospitals occasion to military movements. The case was the same on account of the exoneration from which the French generals were relieved, from the necessity of having commissariat stores conveyed with the armies, and from which the system of forced contributions in the invaded countries, relieved them.

Sixthly,—The Duke's operations in the field were retarded and enfeebled—nay, often endangered, by the remissness and culpability of the government officials, in respect of the deficiencies and imperfections of the engineer and artillery departments of his army. His sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and St. Sebastian, were retarded and greatly impeded, not only from the want of the requisite battering trains and siege *matériel*, but even of a body of men trained to siege duty; and his earnest and frequent representations and remonstrances to the Board of Ordnance on that subject, were not only disregarded, but even treated with slight and indifference. Even when the requisite battering train and siege *matériel* were sent to St. Sebastian, ammunition only for one day's consumption accompanied the train. The cause of the protraction of the siege of the last-mentioned fortress, and the failures of the assaults in the two gallant attempts to storm the breaches, were further occasioned by the absence of cruisers on the coast, to prevent the enemy entering the port with stores and ammunition, and removing the wounded men of the garrison to places of safety. As it has been well remarked, in consequence of the culpable conduct on the part of the government officials, the history of our sieges in the Peninsular war, forms a sad and humiliating chapter in our military annals; they were, as Napier has said with truth, "a succession of butcheries, because the commonest materials (namely, stores, implements, &c.) and the means necessary for their use, were denied to the engineers." As the same author justly observes in another part of his voluminous work, it was from the incredible carelessness of preparation, and the habitual negligence of the different cabinets and government officials, "that the laurels of the British army had for many years been blighted." Another admirable historian of the Peninsular war,* while speaking of the destitute state of the British army prior to its advance into Spain, when "the men were without shoes; the officers and men

without pay and common necessities; the hospitals full, and the military chest empty," adds: "this great and shameful irregularity of providing for the army, was not an isolated occurrence, but obtained frequently throughout the war, and consequently fettered and hampered the illustrious subject of our memoir in the execution of his measures."

"It will scarcely be credited," says the author of *The Defenceless State of Great Britain*, "that the trenches, saps, mines, batteries, and other important works necessary for the capture of Olivença in April, 1811; the attack of Fort Christoval, in May, 1811; the second siege of Badajoz, in 1812; the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, in 1812; the third and last siege of Badajoz, in March and April, 1812; the escalade and capture of the French works at Almaraz, in May, 1812; the reduction of the French posts at Salamanca, in June, 1812; the capture of the Retero, at Madrid, in August, and the siege of Burgos, in September and October of the same year, were undertaken and conducted by a British army, *unattended by a single sapper or miner.*"

Nor were these the only mischievous results arising from the negligence and culpable conduct of the ordnance and admiralty departments in the course of the operations of the British army during the Peninsular war. Among other obstructions to its effective operations during that desperate and eventful struggle, the following may be particularized:—At the battle of Fuentes d'Oñor, the troops were obliged to pick up the enemy's shot fired into the camp, to supply the guns; and after the battle of Vittoria, the only ammunition available was that captured from the French; but as the shot were not of sufficient size for the calibre of the muskets and cannon, the consequence was their comparative inefficiency. Similar cases had occurred at the siege of Badajoz, and in some of the battles previous to that memorable event. "The guns at the siege of Badajoz," says Napier, "were false in the bore, and the shot of different sizes, the largest being too small," and consequently they were in a great measure ineffectual, from the windage thereby caused. In these respects the case was very different with Buonaparte and his generals. They experienced no difficulties and obstructions of the kind. His crouching dependents amply supplied him and his generals with all the necessary succour and

* *Military Memoirs of Wellington.*

aid they wanted; and even his timid and fawning allies contributed their quotas in the furtherance of his ambitious projects of violence and aggression. The inhabitants of the countries in which the war was carried on at the time were, as has been already stated, compelled, under pain and terror of military execution, to furnish ample supplies, which relieved the French generals from being encumbered with magazines and stores.

Seventhly,—The duke's measures and operations were frequently impeded, sometimes foiled, by the short-sighted and narrow-policied views of the imbecile cabinets of his own country, and the perverse, and often perfidious measures of his allies. His admirable plans, when lord Liverpool declared the inability of the government to supply the army with corn and specie, for provisioning the British army, and after replenishing his military chest with the produce of the surplus, supplying the Portuguese population, by the importation of corn, &c., from North and South America, Egypt, and the northern coast of Africa, were, in a great measure, thwarted by the culpable negligence, nay, even the absolute refusal of the admiralty, to establish cruisers for the protection of the coasts of Portugal and Spain from the presence of the French and American privateers, and other vessels of war belonging to the enemy; and his financial contrivances to replenish the bankrupt state of the military chest, were rendered nugatory by the mischievous consequences of lord William Bentinck's enhancement of the value of Spanish dollars, in the idle and visionary Sicilian scheme projected by him and the English ministry. The consequence of the Sicilian competition was, an absolute dearth of specie in Spain; and that of the neglect of the English admiralty to station cruisers on the coasts, the loss of store-ships and merchantmen conveying money, clothing, and the munitions of war for the use of the British army, which were captured by privateers issuing from Santona, Bayonne, and Bordeaux. Even the store-ships from Santander could not sail with the necessaries for the British army during its operations on the Nive and the Nivelles, and in front of Bayonne, for want of convoy. The conse-

quence was, that its operations were checked. And to add to the list of grievances, the commissariat availed itself of every opportunity of turning the culpable negligence and dereliction of duty of the government and its officials, to its own selfish advantage. Among numerous other instances of its transgression, may be mentioned, its employment of the provision mules from the port of St. Jean de Luz, in the conveyance of luxuries, in order to sell them at an exorbitant profit to the army. The evils rose to so great a height, that the daily expense of each man's rations exceeded six shillings, British specie. And to fill up the measure of destitution which the army was suffering from the abject and heartless faction under which the English nation was groaning, while its heroic sons were vindicating the rights and independence of civilized men, on the snows of the Pyrenees, and in the swamps of the plains of France, during the winter of 1812 and 1813, their great coats were not furnished by the greedy contractors until the month of April of the last-mentioned year: a neglect probably occasioned for the purpose of verifying the heartless and ignorant declaration of that wisest of sages and purest of patriots, Lord Melville, "*that the army was the last thing that ought to be attended to.*"* And to crown the folly and iniquity of that timid and incapable faction, colonel Bunbury, the under-secretary of state, was sent to the duke's head-quarters, "at the time millions were being poured by the British ministry into the continent; when every petty German sovereign, partisan, or robber, who raised a hand, or a story, against Napoleon, was supplied to satiety,"—to protest against the maximum expenditure of £100,000 monthly, (and even that sum was not paid regularly) for the maintenance of the British army and its allied battalions; and that, too, at the very crisis of the tremendous struggle, and when the duke was overwhelmed with debt contracted in consequence of the ignorant and crooked policy of the government he was serving. When a review is taken of the tissue of contemptible and culpable conduct by which the government harassed the duke, the only excuse for the strange hallucination under which the ministry laboured,

* It was probably, to adopt a vicious parliamentary phrase, "in the carrying out" the same notion of the army being the last thing that ought to be attended to, that the imbecile Perceval cabinet, in its dread of the newspaper cry for economy, forgot the safety of the

army in the lines of Torres Vedras, in their keen love of place, and actually issued orders to discharge all the transport ships lying in the Tagus, to save expense, or, more correctly speaking, keep them in their places.

is the laughable declaration of one of their body, that "the views of the duke were wild and visionary, and required the sanction of older and wiser heads before they were assented to." In contending with these untoward circumstances, the duke's attention was not only engaged in directing the movements and fighting the battles of the Peninsular war, but also in the provisioning, the equipment, the supply of the stores, and superintending the health of his army: in a word, he was, besides executing the duty of commander-in-chief, obliged to be his own engineer, artillerist, commissary, medical adviser, and financier. How he discharged those duties, the event proved: "By a succession of victories, he taught his countrymen to know their own military capacities, and to believe in the fortune of their arms." It has been truly and emphatically said, "the true mark of a great man is, that he accomplished great achievements with small means." To this high and distinguishing claim no man in any age has proved a better title than the late duke of Wellington. His means were cramped and limited, and yet he "accomplished great achievements," and overcame all difficulties. Buonaparte overwhelmed all obstacles by enormous masses of soldiery, and the unlimited command of all the sinews of war—money, munition, and every warlike *matériel*, besides the homage and co-operation of all the subjugated states of Europe.

To meet these difficulties, and provide for those defects, which were occasioned by the English ministry and his allies, the Spanish and Portuguese, the duke was left to his own resources, and compelled to call into practice all the energy, sagacity, and foresight, of his sound, and well-regulated and well-poised mind. By his deep designs and vast combinations, his soundness of judgment and clearness of perception, his intuitive sagacity and inflexibility of purpose, his indefatigable activity, and prompt and decided

execution, he, notwithstanding the follies and the fears of weak and timid, and selfish cabinets, both foreign and domestic, with which he had to contend, not only overcame all those difficulties, and provided for all those defects, but he subdued and reduced to subjection the colossal power and overweening arrogance of one of the most inveterate foes and aggressors of national honour and independence, that had ever appeared on the face of the earth; and eventually restored peace and happiness to Europe, and collaterally to the whole civilized world.

Such are the comparisons, truth and justice tell us, that ought to be drawn between Wellington and Napoleon Buonaparte; they are well summed up in the following brief and emphatic remark of an able periodical writer:—"Instead of the enormous sacrifices of human freedom, human life, and human comfort, which Napoleon Buonaparte demanded, the duke achieved an immortality for himself and his country without leaving half the youth of each generation on the field of battle—without taking any part in the suppression of national freedom or national intellect—without giving the least help towards reducing his country to a herd of slaves, packed up and driven by legions of policemen and spies." To this high and just praise may be appropriately appended that of the most eloquent and judicious of his biographers:—"Though his commands were many and considerable, and the theatre of his services often varied, he was never charged with one act of rapacity or of cruelty; we find no stain of severity upon his hands, no dirt of plunder adhering to his honourable sword, no tears of desolated provinces to dim the lustre of his laurels." His campaigns were sanctified by the cause: they were sullied by no cruelties, no crime. As a conqueror, he has left a blaze of victory behind him, resplendent with honour, patriotism, and justice.

MEMORANDUM OF OPERATIONS IN 1811.

BY GENERAL VISCOUNT WELLINGTON, K.B.

DURING the period that Lord Wellington was in the Peninsula, he had been in the practice, from time to time, of drawing up memoranda of the operations of the army under his command, and forwarding them to the minister. These documents are all

eminently characteristic of the man, and exhibit in a clear and striking manner his power of conducting the greatest affairs, while he never neglected the most minute and apparently trifling circumstances which might tend towards the great result. The

important memorandum which we here introduce is that of the operations of the Peninsular army in 1811, as giving a concise and accurate epitome of the occurrences of that year, and thus preparing the reader for a clear understanding of the great events of 1812:—

Freneda, 28th Dec. 1811.

The last memorandum on the operations in the Peninsula, brought them down to the end of the year 1810, when a division of the 9th corps, with other troops, which had before endeavoured to join Massena from the frontiers of Castile, through Lower Beira, arrived, and took their station on the right of the enemy's army at Leyria. These troops, supposed to be from 8,000 to 10,000 men, had been annoyed on their march by colonel Wilson's detachment on the Alva.

The other division of the 9th corps under Claparède, amounting also to about 10,000 men, remained on the frontier, and by their manœuvres kept general Silveira in check during the march of the division under Drouet, by the valley of the Mondego. Silveira attacked their advanced guard at Ponte do Abade, on the 30th December, 1810, and was defeated; and he was himself attacked and defeated at Villa da Ponte on the 11th January; and he retired, first to Lamego, and thence across the Douro. Claparède advanced upon Lamego, but general Bacellar having placed the divisions of militia, under the command of general Miller and of colonel Wilson, on his flanks and his communications, he was obliged to retire, and went to Guarda, to which place he had been ordered by Massena.

But the principal occurrence in the commencement of this year was the movement, from Andalusia, of a large force into Estremadura, in order to create a diversion in favour of Massena.

The army of the south, under the command of Soult, consisted of the 1st corps, which was engaged in the operations of the siege of Cadiz; of the 4th corps, which was at Granada; and of the 5th corps, one division of which, under Gazan, could with difficulty maintain its ground in Estremadura against the Spanish division of Mendizabel and Ballasteros, whilst the other division, under Girard, was employed in the Condado

de Niebla, and in keeping open the communication between Seville and the besieging army of Cadiz. The whole amount of the army of the south could not be less in the beginning of the year than 50,000 men.*

Soult broke up from Cadiz with about 5,000 men on the 21st December, and collected at Seville the troops destined for the invasion of Estremadura. He had with him about 20,000 men,† including a very large body of cavalry; to oppose which there were the Spanish divisions of Mendizabel and Ballasteros, which amounted to about 10,000 men, a brigade of Portuguese cavalry, and about 1,500 Spanish cavalry, making altogether about 2,300 cavalry. There were, besides, Spanish garrisons in Badajos and Campo Mayor, Albuquerque, and Valencia de Alcantara; and Don Carlos de España's brigade, about 2,000 men, which was on the right of the British army near Abrantes, was considered disposable for service in Estremadura.

If this corps had been left entire, and had been prudently managed, it would have been fully sufficient, even though not joined by the other troops belonging to the army of the marquis de la Romana, incorporated with the British army, to prevent the enemy from passing the Guadiana, which was full at that season of the year.

But the first measure adopted by the Spanish government, on the same day, the 21st December, that Soult broke up from Cadiz, was to order Ballasteros, with a part of his division, into the Condado de Niebla. Notwithstanding that we received at Cartaxo, on the 29th December, the accounts of Soult having broken up from before Cadiz, the Spanish general Mendizabel did not hear of this circumstance for some days afterwards; and the first he heard of it was from us. He was quite unprepared for his retreat, which was hurried; and he retired in a manner different, and making a different disposition from that which was recommended and ordered.

He had been ordered to break the bridges of Merida and Medellin, and to defend the passages of the Guadiana. He retired upon Badajos and Olivença; and the engineer officer who was sent to destroy the bridge of Merida, instead of obeying the

* By a return of the 25th March, it appears that this army then consisted of 48,619 men; of which number 7,744 were cavalry. This was after the battle of Barossa, and after the siege of Badajos, the battle of the 19th February, &c. It may be pre-

sumed that it was more than 50,000 men in the beginning of the year.

† The 5th corps alone had about 12,000 infantry; and 5,000 brought from the siege of Cadiz and the cavalry, would make his army 20,000 men.

orders he received, made a report which was sent to Cartaxo to the marques de la Romana, and asked for orders. The town of Merida itself was not defended; and the consequence was, that an advanced guard of French cavalry took Merida, which post 400 French troops had held in June in the year 1809, against the whole Spanish army, with this additional disadvantage, that the river Guadiana was then fordable, and that the Spanish troops were in possession of all the avenues to the town.

General Mendizabel, in making his retreat upon Badajos and Olivença, threw 3,000 men of general Ballasteros' division into the latter, the others having marched under general Ballasteros, by order of the government, into the Condado de Niebla. The division of general Mendizabel retired upon Badajos, with all the cavalry, excepting a small body which marched upon Merida.

There were various reports of the movements of the French; and in fact it was but little known in what direction, and with what object, they were moving. It was at one time positively stated, that they had passed the bridge of Merida on the 15th of January, and that they were moving towards the bridge of Almaraz on the Tagus; at another time it was reported that they were encamped at Caceres; but at last it was found that they did not cross the Guadiana in any force, but blockaded the troops of general Ballasteros' division in Olivença.

This blockade was made on the 15th, and continued until the 23rd of January, when the garrison surrendered. Two or three attempts were made by general Mendizabel to raise the blockade, but without success; and as the garrison at last surrendered, before the enemy had attacked the place, and without being distressed for provisions, it is believed that the place was sold.

During the month of January, the marques de la Romana was taken very ill at Cartaxo, of which illness he died on the 23rd of that month. He had ordered don Carlos de España's brigade to march as soon as he heard of the danger of Ballasteros' detachment from the advance of the French troops, and he afterwards ordered that the remainder of the troops which had been incorporated with the British army should move from Villa Franca, where they had been cantoned. They moved on the 20th of January.

From the period at which we had heard of the movement of the French from Cadiz

and particularly, latterly, I had frequent conversation with him regarding the situation of affairs in Estremadura; and as he was unwell, I wrote, in the shape of a memorandum, my opinions on the plan of operations to be pursued, as well for the objects of the war in general, as for the particular purpose of saving Olivença, or rather for relieving the troops in that place, respecting whom the marques was particularly anxious.

The marques died three days after he had received this memorandum; but not till after he had circulated it among the officers under his command, and had desired them to attend to it. A reference to the memorandum, and to the letters and dispatches of that day, will show how far they attended either to the first or to the last.

After two attempts were made to raise the blockade of Olivença, the place surrendered on the 23rd of January; and the enemy invested Badajos, on both sides of the Guadiana, on the 27th of January, and broke ground on the left of the river on the 29th. The Spanish generals were not decided respecting the measures which they should adopt in the circumstances in which they stood. But at length the troops, which had quitted the allied army on the 20th of January, were ordered to advance to Badajos. They immediately re-established the communication between Elvas and Badajos, obliging the French cavalry to retire beyond the Gevora; and then having entered the town, they attempted to raise the siege by making a sortie upon the enemy's works. They were driven back with loss; and having remained in the town, the communication between Elvas and Badajos was again cut off by the enemy's cavalry.*

The Spanish troops, however, came out of the town again on the 9th of February, and at last took the position on the heights of San Christoval, which was recommended to them. They did not, however, adopt any measure to fortify this position, nor did they adopt any of the other measures recommended to them, particularly that of sending away from Badajos the bridge of boats, the want of which was afterwards found to be so fatal to the cause.

The Spanish army, about 10,000 strong, and having besides about 2,000 cavalry, including general Madden's Portuguese bri-

* If the French had sent a sufficient body of cavalry to the right of the Guadiana, they would have taken the whole army without firing a shot.

gade, remained in the position at San Christoval, till the 19th of February, having the Gevora in their front, and that river and the Guadiana between them and the enemy, on which day they were surprised by between 5,000 and 6,000 French troops, and totally destroyed as a military body; their camp and artillery being taken, and the whole body, not killed or taken, dispersed, except the Portuguese brigade of cavalry, and a few hundred Spaniards. About 2,000 of the troops escaped into Badajos.

An examination of the letters written at this period to Mr. Wellesley and the secretary of state, will show my anxiety for the relief of Badajos, and the measures which I recommended for that object. The most effectual measure of any would, undoubtedly, have been to detach a body of British troops to that part of the country; but a moment's reflection on the relative numbers of the two armies at that time on the Tagus, and on the extent and nature of the positions which we had to occupy, will show that it was impossible to venture to detach, from our army at least, till the reinforcements then expected should have arrived in the Tagus.

Massena had come into Portugal with 72,000 men, of which he had lost 10,000 at the battle of Busaco, and its consequences; and it is a large allowance to suppose that he had in January lost 10,000 more by deaths, prisoners, deserters, and killed, in various little affairs which had occurred. This would reduce his original number to 52,000 men; and an aid-de-camp of his who was taken in December, reported that the army had that number before Drouet joined.

To this number Drouet, in December, and Foy, in January, added about 12,000 men, making 64,000; and Claparède was at Guarda with between 8,000 and 10,000 men; of the 64,000, about 14,000 may have been sick, as the army were very sickly; and there would have remained on the Tagus, fit for service, about 50,000 men.

The British army, on the 20th January, consisted of 41,040 men; of which number there were sick, 6,715; on command, 1,974; prisoners of war, 1,586; and there remained present, fit for duty, 30,765. Of this number, the 2nd battalion, 88th (485) were at Lisbon, and the 2nd battalion, 58th, at Torres Vedras; leaving about 30,000 for service; of which number 2,655 were cavalry.

The Portuguese army, joined with the

British for service in the field, at the same time amounted to about 82,000 effective men, exclusive of the garrisons of Abrantes and Elvas, in each of which there were two regiments of infantry, one regiment of infantry at Cadiz, and one regiment of infantry (24th) with general Silveira. The object of the French general at this time was undoubtedly to pass the Tagus; and he had his choice of making the attempt in a course of about thirty miles from Santarem to the Zezere, and even higher than the junction of that river. It was necessary to guard the whole course of the river; for which it is conceived that 14,000 men could not be deemed more than sufficient.

The remainder of the army, about 40,000 men, was on the right of the Tagus, opposed to the whole French army; and it must be observed, that if the enemy had been able to advance, either with their 50,000 men, or after being joined by Claparède, they would have been opposed by very unequal numbers, as some days must have elapsed before the troops on the left of the Tagus could have been brought across the river.

The detachment which it would have been necessary to make, in order to effect any good at Badajos, or even to have been in safety, adverting to the mode in which the Spanish troops have usually conducted themselves, ought to have been about 13,000 men; which numbers, it is obvious, could not be spared from the army from the end of January to the 19th February.

Reinforcements to the amount of 6,000 or 7,000 men were daily expected, which afterwards arrived in the beginning of March. It was hoped that the Spaniards would risk nothing, and would be able to hold out till these reinforcements should arrive, when it was intended to detach a sufficient force to effect the object at Badajos, before any thing else should be attempted against Massena.

The delay of all measures against Massena's position continued to be absolutely necessary on account of the state of the roads and rivers in the country; even if our force had been deemed sufficient to attack him.

The result of the battle of the 19th February, however, destroyed all hopes of being able, even when the reinforcement should arrive, to make such a detachment from the army as should be able to relieve Badajos; more particularly as the Spaniards, having neglected to remove the bridge from Badajos to Elvas, the troops which should attempt

to relieve Badajos had no choice left, in respect to the mode of crossing the Guadiana. They must have passed by the bridge of Badajos.

It was then determined to attack Massena as soon as the reinforcements should arrive, by which time it was hoped that the roads and rivulets would become practicable. In the mean time the governor of Badajos was requested to hold out to the last moment. Massena, however, retired from his position on the night of the 5th March, before our troops, which had arrived at Lisbon on the 1st March, could join the army. The British troops were immediately put in motion in pursuit of the French army; those on the left of the Tagus, by Abrantes and the Zezere; and those on the Rio Mayor river, by the different routes leading in the direction which the enemy had taken.

A letter was written to general Leite, the governor of Elvas, from Santarem, on the 6th, to request him to apprise the governor of Badajos of Massena's retreat, and to assure him that support and relief would be sent to him without loss of time. This support was accordingly ordered to march on the 8th, as soon as the enemy's retreat was found to be decided.

When the enemy retired, it appeared at first that their intention was to go by the road of Thomar and Espinhal, leaving Coimbra on their left; and it was not certain that they had taken the high road by Pombal, till the 9th. On that morning a most favourable report was received of the state of affairs at Badajos. It appeared that the garrison had not suffered; that the fire of the place was superior to that of the enemy; and that one of the enemy's six battering guns had been dismounted by the fire of the place. Under these circumstances, when it was found on the afternoon of the 9th, that the enemy had collected their army in a strong position at Pombal, it was deemed expedient to order the 4th division, and general de Grey's brigade of cavalry (which had been ordered to march on the 10th to join the 2nd and general Hamilton's division on the left of the Tagus, as soon as the bridge should be laid for them), to march upon Pombal, to co-operate in the attack which it was intended to make upon the enemy on the 11th. These troops accordingly joined, and the enemy retired; but the garrison of Badajos surrendered on the 10th of March.

The mode of the enemy's retreat on the

11th, and the fact that they were still stronger than we were, and might have taken up the position of Coimbra and the Mondego, unless hurried beyond that town, caused the continued detention of the 4th division, and general de Grey's brigade of cavalry, till the operations of the 13th forced the enemy past Coimbra, and enabled us to communicate with that town.

The troops for Badajos were immediately put in motion to return to the south, but unfortunately we that night heard of the fall of that fortress on the 10th. These accounts were accompanied by reports of the enemy immediately threatening Campo Mayor; and even if it had not been desirable to prevent them from extending their conquests on that side, the fall of Badajos facilitated to such a degree their entry into Portugal, and Badajos was so much nearer to Lisbon than the point at which we then found ourselves, that it would have been impossible to continue the pursuit of Massena even for one march, without providing for the security of our right flank, by placing a large corps on the Tagus. Thus, then, it was still necessary to make this detachment, notwithstanding that the original object for which it was destined was lost.

The pursuit of Massena was continued with uniform success from that period till he had finally crossed the Agueda on the 9th April. Our reinforcements, however, were not all arrived in Portugal, and those which had arrived did not join the army till the end of March. Even then we were infinitely inferior to the enemy in numbers, particularly when he approached the frontier, and was joined by Claparède's division of the 9th corps from Guarda. Our movements were, therefore, necessarily cramped, and we were obliged to proceed with caution, when the utmost activity would have been desirable.

Let any body now advert to the difference of the result of Massena's invasion of Portugal, if the operations on the Guadiana in the month of January had been carried on as they ought; if the Spanish Regency had not drawn Ballasteros from Estremadura at the moment that province was attacked; if his troops had not been shamefully sold in Olivença; if the battle of the 19th February had not been lost, and the Spanish army annihilated; and, finally, if Badajos itself had not been shamefully sold to the enemy on the day after the governor was informed that relief would be sent to him.

As soon as the French were driven across the Agueda, Almeida was invested; and it will be seen in a subsequent part of this memorandum that the enemy made an attempt in May to relieve the place. What would have been the result of that attempt, nay more, would it ever have been made, if we had had 22,000 men in the ranks, which were at that time in Estremadura.

If our attention had not been preferably, and with part of our army necessarily, carried into Estremadura, in consequence of the events in that province, in the months of January, February, and March, what would have been the result of an attempt to obtain possession of Ciudad Rodrigo in May, after the fall of Almeida, by the concentrated force and resources of the allied army?

But other circumstances occurred, not yet adverted to in this memorandum, which show still more clearly the fatal effects of the Spanish system of military operations. Notwithstanding that general Ballasteros was weak, and that he ought never to have been removed from Estremadura, he held his ground against a French corps which attacked him on the 25th of January. A part of the French force in Estremadura was consequently withdrawn from that province, and the force engaged in the siege of Badajos was reduced.*

Another event occurred highly advantageous in all its circumstances to the state of affairs in Estremadura. In consequence of the diminution of the force before Cadiz in December, 1810, the British and Spanish authorities conceived that a fair opportunity offered of making an attack upon the blockading army by the besieged. This attack was fixed for the 28th of February, but owing to contrary winds, and a variety of circumstances, could not take place till the 6th of March. On that day the battle of Barossa was fought, four days before the surrender of Badajos; and in all probability, if Badajos had held out one day longer, the enemy would not have remained to take possession of the place.

The troops which were detached from the army at Condeixa on the 14th of March, did not arrive at Portalegre till the 22nd of that month. Campo Mayor, which had been regularly attacked by the enemy on the 14th, surrendered on the 22nd. Marshal sir W. Beresford, having collected his corps, ad-

vanced against the enemy, surprised them at Campo Mayor on the 25th, which place they abandoned. Their cavalry fled into Badajos, leaving behind them a regiment of infantry, and all their cannon. Unfortunately the excessive impetuosity of the troops (the 13th light dragoons in particular) prevented sir W. Beresford from taking the advantage which he intended to take of these events. Some of the 13th dragoons were taken on the bridge, between the *tête du pont* and the gate of Badajos.

The instructions to sir W. Beresford were to pass the Guadiana, as soon as he should have possession of Campo Mayor, and to blockade Badajos, till the means for attacking the place regularly could arrive. Unfortunately, here again our operations were frustrated by the conduct of the Spaniards. One of the objects particularly recommended to their attention was to send to Elvas the bridge of boats that was in Badajos. This had been repeatedly desired before, and the reasons for urging the measure again were particularly stated in that memorandum. This was the only bridge in the possession of the allies; and if it had been at Elvas, marshal Beresford could have passed the Guadiana, and have blockaded Badajos on the 26th of March, and in all probability the place would have fallen into our hands as Campo Mayor had, or as Almeida subsequently did, as it was at that time unprovided with stores or with provisions. As it was, he could not pass the Guadiana till the 4th of April, and could not advance till the 6th or 7th; and in the intermediate time the enemy threw into the place all the provisions and stores which it required to last till the enemy were enabled finally to relieve it in the middle of June.

When the French crossed the Agueda on the 9th of April, they left Almeida to its fate, and it was immediately invested and blockaded by our troops. The enemy retired beyond the Tormes, some of them even beyond the Douro, and abandoned Ciudad Rodrigo as well as Almeida. Our army, however, was scarcely strong enough to maintain the blockade of Almeida, and certainly could not have maintained that of Ciudad Rodrigo. Indeed the state of the Agueda rendered it impossible for us to draw supplies across that river.

The enemy having passed the Douro, Almeida being invested, and matters appearing tolerably quiet on the frontiers of Castile, the head-quarters were moved on the 15th

* He had further successes in an action fought in the end of February.

of April into Alemtejo, and arrived at Elvas on the 20th. Sir W. Beresford had crossed the Guadiana on the 4th of April, and had blockaded both Badajos and Olivença. The garrison of the latter place having refused to surrender, guns were brought from Elvas, and lieutenant-general Cole forced the place to surrender on the 15th of April.

In the mean time, sir W. Beresford advanced with the second division of infantry, and general Hamilton's division, and the cavalry, as well to force the enemy to retire from Estremadura entirely, as to give support to general Ballasteros, who had been obliged to retire into that province from the Condado de Niebla. Marshal Beresford surprised the enemy's cavalry on the 16th of April, at Los Santos, and defeated them with considerable loss. Badajos was reconnoitred on the 22nd, and the general plan for the attack was fixed. But unfortunately the rain which had fallen in the third week in April swelled the Guadiana considerably; and the bridge which marshal sir W. Beresford had constructed under Jurumenha, with great trouble and difficulty, and after much delay, was swept away in the night of the 23rd of April. Marshal sir W. Beresford was consequently instructed to delay the operations of the siege till he should have re-established the bridge, or till the river should become fordable. The marshal was likewise instructed and authorised to fight a battle, in case he should think it expedient, in order to save the siege of Badajos; and these instructions applied as well to the corps under general Blake, which landed about this time at Ayamonte.

All these arrangements being made, the head-quarters were again transferred to the frontiers of Castile. They quitted Elvas on the 25th April, and arrived at Alameda on the 28th. Intelligence had been received that orders had arrived from Paris, for Massena to make an attempt to raise the blockade of Almeida; in which attempt marshal Bessières was to co-operate with part of the army of the north.*

The enemy's army was collected at

* It is a curious circumstance, and shows what good intelligence we had, that these accounts were received at Elvas, together with accounts of the day Massena was to set out from Salamanca, and our head-quarters arrived at Alameda in Castile on the day before Massena arrived at Ciudad Rodrigo.

† The enemy never had such a superiority of numbers opposed to the British troops as in this action. They had all the infantry of the four corps which had been in Portugal, and all the cavalry. In addition

Ciudad Rodrigo in the end of April, but the same fall of rain which had swelled the rivers in Estremadura, likewise swelled those in Castile, and they did not advance till the 2nd May. They attacked us at Fuentes d'Oñor on the 3rd and 5th, but could make no impression upon us, and at length retired on the 10th, and the whole were across the Agueda on that night.†

In the middle of the night of the 10th, after the blockade was completely resumed in force, general Brennier, the governor of Almeida, blew up the place, and made his escape with his garrison across the bridge of Barba de Puerco. This event was to be attributed to a variety of unfortunate circumstances.

First, the officer commanding the queen's regiment, who was close to the place, was not aware of the nature of the explosion which he heard, or that the garrison escaped, and made no movement.

Secondly, the officer commanding the 4th regiment, who had been ordered to Barba de Puerco, at one o'clock on the 10th, when the French retired, missed his road; and although the distance he had to march was only three miles, he did not reach Barba de Puerco till the morning of the 11th, after the French had arrived there.

Thirdly, the 8th Portuguese regiment had been ordered to march from its cantonments at Junça to Barba de Puerco, in case an explosion should be heard. These orders were obeyed; the regiment marched to Barba de Puerco, and arrived before the French, and before major-general Campbell, with the 4th and 36th regiments; but finding nothing there but a picket of cavalry, and the commanding officer believing that he had mistaken the nature of the explosion, returned again to his cantonments.

The 3rd and 7th divisions were ordered off to Estremadura on the 13th and 14th; and accounts having been received on the 15th that Soult was about to advance from Seville, the head-quarters were again removed on the following day to Elvas, where they arrived on the 19th. Sir W. Beresford

to which they had three fresh regiments of cavalry, which could not have less than 1,200 men, and 900 cavalry of the guard. We had—British cavalry, 1,331; ditto infantry, 18,000; Portuguese cavalry, 300; ditto infantry, 10,142. But we had two divisions, the 5th and 6th, and general Pack's brigade, and the Portuguese cavalry on the left, either forming or protecting the blockade, and these troops were not engaged. The enemy had about five to one of cavalry, and more than two to one of infantry engaged.

had invested Badajos on both sides of the Guadiana on the 4th, and he broke ground on the 8th. He lost some men on the right of the river, in front of the *tête du pont*, on the first day, and a considerable number in a sortie made by the enemy on the 10th. On the 12th, the marshal heard of the collection of a large body of troops by marshal Soult, in the neighbourhood of Seville, and of their march towards Estremadura, and he immediately raised the siege; and, according to the instructions and recommendation left with them, he and the Spanish generals collected their troops on the Albuera rivulet.

The battle of Albuera was fought on the 16th of May, on the ground pointed out in those instructions. That which was most conspicuous in the battle of Albuera was the want of discipline of the Spaniards. These troops behaved with the utmost gallantry, but it was hopeless to think of moving them. In the morning the enemy gained an eminence which commanded the whole extent of the line of the allies, which either was occupied, or was intended to be occupied, by the Spanish troops. The natural operation would have been to re-occupy this ground by means of the Spanish troops; but that was impossible. The British troops were consequently moved there; and all the loss sustained by those troops was incurred in regaining a height which ought never for a moment to have been in possession of the enemy.* After the battle of Albuera, the enemy retired leisurely to Llerena and Guadalcanal.

It was obvious, from the immense superiority of cavalry which they showed in that battle, and that, as the allies were but little superior in total strength, and had beaten them with difficulty, and could derive no great advantage from their success, it was hopeless to attack Soult in the position which he had taken at Llerena. There was nothing to prevent him from retiring upon Seville, or even upon the troops engaged in the blockade of Cadiz, if he should have found himself so pressed as to render that measure necessary; and the arrival of reinforcements, which it will appear he had reason to expect, would have placed in a

* This is stated, because it has been matter of dispute whether the Spaniards had or had not occupied the height before the French were on it. They were certainly ordered to occupy the ground, and their pickets were on it; but it is not clear that they had occupied it in sufficient strength before the French troops were on it.

state of risk the troops which would have obliged him to take this step. But this reasoning supposes that Soult would have considered himself under the necessity of retiring from the strong position of Llerena and Guadalcanal, in consequence of the measures which we might have adopted in Estremadura in the end of May. I believe there is no foundation for this hypothesis.

The allied troops, which were sent from the frontiers of Castile, and arrived at Campo Mayor on the 23rd and 24th May, were rather more than equal to the loss sustained in the battle of Albuera, and in the first siege of Badajos. It had been obvious in the battle of Albuera, that we could not reckon upon the Spaniards in any affair of manœuvre, and therefore that we could not rely upon them in such an operation as the attack of Soult's army in the positions of Guadalcanal and Llerena.

But the effect of these operations, even if well executed, could only be to force Soult to fall back for a time; and here the question arose whether it was worth while to attempt it. It was known that Drouet had marched with 17 or 19 battalions of the 9th corps, belonging to the army of Portugal, from Salamanca, on the 16th or 17th May, destined for a reinforcement to Soult; and it was calculated that these battalions would join Soult on or about the 8th June.

Under these circumstances, it was deemed better not to lose the time between the 25th May and the 8th June, by an attempt to attack Soult, which appeared hopeless; and to take advantage of our superiority in the battle of Albuera, and in the early arrival of our reinforcements, to make a vigorous attack upon Badajos. Accordingly, the place was reinvested on the 25th May, and the fire was opened on the 2nd June.

There appeared every ground for belief that we should have been able to obtain possession of the place before the day on which it was possible that Soult could advance for its relief. It is certain that its possession depended upon the possession of the outwork of San Christoval, which commanded the point of attack in the castle. This outwork was deemed to be in a state to be taken by storm on the 6th, and again on the 9th. Both attempts failed; and the question whether Badajos could be taken or not in the time which remained, during which the allied army could be applied to that operation, came to be one of means, upon which we were decidedly of opinion

that we had it not in our power to take the place; and therefore we raised the siege on the 10th, although we continued the blockade till the 17th.*

While the operations of the second siege of Badajos were going on, accounts were received that marshal Marmont was about to move from Salamanca into Estremadura, in order to aid Soult in his operations for the relief of Badajos. The first movements of the army were upon Ciudad Rodrigo, into which place Marmont introduced a convoy on the 6th June. Lieut.-general sir B. Spencer retired across the Coa; and Marmont then turned about, and marched through the Puerto de Baños to Plasencia. Lieut.-general sir B. Spencer made a corresponding movement on Castello Branco, at which place he received intelligence of the enemy having had posts on the Alagon, and the cavalry in Coria, and some doubts were entertained of their intention to cross the Tagus. The head of their army, however, crossed that river on the 12th, and arrived at Truxillo on the 13th; and the advanced guard was at Merida, and in communication with Soult, on the 15th.

Soult had broken up from Llerena and Guadalcanal on the 12th, as soon as he was joined by Drouet; and he moved upon Zafra, and his advanced guard to Los Santos, on the 13th. The allied army were immediately concentrated upon Albuera, with the exception of the 3rd and 7th divisions, which kept the blockade of Badajos. But the accounts of the arrival at Truxillo of the advanced guard of the army of Portugal having arrived at Albuera, and Soult† having made a movement from Zafra on Almendralejo, having thus shewn that he knew of the arrival of that army, it was deemed expedient to retire across the Guadiana.

As far as we could form a judgment, the French had at that time assembled in Estremadura 60,000 men, of which 7,000 were cavalry. The British army consisted of:—cavalry, 1,671; infantry, 11,812. The Portuguese—cavalry, 900; infantry, 12,885, and general Blake had about 8,000 men.

* I believe the failure in the attack upon San Christoval is, like many other events, to be attributed to the want of experience in the British army. First, the battery to breach the wall ought to have been placed on the crest of the glacis. Secondly, if it was not, care ought to have been taken from the commencement to prevent the enemy from clearing the rubbish while the fire was continued upon the wall.

The head of sir B. Spencer's column did not join till the 20th, the 5th division not till the 24th. The strength of the whole army,‡ when collected together, was, British infantry, 25,123; Portuguese infantry, 18,926; British cavalry, 3,197; Portuguese cavalry, 1,200.

It would have been impossible for the allies to maintain the blockade of Badajos with the strength which they could produce against that of the enemy, in the days which intervened between the 17th and 24th of June; nor could the allies pretend to attack the enemy in Estremadura, composed as they were, being, after all, even including the Spaniards and sir B. Spencer, inferior in numbers, particularly of cavalry, and very inferior in composition.

These circumstances were stated in a conference with general Blake on the 14th June, at Albuera, and in a previous letter to him; and he was urged either to co-operate with the allied British and Portuguese army; or, having crossed the Guadiana at Jurumenha, to move down the right bank, and to cross that river at Mertola, and to endeavour to obtain possession of Seville, while the enemy's attention should be drawn to us on the frontier of Alemtejo. General Blake preferred the last operation, and he recrossed the Guadiana on the 22nd June.

But, instead of moving at once upon Seville, he attempted to obtain possession of Niebla on the 30th June, where the enemy had only 300 men, in which attempt he failed; and Soult having, towards the end of the month of June, discovered general Blake's movement, and detached a body of troops into Andalusia, general Blake embarked at Ayamonte on the 6th July. While this was going on, the allied British and Portuguese army took a position on the 19th June between Elvas and Campo Mayor. The particular object in taking this position was to protect those places, and to insure the arrival into them of the convoys of provisions and stores destined for their supply. The enemy reconnoitred the position of the army on the 22nd June, but they never showed any inclination to attack it.

† Soult brought to Zafra little more than his advanced guard and cavalry. The main body of the army marched direct from Llerena upon Almendralejo and Merida.

‡ This account includes the 5th division, and Barbacena's brigade of Portuguese cavalry, which did not arrive at Portalegre till the 24th of June. The 5th division consisted of about 5,000 men. In this account the artillery is not included.

The armies remained opposite to each other till the 14th July, when Marmont retired across the Tagus, and cantoned his army about Plasencia, &c., and along the Tagus to Talavera; and Drouet removed the 5th corps to Zafra. Before these troops separated, the allies were certainly stronger than the enemy, in infantry; the enemy were strongest in cavalry; but the attack of the enemy would have answered no purpose, excepting to oblige them to retire from Estremadura. That object was likely to be accomplished without incurring the risk of an attack with inferior numbers of cavalry, and without exposing the troops to the inconvenience of making long marches in Estremadura in that season.

The enemy having retired from Estremadura, the question regarding the future operations of the army was maturely considered, and it was determined to remove the seat of the war to the frontiers of Castile. The grounds of that decision were,—

First, that in that season we could not venture to undertake any thing against Badajoz.

Secondly, that we were not strong enough to venture into Andalusia.

Thirdly, that from all the information I had received, the strength of the northern army was less than that of the south; and that the army of Portugal, which was destined to oppose us in whatever point we should direct our operations, was not likely to be so strongly supported in the north as in the south.

In this supposition I was mistaken. The army of the north, even before the reinforcements arrived, was stronger than that in the south; but it must be observed that there is nothing so difficult as to obtain information of the enemy's numbers in Spain. There is but little communication between one town and another; and although the most minute account of numbers which have passed through one town can always be obtained, no information can be obtained of what is passing in the next. To this add, that the disposition of the Spaniards naturally leads them to exaggerate the strength and success of themselves and their friends, and to despise that of the enemy, and it will not be matter of surprise that we should so often have been misinformed regarding the enemy's numbers.

The first intention was to remain in the cantonments of the Alemtejo, which had been taken up as soon as Marmont had

retired, till the train and stores should have been brought up from Oporto, to make the attack upon Ciudad Rodrigo. The march of the troops would consequently not have taken place till the beginning of September. The movement was made in the end of July and beginning of August, for the following reasons.

In the end of July it was discovered, that notwithstanding marshal Bessières had evacuated the Asturias and Astorga when Marmont moved into Estremadura in the beginning of July, and thereby increased the disposable force under his command, Don Julian had been so successful in the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, that up to that moment the enemy had not been able to keep open any communication with the place, or to supply it at all with provisions.

A return of the supplies in the place, when it was left by Marmont in the beginning of June, had likewise been intercepted, from which it appeared that the provisions would be exhausted by the 20th August. It was therefore determined to send the army across the Tagus immediately, and to blockade Ciudad Rodrigo, if it should not have been supplied; and if it should, to canton the army in Lower Beira, till the train and stores should have arrived. We did not receive intelligence that the place had been supplied till we went so forward as to disclose our design against the place. But there were two other reasons for taking up cantonments for the summer in Castile rather than in Lower Beira; one was, that in Castile we could procure supplies of provisions, which we much wanted, and we could procure none in Beira; the other was, that by threatening Ciudad Rodrigo, we were likely to relieve Galicia, and General Abadia's army, from the attack with which both were threatened by the army of the north.

We accordingly made the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo in the first week in August, and continued it from that time forward. The train for the siege would have arrived at Almeida in the first week of September. But before that period, accounts were received of the arrival in Spain of the enemy's reinforcements. It was also discovered, by an intercepted return of the army of the north, that they were much stronger than they had been supposed in July, when the plan was determined upon to make the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. Under these circumstances, and as Almeida was not in a state

to give security to the heavy train and its stores, it was determined not to bring the equipment forward, and to confine our efforts to the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo.

In the third week of September, the enemy collected the whole army of the north, (with the exception of Bonet's division, which observed Abadia's movements on the side of Galicia,) and two divisions from Navarre, which had recently come from Calabria, and five divisions, and all the cavalry of the army of Portugal, to escort a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo. They had not less than 60,000 men,* of which more than 6,000 were cavalry, to which we could oppose about 40,000. If we had fought a battle to maintain a blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, we must have had the river Agueda, and the place in our rear; and if defeated, a retreat was impossible.

Although we did not fight a battle to protect the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, the army was assembled on the left of the Agueda, and a partial engagement, highly honourable to the troops, was fought at El Bodon on 25th September. The object of taking a position so near to the enemy was to force them to show their army. This was an object, because the people of the country, as usual, believed and reported that the enemy were not so strong as we knew them to be; and if they had not seen the enemy's strength, they would have entertained a very unfavourable opinion of the British army, which it was desirable to avoid. This object was accomplished by the operations at the close of September.

Although the removal of the army from the Alemtejo did not accomplish all the objects which were in view when the movement was made, it had the effect of obliging the enemy to collect their whole force for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, and to abandon all their other operations and objects.† The army of the north were obliged to dis-

continue their operations against Abadia, and still further, to call to their assistance two divisions which had recently arrived from Calabria, and were employed in Navarre against the guerilla Mina. Mina's success in Navarre has consequently been extraordinary, and his numbers have rapidly increased.

After the operations for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, it was determined to persevere in the same system till the enemy should make some alteration in the disposition of their force, and to continue to threaten Ciudad Rodrigo with an attack, in order to keep a large force of the enemy employed to observe our operations, and to prevent them from undertaking any operation elsewhere.

To this system we were forced, not less by the relative force of the two armies, than by the extraordinary sickness of our own troops. All the soldiers who had recently arrived from England, and all those who had been in Walcheren, and vast numbers of officers, were attacked by fever, not of a very violent description, but they were rendered unable to perform any duty, and those who recovered relapsed upon making any exertions. Even if an opportunity had offered, therefore, for undertaking any thing on this side, the unfortunate state of the army would have prevented it.

It would not have answered to remove the army to the frontiers of Estremadura, where a chance of effecting some important object might have offered; as in that case general Abadia would have been left to himself, and would have fallen an easy sacrifice to the army of the north. We availed ourselves of the opportunity which offered of striking a blow against Girard in Estremadura, by which the country between the Tagus and the Guadiana was relieved from the enemy.

But little notice has been taken in this memorandum of the operations of the Span-

* Besides these 60,000 men, general Foy was at Plasencia with one division of the army of Portugal, and some troops of the army of the centre, with which he co-operated with Marmont, and actually ascended the mountains by the Pass of Perales and Poyo on our right. The 2nd and general Hamilton's divisions of infantry, and the 2nd division of cavalry, have always been in the Alemtejo, with the exception of general De Grey's brigade of the latter, while it continued on the strength of that division of cavalry.

† There is nothing more comical than the lies published in the *Moniteur* about the expedition to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, excepting that our newspapers do not notice them. It is not possible that either Marmont or Dorsenne could have written such

nonsense as has appeared with their names affixed to it. They say that they heard of our approach to the Coa in the beginning of September; we approached the Coa on the 6th of August, and they knew it at Salamanca on the 14th. They then say, that in consequence of this knowledge, acquired in the beginning of September, Dorsenne attacked Galicia; he attacked Abadia in Galicia on the 25th of August. Marmont then took four guns on the 25th of September; but he forgets to say that we retook the only two which he had taken for a moment. The comical part of that story is, that major Gordon, who was in the French head-quarters on the 26th, offered to lay a wager that the *Moniteur* would mention that the guns had been taken, but would omit the sequel of the story.

iards, which, having been confined principally to the eastern coast of the Peninsula, have been but little influenced by those on the western side. Tortosa was surrendered by treachery on the 2nd January, as Lerida had been but a short time before. The troops under Suchet then prepared to attack Tarragona, which place was taken by storm on the 28th June.

In the course of the winter it had appeared, by an intercepted letter, to be Soult's intention to attack Carthage, in order to be prepared to attack Valencia on both sides in concert with Suchet. He attempted to carry this intention into execution in the month of July, after he had obliged general Blake to embark at Ayamonte. General Blake, however, went with his army by sea to the coast of Murcia, and landed it there in August, while Soult moved in that direction by Granada. It appears that general Blake quitted the army as soon as it had formed a junction with the army of Murcia, called the third army, and he proceeded to Valencia, leaving general Freire in the command of the troops in Murcia. The French advanced from Granada, but the Spaniards did not retreat in time, and their loss was very great. They had time, however, to re-assemble their dispersed divisions, and the people in Murcia took arms; and partly on this account, partly on account of the prevalence of the yellow fever at Carthage, and throughout Murcia, and partly because the movement of the allied British and Portuguese army upon Ciudad Rodrigo rendered necessary a concentration of the French forces in the Peninsula, Soult returned to the westward, and arrived at Seville on the 17th September.

In the mean time, Suchet, having been joined by reinforcements from France, and having dispersed the troops which general Lacy had attempted to collect in Catalonia, penetrated into the kingdom of Valencia. General Blake had been since August preparing for the defence of that city, and he collected there the army of Valencia, and others from Aragon and Catalonia; and latterly, general Mahy marched from Murcia to join him with the troops which general Blake had brought from Cadiz, and a part of the 3rd army, i.e. that of Murcia. Suchet having gained possession of Orapesa, commenced an attack on the castle of Saguntum on the 29th of September. He made several attempts to obtain possession of the castle by storm, in all of which he

failed; and at last, having brought up a few heavy guns, he broke ground regularly before the place, and made a breach in its wall. He made several attempts to carry the breach by storm, in all of which he failed.

As soon as general Blake was joined at Valencia by the troops from Murcia, under general Mahy, he moved out from Valencia on the 24th of October, and on the 25th attacked Suchet, and was defeated, with the loss of some prisoners and eight pieces of cannon. The French immediately summoned the garrison of Saguntum to surrender, which they did, upon capitulation. Suchet advanced upon Valencia, and it is understood that he opened his fire upon a part of the intrenched position occupied by Blake in front of the town, on the 25th of November. It is likewise stated, that on the 2nd of December, there was a severe action at Valencia, in which the French suffered considerably.

These circumstances, and the movement of Marmont's army towards Toledo, as is supposed, to aid Suchet, have induced us to make preparations for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. By these measures we shall bring Marmont back, and probably oblige the army of the north to re-assemble.

Since Suchet has been in Valencia, the guerillas have been very active and enterprising in Aragon and Navarre. Mina defeated a detachment of 1,100 men, sent against him, only three of whom escaped; and besides other advantages of small amount, he and the Empecinado, and Duran, having joined, it is reported that they had taken the garrison of Daroca, consisting of 2,400 men.

When general Blake embarked on the 6th July from the mouth of the Guadiana, he left there general Ballasteros with a division of troops, which likewise embarked, and went to the Sierra de Ronda on the 24th August. He has been very successful against the French by his light operations in rear of the army, blockading Cadiz; and he has always a secure retreat open upon Gibraltar. In order to aid general Ballasteros, and to give additional security to Tarifa, Colonel Skerrett, with about 1,200 men, was detached thither from Cadiz on the 10th October. By this measure the French were obliged to retire from San Roque on the night of the 21st October, in which position they had kept Ballasteros blockaded under the guns of Gibraltar; and

Ballasteros did them much mischief in their retreat, and in a subsequent attack which he made upon one of their detachments at Bornos. He was afterwards again obliged to retire in the end of November, under protection of the guns of Gibraltar; and colonel Skerret, and the Spanish general Copons, to Tarifa. The object of the French on this occasion was to attack Tarifa, while they should keep Ballasteros blockaded. But they had commenced to retire on the 12th December.

From this memorandum it will be seen, that if the Spaniards had behaved with common prudence, or if their conduct had been even tolerably good, the result of Massena's campaign in Portugal must have been the relief of the south of the Peninsula.

We had to contend with the consequences of the faults of some, the treachery of others, and the folly and vanity of all. But although our success has not been what it might and ought, we have at least lost no ground, and with a handful of British troops fit for service, we have kept the enemy in check in all quarters since the month of March. Till now they have gained nothing, and have made no progress on any side. It is to be apprehended that they will succeed in Valencia; but I believe there is no man who knows the state of affairs in that province, and has read Suchet's account of his action with Blake on the 25th October, who does not believe that, if Blake had not fought that action, Valencia would have been safe. Are the English ministers and generals responsible for the blunders of Blake?

THE FOURTH SPANISH CAMPAIGN.

A.D. 1812.

THE SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

THE English general having collected his battering train and siege stores at Almeida, and the gabions and fascines necessary for the siege having been prepared by the troops while in their cantonments, the 6th of January, 1812, was fixed for the investment of Ciudad Rodrigo; and the trestle bridge prepared by major Sturgeon, at Almeida, for crossing the Agueda, was laid down at the ford of Salicis; but the weather continuing very inclement, the intrenchment did not take place till the 8th.

As the weather was excessively cold, snow and sleet having fallen during several days preceding; and as no camp equipage was with the army, or cover of any kind to be found in the vicinity of the town (which stands on a height, overhanging the northern banks of the Agueda) or its immediate neighbourhood, the duties of the siege were undertaken by the light, third, and fourth divisions alternately, each remaining twenty-four hours in the trenches, and furnishing the guards and working parties for that period.

At nine o'clock of the evening of the 8th, colonel Colbourne, with three companies of

the 52nd, stormed the redoubt on the upper Teson, a hill overlooking the town, and distant about 600 yards from the ramparts. On the night of the following day, the first parallel was established, and the batteries traced out; and on the 13th, the convent of Santa Cruz having been carried by escalade, a lodgment was made in the suburbs, and a communication established by the flying sap. At noon of the 14th, during the interchange of the tour of duty by the divisions, as the workmen of the third division to be relieved, withdrew from the trenches, to meet the advance of the relieving division, a sortie was made from the garrison, for the purpose of destroying the parallels, and spiking the guns in battery; but the officer of engineers on duty collecting a few of the workmen, and the relieving division approaching at the same moment, the enemy retreated into the town.

On the night of the 14th, the fortified convent of San Francisco was escaladed by the 14th regiment. On the 19th, two breaches being established—the width of the one being 100 feet, and that of the



CUIDAD
RODRIGO.

other 30 feet—and lord Wellington receiving intelligence that Marmont was advancing to the relief of the place, reconnoitred the breaches, and deeming them practicable, ordered an assault to be made at 7 o'clock of the evening of that day. Seated on the reverse of one of the advanced approaches, he wrote the orders for the assault. To the light and third divisions, whose tour of duty in the trenches had now come round, that duty was assigned. To carry the main, or great breach, was the duty of the third, under Picton; that of the lesser breach, was assigned to the light division, under Crau-

* The precise order of the assault was:—"The attack on Ciudad Rodrigo must be made this evening at seven o'clock. The light infantry company of the 83rd regiment will join lieutenant-colonel O'Toole at sunset. Lieutenant-colonel O'Toole, with the 2nd capadores and the light company of the 83rd regiment, will, ten minutes before seven, cross the Aguada by the bridge, and make an attack upon the outwork in front of the castle. The object of this attack is to drive the artillery-men from two guns in that outwork, which bear upon the entrance into the ditch, at the junction of the counterscarp with the main wall of the place: if lieutenant-colonel O'Toole can get into the outwork, it would be desirable to destroy these guns. Major Sturgeon will show lieutenant-colonel O'Toole his point of attack. Six ladders, twelve feet long each, will be sent from the engineer park to the old French guard-room, at the mill on the Aguada, for the use of this detachment. The 5th regiment will attack the entrance of the ditch, at the point above referred to; major Sturgeon will likewise show them the point of attack; they must issue from the right of the convent of Santa Cruz; they must have twelve axes to cut down the gate by which the ditch is entered, at the junction of the counterscarp with the body of the place. The 5th regiment are also to have twelve scaling ladders, twenty-five feet long, and immediately on entering the ditch, are to scale the fausse-braille, in order to clear it of the enemy's posts on their left, towards the principal breach. The 77th regiment are to be in reserve, on the right of the convent of Santa Cruz, to support the first party, which will have entered the ditch. The ditch must besides be entered on the right of the breach by two columns, to be formed on the left of the convent of Santa Cruz, each to consist of five companies of the 94th regiment. Each column must have three ladders twelve feet long, by which they are to descend into the ditch, and they are to have ten axes to cut down any palisades which may be placed in the ditch to impede the communication along it. The detachment of the 94th regiment, when descended into the ditch, is to turn to its left to the main breach. The 5th regiment will issue from the convent of Santa Cruz ten minutes before seven. At the same time a party consisting of 180 sappers, carrying bags containing hay, will move out of the second parallel, covered by the fire of the 83rd regiment, formed in the second parallel, upon the works of the place, which bags are to be thrown into the ditch, so as to enable the troops to descend the counterscarp to the attack of the breach: they are to be followed immediately by the storming party of the great breach, which is to consist of the troops of

furd. To the Portuguese brigade, under general Pack, was assigned the duty of making a diversion, or false attack, on the outwork of San Jago, and the convent of Caridade, on the northern face of the works.*

As the cathedral bell tolled seven o'clock, the moon at the same moment rising, both divisions moved simultaneously to the points of attack, each preceded by its respective forlorn hope and stormers, and the sappers carrying the ladders and bags filled with hay. The forlorn hope of the third division was led by lieutenant Mackie, of the 88th; and its storming party, consisting of the major-general M'Kinnon's brigade. Major-general M'Kinnon's brigade is to be formed in the first parallel, ready to move up to the breach immediately in rear of the sappers with bags. The storming-party of the great breach must be provided with six scaling ladders twelve feet each long, and with ten axes. The ditch must likewise be entered by a column on the left of the great breach, consisting of three companies of the 95th regiment, which are to issue from the right of the convent of St. Francisco. This column will be provided with three ladders, twelve feet long, with which they are to descend into the ditch, at a point which will be pointed out to them by lieutenant Wright: on descending into the ditch, they are to turn to their right, and to proceed towards the main breach. Another column, consisting of major-general Vandeleur's brigade, will issue out from the left of the convent of St. Francisco, and are to attack the breach to the left of the main breach; this column must have twelve ladders, each twelve feet long, with which they are to descend into the ditch, at a point which will be shown them by captain Ellicombe. On arriving in the ditch, they are to turn to the left, to storm the breach in the fausse-braille on the left of the small ravelin, and thence to the breach in the tower of the body of the place; as soon as this body will have reached the top of the breach in the fausse-braille wall, a detachment of five companies are to be sent to the right, to cover the attack of major-general M'Kinnon's brigade by the principal breach; and as soon as they have reached the top of the tower, they are to turn to their right, and communicate with the rampart of the main breach; as soon as this communication can be established, endeavour should be made to open the gate of Salamanca. The Portuguese brigade in the 3rd division, will be formed in the communication to the first parallel, and behind the hill of St. Francisco (Upper Teson), and will move up to the entrance of the second parallel, ready to support major-general M'Kinnon's brigade. Colonel Barnard's brigade will be formed behind the convent of St. Francisco, ready to support major-general Vandeleur's brigade: all these columns will have detached parties especially appointed to keep up a fire on the defences during these operations. The men ladders, and axes, and bags, must not have their arms; those who are to storm must not fire. Brigadier-general Pack, with his brigade, will make a false attack upon the outwork of the gate of St. Jago, and upon the works towards La Caridade. The different regiments and brigades to receive ladders, are to send parties to the engineers' dépôt to receive them, three men for each ladder. "WELLINGTON."

light companies of the division, by major Manners, of the 74th. Lieutenant Gurwood led the forlorn hope of the light division, and major Napier the 300 volunteers, constituting the stormers of that division. The supporting columns of each division followed close.*

As soon as the sappers had thrown the bags into the ditch, so as to reduce its depth from fourteen feet to eight feet, the forlorn hope and stormers of the third division jumped down amidst a crash of shells and combustibles which garnished, or had been spread over the base and the summit of the breach. Undismayed by the terrific sight and sound, the assailants rushed forward to the breach; and at the same moment every gun upon the ramparts that could bear upon the spot, opened a concentric fire with one tremendous roar.

A battalion of the 5th, under major Ridge, and a wing of the 94th, under colonel Campbell, which had been directed to move forward for the purpose of clearing away any obstacle that might interrupt the advance of the main storming party, descending the counterscarp by ropes, and gaining the breach unobserved, rushed up, and cutting down the artillery-men, impetuously carried everything before them, notwithstanding the difficulties sustained by the explosion of bombs and grenades rolled down upon them from the summit of the breach, and of the bags of powder deposited among the slopes of its ruins, and the destructive force of the grape from the two guns planted on the summit. So rapid had been their movements, that when they appeared on the top of the breach, they were fired at by their countrymen outside the walls, from the supposition that they were the enemy defending the breach. At this moment, Mackinnon's brigade, consisting of the 45th, 74th, and 88th, appeared. The enemy now being driven from

the opening, retired behind the retrenchment, which isolated the breach, and cut it off from the rampart by a perpendicular descent of sixteen feet, and defended by traverses thrown up on each side of the retrenchment. Here, and from the neighbouring houses, the foe plied the assailants with an enfilade musketry fire of terrible rapidity and destruction. But the third division maintained the terrible struggle with desperate resolution. At the moment that both sides of the retrenchment were turned, the stormers of the light division having carried the lesser breach, which was not intrenched, at the point of the bayonet, and Pack's brigade having converted its false attack into a real one, a shout of victory was raised by the 43rd and 95th regiments, who, rushing along the ramparts to the right and left, appeared in sight. The garrison thus threatened in its rear, and the flanks of the retrenchment of the great breach being at the same moment carried by the third division, fled in confusion; concealing themselves in the houses, and supplicating that mercy to which, by the laws of war, they had forfeited all title, but which was nobly granted them by their generous conquerors. The fortress was now won; and the garrison, consisting of 80 officers and 1,700 men, was surrendered by the governor. A scene of wild disorder ensued. The victors, preceded by Spaniards as guides to conduct them to the species of plunder they most coveted, committed much excess during the night. Next morning, a part of the covering force being marched into the town, the victors were marched out; and never could masquerade, in point of costume and grotesque figures, rival the marauding characters. Hams, loaves, and joints of meat garnished the bayonets of some regiments; cinctures of eighteen or twenty pairs of shoes encircled the waists of some

* The following extract from the *Reminiscences of a Subaltern*, shows the cool bravery with which the soldiers prepared for the attack:—"Our commanding officer announcing to us that our division was directed to carry the grand breach, the soldiers listened to the communication with silent earnestness, and immediately began to disencumber themselves of their knapsacks, which were placed in order by companies, and a guard set over them; each man then began to arrange himself for the combat, in such manner as his fancy or the moment would admit of; some by lowering their cartridge boxes, others by turning theirs to the front, in order that they might the more conveniently make use of them; others unclasping their stocks, or opening their shirt collars, and others oiling their bayonets; then again, others screwing in flints, to

make assurance doubly sure; and more taking leave of their wives and children. This last was an affecting sight, but not so much so as might be expected, because the women, from long habit, were accustomed to scenes of danger, and the order for their husbands to march against the enemy was in their eyes tantamount to a victory; and as the soldier seldom returned without plunder of some sort, the painful suspense which his absence caused was made up by the gaiety which his return was certain to be productive of; or, if unfortunately he happened to fall, his place was sure to be supplied by some one of the company to which he belonged, so that the women of our army had little cause of alarm on that head. The worst that could happen to them was the chance of being in a state of widowhood for a week!"

soldiers; half-a-dozen silk or satin gowns often surmounted the tattered uniform of others. "While marching out to our cantonments," says the lively author of the *Adventures in the Rifle Brigade*, "lord Wellington entering the city gate as we passed through it, inquired of the officer of the leading company what regiment it was; for there was scarcely a vestige of uniform among the men; some of them being dressed in Frenchmen's coats; some in white breeches and huge jack boots; some with cocked hats and queues; most of their swords were fixed in their rifles, and stuck full of hams, tongues, and loaves of bread; and not a few carrying bird-cages. There never was a better masked corps."

Thus was Ciudad Rodrigo, which had baffled, for twenty-five days, all the efforts of Massena in the summer season, and occupied by but a weak garrison, reduced by lord Wellington, in the depth of winter, in eleven days; but the prize, as time did not allow the observance of the regular siege process of the reduction of the counterscarp, being pressed by the advance of the enemy in strength for the relief of the place, had been won at the cost of near 1,100 men; three officers and seventy-seven privates having been killed, and twenty-four officers and 500 men wounded during the siege; and six officers and 140 privates killed, and sixty officers and 500 men wounded in the assault. Among the slain were generals Craufurd* and Mackinnon; the former received his death in the advance to the lesser breach, the latter was blown up by the explosion of an expense magazine in the ditch of the retrenchment. They were both buried in the respective breaches they attacked. The loss of the garrison did not amount to 300 men and officers during the siege and the assault. One hundred and fifty pieces of artillery, forty-four of which constituted Marmont's battering train, and an immense quantity of arms and ammunition, fell into the hands of the captors. In the words of the author of *Military Memoirs*, "The capture of Ciudad

Rodrigo was, indeed, a very proud achievement—most honourable to all the officers and troops employed; and an enterprise so secretly prepared for, so suddenly commenced, and so brilliantly concluded, that it not only astonished the French marshals, —Marmont, who was advancing to its relief with 60,000 men, being so confident in his strength, that in his letter to Berthier, dated January 16th, he bade him 'expect events, as fortunate as they would be glorious for France, in Spain,'—but all those Frenchified politicians at home, to whom it was a constant and a mean delight to disparage the fame of Wellington, and the glory of the British arms."

During the assault, an event occurred deserving commemoration. The men who had been left in guard over the baggage of the 3rd division, not being able to withstand the temptation, as soon as they heard the first shot fired, joined their companions; when the marauders who infested the camp, attempting to plunder, the women of the division defended their charge with so much spirit, that the varlets were glad to sheer off, and leave the heroines in possession of the field.

Among the many incidents and hair-breadth escapes that occurred during the storm, was that which occurred to lieutenant Faris of the 88th, or Connaught rangers. Being separated from his regiment, he found himself opposed to a French soldier. The Frenchman fired at, and wounding Faris in the thigh, made a desperate push with the bayonet at his body, but Faris parrying the blow, the bayonet lodged only in his leg. He immediately sprang forward, and seizing the Frenchman by the collar, a struggle of the most nervous kind took place. In the contest, they both lost their caps, and were so entangled with each other, that their weapons were of no avail. At last Faris disengaging himself from the Frenchman, pushed him back, and before he could recover himself, laid his head open nearly to the chin. With the force of the blow, his

* General Craufurd entered the army at an early age, and had seen much and varied service. In the short interval of peace, he visited the Continent to improve himself in the scientific branches of his profession, and afterwards served in two Indian campaigns under lord Cornwallis. After some unimportant employments on the Continent, he joined the disgraceful expedition against Buenos Ayres, and subsequently served with the army of sir John Moore, in command of the light brigade. After the retreat, he joined sir Arthur Wellesley the morning after Talavera, and

became most deservedly a favourite of that commander. Craufurd's military talents are admitted to have been of the first order. An enthusiast regarding martial glory, he sought every opportunity to distinguish himself. In the affair of the Coa—at Busaco and Fuentes d'Onor, he established an undying reputation. Wellington's despatch contained his well-earned eulogy—and the breach before which he fell was fitly chosen as a last resting-place for the fearless leader of the gallant light brigade.—Maxwell's *Victories of Wellington*.

sword-blade, a heavy soft ill-made one, was completely doubled up, and crimsoned to the hilt.

When the news of the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo reached England, a universal joy was diffused throughout all ranks. As a tribute of his country's gratitude, the English general was created earl of Wellington, and a pension of £2,000 a-year was settled on him. By the Spanish cortes he was

created duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, with a pension of £5,000 a-year; and by the Portuguese government marques of Torres Vedras, with a like pension; but with that magnanimous disinterestedness that distinguished his career throughout the arduous struggle, he declined to accept the foreign pecuniary rewards, desiring them to be applied to the respective emergencies of each state.

THE THIRD SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF BADAJOS.

RODRIGO having been rendered thoroughly defensible, and, on March 5th, delivered over to the Spaniards under the command of Castaños, the captain-general of the province, the allied army commenced its march for the Alentejo. On the 11th the troops were disposed in convenient cantonments on the frontier of Spanish Estremadura. Great exertions had been making for some time, and with the greatest privacy, for undertaking the third siege of Badajos.*

The necessary matériel having been collected, and all preparations completed by the 15th of March, on the following day a pontoon and two flying-bridges were thrown across the Guadiana, and the 3rd, 4th, and light divisions, under generals Picton, Colville, and lieutenant-colonel Barnard, crossed and invested Badajos. The covering army, under Hill and Graham, consisting of the 1st, 2nd, 6th, and 7th divisions, and the cavalry, with the Portuguese, under general Hamilton, occupied positions at Llerena, Merida, and Almodralejos; the one to observe Soult's movements, and the other to prevent a junction between that marshal and Marmont.

On the night of the 17th, in the midst of rain and storm, 1,800 men broke ground 160 yards distant from the Picurina fort. The tempest stifled the sound of their axes, but as soon as the morning dawned, and rendered them visible to the garrison, the

stillness of the scene was broken by conflicting peals of artillery and musketry.

On the 19th, while the working parties were busily engaged, a joint sortie from the town and fort, consisting of 1,500 infantry and cavalry, entered the trenches; but the men rallying, and being assisted by the covering-party, the enemy was vigorously charged and repulsed, being able to do no other damage than fill up a small portion of the parallel, and carry off 200 trenching-tools. The loss of the assailants in this affair amounted to 300 men, that of the English to 150. This casualty had been occasioned by the following circumstance. The French cavalry forming two parties, had a sham-fight, and the smaller party pretending to flee, and answering in Portuguese to the challenges of the English sentries, were allowed to gallop to the engineers' park of artillery.


From the commencement of the siege the weather had been very unfavourable, the rain falling in incessant torrents, not only occasioning difficulty and delay in the formation of the trenches and the erection of the batteries, but exposing the troops to great hardships. The trenches were knee-deep in mud and rain, the pontoon-bridge was swept away, and the flying-bridges were worked with so great difficulty, that at one time fear was entertained that the siege must be raised, from the inability of the army being

tinued till the 10th of June, when the siege was again abandoned; Soult having a second time advanced in combined operation with the army of Marmont from the north. The allies continued the blockade of the town till the 17th, when they recrossed the Guadiana, and took up a position on the Caya. The third siege, again undertaken by lord Wellington in person, was begun on the 17th of March, 1812, and continued without interruption till the 6th of April, when it fell by assault, after a most determined and gallant resistance on the part of the French."—*Mackie*.

* "The town of Badajos contains a population of about 16,000, and, within the space of thirteen months, experienced the miseries attendant upon a state of siege three several times. The first was undertaken by lord Beresford, towards the end of April, 1811, who was obliged to abandon operations by Soult advancing to its relief, and which led to the battle of Albuera on the 16th of May. The second siege was by lord Wellington in person, who, after the battle of Fuentes d'Onor, directed his steps towards the south with a portion of the allied army. Operations commenced on the 30th of May, and con-



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supplied with provisions and military stores. But the weather clearing up, the batteries were completed during the night of the 24th, and on the forenoon of the following day they began to play on the works. At ten o'clock of that night, an assault being made on the Picurina fort by 500 men of the 3rd division, under major-general Kempt, the fort was boldly escalated and captured, and its garrison either slain or taken, but with the loss of 4 officers and 50 men killed, and 15 officers and 250 men wounded, among the resolute assailants.

By the capture of Picurina the besiegers were enabled to push on the second parallel, and complete the breaching-batteries. After five days' firing, two breaches were reported practicable; one in the bastion of La Trinidad, and the other in that of Santa Maria. But lord Wellington observing, on a close reconnaissance, that they were defended by formidable interior retrenchments, directed a third breach to be effected, so that the retrenchments might be turned; which breach, by being exposed to the guns of all the batteries, was effected in twenty-four hours. In the mean time formidable preparations had been made by the garrison to repel the assault. Every means that ingenuity could devise to baffle the assailants were employed in accumulated profusion. The breaches had been retrenched, and secured by interior defences, and deep intrenchments covered by loopholed walls. A chevaux-de-frize, consisting of a massive beam, stuck full of double-edged pointed sword blades, stretched across the ramparts, and its extremities were mortised into the stonework of the parapet. Loose planks, studded with spikes harrow-wise, covered the slopes of the breaches, and lighted shells were ready to be thrown down from the crests. At the foot of the breach sixty fourteen-inch shells, communicating with hoses, and embedded in the earth, were placed ready for explosion; and round the breach a deep trench was cut in the ramparts, which was planted full of muskets with fixed bayonets, fixed perpendicularly and firmly in the earth up to the locks. The

summits of the walls were garnished with huge masses of stones, ponderous logs of wood, cart-wheels, barrels with tarred straw, bags of powder, live shells, grenades, and every species of burning composition and destructive missiles were ready to be hurled down on the assailants. On the flanks of each curtain batteries were charged to the muzzle with grape and case-shot, and mortars doubly loaded with grenades. The trenches were defended by a multitude of men ranged in an amphitheatrical manner, tier above tier, and by the side of each man lay three loaded firelocks, with supernumerary men ready to reload them as they were discharged on the assailants. Thus was Badajos fortified and defended, so as to be without parallel in the history of sieges and military defences. To overcome these terrible defences, and, as an eye-witness terms them, "hellish engines" of destruction, the most heroic courage and the most persevering fortitude were requisite. These truly great military qualifications were eminently displayed by the captors of Badajos, and they were proportionately successful.

As at this period of the siege, information was brought that Soult was rapidly advancing to the relief of the place, and that Marmont was making menacing demonstrations on the frontier of Beira, lord Wellington determined to march and deliver battle to the first-mentioned marshal, leaving 10,000 men to blockade the place; but reconnoitring the breaches on the 6th of April, and finding that in the curtain there was a practicable breach, he ordered the preparations for the assault on that night. The stern orders issued, directed, with awful distinctness,— "The fort of Badajos is to be attacked at ten o'clock this night. The attack must be made at three points; the castle, the face of the bastion of La Trinidad and the flank of the bastion of Santa Maria, and on the Paredelaras and the bastion of San Vicente, on the southern side of the town. The attack of the castle is to be made by escalade, that of the two bastions by the storm of the breaches."* The attacks on the castle and

the breaching batteries ceasing to batter, and the commencement of the assault, to cover the front of the breaches with harrows and crow's-feet, and to fix a chevaux-de-frize of sword blades on their summits.] 2. The attack must be made on three points; the castle, the face of the bastion of La Trinidad, and the flank of the bastion of Santa Maria. 3. The attack of the castle to be by escalade; that of the two bastions by the storm of the breaches. 4. The troops for the storm of the castle, consisting of the 3rd divi-

* The memorandum for the attack¹ was as follows:— 1. The fort of Badajos is to be attacked at 10 o'clock this night. [The time originally named was half-past seven, being immediately after dusk, but it was subsequently changed to ten, in consequence of the arrangements being found to require that delay. The garrison took advantage of the interval between

¹ The parts in the smaller print are alterations and explanations made subsequent to the original order for the attack

San Vicente were intended as feints to divert the attention of the garrison from the breaches.

The following was the order of attack:—Third division, lieutenant-general Picton, to escalate the castle. Fourth division, major-general the honourable C. Colville; light division, lieutenant-colonel Barnard, 95th regiment, to storm the breaches in the bastions of La Trinidad and Santa Maria, and sion of infantry, should come out from the right of the first parallel at a little before ten o'clock. 5. They should cross the river Rivillas below the broken bridge over that river, and attack that part of the castle which is on the right, looking from the trenches and the rear of the great battery constructed by the enemy to fire on the bastion of La Trinidad. 6. Having arrived within the castle, and having secured the possession of it, parties must be sent to the left along the rampart, to fall on the rear of those defending the great breach, in the bastion of La Trinidad, and to communicate with the right of the attack on that bastion.

It is recommended that the attack of the 3rd division should be kept clear of the bastion of San Antonio, at least till the castle which is above and commands the bastion, shall be carried.

7. The troops for this attack must have all the long ladders in the engineers' park, and six of the lengths of the engineers' ladders. They must be attended by twelve carpenters with axes, and six miners with crowbars, &c. 8. The 4th division, with the exception of the covering party in the trenches, must make the attack on the face of the bastion of La Trinidad, and the light division on the flank of the bastion of Santa Maria. 9. These two divisions must parade in close columns at nine o'clock. The light division, with the left in front, the 4th division with its advanced guard, with the left in front; the remainder with the right in front. The 4th division must be on the right of the little stream, near the picket of the 4th division, and the light division must have the river on their right.

This arrangement of the columns is made in order that the light division may extend along the ramparts to the left; and that the 4th division, with the exception of the advanced guard, which is to communicate by its left with the light division, might extend along the ramparts to the right. It may be necessary, however, for these two divisions mutually to support each other, and attention must in this case be paid to the formations.

10. The light division must throw 100 men forward into the quarries, close to the covered way of the bastion of Santa Maria, who, as soon as the garrison are distributed, must keep down by their fire the fire from the face of the bastion of Santa Maria, and that from the covered way. 11. The advance of both divisions must consist of 500 men from each, attended by twelve ladders; and the men of the storming party should carry sacks filled with light materials, to be thrown into the ditch, to enable the troops to descend into it. Care must be taken that these bags are not thrown into the covered way. 12. The advance of the light division must precede that of the 4th division; and both must keep as near the inundation as they possibly can. 13. The advance of both divisions must be formed into firing parties and storming parties. The firing parties must be spread along the crest of the glacis, to keep down the fire of

in the curtain connected therewith between fort Pardeleras and the castle. Fifth division, lieutenant-general-Leith, to attack fort Pardeleras, and to escalate the walls of Badajoz near the western gate. Portuguese division, brigadier-general Power, to storm the bridge over the Guadiana, and attack the works on the right bank of the river. Of these splendid troops, now all life and daring, and desperately resolute to force their way on the enemy; while the men of the storming party, who carry bags, will enter the covered way, at the *place d'armes*, under the breached face of the bastion of La Trinidad; those attached to the 4th division on its right, those to the light division on its left, looking from the trenches or the camp.

No. 13 will run thus:—After the words, "while the men of the storming party, who carry bags, will enter the covered way," insert, "thereof the light division, at the *place d'armes* on the left, looking from camp, of the unfinished ravelin; those of the 4th division, on the right of that ravelin, at the *place d'armes*, under the breached face of the bastion of La Trinidad."

14. The storming party of the advance of the light division will then descend into the ditch, and turning to the left, storm the breach on the flank of the bastion of Santa Maria, while the storming party of the 4th division will likewise descend into the ditch, and storm the breach in the face of the bastion of La Trinidad. The firing parties are to follow immediately in the rear of their respective storming parties.

Major-general Colville will observe that a part of the advance of the 4th division must be allotted to storm the new breach in the curtain.

15. The heads of the two divisions will follow their advanced guards, keeping nearly together, but they will not advance beyond the shelter afforded by the quarries on the left of the road, till they shall have seen the heads of the advanced guards ascending the breaches: they will then move forward to the storm in double-quick time.

The place here pointed out may be too distant. The heads of the columns should be brought as near as they can without being exposed to fire.

16. If the light division should find the bastion of Santa Maria intrenched, they will turn the right of the intrenchment, by moving along the parapet of the bastion. The 4th division will do the same by an intrenchment which appears on the left face, looking from the trenches of the bastion of La Trinidad. 17. The light division, as soon as they are in possession of the rampart of Santa Maria, are to turn to their left, and to proceed along the rampart to their left, keeping always a reserve at the breach. 18. The advanced guard of the 4th division are to turn to their left, and to keep up the communication with the light division. The 4th division are to turn to their right, and to communicate with the 3rd division, by the bastion of San Pedro, and the dense bastion of San Antonio, taking care to keep a reserve at the bastion of La Trinidad. 19. Each (the 4th and light) division must leave 1,000 men in reserve in the quarries.

It will be necessary for the commanding officer of the light division to attend to the ditch on his left, as he makes his attack. He should post a detachment in the ditch, towards the salient angle of the bastion of Santa Maria, so as to be covered by the angle from the fire of the next bastion on its left, looking from the trenches.

this fearful night, through the terrible defences, and the appalling obstacles that opposed their progress, how few were living in a few hours!

As the deep bell of the cathedral of St. John's struck ten, the night being dark and gloomy, and not a sound audible but the chirping of the field-cricket, the croaking of the frogs, and the softened footfall of the assailants the forlorn hopes and storming parties of the light and fourth divisions stepped out of the trenches, closely followed by their supporting columns. On reaching the brink of the ditch, countless fire-balls thrown from the town betrayed the position of the assailants, and rendered their movements distinctly visible by the vivid light they cast around. Immediately a line of levelled muskets, and every gun that could be brought to bear upon the spot, vomited forth a rapid and murderous fire. Amid the pale and leaden hue that rose thickly into the air, the assailants cheered, and, bags filled with hay being thrown into the ditch, the ladders were lowered, and the forlorn hopes and storming parties had scarcely descended into the ditch, when suddenly a broad bright flame flashed upwards, a crash like thunder ensued, and in

20. The 4th division must endeavour to get open the gate of La Trinidad; the light division must do the same by the gate called Puerto del Pila. 21. The soldiers must leave their knapsacks in camp. 22. In order to aid these operations, the howitzers in No. 4 are to open a fire upon the batteries constructed by the enemy to fire upon the breach, as soon as the officers shall observe that the enemy are aware of the attack, which they must continue till they see that the 3rd division are in possession of the castle.

Some signal must be arranged between the commanding officer of the artillery and the officer who shall command the attack on the castle, for ceasing the fire in No. 4.

23. The commanding officer in the trenches is to attack the ravelin of San Roque with 200 of the covering party, moving from the right of the second parallel and round the right of the ravelin, looking from the trenches, and attacking the barriers and gates of communication between the ravelin and the bridge; while 200 men, likewise of the covering party, will rush from the right of the sap into the salient angle of the covered way of the ravelin, and keep up a fire on its faces. These should not advance from the sap till the party to attack the gorge of the ravelin shall have turned it. That which will move into the covered way on the right of the ravelin looking from the trenches, ought not to proceed further down than the angle formed by the face and flank.

It would be better that this attack should move from the right of the sap. The commanding officer in the trenches must begin it as soon as he shall observe that the attack of the 3rd division on the castle is perceived by the enemy.

24. The remainder of the covering party to be a

an instant 400 of the foremost of the assailants were blown to atoms, by the explosion of hundreds of shells, grenades, fougasses, powder-bags, and barrels, which had been laid in the ditch, throwing out a blaze that imparted to its surface the appearance of vomiting fire. Though the destruction was terrific and the confusion great, undismayed the supporting columns rushed down into the fiery gulf, reckless of the danger and the depth of the ditch; the leading platoons of the fusileer brigade unhappily leaping into a part of the ditch deep in mud, and overflowed with water, sunk in the mire, and disappeared in an instant. A murderous scene now ensued. Incessant explosions of shells, grenades, fougasses, and other combustibles of every kind of burning composition, accompanied with a withering fire of musketry and artillery, from the whole front of the parapet and defences, plied with terrible rapidity and effect, produced a scene of the most frightful carnage and confusion. Yet no pause occurred in the attack. The fourth division pressed boldly up a ruinous and unfinished ravelin, mistaking it for the breach, and were here joined by the head of the light division. These corps, finding that a difficult descent separated them from the

reserve in the trenches. The working parties in the trenches are to join their regiments at half-past seven o'clock. Twelve carpenters with axes, and ten miners with crowbars, must be sent with each (the 4th and light) division. A party of one officer and twenty artillerymen must be with each division. 25. The 5th division must be formed, one brigade on the ground occupied by the 48th regiment, one brigade on the Sierra del Viento, and one brigade in the low grounds extending to the Guadiana, now occupied by pickets of the light division. 26. The pickets of the brigades on the Sierra del Viento, and that on the low grounds towards the Guadiana, should endeavour to alarm the enemy during the attack by firing at the Pardeleras, and at the river in the covered way of the works towards the Guadiana.

A plan has been settled with lieutenant-general Leith for an attempt to be made to escalate the bastion of San Vicente, or the curtain between that bastion and the bridge, if circumstances should permit. The commanding officer of the light division will attend to this. General Power will likewise make a false attack on the tête-de-pont.

27. The commander of the forces particularly requests the general officers commanding divisions and brigades, and the commanding officers of regiments, and the officers commanding companies, to impress upon their men the necessity of keeping together, and forming as a military body after the storm, and during the night. Not only the success of the operation, and the honour of the army, but their own individual safety, depend upon their being in a situation to repel any attack by the enemy, and to overcome all resistance which they may be inclined to make, till the garrison are completely subdued.

WELLINGTON

breach, after having sustained a hot fire, were led by their officers, with the most heroic devotion, to the true point of attack. But on gaining the summit of the main breach, an impassable barrier, the formidable and immoveable chevaux-de-frize, presented itself. Nowise daunted, officers and men in fast succession rushed up the ruins into the breach, but "the boldest hearts, the strongest arms" were all unavailable; the gallant groups all fell slain or disabled upon the ruins.

"The tumult was now as if the very earth had been rent asunder, and its central fires were burning upwards uncontrolled." Amidst the roar and red flashes of artillery, the rattle and crash of musketry, the explosion of shells and grenades, rockets bursting on all sides, the blazing of cressets and fire-balls, and the comet-like fusees of the bombs, which spread around a dazzling light, a terrible illumination, intermingled every now and then with lurid or utter darkness; the groans and shrieks of the dying and wounded added to the horror of the scene. To aggravate the effect of the horrific spectacle, the taunting Frenchmen, secure and unharmed behind impenetrable defences, while hurling the engines of death and destruction on their opponents, invited them, in derision, to enter Badajos. After two hours' unavailing efforts, during which the heroic officers, sometimes followed by a few soldiers, sometimes by many, repeatedly rushed up the breach, or clustered near the unfinished ravelin and the traverses in the ditch, in hopes to force an entrance, disdaining to retreat, though unable to advance, and consequently "met confused and bloody deaths." A staff-officer was dispatched to lord Wellington, who was posted in front of the tête-de-pont that defends the great stone bridge across the Guadiana, to apprise him that 2,000 men had fallen in the breaches, and that the troops were without leaders. At the same moment that this communication was brought from the breaches, another staff-officer rode up with tidings that the third division was in possession of the castle. Orders were sent to Picton to retain his position at all hazards until assistance was sent, and to the officers in command at the breaches to withdraw the remnants of the divisions, to be reorganized for a fresh assault as soon as day should dawn.

While the uproar and carnage had been raging in the breaches, the third and fifth divisions met with nearly equal difficulty and

danger at the castle and the San Vicente bastion. The third division having been obliged, from the circumstance of a lighted carcass having fallen close to it, and discovering its array, to begin the attack half-an-hour before the appointed time; rushing up the rugged steep to the foot of the castle-walls, raised, under a destructive fire, their ladders against the wall; but they were no sooner planted, than they were grappled by the garrison with hooked pikes of enormous length, and thrown down with the men who had mounted on them; at the same moment stones, crushing logs of wood, bars of iron, loaded shells, and other destructive missiles, with which the tops of the walls were garnished, were hurled down on the heads of the assailants. Some of the ladders also broke with the weight of the troops that, in their eager haste to meet the foe, swarmed upon them, and precipitated the men who had mounted them upon the bayonets of their comrades below. The heroic troops however persevered, but all who first ascended fell by musketry or the bayonet. But, undaunted by the terrific reception they met, fresh assailants swarmed round the feet of the ladders, eager to ascend, but all in vain; the assault seemed hopeless. Many men of the 45th and Pakenham's brigade, though they reached the top of the rampart, were thrown down wounded. Receding a few paces, the assailants reformed, and Picton, who had been wounded in the early part of the assault, directing ladders to be placed in an embrasure where the wall was lower, lieutenant-colonel Ridge, of the 5th fusiliers, and a German officer, of the name of Girsewald, caught up the ladders, and planting them against the walls, mounted, followed by their men. Having gained a footing, a fierce contest ensued between the combatants, and the ground was, foot by foot, won and lost, until, after a fierce contest of an hour, the intrepidity of the assailants surmounted every obstacle, and drove the enemy from his post, when in a moment the castle was won, its garrison escaping through the sally-port. Had not the castle-gate been bricked up, the victors would have marched down on the rear of the defenders of the breaches.

The fifth division was no less successful; but the party carrying the scaling-ladders having missed its way, the attack on that side of the town was not begun until eleven o'clock. Having effected an escalade, they were sweeping round the rampart, when a vague alarm seized the leading files, from a

port-fire that had been thrown away by a retreating gunner; on the cry of "a mine," the men who had so bravely won the bastion, rushed tumultuously back on a detachment of the 38th, which had been formed on the rampart as a reserve. With that reserve general Walker advanced against the pursuers, and putting them to flight, proceeded with the re-formed battalions through the town towards the breaches; but in his progress through the streets, which were brilliantly illuminated, was fired on by the Spaniards from under the doors and through the wickets of the houses. The governor, now finding the town in the possession of the assailants, retired with the garrison into fort San Christoval, which communicates with the town by a bridge of twenty-eight arches, and since the last siege had been strongly fortified, but at daylight of the following morning surrendered to the victors. Thus "Badajos, so fiercely fought, so terribly won, so dreadful in all its circumstances, that posterity can scarcely be expected to credit the tale," fell into the power of the British general, after nineteen days' siege, of which only eleven were with open trenches. Never, since the invention of gunpowder, had its blasting terrors been so awfully displayed. Never, in the annals of war, had more heroic courage been displayed in assault, or more skill been exhibited in defence. It is worthy of observation, that this formidable place was not carried by the assault at the breaches, but by escalade at two distant points, where the defences were entire. The walls of the castle rose from 18 to 24 feet, and it was deemed secure from attack. The bastion of San Vicente had an escarpe wall 20 feet perpendicular, and the troops having ascended this, had yet 12 feet, which inclined at an angle to an old parapet, to surmount by scrambling. The breach in the curtain was never attempted; the guides having been probably killed, or the way missed, as those to the trenches of La Trinidad and Santa Maria were at first. But the conquest had been purchased at a great price, the captors having sustained a loss of 5,000 men and officers during the siege and in the assault; in the latter, 59 officers and 744 men being killed, and 258 officers and 2,600 men wounded. About 600 men and officers fell in the escalade of San Vicente, as many at the castle, and more than 2,000 at the breaches. The 43rd regiment left 22 officers and 300 men in the breach and ditch, and every other regiment

suffered in the like proportion. How deadly the strife had been at the breaches appears from the fact, that the 43rd and 52nd regiments of the light division alone lost more men than the seven regiments of the 3rd division engaged at the castle. Let the reader picture to himself this frightful carnage, taking place in the space of less than 100 square yards; let him consider that for hours the destruction was endured without shrinking, and that the town was won at last,—he must admit that a British army bears with it an awful power. "When the extent of the night's havoc was made known to the English general, the firmness of his nature gave way for a moment, and the pride of conquest yielded to a passionate burst for the loss of his gallant soldiers." But let it be recollected that that havoc was occasioned by his having had neither the means nor the time to reduce the fortress by a regular system of attack, and therefore he was obliged by a bold effort to make himself master of it, before the French generals could advance to its relief. In the dreadful assault of Badajos, as the author of *The War in the Peninsula* has emphatically said, "the crimes of politicians were atoned for by the blood of the troops." A rebuke covertly uttered by the victorious general himself, in a letter to general Murray: "I trust," says he, "that future armies will be properly equipped for sieges."

The town being won, the soldiers' herosim was tarnished with wild and desperate licentiousness, rapine, and confusion. Hosts of drunken soldiers and women, followers of the camp, the lower classes of the inhabitants of the town and the surrounding neighbourhood, together with some of the vanquished garrison, who had concealed themselves, made one common cause in the commission of violence, plunder, and destruction, in the wildest orgies, and the most frantic excess. "Groans and piteous lamentations resounded for two nights and days in the streets of Badajos:" youth and age, the noblesse and the beggar, were involved in one common ruin; and more than one officer perished by the bullets and bayonets of the very men whom they had but a few hours before led to the assault, in the endeavours to restrain them from the commission of the enormities, to which their maddened state of intoxication excited them.*

* The horrid custom of giving up a city taken by assault to the licentiousness and violence of the captors, though regarded from time immemorial as

"Before six o'clock on the morning of the assault, all organization among the assaulting columns had ceased, and a scene of plunder and cruelty, that it would be difficult to parallel, took place. The army, so fine and effective, of the preceding day, was now transformed into a vast band of brigands. The horde of Spaniards, as well as of Portuguese women and men, that now eagerly sought for admission to plunder, nearly augmented the number of brigands to what the assailing army had been before the assault; and it may with truth be said, that nearly 20,000 armed ruffians were let loose upon the ill-fated inhabitants of this devoted city. These people were under no restraint, and soon became so intoxicated, that they lost all control of their actions. In the first burst of violence, all the wine and spirit stores were burst open by those infuriated and licentious marauders. Casks of the choicest wines and brandy were dragged into the streets, and their heads stove in, or the casks otherwise broken, so that the liquor flowed down the gutters in streams. The inhabitants were compelled, at the point of the bayonet, to bear bales of plunder, taken from their own houses, and deposit them in the camp, under a guard of soldiers' wives. The stately gravity with which the Spaniards went through their

a privilege, is, as the author of *The Military Memoirs* of the Duke, says, "deeply dishonourable to the profession of arms, and as deeply injurious to good discipline." "There is nothing," as the same admirable writer observes, "more deeply humiliating to man, or more mortifying to military pride, than to find noble qualities and base passions in close alliance." To put an end to the horrid custom, "the moral power of a nation's voice," is, as the same humane authority adds, "necessary; no other influence will be effective."

* The fearful scenes of rapine and riot, and the dreadful outrages which ensued the storm, and continued for one day and two nights, may be imagined from the following dismal portrait of the evening of the day after the place had been carried:—"The streets," says an eye-witness, "were heaped with the drunken and the dead. The soldiery were in a state of furious intoxication, and the town in terrible confusion; on every side frightful tokens of military licence met the eye. One street, as I approached the castle, was almost choked up with broken furniture, for the houses had been gutted from the cellar to the garret, the partitions torn down, and even the beds ripped and scattered to the winds, in the hope that gold might be found concealed. A convent at the end of the strada of St. John was in flames; and I saw more than one wretched nun in the arms of a drunken soldier. Further on the confusion seemed greater. Brandy and wine casks were rolled out before the stores; some were full, some half drunk, but were staved in mere wantonness, and the liquors

work, often dressed in hat and plumes, followed by our raggamuffin soldiers, was at times laughable. The following day (April 8th), was a fearful one; the men had been drunk and reckless to so dreadful an extent, that no person's life was safe; they even fired on their own comrades.* To put a stop to so frightful a scene, in the course of that day, parties from those regiments that had least participated in the assault, were ordered into the town, to collect the hordes of stragglers that filled the streets, but they becoming infected by the contagion, increased the disorder. At length, a brigade of troops was marched into the city, and were directed to stand by their arms while any of the marauders remained; the provost-marshal attached to each division were directed to use their authority. Gibbets and triangles were in consequence erected, and many men were flogged before submission was obtained. Towards evening tranquillity was restored. Early on the morning of the 9th, the auction for the sale of the plunder began; and to it a vast concourse of Spaniards from the neighbouring valleys thronged. Of the produce of the spoil, some men realised upwards of 1,000 dollars."

When the fury of the sack had abated, and the fearful scene of rapine and riot had

running through the kennel. Many a harrowing scream saluted the ear of the passer-by; many a female supplication was heard asking in vain for mercy. How could it be otherwise, when it is remembered, that twenty thousand furious and licentious madmen were loosed upon an immense population, among which many of the loveliest women upon earth might be found? All within that devoted city was at the disposal of an infuriated army, over whom, for the time, control was lost, aided by an infamous collection of camp followers, who were, if possible, more sanguinary and pitiless even than those who had survived the storm. It is useless to dwell upon a scene from which the heart revolts. Few females in this beautiful town were saved that night from insult; the noblest and the beggar—the nun, and the wife and daughter of the artisan—youth and age, all were involved in general ruin. None were respected, and few consequently escaped. The madness of these desperate brigands was variously exhibited; some fired through doors and windows: others at the church bells; many at the wretched inhabitants as they fled into the streets to escape the bayonets of the savages who were demolishing their property within doors; while some wretches, as if the blood had not flowed in sufficient torrents already, shot from the windows their own companions as they staggered on below. What chances had the miserable inhabitants of escaping death, when more than one officer perished by the bullets and bayonets of the very men whom a few hours before they had led to the assault."

been suspended by the mere inanition of the vast band of brigands to continue their work of mischief and violence, a Portuguese brigade, accompanied by the provost-marshal and the gallows, was marched into the town. No sooner was the brigade drawn up, and the gallows planted, than the demon of mischief and misrule disappeared, and order and military subordination were restored; the rope carrying terror to those whom the bayonets of a brigade could not appal. As soon as the wonted empire of discipline was restored, the ludicrous succeeded to the terrible. Men were to be seen marching out of Badajos, some decked in the uniform of the slain French officers; others begirt in all the ample foldings of Spanish toggery, and in the various costumes of priests, monks, nuns, grandees, and ladies of quality; and bearing everything away that was portable or drivable. Others were preceded by Spaniards, dressed in slashed doublets and hat and plumes, laden with bales, often their own property, before their hard task-masters.

Such were the horrors of the siege of Badajos. On the morning succeeding the capture, a beautiful sun displayed a fearful scene of death and destruction. Silence had succeeded to the dreadful din and crash of arms. Hosts of gallant hearts that had the night before beat high with devoted bravery, lay in the cold grasp of death. The breaches and the ditch presented an awful charnel-pit of wretchedness, slaughter, and destruction. In the main breach lay a frightful heap of 2,000 gallant soldiers; many dead, but still warm, mixed with the desperately wounded, to whom no assistance could yet be given. In the ditch, lay the burned and blackened corpses of those who had perished by the explosions of the combustible materials with which it had been profusely garnished, mixed with those who had been torn to pieces by round shot or grape, or had been killed by musketry; stiffening in their gore, body piled upon body, involved and intertwined in one hideous and enormous mass of carnage. Among the heaps of dead and mangled corpses, some still holding their firelocks in their grasps, lay broken piles of arms, shattered ladders, and the remnants and mangled remains of those who had been blown up by the explosions of magazines and mines; many with their heads swollen to an enormous size, and their limbs of a gigantic and terrific appearance. The

stench arising from the still burning blood-cemented pile of slain, wounded, and dying, was as noisome and sickening, as that of a vast charnel-house, and was perceptible some miles distant from the horrid scene. In the main breach stood the still terrific beam, armed with its sharp and bristly sword-blades, which no human dexterity or strength could pass without impalement; and on which some of the bodies of its assailants were still affixed, in all the horror and agony of dying attitudes: the men, in their ardour and impetuosity of attack, having pushed on their comrades in front, in the desperate hope of effecting a passage over their writhing and wriggling bodies. While viewing this appalling scene of horror and havoc, of desolation and destruction, the only redeeming reflection that could occur to the mind of the spectator was, that the fallen filled a glorious grave on the spot on which they had displayed their indomitable valour.

The most appropriate and interesting appendage that can be made to this brilliant exhibition of siege process—a siege such as Cohorn and Vauban never dreamt of, and which is unparalleled in military annals—is its unassuming detail by the great actor in its operations, to the secretary of state, in his despatch dated—

“Camp before Badajos, 7th April, 1812.

“My dispatch of the 3rd instant will have apprised your lordship of the state of the operations against Badajos to that date; which were brought to a close on the night of the 6th, by the capture of the place by storm. The fire continued during the 4th and 5th against the face of the bastion of La Trinidad, and the flank of the bastion of Santa Maria; and on the 4th, in the morning, we opened another battery of six guns in the second parallel against the shoulder of the ravelin of San Roque, and the wall in its gorge.

“Practicable breaches were effected in the bastions above-mentioned on the evening of the 5th; but as I had observed that the enemy had intrenched the bastion of La Trinidad, and the most formidable preparations were making for the defence, as well of the breach in that bastion, as of that in the bastion of Santa Maria, I determined to delay the attack for another day, and to turn all the guns in the batteries in the second parallel on the curtain of La Trinidad; in hopes that by effecting a third breach, the troops would be enabled to turn the

enemy's works for the defence of the other two; the attack of which would besides be connected by the troops destined to attack the breach in the curtain. This breach was effected in the evening of the 6th, and the fire of the face of the bastion of Santa Maria, and of the flank of the bastion of La Trinidad being overcome, I determined to attack the place that night.

"I had kept in reserve in the neighbourhood of this camp, the 5th division under lieutenant-general Leith, which had left Castile only in the middle of March, and had but lately arrived in this part of the country, and I brought them up on that evening. The plan for the attack was, that lieutenant-general Picton should attack the castle of Badajoz by escalade with the 3rd division; and that a detachment from the guard in the trenches furnished that evening by the 4th division, under major Wilson of the 48th regiment, should attack the ravelin of San Roque upon his left, while the 4th division, under major-general the honourable C. Colville, and the light division under lieutenant-colonel Barnard, should attack the breaches in the bastions of La Trinidad and Santa Maria, and in the curtain by which they are connected. The 5th division were to occupy the ground which the 4th and light divisions had occupied during the siege; and lieutenant-general Leith was to make a false attack upon the outwork called the Pardaleras, and another on the works of the fort towards the Guadiana, with the left brigade of the division under major-general Walker, which he was to turn into a real attack, if circumstances should prove favourable; and brigadier-general Power, who invested the place with his Portuguese brigade on the right of the Guadiana, was directed to make false attacks on the tête-du-pont, the fort San Christoval, and the new redoubt called Mon Cœur.

"The attack was accordingly made at ten at night; lieutenant-general Picton preceding by a few minutes the attacks by the remainder of the troops. Major-general Kempt led this attack, which went out from the right of the first parallel. He was unfortunately wounded in crossing the river Rivillas below the inundation; but notwithstanding this circumstance, and the obstinate resistance of the enemy, the castle was carried by escalade, and the 3rd division established in it at about half past eleven. While this was going on, major Wilson, of the 48th, carried the ravelin of San Roque by the

gorge, with a detachment of 200 men of the guard in the trenches; and with the assistance of major Squire, of the engineers, established himself within that work. The 4th and light divisions moved to the attack from the camp along the left of the river Rivillas, and of the inundation. They were not perceived by the enemy till they reached the covered way, and the advanced guards of the two divisions descended without difficulty into the ditch, protected by the fire of the parties stationed on the glacis for that purpose, and they advanced to the assault of the breaches, led by their gallant officers, with the utmost intrepidity. But such was the nature of the obstacles prepared by the enemy at the top and behind the breaches, and so determined their resistance, that our troops could not establish themselves within the place. Many brave officers and soldiers were killed or wounded by explosions at the top of the breaches; others who succeeded to them were obliged to give way, having found it impossible to penetrate the obstacles which the enemy had prepared to impede their progress. These attempts were repeated till after twelve at night, when, finding that success was not to be attained, and that lieutenant-general Picton was established in the castle, I ordered that the 4th and light divisions might retire to the ground on which they had been first assembled for the attack.

"In the mean time, lieutenant-general Leith had pushed forward major-general Walker's brigade on the left, supported by the 38th regiment, under lieutenant-colonel Nugent, and the 15th Portuguese regiment, under colonel Do Rego, and he had made a false attack upon the Pardaleras with the 8th caçadores, under major Hill. Major-general Walker forced the barrier on the road of Olivença, and entered the covered way on the left of the bastion of San Vicente, close to the Guadiana. He there descended into the ditch, and escaladed the face of the bastion of San Vicente. Lieutenant-general Leith supported this attack by the 38th regiment and 15th Portuguese regiment, and our troops being thus established in the castle, which commands all the works of the town, and in the town; and the 4th and light divisions being formed again for the attack of the breaches, all resistance ceased, and at daylight in the morning the governor, general Philippon, who had retired to fort San Christoval, surrendered, together

with general Vieland, and all the staff, and the whole garrison. I have not got accurate returns of the strength of the garrison, or of the number of prisoners; but general Philippon has informed me that it consisted of 5,000 men at the commencement of the siege, of which 1,200 were killed or wounded during the operations, besides those lost in the assault of the place. There were five French battalions, besides two of the regiment of Hesse Darmstadt, and the artillery, engineers, &c.; and I understand there are 4,000 prisoners.

"It is impossible that any expressions of mine can convey to your lordship the sense which I entertain of the gallantry of the officers and troops upon this occasion. The list of killed and wounded will show that the general officers, the staff attached to them, the commanding and other officers of the regiments, put themselves at the heads of the attacks which they severally directed, and set the example of gallantry which was so well followed by their men.

"Major sir W. Beresford assisted me in conducting the details of this siege; and I am much indebted to him for the cordial assistance which I received from him, as well during its progress, as in the last operation which brought it to a termination. The duties in the trenches were conducted successively by major-general the hon. C. Colville, major-general Bowes, and major-general Kempt, under the superintendence of lieutenant-general Picton. I have had occasion to mention all these officers during the course of the operations; and they all distinguished themselves, and were all wounded in the assault.

* * * * *

"Marshal Soult left Seville on the 1st instant, with all troops which he could collect in Andalusia; and he was in communication with the troops which had retired from Estremadura, under general Drouet, on the 3rd, and he arrived at Llerena on the 4th. I had intended to collect the army on the Albuera rivulet, in proportion as marshal Soult should advance; and I had requested lieutenant-general sir T. Graham to retire gradually upon Albuera, while lieutenant-general sir R. Hill should do the same on Talavera, from Don Benito and the upper parts of the Guadiana. I do not think it certain that marshal Soult has made any decided movement from Llerena since the 4th, although he has patrolled forward with small detachments of cavalry, and the ad-

vanced guard of his infantry have been at Usagre. None of the army of Portugal have moved to join him.

"According to the last reports which I have received of the 4th instant, from the frontier of Castile, it appears that marshal Marmont had established a body of troops between the Agueda and the Coa, and he had reconnoitred Almeida on the 3rd. Brigadier-general Trant's division of militia had arrived upon the Coa, and brigadier-general Wilson's division was following with the cavalry, and lieutenant-general the conde de Amarante was on his march, with a part of the corps under his command, towards the Douro.

"It would be very desirable that I should have it in my power to strike a blow against marshal Soult before he could be reinforced: but the Spanish authorities having omitted to take the necessary steps to provision Ciudad Rodrigo, it is absolutely necessary that I should return to the frontiers of Castile within a short period of time. It is not very probable that marshal Soult will risk an action in the province of Estremadura, which it would not be difficult for him to avoid, and it is very necessary that he should return to Andalusia, as general Balasteros was in movement upon Seville on the 29th of last month, and the conde de Penne Villemur moving on the same place from the Lower Guadiana.

"It will be quite impossible for me to go into Andalusia till I shall have secured Ciudad Rodrigo. I therefore propose to remain in the positions now occupied by the troops for some days; indeed, a little time is required to take care of our wounded; and if marshal Soult should remain in Estremadura, I shall attack him; if he should retire into Andalusia, I must return to Castile.

"I have the honour to enclose returns of the killed and wounded from the 31st of March, and in the assault of Badajos, and a return of the ordnance, small arms, and ammunition found in the place. I shall send the returns of provisions in the place by the next despatch. This despatch will be delivered to your lordship by my aid-de-camp, captain Canning, whom I beg leave to recommend to your protection. He has likewise the colours of the garrison, and the colours of the Hesse Darmstadt's regiment, to be laid at the feet of H.R.H. the prince regent. The French battalions in the garrison had no eagles."

OPERATIONS FROM THE CAPTURE OF BADAJOS TO THE BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.

HAVING snatched the two frontier fortresses out of the hands of the enemy, "in the presence," as Lery, the chief engineer of Soult's staff, said, in his letter to Kellerman, "of two armies amounting to 80,000 men," the English general would have advanced into Andalusia, for the purpose of raising the siege of Cadiz; and with this intent he ordered sir Stapleton Cotton to pursue Soult's army, which had approached Llerena, (only two marches distant from Badajos), when that marshal, apprised by a body of cavalry, which had escaped from Fort San Christoval, that Badajos had fallen, immediately retreated. By a rapid night march, the British cavalry overtook his rear-guard at Usagre, and having slain a considerable number, took captive 150 men and horses.

But the advantages which the capture of these fortresses presented, were neutralized for a time by the advance of Marmont into Portugal; the apathy and indolence of the Spaniards in neglecting to put Ciudad Rodrigo into a defensive state; and the English general's financial difficulties, his military chest being almost empty, the English merchants having, by artifices, depreciated the commissariat bills twenty-five per cent., for the purpose of buying them up at a ruinous discount. This disgraceful spirit of cupidity displayed by his countrymen, occasioned the English general great embarrassment.

During the siege of Badajos, Marmont, relying on the advance of Soult to the relief of that fortress, had marched from Salamanca, and leaving a division to blockade Ciudad Rodrigo, invested, in the beginning of April, Almeida with the remainder of his force; his marauding parties laying waste and devastating Lower Beira. The English general having foreseen that this was likely to take place, had directed Silveira to protect the Tras-os Montes, Alten to take post in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, and Trant and Wilson to cover that part of Beira, extending from the Douro along the Coa to Subugal, with especial orders to attend to the safety of a considerable magazine of

ammunition collected at Celerico. The French general was diverted from his assault of Almeida, by Trant's kindling fires to the right and left of his position on the left bank of the Coa, from the apprehension of the presence of a large British force. But Alten's and Silveira's measures frustrated in a great degree the British general's plans. The former, instead of falling gradually back, according to his instructions, on Castello Branco, disputing the rivers and defiles with the enemy's advanced parties, crossed the Tagus at Villa Velha, leaving the country open to the enemy's marauding parties; and the latter was so slow in his advance in joining Trant at Guarda, that it was necessary to destroy a considerable part of the magazines of ammunition at Celerico, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. To meet this emergency, lord Wellington, leaving Hill, to whom the task of restoring Badajos to a defensible state was entrusted, two divisions of infantry and two brigades of cavalry, marched the remainder of the army into Beira; and on Marmont's retreat towards Salamanca, he re-established his head-quarters at Fuente Guinaldo, and cantoned his troops between the Agueda and the Coa. Here he was engaged in devising his plans for the ensuing campaign.

Having received information that sir Home Popham's expedition had sailed for the coast of Biscay, and that the Sicilian expedition was on its passage, the object of the former being to divert Caffarelli's reserves from joining Marmont, and that of the latter to effect the same purpose in respect of the armies of Suchet and the intrusive king, by threatening Catalonia and Valencia, he directed the middle arch of the Roman bridge of Alcantara to be repaired,* and sir Rowland Hill to destroy the pontoon bridge of Almaraz. Thus, by the first operation, a short and easy communication was secured with Hill; and by the second, the communication between Marmont and Soult, whose commands amounted to 108,000 men, was interrupted. Graham was posted at Portalegre, with 20,000 men as a corps

* The chasm occasioned in the Alcantara bridge, by the destruction of the middle arch by the French, which was 100 feet in extent, was restored under the direction of colonel Sturgeon, with such materials as

some ruined buildings near the spot supplied, and by means of cables and a net-work of strong ropes, secured by straining beams, fixed in the masonry on each side of the broken arch.

of observation, to protect Hill in his expedition from any movement of Soult or Marmont.

On the 12th of May Hill moved from Almendralejos on his expedition, with 6,000 men, six twenty-four pounder howitzers, and the necessary equipment of stores. On reaching (May 16th) the pass of Miravete, finding it strongly fortified, and protected by the neighbouring castle, which was situated in the highest part of the gorge of the mountains, and the pass being the only route practicable for the passage of artillery, dividing his force into two columns, he instructed general Chowne to make a false attack with one on the castle, while he advanced with the other down the steep and rugged mountain tract leading through the village of Romangorda. In a night march he advanced towards the pontoon-bridge, and soon after daybreak, halting in a concealed position, about eight o'clock the 50th and a wing of the 71st rushed forward from the cover of a hill with the bayonet, and, with a loud shout, planted their ladders. Though assailed with a heavy discharge of small arms and artillery by the garrison, supported by a flank fire from fort Ragusa on the opposite bank of the river, they escalated fort Napoleon, and, driving their opponents before them at the point of the bayonet, entered the tête-du-pont or bridge-head with the fugitives. The guns of fort Napoleon being turned on fort Ragusa, the governor and garrison, after firing a few rounds, took to flight. Besides a considerable number of killed and wounded, the enemy lost 250 prisoners. On the part of the English only 32 were killed and 144 wounded. Had it not been for the false report of Erskine—who, somehow or other, was a strange marplot in all transactions in

which he was concerned—that Soult was in Estremadura, Hill would have assaulted the castle. Having destroyed the bridge and forts, with all the stores and magazines, the English general retired to Merida, and thus frustrated Soult's and Marmont's intention to intercept him. On the 11th of July, the garrison of Miravete being relieved by Marmont, on the retreat of that marshal the castle was blown up, and thus the pass was left open, and lord Wellington's wishes fully realized.

Wellington having now completed his field magazines, secured his right flank by Hill's destruction of the pontoon-bridge at Almaraz, and obtained the means of a short and easy communication with that general, on the 13th of June, determined to reap those fruits for the enjoyment of which his reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos opened a fair and promising prospect, crossed the Agueda with an army of 35,000 infantry, and 2,500 cavalry, plunged into the heart of Spain, and commenced that campaign which has immortalized his name. The first collision with the enemy took place on the 16th, near the Valmusa rivulet, distant about six miles from Salamanca. On the occurrence of this cavalry skirmish, the French evacuated Salamanca, leaving a garrison of 800 men in the three forts of San Vicente, Cayetano, and La Merced, which had been constructed and fortified for the defence of Salamanca, now converted into a depôt for the army of Portugal.* On the 17th the English army crossed the Tormes by the fords of El Campo and San Martha, above and below the bridge which was in occupation of the enemy, and entered Salamanca, being greeted by the inhabitants with universal acclamations, and all that vehemence of enthusiasm which is

* The duke has been subjected to much censure and animadversion for not having attacked Marmont at this time; his letter to the earl of Bathurst, dated near Salamanca, July 21st, is a sufficient answer to his impugnors:—"I have invariably been of opinion, unless forced to fight a battle, it is better that one should not be fought by the allied army, unless under such favourable circumstances as that there would be room to hope that the allied army should be able to maintain the field, while that of the enemy should not. Your lordship will have seen by the return of the two armies, that we have no superiority of numbers even over that single army immediately opposed to us; indeed, I believe that the French army is of the two the strongest, and it is certainly equipped with a profusion of artillery double ours in number, and of larger calibres. It, therefore, cannot be attacked in a chosen position

without considerable loss on our side. To this circumstance add, that I am quite certain that Marmont's army is to be joined by the king's army, which will be 10,000 or 12,000 men, with a large proportion of cavalry, and that troops are still expected from the army of the north, and some are ordered from that of the south; and it will be seen, that I ought to consider it almost impossible to remain in Castile after an action, the circumstances of which should not have been so advantageous as to have left the allied army in a situation of comparative strength, while that of the enemy should have been much weakened. I have therefore determined to cross the Tormes if the enemy should; to cover Salamanca as long as I can, and above all, not to give up communication with Ciudad Rodrigo, and not to fight an action unless under very advantageous circumstances, or that it shall become absolutely necessary."

peculiar to a southern temperament. Immediately the sixth division, under Clinton, invested the forts, and the main body took up a position on the heights of San Christoval, which extend about four miles in front of Salamanca, and about three miles distant from that city, the Tormes sweeping round its reverse and touching both its flanks. An advanced guard followed Marmont, who had withdrawn to the heights of Aldea Rubia, about six miles in the rear of his original position.

The siege of the forts now proceeded with vigour. On the night of the second day after the investment, San Cayetano was attempted to be escalated, but the storming party was repulsed with the loss of 120 killed and wounded, among the latter of which was general Bowes. On the 20th, Marmont advancing for the purpose of drawing off the garrisons of the forts, the British army formed in order of battle on the summit of San Christoval. After a heavy discharge of shells, and a brisk cannonade, the French marshal having, by an impetuous assault, possessed himself of the village of Morisco, which lay at the foot of San Christoval, took up a position on the plain, in front of the English army, and just out of gun-shot. During the following day, though both armies were in presence of each other, no other movement took place than the recapture of Morisco; but Marmont having, in the course of the night, occupied an eminence which overlooked the right flank of the allies, on the following morning he was dislodged by the 58th and 61st with considerable loss. Early in the morning of the 24th, in the midst of a heavy fog, 12,000 infantry and 14 squadrons of cavalry crossed the Tormes, at the ford of Huerta, and attacked Bock, who had been posted on the other side of that river, to watch that ford, for the purpose of covering Salamanca. As the fog cleared off, Bock being observed to be retreating in excellent order, Graham was detached to his assistance, with two divisions and Le Marchant's brigade of cavalry, while Wellington concentrated the

main body of the army between Morisco and Cabrerijos, in readiness to avail himself of any false movement of his rival. "The apparition of Wellington's skilful disposition"—Graham ranged in order of battle, Wellington's columns clustering on the heights above the fords of Santa Martha, and the light division at Aldea Lengua—caused the French marshal hastily to face about, and repass the Tormes.

On the 26th, ammunition being brought up from Almeida, the batteries commenced firing with red hot shot, and on the following day, San Vicente being in flames, and a breach effected in Cayetano, a white flag was hoisted on the first-mentioned redoubt, but as it was evident that the commandant wished to gain time, on his non-compliance with the English general's proffer, of five minutes for consideration, San Cayetano was ordered to be stormed, and La Merced escalated, and both attacks being successful, the commandant of San Vicente surrendered: 700 prisoners, and a vast quantity of stores fell into the hands of the captors, who immediately destroyed the forts. The loss of the English since the passage of the Tormes, had been 36 officers and 450 men.

On the night of the surrender of the forts, Marmont, who had continued manœuvring in front of Salamanca, in hopes of drawing off the garrisons of the forts, set fire to Morisco and the neighbouring villages, burning all the corn, both standing and housed, in the neighbourhood, and plundering the inhabitants, retreated by Toro and Tordesillas, on the Douro. He was closely followed by Wellington, who, on the 2nd of July, came up with his rear-guard, and drove it across the river with loss. On the 3rd of July the hostile armies were in presence of each other. Marmont concentrated his forces on the opposite bank to dispute the passage; and Wellington occupied Rueda,* in force, on the other bank of the river. The intervening period, from the 3rd to the 15th, was marked by few changes of position. On the 16th the French general concentrated his forces be-

* Here wine was so plentiful, that it was difficult to keep the soldiers sober. The wine-caves, natural, and cut in the rock below Rueda, were so immense, and so well stocked, that the drunkards of the two armies failed to make any sensible diminution in the quantity. Many men on both sides perished in a state of drunkenness in that labyrinth. Here also recurred one of those recognitions of military propriety that tend to mitigate the severity of war. During the continuance of the hostile armies in this

position, the soldiers of both sides passing the Douro in groups, held amicable intercourse. In the retreat from Burgos, a repetition of the scene which took place at Rueda, occurred at Torquemada. The immense well-stored wine vaults there were plundered; twelve thousand men of the allied army were lying at one time in the streets and houses, in a state of helpless drunkenness; and on Souham's occupation of that town, the drunkards of the French army more than numbered that of the English.

tween Toro and San Roman, and having repaired the bridge of Toro, passed over Bonet's division, in the hopes of occasioning an alteration in Wellington's movements, by forcing him back from the line of the Douro, and thus intercepting his communication with Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo; but the English general replied to the ruse by making a feigned advance on Toro, while he prepared to take up a position on the Guarena, a tributary stream of the Douro. With this view, sir Stapleton Cotton was posted, with the fourth and light divisions, and a brigade of cavalry, at Castrejon, on the Trebancos, to favour the concentration of the British forces. At the dawn of the morning of the 18th, those troops were vigorously attacked by the whole French army; Marmont having, by a forced march of 40 miles, reached Tordesillas on the 17th. Cotton maintained his position from daylight till seven o'clock, when lord Wellington arriving on the ground, the troops were withdrawn, and retired in perfect order to the main body on the Guarena. While observing the enemy's movements in this affair, the English commander-in-chief was surrounded by the French cavalry, who had been allowed to approach, from the supposition that they were deserters. The whole mass, friends and foes, were mixed in the *melée*, and went like a whirlwind to the foot of the height, bearing among them the English general and his staff, who, with drawn swords, extricated themselves with difficulty. In this affair the loss of the French was 240 prisoners, and 400 killed; that of the allies amounted to 550.

The French army now crossed the Guarena a little below the junction of the four streams which form that river, and advanced to Castillos, with the intent to turn the left of the allies in the command of the Salamanca road; but Cole, at the head of the 27th and 40th regiments, supported by a brigade of Portuguese, advanced against them with the bayonet, and took 300 prisoners, including a general, and a piece of artillery. The loss on the side of the allies was 100 killed, 400 wounded, and 50 prisoners.

The 19th and 20th were passed in countermarches and manœuvres in parallel or corresponding ridges of country, each chief endeavouring to outflank the other, and each watching a favourable moment to attack. To reach a point was Marmont's object; to intercept him was that of Wel-

lington. During these manœuvres, each hour wore away in the belief that the succeeding one would usher in a conflict. A battle in the plain of Valesa was considered inevitable. As the dread note of artillery resounded among the hills, as circumstances were favourable for its play, each host prepared to form into line. But though the line of march of both armies was within half-cannon-shot range, often half-musket-shot, of each other, and was at times on an open plain, the discharge of a few cannon-shots alone interrupted the stillness of the scene, according as the diversities of ground or other accident afforded either party an advantage, or an occasional fusillade brought the light troops, or the stragglers of both armies into collision, in their contests for the plunder of the villages that lay in the intermediate space between the parallel lines of march of the hostile hosts. As the valley began to widen, on the 21st the enemy took the route to the left, while the allies marched direct to San Christoval. During the last day of the hostile exhibition of one of the finest displays of military tactics ever exhibited—two hostile hosts, consisting of near 100,000 men, in the immediate presence of each other, so skilfully manœuvred by their respective leaders, as to afford no opportunity to each other of a favourable result from a collision, neither general furnishing an opportunity for a partial attack—the officers of both armies exchanged courtesies and recognitions with hand and hat, pointing onwards with their swords, as if to urge each other to the common goal, for the exhibition of their courage and military skill and rivalry. In the course of the operations of these manœuvres, the loss of each side by the sword and casualties was about 1,000 men.

The preceding sketch of the series of masterly manœuvres exhibited by the contending generals of the hostile armies is admirably detailed in the despatch of the English general, officially addressed to earl Bathurst, foreign secretary of state; it is as remarkable for its candour and truthfulness of narration as it is perspicuous, precise, and exact.

"Cabrerizos, near Salamanca,
"21st July, 1812.

"MY LORD,—In the course of the 16th the enemy moved all their troops to the right of their position on the Douro, and their army was concentrated between Toro and San Roman. A considerable party

passed the Douro at Toro, on the evening of the 16th; and I moved the allied army to their left on that night, with an intention to concentrate on the Guareña.

"It was totally out of my power to prevent the enemy from passing the Douro at any point at which he might think it expedient, as he had in his possession all the bridges over that river, and many of the fords; but he recrossed that river at Toro on the night of the 16th, moved his whole army to Tordesillas, where he again crossed the Douro on the morning of the 17th, and assembled his army on that day at La Nava del Rey; having marched not less than ten leagues in the course of the 17th.

"The 4th and light divisions of infantry, and major-general Anson's brigade of cavalry, had marched to Castrejon on the night of the 16th, with a view to the assembly of the army on the Guareña, and were at Castrejon under the orders of lieutenant-general sir Stapleton Cotton on the 17th, not having been ordered to proceed further, in consequence of my knowledge that the enemy had not passed the Douro at Toro, and there was not time to call them in between the hour at which I received the intelligence of the whole of the enemy's army being at La Nava, and daylight of the morning of the 18th. I therefore took measures to provide for their retreat and junction, by moving the 5th division to Torrecilla de la Orden; and major-general Le Marchant's, major-general Alton's, and major-general Bock's, brigades of cavalry, to Alaejos.

"The enemy attacked the troops at Castrejon at the dawn of the day of the 18th, and sir Stapleton Cotton maintained the post, without suffering any loss, till the cavalry had joined him. Nearly about the same time the enemy turned, by Alaejos, the left flank of our position at Castrejon.

"The troops retired in admirable order to Torrecilla de la Orden, having the enemy's whole army on their flank, or in their rear, and thence to the Guareña, which river they passed under the same circumstances, and effected their junction with the army.

"The Guareña, which runs into the Douro, is formed by four streams, which unite about a league below Cañizal, and the enemy took a strong position on the heights on the right of that river; and I placed the 5th, 4th, and light divisions on the opposite heights, and had directed the remainder of the army to cross the upper Guareña at Val-


lesa, in consequence of the appearance of the enemy's intention to turn our right.

"Shortly after his arrival, however, the enemy crossed the Guareña at Castrelo, below the junction of the streams; and manifested an intention to press upon our left, and to enter the valley of Cañizal. Major-general Alton's brigade of cavalry, supported by the 3rd dragoons, were already engaged with the enemy's cavalry, and had taken, among other prisoners, the French general Carrié; and I desired lieutenant-general the hon. L. Cole to attack, with major-general William Anson's, and brigadier-general Harvey's brigades of infantry (the latter under the command of colonel Stubbs) the enemy's infantry, which were supporting their cavalry. He immediately attacked and defeated them with the 27th and 40th regiments, which advanced to the charge with bayonets, colonel Stubb's Portuguese brigade supporting, and the enemy gave way; many were killed and wounded; and major-general Alton's brigade of cavalry having pursued the fugitives, 240 prisoners were taken.

"In these affairs, lieutenant-general the honourable L. Cole, major-general V. Alten, major-general W. Anson, lieutenant-colonels Arentchildt of the 1st hussars, and Hervey of the 14th light dragoons; lieutenant-colonel Maclean of the 27th, and major Archdall of the 40th; colonel Stubbs, lieutenant-colonel Anderson, commanding the 11th, and major de Azeredo, commanding the 23rd Portuguese regiments, distinguished themselves.

"The enemy did not make any further attempt on our left, but having reinforced their troops on that side, and withdrawn those which had moved to their left, I brought back ours from Vallesa.

"On the 19th, in the afternoon, the enemy withdrew all their troops from their right, and marched to their left by Tarazona, apparently with an intention of turning our right. I crossed the Upper Guareña at Vallesa and El Olmo, with the whole of the allied army, in the course of that evening and night; and every preparation was made for the action which was expected on the plain of Vallesa on the morning of the 20th. But shortly after daylight the enemy made another movement, in several columns, to his left along the heights of the Guareña, which river he crossed below Cantalapiedra, and encamped last night at Babila-fuente and Villoruela; and the allied army made a





BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.

corresponding movement to its right to Cantalpino, and encamped last night at Cabeza Velloso, the 6th division and major-general Alten's brigade of cavalry being upon the Tormes at Aldea Lengua. During these movements, there have been occasional cannonades, but without loss on our side.

"I have this morning moved the left of the army to the Tormes, where the whole are now concentrated; and I observe that the enemy have also moved towards the same river near Huerta. The enemy's object hitherto has been to cut off my communication with Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, the want of which, he knows well, would distress us very materially. The wheat harvest has not yet been reaped in Castile, and even if we had money, we could not now procure anything from the country, unless we should follow the example of the enemy, and lay waste whole districts, in order to procure a scanty subsistence of unripe wheat for the troops.

"It would answer no purpose to attempt to retaliate upon the enemy, even if it were practicable. The French armies in Spain have never had any secure communication beyond the ground which they occupy; and provided the enemy opposed to them is not

too strong for them, they are indifferent in respect to the quarter from which their operations are directed, or on which side they carry them on.

"The army of Portugal has been surrounded for the last six weeks, and scarcely even a letter reaches its commander; but the system of organised rapine and plunder, and the extraordinary discipline so long established in the French armies, enable it to subsist at the expense of the total ruin of the country in which it has been placed; and I am not certain that marshal Marmont has not now at his command a greater quantity of provisions and supplies of every description than we have. Any movement upon his flank, therefore, would only tend to augment the embarrassments of our own situation, while it would have no effect whatever upon that of the enemy; even if such a movement could have been made with advantage as an operation purely military: this, however, was not the case, and when the French attempted to turn our right, I had the choice only of marching towards Salamanca, or of attacking the enemy in a position highly advantageous to him, which, for several reasons, I did not think expedient." * * * *

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THE two hostile generals having exhausted all their skill in the series of manœuvres during the past week; the one to maintain himself till he had been joined by his expected reinforcements; and the other to cover Salamanca, at length came to a standstill, neither having been able to obtain "the 'vantage ground" favourable for battle, to the prejudice of his opponent.

On the morning of the 21st July, the English army was concentrated in its old position of San Christoval; Marmont on the evening of the same day, having garrisoned the castle of Alba, which had in a panic been abandoned by the Spaniards, crossed the Tormes between the fords of Alba and Huerta, and occupied the hamlets of Calvarassa de Ariba, and the adjoining heights of Lapeña, for the purpose of gaining the road to Ciudad Rodrigo. To counteract his intention, lord Wellington, leaving the third division, and D'Urban's Portuguese cavalry, intrenched at Cabrerizos, on the right bank of the Tormes, to watch the corps of the

enemy posted on the heights of Babilafuente, as also to retard the progress of Marmont should he cross the river in the course or the night, made a correspondent flank movement, and crossing the river late in the evening of the same day, by the bridge of Salamanca and the Santa Martha and Aldea Lengua fords, placed his army on the chain of hills near the Arapiles. Before the last of the columns had passed the fords, night came on with unusual darkness; for a tempest, that common herald and usual precursor of the Peninsular battles, was gathering. A dreadful storm of thunder and lightning, with heavy rain, ensued; crash succeeded crash, the lightning glared in sheets of vivid flashes, and the rain poured down in torrents. One flash killed several men and horses of Marchant's brigade, near Santa Martha; and hundreds of the horses, terrified by the storm, broke away from their picketings; above thirty escaped into the enemy's lines. The dispersion of the troopers in their endeavour to retake their horses,

and the scared cattle, galloping about in a state of wildness and confusion, increased the awful effect of the elemental strife.

Before daylight of the 22nd, the hostile armies moved into position; the allied army appuying its right on the larger and nearer Arapile, its left extending to the Tormes, below Santa Martha, and having its cavalry posted in front of Cavariza de Abaxo. The enemy was in position in front, on the heights of Lapeña, covered by the thick wood of Calvarassa de Ariba. In taking up their positions, both generals had overlooked the advantage the two steep and rugged hills—which on account of their perfect symmetrical resemblance, were called Dos Arapiles, (the two Arapiles)—presented, and which lay about half cannon shot from each army. But lord Wellington being informed that a column of the enemy was rapidly advancing towards them, despatched the 7th caçadores to seize the more distant and stronger of them, which the French perceiving, the column rapidly broke, and with a rush seized the hill. In their attempts on the larger Arapile, they were less fortunate. This, in spite of all their efforts, was seized and retained by the English. Soon afterwards, the 7th division and the 4th caçadores, attacked the heights of Lapeña, and succeeded in obtaining possession of one half of them. At the same time, lord Wellington, judging from Marmont's movements that his intentions were on the left of the Tormes, ordered the 3rd division and the Portuguese cavalry from the right bank of the river, to take post behind Aldea Tejada, which gave the allies the command of the Ciudad Rodrigo road.

About noon Marmont made a demonstration, by marching a force to the right, and forming columns of attack opposite the 5th division, as if his design was to attack the allied left; but lord Wellington, on re-

* "An error of one of their generals gave him the opportunity he desired, availing himself of which, he fell upon them like a thunderbolt; and the issue of the attack was as decided a rout upon the part of the French, as was, perhaps, ever experienced by any army. Their broken and discomfited masses, swept away before our victorious troops, were precipitated upon the Tormes, in crossing which many were drowned. Had it not been for the protection afforded them by the night immediately coming on—for it was four in the evening before the action commenced—few of them could have escaped. As it was, although prevented following up the victory to the full extent, the trophies of the day were two eagles, twelve pieces of cannon, and 10,000 prisoners. It has been said, how far with truth the editor is not aware, that the duke of Wellington has

connoitring the manœuvre, being satisfied that no real attack was designed in that quarter, galloped back to the right. In the interval, a sharp cannonade was exchanged from the Arapile hills, on which the two hostile generals had taken their positions, each eagerly looking out for the moment when a false step of his opponent should invite him to pounce upon his quarry. Both Wellington and Marmont were at this moment masters of their respective lines of communication, free to accept or decline battle as they chose.

The third division, and D'Urban's cavalry, being concealed by the nature of the ground, occasioned an apparent interval of near two miles between the actual and apparent right of the allied position. Marmont, deceived by this illusion, as also by the movement of the baggage of the allied army towards the Rodrigo road, ordered about three o'clock Thomière's division, with his light cavalry and fifty guns, to outflank the allied right and cut off its retreat, by interposing his force between the allies and the Rodrigo road. Under cover of a heavy cannonade, Thomière advanced, and at the same time Marmont hastened the march of his other divisions, intending to fall on his adversary the moment he should move against Thomière, for he was in total ignorance of the English position at Aldea Tejada.

The extension of the French left being observed by a staff officer, was reported about three o'clock to lord Wellington, who, satisfying himself of the error, made immediate dispositions for the attack.* Suddenly the mass which covered the greater Arapile rushed down the interior slope of the hill, and entered the hollow beneath, amidst a storm of grape and bullets, which seemed to tear away the whole surface of the earth over which they moved. Instantly their formation was effected. Packenham's division been heard to express himself to this effect,—"that if required to particularize any of the battles in which he commanded for the purpose, that Salamanca is the one on which he would be best contented to rest his reputation as a general." When we consider the infinite skill with which, during the previous operations, he outmanœuvred his opponents, rendering their superiority of numbers of no avail, the eagle-eyed sagacity that saw the error of the French commander, and the promptness and decision with which he turned it to his purpose, ending, as it did, in the total discomfiture and rout of the enemy, it is by no means improbable that such is his opinion, although it may never have been so openly expressed. On comparing it even with the most brilliant of his other victories, such, no doubt, will be the opinion of most military men."—*Mackie*.

sion (the third), and D'Urban's cavalry, formed the right of the line; Cole and Leith's divisions (4th and 5th), and Bradford's Portuguese brigade, the centre; supported by Clinton and Hope's divisions (6th and 7th), in the second line. The 1st and light divisions, under Campbell and Alten, with Pack's Portuguese brigade, were in reserve on the higher ground, behind the greater Arapile hill. The heavy cavalry brigade, under Cotton, was posted chiefly on the right of the first line, and the light cavalry in the second. The guards occupied the village of Arapiles. By this change of position the allied army was placed nearly perpendicular to its original position, its left occupying the near peak of the greater Arapile, and its right extending to Aldea Tejada, and thus that which was the rear became the front.

This formation having been effected, Packenham, supported by D'Urban's cavalry, two squadrons of the 14th light dragoons, with two brigades of artillery, moved on the enemy's left at a rapid pace; while the 4th and 5th divisions, supported by the 6th and 7th, and the heavy and light cavalry, proceeded to the attack of the hostile force in the centre and front; at the same time Pack's Portuguese brigade advanced against the lesser Arapile, with orders to assail it at the moment the British centre line should pass it.

About five o'clock, Packenham, rapidly ascending the ridge on which the French left was posted, his division deploying from column into line as they advanced, fell upon Thomière's flank, and though a furious cannonade threw showers of grape and bullets on them, the half-formed lines of the enemy were soon broke into fragments and driven in confusion on the advancing supports. On cresting the wooded heights, the main body of the enemy was seen drawn up in continuous supporting squares, with the front ranks kneeling. Nearly at the same moment the French squares and the British line delivered their volleys, when the latter rushing forward with levelled bayonets, broke the squares, drove the discomfited Frenchmen headlong down the opposite slope, and pursued them from one height to another, until they had made 3,000 prisoners, and captured two eagles. On a sudden an impenetrable cloud of dust arose, when Marchant's heavy brigade, consisting of the 3rd and 4th dragoons, and the 5th dragoon guards, flanked by Anson's light cavalry, burst from it. These gallant horsemen,

sabring all that opposed them, rushed against three battalions of the French 66th, formed in six supporting lines to check their progress, and afford time for the broken divisions to reorganize, scattered them as chaff before the wind. Le Marchant fell, but still his gallant horsemen, galloping forward, charged a brigade under a forest of ilex trees, and captured five guns. But their formation having been much disordered by the nature of the ground over which they charged, their loss in this daring exploit was so severe, that of the three regiments, consisting of 1,000 men, that had entered the field, only three squadrons could be formed of the survivors on the evening of this glorious day. Thus, in less than half an hour, the French left was broken and routed, and no longer existed as a constituent part of the hostile army. Thomière was slain; and Marmont, in the act of hurrying forward to his ill-fated left, had his arm broken, and two deep wounds inflicted in his side, by the explosion of a shell. On the occurrence of this accident, Bonet assumed the command in chief.

While the ruin of the French left was being consummated, the battle was raging in the centre. The divisions of Cole and Leith had advanced to the attack of the enemy's centre and front, at the same moment as Packenham marched against his left, while Pack led his Portuguese brigade against the lesser Arapile. Cole and Leith attacked the enemy's front with no less ardour than his left had been by Packenham, and driving their opponents from one height to another, broke and dispersed his centre. Thus, on this part of the line, the fortune of the day was adverse to the enemy. During these successful operations, Bonet had been repulsed in his attack on the village of Arapiles.

All, hitherto, had been propitious to the allied arms; but as the fourth division was necessarily obliged to lend its flank to the enemy posted on the lesser Arapile, and as Pack's Portuguese brigade had been repulsed from that position, while that division was in the act of passing the hill, Bonet, encouraged by Pack's failure, and having been reinforced by the fugitives from the left and the centre, re-formed his divisions and advanced against Cole, while a withering fire of grape and musketry was poured in on the flank and rear of the 4th division from the crest of the lesser Arapile. Cole lay wounded, and his division, overpowered by overwhelming masses, was forced to give way; but being

reinforced by a brigade, withdrawn by Beresford from the second line, which, by a skilful change of front, took the enemy in flank with a heavy fire, they drove him backward. A brigade of the 6th division at the same time carried the lesser Arapile. The left and the centre of the enemy were now *hors de combat*, but the French right was yet unbroken.

Clausel, who had now succeeded to the command in consequence of Bonet's having been wounded, rallying the fleeing troops, re-formed them in a new position, at right angles to their original one. The battle was now restored, and its crisis had arrived; and victory hung in the balance. To meet the emergency, Wellington ordered the 6th division to attack the enemy's re-formed front, while the 1st and the light divisions, with two brigades of the 4th, were directed to turn his right. The 6th rapidly advanced under a tempest of grape and bullets. It was half-past eight o'clock at night, and nearly dark. The glare of light produced from the thunder of the artillery, the continued blaze of musketry, and the lurid glare of the burning dried grass, which had caught fire from the ignited cartridges, to the extent of a mile, gave to the face of the hill a terrific appearance; it was one vast sheet of flame; and it appeared as if Clinton's men were attacking a burning mountain, the crater of which was defended by a barrier of glittering steel. But nothing could retard the dauntless 6th division, as they advanced with desperate resolution to carry the hill. Onward they rushed against the enemy with the bayonet, and supported by the brigades of the 4th on the flank, they ascended the crest of the hill, and drove the French down the opposite slope from their last hold, as a shattered wreck borne away by the force of some mighty current; and now the hill, which but a moment before was glowing like a furnace, suddenly sank into utter darkness.

The battle being irretrievably lost, Clausel rallied the divisions of Foy and Macune on a rising ground, the first being so placed as to command the roads leading to the fords of Huerta and Encina, while the latter covered the road to Alba de Tormes, whither the broken fragments of the army retired behind them in confusion; but under cover of the woods and the night, a host of the fugitives, who would otherwise have swelled the triumph of the victors as prisoners, effected their escape. It was now ten o'clock

at night; the battle, which had lasted seven hours, was ended. At its closing scene, it had been confined to a small space, which, trampled and blood-stained, gave ample evidence of the havoc that had taken place in its confined limits. The loss had been great on both sides. Above 7,000 of the enemy had been killed and wounded, among whom were six generals; that of the allies about 5,600. Of the British, 500 had been killed, 3,100 wounded, and 101 missing; of the Portuguese, 338 killed, 1,648 wounded, and 207 missing; of the Spaniards, *two killed and four wounded*. General Marchant was killed; and Beresford, Cotton, Leith, Cole, and Spry wounded: 7,000 prisoners, two eagles, eleven cannon, and a field covered with the slain and wounded left in possession of the victors, attested at once the severity of the contest and the splendour of the victory. These were its immediate results; its consequential ones were the abandonment of Andalusia and the Asturias; the raising the siege of Cadiz; the paralyzing of the operations of the enemy; and the shaking the basis of his dominion and influence to its very centre throughout the Peninsula.

Exhausted with fatigue from their mighty efforts, those portions of the allied force that had been actively and unremittingly engaged in this magnificent battle, rested on the scene of their heroic exploits.

Among the instances of gallantry exhibited at Salamanca, the two following were conspicuous. Captain Brotherton, of the 14th light dragoons, having received a severe sword wound in his side in a recent skirmish, not being permitted to serve with his regiment, in an undress, he joined a Portuguese corps, and was a second time wounded in assaulting the Arapiles. Captain Mackie, of the 88th, after heading his regiment throughout their advance against the foe, joined the heavy cavalry as they charged the enemy, and rode through every charge. And heroism on that brilliant day, to adopt the words of the historian of the war in the Peninsula, was not confined to a particular service, or even to the sex to which gallantry inherently belongs. A man of the 43rd, though shot through the middle, and having lost his shoes in passing the marshy streams, refused to quit the fight, limping under fire in rear of his regiment, with blood streaming from his wound. The wife of colonel Dalbiac, an English lady of gentle disposition, and possessing a very delicate frame, had braved the dangers

and endured the privations of two campaigns, with the patient fortitude that belongs only to her sex; and in this battle, forgetful of everything but that strong affection which had so long supported her, she rode deep amidst the enemy's fire, trembling, yet irresistibly impelled forward by feelings more imperious than horror, more piercing than the fear of death."

Wellington, though much fatigued, placing himself at the head of the 1st and light divisions, and a brigade of cavalry, proceeded in pursuit of the fleeing foe, and in the belief that the castle of Alba de Tormes was in possession of the Spaniards, and that the French must necessarily retreat by Huerta, for España suppressed the knowledge of the fact of its having been abandoned by his countrymen, directed his pur-

* Though the duke never experienced the perils and hair-breadth escapes of "the deadly imminent breach," his experience of the dangers and hazards of war were not "few and far between." At the battle of Assaye, while crossing the river Juah, the head of his orderly, who was close by his side, was struck off by a cannon-ball; he had two horses killed under him, one piked, the other shot; and the tree under which he stood during the battle, was pierced with balls. It is said, on the authority of the *Standard* newspaper, that in some one of the Indian battles, he received an injury near the knee-joint. At the battle of Talavera, two balls perforated his coat; a spent ball struck him on the shoulder; a branch of the tree near which he stood, was struck off just above his head by a cannon-ball; and while reconnoitring the position of the enemy at the Casa de Salinas, he was nearly captured. During the movements of the English and French armies, preceding the battle of Salamanca, the duke, while observing the enemy's movements, was surrounded by the French cavalry, who had been allowed to approach from the supposition that they were deserters. The whole mass, friends and foes, were mixed together in the *mêlée*, and went like a whirlwind to the foot of the height, carrying away the English general and his staff, who with drawn swords extricated themselves with difficulty. At the battle of Vittoria, he passed, unharmed, through the fire of the French centre, bristling with eighty pieces of artillery. In the battle of Sorauren, July 28th, 1813, while he sat in observation on the heights, within close musket-range, a ball, which struck the hilt of the breast-plate of the marquis of Worcester's sword, and threw him from his horse, glancing off grazed lord Wellington. In the course of the evening of the same battle, while examining his maps in the neighbourhood of Echellar, he was so nearly captured by a detachment of the enemy, that it was almost a miracle that he escaped the volley of shot they poured on him while he galloped away. At the battle of Orthes he was struck by a spent ball. At the battle of Waterloo the elm tree, which was in the centre of the British line, and under which he took post during part of the battle, was pierced with balls. In the advance on Paris, after the battle of Waterloo, the commandant of the citadel of Cambray having consented to the proffered conditions for the surrender of that important for-

suit towards the fords of Huerta and Encina. A squadron of French dragoons bursting hastily from the forest, and after a hurried discharge of their arms, fled at full gallop towards Huerta, thus confirming lord Wellington's opinion that the retreat was in that direction. While urging on the pursuit in the rear of the 43rd regiment, a spent bullet perforated the holster of the English commander-in-chief, and slightly contused his thigh.* By España's culpable suppression of the fact of the abandonment of the castle, the enemy gained Alba, and passed the river unmolested: had he given timely notice, the English general would at once have directed the pursuit upon the right track, and no doubt the enemy would have sustained the loss of many more thousands in prisoners, or possibly the greater part of the tress, the duke being anxious to obtain its immediate possession, proceeded in person to one of its gates to wait until it should be opened. Directing his staff to get under shelter in the ditch of an unoccupied outwork, he posted himself in a sally-port of the glacis. A staff officer, having an important communication to make, and thinking the duke had entered the place, rode towards the gate, and suddenly approaching the duke, while posted as above described, drew the attention of the enemy, who treacherously discharged a howitzer, loaded with grape, at that point, by which the wall where the duke was standing was shattered to pieces, and his clothes covered with its fragments. In his passage to Lisbon in the year 1809, the vessel in which the future hero of the Peninsula and Waterloo sailed from Spithead, was nearly wrecked on the shoal which runs from St. Catherine's Point, and extends to the back of the Isle of Wight into the sea. While inspecting the troops stationed on the Bois de Boulogne, he was several times fired at by assassins. On the occasion of a fête to take place in his honour in Paris, it was intended to set fire to a quantity of powder concealed in the cellar; and, on another occasion, while his carriage entered the gates of his hotel, a pistol was fired at him by an assassin of the name of Cantillon, to whom Buonaparte bequeathed a legacy of 10,000 francs, in recognition of the deed, and, in his own words, the "right to assassinate that oligarchist." What a contrast to this despicable act of the "great and magnanimous Napoleon," does the duke's conduct form, who, to the offer of the conspirators to seize Soult and deliver him over to the British, as a part of their plan to free themselves from the tyranny of Buonaparte, and change the form of government, declined all sanction of the act, adding that "it would be more honourable to the British arms to vanquish the enemy in the field, than to accomplish his overthrow by the countenance of any such project." His conduct and sentiments on the occasion of general Muffling's communicating to him Blücher's proposal, should they capture Buonaparte, to shoot him on the spot where the duc d'Enghien was put to death, were equally magnanimous—"Such an act," said the hero, "would hand our names down in history stained by a crime, and posterity would say of us that we were not worthy to have been his conquerors"—this was true heroism—true magnanimity.

fleeing host would have been crushed. This circumstance, in conjunction with the setting in of the night, was the salvation of the remnant of the French army. "They all agree," wrote lord Wellington, "that if we had had another hour's daylight at Salamanca, the whole army would have been in our hands." Another awkward accident happened just at the moment that the night pickets were set at Huerta. Sir Stapleton Cotton, who was returning from the ford, was shot through the arm by a Portuguese sentinel whose challenge he had disregarded.

What the victor himself felt when the night closed on his splendid triumph, may be estimated from the graphic words of the historian of the War in the Peninsula: "I saw him late in the evening, when the advancing flashes of the cannon and musketry, stretching as far as the eye could command, showed him the field was won. He was alone; the flush of victory was on his brow, and his eyes were eager and watchful; but his voice was calm, and even gentle. More than the rival of Marlborough, since he had defeated greater warriors than Marlborough ever encountered; with a prescient pride he seemed only to accept this glory as an earnest of greater things."

On the eve of this battle, the following affecting scene is detailed, in a communication, entitled, "Recollections in Quarters," to the *United Service Journal*, as having taken place:—

"On the eve of the memorable battle of Salamanca, as the camp-fires were slowly dying out, or flickering, while stirred by some sleepless watcher, feeling no inclination for repose, on account of the sharp, chilly, and moist night-air, I wandered for a short distance from the camp. The larger stars only were visible. The scene was as tranquil as that of a church-yard. The piles of arms, the groups of men, and the scattered tents were dimly blended to my gaze. At this moment a murmur fell upon my ear. I approached the spot whence the sound proceeded; it was of two voices, that of a youth, and that of a full grown man. A few steps farther brought me in sight of them. I looked on them attentively. Two figures were on the ground kneeling; an elderly man and a youth of sixteen. Their faces were close together, their hands elevated in the attitude of prayer, and their heads directed upwards. Their words now dropped distinctly on

my ear. I recognised the elderly one, a most meritorious soldier, who had risen from the ranks to a lieutenancy. Two days before, his only son had arrived from England, as an ensign in the same corps as his father, who was justly proud of his son, a fine promising lad, just from school, and from the quiet home of his boyhood, now all at once cast into the arena of death. Could it be wondered at, that his young spirit quailed at the prospect before him, when he compared it with all he had left behind him in his native land. That night he had withdrawn with his parent into the solitude of the encampment, where I beheld that father and that son, unseen by them, invoking the Father of all at that midnight hour. The prayer of the son was interrupted by many a sob; his father's low but earnest voice in vain whispered consolation; the youth felt awfully oppressed by the sense of his new and startling position in commencing his career. Distinctly I heard his young heart unfold all its latent apprehensions, and utter all its doubts and dismays; and then he sobbed bitterly, casting himself in the arms of his kneeling father, whose voice rose louder as he appealed to heaven to strengthen and shield his boy in the hour of combat. Down he turned his face on his son's, and kissed him, with a low whisper. To that son the glory of a soldier's fame and a soldier's death appeared vain and unenviable; he wished to forsake his dismal trade, to pursue a humble and an unaspiring course in the midst of civil life, and in the absence of pride; but the old soldier would not listen to those requests; he did not chide or upbraid his son; he knew that nature was strong, and must hold her course, unconstrained. A long silence ensued, the sobs of the youth became less frequent, and at length both rose, the one with a lighter and a bolder heart, fortified by the spirit which had regained the mastery, and by the prayers which had not been unheard or unheeded. The father placed his arm round the neck of the youth, and both walked leisurely away.

"The son did his duty at Salamanca; his conduct was especially noticed and applauded; he behaved like a young lion, and was in the thickest of the death-storm till the close of the day. The struggle did not end till night came over the field; but then the young hero's hour was come; it came as he was congratulated by a brother officer

on the almost achieved success of the day, when he fell dead by a musket shot. His grieved father sought him among the slain, and buried him in a lonely grave near the spot on which they had prayed the previous night. From that hour that father pined away; he still did his duties well; death he vainly sought in every succeeding action; at last the spirit was vanquished, and he passed away from among us, unscathed by mortal weapon; but his heart pierced by that wound which baffles mortal skill."

The clear and unassuming official detail of the incidents of this memorable battle, by its great actor, is admirably elucidative of the preceding narrative:—

"To earl Bathurst.

"Flores de Avila, 24th July, 1812.

"In my letter of the 21st, I informed your lordship, that both armies were near the Tormes; and the enemy crossed that river with the greatest part of his troops, in the afternoon, by the fords between Alba de Tormes and Huerta, and moved by their left towards the roads leading to Ciudad Rodrigo.

"The allied army, with the exception of the 3rd division and general D'Urban's cavalry, likewise crossed by the bridge of Salamanca, and the fords in the neighbourhood; and I placed the troops in a position, of which the right was upon one of the two heights, called Dos Arapiles, and the left on the Tormes, below the ford of Santa Martha.

"The 3rd division, and brigadier-general D'Urban's cavalry, were left at Cabrerizos, on the right of the Tormes, as the enemy had still a large corps at Babilafuente, on the same side of the river; and I considered it not improbable that, finding our army prepared for them in the morning, on the left of the Tormes, they would alter their plan, and manœuvre by the other bank.

"In the course of the night of the 21st, I received intelligence, of the truth of which I could not doubt, that general Chauvel had arrived at Pollos on the 20th, with the cavalry and horse artillery of the army of the north, to join marshal Marmont; and I was quite certain that these troops would join him on the 22nd or 23rd at latest.

"There was no time to be lost therefore; and I determined that, if circumstances should not permit me to attack him on the 22nd, I would move towards Ciudad Rodrigo without further loss of time, as the difference of the numbers of cavalry might have made a march of manœuvre, such as

we have had for the last four or five days, very difficult, and its result doubtful.

"During the night of the 21st, the enemy had taken possession of the village of Calvarassa de Arriba, and of the heights near it, called Nuestra Señora de la Peña, our cavalry being in possession of Calvarassa de Abaxo; and shortly after daylight, detachments from both armies attempted to obtain possession of the more distant from our right of the two hills called Dos Arapiles.

"The enemy, however, succeeded; their detachments being the strongest, and having been concealed in the woods nearer the hill than we were; by which success they strengthened materially their own position, and had in their power increased means of annoying ours.

"In the morning the light troops of the 7th division, and the 4th caçadores belonging to general Pack's brigade, were engaged with the enemy on the height called Nuestra Señora de la Peña, on which height they maintained themselves with the enemy throughout the day. The possession by the enemy, however, of the more distant of the Arapiles rendered it necessary for me to extend the right of the army *en potence* to the height behind the village of Arapiles, and to occupy that village with light infantry; and here I placed the 4th division under the command of lieutenant-general the hon. L. Cole; and, although from the variety of the enemy's movements, it was difficult to form a satisfactory judgment of his intentions, I considered that, upon the whole, his objects were upon the left of the Tormes. I therefore ordered major-general the Hon. E. Packenham, who commanded the 3rd division, in the absence of lieutenant-general Picton, on account of ill-health, to move across the Tormes with the troops under his command, including brigadier-general D'Urban's cavalry, and place himself behind Aldea Tejada; brigadier-general Bradford's brigade of Portuguese infantry, and Don Carlos de España's infantry having been moved up likewise to the neighbourhood of Los Torres, between the 3rd and 4th divisions.

"After a variety of evolutions and movements, the enemy appeared to have determined upon his plan about two in the afternoon; and, under cover of a very heavy cannonade, which, however, did us but very little damage, he extended his left, and moved forward his troops, apparently with an intention to embrace, by the position of his troops, and by his fire, our post on that

of the two Arapiles which we possessed; and from thence to attack and break our line, or, at all events, to render difficult any movement of ours to our right.

"The extension of his line to his left, however, and its advance upon our right, notwithstanding that its troops still occupied very strong ground, and his position was well defended by cannon, gave me an opportunity of attacking him, for which I had long been anxious. I reinforced our right with the 5th division, under lieutenant-general Leith, which I placed behind the village of Arapiles, on the right of the 4th division, and with the 6th and 7th divisions in reserve; and as soon as these troops had taken their station, I ordered major-general the Hon. E. Packenham to move forward with the 3rd division, and general D'Urban's cavalry, and two squadrons of the 14th light dragoons, under lieutenant-colonel Harvey, in four columns, to turn the enemy's left on the heights; while brigadier-general Bradford's brigade, the 5th division, under lieutenant-general Leith, the 4th division, under lieutenant-general the Hon. L. Cole, and the cavalry, under lieutenant-general sir Stapleton Cotton, should attack them in front, supported in reserve by the 6th division, under major-general Clinton, the 7th under major-general Hope, and don Carlos de España's Spanish division; and brigadier-general Pack should support the left of the 4th division, by attacking that of the Dos Arapiles, which the enemy held. The 1st and light divisions occupied the ground on the left, and were in reserve.

"The attack upon the enemy's left was made in the manner above described, and completely succeeded. Major-general the hon. E. Packenham formed the 3rd division across the enemy's flank, and overthrew every thing opposed to him. These troops were supported, in the most gallant style, by the Portuguese cavalry, under brigadier-general D'Urban, and lieutenant-colonel Harvey's squadrons of the 14th, who successfully defeated every attempt made by the enemy on the flank of the 3rd division.

"Brigadier-general Bradford's brigade, the 5th and 4th divisions, and the cavalry, under lieutenant-general sir Stapleton Cotton, attacked the enemy in front, and drove his troops before them from one height to another, bringing forward their right, so as to acquire strength upon the enemy's flank, in proportion to the advance. Brigadier-

general Pack made a very gallant attack upon the Arapiles, in which, however, he did not succeed, excepting in dividing the attention of the enemy's corps, placed upon it, from the troops under the command of lieutenant-general Cole, in his advance.

"The cavalry, under lieutenant-general sir Stapleton Cotton, made a most gallant and successful charge against a body of the enemy's infantry, which they overthrew and cut to pieces. In this charge major-general Le Marchant was killed at the head of his brigade; and I have to regret the loss of a most able officer.

"After the crest of the height was carried, one division of the enemy's infantry made a stand against the 4th division, which, after a severe contest, was obliged to give way, in consequence of the enemy having thrown some troops on the left of the 4th division, after the failure of brigadier-general Pack's attack upon the Arapiles, and lieutenant-general the honourable L. Cole having been wounded. Marshal sir W. Beresford, who happened to be upon the spot, directed brigadier-general Spry's brigade of the 5th division, which was in the second line, to change its front, and to bring its fire on the flank of the enemy's division; and, I am sorry to add that, while engaged in this service, he received a wound which I am apprehensive will deprive me of the benefit of his counsel and assistance for some time. Nearly about the same time lieutenant-general Leith received a wound which unfortunately obliged him to quit the field. I ordered up the 6th division, under major-general Clinton, to relieve the 4th, and the battle was soon restored to its former success.

"The enemy's right, however, reinforced by the troops which had fled from his left, and by those which had now retired from the Arapiles, still continued to resist; and I ordered the first and light divisions, and colonel Stubbs' Portuguese brigade of the 4th division, which was reformed, and major-general W. Anson's brigade, likewise of the 4th division, to turn the right, while the 6th division, supported by the 3rd and 5th, attacked the front. It was dark before this point was carried by the 6th division; and the enemy fled through the woods towards the Tormes. I pursued them with the 1st and light division, and major-general W. Anson's brigade of the 4th division, and some squadrons of cavalry under lieutenant-general sir S. Cotton, as long as we could

find any of them together, directing our march upon Huerta and the fords of the Tormes, by which the enemy had passed in their advance; but the darkness of the night was highly advantageous to the enemy, many of whom escaped under its cover who must otherwise have been in our hands. I am sorry to report that, owing to the same cause, lieutenant-general sir S. Cotton was unfortunately wounded by one of our own sentries after we had halted.

"We renewed the pursuit at break of day in the morning with the same troops, and major-general Bock's and major-general Anson's brigades of cavalry, which joined during the night; and, having crossed the Tormes, we came up with the enemy's rear of cavalry and infantry near La Serna. They were immediately attacked by the two brigades of dragoons, and the cavalry fled, leaving the infantry to their fate. I have never witnessed a more gallant charge than was made on the enemy's infantry by the heavy brigade of the King's German Legion, under major-general Bock, which was completely successful; and the whole body of infantry, consisting of three battalions of the enemy's 1st division, were made prisoners. The pursuit was afterwards continued as far as Peñaranda last night, and our troops are still following the flying enemy. Their head-quarters were in this town, not less than ten leagues from the field of battle, for a few hours last night; and they are now considerably advanced on the road towards Valladolid, by Arevalo. They were joined yesterday on their retreat by the cavalry and artillery of the army of the North, which have arrived at too late a period, it is to be hoped, to be of much use to them.

"It is impossible to form a conjecture of the amount of the enemy's loss in this action; but, from all reports, it is very considerable. We have taken from them eleven pieces of cannon,* several ammunition wagons, two eagles, and six colours; and one general, three colonels, three lieutenant-colonels, 130 officers of inferior rank, and between 6,000 and 7,000 soldiers are prisoners;† and our detachments are sending in

more at every moment. The number of dead on the field is very large.

"I am informed that marshal Marmont is badly wounded, and has lost one of his arms; and that four general officers have been killed, and several wounded.

"Such an advantage could not have been acquired without material loss on our side; but it certainly has not been of a magnitude to distress the army, or to cripple its operations.

"I have great pleasure in reporting to your lordship that, throughout this trying day, of which I have related the events, I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the general officers and troops. The relation which I have written of its events will give a general idea of the share which each individual had in them; and I cannot say too much in praise of the conduct of every individual in his station.

"I am much indebted to marshal sir W. Beresford for his friendly counsel and assistance, both previous to, and during the action; to lieutenant-generals sir S. Cotton, Leith, and Cole, and major-generals Clinton, and the honourable E. Packenham, for the manner in which they led the divisions of cavalry and infantry under their command respectively; to major-general Hulse, commanding a brigade in the 6th division; major-general G. Anson, commanding a brigade of cavalry; colonel Hinde; colonel the honourable W. Ponsonby, commanding major-general Le Marchant's brigade after the fall of that officer; to major-general W. Anson, commanding a brigade in the 4th division; major-general Pringle, commanding a brigade in the 5th division, and the division after lieutenant-general Leith was wounded; brigadier-general Bradford; brigadier-general Spry; colonel Stubbs; and brigadier-general Power, of the Portuguese service; likewise to lieutenant-colonel Campbell of the 94th, commanding a brigade in the 3rd division; lieutenant-colonel Williams of the 6th foot; lieutenant-colonel Wallace of the 88th, commanding a brigade in the 3rd division; lieutenant-colonel Ellis of the 52nd, commanding major-general the honourable E. Packenham's brigade in the 4th division, during his absence in the command of the 3rd division; lieutenant-colonel the honourable C. Greville of the 38th regiment, commanding major-general Hay's brigade in the 5th division, during his absence on leave; brigadier-general Pack; brigadier-general the Comte de Re-

* The official returns only account for eleven pieces of cannon, but it is believed that twenty have fallen into our hands.

† The prisoners are supposed to amount to 7,000; but it has not been possible to ascertain their number exactly, from the advance of the army immediately after the action was over.

zende of the Portuguese service; colonel Douglas of the 8th Portuguese regiment; lieutenant-colonel the conde de Ficalho of the same regiment; and lieutenant-colonel Bingham of the 53rd regiment; likewise to brigadier-general D'Urban and lieutenant-colonel Hervey of the 14th light dragoons; colonel lord E. Somerset, commanding the 4th dragoons; and lieutenant-colonel the honourable F. Ponsonby, commanding the 12th light dragoons.

"I must also mention lieutenant-colonel Woodford, commanding the light battalion of the brigade of guards, who, supported by two companies of the fusiliers, under the command of captain Crowder, maintained the village of Arapiles against all the efforts of the enemy, previous to the attack upon their position by our troops.

"In a case in which the conduct of all has been conspicuously good, I regret that the necessary limits of a despatch prevent me from drawing your lordship's notice to the conduct of a larger number of individuals; but I can assure your lordship that there was no officer or corps engaged in this action who did not perform his duty by his sovereign and his country.

"The royal and German artillery, under lieutenant-colonel Framingham, distinguished themselves by the accuracy of their fire wherever it was possible to use them; and they advanced to the attack of the enemy's position with the same gallantry as the other troops.

"I am particularly indebted to lieutenant-colonel De Lancy, the deputy quarter-master-general, the head of the department present, in the absence of the quarter-master-general, and to the officers of that department and of the staff corps, for the assistance I received from them, particularly lieutenant-colonel the honourable L. Dundas and lieutenant-colonel Sturgeon of the latter, and major Scovell of the former; and to lieutenant-colonel Waters, at present at the head of the adjutant-general's department at head-quarters; and to the officers of that department, as well at head-quarters as with the several divisions of the army; and lieutenant-colonel lord Fitzroy Somerset, and the officers of my personal staff. Among the latter I particularly request your lordship to draw the attention of his royal highness the prince regent to his serene highness the hereditary prince of Orange, whose conduct in the field, as well upon every other occasion, entitles him to

my highest commendation, and has acquired for him the respect and regard of the whole army.

"I have had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the Mariscal de Campo Don Carlos de España, and of brigadier Don Julian Sanchez, and with that of the troops under their command respectively, and with that of the Mariscal de Campo Don Miguel de Alava, and of brigadier Don José O'Lawlor, employed with this army by the Spanish government, from whom, and from the Spanish authorities and people in general, I received every assistance I could expect.

"It is but justice likewise to draw your lordship's attention upon this occasion to the merits of the officers of the civil departments of the army. Notwithstanding the increased distance of our operations from our magazines, and that the country is completely exhausted, we have hitherto wanted nothing, owing to the diligence and attention of the commissary-general, Mr. Bissett, and the officers of the department under his direction. I have likewise to mention that, by the attention and ability of Dr. McGrigor, and of the officers of the department under his charge, our wounded, as well as those of the enemy, left in our hands, have been well taken care of; and I hope that many of these valuable men will be saved to the service.

"Captain lord Clinton will have the honour of laying at the feet of his royal highness the prince regent the eagles and colours taken from the enemy in this action."

"WELLINGTON."

The annexed was addressed by lord Wellington to earl Bathurst, and in a light and playful manner alludes to the great victory he had just achieved:—

"Flores de Avila, 24th July, 1812.

"I hope that you will be pleased with our battle, of which the despatch contains as accurate an account as I can give you. There was no mistake; everything went on as it ought; and there never was an army so beaten in so short a time. If we had had another hour or two of daylight, not a man would have passed the Tormes; and as it was, they would all have been taken if ——— had left the garrison in Alba de Tormes as I wished and desired; or, having taken it away, as I believe before he was aware of my wishes, he had informed me that it was not there. If he had, I should have marched in the night upon Alba, where I should have caught them all, instead of

upon the fords of the Tormes. But this is a little misfortune, which does not diminish the honour acquired by the troops in the action; nor, I hope, the advantage to be derived from it by the country; as I do not believe there are many soldiers who were in that action, who are likely to face us again till they shall be very largely reinforced indeed.

"I am very anxious that a mark of his royal highness' favour should be conferred upon sir S. Cotton. I believe he would be much gratified at receiving the red riband. No cavalry could act better than ours did in the action; and I must say for sir Stapleton, that I do not know where we should find an officer that would command our cavalry in this country half so well as he does."

The following is the duke's letter to sir Thomas Graham, in which he describes this important battle:—

"Flores de Avila,

"25th July, 1812.

"I took up the ground which you were to have taken during the siege of Salamanca, only the left was thrown back on the heights, it being unnecessary, under the circumstances, to cover the ford of Santa Martha. We had a race for the large Arapiles, which is the more distant of the two detached heights which you will recollect on the right of your position; this race the

French won, and they were too strong to be dislodged without a general action.

"I knew that the French were to be joined by the cavalry of the army of the north on the 22nd or 23rd, and that the army of the centre was likely to be in motion. Marmont ought to have given me a *pont d'or*, and he would have made a handsome operation of it. But instead of that, after manœuvring all the morning in the usual French style, nobody knew with what object, he at last pressed upon my right in such a manner, at the same time without engaging, that he would have either carried our Arapiles, or he would have confined us entirely to our position. This was not to be endured, and we fell upon him, turning his left flank; and I never saw an army receive such a beating.

"I had desired the Spaniards to continue to occupy the castle of Alba de Tormes. — had evacuated it, I believe, before he knew my wishes; and he was afraid to let me know that he had done so; and I did not know it till I found no enemy at the fords of the Tormes. When I lost sight of them in the dark, I marched upon Huerta and Encinas, and they went by Alba. If I had known there had been no garrison at Alba, I should have marched there, and should probably have had the whole.

"Believe me to be, &c.,

"WELLINGTON."

EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.

SUCH was the great and important battle of Salamanca—a battle which, from the peculiarities attending it, stands foremost of all the contests in the Peninsular war. It effaced the last traces of the spell of French invincibility, and showed that however highly skilled in military manœuvres their generals might be, that they had now to oppose them an enemy who was equally their match, both in skill and bravery. Well might a contemporary writer, when speaking of this battle, say, that "whether we consider it in reference to the uncommon sagacity displayed by lord Wellington in taking advantage of the injudicious movement of his adversary, the promptitude and skill with which the plans and arrangements were formed in this critical moment, the intrepidity and success with which all these arrangements were executed, or the final issue

of the whole, must be deemed the most decisive proof of the superiority of British military talent and bravery; and a battle to which the sons of Britain may always appeal with the proudest feeling, as challenging a comparison with any that history records."

The great achievements of the British arms in the course of this war, which we have still to narrate, may perhaps cause the battle of Salamanca, in the view of the cursory reader, to lose comparatively some of its importance; but those who with intelligence study the links of cause and effect, will find that it marks a brilliant and important era in British history. Wellington's previous successes, though far from unimportant, did not appear to make that lasting impression on the enemy which might justify the hope that the day of his expulsion from the Peninsula was at hand. Though frequently baffled,

the French force had heretofore remained unbroken. The victory of Salamanca created a feeling with regard to British interference in Spain which had been till then unknown. "Marmont," says the writer already quoted, "seems to have thought that he could, by the variety and rapid change of his movements, so utterly and deeply fill the thoughts of lord Wellington, for the protection and safety of his own army, that he would not be able to direct any active thought against the French army. In this, Marmont underrated the powers of lord Wellington's mind, and it is from a reference to this circumstance, that we are best able to estimate the great merit of lord Wellington, in the victory which he gained at Salamanca. This circumstance distinguished it far above his former victories, not less than its consequences did, and this circumstance rendered it particularly interesting and instructive to military men. In his former victories lord Wellington had not room for the full display of his military genius: they had been won as much by the discipline and valour of his troops, as by his own talents, since those talents, from the circumstances in which the battles were fought, could only exert themselves in the evolutions necessary during the battles, whereas at Salamanca there was ample room for the display and exercise of military genius of the highest order, and rarest kind."

The French ascribed their disastrous overthrow at Salamanca to the error of a subordinate commander, but it was impossible to deny the fact that the English general was one who, if a military error was committed in his presence, could instantly turn it to account.

The effects of this great event were most important—the confidence of wavering allies was confirmed—the evacuation of Madrid was rendered necessary—the siege of Cadiz was raised—Andalusia and Castile were delivered from military occupation—while Napoleon was prevented from reinforcing his army of the north from the troops in the Peninsula, as he had notice of Marmont's defeat as early as the 2nd of September, a week before the great battle of Borodino.

The inhabitants of Salamanca had watched from all the high grounds about the city, the various changes of the battle, with painful anxiety, and when, after the total discomfiture of the French, the allied troops entered the town, they were received with the most rapturous demonstrations of joy.

Mules and cars laden with refreshments were despatched from Salamanca to the field of battle; every care was taken of the wounded; and every exertion made to alleviate their sufferings; here might be seen the interesting spectacle of Spanish girls supporting from the field such of the wounded as were able to walk, and carrying for them their knapsacks and muskets. High mass was said in the cathedral, which the duke attended, and the new Spanish constitution was proclaimed with great ceremony.

Favoured by the night, and aided by the untoward circumstance of d'España's not having communicated his abandonment of the castle of Alba, the enemy continued their retreat, Clausel employing the time with great skill and energy in carrying off his broken army. But he was allowed no respite; the pursuit was renewed at the break of the following day, and Bock and Anson's brigades of cavalry having joined during the night, the pursuers came up in the course of the morning of the 23rd, with the rear-guard of the enemy, both cavalry and infantry, near La Serna. They immediately attacked the cavalry, which taking to flight, and leaving the infantry, drawn up in three squares, to its fate, with unhesitating spirit, they charged the squares, broke them, and captured 900 prisoners. Such as were not cut up or taken, threw away their arms, and scrambling over the fields, joined the main body of the retiring army. But as the French were still strong in cavalry and horse artillery, having been joined at Naval de Sotroval, two days after the battle, by Chauvel's long expected reinforcement in those arms, and by making forced marches, they reached Valladolid without further loss. So headlong had been their flight, that Clausel's head-quarters were on the night of the 23rd, at Flores de Avila, which is ten leagues from the field of battle. To that city Wellington pursued them, and they retired to Burgos as he approached. In Valladolid, which he entered on the 30th, and was greeted with as enthusiastic a reception as he had received at Salamanca, he captured 800 sick and wounded, seventeen pieces of artillery, and considerable stores. On the next day the allies recrossed the Douro, and head-quarters being fixed at Cuellar, preparations were made for a move against the army of the centre, under Joseph and Jourdan, which had, since the battle of the 22nd, been manœuvring at no great distance from the allies, to favour the escape of the

defeated force, and allow time for Clausel to rally it. At this time the movements of the English chief were so impeded for want of supplies and money, that in a letter to the secretary-of-war he said—"we are absolutely bankrupts. The troops are now five months in arrears, instead of being one in advance. The staff has not been paid since February, the muleteers not since June, 1811." By great exertions, however, supplies were brought up, and on the 6th of August, the English general, leaving the 6th division, Anson's brigade of cavalry, and some of the regiments which had suffered most in the late battle, to observe the line of the Douro, and prevent the junction between the armies of Portugal and the centre, marched on the capital by the route of Segovia and St. Ildefonso.* On the 9th he reached St. Ildefonso, and on the two following days, the troops defiling by the passes of Guadarama and Naval Serrada, crossed the mountains, and descended into the plains of new Castile.† Though Joseph Buonaparte made a show of resistance by placing his army across the roads leading from the passes of the Guadarama, he fled hurriedly to Madrid, from which he retreated with all his court and followers, to the number of above 2,000 persons, and crossing the Tagus, anxious to leave it as a barrier between him and the English, retreated on Valencia. On the evening of

the 11th the advanced guard, composed of D'Urban's Portuguese cavalry, supported by captain Macdonald's troop of horse artillery, and of the German legion, came up with the cavalry and outposts of Joseph's army, and driving them in, made themselves masters of Majalahonda. The enemy's cavalry, who had been compelled to retire in the morning, returned in greater numbers in the latter part of the day, when D'Urban forming his men, ordered them to charge the enemy's leading squadrons; but when they came within a few paces of the enemy, they disgracefully fled through the village upon the German dragoons, who were posted at Las Rosas, about a mile in the rear, leaving the guns of Macdonald's troop of horse artillery totally unprotected, and dashed through the village upon the German dragoons. Macdonald made a vigorous effort to save his guns, but three of them being overturned, fell into the hands of the enemy. Though surprised, the Germans charged as they best could; and, in small bodies, sword in hand, many of them being undressed, resisted the enemy, until Ponsonby's cavalry and the 7th division appearing in the distance, the enemy suddenly fell back on Madrid, having set fire to the three gun-carriages. The enemy slew 200 of the brave German horsemen, and carried off 140 of their horses.

Maxwell gives the following account of

* Segovia, a celebrated town of Old Castile, where are many remains of Moorish and Roman antiquity. Among the former is the Alcazar, once the palace of the Moorish kings, and afterwards of Ferdinand and Isabella, but which since their days has been used as a state prison. This building stands on a rock, rising some hundred feet above the river, which winds round nearly three-fourths of its base, and is cut off from the town on the remaining portion by a deep ditch and defences. The aqueduct, said to have been built by Trajan, is to be seen at different points between the town and Ildefonso, where the water is obtained; but the most remarkable feature of this structure is the portion in the suburb of the town, consisting of two rows of arches one above the other, nearly two hundred in number, the whole being formed of large blocks of stone, fitted into and supporting each other without cement, having thus withstood the ravages of time for eighteen centuries. San Ildefonso is a village fifty miles north of Madrid. Here is situated the palace of La Granja, a favourite summer residence of the royal family. The building and gardens, with the numerous *jets d'eau*, were formed after the model of the palace and gardens of Versailles, by the Bourbon dynasty on their accession to the throne of Spain. The palace is situate at the bottom of the Sierra Nevada, an attached ridge of the Guadarama, in a recess on the north side of the mountain, which rises to a considerable height, covered with trees to its summit, and to the east and

west; thus sheltering it at all times from the scorching heats of summer. The front of the building looks to the gardens, which rise before it, till they terminate in the craggy, pine-covered summit, adding much to the picturesque beauty of this delightful residence. The whole presents a scene, certainly, much more calculated to remind the beholder of the verdure and freshness of a more northern clime than of the burning fields and sultry sun of Spain.—*Maxwell*.

† From our bivouac in the woods of Ildefonso, at daybreak on the 10th of August, we began to ascend the mountain; the road winding among stately pines and rugged precipices, at every point presenting behind us a prospect in every way worthy to arrest the attention. From the summit we commanded a boundless view of the country we had lately traversed, interesting from being the scene of our past toils and victories; while in our front lay one not less so from its novelty, from the many striking objects that presented themselves to the eye; but, above all, awaking feelings the most intensely interesting, from our near approach upon the capital of Spain, a flying and dispirited enemy in our front. With exhilarated spirits we descended the wooded skirts of the mountain, the palace of the Escorial to our right, while more distant lay Madrid, with its hundred globe-topped spires, the indications of former Moorish sway. Encamping in the neighbourhood upon the 12th, we moved into the city the following day.—*Mackie*.

this untoward affair :—" On the evening of the 11th, the army of Lord Wellington was comfortably bivouacked three miles in the rear of Majalahonda. The Portuguese cavalry, under D'Urban, forming the advanced guard, were pushed forward a mile beyond the village, in which two regiments of German dragoons, and Macdonald's brigade of horse artillery, were posted to support them. Some trifling skirmishing had taken place during the day, between the Portuguese cavalry and the French lancers, who formed part of Joseph Buonaparte's escort, but it led to no serious result. No hostile movement was apprehended—all foretold a quiet night—when suddenly the horse-artillery opened in front of the village, and announced that the outposts were attacked. In a few minutes it was ascertained that the Portuguese dragoons had given way—and indeed, their flight was most disgraceful; they rode off at speed, without crossing a sabre, leaving their brave supporters, the horse-artillery, surrounded by the enemy. Nor was theirs a momentary panic—the fugitives dashed through the village of Majalahonda, without an attempt to rally—while many of the startled horsemen there were cut down before they could reach their saddles, and their colonel was killed in the act of dressing. But still, though surprised, the Germans maintained their well-won reputation; these gallant troopers charged as they best could; and in small bodies, sword in hand, met, checked, and at last fairly drove back the lancers. The cowardice of the Portu-

guese on this occasion was indefensible—they had scarcely a casualty to show—while, of the brave men who fought so gallantly, half-armed and surprised, 200 were put *hors de combat*, 120 horses carried off, and three guns taken. The cannon were recovered—but, to use the words of an amusing writer, whose military descriptions are lively and characteristic—"it was one of the most disgraceful and unlooked-for events that had taken place during the campaign. To be beaten at any time was bad enough; but to be beaten by a handful of lancers on the eve of our entering Madrid, almost in view of the city, was worse than all."

The duke thus refers to the same event in one of his despatches :—"We had a devil of an affair on the evening of the 11th. The French, 2,000 cavalry, moved upon the Portuguese cavalry; D'Urban ordered them to charge the advanced squadrons, which charge they did not execute as they ought, and they ran off, leaving our guns (captain M'Donald's troop). They ran in upon the German cavalry, half a mile or more in their rear, where they were brought up; but they would not charge upon the left of the Germans. These charged and stopped the enemy; but colonel de Jonquiers was taken, and we have lost a good many of these fine fellows. There are twenty killed, and about as many wounded and prisoners. We likewise lost three guns of M'Donald's troops in the Portuguese flight, but the French left them behind."

LORD WELLINGTON'S ENTRY INTO MADRID.

On the 12th of August, a memorable epoch, the allied army and its illustrious chief entered Madrid, amidst the most enthusiastic acclamations, and every demonstration of joy and exultation by all ranks throughout the capital. It was a day of public jubilee. All business was suspended; the inhabitants sallied forth in throngs, bearing laurel branches, welcomed their liberators at the gates with tears of joy, and waving handkerchiefs, and showering flowers upon them to evince their gratitude. "Every individual, from the first to the last," says a participator in the scene, "embraced either the officer or a soldier whom they could first lay hold of while we were marching. They invited us to their

homes, and insisted on our drinking wine with them almost at every corner of the streets. With tears, and every other sign of deep emotion, the inhabitants crowded around the horse of the illustrious conqueror, hung on his stirrups, touched his clothes, or throwing themselves upon the earth, blessed him aloud as the friend of Spain." "The entrance into the capital," said the editor of the *Madrid Gazette*, in the first number of that journal, published after the occupation of that city by the allied army, "was equal to the triumphal entries of the heroes of antiquity." Instantly Wellington proceeded to reconnoitre the Retiro palace, which the French had strongly fortified, and was garrisoned by 2,500 men. The place stands

on a rising ground at the eastern extremity of Madrid. Having been converted into a *dépôt* of the enemy, it then contained 23,000 stand of arms, upwards of 180 pieces of brass ordnance, eight field guns, and an immense quantity of trenching tools and stores, among which were the cables and hawsers with which the centre arch of the Almansor bridge was repaired, to enable sir Rowland Hill to march to Madrid. The eagles of the 13th and 57th regiments were also deposited there. By the evening of the 13th, the place was completely invested; and on the morning of the 14th, while arrangements were making for the attack of the place, the commandant surrendered.

In the evening of the 13th, don Carlos de España was appointed governor of Madrid, and the ancient government of the cortes and Ferdinand VII. was anew proclaimed. The new constitution was proclaimed amid the vivas of exulting crowds. All was joy and exultation. The entire population poured into the streets and squares; every tongue was loosened; on all sides were heard the accents of joy. "The scene was truly grand," says the paper already mentioned. "His lordship was attended by the flower of the British nobility, and by all the generals of the allied armies—whilst the Spanish nobility and the dignitaries of the church came out to meet him, accompanied by almost the whole population of the city, to witness the presentation of the keys. The air was rent with cries of long live the great duke of Rodrigo; but the elegant females, and those of the first rank, threw under his horse's feet, not only laurels and flowers, but even shawls and veils of the finest texture. When he attempted to alight at the palace assigned for his residence, women of the first quality embraced and kissed him, and even every person whom they took for him, so that it was a long time before he and his generals could get housed. There was, indeed, but little trouble in getting billets, for the inhabitants took hold of the British officers where they could find them, and insisted on making them inmates of their homes. The doors of all the houses were seen instantly adorned as if by enchantment, and every thing contributed to prove that the inhabitants considered the day as the aurora of liberty. The council of Madrid also entertained the marquis with a magnificent bull-fight. When he appeared in the royal box, twelve thousand spectators made the air ring with their repeated cheers."

On August the 22nd, the newly-appointed municipal council of Madrid, with the governor at their head, waited on the English general, with all the ceremonies of state, to offer him the following congratulatory address as duke of Ciudad Rodrigo:—"The inhabitants of Madrid manifest to your excellency, by the voice of their magistrates, the satisfaction they feel at seeing in the palace of their kings the illustrious conqueror of Vimiera and Talavera—the deliverer of Portugal—the conqueror of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos—the hero who, on the plains of Salamanca, humbled the pride of our perfidious and cruel enemies, frustrated their designs, and broke the chains which disgraced the capital of the Spanish empire, by a memorable victory, which history shall transmit to the latest posterity." To this proud and swelling enumeration of his great exploits, Wellington replied with simple dignity and unaffected modesty. After stating that he was sensible of the honour the council had conferred on him by the visit—"The events of war," said he, "are in the hands of Providence;" adding, "that he should continue to make every effort ultimately to establish the independence, prosperity, and happiness of Spain." Feelings such as these, so free from the elation and intoxication of triumph were the sure prelude of future and still more glorious exploits.

But, amidst these festivities and rejoicings, the poor *Medrileños* were suffering famine—of which 20,000 persons had died between September, 1811, and July, 1812—produced by the oppression and pillage of their cruel enemy. This was remedied in a small degree by the subscriptions raised among the English officers for the establishment of soup kitchens, &c. "At night," says one who witnessed the sad spectacle, "the groans, and stifled cries of famishing people were heard, and every morning emaciated dead bodies cast into the streets, showed why their cries had ceased. Even noble families secretly sought charity that they might live."

Honours and titles now thickly accumulated on lord Wellington. When the news of the victory at Salamanca reached England, it was hailed with great joy, and celebrated by a general illumination. Wellington was created a marquis of the United Kingdom, and allowed to add to his armorial bearings, in the dexter quarter, an escutcheon, charged with the crosses of St. George, St.

Andrew, and St. Patrick; being the union badge of the United Kingdom, as a lasting memorial of his glorious achievements; and subsequently, £100,000 was granted by parliament to purchase lands, and enable him to support the dignity of the peerage. In addition to the title of duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, the knighthood of the golden fleece was subsequently conferred on him, and he was made generalissimo of the Spanish armies. The prince regent of Portugal created him, in addition to the title of conde of Vimiero, marquis of Torres Vedras, a title subsequently augmented to that of duque da Vittoria. But in the midst of the enjoyment of these honours and titles, the private finances of their possessor were suffering

* The instances of the duke's disinterestedness and charitable disposition are numerous. In 1810, during the French invasion of Portugal he contributed liberally from his private resources to the relief of the distress and misery of the Portuguese population. His refusal of the pay attached to his high commands in the Portuguese and Spanish armies, as also of the rental of the Spanish estate given by the central junta, and the appropriation of the same to the use of each country during the war, is an instance of disinterestedness of which it would be difficult to find its parallel. When the Portuguese regency appointed the duke field-marshal-general of the Portuguese armies, he declined accepting the pay and emoluments attached to the rank, which were about £12,000 sterling a-year; and he again refused to accept the annual accumulations which the Portuguese government had reserved, with the hope that they would eventually meet with his acceptance, and his request was that the accumulated sums should be distributed among the officers of the Portuguese army, who had faithfully served their country. His conduct was equally disinterested and magnanimous in regard to the appointments of the Spanish central junta. He declined the acceptance of the pay and emoluments attached to his appointment of captain-general, or generalissimo of the Spanish armies, which amounted to about the same sum annually as his Portuguese appointments, and requested that the proceeds might be transferred to the Spanish treasury during the war, to be appropriated to the use of the state. He even transferred to the same use during the struggle for Spanish independence, the revenue (17,000\$) arising from the estate, which the junta had conferred on him during the time the war might last; and even in the selection of the estate, he manifested the same disinterestedness; of the three estates the junta submitted to his selection, he chose the least valuable one, namely, the Soto de Romana, situated on the river Xenil, about two leagues from Grenada, merely on account of its picturesqueness. Much misapprehension prevails on this subject, and has been occasioned by the duke's invariable practice when applied to for contributions towards public charities, to request the applicants not to make public his donation. The instances of his private charity were not few. The frauds practised on him by the begging-letter impostor (Stone), and the woman (Stanley), with whom he cohabited, under the pretences that she was the daughter of officers who had

great derangement; in explicit language, the income allowed him was insufficient to meet his necessary and unavoidable expenses. In a letter written to lord Bathurst, a few days after his triumphant entry into Madrid, he says, "I have been going on for more than three years upon the usual allowance of a commander-in-chief, that is, ten pounds per diem, liable to various deductions; among others, of income-tax, reducing it to about eight guineas; but it will be necessary that government should now either give me an additional pay, under the head of 'table money,' or any other they please, or that they should allow me to charge some of the expenses, such as charities,* &c., which I am obliged to incur, in the existing

been slain under the duke's command, are fresh in the recollection of the public. His conduct towards the son of Dhoondiah Waugh, his extra duplicate majesty of Indian notoriety, who was slain, after a long and arduous "royal chase," is a convincing proof of the generosity of his disposition. He took him under his protection, and when he left India, settled a pension on him for the purpose of defraying the expenses of his education. As one of his biographers has justly said, the assertion by misinformed and factious writers, that the duke's nature was "cold and unfeeling,"—is false. If other proofs were wanting, his extensive correspondence published in the *Despatches* proves that misfortune obtained his sympathy and the widow and orphan met frequently in him a warm and an eloquent friend. Lord Ellesmere, in his recent lecture in the Worsley Library and Reading-rooms, introduced the following anecdote of the duke's sensibility to distress. He told his auditors, that a lady present in the lecture-room had once directed the duke's attention to the case of a distressed needlewoman at Nottingham, whose privations had been recorded in the *Morning Chronicle*. The lecturer said, that the duke made some remark at the time, but on the following morning informed the lecturer that he had written to the editor of that journal, stating that the poor woman should have her wishes, namely, a passage to the colonies, complied with at his expense. And the instances of the like benevolent and beneficent feeling are not rare. A lady wrote to the duke requesting his autograph, to dispose of among a collection of the kind, at a charitable sale. The duke's reply was—"London, May 17, 1847.—F.M. the duke of Wellington presents his compliments to Mrs. N—. To aid in promoting the object of a charity is one thing—to send a signature for sale at a bazaar is another. To comply with the latter may prove very injurious to those with whom the sender of the signature might have pecuniary relations. F.M. the duke of Wellington therefore declines to do the latter; but he incloses a pecuniary contribution (£5) to the charity which Mrs. N— desires to promote." And even no later than within five days of his death, he gave evidence of his charitable disposition. Mr. John Hughes, of Downsend, near Bristol, having addressed a letter to the duke, requesting his interference to procure a pension for a man, named Joseph Flock, who had served in the 15th hussars, and had been in




Engraved by W. Finden

HORATIO, VISCOUNT NELSON

OB. 1805

FROM THE ORIGINAL OF HOPPNER, IN

HIS MAJESTY'S COLLECTION.







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HORATIO, VISCOUNT NELSON


OB. 1805.

FROM THE ORIGINAL OF HOPPNER, IN

HIS MAJESTY'S COLLECTION.



THE SHIP



state of this country, or I shall be ruined. It is not proper, probably, to advert to other services; but I believe there is no service in which a commander-in-chief, with such a charge as I have, is so badly paid as in the British service. Indeed, as far as I can learn, there is no instance of an officer holding a permanent command in the British service whose receipts have been confined to ten pounds per diem, with deductions. They all receive either the allowance of a government, with that of a commander-in-chief, or

an allowance of some other description; but I doubt that the trouble or responsibility, or the expenses of any at all equal mine. However, I should not have mentioned the subject, knowing that the public expect in these days to be well served at the lowest possible rate of expense, if I did not find that I was in a situation in which I must incur expenses which I cannot defray without doing myself an injury." This letter produced the parliamentary grant of £100,000 already mentioned.

THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION.

DURING the occurrence of these transactions, the Sicilian expedition to the eastern coast of Spain, and that of sir Home Popham to the north-western coast, took place, and were intended as diversions to prevent the enemy from concentrating his armies upon the allied force under lord Wellington. To enable the reader properly to understand these operations, it will be necessary to take a rapid glance at the affairs of Sicily at this period. In the year 1806, English troops had been landed in that island, and from that time up to the period of which we are now treating, they had been maintained there at a great expense. A luxurious prince and a thoughtless court, had, however, rendered their efforts almost unavailing for any of the purposes for which they were intended. English generals had successively remonstrated, but to little purpose, though a subsidy was annually paid to the Sicilian government by England, amounting to from three to four hundred thousand pounds. The object of this advance was to insure the Sicilian army being placed on a proper footing, but it still remained badly paid, and deficient in discipline. The king is spoken of as not being wanting in understanding, but like his namesake of Spain, so his personal enjoyments were secured, all else seemed beneath his care. To Caroline of Austria, the sister of Marie Antoinette, the combat of Sahagun, and the battles of Vittoria, Orthes, Thoulouse, and Waterloo; the duke replied, that he had no power to procure a pension or reward for any soldier, adding—"all the duke can do is to give the man charity," which he accordingly did. In a word, his purse was ever open to the wants and distresses of the soldier's orphan and widow; it was that feeling which rendered him the

he was content to leave all affairs of state. Queen Caroline had been one of the most fervent admirers of Nelson. She was considered amiable, generous, and though addicted to pleasure, capable of acting a noble part on great occasions. The miserable fate of her sister had, in the course of years, produced in her, so it was thought, a mournful change; and from being gay and gentle, she became angry and vindictive. She prompted that severity towards the Neapolitan admiral, Caraccioli, which threw dishonour on the name of the hero of the Nile. Great misfortunes had since overtaken her, and soured by these, she was disposed to regard all who avowed themselves favourable to reform, as no better than traitors. Hence the prisons and fortresses of Sicily became the recipients of numerous state prisoners. The humane interference of English commanders, in favour of some of the sufferers, gave her serious offence, and she reproachfully complained, that king Ferdinand was no longer master in his own island, and that the English encouraged refractory subjects, whose only aim was to bring about a revolution. These complaints became louder, after the marriage of Napoleon with her niece Maria Louisa. Some emissaries of Buonaparte were at this time in Sicily, and through them, queen Caroline corresponded with the French emperor. victim of the audacious impostor Stone. There are few public characters of whom the million have a more false idea. The far-seeing kindness, the anxious consideration for others, and the extensive and never-talked of charities, prove that the soubriquet of "the Iron Duke," however applicable to his undiminished sense of duty, is a complete misnomer as far as relates to his other characteristics.

The abhorrence she had formerly felt for the French nation, while it was proclaimed to be a republic, had been greatly softened down by its taking the shape of an empire, under Buonaparte, who had been the fierce enemy of the Jacobins and the republicans. Let it be added, he was commended to her better feelings by the severity he used towards those who had sent the unfortunate Marie Antoinette to the scaffold. Napoleon had promised to restore her husband's dominions, or to give him a kingdom elsewhere, making it, however, a condition, that he should by some means or other expel the English from Sicily. Such a delusive scheme is said to have been submitted to Caroline, and to have been approved by her. She, in consequence, was favourable to a plot, having for its object the utter extinction of the British army, which had been sent to Sicily for her defence.

Affairs were in this situation when lord William Bentinck was sent to Palermo, as envoy-extraordinary and commander-in-chief. The information which he possessed, rendered it necessary for him to state some painful truths to her majesty. His interference in behalf of parties who had been imprisoned on suspicion, she fiercely resented, and contemptuously described the English commander-in-chief to be a "hard-hearted German corporal," who would not listen to reason. Had not, she indignantly demanded, "the king, her husband, and herself, a right to govern in Sicily as they thought proper, and to imprison without trial as many Sicilians as they pleased?" She pointed to her Sicilian troops and Calabrians, and vowed if the English attempted to control the movements of the king or her own, she would resist force by force. Thus treated, it appeared to Bentinck necessary to return forthwith to England, to ask for new instructions and additional powers. General Maitland, who commanded the forces, announced to the English army in general orders, that urgent political considerations, intimately connected with the future prosperity of Sicily, had called his lordship away. He stated at the same time, that four persons, who had been imprisoned for corresponding with the enemy in Calabria, were then liberated, because, though sufficient proofs were obtained against them, he would not on first assuming the command, put offenders to death. It was added, like clemency would not be shewn in any other case, as the general was determined to put

an end to the system of espionage and treachery, which had long been acted upon by those who were equally enemies to the Sicilian people, and their British allies. The general declared, from that time forward parties guilty of like practices, should be brought before a council of war, and if convicted, the sentence of the council should be at once executed. It had by this time become known that general Manhes, who commanded the French army in Calabria, was in communication with Neapolitan traitors. Facts transpired, which made their doings known, and scheme was employed against scheme.

By means of bribery those who brought the letters of Manhes were induced to give them up to the English, who allowed them to be forwarded to their destination, but not till an exact copy had been made. General Manhes had no suspicion of being thus overreached, and having in one of his communications stated that he had matters to impart, which could not be trusted to a letter, he added, an aid-de-camp would shortly wait upon his correspondent, a colonel De Philippis, with whom all that was necessary could be arranged. To guard effectually against De Philippis being imposed upon, Manhes supplied a minute description of the person of the young French officer with whom he was to confer. What immediately followed, we give in the words of Mr. M'Farlane, who states many of the particulars to have been obtained from private information in Sicily, at Naples, and at home:—"It became necessary for the English general to find some one who should personate this French aid-de-camp. This was not very easy: it was in vain to look among the British and Sicilian officers, for a man that could speak French so as to pass for a Frenchman; it was moreover indispensable that this spy or counter-plotter should be a person of address, ability, courage, and confidence, and also a stranger in Messina, and that he should bear some resemblance to the French aid-de-camp whom Manhes had described. At length such a man was found in one of the foreign regiments in our service, Monsieur A—— De —, a subaltern in a regiment doing duty at Malta, who, though educated from his childhood in England, was a Frenchman by birth, the son of a French emigrant. Having undertaken to personate the aid-de-camp, now anxiously expected by the conspirators, he was brought to Messina in



Alhambra





disguise, kept concealed till his moustachios had grown to the pattern, and till he received the instruction necessary to enable him to go through the difficult part he had to act. He was then secretly carried out to sea, and was landed by night from a small boat on an open part of the shore, as if from the Calabrian coast, wearing the disguise of a sailor's dress, which Manhes had said his aid-de-camp would wear. He was furnished with such credentials as the intercepted materials in general Maitland's hands enabled him to provide, and he had the watchwords which had been agreed upon between Manhes and De Philippis. M. A—— De —— was led, blindfolded, into the conspirator's den, in the very heart of Messina. This den was the lodging of colonel De Philippis, and here the adroit and strong-nerved Frenchman, gained the complete knowledge of everything, with a list of all the persons in Sicily upon whom Manhes might count. There was matter to try his nerves and his wit. He was in imminent danger of being discovered by a Sicilian who had been his brother officer, but who had been turned out of the regiment for misconduct, and some of the Neapolitan conspirators were personally acquainted with Manhe's real aid-de-camp. But with great art and firmness, and an unchanging countenance, he refused to see the Sicilian and the others who were clamorous for admission, alleging the positive order of his general, to be introduced only to a small and select number, to men whose courage and honour could be depended upon."

This clever impostor succeeded in gaining all the information he sought, and withdrew in an open boat as if to return to Reggio, but speedily finding his way to the Sicilian coast, before daylight next morning, the 2nd of December, 1811, those he had rejoiced by promising them such assistance as should enable them to dispose of the English army as they pleased, found themselves arrested and lodged in the citadel. Lord William Bentinck soon after this reappeared in Sicily, having obtained those powers from his government which he thought it necessary to demand. The town-major of Messina was one of the conspirators who had been apprehended. They were all brought to trial before a court-martial formed of British and Sicilian officers. All were found guilty and received sentence of death, but of fifteen thus doomed, only one suffered capital pun-

ishment. After their trial had been completed, the president of the court committed to the flames a list of conspirators with which he had been furnished, in the hope that this act of mercy, in abating fear, would check disaffection. Facts were stated in the course of the proceedings which deeply implicated queen Caroline. The mind of this lady had been so operated upon by various circumstances, that some of her proceedings really wore the aspect of insanity. Lord William Bentinck judged it expedient to restrain the queen, and it was very distinctly intimated that an important change must take place by suspending for a time the expected subsidy. The duke of Orleans, afterwards king Louis Philippe, who had become the husband of Maria Amelia, a Neapolitan princess, and queen Caroline's second daughter, acquainted with the intrigues which had been in progress, approved of the course pursued by lord William Bentinck, and urged Don Francisco, the hereditary prince, to come forward at this juncture, and take the reins of government out of the hands of his incapable father. Don Francisco was indolent and infirm, and but indifferently qualified for the high station to which he aspired, but to invest him with kingly authority offered the best means of opposing the mad plottings of his mother, and Ferdinand himself thought this was necessary to save him from the ruinous consequences of his consort's folly. He accordingly resigned the kingly authority into the hands of Don Francisco with the title of *Alter Ego*. The arrangement was formally completed on the 16th of January, 1812.

Early in the year 1812, an expedition was to have left Sicily, to clear the eastern coast of Spain of the enemy, and if possible, expel him from Catalonia, Valencia, and Murcia. The expediency of this course was called in question, and lord William Bentinck, the English commander-in-chief in Sicily, recommended that instead, the Anglo-Sicilian armament should be directed to operate on the coast of Italy, which was then left almost defenceless. Murat, and a Neapolitan force, having been called off by Buonaparte, to aid him in the war then breaking out between France and Russia, lord Bentinck was of opinion that no very beneficial result could reasonably be anticipated, from employing the troops under him, on the eastern coast of Spain. Wellington felt much disappointed at learning this, after the measure

had been proposed to government, and he failed not to make his view of it known to his lordship.

In a communication to lord W. Bentinck, dated Boecillo, near Valladolid, 30th July, he says, "I am happy to find that, although it appears that you do not expect any successful result from the operations of the Sicilian army on the eastern coast of the Peninsula, to which point I shall advert presently, you had resumed the intention of sending them there. I acknowledge that I thought that, upon consideration, you would find the grounds for your intended expedition to the coast of Italy so little satisfactory, that you would resume the plan for the eastern coast which had been concerted and arranged; and every thing remains in exactly the state in which it was in the beginning of June, excepting that the first division of the Sicilian army has gone, according to your former directions, to Sardinia. I should hope, however, that there will be no inconvenience in bringing it back from thence. In regard to the aid to Spain to be derived from this expedition, I am concerned to find that you have altered your opinion upon it since you first proposed the measure to government; and if I did not hope that general Maitland and the staff and other officers of the Sicilian army would alter their opinion upon a nearer view of what they have to accomplish, and its effect upon the contest, I should despair of any success from persons coming on a service holding such opinions. I am quite certain that they can succeed in taking Tarragona, and in opening a communication between the fleet and the Spanish army by Tarragona—which is in itself a service of the greatest importance. I am likewise quite certain that they can take the city of Valencia; that they will thereby give to the Spaniards, and deprive the French of, an important resource; that the war will revive again in Valencia; and that, if matters are well arranged in that quarter, the enemy will never again gain possession of that city. But if I should be mistaken in my expectations of their success in these operations, I cannot be mistaken in their effect upon my own. I have lately, on the 22nd, beaten marshal Marmont in a general action, fought near Salamanca, and I have pursued him beyond the Douro; and our troops have this day entered Valladolid. *

* * * Then, if Suchet's attention should not be diverted from me, and, not-

withstanding Marmont's defeat, the French should become too strong for me in Old Castile, I shall at least have the satisfaction of reflecting, while I am retiring, that general Maitland's progress will be unopposed, and that we shall take Tarragona and Valencia. But it is not impossible, that neither my success in Castile, nor general Maitland's on the eastern coast, will eventually give any aid to Spain; upon which point I have nothing to say. That is a subject for the consideration of politicians; and, as a military officer, I can advert to any plan only as being likely to be attended with military success, or otherwise; but I beg to remark, that the same observation is applicable by politicians, not only to every military plan, but to the general operations of every war, and even to the objects of the war itself. I have taken up so much of your attention upon this subject, because, in my opinion, without intending it, you have, by a few words, thrown upon the king's ministers a larger share of the responsibility for the success of general Maitland's expedition than belongs to them. I am certain he will succeed; and, at all events, he will do good to my operations. But much as I wish for their success, I assure you that I should not give my advice that general Maitland's credit, or the safety of the troops, should be risked for that object only."

A few days later he wrote to lord Bathurst, impressing upon him the importance of the aid which he expected to derive from the operations of the Sicilian expedition. His letter was dated from Cuellar, the 3rd August, and in it he says:—

"It is perfectly true that his Majesty's government had at first in contemplation only a short service on the east coast; and that I reckoned upon the co-operation of the troops from Sicily, only till the period of the equinoctial gales. Circumstances, however, have now materially altered; and either my position in Castile must be supported by the continuation of the appearance of the troops on the eastern as well as on the northern coast of the Peninsula, or it must be expected that I shall be obliged to withdraw into Portugal at an early period after those troops shall have withdrawn.

"If lieutenant-general Maitland should succeed in taking Valencia, there appears no reason for which he should quit the coast, unless, indeed, the enemy's army in the kingdom of Naples should be so reinforced, as that the island of Sicily shall be in

danger. If he should not succeed in taking Valencia, as long as the allies shall remain in possession of Minorca, Alicante, and Carthagena, there appears no reason why the fleet of transports and troops under the command of lieutenant-general Maitland should quit the coast, or should discontinue their efforts to alarm the enemy for the safety of their possession of Valencia. The expedition to the northern coast might likewise remain on the coast to keep up the alarm which has already been so useful to this army. This is my view of these operations at the present moment; and I hope that, if your lordship should concur in it, you will send orders accordingly to lieutenant-general Maitland, and to sir H. Popham.

"Circumstances may put it in my power to acquire fresh successes, particularly against the army of the centre; and this army may, by its own efforts, secure its position in Castile, at least till the French shall evacuate Andalusia. It will then remain to be considered what ought to be done with the Sicilian troops; but in the mean time, I trust that your lordship will not allow them to withdraw from the Peninsula, as ordered, in the second week in September."

When Wellington thus wrote, an expedition was almost within sight of the eastern coast of Spain; but the force sent was wholly inadequate to the object in view. It consisted of but 6,000 men, under the command of lieutenant-general Maitland, one-half British and Germans, the other were

Calabrians and Sicilians. In its passage to the coast of Catalonia, it was joined by the Spanish Majorcan force, a large portion of whom were such runaways from the routs in Valencia and Murcia, as could be collected and caught, consisting of about 4,000 men, and transports having "the honoured battering train which had shattered the gory walls of Badajos" on board. Maitland reached Palamos on the 31st of July, but ascertaining that Alicante was in danger on account of Joseph O'Donnel's defeat at Castalla on the 21st of July, in which the Spanish general lost 4,000 men, though Harispe's attacking force did not exceed that number, he, on August the 10th, landed at that fort. On the 14th he took the field, but on the 18th, receiving intelligence that the army of the intruder and that of Suchet were about to form a junction, he fell back to his position in front of Alicante. Maitland's health giving way under the anxieties of his situation, the command devolved upon major-general John Murray, until major-general W. Clinton arrived from Sicily. Thus the Anglo-Sicilian expedition was rendered useless, and disappointed the hopes of Wellington. The results, however, of sir Home Popham's expedition had been more encouraging: Gueteria, Santander, and Bilbao had been recovered by the patriots. In the mean time, Hill, being pressed by Soult, advanced to Albueria, but the French general was unwilling to risk a second battle on that field.

LORD WELLINGTON EVACUATES MADRID.

BESIDES the failure of the support which the English general hopefully expected from the Sicilian expedition, he was embarrassed by other disappointments. The cortes, instead of directing their attention to reorganizing their armies and rendering them efficient, were engaged in inventing new constitutions and determining the precedence of saints. Such was their apathy, that the English chief, in a letter dated Madrid, 23rd of August, 1812, and addressed to the right honourable Henry Wellesley, says, "As for raising men and supplies, or taking any one measure to enable them to carry on the war, that is out of the question. They are in general

the most incapable of useful exertion of all the nations that I have known." But his own exertions began now to display themselves in all their lustre and effect. The moral consequences, military and political, of the great victory of Salamanca, appeared in every direction throughout the Peninsula. Andalusia, indeed almost the whole of the south and centre of Spain, was liberated from the thralldom of the oppressor, and the fabric of his power and domination was shaken to its very centre. The same event also materially contributed to uphold the insurrectionary spirit of the guerillas and Somatenes. Astorga, Guadalaxara, and Tordesillas, containing garrisons, amounting to 2,450 men,

surrendered to the patriots. The siege of Cadiz was raised on August the 24th, the French having previously destroyed a large number of their guns and stores on the works of Chiclana, Santa Maria, and the Trocadero, but the garrison advancing to the lines, they retreated in so great haste, that about one-half of the artillery, with a large portion of their stores, and thirty gun-boats, fell into the hands of the allies. Soult then leaving eight battalions in Seville, on the night of the 26th, quitted the city, and advanced on Granada, with the intention of concentrating his army in that province. To recover Seville, a detachment of Spaniards, consisting of 600 men, under general Cruz-Morgeon, the 1st regiment of guards, the 87th, and a Portuguese regiment, under colonel Skerrett, were deputed from Cadiz. This small force, landing at Huelva, in the Guadalquivir, made a rapid march by San Lucar; on the 24th, drove the enemy thence, and on the morning of the 27th suddenly seized the suburb of Triana, and advanced to the bridge as rapidly as possible. The French immediately attempted to destroy the bridge between the suburb and the city; but the guards, and Downie's legion soon carried it. Downie,* who was second in command, during the assault, leaping his horse over the chasm the enemy had made, and falling wounded into the hands of the enemy, threw his sword (which had been Pizarro's) among his own people. The bridge being carried, the enemy retired to the Triunfo, and there again made a stand, but soon retreated through the city, taking the direction of Alcala. Scarcely had the allies taken Seville, when 7,000 French infantry from the blockade of Cadiz approached with the intention of taking up their quarters there; but supposing that it was occupied by sir Rowland Hill's force, they hastily moved towards Soult, Ballasteros hanging upon their flank, and continuing to harass them till they reached Granada.

Clausel having re-organized his army, and received some reinforcements, by a bold advance carried off the garrisons from Toro and Zamora, and drove back the Gallician army under Santocildes, which, after

* Downie, who had commenced his military career by accompanying Miranda in his first expedition to Venezuela, served as assistant commissary-general in sir John Moore's army, and was in the same capacity with sir Arthur, in 1809. But seized with a military mania, he entered the Spanish service, and raised the loyal legion of Estremadura, which he caused to be clothed according to the old Spanish

its capture of Astorga, had advanced towards Zamora for the purpose of effecting a junction with Paget's force posted at Cuellar; and having made demonstrations against that force so as to induce the English general to retire on Arevalo, Wellington, to prevent the interruption of his communication with Portugal, determined to besiege Burgos, for the purpose of putting the Gallicians in possession of it, as then the French would be deprived of any strong post or depôt on the great line of communication between France and the interior of Spain, and the Gallician army would be enabled to hold the army of Portugal in check while he was proceeding against Soult, the intruder, and Suchet. He therefore directed Hill to advance from the Guadiana to the Tagus, and take post in the Jarama, for the purpose of covering Madrid on that side; and leaving under his command the 3rd, 4th, and light divisions, Alten's brigade of cavalry, D'Urban's Portuguese cavalry, and de España's Spanish corps in the capital and its neighbourhood, he despatched the 1st, 5th, and 7th divisions, Bradford and Pack's Portuguese divisions, with the German heavy cavalry, and Anson's light brigade to advance and form a junction with Paget at Arevalo. He himself quitted Madrid on the 1st of September, having previously addressed the following proclamation to the Spanish nation:—

“Madrid, 29th August, 1812.

“Spaniards—It is unnecessary to take up your time by recalling to your recollection the events of the last two months, or by drawing your attention to the situation in which your enemies now find themselves.

“Listen to the accounts of the numerous prisoners brought in, and deserters from their army; hear the details of the miseries endured by those who, trusting to the promises of the French, have followed the vagabond fortunes of the usurper, driven from the capital of your monarchy; hear these details from their servants and followers who have had the sense to quit this scene of desolation, and if the sufferings of your oppressors can soften the feeling of those inflicted upon yourselves, you will find ample cause for consolation.

costume. By this, and by his character, which in some respects resembled their own, he made himself popular among the Spaniards; inasmuch, that the marquesa de Conquista, the representative of the Pizarros, presented him with the sword of her ancestor, “the famous or infamous conqueror of Peru,” as a testimony of her appreciation of his efforts in behalf of Spanish liberty.

"But much remains still to be done to consolidate and secure the advantages required. It should be clearly understood that the pretended king is an usurper, whose authority it is the duty of every Spaniard to resist; that every Frenchman is an enemy, against whom it is the duty of every Spaniard to raise his arm.

"Spaniards! you are reminded that your enemies cannot much longer resist; that they must quit your country if you will only omit to supply their demands for provisions and money, when those demands are not enforced by superior force. Let every individual consider it his duty to do every thing in his power to give no assistance to the enemy of his country, and that perfidious enemy must soon entirely abandon, in disgrace, a country which he entered only for the sake of plunder, and in which he has been enabled to remain only because the inhabitants have submitted to his mandates, and have supplied his wants.

"Spaniards! resist this odious tyrant, and be independent and happy.

"WELLINGTON."

While quitting Madrid, he took every precaution that might be requisite in case of a reverse, pointing out the different measures to be adopted according to the movements of the enemy, and ordering that if they advanced, the sick and the stores should be removed, and every thing destroyed that could not be carried off. Hill, by his occupation of Toledo, Yepes, and Aranjuez, guarded all the roads which led from the south of Spain to Madrid, and thus not only covered Madrid but the right of the main army.

On the 4th of September, the allied force moved from Arevalo, on the 6th forded the Douro, and on the 7th entered Valladolid; Clausel having, on the preceding night, quitted it, retreating through the fruitful and picturesque valleys of Arlanzan and Pisuerga, and destroying the bridge on the Pisuerga; his "long line of baggage being larger and closer than any man who had served in

India had ever seen with an Indian army, for he had pressed all the cattle in the country, and left nothing transportable for any marauder who might follow him." Now began a trial of consummate military skill between the French general and his great adversary. The valleys through which the enemy was retreating, abounding with numerous enclosures and ridges, whose flanks appearing on the lofty hills which rose on each side, afforded at every mile a position capable of vigorous defence. Of these local advantages the French general skilfully availed himself. "Each day he offered battle, but on ground which Wellington was unwilling to assail in front, partly because he momentarily expected the Galicians up, but chiefly because of the declining state of his own army from sickness, which, combined with the hope of ulterior operations in the south, made him unwilling to lose men. By flank movements he dislodged the enemy, yet each day's darkness fell ere they were completed, and the morning's sun always saw Clausel again in position [as little assailable as that of the preceding day]. At Cigales and Dueñas, in the Pisuerga valley; at Magoz, Torquemada, Cordobilla, Revilla, Vallejera, and Pampliega, in the valley of the Arlanzan, the French general thus offered battle, and finally covered Burgos on the 16th by taking the strong position of Cellada del Camino."*

The pursuit continued beyond Valencia, where the English general forming a junction with the Gallician army, consisting of about 12,000 men, Clausel made a hasty retreat to a strong position near Burgos, where he was next day joined by Souham with 9,000 infantry; Souham assuming the supreme command, retired to a position near Briviesca. On the 18th, the allies crossed the Arlanzan, and taking possession of the heights on the north-west of the castle, entered the city of Burgos, which the French abandoned, and retired into the castle. The garrison consisted of 2,500 men, commanded by general Dubreton.

SIEGE OF BURGOS.

BURGOS, which is the capital of old Castile, and the original seat of the Spanish monarchy, is situated in the beautiful and fertile valley of the Arlanzan, and stands on that river, over which it has three bridges. Many

historical recollections are connected with it. It was the birth-place of Gonzales and the Cid Campeador, and the last mentioned hero and his wife Xemina lie buried there

* *History of the War in the Peninsula.*

Our Edward I. was knighted there by his brother-in-law, Alphonso the Wise. It abounds with objects of antiquity and veneration. Among the relics shown in its magnificent cathedral were the handkerchief of the prophet Elijah, and a lock of Abraham's hair. But those extraordinary relics were eclipsed by the miraculous crucifix in the convent of St. Augustine, which is supposed to have been the image carved by Nicodemus, and carried from Jerusalem to Berytus, or to have descended from heaven, in order that there should be on earth one perfect resemblance of the crucified Saviour, and which a merchant, on his homeward voyage from Flanders, is said to have found at sea in a chest shaped like a coffin. Volumes, filled with *authentic* accounts of the miracles which this extraordinary crucifix has performed, have been published, and are highly esteemed by pious Spanish catholics.

On its north stand the castle and the rocky hill San Miguel. The castle of Burgos stands on an oblong conical hill, towering above all the houses of the town; and the acclivity on which it is situated was encircled at the time of the siege by successive lines of field works, from the base to the summit. The two inner lines bristled at all points with cannon. The third line consisted of an uncovered scarp wall of difficult access at the base of the hill. At the distance of 300 yards from the castle hill, and separated from it by a deep ravine, stands the Cerro de San Miguel, which was surmounted by a horn-work, and is about an equal elevation.

On the 19th of September, the allied army invested the castle. The operations of the siege were entrusted to the 1st and 6th divisions, under Campbell and Clinton, and the Portuguese brigades of Pack and Bradford. The covering army, under the immediate command of Wellington, was advanced on the high road in front of Monasterio, to hold Souham in check. Headquarters were established at Villa Toro.

The enemy's outposts being driven in, as a preliminary measure to any attack, it was necessary to win the horn-work for the purpose of erecting a battery to weaken the defences on the castle-hill preparatory to their being attacked. This plan, from the very small artillery means, namely, three 18 long pounders, and five 24-pound iron howitzers, at the disposal of the English general, gave the best promise of success. Accordingly, on the evening of the 19th, two parties were directed to attack it in

front, while major the honourable W. Cocks forced it in the rear. The attack in front could not be carried into effect, on account of the ladders not being long enough for the face of the work, and the injudicious act of the parties opening fire before they had reached the ditch. But major Cocks, though he lost in advancing nearly half his party by the fire of the castle, found an entrance over the palisades at the gorge, which the garrison had neglected, being fully occupied with the attack in front. He therefore, with little opposition, got over the palisades, and entered the body of the work, with about 140 men; these he divided, putting one-half on the ramparts to ensure the entry of the co-operating force in front, and the other he formed opposite the gateway in the hope of making the garrison prisoners; but the French running from their works, in number about 500, literally ran over this little party, and escaped into the castle; leaving eight guns, one officer, and sixty-two men in the hands of the captors. The assailants sustained a loss of about 400 killed and wounded. That of the enemy was about 100. Batteries were now erected on the horn-work, and trenches were opened to secure the communication with that work. Encouraged by the success of the attack of the 19th, on the night of the 22nd an attempt was made to carry the exterior line or outer escarp wall of the works by escalade. The attack was made by detachments of Portuguese troops on the French left, while a part of the 1st division under major Laurie, of the 79th, attempted to scale the walls. The ladders were reared, and the storming party forced up the wall most gallantly; but as soon as the leading men gained a momentary footing, they were bayoneted down, and those on the ladders either shot or knocked down by heavy cannon balls and combustibles, which caused the men's pouches to explode. After repeated attempts, the storming columns were obliged to retire with the loss of half their number in killed and wounded; among the latter of whom was Laurie.

It was now determined to mine the outer or escarp wall. The execution of this process was retarded by the heavy falls of rain, and the exposure of the workmen to the murderous fire of the garrison from the lofty site of the enemy's defences. In carrying the approaches down the hill, the workmen were exposed to the whole artillery of the place, and the enemy's marksmen,

showers of grape and tempests of bullets falling without intermission around the spot were they were working. A gallery was however at last carried under the outer wall, and a mine being charged with 1,100 lbs. of powder, at midnight of the 29th the hose was fired, and a breach being effected by the explosion, a serjeant and three privates, who formed the forlorn hope, rushed through the smoke, and mounting the ruins, bravely gained the breach; but the storming party missing its way in the dark, the French, who had been at first surprised, seeing the four men in the breach without support, charged and drove them down. These brave men, three of whom had been wounded, regained their division. Before daylight the enemy had made the breach impracticable.

Another mine having been placed under another part of the wall, a fire was opened on October 4th from San Miguel, against the old breach, and at five o'clock, p.m., the mine was sprung, when 100 feet of the wall giving way, the 24th regiment rushed forward through the smoke and ruins, and carrying both breaches, a lodgment was made within the outer wall, and the first line of the defences. In this gallant affair about 200 men were killed and wounded. At this time a supply of ammunition arrived from Santander.

On the afternoon of the 5th, the enemy made a furious sally on this post, destroying the lodgment, carrying off the intrenching tools, and causing a loss of 150 men in killed and wounded to the besiegers. As soon as it was dark this damage was repaired, and a parallel pushed within ten yards of the enemy's second line; but many of the labourers were slain by the enemy's marksmen, and the large shells which they rolled down the glacis. Only one piece of siege artillery now remained serviceable.

About three o'clock of the morning of the 8th they made another fierce sortie, when the guard in the trenches being overpowered, they levelled the works and carried off the tools. In this sortie 200 of the besiegers were killed and wounded, among the former of whom was colonel Cocks, who lost his life in rallying the guard and workmen, and repelling the assailants.

The troops being now established within about 100 yards of the interior line, another gallery was run under the second or interior lines, and a mine laid beneath the church of San Roman. As soon as the hose was fired,

a counter-mine was immediately sprung by the enemy, when colonel Brown, with a detachment of Portuguese and Spaniards, rushing on, seized on the ruined building; at the same time a practicable breach being effected in the line, on the afternoon of the 18th, preparations were now made for the assault. A detachment of the guards rushed through the old breach, escalated the second line of defence, and in front of the third line encountered the French in overpowering numbers; at the same time 200 of the German legion carried the new breach, and some of them escalated the third line. The defence of the enemy was not less vigorous than the attack; they poured so destructive a fire from the third line and the castle on both the detachments, and attacked them with so overpowering numbers before they could be supported, that the assailants were driven back with the loss of more than 200 in killed and wounded.

At this period of the siege, namely, the day of the failure of the last assault, Souham, who had succeeded Massena in the command of the army of Portugal, being joined by the army of observation from Alava, and the remainder of the army of the north, moved a strong body against the outpost of Monasterio, and capturing the picket of Germans, obtained possession of the heights covering that place. In consequence of this menacing movement, the covering army moved near Quintanapalla, and all the besieging troops, except a force sufficient to maintain the siege, were ordered to join it.

Wellington immediately arranged his army. The French moved 10,000 men forward on the evening of the next day, for the purpose of driving the allied outposts from Quintanapalla and Olmas; when the English general, seeing there was a fair opportunity to strike a blow, directed Paget, who had recently joined, to move with two divisions on their right flank. The enemy was quickly driven back, and Monasterio recovered. During the whole of the siege, the vigilance and active superintendence of the commander-in-chief had been unremitting; the arrangements for each attack had been written out by himself as he sat on the ground watching the movements. Considering how often he was within fire, his escape from injury was surprising. As he closely observed the assault on San Miguel, 29th September, he was in imminent danger; a field which he crossed being literally ploughed up by grape and bullets.

The siege had now lasted thirty days, five intrepid assaults had been made on the successive strong lines of defence, and above 2,000 men had been killed and wounded in their gallant efforts, but still the fortress remained in the hands of the enemy. No blame was attributable either to the general or his army. The discomfiture was occasioned by the insufficient means with which the siege had been undertaken. The artillery was defective both in numbers and force, the entire siege park being only, as before stated, three 18-long-pounders, and five 24-pound iron howitzers, and being the same as had been in battery against the forts of Salamanca, where they were found to be of not sufficient weight and calibre. The ammunition was so scanty and deficient, that the 16-pound shot fired by the enemy, were collected, and made to serve for the English artillery. The siege establishments of the army had been deficient in the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, and therefore success had been purchased by a profuse expenditure of human life; but at Burgos there was not even the skeleton of an establishment. The weather had also been very unfavourable; rain, accompanied by violent winds, having impeded the progress of the operations during a great part of the siege. Preparations therefore were made to raise the siege; a measure which the combined movement of the armies of the south and centre, under Soult and the Intruder, and the effective and powerful army of Souham in his front, determined the English chief to adopt. Soult had been enabled to effect his junction with the intruder, in consequence of Ballasteros, who, on the 1st of June, had been defeated at Bornos by Coureux, with great loss, refusing to take a position at Alcaraz, in La Mancha, for the purpose of preventing the juncture of Soult and the intruder, according to the plan prescribed by the commander-in-chief, and enjoined by the cortes; an act of dereliction of duty, proceeding from jealousy that the English general had been appointed generalissimo of the Spanish armies. Soult accordingly moved, on the 15th of September, from Grenada, having in his march reduced, October 3rd, the castle of Chinchilla, a fortress peculiarly strong by site and construction, which stands on an isolated rugged hill, at the confines of Murcia and La Mancha, and on the point where the roads from Alicante and Valencia run to Madrid; thus forming the knot of all the great lines of communication.

During this siege, the English general had been subject to sore annoyance by his Portuguese and Spanish allies. To the neglect of the regency at Lisbon to the payment of the Portuguese troops serving in Spain, with any part of the British subsidy which they received in money, he indignantly observed, "Something or other has made a terrible alteration in the troops for the worse. They have lately, in several instances, behaved very ill; and whether it be owing to the nature of the service, or their want of pay, I cannot tell; but they are not at all in the style they were. I am rather inclined to attribute their misbehaviour to the misery and consequent indifference of both officers and soldiers, on account of their want of pay. If it be true, as I declare it is, that the subsidy is not in arrears, ought the pay of the Portuguese army to be in arrears at all? ought it to be in arrears for a longer period than the pay of the British army? That it is so, there is no doubt; and yet Dom Miguel, &c., will produce hundreds of documents to prove this assertion to be false, and contrary to the evidence of all the officers of the army, that the men have the money in their pockets." To the regency's pretence that frauds were practised on the Portuguese revenue by the British commissariat, under cover of importing stores for the army, the British chief indignantly replied—"I have no knowledge of 'frauds or extortions' on the country; or 'violence on the magistrates,' committed by the officers of the commissariat of the British army; and if the Conde de Funchal has any knowledge of such acts, I hope he will make them known to me in detail. If he has not, I hope that he will have no objection to make known the authority he had for making so serious a charge in a public document.

"It is perfectly true, that owing to the poverty of the government, 'exactions and violence' (but not 'frauds,' as far as I have any knowledge) have been practised by the officers of the Portuguese commissariat; but to remedy these evils is one of the objects of my repeated remonstrances to the Portuguese government, in regard to their finances, and other measures."

His Spanish allies occasioned him no less anxiety. Among other causes of vexation, the conduct of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and their treatment of the French prisoners, particularly those who surrendered at Madrid on capitulation, excited his

anger: he declared it was atrocious, and threatened—a threat of all others most likely to be felt by offenders of the kind—to withhold their pay.” “You know,” said the humane and highminded chief to the governor, “under what conditions I promised to pay the troops under your command, and you know whether I have acted according to my promise. The fact is that you have received more than my own soldiers, since this arrangement. But I will give no more money to officers and troops that have not discipline, and dare to pillage and murder prisoners of war with whom I have made a capitulation. The officers of the garrison have not done their duty, or this misfortune would not have happened; and I will not pay officers who slight their duty. Having been guilty of this neglect, they ought to be punished; and neither will I give anything to the chiefs who do not punish such neglect.”

Wellington now commenced preparations for withdrawing his army across the Arlanzan, and moving back to the Douro, so as to secure his junction with Hill, whom he ordered to withdraw from Aranjuez to Arevalo on the Adaja. Two routes were open for the retreat, one by the bridge of Villaton, the other by the bridge of Burgos. The latter, being the shorter, was preferred.

All being in readiness, the siege was raised, and the whole army defiled on midnight of the 21st, within musket-range, under the walls of the castle, and over the bridge, with their entire baggage and field-equipage, the wheels of the gun-carriages being muffled with straw. The allies moved in silence and good order; but a party of guerilla horsemen “failing in nerve,” putting their horses to their speed, the garrison was alarmed by the clatter. A fire was immediately opened from the castle, the guns having been trained upon the bridge in anticipation of the attempt, and the first discharge was destructive; but the range and direction being lost, after a discharge or two, the retreating army reached the other side of the Arlanzan, with but a trifling loss. By the exertions of the artillery and engineer officers, everything was carried off, except the three eighteen-pounders destroyed by the enemy’s fire, and the eight pieces of cannon taken from them in the storm of the hornwork. These were buried and their carriages destroyed; such stores and ordnance as could not be removed having also been wasted and disabled.

The allies, by this skilful arrangement and bold manœuvre, were now in the direct line of their retreat, and on the morning of the 22nd, reached Celada del Camino. The troops left in blockade of the castle, which had begun their retrograde movement early on the morning of the 22nd, joined the army on its march from Celada to Aldea. The rear-guard consisted of two light battalions of the German legion under colonel Halkett, and Anson’s and Bock’s brigades of cavalry; the whole under the command of sir Stapleton Cotton. So complete was the success of this bold manœuvre, that a march was gained on the enemy, the retreat of the allies not being discovered till the afternoon of the 22nd, when he rapidly proceeded in pursuit. On the 23rd the army continued its retreat to Torquemada. On noon of that day the French cavalry pressing closely on the rear-guard, just at the time that the main body had crossed the Pisuerga, at Cordovillas and Torquemada, the British cavalry twice charged and checked them for nearly three hours before they could effect a passage. The rear-guard then retired slowly, when a considerable interval occurring between the hostile squadrons, the guerilla horsemen of Marquinez and Julian Sanchez, who had been hovering in a kind of scattered swarm on the flank, taking courage, entered the interval, and made an irregular charge on the enemy; but being rapidly driven back towards the flank of Anson’s brigade, mingled with four or five squadrons of the enemy. The hostile squadrons being mistaken for Spaniards, were allowed to approach without opposition, and fell on the rear of the British, and as they brought up fresh squadrons every moment, the allied cavalry were so hard pressed that they were obliged to give way and fall back on the two German battalions of infantry of the rear-guard under colonel Halkett. That officer formed his brigade into squares, in echelon, and gallantly repulsed the attack of the enemy. The next day the army crossed the Pisuerga; and on the 24th was in position on a lofty range of hills with the garrison in front, while their right wing rested at Dueñas, covered by the Pisuerga, and their left at Villa Muriel. The 1st battalion 1st guards, with detachments of other regiments, under lord Dalhousie, here joined the army from Corunna.

Wellington, now determined to make a stand, and check his pursuer, sent out de-

tachments to destroy the bridges over the Carrion at Palencia, Villa Muriel, and Dueñas, and that on the Pisuerga at Tariejo. Those at Villa Muriel and Dueñas were successfully destroyed; but those at Palencia and Tariejo remained passable; and even at Villa Muriel, the enemy was able to effectuate a passage from the following untoward circumstance. A horseman suddenly started from the French column, and galloped up under a storm of bullets, to the chasm of the bridge made by the explosion; when, suddenly reining up his horse and exclaiming, he was a deserter, begged the English soldiers on guard of the bridge to point out some ford by which he could pass. On one being pointed out close by, the horseman kissing his hand in derision, wheeled his horse round, and bending over his saddle-bow, dashed back to his comrades, while the shots whistled about his ears, and shouts of laughter burst from the lookers-on of both armies. The consequence of this discovery was that the French crossed the river with a strong body of infantry and guns, under a concentrated fire of artillery, and immediately lined the bed of the canal at Muriel; general Oswald, who had succeeded to the command of the 5th division in consequence of Leith's indisposition, having neglected to occupy Muriel in strength, and having overlooked the advantages presented by the bed of the canal. Wellington coming up to the position at the moment of its occupation by the enemy, instantly despatched a column of Spanish troops to dislodge them; but the Spaniards being quickly thrown into confusion and repulsed, the Brunswick Oels corps advanced, and drove the French across the Carrion. Thus the left of the allies was secured. But the enemy having in the mean time crossed the river at the bridge of Tariejo, and the allied position having thus become sapped, Wellington before daybreak of the 26th crossed the Pisuerga at Cabezon, and ordering a detachment to hold the bridge of Tudela on the Douro behind him, he directed the 7th division to secure the bridges of Valladolid, Simancas, and Tordesillas. Having thus assured his retreat behind the Douro, the waters of which were now full, he again halted, his object being still to gain time and detain the enemy as long as possible, in order to effectuate his junction with Hill.

On the morning of the 27th, the whole French army was in front of Cabezon, and made an attempt to gain possession of the

bridge, but were defeated in their intention. At this period of the retreat, the English general having had an opportunity of ascertaining the overwhelming superiority of the enemy's force, fearing, should he be obliged to retreat behind the Tormes, that Hill would be exposed to the enemy both in front and rear, ordered him to abandon the defence of the Tagus, and to advance through the Guadarama pass, to effectuate a junction with him on the Adaja.

On the morning of the 28th, Souham attempted to turn the left of the allied army, still halted in its position at Cabezon, by extending his own right, and endeavouring to force the bridge of Simancas on the Pisuerga, and that of Tordesillas on the Douro. In both attempts he was foiled, the bridges being destroyed. But the French perceiving that only a weak guard of the Brunswick Oels corps was left in the castle to observe the broken bridge at Tordesillas, the enemy caused a chosen party of volunteers, consisting of sixty officers and non-commissioned officers, to secure the river in the night. These gallant men crossing the river on horseback, or, in the chivalrous expression of the author of the *War in the Peninsula*, "placing their clothes and arms upon a raft, having effected their passage, naked as they were," boldly attacked and stormed the castle behind the ruins of the bridge held by the Brunswick Oels guard, and thus opened a passage over the river to the French army.

Wellington, now, to prevent the enemy intercepting his line of communication with Hill, put the army in motion, and on the 30th crossed the Douro by the bridges Tudela and Ponte de Douro, and then marching by his left, and gaining the heights between Rueda and Tordesillas, placed his army in battle position immediately opposite Tordesillas, thus confronting the enemy now posted at this town, on the northern bank of the river. In this position he remained to the 6th of November, employing the interval in refreshing and reposing his army, as well as for affording time for effecting his junction with Hill. But the enemy having repaired the bridge at Toro, as well as that at Tordesillas, on the 7th of that month, the allied army fell back to Torrecilla de la Orden. Having now ascertained that Hill was sufficiently forward, he broke up from his position, and marched towards the heights of San Christoval, in front of Salamanca, and then posted the army in the course of

the day of the 8th. In the prosecution of the retreat to this point, the ground over which the retreating army passed presented a considerable advantage, the road from Burgos to Valladolid being intersected every ten or twelve miles by a river, over which the road passes by a ford or bridge. Of this advantage the English general availed himself, by taking up his several positions on the further side of the intersecting rivers, and destroying the bridges; thus interposing the stream as a barrier between himself and the enemy. He was thus secured in his bivouacs, and had time to retreat before his rear was forced, or, his flank turned.

During these operations of the allied army under Wellington, Hill, in obedience to his orders to abandon the line of the Tagus, and fall back by the Guadarama pass on Salamanca, concentrated the forces under his command. Having destroyed the stores and works on the Retiro, he retreated (Oct. 30) by the Guadarama valley, cautiously followed by the united armies of the centre and south, under Joseph and Soult. While moving on Arevalo, for the purpose of effecting his junction with Wellington on the Adaja, he received orders to direct his march by Fontiveros, on Alba de Tormes. On the 7th the advanced posts of the two armies entered into communication; and on the 8th, Hill, crossing the Tormes, and leaving in the town of Alba a corps of British and a division of Portuguese, a junction was effected. The ground on which the late battle had been fought, was still blanched with the bones of the combatants, and strewn with fragments of casques and cuirasses, and broken arms. The position of the allies on the right bank of the river, extended from the heights of San Christoval to Aldea Lengua; and the castle of Alba, lower down on the same side, was occupied by Howard's brigade of the 2nd division. On the left bank, the position terminated at the bridge of Alba, behind which Hamilton's Portuguese were posted as a support to the garrison in the castle; the other brigades of the 2nd division watched the fords of Huerta and Encina, while the 3rd and 4th divisions were stationed at Calvarassa de Ariba, in reserve. The British cavalry covered the whole front of the position on the other side of the Tormes, and the Spanish infantry were posted in Salamanca.

The French armies of the north, south, and centre, were united upon the right bank of the Tormes, on the 9th. Their combined

forces amounted to 75,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, with 200 pieces of artillery. The allied army amounted to 48,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. On the 10th Soult attacked the town and castle of Alba, with twenty pieces of cannon and a considerable body of infantry, but he met with so vigorous a resistance that he drew off his forces in the course of the night. On the 14th, the united armies of the south and centre crossed the river at the fords of Encinas, and took post on the wooded heights of Mozarbes. Wellington, when apprised of this movement, posting Hill in front of Alba to protect his movements, and securing the Arapiles, by leaving the 3rd division there in reserve, marched with the 2nd division, and a large body of cavalry, to drive the enemy across the Tormes; but finding the enemy too numerous and too strongly posted to be attacked with the prospect of success, he, in the course of the evening, withdrew the troops from the neighbourhood of Alba to the Arapiles, and having destroyed the bridge, left a garrison of 300 Spaniards in the castle. The enemy now threatening the line of communication with Ciudad Rodrigo, the English general determined to retreat. The allied army was immediately put into motion, and marching to its right, passed round the enemy's left flank at little more than cannon-shot distance, a thick fog and heavy rain favouring the movement. Having now gained the direct road to Portugal, the army was encamped for the night on the Valmusa river. The retreat continued towards the Huebra during the two next days; the French following the line of march with a strong advanced guard. On the 17th sir Edward Paget, who commanded the first column, consisting of three divisions, observing an interval of about half a mile between the 5th and 7th divisions, which had been occasioned by the badness of the roads and the swelling of the rivulets, riding to the rear to ascertain the cause of the separation, was, together with his aid-de-camp and orderly, captured and carried off by a few Italian cavalry who had pushed forward through the wood on the scout. The allied army on the same day approached the Huebra, which in this part flows between two steep and wooded hills. The main body quickly passed the river, and took post behind it; but the light division, instead of following immediately, was formed by its commander into squares, to resist the enemy, who were pressing forward with vigour.

Wellington, perceiving its dangerous position, ordered four companies of the 43rd, and one of the 95th rifles, to cover the passage, while he pushed the remainder of the division across the river. The covering parties spreading themselves out as skirmishers, though assailed in flank and rear, maintained their ground at the edge of the wood, till the division was safe on the other side of the Huebra; then, dashing down the hill, they crossed the ford with but little loss. The allied army was now in a position that covered the roads to Ciudad Rodrigo, and were only one day's march distant from it.

Between three and four on the following morning the army resumed its march. The retreat at this point was a matter of peculiar delicacy; for though the Huebra presented a strong position for defence, it was not unattended with difficulty to remove from, in the presence of an enemy; and that difficulty was increased by the principal road, which was about a mile in the rear of the position, being rendered impassable by the overflowing of a rivulet. Of this the commander-in-chief being aware, he ordered that the army should march by a longer and seemingly more difficult road. But his general officers adopted the line of march for themselves. Wellington posted himself before daybreak in his line of route; but finding the troops did not make their appearance, he galloped off for the other road, where he found his self-sufficient generals brought to a stand by the flood. Contenting himself with one sarcastic remark, more expressive of contempt than anger, he proceeded to draw off the troops and lead them into the road selected. On the following day (18th November) the army reached Ciudad Rodrigo; on the 20th, crossed the frontier of Portugal, or halted in the villages on the Agueda; and as soon as it was known that the enemy had re-crossed the Tormes, they were distributed in their winter quarters, the left resting at Lamego, on the Douro; and the right advanced to Baños and Bejar, to hold the passes. As soon as the army had reached Ciudad Rodrigo, the light cavalry and the guerilla horse were despatched to search for the stragglers, the wounded, and disabled, in the woods; of whom they found above 1,500.

"During the retreat from the Tormes to the Agueda, the weather was very inclement, storms of wind and rain succeeded each other with little intermission, and the march

was either over stony and ploughed grounds, or marshy and swampy lands scored with gullies, so that the troops were often ankle-deep in clay and mud, and water, and the horses sank up to the fetlocks. In the march from the Arlanzan to the Douro, some of the rivers crossed were breast-high at the fords. Sometimes divisions were moved too soon, more frequently too late, and kept standing upon wet ground, in rain, for hours, perishing with cold, waiting the order to move. Their clothes were seldom dry for six hours together, and during the latter part of the retreat continually wet; sometimes they were bivouacked in a swamp when better ground was near; they lay down upon the wet ground, fell asleep from mere exhaustion, were roused to receive their meat, and had then no means of dressing it—the camp-kettles had been sent on, or by some error were some miles in the rear, or the mules which carried them had famished on the way; and no fire could be kindled on wet ground, with wet materials and under a heavy rain. The subalterns threw the blame upon their superiors, and these again upon theirs, all complaining of incompetence in some of the general officers, and carelessness or supercilious neglect in some of the staff. The consequence was, the bivouacks were on ground perfectly saturated with water. The privations were equally great."* From the negligence of the commissariat, only two rations had been served to the troops during the five days of the retreat from the Tormes to the Agueda. Insubordination and marauding were the result. In the retreat from Burgos to the Douro, 12,000 men were lying at the same moment about the streets, and in wine caves of Torquemada, in a helpless state of intoxication; and the excesses were equalled to a proportionate extent by Hill's rear-guard at Valdemoro: hundreds were picked up in a senseless state in the cellars which they had plundered. The retreat during the 16th was through the extensive woods on the Huebra, and as those localities abounded with droves of swine, both officers and men straggled during the night from the lines of march, and shot them. At one time so regular a fire of musketry rolled through the forest that it was apprehended the enemy were making a night attack. Though two of the offenders were hung, it had little effect in restraining the starving soldiers.

Thus ended this masterly retreat, in which

* Southey.

no capture or destruction of stores, treasure, ordnance or provisions—no abandonment of the sick and wounded—had taken place; and though a considerable loss of prisoners had been sustained, that loss did not happen in combat, but from the straggling of the men from the line of march, or in the course of the night, for the purpose of marauding; or when in a state of intoxication. The loss has been variously stated—the French represented it to exceed 12,000; the English scarcely as many hundreds. The truth is, the loss by casualties and prisoners, was about 1,500; while more than twice that number of stragglers fell into the hands of the enemy.

In speaking of the retreat from Burgos, an infantry officer says,—“The privations which the army suffered were unusually severe: I saw many a brave fellow lying on the road, dying from fatigue, famine, and the inclemency of the weather. On one spot, about 100 English and Portuguese soldiers lay extended after the retreat. One miserable instance was a soldier of the 95th; having marched as far as he was able, at last he sunk from exhaustion, and crawled upon his hands and knees, until he expired.” Another thus describes his misadventure. “We travelled the whole of the night, our army in full retreat, and the French in close pursuit; the weather wet and miserably cold, and the roads so drenched, it was up to the middle in mud; the animals were knocked up, and I unfortunately fell into the hands of the enemy, a French hussar regiment, who treated me vilely. They knocked the cart from under me, sabred the men and dragged me into the middle of the road; stripped me, tearing my clothes into shreds, and turning me over with their sabres, plundered me of what little I had remaining; tore a gold ring from my finger, and then left me naked, to perish with cold and hunger. I lay in this miserable state two days and nights, with no mortal near me, except dead ones; one of which lay with his head upon my legs, having died in that position during the night preceding, and I was too weak to remove his body; I could not raise myself, I was so reduced. In this suffering state I continued to exist, which I attributed to some rum, of which I drank a considerable quantity from a Frenchman’s canteen, who was humane enough to let me do so, when I explained to him that I was a British officer:

* Maxwell.

the rum soon laid me to sleep. The Frenchman was a hussar, and appeared to belong to the regiment who had treated me so inhumanly in the morning (it was now past dusk). I begged him to take me up behind him. He shook his head; but kindly took an old blanket from under his saddle, covered me with it, and then rode off. In this wretched state I was discovered by an Irish soldier, who turned out a true Samaritan. The poor fellow found me literally in a state of starvation, and took me upon his back (for I was quite helpless) to the village; begged food for me from door to door; but the inhuman Spaniards shut them in our faces, refusing me both shelter and food, at the same time they were actually baking bread for the French. However, my fellow-sufferer, by good chance, found a dead horse, and he supplied me with raw flesh and acorns; which, at the time, I thought a luxury, believe me, and devoured, when first given me, in such quantities, as nearly put an end to my sufferings.”

“A very creditable exception must be made in favour of the Spanish women, who during the Peninsular campaign, exhibited the greatest kindness towards the British, and afforded to the sick or wounded soldiery the most disinterested and devoted attention. In the higher classes this feeling was frequently indulged, even at the risk of family or personal proscription; and it would appear that among the humbler grade a warm sympathy existed towards their deliverers.”* “Two girls, daughters of the baker of the village, notwithstanding the threat of punishment to those who should relieve me,” says a sufferer, “absolutely did, two or three times, bring me a little food saved from their own meals.”†

Another writer, referring to this retreat, says, “It is scarcely possible to imagine what powerful effect the excitement consequent on active warfare produces upon those who under different circumstances would evince apathy or irritability. Men nursed in the lap of luxury, and accustomed from childhood to all the elegancies of upper life, submitted to every privation without a murmur; while others, whose constitutional indolence was proverbial, seemed actuated by some secret impulse that spurred them to exertion, and roused a latent energy that was surprising even to themselves. Persons who at home would have dreaded injurious cir-

† *Military Recollections of Four Brothers.*

cumstances from a damp shoe, were too happy, on service in the Peninsula, to find the shelter of a roof and luxury of wet litter after a ten hour's march over muddy roads, in rain, and storm, and darkness; and those whose Apician tastes were not unfrequently outraged by the culinary offendings of the most gifted mess-cook, cheerfully discussed the ration cut from the reeking carcase of an over-driven ox, and exchanged claret and champagne for *aqua ardentia* and *vin du pays*, flavouring more strongly of the goat-skin than the grape.

"It is true, that when cantoned the army were spared from these annoyances. The strict eye kept by lord Wellington over the commissariat at these times, secured a plentiful supply of necessaries for the troops, and under huts or canvass they were tolerably protected from the weather; but at the sieges, the retreats, and the rapid advances in bad weather, nothing could surpass the misery endured through cold and heat, hunger and thirst, continued fatigue, and all the ills the soldier's life is heir to. Bright as the hour of triumph appears to the conqueror—brilliant as the foughten field that ends in victory—'the tale of war still bears a painful sound,' and many a heart-rending story of distress might be narrated attendant on the storms of Badajos and Rodrigo, and the retreats to Corunna, the Lines, and from Burgos. The state of the sick, the worn-out, and the wounded, was pitiable. Unable to extricate themselves, numbers, 'with vulnerable wounds,' perished of cold and hunger in the ditches of the captured fortresses—or, after struggling to the last, died on the line of march, abandoned of necessity by their comrades, and ridden over or cut down by merciless pursuers, who had neither leisure nor inclination to extend succour to those deserted sufferers."

The following extracts from the "Despatches," dated Cabezon, October 26th; and Ciudad Rodrigo, November 19th, exhibit an admirable summary of the operations which occurred:—

"Cabezon, 26th October, 1812.

"The enemy followed our movement with their whole army. Our rear-guard consisted of two light battalions of the king's German legion, under colonel Halkett; and of major-general Anson's brigade of cavalry; and major-general Bock's brigade was halted at the Venta del Poso, to give them support; the whole under the command of lieutenant-

general sir Stapleton Cotton. Don Julian Sanchez marched on the left of the Arlanzan; and the party of guerillas hitherto commanded by Marquez, on the hills on the left of our rear-guard.

"Major-general Anson's brigade charged twice, with great success, in front of Celada del Camino, and the enemy were detained above three hours by the troops under lieutenant-general sir Stapleton Cotton, in the passage of the Hormaza, in front of that village. The rear-guard continued to fall back in the best order, till the guerillas, on the left, having been driven in, they rode towards the flank of the rear of major-general Anson's brigade, and four or five squadrons of the enemy mixed with them. These were mistaken for Spaniards, and they fell upon the flank and rear of our troops. We sustained some loss; and lieutenant-colonel Pelly, of the 16th dragoons, having had his horse shot, was taken prisoner.

"The delay occasioned by this misfortune enabled the enemy to bring up a very superior body of cavalry, which was charged by major-general Bock's and major-general Anson's brigades, near the Venta del Poso, but unsuccessfully, and our rear-guard was hard pressed. The enemy made three charges on the two light battalions of the king's German legion, formed in squares, but were always repulsed with considerable loss by the steadiness of these two battalions. They suffered no loss, and I cannot sufficiently applaud their conduct, and that of colonel Halkett, who commanded them."

The despatch then expressing the commander-in-chief's approbation of the exertions and conduct of lieutenant-general sir Stapleton Cotton, and Major Bull's troop of horse artillery, under major Downman and captain Ramsay, proceeds to state that—

"The army continued its march on the 24th, and took up its ground on the Carrion, with its right at Dueñas, and left at Villa-Muriel; and the 1st battalion 1st guards joined us from Coruña. I halted there on the 25th, and the enemy attacked our left at Villa-Muriel. They were repulsed, however, by the 5th division of infantry, under the command of major-general Oswald, in the absence of lieutenant-general Leith, on account of indisposition.

"I had directed the 3rd battalion of the Royals to march to Palencia, to protect the destruction of the bridges over the Carrion at that place; but it appears that the enemy assembled in such force at that point that

lieutenant-colonel Campbell thought it necessary to retire upon Villa-Muriel, and the enemy passed the Carrion at Palencia. This rendered it necessary to change our front, and I directed major-general Oswald to throw back our left, and the Spanish troops upon the heights, and to maintain the Carrion with the right of the 5th division. The bridge of Villa-Muriel was destroyed, but the enemy discovered a ford, and passed over a considerable body of cavalry and infantry. I made major-general Pringle and brigadier-general Barnes, attack these troops, under the orders of major-general Oswald; in which attack the Spanish troops co-operated, and they were driven across the river with considerable loss. The fire upon the left had been very severe throughout the day, from which we suffered a good deal, and major-general Don Miguel Alava was unfortunately wounded while carrying on the Spanish infantry in pursuit of the enemy. I broke up this morning from the Carrion, and marched upon Cabezon del Campo, where I have crossed the Pisuerga."

"Ciudad Rodrigo, 19th Nov. 1812.

"The troops under the command of lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill, crossed the Tormes at Alba on the 8th instant, and those under my command took the position on the heights of San Christoval de la Cuesta on the same day; brigadier-general Pack's brigade occupying Aldea Lengua, and brigadier-general Bradford's Cabrerizos, on our right, and the British cavalry covering our front. I had desired lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill to occupy the town and castle of Alba with major-general Howard's brigade of the 2nd division, leaving lieutenant-general Hamilton's Portuguese division on the left of the Tormes to support those troops, while the 2nd division was posted in the neighbourhood of the fords of Encinas and Huerta, and the 3rd and 4th divisions remained at Calvarrassa de Arriba in reserve.

"On the 9th, the enemy drove in the pickets of major-general Long's brigade of cavalry in front of Alba; and major-general Long was obliged to withdraw his troops through Alba on the morning of the 10th. In the course of the day, the enemy's whole army approached our positions on the Tormes; and they attacked the troops in Alba with twenty pieces of cannon and a considerable body of infantry. They made no impression on them, however, and withdrew the cannon and the greatest part of the

troops in the night, and this attack was never renewed.

"I enclose lieutenant-general Hamilton's report to sir Rowland Hill, of the transactions at Alba, which were highly creditable to the troops employed. From the 10th to the 14th the time was passed in various reconnaissances, as well of the fords of the Tormes, as of the position which the troops under my command occupied, on the right of that river, in front of Salamanca, and on the 14th the enemy crossed that river in force at the fords near Encinas, about two leagues above Alba.

"I immediately broke up from San Christoval, and ordered the troops towards the Arapiles; and as soon as I ascertained the direction of the enemy's march from the fords, I moved with the 2nd division of infantry and all the cavalry I could collect, to attack them, leaving lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill with the 4th; and lieutenant-general Hamilton's divisions in front of Alba to protect the movement, and the 3rd division in reserve on the Arapiles, to secure the possession of that position.

"The enemy, however, was already too strong, and too strongly posted at Mozarbes to be attacked; and I confined myself to a cannonade of their cavalry, under cover of which I reconnoitred their position.

"In the evening I withdrew all the troops from the neighbourhood of Alba to the Arapiles, leaving a small Spanish garrison in the castle, with directions to evacuate it, if they should find that the enemy retired, and having destroyed the bridge. In the course of the night and following morning I moved the greatest part of the troops through Salamanca, and placed lieutenant-general sir E. Paget with the 1st division of infantry on the right at Aldea Tejada, in order to secure that passage for the troops over the Zurguen, in case the movements of the enemy on our right flank should render it necessary for me to make choice either of giving up my communication with Ciudad Rodrigo or Salamanca.

"On the morning of the 15th, I found the enemy fortifying their position at Mozarbes, which they had taken up the night before, at the same time that they were moving bodies of cavalry and infantry towards their own left, and to our communications with Ciudad Rodrigo. It was obvious that it was the enemy's intention to act upon our communications; and as they were too strong, and too strongly posted for me to think of

attacking them, I determined to move upon Ciudad Rodrigo. I therefore put the army in march in three columns, and crossed the Zurguen, and then passed the enemy's left flank, and encamped that night on the Valmuza. We continued our march successively on the 16th, 17th, 18th, and this day, when part of the army crossed the Agueda, and the whole will cross that river to-morrow, and canton between the Agueda and Coa.

"The enemy followed our movement on the 16th with a large body, probably the whole of the cavalry, and a considerable body of infantry; but they did not attempt to press upon our rear. They took advantage of the ground to cannonade our rear-guard, consisting of the light division, under major-general Alten, on the 17th, on its passage of the Huebra at San Muñoz, and occasioned some loss.

"The troops have suffered considerably from the severity of the weather: which, since the 13th, has been worse than I have ever known at this season of the year. The soldiers, as usual, straggled from their regiments in search of plunder, and I am apprehensive that some may have fallen into the enemy's hands.

"I am sorry to add, that we have had the misfortune to lose lieutenant-general sir E. Paget, who was taken prisoner on

the 17th.* He commanded the centre column; and the fall of rain having greatly injured the roads, and swelled the rivulets, there was an interval between the 5th and 7th divisions of infantry. Sir Edward rode alone to the rear to discover the cause of this interval; and as the road passed through a wood, either a detachment of the enemy's cavalry had got upon the road, or he missed the road, and fell into their hands in the wood. I understand that sir Edward was not wounded, but I cannot sufficiently regret the loss of his assistance at this moment.

"In my despatch of the 7th instant, I communicated to your lordship my opinion of the strength of the enemy, as far as I could judge of it from the reports I had received, and from what I had seen. I have since learned that general Caffarelli, with the army of the north, certainly remained joined with the army of Portugal. King Joseph left Madrid on the 4th instant, and arrived at Peñaranda on the 8th, leaving at Madrid the civil authorities of his government, and a small garrison. These authorities and troops evacuated Madrid on the 7th, and marched for Castile; and colonel Don J. Palecca took possession of that city.

"Your lordship will have seen general Ballasteros' letter of the 24th of October to the regency, from which you will observe that he disobeyed the orders of the govern-

* In the course of the same day, general sir Edward Paget, who had ridden to the rear to discover the cause of some delay in the march of the 7th division of infantry, was surprised, when on the top of a hill, with a spy-glass in his hand, and was taken prisoner by some Italian cavalry which issued from a wood. "I was well acquainted with the officer who had the principal share in this capture. It was Don Marc Antonio Colonna, son of the prince of Stigliano, a branch of the most ancient and noble family of the Colonna, long settled in the kingdom of Naples. He discovered, with his glass, an English general officer on the top of a hill, and galloping to the spot, surrounded the base of the hill. I have often heard him give a graphic and touching account of the behaviour of the stately and gallant veteran, who had already lost an arm, and was very short-sighted. Sir Edward, upon first seeing the dragoons, put spurs to his horse, and would have galloped down the hill, but Colonna cried out that it was surrounded, that escape was impossible, that the attempt might lead to destruction; and as he closed upon him with several troopers, sir Edward presented his sword, and surrendered." Upon learning the capture, lord Wellington wrote the following characteristic letter.

Head-quarters, 19th November, 1812.

MY DEAR PAGET,—I did not hear of your misfortune till more than hour after it had occurred, nor was I certain of it till the enemy attacked our rear-guard, and the firing had continued for some time,

and I found you were not on the field; and you will judge of my concern by the sense which I hope you feel I entertain of the cordial assistance which I received from you during the short time that you have been with us. I cannot account for your misfortune, excepting that you were alone, and could not see the approach of the enemy's cavalry. That which must now be done, is to endeavour to obtain your exchange. I have no French general officer in the Peninsula; but I beg you to make it known to the king and to the duke of Dalmatia, that I will engage that any general officer they will name shall be sent from England to France in exchange for you. If you should find that there is any prospect of your being exchanged, I recommend to you to endeavour to prevail upon the king not to send you to France. It is not necessary to enter into the reason for giving you this advice. If the king or the duke of Dalmatia will not name an officer to be exchanged for you, the sooner you are sent to France the better, I send you some money—£200. I will take care of your friend Morley. You cannot conceive how much I regret your loss. This is the second time I have been deprived of your assistance, at an early period after you had joined us, and I am almost afraid to wish to have you again; but God knows with what pleasure I shall hear of your being liberated, and shall see you with us.—Believe me, &c.

WELLINGTON.

P. S.—Let me know your wishes on any subject, and they shall be carried into execution.—*Macfarlane.*

ment given to him at my suggestion, to march his troops into La Mancha, and hang upon the enemy's left flank, because the regency and cortes had offered me the chief command of the Spanish armies. General Virues, who succeeded to the command upon general Ballasteros being removed, had not advanced farther than Jaen, when I last heard from that quarter on the 8th instant. The whole of the enemy's disposable force in Spain was therefore upon the Tormes in the middle of this month, and they were certainly not less than 80,000 men, but more probably 90,000. Of these, 10,000 were cavalry; and as the army of Portugal alone had 100 pieces of cannon, it is probable that they had not less in all than 200 pieces. I had 52,000 British and Portuguese troops, of which 4,000 were British cavalry, on the Tormes, and from 12,000 to 16,000 Spaniards; and, although I should have felt no hesitation in trying the issue of a general action on ground which I should have selected, I did not deem it expedient to risk the cause on the result of an attack of the enemy in a position which they had selected and strengthened.

"I entertained hopes that I should have been able to prevent the enemy from crossing the Tormes, in which case they must have attacked me in the position of San Christoval, or must have retired, leaving us in possession of the line of the Tormes. I considered either to be likely to be attended by so many advantages to the cause, that I deemed it expedient to delay my march from the Tormes till the enemy should be actually established on the left of that river; and if the weather had been more favourable, we should have made the movement without inconvenience or loss.

"It is difficult to form a judgment of the enemy's intentions at present. They have not pushed any troops beyond the Yeltes, and very few beyond the Huebra. But it is obvious, and a general sense is said to prevail among the French officers, that until they can get the better of the allied army, it is useless to attempt the conquest and settlement of Spain; and as far as I can form a judgment from one of marshal Soult's letters to the king in cipher, which was intercepted, and fell into my hands some time ago, it was his opinion, and he urged that Portugal should be made the seat of the war.

"The result of the campaign, however,

though not so favourable as I at one moment expected, or as it would have been, if I could have succeeded in the attack of the castle of Burgos, or if general Ballasteros had made the movement into La Mancha, which was suggested, is still so favourable, that this operation appears out of the question. The strong places of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos being in our possession, and Almeida being re-established, it is not easy for the enemy to penetrate by either of the great entrances into Portugal; and although the two former of these places (particularly the first-mentioned) are neither in the state of defence nor garrisoned as I should wish to see them, having deprived the enemy of their ordnance, arsenals, and magazines in Andalusia, at Madrid, at Salamanca, and Valladolid, it does not appear possible that these places should be attacked. I conclude, therefore, that for the present they will canton their army in Old Castile, and in the valley of the Tagus, and will wait for the arrival of fresh reinforcements and means from France."

The army being now disposed in its winter cantonments, the commander-in-chief devoted his attention to the reform of its moral inefficiency and physical deterioration. In pursuance of this purpose, he addressed the following circular to the commanding officers of divisions and brigades:—

"Freneda, 28th November, 1812.

"Gentlemen,—I have ordered the army into cantonments, in which I hope that circumstances will enable me to keep them for some time, during which the troops will receive their clothing, necessaries, &c., which are already in progress by different lines of communication to the several divisions of brigades.

"But, besides these objects, I must draw your attention in a very particular manner to the state of discipline of the troops. The discipline of every army, after a long and active campaign, becomes in some degree relaxed, and requires the utmost attention on the part of the general and other officers to bring it back to the state in which it ought to be for service; but I am concerned to have to observe, that the army under my command has fallen off in this respect in the late campaign to a greater degree than any army with which I have ever served, or of which I have ever read. Yet this army has met with no disaster; it has suffered no privations, which but trifling attention on the part of the officers

could have prevented, and for which there existed no reason whatever in the nature of the service; nor has it suffered any hardships excepting those resulting from the necessity of being exposed to the inclemencies of the weather at a moment when they were most severe.

"It must be obvious, however, to every officer, that from the moment the troops commenced the retreat from the neighbourhood of Burgos on the one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the officers lost all command over their men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained which ought never to have occurred. Yet the necessity for retreat existing, none was ever made on which the troops had such short marches; none on which they made such long and repeated halts; and none on which the retreating armies were so little pressed on their rear by the enemy.

"We must look, therefore, for the existing evils, and for the situation in which we now find the army, to some causes besides those resulting from the operations in which we have been engaged.

"I have no hesitation in attributing these evils to the habitual inattention of the officers of the regiments to their duty, as prescribed by the standing regulations of the service, and by the orders of this army.

"I am far from questioning the zeal, still less the gallantry and spirit of the officers of the army; and I am quite certain, if their minds can be convinced of the necessity of minute and constant attention to understand, recollect, and carry into execution the orders that have been issued for the performance of their duty, and that the strict performance of this duty is necessary to enable the army to serve the country as it ought to be served, they will in future give their attention to these points.

"Unfortunately the inexperience of the officers of the army has induced many to consider that the period during which an army is on service is one of relaxation from all rule, instead of being, as it is, the period during which, of all others, every rule for the regulation and control of the conduct of the soldier, for the inspection and care of his arms, ammunition, accoutrements, necessities, and field equipments, and his horse and horse appointments; for the receipt and issue and care of his provisions, and the regulation of all that belongs to his

food and the forage for his horse, must be most strictly attended to by the officers of his company or troop, if it is intended that an army, a British army in particular, shall be brought into the field of battle, in a state of efficiency to meet the enemy on the day of trial.

"These are the points, then, to which I most earnestly entreat you to turn your attention, and the attention of the officers of the regiments under your command, Portuguese as well as English, during the period in which it may be in my power to leave the troops in their cantonments. The commanding officers of regiments must enforce the orders of the army regarding the constant inspection and superintendence of the officers over the conduct of the men of their companies in their cantonments; and they must endeavour to inspire the non-commissioned officers with a sense of their situation and authority; and the non-commissioned officers must be forced to do their duty by being constantly under the view and superintendence of the officers. By these means the frequent and discreditable recourse to the authority of the provost, and to punishments by the sentence of court-martial, will be prevented, and the soldiers will not dare to commit the offences and outrages of which there are too many complaints, when they know that their officers and non-commissioned officers have their eyes and attention turned towards them.

"The commanding officers of regiments must likewise enforce the orders of the army regarding the constant real inspection of the soldiers' arms, ammunition, accoutrements, and necessities, in order to prevent at all times the shameful waste of ammunition, and the sale of that article and of the soldiers' necessities. With this view both should be inspected daily.

"In regard to the food of the soldier, I have frequently observed and lamented in the late campaign, the facility and celerity with which the French soldiers cooked in comparison with those of our army.

"The cause of this disadvantage is the same as that of every other description, the want of attention of the officers to the orders of the army, and the conduct of their men, and the consequent want of authority over their conduct. Certain men of each company should be appointed to cut and bring in the wood, others to fetch water, and others to get the meat, &c. to be cooked; and it would soon be found that if this

practice were daily enforced, and a particular hour for seeing the dinners, and for the men dining, named, as it ought to be, equally as for parade, that cooking would no longer require the inconvenient length of time which it has lately been found to take, and that the soldiers would not be exposed to the privation of their food at the moment at which the army may be engaged in operations with the enemy.

"You will, of course, give your attention to the field exercise and discipline of the troops. It is very desirable that the soldiers should not lose the habits of marching; and the divisions should march ten or twelve miles twice in each week, if the weather should permit, and the roads in the neighbourhood of the cantonments of the divisions should be dry.

"But I repeat, that the great object of the attention of the general and field officers must be to get the captains and subalterns of the regiments to understand and perform the duties required from them, as the only mode by which the discipline and efficiency of the army can be restored and maintained during the next campaign.

"I have the honour to be, &c.

"WELLINGTON."

This letter was received by the army in general with vexation; and by some of the oldest and best regiments, who had maintained their discipline, and whose losses had been trifling, with a momentary feeling of resentment. But it must be admitted that the circumstances of the retreat justified the severity of the remarks. Of those who had been the most culpable, some were tried, others dismissed, and many allowed to return home to avoid more painful consequences.

In the annexed despatch, addressed to the earl of Liverpool, lord Wellington takes a rapid glance at the state of affairs in the Peninsula, and alludes to his prospects in the beginning of the next year.

"Ciudad Rodrigo, 23rd Nov. 1812.

"I received by the last post your letter of the 27th October. When one army is so inferior in numbers to another as ours is to the French army, now assembled in Castile, its operations must depend in a great degree upon those of its opponent. It is impossible therefore for me at this period to point out what line I shall follow. The enemy have abandoned Madrid, and having given up all their communications with the north, solely with a view to collect a still larger force against us, there is no diversion which

would answer at present to effect an alteration in our relative numbers, even if I could depend upon the Spaniards to do any thing. But I am quite in despair about them. The only man among them who ever did any thing (Ballasteros) is gone; and I am apprehensive that it will be quite impossible to employ him again. But even he never did more than give employment for a short period to one or at most two divisions of the enemy's army. Then there is another circumstance which must be attended to, and that is the situation of our own army. It has been actively employed since the beginning of last January, and requires rest. The horses of the cavalry, and artillery in particular, require both that and good food and care during the winter; and the discipline of the infantry requires to be attended to as is usual in all armies after so long a campaign, and one of so much activity.

"I believe that the enemy require repose as much, if not more than we do; and that their immense numbers are rather embarrassing to them in a country already exhausted. But I am not quite certain that they do not propose to penetrate into Portugal this winter. I hope the enterprise will end fatally to them; but our troops will suffer a good deal if they are to have a winter campaign, and if the weather should continue as severe as it has been since the 15th of this month. I believe that I have under-rated rather than over-rated, the enemy's force. They say themselves at Salamanca that they have 90,000 infantry and 14,000 cavalry; and their demand for provisions from the country is 140,000 rations daily. I think they have 90,000 men altogether, including from 10,000 to 12,000 cavalry. The morning state will show what we have.

"It is not easy to form a judgment in Spain of the strength of the enemy's armies. The disposition of the Spaniards to exaggerate their own advantages induces the best intentioned among them to deceive; and no individual will ever allow that the French have more men than he has seen himself. The numbers of the army now in Castile have been stated to me at 15,000, and at almost every number from 15,000 to 90,000. I have never found myself mistaken in my estimate of the numbers of the enemy, when I relied upon the returns, making a reasonable abatement for losses during the period elapsed since their date. The only occasion

on which I have been seriously mistaken was at Burgos, when I relied upon the reports of the country; and was induced to believe that sir H. Popham's operations would continue to give employment to Caffarelli. But I afterwards found that the army of Portugal had been very largely reinforced in cavalry as well as in infantry, to a larger amount even than I stated in my despatch to Lord Bathurst, as it was thirty-one battalions instead of twenty-three, as I stated, and the 130th regiment. There were besides two divisions of infantry, and from 1,000 to 1,400 cavalry of the army of the North; and most certainly when I saw the whole drawn out near Cigales, they were not less than 46,000, of which 5,000 are cavalry. Soult has six divisions of infantry, and sixteen regiments of cavalry. The gross numbers of his army last April were 65,000. He has since sustained no great loss excepting the garrison of Badajos, 5,000 men. But I strike off from his gross strength, for losses, sickness, and men on his strength who were employed principally in the siege of Cadiz, 25,000 or 30,000, including the garrison of Badajos; and I believe his army consists of 35,000 men, of which from 4,000 to 5,000 are cavalry. The army of the king, when it quitted Madrid in August, was from 20,000 to 22,000 men, including *juramentados*, and an Italian division belonging to Suchet's army, under general Palombini, and the 16th regiment, likewise belonging to Suchet. Supposing the king to have lost by desertion, or to have sent away all the *juramentados*, and that the troops belonging to Suchet's army were left in Valencia, there will still remain the French troops of the king's guard, 5,000 men, about 3,500 more French and German infantry (I know the numbers of the regiments), which belong to the army of the centre, and from 2,000 to 3,000 good French cavalry. I believe all this put together will amount to 90,000 men.

"What are our prospects against this army? At present none certainly. In the spring, as soon as the green forage shall appear, I shall be able to take the field with a very large British and Portuguese force, probably larger than we have yet produced, and more efficient I hope in cavalry and artillery. I have sent the army of Galicia home; and I hope advantage will be taken of the winter to do something with them; but unless some changes are effected I shall certainly be disappointed. There are be-

sides, applicable to the *guerra* in Castile, the Spanish army lately under the command of Ballasteros, and the troops under the command of Elio.

"If I should find that the French remain quiet during the winter, I propose to go to Cadiz for a short time, to endeavour to put matters upon a better footing, at least as far as regards the armies of Galicia, and that lately under the command of Ballasteros, which must be brought forward in co-operation with us. It will likewise be necessary to apprise the government of the inconvenience and danger of the system on which they have been acting in the provinces which have been freed from the enemy; and of the inefficiency of all the persons selected for public trusts; and of the inconvenience of loading the resources of the provinces with the maintenance of such people. It is useless to trouble your lordship with a detail of these facts; but I can only say that, if I cannot by the exercise of fair influence in concert with my brother, produce some alteration, it is quite hopeless to continue the contest in the Peninsula with the view of obliging the French to evacuate it by force of arms. After this detail of facts, your lordship will see that it is very useless to trouble you with my opinion of what ought to be done after the French shall leave the Peninsula, more particularly as I have already communicated that opinion to Lord Bathurst.

"From what I see in the newspapers I am much afraid that the public will be disappointed at the result of the last campaign, notwithstanding that it is in fact the most successful campaign in all its circumstances, and has produced for the cause more important results than any campaign in which a British army has been engaged for the last century. We have taken by siege Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, and Salamanca; and the Retiro surrendered. In the mean time the allies have taken Astorga, Guadalaxara, and Consuegra, besides other places taken by Duran and sir H. Popham. In the months elapsed since January, this army has sent to England little short of 20,000 prisoners; and they have taken and destroyed, or have themselves the use of, the enemy's arsenals in Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, Salamanca, Valladolid, Madrid, Astorga, Seville, the lines before Cadiz, &c.; and upon the whole we have taken and destroyed, or we now possess, little short of 3,000 pieces of cannon. The siege of Cadiz

has been raised, and all the countries south of the Tagus have been cleared of the enemy.

"We should have retained still greater advantages, I think, and should have remained in possession of Castile and Madrid during the winter, if I could have taken Burgos, as I ought early in October; or if Ballasteros had moved upon Alcaraz as he was ordered, instead of intriguing for his own aggrandizement. The fault of which I was guilty in the expedition to Burgos was, not that I undertook the operation with inadequate means, but that I took there the most inexperienced instead of the best troops. I left at Madrid the 3rd, 4th, and light divisions, who had been with myself always before; and I brought with me that were good the 1st division, and they were inexperienced. In fact the troops ought to have carried the exterior line by escalade on the first trial on the 22nd September, and if they had we had means sufficient to take the place. They did not take the line because — — —, the field officer, who commanded, did that which is too common in our army. He paid no attention to his orders, notwithstanding the pains I took in writing them, and in reading and explaining them to him twice over. He made none of the dispositions ordered; and instead of regulating the attack as he ought, he rushed on as if he had been the leader of a forlorn hope, and fell, together with many of those who went with him. He had my instructions in his pocket; and as the French got possession of his body, and were made acquainted with the plan, the attack could never be repeated. When he fell, nobody having received orders what to do, nobody could give any to the troops. I was in the trenches, however, and ordered them to withdraw. Our time and ammunition were then expended, and our guns destroyed in taking this line; than which at former sieges we had taken many stronger by assault.

"I see that a disposition already exists to blame the government for the failure of the siege of Burgos. The government had nothing to say to the siege. It was entirely my own act. In regard to means, there were ample means both at Madrid and Santander for the siege of the strongest fortress. That which was wanting at both places was means of transporting ordnance and military stores to the place where it was desirable to use them.

"The people of England, so happy as they are in every respect, so rich in resources of every description, having the use of such roads, &c., will not readily believe that important results here frequently depend upon fifty or sixty mules more or less, or a few bundles of straw to feed them; but the fact is so, notwithstanding their incredulity. I could not find means of moving even one gun from Madrid. — — — is a gentleman who piques himself upon his overcoming all difficulties. He knows the length of time it took to find transport even for about 100 barrels of powder and a few hundred thousand rounds of musket ammunition which he sent us. As for the two guns which he endeavoured to send, I was obliged to send our own cattle to draw them; and we felt great inconvenience from the want of those cattle in the subsequent movements of the army."

While exerting himself to restore the army to its moral and military efficiency, its re-equipment was no less a subject of his care. He directed, instead of the ponderous large iron camp-kettles in use for the preparation of the food, that small tin kettles should be substituted, one for every six men, to be carried in turn on the top of a knapsack. The mules hitherto employed in the carriage of the large lumbering iron kettles were appointed to the conveyance of three tents for a company. Thus, besides expedition being obtained in the preparation of the food, the men off duty would always be provided with some cover in the field, which would obviate many casualties from sickness. Having thus put matters in a train for the re-equipment and reorganization of the army, and transferred the command of the army to Hill, he proceeded, December 12th, accompanied by lord Fitzroy Somerset, and one orderly dragoon, to Cadiz, to communicate, in person, with the Spanish government, to endeavour to effectuate the reform or more efficient organization of the Spanish army; intending, as he expressed himself, "to throw himself in fortune's way at the commencement of the next campaign, if he could collect a sufficient army." He reached Cadiz on the 24th of the month, and was received with enthusiasm and the highest respect by the cortes and the population of the town. His visit promoted the good understanding between him and the Spanish executive. They conferred on him the rank and authority of generalissimo of the Spanish forces; and

arranged that he should have the active co-operation of 50,000 Spanish troops in the next campaign. Having accepted the command, he issued the following address to the Spanish army.

"Cadiz, 1st January, 1813.

"The army have been already informed that the command-in-chief of the armies in Spain has been conferred on the captain-general, lord Wellington, duque de Ciudad Rodrigo. Although this is the first time his excellency has the honour of addressing the army as its commander, he has long been acquainted with its merits, its sufferings, and its state; and in taking upon himself the exercise of a command so highly honourable to him, he wishes to assure the general officers, officers, and troops, of his earnest desire that his arrangements may tend to enable them to serve their country with advantage, and that while under his command the honour of their profession may be advanced.

"It is necessary, however, that, at the same time, the utmost attention will be paid by the government to what will tend to the comfort of the soldiers, and the convenience of the officers of the army, the discipline established by the royal ordenanzas should be maintained; as without discipline and order not only is an army unfit to be opposed to an enemy in the field, but it becomes a positive injury to the country by which it is maintained. The commander-in-chief trusts, therefore, that every effort will be made by the general and other officers, to enforce and maintain, in every particular, the discipline ordered by the royal ordenanzas; and he assures them that, at the same time that he will be happy to draw the notice of the government, and to extol their good conduct, he will not be backward in noticing any inattention on the part of the officers of the army to the duties required from them by the royal ordenanzas, or any breach of discipline and order by the soldiers.

"WELLINGTON."

For the purpose of investing sir Charles Stuart with the order of the Bath, Wellington made a brief visit to Lisbon, where he was received with the most enthusiastic gratitude and rapturous acclamations. The city was illuminated three nights. It was about this period that he was created, by the prince regent of Portugal, duke of Vittoria; and about the same time he was made knight of the Garter, and appointed

colonel of the Blues, or Royal Horse Guards. He left Lisbon January 20th, and reached head-quarters, at Frenada, on the 25th of the same month.

He was now busily engaged in adjusting the arrangements for the prosecution of the ensuing campaign. Every military department underwent a searching reform. The attention of regimental officers was directed to the revision and inspection of the conduct and discipline of their men. The malingerers and idlers were forced back to their colours. The 2nd division had recovered no less than 600 bayonets in one month. The Douro was rendered navigable above its confluence with the Agueda; a pontoon-train was prepared to accompany the army on its line of march in the following campaign; and as the season for taking the field approached, the different divisions and brigades were practised in manœuvres on an extensive scale, thereby training both officers and men for the rapid movements and long marches which the "short and brilliant campaign" their leader intended to make would require. And amidst all these exertions, the commander-in-chief and his officers found leisure for their pleasures. During this interval, races were established, hunting parties formed, and the Spanish gentry entertained with balls. At the head-quarters of sir Rowland Hill, a theatre was fitted up, at which *The School for Scandal*, *The Rivals*, and *The Poor Gentleman*, were acted by the officers.

During the continuance of the army in winter cantonments, the only military affair that had taken place, was the attempt, in February, of general Foy to capture the town of Bejar, one of Hill's outposts; but he was resolutely repulsed by the 50th regiment, and the 6th caçadores.

At this period of the Peninsular struggle, the war was almost at a stand for want of specie; there not being 20,000 dollars in the military chest, and "each regiment not possessed of three." To provide for the deficiency, Wellington, in conjunction with sir Charles Stuart, the British minister at Lisbon, made purchases of corn in the Brazils, America, and Egypt, by which they not only fed the army, and saved the people of Portugal from starvation, during a year of invasion and another of famine, but replenished the military chest with large sums of money. To the dissatisfaction expressed by the English ministry, who, listening to the interested complaints of a few sordid

merchants, his reply was: "Sir Charles Stuart can show that we have not only saved the people of Portugal during the scarcity of 1810-11, by this system, but that we have actually brought into the military chest considerable sums of money which would otherwise not have found their way there; that we have gained money for the public by each of these transactions; and that we paid more than two-thirds of the Portuguese subsidy in kind in the last year, principally in corn thus imported. In a letter on this subject to sir Charles Stuart, he observes: "I admit that your time and mine would be much better employed than in speculating on corn, &c., but when it is necessary to carry on an extensive system of war with one-sixth of the money in specie which would be necessary to carry it on, we must consider questions, and adopt measures of this description, and we ought to have the confidence and support of the government in adopting them." Nor was this the only

difficulty thrown in the way of the English general by the British ministry. When the war broke out between England and the United States, he earnestly pointed out to them the necessity of stationing ships to protect the vessels bringing flour and stores to Portugal. So far from attending to this advice, they so reduced the naval force at Lisbon, that American privateers so infested the Portuguese shores, as almost to put an end to the provision trade with the Brazils, from which country the army drew its principal supplies.

Thus ended the campaign of 1812, which gave so much disappointment to the expectations of England, that when a motion for thanks to Wellington and the British army was proposed in parliament, it met with strenuous opposition. In its vindication and results, the best exposition is to be found in the words of its chief actor, which will be found in one of his despatches in a previous page.

THE FRENCH INVASION OF RUSSIA.

It will now be necessary to take a glance at the state of Europe, at the close of the year 1812, in order that the reader may the more clearly comprehend the events of the ensuing years 1813 and 1814—events which brought the operations of war from other countries to be enacted on the soil of France itself, and compelled the haughty French invaders to submit to the drinking of the bitter cup themselves which they had so often held to the lips of other nations. In those years the star of their great military demigod paled before the might of outraged Europe; and he, who in the early part of the year 1812, addressed such language as the following to the ambassador of the emperor of Russia—"I would have your master to know that I propose and I dispose," found in the reverses of that and the following years how signally his boastful impiety was avenged. In the history of these years the reader will perceive the vindication of the ways of God to man, and the retributive justice which sooner or later inevitably overtakes long triumphant wickedness. In 1813 the soil of France was invaded on all sides. Wellington on the south, with hostile banners displayed, came down from the Pyrenées upon the fertile plains of the Garonne, while the united armies of Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Sweden, extended their mighty masses towards the north and the east, enclosing by the progressive development of their resources, their formidable antagonist in a "circle of fire."

The great proximate cause of the downfall of Napoleon was doubtless the steady opposition given to all his schemes of plunder and aggrandizement by the British nation, and especially to the assistance which they had rendered to Spain, and the able manner in which the arms of Britain, under the command of lord Wellington, had been opposed to the French generals; next to this may be placed the invasion of Russia by the French in this year, some account of which we shall now proceed to give.

The aim of Napoleon Buonaparte, when he became emperor of France, was to make all Europe one nation, or, at least, a confederacy of nations, of which he was to be the acknowledged head. His own words were, "There must be one universal Euro-

pean code—one court of appeal. The same money, the same weights and measures, the same laws, must have currency throughout Europe. I must make one nation out of all the European states, and Paris must be the capital of the world." In the accomplishment of this purpose he had been so far successful, as one European nation after another bowed in the dust before his iron rule. His principal obstacle was the power and independence of Britain. Napoleon was aware that the main strength of Britain was in her trade and commerce; that from these sources she derived the great revenues and profits by which she was able, almost single-handed, to maintain her opposition to his plans. To ruin these resources became therefore his avowed and settled purpose. In 1806, by his famous Berlin decrees, he declared the British islands in a state of blockade, and all commerce or intercourse with them was forbidden to France and her allies. By subsequent decrees he insisted on the exclusion of British goods and British colonial produce from all the continental ports. These exclusive decrees were generally complied with by almost every nation except Russia. The Russians carried on an extensive and lucrative trade with this country in the exchange of their articles of raw produce, such as hemp, tallow, timber, potash, pitch, and other commodities, for our manufactured goods, comprising cotton and woollen cloths, cutlery, &c. The emperor Alexander was disposed to make any arrangements which he could, short of the destruction of the trade and commerce of his subjects, for the purpose of maintaining peace with France; but nothing less than the entire exclusion of British goods would satisfy the haughty tyrant of the Tuilleries.

In 1807, however, when Russia as the ally of Prussia, had suffered a severe defeat at Friedland, Napoleon forcibly procured the consent of the emperor Alexander to his exclusive decrees with reference to trading with Great Britain; notwithstanding the forced consent of the emperor, Russia never entered cordially into Napoleon's continental system. In the year 1810 the landholders of Russia, from the stoppage of their trade with Britain, suffered great distress. This induced the emperor to issue a ukase dated

the 31st of December in that year, permitting all colonial and other goods to enter the ports of Russia, unless they were clearly proved to be British property. It is obvious a prohibition so indifferently provided for, might easily be evaded. This occurred, and it may fairly be concluded the Russian government had no wish to prevent it, and the trade with England soon revived. On this subject remonstrances were made by the French ambassador at St. Petersburg, which were followed by a series of attacks on the personal character of the emperor Alexander, in the Paris journals. The pens which had been employed to eulogise, now laboured to traduce him, and a history of the Russian empire appeared, in which every vice said to have disgraced the Roman emperors, was represented to have belonged to the czars of Russia; and the reigning emperor, it was broadly hinted, might be numbered among the assassins of his father. For the same reasons which caused the English government to complain of the articles that appeared in the *Moniteur* a short time before the rupture of the peace of Amiens, the Russian emperor could only regard these outrageous attacks as originating in the malevolence of Buonaparte.

There were also other circumstances besides the Berlin and Milan decrees, which were tending to produce a rupture between France and Russia. The territory of the czars is exposed to aggression on that important western frontier which connects Russia with Europe. The partition of Poland was to her a greater benefit than to the other powers associated with her in that act of spoliation, and consequently any new change which would restore Polish independence, would, in a great measure destroy Russian influence in Europe. Buonaparte had encouraged the Poles to expect at his hands the boon of national independence, and this had brought them in great numbers to his standard after the battle of Jena. Forming the Polish provinces into what was called the Independent Grand Duchy of Warsaw, placed under the sovereignty of the king of Saxony, who was descended from the ancient kings of Poland, was viewed by Russia, in connection with other circumstances, as indicating a design at some future period to unite the provinces held by Russia and Austria to that duchy. The Grand Duchy of Warsaw was regarded as but a vast garrison established there, for the furtherance of Napoleon's ultimate views in

days to come. Alexander thought it right to claim from him an explicit engagement that the kingdom of Poland should not be re-established. Refusing to comply with this requisition, Napoleon offered to pledge himself not to favour any enterprise having that object in view. Such a concession was by no means satisfactory. Greater changes in the policy of Buonaparte were called for, but without effect, other than that of waking feelings of jealousy and animosity; and the movements of the French armies in the direction of Pomerania, soon brought full conviction to the mind of Alexander, that war could not be avoided. Things were at this crisis in the early part of the year 1812. About the same time causes of difference had arisen between Napoleon and Bernadotte, king of Sweden, and in consequence of his failing to enforce in a manner satisfactory to Buonaparte, his exclusive decrees, he seized and confiscated fifty Swedish merchant vessels. Resenting this and various affronts not less galling, Bernadotte signed a treaty of alliance with the Russian emperor, in March 1812, and formed in concert with him a plan to resist the tyranny of Buonaparte.

Infatuated with success, and urged on by his boundless ambition, Napoleon decided on a military attack on Russia, to bring her to terms. Against the advice of his friends and counsellors, he determined that nothing should prevent what he termed his "accomplishing the destiny of Russia." He felt that Spain had cost him dear, and hoped to console himself with the subjugation of the great northern potentate. By crushing Russia he assured himself that Spain must ultimately yield. Fouché, in an able and eloquent address, endeavoured to advise him against this reckless attempt, reminding him that he was already master of the finest empire the world had ever seen, and that all history demonstrated that universal monarchy was an impossibility—and suggested that he should rather apply himself to consolidate and secure his present acquisitions, than endeavour to achieve further conquests—as whatever he might acquire in extent he must lose in solidity. Fouché also drew his attention to the extent of the country which he was about to invade, and the distance which each fresh victory must remove him from his resources, annoyed as his communications were sure to be, by hordes of Tartars and Cossacks. Napoleon listened to this advice with but ill-disguised impatience and contempt—and in the charlatan lan-

guage which had now become habitual to him, he replied—"Don't disquiet yourself; but consider the Russian war as a wise measure, demanded by the true interests of France, and the general security. Am I to blame because the great degree of power I have already attained forces me to assume the dictatorship of the world? My destiny is not yet accomplished—my present situation is but a sketch of a picture which I must finish." Advices from other counselors had no better effect. His uncle, Cardinal Fesch, alarmed for the consequences of engaging in such a distant war, used every argument he could to dissuade him from this insane expedition. He conjured him to abstain from tempting providence—and entreated him not to defy heaven and earth—the wrath of men and the fury of the elements at the same time. Napoleon met the arguments of the ecclesiastic in the same spirit as he had those of his minister of police—and both were equally in keeping with his character. Leading the cardinal to a window, opening the casement and pointing upwards, he asked him if he saw yonder star?" "No, sire," answered the astonished cardinal. "*But I see it,*" rejoined Buonaparte, and turned from his relative as if he had fully confuted his arguments.*

Thus refusing all counsel, Napoleon hurried on his preparations for the war with Russia. Notwithstanding the enormous number of troops he required for the occupation of Spain, he found no difficulty in raising new armies; and just before the opening of the Russian campaign, he is understood to have had in France, Spain, Italy, and elsewhere, upwards of 800,000 men in arms, independently of allies. To raise so many soldiers the cruel conscript system was put into full operation, draughts were made on the whole male inhabitants of France between eighteen and sixty years of age; and the population was so decimated, that a large portion of the business of the country was necessitated to be carried on by women. At this time, also, the continent of Europe was afflicted with a famine, which caused a great degree of privation. Although everything tended to show the madness of the Russian invasion, yet nothing was allowed to stop the preparations for it. The French people, blinded by what they insensately denominated "military glory," entered into this new war with

the highest hopes, whilst the soldiery looked upon it as opening up new fields for pillage. As to the morality of the question, it was an element not to be considered. Napoleon was, however, by no means blind to the difficulties of the great project which he had determined to carry out. Before it was possible for him to gain the interior of Russia, where a most determined opposition was likely to be made to him, he would have to march his troops 1800 miles, through different states, possessing little or no food for men or horses. He had thus a powerful obstacle to contend with in the procuring of supplies for his army. His next great difficulty was the transporting the *materiel* of such a monster army across the large rivers which it was necessary to pass before he could gain the centre of Russia. In his line of march there were several extensive rivers emptying themselves into the Baltic, or Mediterranean seas, and therefore flowing at right angles with his proposed route. A number of them could be crossed by bridges; but the Niemen, the Berezina, the Dnieper, and some others, would require to be forded, and that, probably, under the fire of a vigilant and watchful foe. To meet these formidable difficulties every provision was made that was possible in the circumstances.

As a preliminary to the new war, a sham overture of peace was made to England, in which he proposed as a basis, that "*la dynastie actuelle sera déclaré independante et l'Espagne regie par un constitution nationale des cortes.*" To this lord Castlereagh replied, in the name of the prince regent, in reference to the passage just quoted, stating that if, as his royal highness apprehended, its meaning was, that the royal authority of Spain, and the government thereof by cortes, should be recognised as residing in the brother of the ruler of France, and cortes formed under his authority, not under that of the legitimate sovereign, Ferdinand VII., and the extraordinary cortes then exercising the powers of government, he must frankly declare that obligations of good faith precluded the prince regent from entertaining a proposition for peace, founded upon such a basis. This matter disposed of, and the Russian minister having first been insulted, and then presented with his passports; on the 9th of May Buonaparte, with his empress, left Paris for Dresden, where his vassal kings of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Saxony, and West-

* Sir Walter Scott.

phalia, and other princes of less importance, assembled to meet him, as did the emperor of Austria and the king of Prussia. The former was accompanied by the mother of Maria Lousia; the queen of the latter was no more. She had passed to the grave, deeply wounded, it was believed, by the unmanly calumnies which had been circulated against her, with the sanction of Napoleon.

In the capital of Saxony, fêtes and festivals surprised all beholders by their magnificence, and still more by their extraordinary attendance. Dramatic performances were among the entertainments provided, and the powers of Talma were there displayed before a pit peopled with emperors, empresses, kings, and princes.

Taking leave of his empress, Buonaparte hastened to Thorn, which he reached on the 2nd of June; from this period he became the presiding genius of the enterprise. The tactics of Napoleon, as a general, had always been to bring an enormous force to bear on a centre of operations; on these tactics he now acted. That part of the army which was furnished by France passed in an easterly direction into Germany, where it united with the levies drawn from Spain, Italy, Austria, Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, Poland, and the other countries over which he exerted a control. From different directions this immense force drew towards a central point on the Oder, whence they were all to combine in a united attack on the Russian frontier.

HOSTILITIES ARE COMMENCED.

NAPOLEON commenced this war in his usual way, by robbery. The districts between the Oder and the Vistula were laid under contribution; and the subsistence of his forces was made to depend upon plunder. The hero-worshippers of Buonaparte have said that he did not sanction robbery as a principle; but this it is impossible for them to deny, that he winked at it as a practice. Segur, not a bad authority, says—"Ever since 1805, there was a sort of mutual understanding—on his part, to wink at the plundering practices of his soldiers—on theirs, to suffer his ambition." In other words—"if you allow us to be thieves, we have no objection to your being our chief." So that, stripped of the tawdry appellation of emperor—in all his pomp and pride—Buonaparte was but the head of a band of robbers. Like all aberrations, however, from the moral code, this toleration of rapine recoiled on its author. The unprincipled conduct of the French soldiery had become so well known, that the inhabitants of the countries through which they passed, fled at their approach, carrying everything with them that was possible, and frequently destroying what they could not take away; so that it was only by sudden onslaughts that his ruthless followers could insure any booty.

The mighty host arrayed against Russia comprehended, on the extreme right, 34,000 Austrians, led by prince Schwartzburg;

on the left Jerome Buonaparte appeared with 79,200 Westphalians, Saxons, and Poles. The viceroy of Italy, Eugene Beauharnois, commanded 79,000 Bavarians, Italians, and French. Buonaparte himself appeared, assisted by Murat, Davoust, Oudinot, and Ney, with 220,000 men, and general Macdonald brought up a force of 32,500 Prussians, Bavarians, and Poles. Other corps might be enumerated, making a total of 480,000 men, and besides large armies of reserve had been assembled. Of the force present, 80,000 were cavalry. The army was attended by thousands of waggons, carrying provisions, gunpowder, shot, and shells, with medicines, and other accommodations for the sick and wounded. His attendant artillery comprehended 1,372 pieces of cannon, for drawing which, and the various vehicles now to be put in motion, 100,000 horses were required; and to supply food for these animals a most extensive system of forage was required.

Here, then, was an army of about half a million of men invading a country with whom they had no just cause of quarrel, carrying misery and ruin in their track, in order to pander to the insatiate and heartless ambition of one man, that he might be styled "emperor of Europe." Out of the 500,000 who followed him, perhaps not five knew what was the real cause of the war. Sufficient for them it was that the emperor *willed* it, and that plunder and "glory"

were to be acquired. Satisfied with his arrangements, and feeling, doubtless, that his prey was within his grasp, on the 22nd of June he deigned to declare himself to his army in one of his bombastic proclamations:

"Soldiers! the second Polish war has begun. The first terminated at Friedland and at Tilsit. At Tilsit, Russia vowed an eternal alliance with France, and war with England. She now breaks her vows, and refuses to give any explanation of her strange conduct, until the French eagles have repassed the Rhine, and left our allies at her mercy.

"Russia is hurried away by a fatality! Her destinies will be fulfilled. Does she think us degenerated? Are we no more the soldiers who fought at Austerlitz? She places us between dishonour and war. Our choice cannot be difficult. Let us, then, march forward. Let us cross the Niemen, and carry the war into her country. The second Polish war will be as glorious to the French arms as the first has been; but the peace we shall conclude will carry its own guarantee, and will terminate the fatal influence which Russia has for fifty years past exercised in Europe."

By the soldiers and supporters of Buonaparte this proclamation was looked upon as a miracle of eloquence, and to men who wanted no substantial reason for fighting, it was pronounced quite satisfactory, and they proudly contemplated the "glory" they were to achieve.

By means of pontoons the Niemen was passed, and when the emperor Alexander was made aware that this act of aggression had been committed, he issued the following proclamation, the spirit of which may be well contrasted with that of his boastful antagonist:—

"Wilna, June 25th, 1812.

"We had long observed, on the part of the emperor of the French, the most hostile proceedings towards Russia, but we had always hoped to avert them by conciliatory and pacific measures. At length, experiencing a continued renewal of direct and evident aggression, notwithstanding our earnest desire to maintain tranquillity, we were compelled to complete and assemble our armies. But even then we flattered ourselves that a reconciliation might be produced while we remained on the frontiers of our empire; and without violating our principle of peace we prepared to act only in our own defence. All these con-

ciliatory and pacific measures could not preserve the tranquillity which we desired. The emperor of the French, by suddenly attacking our army at Kowno, has been the first to declare war. As nothing, therefore, could inspire him with those friendly sentiments which possessed our bosom, we have no choice but to oppose our force to those of the enemy, invoking the aid of the Almighty, the witness and defender of the truth. It is unnecessary for me to recal to the minds of the generals, the officers, or the soldiers, their duty and their bravery. The blood of the valiant Sclavonians flows in their veins. Warriors! you defend your religion, your country, and your liberty! I am with you, God is against the aggressor.

"ALEXANDER."

Much to the surprise of the French, their aggressive progress was but little interfered with; and, except in the affair at Kowno, there was no enemy to dispute their advance into the interior of Russia. As division after division of the French army advanced in almost the same line of march, the Russians fell back, giving no decided interruption. The invaders were astonished at the rapidity with which they were allowed to proceed. It was midsummer, and they experienced little inconvenience but from the heat of the weather, and the immense clouds of dust which were raised by the marching of their troops.

It was not from a lack of courage nor for a want of determination on the part of the Russians to resist the invading foe to the utmost, that the passive resistance system was adopted by the emperor Alexander. He was strenuously advised by those who were well acquainted with Napoleon's inordinate ambition, that it would lead him, if unopposed, to push forward his army into countries where the snows of winter would more surely do the work of destruction and death than could the cannon or the musket. Acting on this prudential advice the Russians risked no encounter of great moment, but kept retreating so as to leave the French in entire possession of the country through which they passed. The army which the emperor had raised to oppose the invaders amounted to 300,000 men, divided into two corps, respectively commanded by Barclay de Tolly, a Scotchman by extraction, and the prince Bagration.

To explain the system of passive resistance adopted by the Russian Emperor, he

issued a second proclamation, addressed to the French soldiers, to apprise them of the true nature of the successes in which they had begun to exult; for in the several conflicts which had already taken place, the Russians had given way; they had shown their valour, but they had uniformly retreated. "Do not," said this proclamation, "be deceived by our first movements. You ought to know the Russians too well to suppose that they will fly before you. As soon as we begin the combat, you will find it difficult to retreat. We advise you, as fellow-warriors, to return *en masse* to your own country." Happy would it have been for the brave men then advancing with "the Man of Destiny," had this prophetic language been duly respected; happy would it have been for their chief himself, had the sudden desertion of his soldiers spared him those scenes of misery and humiliation through which it was eventually his fate to pass.

Acting upon the principle of opposing the enemy by retiring before him, and destroying everything in his way before he could seize it—houses, villages, and towns likely to afford him shelter, were razed to the ground, so as to render it difficult to say where they had stood. The crops of grain and hay were cut and carried away, or effectually destroyed. Here, as in Spain, Buonaparte found, to his sorrow, that he had not merely to encounter armies, but to subdue a whole people. The Russians, nobles, priests, and serfs, for the time united in a warm attachment to their emperor, and in a determination to withstand the domination of the invaders of their country; so much so that they voluntarily ruined themselves to bring about the desired object. By Napoleon, as well as by many others, it was believed that the Russian serfs would have hailed and succoured the French, under their much-belied declaration of being heralds of liberty; but that spirit, so universal and so justly entitled to reverence, which leads men to proclaim, "whatever our condition, whatever the defects of our political system, we will accept of no redress from a foreign invader; we claim to settle our differences for ourselves;"—that feeling was manifested by all classes in Russia. Startling superstition united with glorious patriotism, to repel the hostile intruder, and vindicate the cause of despotism. The lowly peasant marched to battle with the gallant devotion of a hero, while the arch-

bishop of Moscow forwarded to his imperial majesty the precious image of St. Serge, described as "the ancient defender of the country's happiness," for the acceptance of Alexander. It is impossible to enumerate all the indications manifested of a fixed determination, never to yield to the domination of France. Besides setting fire to their hamlets, the peasants, says Scott, "proclaimed the punishment of death to all of their own order who, from avarice or fear, should be tempted to supply the enemy with provisions; and they inflicted it without mercy on those who incurred the penalty. It is an admitted fact, that when the French, in order to induce their refractory prisoners to labour in their service, branded some of them on the hand with the letter N, as a sign that they were the serfs of Napoleon, one peasant laid his hand on a log of wood, and struck it off with an axe which he held in the other, in order to free himself from the supposed thralldom." The devotion of the peasantry was equalled by the patriotism of the nobles, who everywhere deserted their mansions, and left them a prey to the invaders. Many of these chateaux were splendid buildings, yet their proprietors did not hesitate upon their destruction. Labaume, a French officer, states, that in one day he saw two of these palaces completely ravaged. "Halting at the second, he passed through a delightful garden, with beautiful walks, tastefully arranged. The pavilions, which had been newly decorated, now presented a picture of the most frightful desolation. The valuable furniture was broken in pieces, fragments of the most beautiful china were scattered about the garden, and many fine paintings had been torn from their frames, and were dispersed by the winds." At a village, which a band of the French one day reached, they found the seigneur, or feudal proprietor, surrounded by a number of men armed with scythes, poles, and other rude weapons, resolved to make a stand. A few shots from the invading force speedily dispersed this miserable group; the chief alone evincing firmness on this trying occasion. Awaiting the approach of the French soldiers, armed with a poniard, he menaced all who approached him. "How can I survive the dishonour of my country!" exclaimed he, when summoned to surrender—"our altars are no more! our empire is disgraced! Take my life, it is odious to me!" His last frantic request was soon complied with by the brutal French soldiery, and the unfortu-

nate nobleman was killed by repeated stabs of the bayonet.

The van of the army, with Napoleon at its head, reached Witepsk on the 28th of July, and found the place nearly deserted. As they moved forward, though the Russians still gave way, the ranks of the invaders were considerably thinned by famine, desertion, and other casualties. Buonaparte was advised not to continue his advance; but to pause or retreat would be to confess failure, and that was a thought which he could not brook. He flattered himself that marching to Moscow, he should bring the emperor Alexander on his knees, happy to accept of any peace which it might be his good pleasure to grant.

After a brief engagement, the Russians still retiring before them, the French entered and took possession of Witepsk on the Dwina, on the 28th of July. This town, like all the others which they had reached, they found deserted, the inhabitants having carried with them every article of value which they possibly could. Already Napoleon began to experience the difficulty of supporting so large an army in an enemy's country, without any supplies but those which could be forcibly taken from the inhabitants. Every day now added to the difficulties of his position. Confident, when he entered the Russian territory, that he had only to march steadily on the capital, in order to compel the emperor to sue for peace, he felt surprised that no such communication had been received, while desertion, fatigue, famine, and wounds, were daily diminishing the numbers of his soldiers; and when he entered Witepsk, little more than a month after the commencement of the campaign, his muster-roll was less by one-third than when he left France. The soldiers had already been obliged to submit at first to the stoppage of their allowance of wine, then beer, and latterly even water and bread fell short. For several days at a time the soldiers were reduced to feed on roots; and by the end of the month of July, the only provisions which could be obtained for whole divisions of the army was a nauseous kind of broth made from rye. This unwholesome food soon produced its natural consequences, and the men were attacked with dysentery and typhus fever; and as shelter or comforts of any kind could not be obtained for the sick, thousands of them died. For hundreds of miles the track of the "grand army" was marked by devas-

tation on every side, and by the dead bodies of men and horses. The severities and hardships which the troops had to undergo began to produce dissatisfaction, and to undermine discipline. The aimless object of the enterprise began to be discussed among the soldiers, and they deserted in considerable bodies. The inhabitants, however, profited but little from these defections, as the deserters never thought of returning to France, but joined themselves into predatory bands, murdering and robbing all who came in their way, and living a life of dissipation, as long as the means of their indulgence could be obtained by force or rapine. Ultimately all these marauders were cut down by the Cossacks, or by armed bands of the peasantry, who combined for mutual protection.

The difficulty of procuring supplies produced sometimes the most heartrending scenes. Everything which constituted the wealth or fortune of families was taken from them in the most ruthless manner, and the slightest opposition to the parties who scoured the country to procure provisions, resulted in the murder of those who opposed their proceedings. Labaume, a French authority, whom we have already quoted, says, in describing the entrance of a division into one of the Russian towns—"As we advanced towards the centre of the town, we observed, in every street, crowds of soldiers robbing the houses, altogether regardless of the cries of the wretched inhabitants, or the tears of the mothers who, on bended knees, begged for their own lives and those of their children. This insatiable rage for plunder was justified by some who, famishing, only sought for provisions; but others, under this pretence, rifled the dwellings of their contents, and even robbed the women and children of the clothes with which they were covered."

The more prudent counsellors of Napoleon now advised him either to fortify and remain in Witepsk till the succeeding spring, or to return to Wilna or Warsaw. He, however, had willed otherwise, and hurried on by his blind ambition, he determined not to stop short of Moscow, the capture of which he considered would enable him to put his troops into comfortable winter-quarters. He was compelled at once to advance, as there could not, at Witepsk, on any occasion, be gathered together more than twenty-four hours' provisions at any one time. To have returned to Poland

would have destroyed the prestige of success which he affected to believe was attached to his name; therefore forming a junction of his army (August 10th) he marched on Smolensk.

After the occupation of Witepsk by the French, the Russians partially changed their tactics. Their object now became to keep the invaders in check until the winter should overtake them; so that the retreat, which they foresaw must ultimately take place, might be aggravated by all the horrors of a northern winter. Smolensk, the next place of importance which the French approached, is a large fortified city, situated on the Dnieper. Here Barclay de Tolly, with his division of the Russian army, made a resolute stand, in order to cover the removal of the inhabitants, with all the transportable stores. Napoleon observing this, was delighted at the prospect that a general engagement was about to take place; for, having gained most of his successes by generalship in great battles, he concluded that similar results would follow in this instance. "Now I have them!" he exclaimed, when he came in sight of the Russian forces. The Russians were attacked with all the energy and skill of the French commanders, and a bombardment of the city ensued; after a severe struggle Smolensk was taken on August the 18th, the Russians retiring according to their ordinary practice. The French, however, found, to their astonishment, that their victory was of but little value to them. On the evening of the day of battle thick columns of smoke were seen ascending from the city; shortly after the bright red flames burst forth, spreading with fearful rapidity in every direction, and before the morning sun had dawned Smolensk was a smoking ruin.

Next day the French army entered the town; but so completely had the fire done its work, that there was not even shelter to be obtained in the half-burnt houses. Palaces yet burning showed walls half destroyed by the flames, and strewn among the charred and smoking ruins were to be seen the dead bodies of the unfortunate inhabitants who had been overtaken by the destructive element, or who had been slain in the bombardment of the previous day. Some few of the houses and the churches which had been spared, were filled by miserable wretches, who presented a woeful spectacle. In the great cathedral, venerated by the Russians, might be seen whole families, aged men and children, prostrated on the

steps of the altar, imploring that aid from heaven which had been denied them by man. The clang of military music, and the shouts of the French soldiery, however, soon drowned the wail of misery which had been uttered by the wretched sufferers. The Russians, in this affair, lost 12,000, and the French 4,000 men.

Calculating on this fine city as a place where he could have quartered and provisioned his troops, and, if required, that he could have fallen back upon from Moscow, the burning of Smolensk dismayed and perplexed Napoleon. He now appeared to comprehend the true nature of the contest in which he had engaged; and as he began to form a just estimate of the character of the people whose country he had invaded, his mind was filled with the most anxious forebodings. He found that this was not a mere war with the emperor of Russia, but a war with the entire people; that he had not only to contend with soldiers in pitched battles, but he had to encounter the determinate resistance of the whole population; and, what was worse, he was becoming hemmed in a wilderness infinite in extent, barren in condition, and remote from succour. His ablest generals also at this time murmured against the undertaking, and Murat, Ney, and others, loudly exclaimed against the foolhardiness of the spoiled child of fortune. Their objections were overruled, and Moscow was pointed to as the goal of all their endeavours, which was to crown their exertions with peace and security, and the troops were ordered to march onwards.

Having halted four days at Smolensk, the march from that city to Moscow, a distance of 280 miles, was commenced. The way lay through marshes and forests, and as the invaders moved, fatigue and intoxication, joined with the irregular assaults made on them by the enemy, reduced their numbers. The Russian army still retired, and the French advanced, occasionally exposed to the fierce charges of the Cossacks, a description of cavalry pictured as contemptible in the bulletins of Buonaparte, but one that through the campaign was often found to be terrible by his followers. The plan of Barclay de Tolly was to avoid a general engagement, but to weaken the enemy in partial actions, and draw him on from swamp to swamp, from desert to desert, and from conflagration to conflagration. At Gjatze, a place which the French reached after leaving Smolensk, a Russian

officer appeared with a flag of truce. He was asked by a French general what place of consequence would be found between Wiazma and Moscow. "Pultawa, the place where Charles XII. saw his proud hopes annihilated by Russia," was the brief but significant reply.

Their onward course the French still pursued. On the 7th of September, having reached a place called Borodino, it was obvious that prince Kutusoff, who had now superseded Barclay de Tolly, proposed to give battle. Buonaparte, in a brief address to his troops, announced to them that a victory there achieved would secure them abundance, good winter-quarters, and a prompt return to their own countries, while late posterity would exalt the fame of each who was at "the great battle under the walls of Moscow." The hostile armies engaged, and awful was the attendant carnage. The French lost more than 50,000 men, with 43 generals; the Russian loss was said to reach 32,000 men, and 50 generals. Ninety thousand cannon were fired by the French, and each soldier used 100 cartridges. Sixty thousand men and 25,000 horses were burnt or buried on the fatal field, while the neighbouring ravines were crowded with wounded sufferers, who filled the air with passionate appeals to their comrades to give them death, that their present anguish might terminate.

Labauume, speaking of the destruction attendant on this battle, says—"As we passed over the ground which the Russians had occupied, we were able to judge of the immense loss that they had sustained. On many places the bursting of the shells had promiscuously heaped together men and horses. The fire of our howitzers had been so destructive, that mountains of dead bodies were scattered over the plain; and the few places that were not encumbered with the slain, were covered with broken lances, muskets, helmets, and cuirasses, or with grape-shot and bullets, as numerous as hail-stones after a violent storm. The most horrid spectacle, however, was the interior of the ravines: almost all the wounded who were able to drag themselves along, had taken refuge in these hollows, to avoid the shot. These miserable wretches—heaped one upon another, and almost suffocated with blood, uttering the most dreadful groans, and invoking death with piercing cries—eagerly besought us to put an end to their torments. We had no means of re-

lieving them, and could only deplore the calamities inseparable from a war so atrocious." Segur also thus refers to the sufferings of the Russians at this time—"One of these poor fellows lived for several days in the carcase of a horse, which had been gutted by a shell, and the inside of which he gnawed. Some were seen straightening their broken leg by tying a branch of a tree tightly against it, then supporting themselves with another branch, and walking in this manner to the next village."

The town of Mojaïsk was captured, but neither inhabitants nor provisions were found, and Napoleon began to contemplate the awful consequences of being opposed by means like those on which the Russians relied. He laboured to conceal the dreary forebodings which came over him, and to affect an air of triumph. On the 14th of September, his army reached the crest of the last eminence interposed between them and Moscow, and they gazed on its numerous gilded domes and steeples with as much eagerness, if not with as much pious joy, as the pilgrims of other days felt when they first caught a glimpse of Jerusalem.

As the French approached the ancient capital of the Russian empire, they found that the population, as elsewhere, fled before them, leaving to the invaders nothing but scorched fields and smoking ruins. The determination with which the work of devastation was carried on by the Russians, appalled Buonaparte. Other circumstances at this time tended to depress his mind, and almost drove him to desperation. News of the disasters which had overtaken his armies in Spain reached him at this period. About a week before the battle of Borodino, Marmont's defeat at Salamanca was made known to him by colonel Fabvier, who made the journey from Valladolid in one course, and having fought at the Arapiles in Spain, on the 22nd of July, he was wounded on the heights of Moskowa on the 7th of September. Intelligence from France told him of plots against his power, and he was earnestly pressed by Fouché and his other ministers to return to Paris as soon as he possibly could.

The possession of Moscow, however, he still flattered himself would make amends for all he had undergone; the Russian citizens he fondly imagined, when they saw their capital fairly in his possession, would submit themselves to his rule. He would dictate to them his laws, and afford them

his protection. Subsidies would be raised, his army would be comfortably fed and lodged, and its efficiency restored. Trade and commerce being protected, would assume their accustomed course; and here, from the palace of the Kremlin, with the emperor at his feet suing for peace, he could dictate to him whatever terms he chose. Alas! how miserably were these high hopes fulfilled!

The city of Moscow is the capital of the Russian government of that name, and formerly the capital of all Russia. It is situated in a fertile and richly cultivated country on the banks of the river Moskwa, and of the rivulets Yausa and Neglina, 482 miles south-east of St. Petersburg. The form of the city is a sort of irregular rhomboid, and its circuit, within the ramparts that enclose the suburbs, is said to exceed twenty-six English miles; the population, however, does not correspond with its extent, as in this space are contained upwards of 1,000 gardens, besides about 240 kitchen-gardens, some of great extent, and a number of unenclosed fields, called *Poles*, which are used for exercising troops, holding festivals, and for promenades; and there are also upwards of 250 small lakes, the banks of some of which are laid out with much taste as public walks and gardens. Moscow was still the most populous city of the Russian empire, and had the largest and most splendid establishments of the nobility, notwithstanding the residence of the court at St. Petersburg. The city is distributed into five divisions, each of which has its respective circumvallation, and forms, as it were, a separate town; viz., the Kremlin, or central part; the Kitai-Gorod, or Chinese Town; the Beloi-Gorod, or White Town; the Zemlianoi-Gorod, or Earthen Town; and the Slobodi, or suburbs. The Kremlin, the central and highest part of the city, occupies a commanding situation on the banks of the Moskwa, and is surrounded by high walls of stone and brick, nearly two miles in circuit, furnished with battlements, embrasures, numerous towers, and five gates. This division was built of stone in 1367, and has no wooden houses; it includes the ancient palace of the czars, in which Peter the Great was born, the cathedral of the Assumption, the cathedral of the Annunciation, the cathedral of St. Michael, and the cathedral of the Transfiguration; several other churches with beautiful spires, two convents, the patriarchal palace, and the

arsenal. The Kitai-Gorod is much larger than the Kremlin; it is the centre of the trade of Moscow, and contains the bazaars, the magazines, and the best and greatest number of shops; and it has the only streets in Moscow in which the houses stand close to each other. Here also are the Pokrovskoi cathedral, which is so constructed as to contain twenty different chapels or places in which divine service may be performed at the same time; the town-hall; the printing-office of the holy synod; and various other public buildings. The Beloi-Gorod, or White Town, runs round the last-named division; it takes its name from a white wall, by which it was formerly surrounded. Besides many fine palaces of the nobility, it contained several remarkable edifices, such as the university, the medico-chirurgical academy, the foundling-hospital, the post-office, the college of foreign affairs, the residence of the governor-general, the excise-house, the assembly-room of the nobility, three monasteries, three nunneries, and several churches. The Zemlianoi-Gorod environs all the other three divisions, and is so denominated from a circular rampart of earth by which it is encompassed. It contained the depôt of the commissariat, the government depôt for spirits, the Imperial Philanthropic Society and the Moscow commercial school. In this division also are several promenades, planted with trees. The two last-named divisions exhibit a grotesque group of churches, convents, palaces, brick and wooden houses, and mean hovels. The slobodi, or suburbs, thirty-five in number, form a vast exterior circle round all the parts already described, and are invested by a low rampart and ditch; among these suburbs are to be found Catharine's Barracks, the military hospital, the hospital of Sheremetof, many monasteries, &c.; besides which, there are numerous orchards, gardens, corn-fields, much open pasture, and some small lakes, which give rise to the Neglina. The Moskwa, from which the city takes its name, flows through it in a winding channel; but, excepting in spring, is only navigable for rafts. Moscow exhibits an astonishing degree of extent and variety, irregularity, and contrast; some parts have the appearance of a sequestered desert, others of a populous town; some of a contemptible village, others of a great capital: the streets in general are very long and broad; some of them are paved; others, particularly in the suburbs, are formed with trunks of trees, or boarded with planks, like

the floor of a room. The churches are richly ornamented within, and the pictures of the saints are decorated with gold, silver, and precious stones; some of their bells are of a stupendous size; they hang in belfries detached from the church, are fixed immovably to the beams, and rung by means of a rope tied to the clapper. In the cathedral of St. Michael the sovereigns of Russia were formerly interred; their bodies are deposited in raised sepulchres, mostly of brick, in the shape of a coffin, above the pavement, each having, at the lower extremity, a silver plate, containing the name of the prince and the time of his death: on great festivals they are all covered with palls of gold or silver brocade, studded with pearls and jewels. The cathedral of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary is the most magnificent in the city, and has long been appropriated to the coronation of the Russian sovereigns. Between these two cathedrals, and nearly in the centre of the Kremlin, is the church of Ivan Veliki: it has a circular tower, terminated by a conical-shaped cupola richly gilt, about 300 feet high, and is the loftiest building in Moscow. In 1737, a bell, weighing more than 400,000 lbs., was cast for this church, but was materially injured by fire the same year; its height is 19 feet, the circumference at the bottom 64 feet, the greatest thickness 23 inches, and a triangular piece is broken off from its periphery: on festival days this bell is visited by the natives, who regard it with superstitious veneration. The Foundling Hospital, founded by Catharine II., is an immense pile of building, of a quadrangular shape, and will contain 8,000 foundlings. Two miles north of the city is the palace of Petrovsky, the usual residence of the Russian sovereigns during their visits to Moscow: it is a large edifice of brick-work, and has an appearance of great magnificence, but the style of architecture is cumbrous and heavy.

Napoleon, when he first beheld "Moscow with the golden cupolas," partook of the general enthusiasm of his soldiers. About two o'clock on the 14th of September, while the rear-guard of the Russians were in the act of evacuating Moscow, he reached the hill called the Mount of Salvation, because it is there where the natives kneel and cross themselves at first sight of the Holy City. Moscow seemed lordly and striking as ever, with the steeples of its thirty churches, and its copper domes glit-

tering in the sun; its palaces of eastern architecture mingled with trees, and surrounded by gardens, while the Kremlin rose like a citadel out of the general mass of groves and buildings. But not a chimney sent up smoke, not a man appeared on the battlements, or at the gates. Napoleon gazed, every moment expecting to see a train of bearded Boyards arriving to fling themselves at his feet, and place their wealth at his disposal. His first exclamation was—"Behold at last that celebrated city!" His next—"It was full time." His army, less regardless of the past or the future, fixed their eyes on the goal of their wishes—and a shout of Moscow! Moscow! passed from rank to rank.*

Napoleon halted till the evening, the whole of his forces in the mean time coming up, his scouts advancing to the city, and even mingling with the retreating Russians. He remained in the anxious expectation that a deputation of the inhabitants would wait upon him formally to surrender to him their ancient capital. Time came on, but no deputation appeared. Was it possible that the Russians were ignorant of the usual formalities of surrendering a town? The scouts of Murat had returned—they had penetrated into the streets, and found Moscow deserted—the population had either left, or was asleep. Several Frenchmen who had been resident in Moscow came out of their hiding-places, and made the same report—the city had been deserted. Napoleon at first refused to give credit to what he was told, so contrary was it to his experience of war or of human nature, that the entire population of a large city should abandon it, because it was about to fall into the hands of an enemy. Disagreeable and unprecedented as the fact was, however, it was impossible to disbelieve it, and when the city was entered, no one was found in its deserted houses and streets but a few thousand vagabonds, who had remained in the hope of plunder; and a few French and other foreign residents, whom the retreating Russians had not been able to induce to leave.

When the emperor Alexander was forced to retire before the French, he committed the command of his army to his two generals, as we have before stated. He then proceeded into the interior of his country, in order to superintend the preparations which were being made for the defeat of the

* Sir Walter Scott.

enemy. He visited Moscow, a city which from the wealth of its inhabitants, and the number of nobles who resided in it, was considered one of the most important in his empire. The excess of the danger which threatened the empire, begot the most intense spirit of loyalty in the inhabitants; and when Alexander reached the ancient city, he was received with every demonstration of enthusiasm, and offers of money and other supplies were made, which could never have been expected. One merchant subscribed 50,000 rubles, two-thirds of his fortune, and paid the sum the ensuing day. The strong feeling of patriotism which thus exhibited itself, convinced Alexander that Moscow would do its duty.

The emperor having left the city to proceed to other parts of his dominions, the inhabitants of Moscow watched the gradual approach of the French with the greatest anxiety. Rostopchin, the governor, upheld the spirits of the citizens by proclamations, in which he assured them that the French would be defeated long before they could reach Moscow, and forced to retreat. Notwithstanding these assurances, many of the inhabitants left the city. Rostopchin, while he appeared to have great confidence in his own proclamations, did not fail to make provision for the reception of the enemy should his hopes be frustrated. Large quantities of fireworks and combustibles were accumulated in the houses, which were to be fired at the proper time, and thus destroy the invader and his followers in a

general explosion. Such was the determined spirit with which the invading army of France was to be met.

About a fortnight before the arrival of the French, the general emigration of the inhabitants had commenced. The governor had the archives of the city and the public treasure removed, the merchants next began to shift their property, and the whole country for miles round was covered with fugitives from the devoted city. The news of the battle of the Moskwa completed the desertion of the city. It was at first supposed by Rostopchin that Kutusoff would risk another battle in the vicinity of Moscow; but when he learned that it was the intention of that general to retreat still further, he determined to lose no time in carrying his desperate design of burning the city into execution. On the night of the 13th, while the French were hurrying forward to take possession of their much coveted prize, Rostopchin sent emissaries round to warn the few remaining inhabitants to lose no time in leaving the city. Fusees and other combustible materials, it is said, were introduced into the deserted houses and shops, and places where they would be the most likely to lead to a general conflagration. A stream of fugitives now poured out of the gates of the city, urged alike by their fear of the French, and the stern measures of Rostopchin. Men might be seen harnessed to carts, dragging their wives, children, their aged parents, and the slight remains of their property.

BURNING OF MOSCOW.

SUCH was the condition of Moscow when the invading army approached the city. Napoleon experienced severe disappointment, when made acquainted with the above facts, but still indulged a hope that the fall of Moscow would produce an impression on the Russians favourable to his views. He entered it on the evening of the 14th of September, but passed that night in a house in the suburbs. While here, a report reached him that it was intended to fire the city. He was vigilant in observing all that passed, and was continually sending messengers to ascertain that all was quiet in Moscow, when at two o'clock in the morning he learned that a fire had actually broken out. A fire balloon was sent up, which fell in the

palace of Trubetskoi, and this seems to have been the signal for a general conflagration. It was seen that the exchange was on fire, and the pillaging of that building immediately commenced. "Under the piazzas," says Labaume, "numerous warehouses were found, in which the soldiers broke the chests, and divided the spoil, which exceeded all their expectations. No cry, no tumult, was heard in this scene of horror; every one found wherewithal to satisfy his thirst for plunder. Nothing was heard but the crackling of the flames, and the noise of the doors that were broken open; till all at once, a dreadful crash was occasioned by the falling in of a wall. Cottons, muslins, in short the most costly pro-

ductions of Europe and of Asia were seen in a blaze. In the cellars were accumulated sugars, oils, vitrol,—all these objects consumed at once, in subterraneous warehouses, sent forth torrents of flames, through thick iron grates." The fire soon reached the finest parts of the town; the palaces which adorned Moscow were destroyed; the steeples of the churches lately resplendent, like gold and silver, were laid low; and more dreadful still, the hospitals were soon involved in the conflagration. These had contained 20,000 wounded sufferers, many of whom, previously mutilated, were seen vainly struggling to escape the devouring element. Napoleon affected an air of calmness, and directed his soldiers to enter the Kremlin, the ancient palace of the czars, which is in the central part of Moscow. Thence he wrote with his own hand proposals of peace, which he forwarded by a Russian officer of rank, who had lately been captured. The flames abated the next day, and the French officers occupied the deserted palaces, but at night the fire burst out again. Many persons were discovered with torches in their hands, who had concealed themselves till darkness arrived. Whether these persons were animated by patriotism, or by a hope of plunder, admits of some doubt; but the latter, it is probable, more generally prevailed among them. Some of them were cut down by the exasperated French. It was impossible to check the conflagration; the fire engines had previously been sent away, and it was soon apparent that the Kremlin was in danger. There, anxiously pacing his apartment, Bonaparte sorrowfully contemplated the magnificently frightful spectacle which was presented to him, while such exclamations as, "What desperate resolution!—it's all their own doings!—these are Scythians indeed!"—were heard to fall from his feverish lips. Soon a cry was raised that the Kremlin was on fire. He found it no easy task to withdraw. He wished to seek Petrovsky, a residence of the Russian emperor, three miles distant on the Petersburg road; but attempting to leave the Kremlin by a postern gate, found himself surrounded by the fire. A single narrow winding street presented the only outlet; through this he rushed, and with great difficulty made his way to Petrovsky.

Segur gives the following graphic account of the escape of Napoleon:—"We were encircled by a sea of fire, which blocked up all the gates of the citadel, and frustrated the first attempts that were made to depart.

After some search, we discovered a postern gate, leading between the rocks to the Moskwa. It was by this narrow passage that Napoleon, his officers, and guards, escaped from the Kremlin. But what had they gained by this movement?—they had approached nearer to the fire, and could neither retreat nor remain where they were. And how were they to advance? how force a passage through the waves of this ocean of flame? There was no time to be lost; the roaring of the flames around us became every moment more violent. A single narrow winding street appeared to be the only outlet. The emperor rushed on foot, and without hesitation, into this narrow passage. He advanced amid the crackling of the flames, the crash of floors, and the fall of burning timbers, and of the red-hot iron roofs which tumbled around him. The flames, which, with impetuous roar, consumed the edifices between which we were proceeding, spreading beyond the walls, were blown about by the wind, and formed an arch over our heads. We walked on a ground of fire, beneath a fiery sky, and between two walls of fire. The intense heat burned our eyes, which we were, nevertheless, obliged to keep open and fixed on the danger. A consuming atmosphere, glowing ashes, detached flames, parched our throats, and rendered our respiration short and dry; and we were already almost suffocated with the smoke."

This occurred on the evening of the 16th. The conflagration, however, raged till the 20th, when it ended, having lasted in all six days. During that period, Dr. Lyall states in his *History of Moscow*, "innumerable palaces, crowds of noble mansions, and thousands of houses, bazaars, shops, and warehouses, containing the wealth and luxuries of the world—the depositories of science, and literature, and taste, the cabinets and galleries—were destroyed." Karamzin, a Russian historian, says:—"Palaces and temples, monuments of art and miracles of luxury, the remains of ages which had passed away, and those which had been the creation of yesterday—the tombs of ancestors and the nursery cradles of the present generation—were indiscriminately destroyed. Nothing was left of Moscow save the remembrance of the city, and the deep resolution to avenge its fall."—The total loss by fire and the war in the government of Moscow was estimated at 321,000,000 of rubles, about £50,000,000 sterling.

On the 20th, Napoleon returned to Moscow, and again took up his lodging at the Kremlin, which, owing to the exertions of the soldiers to save it from destruction, had escaped with but little damage. At this extremely perilous period of their affairs, the appearance of the French invaders was anything but what might have been expected. Their camp or quarters presented a resemblance to a fair. It was, in reality, what has been laughed at as one of the most facetious efforts of Mr. Canning's imagination, "An army in disguise." While Moscow was burning, the staff-officers stationed round the chateaux, where their generals resided, were established in the gardens and quartered under grottos, Chinese pavilions, or green-houses. The horses tied under acacias or linden-trees, were separated from each other by hedges or beds of flowers. "This camp, truly picturesque, was rendered still more so, by the new costume adopted by the soldiers. Thus we saw walking in our camp, soldiers who were dressed *à la Tartare*, *à la Cosaque*, *à la Chinois*; one wore the Polish cap, another wore the high bonnet of the Persians, the Basques, or the Calmucks. In short, our army presented the image of a carnival." Labaume, the writer thus quoted, goes on to state that the army forgot their fatigues, rejoicing in the good cheer they found, and the profits which they made by articles stolen at Moscow; the army having by this time withdrawn from that city and assembled at Petrovsky. The soldiers continued to return to the Kremlin, where they found many valuable articles, of which they made sale. They were, notwithstanding their wealth, so indifferently lodged as to be constantly exposed to all the inclemency of the weather; while they ate off China plates, drank out of silver vases, and had at their command the most elegant appliances of luxury. But distress was fast approaching. The cattle died for want of forage. Their tables were laden with syrups and dainties, but bread and meat were wanting. All foretold, as might easily be perceived, through the rent veil of splendour, that dire want must soon overtake the grand army.

The description given by eye-witnesses of the appearance of the city and its suburbs, now that the fire was over, is horrible in the extreme. "Strict orders had at first been issued to refrain from pillage, but these had been at last withdrawn, and thousands of persons of all descriptions, French and Rus-

sians, officers and privates, men of respectable character and the lowest dregs of the population, the refuse of the Russian gaoles, had for several days been going about through the streets, breaking open shops, and ransacking houses, in quest of such goods or movables as had escaped the fire. There had been no order or regularity; all had been excess and brutal indulgence. On the road from Petrovsky to Moscow, the most strange and disgusting scenes met the eyes of the emperor: large blazing bonfires, in which the fuel consisted of mahogany furniture and gilded doors; around these, officers and soldiers, splashed and bedaubed with mud and dirt, lying on silken couches, or sitting in fine arm-chairs, their feet resting on Siberian furs, Cashmere shawls, or Persian gold-cloth; gold and silver plates in their hands, from which they were ravenously eating huge pieces of half-broiled horseflesh. Round every one of these little groups were gathered crowds of Russian citizens trying in some cases to recover part of their own property, in others to pillage their neighbours, but many of them tempted merely by the fires which the French had kindled, and the horseflesh which they were eating. Entering the suburbs of the city, the scenes which offended the eye and the other senses were more disgusting. Everywhere heaps of ashes, and fragments of stone and iron, blocked up the path; and the air was filled with an indescribable stench, rising from such a smouldering chaos of lime, bricks, wood, dead bodies, and all the heterogeneous mass of materials which the imagination can conceive to be lodged in a great city. In the gardens, wretched and gaunt-looking Russians of both sexes, some with scarcely a rag to cover them, others clad in furs and rich pelisses, were seen scraping the soil with their nails in search of roots or herbs; or fighting with each other for the thigh-bone of a horse which had been left behind them by the French. On the banks of the river, crowds were devouring handfuls of raw and sour corn, which they had fished up from the water, out of a large quantity which had been sunk by the orders of Rostopchin."

The return of Napoleon put a stop to many of these scenes of disorder. Indiscriminate pillage was ordered to cease; the churches were evacuated by the soldiery; the principal streets were cleared; and means were taken to restore order and regularity into the sacked and ruined city.

But nothing could repair the losses sustained by the indiscriminate pillage of the last six days. Quantities of provisions which, if prudently taken care of, would have been a welcome addition to the army stores, had been irretrievably squandered by a wasteful and licentious soldiery.

Thus have we endeavoured to convey to our readers a faint idea of that great event in history, the "Burning of Moscow;" and though we have, in accordance with the generally-received account of this event, attributed the act to the Russians, yet we cannot refrain from giving colonel Mitchell's view of the question, although he differs from all other writers on the subject. Colonel Mitchell denies that the Russians did burn Moscow. Alison, in his *History of Europe*, states that Rostopchin, in Paris, with his own lips, told him that he had applied the incendiary torch with his own hands; but to what? *to a bed in his own country palace.* The French evidence of course is worth nothing, as they had no means of knowing who set fire to the town, whether their own soldiers or the Russians. They had strong motives, however, for saying the latter, and therefore they said it. We will, however, let colonel Mitchell state his own case.

"But," he says, "it will be asked, how then was Moscow burnt? for if the Russians did not burn it, the French certainly would not. The answer is very easy. The first thing famishing troops are likely to do on entering a town, is to demand food; but when there are no inhabitants to supply them, as was the case in the deserted city of Moscow, the soldiers naturally look for it themselves; and as they are not generally provided with lanterns and wax tapers for the purpose of searching cellars, cupboards, and dark corners, their usual substitutes are wisps of lighted straw, or burning sticks: and thousands of starving wretches so employed—to say nothing of intemperance, and the proverbial carelessness of soldiers—would soon set fire to a deserted city, mostly built of wood. We have seen what the conduct of the troops was on entering the capital, and may safely ask, how could any city escape being burnt under such circumstances! The Russians, seeing that great honour attached to this presumed sacrifice, very quietly took the credit of it to themselves, though they had in the first instance accused the French of the deed. Count Rostopchin, in a pamphlet written on the

subject, frankly owns that it was not the act of the Russian government: but so proud have the nation become of this pretended deed of heroism, 'this sublimest of volcanoes,' that colonel Bouturlin, in his half-official account of the campaign of 1812, avowing that no direct orders were given for the destruction of the city, insinuates, nevertheless, that intelligible hints to the same effect emanated from the highest quarter, and were received as absolute commands in consequence. We doubt the assertion altogether, and believe the fire to have been the very natural result of the circumstances under which the deserted city was taken possession of by the famishing French. Nor can the Russians claim any credit for this pretended national sacrifice, unless at the expense of the very moderate degree of sagacity which must have rendered the needless severity of such a measure plain and apparent."

We add the observations of Sir Walter Scott on this important point in history:—"The conflagration of Moscow was so complete in its devastation, so important in its consequences, so critical in the moment of its commencement, that almost all the eye-witnesses have imputed it to a sublime, yet almost horrible exertion of patriotic decision on the part of the Russians, their government, and, in particular, of the governor, Rostopchin. Nor has the positive denial of count Rostopchin himself diminished the general conviction that the fire was directed by him. All the French officers continue to this day to ascribe the conflagration to persons whom he had employed. On the other hand, there are many, and those good judges of the probabilities in such an event, who have shown strong reasons for believing that Moscow shared but the fate of a deserted city, which is almost always burnt as well as pillaged. In the meantime, we shall only observe, that should the scale of evidence incline to the side of accident, history will lose one of the grandest as well as most terrible incidents which she has on record. Considered as a voluntary Russian act, the burning of their capital is an incident of gigantic character, which we consider with awe and terror—our faculties so confused by the immensity of the object, considered in its different bearings, that we hardly know whether to term it vice or virtue, patriotism or vengeance. Whether the conflagration of Moscow was or was not the work of Russian will and Russian hands, the effects

which it was to produce on the campaign were likely to be of the most important character. Bonaparte's object in pressing on to the capital at every risk was to grasp a pledge, for the redemption of which he had no doubt Alexander would be glad to make peace on his own terms. But the prize of his victory, however fair to the sight, had, like that fabled fruit, said to grow on the banks of the Dead Sea, proved in the end but soot and ashes. Moscow, indeed, he had seized, but it had perished in his grasp; and, far from being able to work upon Alexander's fears for its safety, it was reasonable to think that its total destruction had produced the most vehement resentment on the part of the Russian monarch, since Napoleon received not even the civility of an answer to his conciliatory letter. And thus the acquisition so much desired, as the means of procuring peace, had become, by this catastrophe, the cause of the most irreconcilable enmity. Neither was it a trifling consideration, that Napoleon had lost by this dreadful fire a great part of the supplies which he expected the capture of the metropolis would have contributed for the support of his famished army. Had there existed in Moscow the usual population of a capital, he would have found the usual modes of furnishing its markets in full activity. These, doubtless, are not of the common kind, for provisions are sent to this capital, not, as is usual, from fertile districts around the city, but from distant regions, whence they are brought by water carriage in the summer, and by sledges, which travel on the ice and frozen snow, in the winter time. To Moscow, with its usual inhabitants, these supplies must have been remitted as usual, lest the numerous population of 250,000 and upwards should be famished, as well as the enemy's army. But, Moscow deserted—Moscow burnt and reduced to mountains of cinders and ashes—had no occasion for such supplies; nor was it to be supposed that the provinces from which they were usually remitted would send them to a heap of ruins, where there remained none to be fed save the soldiers of the invading army. This conviction came with heavy anticipation on the emperor of France and his principal officers."

Accustomed to domineer over the sovereigns of Europe, Buonaparte had confidently expected that the emperor Alexander, his ancient capital lost, would be content to take his place among the vanquished. He

had the grief to learn, after sending Lauriston to Kutusoff to propose an accommodation or an armistice, that he, while receiving the communication with all courtesy, had made known that he had no authority to receive any proposals for peace or for an armistice. With respect to an armistice, the Russians had no occasion for it, and they were in possession of too many advantages to think of granting a cessation of arms to an invading enemy. When Lauriston complained of the barbarous manner in which the war was conducted on the part of the Russians, he was answered that the barbarities complained of originated with the French, who had, without provocation, invaded their country. He added, that now, when vengeance and retaliation were at hand, they sought for peace; but peace could not be granted till the French were beyond the Vistula. They had come to Moscow uninvited, and must get back how they could. The Russian army, he might be assured, would do its duty, and this was but the commencement of the campaign. In the same spirit, when Murat having concluded a short armistice, with Miloradovitch, complained of the excesses committed by the Cossacks, the latter at once declared that they had acted only according to orders. Murat remonstrated against their firing on flags of truce, but received for an answer—"We want not to negotiate, but to fight. Take your measures accordingly." These brave commanders only communicated the sentiments and the fixed resolve of their sovereign. When he learnt the fall of Moscow, this was the language of Alexander—"No pusillanimous dejection! Let us vow redoubled courage and perseverance. The enemy is in deserted Moscow, as in a tomb. He entered Russia with 300,000 men of all countries, without union, or any national or religious bond: he has lost half of them by the sword of famine and desertion. He is in the heart of Russia, and not a single Russian at his feet. To escape famine he will soon be obliged to direct his flight through the close flanks of our brave soldiers. Shall we then falter when our efforts against the common enemy are beheld and approved by all Europe?"

While Napoleon remained in deserted Moscow, Murat, with part of the army, was in pursuit of Kutusoff and his Russians. Several engagements took place between the Russian general and the chivalrous king of Naples, which, however, were decisive of nothing, save the stubborn bravery of

the Russians. Tired of this protracted and undecisive warfare, and becoming every day more sensible of the danger of his position, Napoleon still hoped that he might be able to bring the czar to sue for terms of peace. His plans at this time were undecided. At one time it seemed to be his intention to remain at Moscow through the winter; and in conformity with this design, or probably with the intention of deceiving the Russians, an intendant and municipal magistracy were established for the city; a theatre was erected amid the ruins; first-rate actors were sent for from Paris; and an Italian singer commenced giving entertainments in the Kremlin. At another he would propose to his assembled officers, that the army should at once march on St. Petersburg; this idea, however, was soon laid aside. A third proposed measure was to move southward on the fertile province of Kalouga, and thence to proceed westward to Smolensk, which was their first *dépôt*. This, however, would involve a general action with Kutusoff, who occupied a favourable position to the south of Moscow. The sample which Napoleon had received of this general's bravery at the battle of Borodino, indisposed him to risk another encounter with him, as, should it be as obstinately contested, and as doubtful in its termination, it would be but a bad commencement for a retreat, the flanks of which would certainly be annoyed, even if the Moldavian army did not intercept him in the front. There was but one other course open to the invaders, and that was to retreat. This, as yet, none of his generals had the courage to propose to their great leader. Besides, the line of retreat must lie through the countries which had been totally wasted and destroyed by the advance of the army, and where all the villages had been burned and abandoned, either by the French or the Russians themselves.

Buonaparte's difficulties still continued to increase; and it became necessary at once to decide on what course was to be pursued. Provisions were becoming so scarce that the soldiers had to depend for their rations on the supplies which were brought in by parties of cavalry who scoured the country round, and seized on everything eatable they could find. The stock in the neighbourhood was in a short time all consumed, and it became necessary for these foraging parties to extend their circle of robbery and pillage wider and wider, where they had to contend with the enraged peasantry, and bands of

Cossacks fell upon them whenever an opportunity presented itself. In addition to their present sufferings, the French were haunted with the dread of a Russian winter, of whose horrors they had heard, but of the true nature of which they could as yet form but a faint idea. In the conversations they had had with the inhabitants and the prisoners they had taken, the French soldiers were told that the winter was at hand; that when it did come, within a fortnight their nails would drop off from the effects of the cold, and their muskets would fall from their half-dead and frozen fingers; that in fact, their graves would be the snows of Russia.

Still Napoleon would not decide on a retreat; still he clung to the hope that the fall of Moscow would dispose the Russians and their emperor to sue for peace; he calculated that the occupation of Moscow, even in its deserted state, was a blow which the nation could not survive. "Millions of money," he said, "have no doubt slipped through our hands in consequence of the burning of Moscow; but how many millions is Russia losing? Her commerce is ruined for a century to come. The nation is thrown back fifty years; this, of itself, is an important result. When the first moment of enthusiasm is past, this reflection will fill them with consternation."

Napoleon still determined to await an answer to a communication despatched by Lauriston to Kutusoff, which was to be forwarded to the emperor. Lauriston, after much difficulty, obtained an interview with Kutusoff on the 6th of October. He opened his business with a proposal for an exchange of prisoners; this Kutusoff declined; the shrewd old Russian easily perceived that a lack of soldiers was not likely to occur in his army, while the ranks of the French must every day become thinner. General Lauriston then entering on the real business of his mission, asked "if this war, which had assumed such an unheard-of character, was to last for ever?" declaring at the same time that the sincere desire of his master, the emperor of France, was to terminate hostilities between two great and generous nations. The Russian general easily perceived that the desire of Napoleon to make peace arose from the difficulties of his position, and he immediately adopted the course which he thought most likely to gain time, which must at once increase the difficulties of the French, and his own power of availing

himself of them. He affected a sincere desire to promote a pacification, but declared that the emperor had given him no power to receive any proposal of that kind himself, or to transmit it to him. He therefore declined to grant to general Lauriston a passport to the presence of Alexander, but professed himself willing to send general Wolkonsky, an aid-de-camp of the czar, to learn his imperial pleasure. Lauriston did not object to this arrangement. Occupying still his apartments in the Kremlin, Napoleon persisted in awaiting the answer to his letter to the czar despatched by Lauriston; this answer could not be expected till the 26th.

If Buonaparte had any real expectation of the Russian emperor's agreeing to terms of peace, he had indulged in a groundless hope. Alexander refused to hear of any negotiation, and severely reprimanded his general for holding any communication with the invaders. The Russian soldiers were at the same time made acquainted with the news of the success of the British arms in Spain; Frenchmen, like others, it was shown, were liable to defeat; and the soldiers were called on to emulate the courage of the British and patriotism of the Spaniards. While the minds of the soldiery were thus excited and encouraged, Kutusoff put an end to the armistice, and took up an offensive position.

At this time, a scheme is said to have been suggested by Daru, one of Napoleon's generals, to turn Moscow into an entrenched

camp, and occupy it as winter quarters. Let them, he said, make themselves as comfortable as possible in the city; let every effort be made to procure food by sweeping the neighbouring country; and to lessen the amount of forage required, kill all the spare horses, and let them be salted down and barrelled. With these preparations they would be able to defy the rigours of a Russian winter, and be able to take the field again in spring! Napoleon approved of what he termed a lion's counsel; but finally this plan was abandoned. The fear of what might happen in France, from which this plan would have excluded them for six months, weighed heavily with him. "Besides, if Napoleon fixed himself at Moscow for the winter, not only his line of communication, but Lithuania and the Grand Duchy, which formed the base of his operations, ran every risk of being invaded. On the south-west the dubious faith of Austria was all he had to trust to, for the purpose of resisting the united armies of Tchitchagoff and Tormasoff, which might be augmented to 100,000 men, and make themselves masters of Warsaw and Wilna. On the northern extremity of his general line of operations, Macdonald and St. Cyr might prove unable to resist Wittgenstein and Steingel; and he had in his rear Prussia, the population of which Napoleon justly considered as ready to take arms against him at the first favourable opportunity. The scheme, therefore, for occupying winter quarters at Moscow was rejected as fraught with danger."

THE FRENCH RETREAT FROM MOSCOW.

WE now come to the saddest chapter which is perhaps to be found in the bloody annals of war,—the retreat from Moscow. Not until a heavy fall of snow had unmistakeably reminded the French emperor of the climate he was braving, did he decide on leaving Moscow; but he dared not longer remain there; and at length, with feelings of the deepest humiliation, but maintaining his ordinary bravado and pretension, the order to retreat was given. It was issued on the 18th of October, thirty-four days after they had entered Moscow in triumph, and never was a richer burlesque on calamity exhibited to the world, than was displayed on this occasion. Far distant from their home, having before them a two month's journey

through rugged roads, and pathless snows, and exposed to all the horrors of a northern winter, though scantily supplied with provisions and necessaries for such a dismal pilgrimage, long files of carriages in three or four ranks moved in the sad procession, laden with booty; valuables that might be desirable in a milder climate and in the security of peace, but worse than valueless to the traveller in a desert, surrounded by enemies to whom these treasures belonged. Yet these, and the trophies of war, among which must be mentioned the Cross of St. Ivan, were proudly paraded. The resolution of Napoleon was taken to march by the Kalouga road, and in his wonted bombastic style he thought it fitting to exclaim: "Wo

be to those I meet by the way." The army left Moscow on the 19th, then consisting of 100,000 fighting men, while a vast number of helpless women and children were among the followers of the army.

On the 22nd, the emperor had reached Borowsk, ten leagues from Moscow, and had fixed his quarters there. Here was distinctly heard the dreadful explosion of the blowing up of the Kremlin, which Napoleon had left his rear-guard to execute. The mode of carrying out this mandate was a piece of additional barbarity. Aware that some of the Russians who were left behind, the offscourings of society, would crowd in to plunder the palace when the French retreated, the soldiers attached long slow matches to the barrels of gunpowder which were stored in the vaults of the palace, and lighted them when the rear of the French column marched out. The French were but at a short distance when the explosion took place, which laid a considerable part of the Kremlin in ruins, and destroyed at the same time, in mere wantonness, a large number of unfortunate beings whom curiosity or love of plunder had induced to enter the palace.

On the 23rd, a battle was fought at Maro-Jaroslawitz, between the advanced portion of the army, under prince Eugene Beauharnois, and the whole Russian army, under Kutusoff. The French were victorious; but victory in their then situation brought them little cause for rejoicing. The town of Maro-Jaroslawitz presented scenes too mournful to be described. Napoleon is said to have heard, without emotion, the doleful cries of the wounded, who demanded assistance, while he ascribed to Eugene all the honour of that glorious day. Buonaparte could no longer disguise to himself the appalling fact, that the situation of his army, though triumphant in this battle, was becoming desperate; and anxious to reach Smolensk without loss of time, he made choice of one of the three roads leading to that city, which passed by Mojaïsk.

On the day succeeding this engagement an incident occurred, as he was proceeding to reconnoitre, in which Napoleon incurred a great risk of his life or freedom. It was about daybreak when, as attended by his staff and orderly soldiers, he crossed the little plain on the northern side of the Louja in order to gain the bridge; the level ground was suddenly filled with fugitives, in the rear of whom appeared some black

masses. At first, the cries they made seemed to be those of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" but the wild hurrah of the Cossacks, and the swiftness of their advance, soon announced the children of the desert. "It is the Cossacks," said Rapp, seizing the reins of the emperor's bridle, "you must turn back." Napoleon refused to retreat, drew his sword, as did his attendants, and placed themselves on the side of the highway. Rapp's horse was wounded, and borne down by one of the lancers; but the emperor and suite preserved their liberty by standing their ground, while the cloud of Cossacks, more intent on plunder than prisoners, passed them within arm's length, without observing the inestimable prey which was within their grasp, and threw themselves upon some carriages which were more attractive. The arrival of the cavalry of the guard cleared the plain of this desultory but pertinacious enemy; and Napoleon proceeded to cross the river, and ascend the further bank, for the purpose of reconnoitring.

On the 28th of October, the army reached Mojaïsk, leaving a track of ruin and devastation behind them, and fronting a desert equally horrible. "The fields," says Labaume, "trampled down by thousands of horses, seemed as though they had never been cultivated. The forests, cleared by the long continuance of the troops, partook likewise of the general desolation; but most horrible were the multitudes of dead bodies which, deprived of burial for fifty-two days, scarcely retained the human form. As we traversed the field of Borodino, my consternation was inexpressible when I found the 40,000 men who had perished there yet lying exposed. The whole plain was entirely covered with them. None of the bodies were more than half buried. In one place were to be seen garments yet red with blood, and bones gnawed by dogs and birds of prey; in another were broken arms, drums, trumpets, and helmets. Continuing our march through the plain, we heard at a distance a feeble voice appealing to us for succour. Touched by his plaintive cries, some soldiers approached the spot, and, to their astonishment, saw a French soldier stretched on the ground, with both his legs broken. 'I was wounded,' said he, 'on the day of the great battle. I fainted from the agony I endured, and, on recovering my senses, I found myself in a desolate place, where none could hear my cries or afford me relief. For two months I daily dragged myself to the brink

of a rivulet, where I fed on the grass and roots, and some morsels of bread which I found among the dead bodies. At night I laid myself down under the shelter of some dead horses. To-day, seeing you at a distance, I summoned all my strength, and happily crawled sufficiently near your route to make my voice heard.' " The poor wretch was placed in a carriage, and carried along with the army.

The weather became piercingly cold, the "hurrah" of the Cossacks who pursued the retreating host was more formidable than ever, and on the 6th of November, while yet they had some days' march to perform to reach Smolensk, the winter set in. Withering blasts swept the surface of the earth, and masses of snow descended to furnish a shroud for the soldiers of the grand army. Their freezing garments stiffened on their bodies, their benumbed limbs became powerless, they staggered rather than walked, and the thick snow which covered the soil soon presented a multitude of tumuli, which served but to indicate so many graves. The Cossacks hung on their rear with unfailing courage, the peasants joined them to exterminate the hated intruders, and the very dogs of the neighbourhood joined in the pursuit, to feast on the carcases of the victims to mad ambition. Then the useless artillery they had brought with them, the trophies which they had won, and the treasures which they had stolen, were rapidly abandoned. Men and horses expired from fatigue. The flesh of the horses was all the soldiers had to feed on for many days. The animals were torn to pieces as soon as they were dead, and portions of the meat broiled on coals, or on the wood fires which were kindled. Warming themselves by these, if for a moment they forgot their woe, when they rose to move forward, their frost-bitten limbs were powerless, and they preferred falling into the hands of the enemy to a further effort at continuing their painful journey. Hundreds, seated by the fires kindled on their march, fell fast asleep to wake no more. They had left Moscow from 100,000 to 120,000 strong; when they had reached Viazma on the Wop, not more than 60,000 capable of standing before an enemy remained. One anecdote of their march will show the terrible condition to which the unfortunate fugitives were reduced. "At the gates of Smolensk," says Segur, "a mother had abandoned her little son, only five years

old. In spite of his cries and tears, she had driven him away from her sledge, which was too heavily laden. She herself cried out, with a distracted air, that *he* had never seen France; that *he* would not regret it: as for *her*, *she* knew France, and was resolved to see France once more. Twice did Ney himself replace the unfortunate child in the arms of his mother: twice did she cast him off into the frozen snow. This solitary crime, amid the many instances of the most devoted tenderness, they did not leave unpunished. The unnatural mother was abandoned to the same snow from which her infant was snatched, and entrusted to another mother. This little orphan was exhibited in their ranks, and he survived all the horrors of the retreat."

Napoleon reached Smolensk on the 9th of November, but instead of gaining there, as he expected, a fortnight's provision for all his army, he found the activity of the Russians had left within his reach a very inadequate supply. Scenes of great disorder and fierce contention, attended with bloodshed, ensued. Those who soonest reached the city, were not disposed to spare anything for comrades that might follow. They feasted with reckless greediness, and many died from repletion, from wastefully consuming that which would have saved their friends from starving. At Smolensk the emperor proceeded to reorganize his army. It was now reduced to 40,000 men; and 350 cannon had already been left behind; this force he divided into four corps, which were to leave Smolensk, placing a day's interval between each. He himself led the van, with 6,000 of his guard, and about as many soldiers, the relics of different corps, amalgamated into battalions as well as circumstances would permit. It was not till the 14th of November, that all the army had reached Smolensk, and on that day Napoleon left for Orcha. The rear of the army was brought up by Ney, who had to sustain a series of desperate conflicts on the road. When the rest of the army had reached Orcha he was given up as lost. On the 17th of November, Ney, last of the invading army, left Smolensk at the head of 7,000 or 8,000 fighting men, leaving behind 5,000 sick and wounded to the tender mercies of the Russians. They advanced without much interruption, until they reached the field of battle of Krasnoi, where they saw all the relics of a bloody action, and heaps of dead, from whose dress and appear-

ance they could tell that they had belonged to the French army; but there was no one to tell the fate of the survivors. They soon arrived at the banks of the Losmina, where they had to encounter the Russian general Miloradovitch, at the head of a great force. A thick mist concealed the Russians from view, and Ney's columns were under their batteries before they were aware of their danger. A single Russian officer appeared, and invited Ney to capitulate. "A marshal of France never capitulates," answered the heroic general. The officer retired, and the Russian batteries opened at the distance of only 250 yards, while at the concussion the mist arose, and showed the devoted column of French, subjected on every side to a fire of artillery, while the hills were black with the Russian soldiers, placed to support their guns. Far from losing heart in their perilous situation, the guards forced their way through the ravine of the Losmina, and rushed with the utmost fury on the Russian batteries. They were, however, charged in their turn by the bayonet, and those who had forced their way across the ravine suffered dreadfully, and were obliged to retrace their steps. Ney, however, made another attempt to cut his passage through the opposing Russians. Again the French advanced upon the cannon, losing whole ranks, which were supplied by their comrades as fast as they fell. The assault was again unsuccessful; and Ney, seeing that the total destruction of his column must ensue if he further persevered in this attempt, selected about 4,000 of the best men, and separating himself from the rest, he set forth, under the shelter of the night, moving to the rear, as if about to fall back on Smolensk. This, indeed, was the only road open to him, but he did not pursue it long; for as soon as he reached a rivulet, which had the appearance of being one of the feeders of the Dnieper, he adopted it for his guide to the banks of that river, which he reached in safety. Here he found a place where the ice was sufficiently strong for his soldiers to pass over, one at a time; but when the waggons, some of which were loaded with sick and wounded, attempted to pass, the ice gave way beneath them, and they were precipitated into the river. The heavy plunge and the stifled moaning told their fate. The Cossacks, as usual, speedily appeared in the rear, captured some hundreds of prisoners, and took possession of the baggage and artillery.

On Ney's arrival on the 20th, Napoleon testified great joy at his safety. By the 25th of November, the march being continued under increasing difficulties, the numbers of the grand army were shrunk to about 28,000 fighting-men, and 40,000 stragglers. Buonaparte was reflecting what step it might be necessary to take after crossing the Berezyna, when he learnt that the Borizoff bridge, 300 fathoms in length, and to which he was directing his anxious steps, with the town from which it takes its name, was lost to him; the town having been captured, and Dumbrowski defeated under its walls. "The Man of Destiny" could not dissemble the concern which this intelligence gave him; disconsolately looking upwards, while he smote the earth with his cane, he was heard to exclaim, "Is it then written in the book of fate, that we shall commit nothing but errors?"

Mindful of the admonitory hint he had formerly received from Fouché, it had been the policy of Napoleon to furnish bulletins couched in terms calculated to keep up the spirits of the people of Paris, by sending flattering accounts of the successes achieved by his troops. This task had often been somewhat difficult to perform; now there was great danger indeed of taking that "step" of which he often spoke, "from the sublime to the ridiculous." When a drawn battle was to be described, it was easy to claim a victory, but when the grand army was no more, still to have chronicled new triumphs, would have been, not to wake admiration or sustain hope, but to provoke laughter. When the twenty-ninth bulletin was to appear, he found it necessary to make some important admissions, and here we accordingly read, "the cold which began on the 7th suddenly increased, and on the 14th, 15th, and 16th, the thermometer was sixteen and eighteen degrees below the freezing point. The roads were covered with ice, the cavalry, artillery, and baggage horses perished every night, not only by hundreds but by thousands, particularly the German and French horses. In a few days more than 30,000 horses perished; our cavalry were on foot, our artillery and our baggage were without conveyance. It was necessary to abandon and destroy a good part of our cannon, ammunition, and provisions." It was now admitted that a pursuing enemy inflicted on them great loss. Of the Cossacks it was said, "This contemptible cavalry, which only makes a noise,







10 18 20 22

DENMARK

RUSSIA

THE BALTIC SEA

GULF OF DANTZIG

WARSAW

CHACOW

THE POLISH PALACE

FROM THE PALACE

om Greenwich

16 18 20 22



rendered themselves formidable by favour of circumstances." More need not have been told. If a force which could "only make a noise" had become "formidable," what must have been the state of that well-disciplined army to which a noise only was

formidable! The unwilling admissions which were thus drawn from Napoleon, told to all Europe very distinctly the dreadful state of his soldiers. It was not unaptly called "the last dying speech and confession of the grand army."

PASSAGE OF THE BEREZYNA, AND TOTAL RUIN OF THE GRAND ARMY.

NAPOLEON'S situation at this moment was little to be envied. Attachment melts rapidly before misfortune, and those who had idolized him in the moment of victory, pointed to him with contempt when they saw him retreating with shame and disorder before a vindictive enemy. In this miserable progress, for some time he rode in his carriage. The soldiers, who had been devoted to him, insisted that he should leave it, and share their fatigue. He was wrapped up in a cloak. They demanded that it should be thrown aside, and the mandate was from necessity obeyed. Trifles could now agitate him. Stretched on a couch, while he seemed to sleep, Duroc and Darou sitting near him, conversed on the difficulties which surrounded them, when the expression, "state prisoner," having fallen from one of them, Napoleon instantly started up,—“How,” said he, “can you for a moment suppose they would dare?” The reply of Darou was not very consoling: it told the emperor that “state policy might induce the Russians, should he fall into their hands, to immure him as their captive. For his own part, he was anxious that Napoleon should reach France through the air, if the earth offered him no passage thither.” Buonaparte seemed sadly to ruminate on the condition in which he was likely to be placed, and ordered the reports of his ministers to be burnt. He admitted their condition was most lamentable, and tracing the course of the Berezyna on a map, was repeatedly heard to murmur, “Charles XII.—Pultawa!” He saw his own fate shadowed in the melancholy termination of the Swedish conqueror's career. The grand army, says Labaume, had, in fact, now reached the very spot where Charles XII. crossed the Berezyna, June 25th, 1708, on his way to Moscow, and the French writer proceeds, “What a frightful picture did this multitude of men present, overwhelmed by misfortunes of every kind, and hemmed in by a morass;

that very multitude which, two months before, had exultingly spread itself over the surface of a vast empire! Our soldiers pale, emaciated, dying with hunger and cold, having nothing to defend them from the inclemency of the season, but tattered pelisses, sheep skins half-burnt, and uttering the most mournful lamentation, crowded the whole length of this unfortunate bank. Germans, Poles, Italians, Spaniards, Croats, Portuguese, and French, were all mingled, quarrelling with each other, in their different languages, while the officers, even the generals, wrapped in pelisses covered with dirt and filth, were confounded with the soldiers, abusing those who insulted them, or braved their authority.” Two wooden bridges having been hastily constructed, the troops began to pass over on the 27th, and among them was Buonaparte himself, with a division of 6,000 strong. No language can adequately describe the horrors now accumulated. The two bridges were intended, one for the carriages, and the other for the foot soldiers; but the crowd was so great, that the approaches to them became choked up; and about eight o'clock in the morning of the 28th, the bridge appropriated to the cavalry, baggage, and artillery, gave way. A frightful struggle ensued among the desperate unfortunates who strove to reach the only remaining bridge. The cavalry became at last so exasperated by the resistance opposed to them, that they adopted the murderous resolution of cutting their way through the crowd. The Russian armies had come up before daylight. Their fire was incessant, the slaughter enormous, and one whole division was forced to surrender. The multitude was still urged forward, amidst a shower of cannon-balls. Many perished by the hands of their comrades, and the passage to the bridge was so obstructed by the remains of men and horses, that it was necessary to climb over mountains of dead bodies, to get to the

river side. "Some buried in these horrible heaps still breathed, and struggling with the agonies of death, caught hold of those who mounted over them, but the latter kicked them with violence to disengage themselves." The scene became every moment more horrible. Many hundreds were seen striving in the water against masses of ice, while the snow descended in immense flakes. Screams, groans, and curses filled the air, the roar of the enemy's artillery continued through the whole night to add to the fearful tumult. Another morning dawned, yet thousands were still waiting to cross the bridge, but the Russians were now so close that it was thought necessary to burn the bridge, for the security of those who had already passed the river. Crossing the Berezyna, it is said, inflicted on the invaders a loss of upwards of 30,000 men.

Pursued by the exulting Russians, the disorganized fugitives continued their flight, suffering every imaginable privation, and encountering every variety of misery. At Smorgoni, Bonaparte determined to quit the army and proceed to Paris. Three sledges were provided; one was to carry him and Caulincourt (duke of Vicenza), who, on their journey, was to assume the title of emperor. Calling his officers together, he announced to them that Murat, in his absence, was to command the army as generalissimo. He tried to encourage those about him by confidently announcing that he had ordered Ney to Wilna, who would reorganize the army, and strike such a blow as would effectually check the Russians. He then departed, endeavouring to dissemble the dire apprehension that came over him, but which showed itself in peevish answers and impatient gestures. He narrowly escaped being captured at Youpranoui, but reached Warsaw on the 10th of December.

After his departure, the sufferings of the army, which was now reduced to a very select body, continued to be dreadful in the extreme. The weather was intensely cold, and, says Segur, "the dull and monotonous sound of our steps, the cracking of snow, and the feeble groans of the dying, were the only interruption to the vast and doleful silence. Such of our soldiers as had hitherto been the most persevering here lost heart entirely. Whenever they stopped for a moment, from exhaustion, the winter laying

his heavy and icy hand upon them, was ready to seize upon his prey. In vain did these poor unfortunates, feeling themselves benumbed, and already deprived of speech and plunged into a stupor, proceed a few steps, like automaton; their blood freezing in their veins, like water in the currents of rivulets, congealed their hearts, and then flew back to their heads: these dying men staggered as if they had been intoxicated. From their eyes, which were reddened and inflamed by the continual aspect of snow, by the want of sleep and the smoke of the bivouac, there flowed real tears of blood. They were not long before they fell upon their knees, and then upon their hands; their heads still wavered for a few minutes, to the right and left; from their open mouths some agonizing sounds escaped; at last they fell upon the snow, which they reddened with livid blood, and their sufferings were at an end. Their comrades passed on without moving a step out of their way, for fear of prolonging their journey." The remnant of the grand army reached Wilna on the 9th of December. Though joined by 25,000 recruits, after the passage of the Berezyna, no more than 40,000 could be numbered at Wilna. Their distress did not terminate even there. No preparation had been made for their reception, and no regular rations being supplied, a new scene of contention and plunder was witnessed, and many perished in the streets before food could be obtained. From Wilna the French marched to Kowno, the last town on the Russian frontier; and on the 13th of December they re-crossed the Niemen. Of 400,000 men that were computed to have entered Russia on this memorable expedition, not more than 25,000 returned; and these were debilitated by their sufferings, and, in every respect, in a most deplorable plight.* They plunged into the forests of Russian-Poland, and sought their several homes, still chased by the untiring Cossacks, and few indeed were they who reached France in safety and in health. It has been calculated that during the invasion and the defence of Russia six hundred and fifty thousand lives were sacrificed! Many thousands of Russians perished obscurely, attempting to repel the enemy from their habitations; and multitudes were lost from fatigue, hunger, and the destruction of their towns and cities. In this sketch

* Sir Walter Scott gives the numbers, on the authority of Boutourlin, as follows:—Slain in battle, 125,000; died from fatigue, hunger, and the severity

of the climate, 182,000; prisoners, comprehending 48 generals, 3,000 officers, and 190,000 men,—193,000.—Total 450,000.

the reader has been spared many scenes of appalling horror. Some apocryphal narratives preserved by Labaume, though very interesting, have been purposely omitted. Enough has been retained to indicate the devastation and ruin Napoleon spread around him as he advanced, the terrifying slaughter and desolation which marked his triumph, and the awful retaliation which signalized his retreat. France long continued to idolize him as a conqueror; but what chief could be named from her annals who ever brought upon her such fearful humiliation, such complete prostration, such miserable defeat!

Thus ended the celebrated French invasion of Russia, which was undertaken for no wise or intelligible purpose, and with no prudent foresight or sagacious calculation, but merely from the morbid restlessness, unbounded ambition, and overweening self-confidence of a military adventurer, who aspired to the acquisition of universal monarchy. The hero-worshippers of Buonaparte ascribe the entire of the failure of this campaign to the frost, the snow, and the fire: but surely frost and snow in such a high northern latitude were not to be unlooked for in the months of November and December. Nor was it an unlikely thing to occur that the Russian people, against whom a most unjustifiable war of aggression was being carried on, should resort to every means they could to oppose the invaders of their country. But from the Egyptian expedition downwards, blind rashness and inconsiderate daring had been a principal feature in Napoleon's character; and though he escaped punishment nineteen times; still, upon his own theory of the doctrine of chances, it was only the more natural to look for it the twentieth time. He himself has left on record a graphic picture of the capability of Russia to repel foreign aggression, which goes far to prove the foolhardiness of the project.

"Backed," said he, "by the eternal ices of the pole, which must for ever render it unassailable in rear or flank, it can only be attacked even on its vulnerable front during three or four months in the year, while it has the whole twelve to render available against us. It offers to an invader nothing but the rigours, sufferings, and privations of a desert soil, of a nature half dead and frozen, while its inhabitants will ever precipitate themselves with transport towards the delicious climates of the south. To these physical advantages, we must join an immense

population, brave, hardy, devoted, passive; and vast nomad tribes, to whom destitution is habitual, and wandering is nature. One cannot avoid shuddering at the thought of such a mass, unassailable alike on the flanks and rear, which can at any time with impunity inundate you; while, if defeated, it has only to retire into the midst of its snows and ices, where pursuit is impossible, and reparation of loss easy. It is the Antæus of the fable, which cannot be overcome but by seizing it by the middle, and stifling it in the arms; but where is the Hercules to be found who will attempt such an enterprise? We could alone attempt it, and the world knows what success we have had. Show me an emperor of Russia, brave, able, and impetuous: in a word, a czar who is worthy of his situation, and Europe is at his feet. He may begin his operations at the distance only of 100 leagues from the two capitals of Vienna and Berlin, the sovereigns of which are the only obstacles he has to apprehend. He gains the one by seduction, subdues the other by force, and he is soon in the midst of the lesser princes of Germany, most of whom are his relations or dependents. A few words on liberation and independence will set Italy on fire. Assuredly, in such a situation, I should arrive at Calais by fixed stages, and be the arbiter of Europe.*

It is astonishing, that after the committal of such a grievous error as the Russian campaign, that Napoleon should, for so long a period, have retained the reputation of a great military genius. Genius he certainly possessed; and great genius of a certain volcanic and purely physical kind; but more extraordinary than his genius unquestionably was his good fortune, in that his early adversaries were feeble and divided; and that the popular enthusiasm, whatever there was worthy of the name at that time, was all on the side of a despot. We cannot close this chapter more appropriately than by giving colonel Maxwell's summary of the military character of Napoleon.

"The world at large are easily dazzled by military success; and the splendid triumphs of Napoleon's early campaigns, his long, unbroken career of victory, seemed almost to justify the multitude, who judge only from results, in ascribing to him the highest order of military talents. When reverses came in their turn, opinion was already formed in his favour; and the world are

* Napoleon, in *Las Cases*.

slow to change an opinion, however extravagant, when once established: men do not like to avow that they have been mistaken; and though ready to judge by results when these tell in favour of their views, are not easily made to strike an impartial balance when results tell both ways. Had it been otherwise, Moscow and Leipzig must have been weighed against Lodi and Marengo; Laon and Waterloo against Austerlitz and Jena; a process which would 'leave the grand result in yon lone isle,' to show the just finale of the inquiry. The historian is not, however, allowed to judge by results alone, for in all ages very ordinary commanders have gained battles; and though it would be idle to estimate the skill of commanders by any pedantic rules of martinet tacticians, or line and compass strategists, there are plain and intelligible principles, according to which all who are acquainted with history can form a fair estimate of the talents displayed by those who have been long at the head of armies. A great commander will effect great things with comparatively small means, and will conduct operations, and achieve victory, with the least possible loss and suffering to the troops under his orders. Such a commander will know, like Hannibal, how to strike after enticing his adversaries into the fatal defiles of Thrasymene; but like the great Carthaginian, will also know how to extricate an army from peril, and foil an enemy anticipating certain triumph on the Casilian hills. And, from an absolute sovereign, possessing great military genius, some improvement in the science of tactics, the very foundation of the whole science of war, will surely be expected. But in the history of Napoleon we find none of these proofs of military skill, and only find victories gained and conquests achieved by fully adequate means. The revolution had unshackled all the energies of the country, already the most powerful on the continent, and placed the lives and properties of the people completely at the disposal of government. The conscription sent the best men of France by myriads into the ranks of the army; rapid promotion, and the enthusiasm of fancied freedom, animated the first republican soldiers; and at a later period, crowns, wealth, domains, principalities, the spoils of conquered provinces, rewarded the victors, and

became incitements to daring deeds by the aid of revolutionary power. Robespierre and his Committee of Public Safety sent, according to Capefigue, fourteen armies into the field; and from 1811 to 1813, Napoleon levied more than 1,100,000 conscripts in France alone, independently of those raised for his service in Italy and in the states of the Rhenish confederation! and all this at a period when civilization had long acted the pioneer in Europe, made roads, and extended cultivation, and thus facilitated the movements of large armies to an extent never known in earlier times. And what could the old established continental governments, fettered as the most despotic were by the laws which protected persons and property, oppose to this tremendous force? Inferior armies of well-powdered and well-buttoned soldiers, taken mostly from the refuse of the German population, ruled by a cruel and degrading system of discipline; three-halfpence a day, without the slightest prospect of ever improving their condition, being their brightest incentive to meet wounds, death, and mutilation. That these men fought so bravely, as they certainly did on many occasions, could result solely from the natural bravery of the people; but such exertions required to be encouraged, and they were not. In Austria, the mass of the subaltern officers were not even eligible to the command of companies; and the higher ranks of the army were filled exclusively by members of the higher orders of the aristocracy. When, however, the necessity of self-defence obliged the other states of Europe to introduce the French conscription, and make Europe one vast drill-ground, though without the power of plundering provinces, and giving French reward, there was a speedy termination to the brilliant lustre of French victories. The advantages gained by Napoleon at Wagram, Smolensk, and Borodino, were in no proportion to the superiority of his forces; and of Lutzen and Bautzen, Clausewitz tells us that there was not a man present who did not feel confident that with equal numbers the allies would have been victorious. Of the disasters which followed in rapid succession, it is needless to speak; for military annals furnish no parallel to the retreat from Moscow, the rout of the bridge of Leipzig, and the flight from Waterloo."

BUONAPARTE RETURNS TO PARIS—CONFEDERATION OF RUSSIA AND PRUSSIA.

AFTER Buonaparte had left the poor remains of the grand army, he lost no time in making his way to Paris. He ran some risk of being arrested in Silesia, but, as he afterwards said, the Prussians lost the opportunity of securing him, by debating whether he ought to be arrested or not. It is, however, by no means certain, that the Prussian monarch ever thought of thus dealing with his former conqueror, and present ally. Buonaparte found himself at Dresden on the 14th of December, where he had a long conference with the king of Saxony, who still adhered to him, being indeed too deeply committed with the allies, to have anything to hope for from them, if they should ultimately triumph. Their interview took place at the hotel where Buonaparte alighted, and the royal Saxon visited him *incognito*. Napoleon reached Paris on the evening of the 18th, two days after that city had been thrown into a state of despondency, by the publication of the twenty-ninth bulletin. It was late when he approached the Tuilleries, and his appearance was so altered, or he was still so well disguised, that he found some difficulty in gaining an entrance. The empress had retired to her private apartment, when "two figures, muffled in furs, entered the ante-room, and one of them directed his course to the door of the empress' sleeping-chamber. The lady-in-waiting hastened to throw herself betwixt the intruder and the entrance, but recognising the emperor, she shrieked aloud, and alarmed Maria Louisa, who entered the ante-room. Their meeting was extremely affectionate."* On the following morning, all Paris resounded with the news of his sudden appearance, and whatever the feeling, the general appearance of Paris was greatly improved. If the French people were still disconsolate, they assumed an air of gladness, as if the escape of the emperor consoled them for the loss of their army. He immediately convoked the council of state. He spoke of the misfortunes which had befallen the army, but accounted for all the disasters which had occurred, by the severity of the winter. He spoke of that, as an evil which wisdom could not foresee, or prudence guard against, and this view of the subject was adopted, and promulgated

by many politicians, who were supposed to have been well informed, though the truth is, the winter had set in later than usual; and certainly during his advance, when his bulletins compared his march on Moscow, to a holiday excursion to Fontainebleau, he was warned in some of the English journals that before the close of the year, he would be likely to find it the most disagreeable excursion that ever thoughtless Frenchman had ventured to undertake. The senate and the legislative body appeared as loyal, as obsequious as ever, but he learnt with some vexation, that during his absence, an insurrectionary attempt had been made, in which a general Malet was the chief instigator, which had caused some confusion.

Intelligence of this had reached Buonaparte on the 6th of November, and had hastened his return to the French capital. That so many should have been executed, startled him, and he declared it to be a massacre, and was afraid it would make a bad impression on the people of Paris. He ascertained that the Parisians had taken little interest in the business, and he therefore hesitated not to sound the praises of the judges, who had acted in defence of the throne and the laws.

He lost no time in calling for new levies, remarking, that if he were not enabled to meet the Russians on German ground, the sacred frontier of France would be passed by the armies of all Europe. Properly supported, he doubted not it would be his, to give a good account of his enemies, while yet their armies were at a distance, and to make known his perfect disinterestedness, he told them, he could do better without the French, than the French could do without him. The appeal seemed to be answered with eagerness and loyal alacrity. The new conscriptions were enforced with the utmost rigour. The 100,000 youths of the first band of national guards, who had been placed in frontier garrisons under the declaration that they were never, on any occasion, to march out of France, were converted into soldiers of the line. Troops were recalled from Spain, sailors were taken from the fleets, and formed into regiments; and every possible exertion was made to raise a mighty host, that would enable him, in a new campaign, to accomplish all that

* Sir Walter Scott.

he had failed to realize in the last. Early in the year 1813, such stupenduous exertions had been witnessed, that an army comprehending between 700,000 and 800,000 men, was prepared to march at Napoleon's command. The remounting of the cavalry was a matter of great difficulty, but horses were purchased or procured in every direction; and Napoleon promised the legislative representatives that he would retrieve all, provided the sum of 300,000,000 of francs were forthcoming, which were wanted to repair the losses occasioned by the Russian campaign. He contemplated levying 10,000 youths of the higher ranks, who had formerly been exempted from the levies, or had found substitutes. They were to be formed into four regiments of guards of honour, who were to be treated like the troops of the royal household under the old régime. This scheme was opposed by the jealousy of the imperial guard, who conceived the privileges of such a corps might interfere with theirs. Without this aid, however, he found himself at the head of an army, numerous enough to render his will law, wherever it moved; but still it was not equal to that which he led forth in the preceding year, to perish in Russia, and in Poland. The cavalry was far from being like what he once possessed; and Murat, the most distinguished cavalry general, refused to quit his kingdom to place himself at its head. Murat, however, was a weak, vain, wavering man, and very much under the influence of his wife, who now united with Ney and Fouché to bring him back to his old comrades, and eventually prevailed upon him to repair to Germany. He went with reluctance, and such is believed to have been the case with many of the generals who followed Napoleon in this campaign. It is in some degree thus accounted for: they had gained wealth and honours in former days. The contest, in which Buonaparte was at present engaged, seemed to them unnecessary, its result very doubtful, and as they were now approaching "the sere and yellow leaf," they repined at being called from those enjoyments, which they had thought reserved for their declining years, again to endure the privations, and brave the dangers of war. Not only was there a spirit of discontent thus kindled, but there was positive disaffection to his cause, and to his person, and when Bernadotte became a member of the coalition, he was enabled to place in the hands of the emperor of Russia

a comprehensive list of officers who were disposed to betray their trust. Generals Massena and Angereau, and other greatly distinguished captains, were of the number.

The commanders who were now disposed to forsake Napoleon, were but the representatives of his allies, former supporters, and flatterers. The successful stand made against him in Spain, and the terrible Russian catastrophe, gave evidence to all the world that his fortunes were on the decline, and prudence whispered that the time had arrived when those who had marched with him, might safely declare against him. The Russians did not think it necessary to wait till the French emperor might prepare for a second invasion, but advanced into Prussia. Though the monarch of that nation had appeared with an army in support of Buonaparte's views, Alexander was well assured that he was never sincerely well-disposed towards the conqueror who had been such a scourge to him and his people.

It was not to be expected that having seen his dominions overrun by the French as enemies, that Frederick William would now, if it could be avoided, submit to their being ravaged anew by the Russians, because he was the ally of France. General D'Yorck, a Prussian general, on the 30th of December concluded an armistice with the Russian general Diebitsch, under which the Prussian troops were to be cantoned in their own country, and to be considered neutral for two months. D'Yorck then wrote to Macdonald to announce his secession from the French army, at the same time declaring that whatever opinion the world might form of his conduct, it was dictated by a sense of duty to his troops and to his country. The conduct of the general was at first denounced by the king, but eventually approved. It is due to general D'Yorck to say that he acted honourably towards his late comrades. Had he been disposed to do otherwise, he might have turned his arms against them, at a moment when, in their confusion and distress, they could have offered no effectual resistance. Many of his officers wished him to take this course, but he resisted all their representations, and did not withdraw from Macdonald till he was comparatively in safety.

To the king of Prussia it was apparent that at this moment he might regain much, or all the territory of which he had been despoiled, and this chance neglected, it was hardly within the range of things possible

that so favourable an opportunity could ever again occur. With that impression, on the 22nd of January, 1813, he suddenly quitted Berlin, and proceeded to Breslau, where, no longer encompassed by the French military, he could more freely correspond with the Russians and their emperor. He then published an address to his people, and called his armies together. The outrages committed by the French in the hour of victory had united all classes of the Prussian community in hostility to Buonaparte. All panted with eagerness to avenge the wrongs they had suffered. What followed may be easily anticipated. A treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, was concluded with Russia early in March; and on the 15th of that month the emperor Alexander arrived at Breslau. The two sovereigns conferred personally, and renewed their former friendship. The king of Prussia is described to have been so affected at their meeting that he could not refrain from tears. Alexander soothed him by encouraging hope for the future. "Courage, my brother!" said he, "these are the last tears Napoleon shall cause you to shed." On the 16th of March, the king of Prussia declared war against France, and a statement was laid before the world of the many injuries, of the countless indignities, which Prussia had borne. It set forth, that while professing to recognise her independence, France had made Prussia her subject and her slave. Hence it became necessary for Prussia to shake off the fetters which violence had imposed, and take counsel of herself in order to raise anew and support her existence as a nation. In the love and courage of his people the king sought for means to extricate himself, and to restore to his monarchy the independence which was essential to the future prosperity of his kingdom.

A noble proclamation was put forth by the Russian general Wittgenstein, calling on Saxony to take part in the struggle against the common oppressor. It declared that the emperor Alexander came not as an enemy, but as a friend, to liberate Germany from a foreign and degrading yoke. It described the Saxon people to be forsaken by their king, who still adhered to the French, and who might, in fact, be considered their prisoner. It demanded, could Saxony ever be prosperous or independent while her soil was polluted by the presence of a single Frenchman? Did they recollect what was the condition of their country before the French entered it? How peaceful it was!—

how flourishing, how happy? Did they witness the state to which it had been reduced, and not wish to restore it to what it was formerly seen? Was every spark of liberty and patriotism extinguished in their bosoms? He trusted not; but if they remained inactive, or the partisans of France, they were no longer Germans, nor would he treat them as such. The proclamation proceeded:—"Whoever is not for liberty is against her. Therefore, choose: accept my fraternal offer of aid, or meet my sword. Join me to restore your king, and you shall have a free king, and be free Saxons. Up! up! and arm yourselves! were it even only with sickles, scythes, and cudgels: drive the strangers from your soil. You shall always find me and my Russians, with the valiant Prussians, wherever danger is most prominent. Already has the vengeance of God been manifested against the insolent. Believe me we shall conquer. The long forbearance of God is exhausted. We shall conquer! I speak not this in the spirit of idle boasting, but in reliance on God and on you, and in the just and sacred cause which is ours."

The consequences of the ill-judged and rash campaign in Russia were now beginning to develop themselves. The German PEOPLE in their might were aroused, and determined to resist the grinding exactions of the tyrant of Europe; it was "written in heaven" that pride should have a fall.

At this period, however, gloomy as his prospects were, Napoleon appeared full of hope and confidence. The declaration of Prussia (March the 16th,) could not but give him serious concern, but he received it with an air of calmness, merely remarking, that it was better to have an open enemy than a doubtful ally. The legislative body continued to flatter him, and even thanked him for the sacrifices he called upon them to make for his dynasty, while they promised him every aid that he might require. He replied in a complimentary strain, and told them that Providence and the will of the nation had called upon him to constitute the great French empire, and in a few years more the mighty task would be complete. The prosperity of France was the sole object he had in view; he aimed at snatching her for ever from English dictation. The world would behold with admiration and wonder the tranquillity with which late reverses had been sustained, and the speed with which they had been repaired.


Thence they would be taught the important lesson, how capable the French were of defending their own territory; and the independence of his crown. He was about to place himself at the head of his armies, to meet and confound his enemies. In no case would he suffer the integrity of the French empire to be called in question, or abandon any of his conquests. Finally, he promised those he addressed, when the cares of war would allow it, to recall them to Paris, with the notables of the empire, to assist at the coronation of Maria Louisa, and that of the king of Rome.

Prussia was now committed to a new struggle, and soon made efforts to which Buonaparte flattered himself his policy had rendered her unequal. He had bound her down not to maintain a militia of more than 25,000 men on foot; but this number had, in effect, been doubled by the Prussian government, as, though only that number were exercised in the course of a year, two calls were made, and the individuals forming that force were changed in the course of twelve months. By this expedient, discipline was largely diffused, and the youth of Prussia, exasperated by the wrongs their connexions and their country had sustained from the French while victorious, were impatient to seek glory and vengeance on the field of battle. All classes came forward to swell the ranks of Frederick William's army. The Prussian nobles and burgesses largely taxed themselves to sustain the cause, while the ladies resigned their diamonds and gold ornaments, substituting for those they had been accustomed to wear, chains and bracelets beautifully wrought out of iron, proud of introducing such a fashion as a measure of hostility against France. The students formed themselves into battalions and squadrons; some took arms as *black-bands*, while others assumed the weapons and dress of the Cossacks. They were admirably disciplined on a new system, devised by the celebrated Scharnhorst; and in a few weeks vast armies were on foot, and a leader worthy to lead the patriots who thus rose to vindicate their country's fame was found in the veteran Blücher. This distinguished commander was not eminently scientific. Scharnhorst and Gneissau attended to such


matters in connection with the present movement, but in courage and determination he was second to no general of his age. Superior to misfortune, if vanquished one day he was ready to take the field on the next; and when, after the disaster at Jena, he saw his country prostrate at the feet of Buonaparte, in the spirit of prophetic hope, he still disdained to abandon her cause in despair.

The Russian emperor had been active to recruit his armies, and to follow up the successes of the last campaign. In the dead of winter he passed from St. Petersburg to Wilna. There his victorious army and his "clouds of Cossacks," as Buonaparte called them, received him with shouts of congratulation. Not long did he allow his troops to repose. His army advanced in two divisions, one taking the direction of Warsaw, the other of Königsburg. On reaching Poland, the excesses which the French had committed caused Alexander to be welcomed as a deliverer. Continuing his advance, he conferred with the king of Prussia, and this, as has been seen, ended in a treaty of alliance, the basis of a sixth coalition against France. Dantzic, Glogau, Stettin, and other Prussian fortresses were in the hands of the French. Dantzic was soon blockaded by the Russians. They advanced from the Vistula to the Oder, strengthened on their march by the Prussian general Bulow. Prussia was at this time in a flame. The poet Körner's "Song of the Sword" waked a degree of loyal enthusiasm in the bosoms of the youth of Prussia, not less ardent than the Jacobinical frenzy which had been kindled by the "Marseillaise Hymn" in France. While these clouds, big with impending ruin, were gathering over the fortunes of Buonaparte, he affected to remain undismayed, and spoke of leading to victory an army double the number of that which had met its fate in Russia, and, at the same time, of maintaining 300,000 men in Spain; while it was proudly intimated, that if any one desired the price at which he would grant peace, it might be found in the duke of Bassano's letter to lord Castlereagh, before 1812.

With this rapid glance at the state of Europe at the end of the year 1812 and the beginning of 1813, we shall close this volume.



THE SIGHTS OF THE WILK









THE GREAT BAZAAR OF THE EAST







PRAG.

ON THE OCCUPATION OF THE ALLIED TROOPS

THE LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF WELLINGTON.

PREPARATIONS FOR OPENING THE SPANISH CAMPAIGN OF 1813.

THE entire destruction of the "grand army" in Russia, and the great confederation of the German people, had an immediate effect on the affairs of the Peninsula. Instead of complaints being made by the whig party in the British parliament of the folly of endeavouring to uphold a falling cause by a useless expenditure of men and money in Spain, the government was urged to proceed energetically in rendering assistance to the army of lord Wellington; and to their remissness in the sending of necessary supplies was attributed the loss of that success which ought to have followed the victory of Salamanca. All parties agreed that the most strenuous efforts should be made to carry on the war with vigour—the Tories supported it because it was in accordance with the policy which they had always advocated—the Whigs, that from active hostilities being now carried on, they saw the best prospect of a speedy termination to the war. On the part of the opposition, it was contended by marquis Wellesley and earl Grey,—

"What secret cause amidst the splendid scene which has been exhibited in the Peninsula, what malign cause amidst the rejoicings and acclamations of triumph, has counteracted the brilliant successes of our arms, and has converted the glad feelings of a just exultation into the bitterness of regret and disappointment? With an army in discipline and spirit superior to any that had ever before been assembled; uniting in itself qualities so various as to have never entered into the assemblage of any other species of force; with a general pronounced by the whole world to be unsurpassed in ancient or modern times—the pride of his country, the hope and refuge of Europe; with a

cause in which justice vied with policy, combining all that was ardent in the one motive, with all that was sober in the other; with the admiration of the world excited by our achievements—how is it that they have terminated only in disappointment; that a system of advance has suddenly and inevitably been converted into a system of retreat; and that the great conqueror who chased the French armies from the plains of Salamanca has been pursued in his turn over those very plains, the scene of his triumph and his glory, to take refuge in the very positions which he held before the campaign commenced? The advantages of our situation in the Peninsula, during the last campaign, were very great, and totally different from what they had been at any previous period. The reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz weakened, in a great degree, the enemy's frontier lines; and this advantage was accompanied by a most extraordinary and unlooked-for failure in the means, and relaxation of the exertions, of the French in the Peninsula. The efforts of the French army were deprived of the unity of counsel, of design, and of action; distraction reigned among the generals; the exertions of their armies were wholly different from those which we have witnessed when the soul which inspired them was present, infusing its own vigour into every operation. The central government in Madrid was miserable beyond description; without power to enforce obedience, without talents to create respect, or authority to secure compliance, it was at the mercy of rival and independent generals; each solicitous only for his own fame or aggrandizement, and little disposed to

second each other in any operations for the public good. Here, then, was a most astonishing combination of favourable circumstances, and yet we have derived no greater benefit from them than we did from previous campaigns when everything was of the most adverse character. To take advantage of these favourable contingencies we should clearly have augmented our force in Spain to such an amount as would have enabled its general at once to have in the field a force adequate to check the main body of the French army, and another to carry on active operations. Unless you did so, you necessarily exposed your cause to disaster, because the enemy, by relinquishing minor objects, and concentrating his forces against your one considerable army, could easily, being superior on the whole, be enabled in the end to overwhelm and crush it. Hill never had a force of more than 5,000 British, and 12,000 Portuguese and Spaniards; yet, with this handful of men, he kept in check all the disposable forces of Soult in Estremadura, a clear proof of the vast benefit which would have arisen to the allied cause if an adequate force of perhaps double or triple the amount had been similarly employed. Now, what period could have been desired so suitable for making such an effort, as that when the central government at Madrid was imbecile and nugatory, the French armies separated and disunited, Napoleon thoroughly engrossed with his all-absorbing expedition to Russia, and the British army in possession of a central position on the flank of the theatre of war, which at once menaced hostility and defied attack? The successes which have been gained throughout the whole campaign, and they have been not only brilliant, but in some degree lasting—were entirely owing to the skill of the general and the valour of his troops, and in no degree to the arrangement or combination at home on the part of those who had the direction of military affairs. Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz were both carried with means scandalously inadequate, by intrepid daring on the part of the general, and the shedding of torrents of English blood. After the reduction of the last of these fortresses, what was the policy which obviously was suggested to the British general? Evidently to have pursued his advantages in the south, attacked Soult in Andalusia, destroyed his great military establishments in that province, and again brought Spain into active hostility, by rescuing from

the grasp of the enemy its richest and most important provinces. He was prevented from doing this, to which interest and inclination equally pointed, by the necessity of returning to the north to check the incursion of Marmont into Beira, and by the notoriously unprovided state of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz to withstand a siege. With whom did the blame of not providing adequate means for the protection of the north, when the career of victory was pursued in the south, rest? Evidently with the government at home, which both neglected to send out the requisite supplies, and never maintained the British force in the field at more than half the amount which their ample resources, both military and pecuniary, would have afforded. When the invasion of Leon was commenced in July, and the whole disposable British force was perilled on a single throw, the defects in the combinations, and languor in the support of government, were still more conspicuous. That irruption, attempted by 45,000 men into a country occupied by 250,000, could be based only on the prospect of powerful co-operations in other quarters. Was any such afforded? Murray's descent on the eastern coast, with the Anglo-Sicilian expedition, was mainly relied on; but did not arrive in time to take any part of the pressure off Wellington; so far from it, though the whole arrangements for the sailing of the expedition were concluded as early as March, yet on the 15th July he had heard nothing of its movements, and he was compelled to begin a systematic retreat: in the course of which he gained, indeed by his own skill, a most splendid victory; but which, leading as it did, to a concentration of the enemy's troops from all parts of the Peninsula, involved him in fresh difficulties, where the incapacity of ministers was, if possible, still more conspicuous. No sufficient efforts were made to provide the general with specie, and all his operations were cramped by the want of that necessary sinew of war. No adequate train of artillery was provided for the siege of Burgos; no means of resisting the concentration of troops from all parts of the Peninsula were afforded to him; and he was ultimately compelled, after the most glorious efforts, to relinquish all his conquests except the two fortresses first gained, and again to take refuge within the Portuguese frontier. So nicely balanced were the forces of the contending parties

during this memorable campaign, that there is no stage of it in which 12,000 additional infantry, and 3,000 cavalry would not have insured decisive success. Now, was such a force at the disposal of government in addition to those which were actually on service in the Peninsula? The details of the war-office leave no room for doubt on this head. During the whole of last year there were, exclusive of veteran and garrison corps, 45 battalions of regular infantry, and 16 regiments of cavalry, presenting a total of 53,000 men; besides 77,000 regular militia, 200,000 local militia, and 68,000 yeomanry cavalry. Can any one doubt that out of this immense force lying dormant, as it were, in the British islands, at least 25,000 might have been forwarded to the Peninsula? And yet the whole number sent was only 21,000, of whom more than one-half were drafts and recruits, leaving only 10,545 actually sent out of fresh regiments. Why was not this number doubled?—why was it not trebled? Were we looking for a more favourable opportunity than when Napoleon was absent with half his military force in Russia? Did we wait for more glorious co-operations than were afforded us during the Moscow campaign? And what would have been the effect in France if, when the shattered remains of the grand army were arriving on the Elbe, Wellington, with 100,000 men, flushed with victory, had been thundering across the Pyrenees?"

To these able arguments urged by the opposition, it was replied, by lord Bathurst, lord Castlereagh, and lord Liverpool:—"The confident tone assumed by the noble marquis might induce the suspicion that his brother, the illustrious Wellington, shares his opinions, and is dissatisfied with the support which he received from government during the campaign. But the fact is otherwise; and he has voluntarily written to them, expressing his entire satisfaction with their conduct in this particular. The objections made are mainly founded upon this: that we have not, in the Peninsular contest, employed our whole disposable force; that it might have been materially augmented without detriment to the home service: but it was not the policy of this country—it was not in itself expedient to employ its whole force upon any one foreign affair, how important soever; but rather to retain a considerable reserve, at all times ready in the citadel of our strength, to send to any quarter where it may appear capable of being

directed to the greatest advantage. No one will dispute the importance of the Peninsular contest; but can it be seriously maintained that it is in that quarter alone that the dawning of European freedom is to be looked for? Is Russia nothing? Is Prussia nothing? And, with the profound hatred which French domination has excited in the north of Germany, is it expedient to put ourselves in a situation to be unable to render any assistance to insurrectionary movements in Hanover, Holland, or the north of Germany—countries still nearer the heart of the enemy's power, and abounding with a more efficient warlike population than either Spain or Portugal? When it is stated, too, that the campaign terminated with the British armies in the same quarters which they held at its commencement; this, though geographically true, is, in a military and political point, utterly erroneous. Was the reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, the capture of the whole heavy artillery of the armies of Portugal and of the centre, at the former of these fortresses and the Retiro, nothing? Is it no small matter to have shaken loose the spoiler's grasp over the whole of Spain?—to have compelled the evacuation of Andalusia and Granada, taken 20,000 prisoners, and destroyed the great warlike establishments at Seville and before Cadiz, stored, as they were, with above 1,000 pieces of cannon? If the expedition of Soult to the south of the Sierra Morena, contrary as it was to all military principle, while the English power in Portugal remained unsubdued, was suggested entirely by the desire to open up new and hitherto untouched fields of plunder; the loss of these provinces, the throwing back the enemy for his whole support on the central provinces of Spain, the wasted scene of his former devastation, was a proportional disadvantage to his cause, a proportional benefit to the allied operations. How many campaigns in English history will bear a comparison, not merely in brilliant actions, but in solid and durable results, with that of Salamanca? And it is, perhaps, not the least proof of its vast moral influence, that it has wrought an entire change in the views of the gentlemen opposite; and, for the first time in the history of the war, made the burden of their complaint, not, as heretofore, that too much, but that too little has been done by British co-operation for the deliverance of Europe. The expected co-operation of lord William Ben-

tinck from Sicily, certainly did not arrive at the time that was calculated upon; but the fault there lay not with government, but in circumstances which prevented that officer from exercising in due time the discretion with which he was timeously invested, as to appearing with a powerful British force on the east of Spain in the beginning of July. The failure of the attack on Burgos, however much to be regretted, was neither to be ascribed to negligence on the part of government in forwarding the necessary stores, nor to want of foresight on the part of Lord Wellington in the preparations for its reduction, but to the accidental circumstance of its having been unknown to the English general, strengthened to such a degree as to render it impregnable with the means which he deemed amply sufficient for its capture. He never asked for a battering train, because he never thought it would be required; if he had done so, he could at once have got any amount of heavy guns he required from the ships of war at Santander. Even as it was, the fort would have been taken but for the accidental death of the officer who headed the assault on the 22nd September, and the still more unfortunate circumstance of his having had upon his person a plan of the siege, so that the whole designs of the British engineers became known to the enemy. The complaints made of the want of specie at Lord Wellington's head-quarters are sufficiently answered by the fact, that such was the state of the exchanges from the extraordinary demand for specie on the continent, that we lost twenty-four per cent. upon all remittances to the Peninsula, which, upon the £15,000,000 which the campaign actually cost, occasioned a further loss of £3,000,000. But the effect of the last campaign is yet to be judged of; it is not in a single season that the French power in the Peninsula, the growth of five years' conquest, is to be uprooted. The blow delivered at Salamanca loosened their power over the whole realm: one is, perhaps, not far distant which may totally overthrow it."

Although, upon a division, the motion for a committee of inquiry into the conduct of the war was negatived by a majority of 76—the numbers being 115 to 39—still, great good resulted from the able exposition made by the marquis Wellesley, as through it the government were induced to put the army at home in the most efficient condition, and

to increase the reinforcements to Wellington in the Peninsula. The efforts made by the British nation at this period, to put an end to the domination of Napoleon, and to preserve the freedom of Europe, were immense. The military force maintained during this year by Great Britain, independent of the force in India, was very large; and, coupled with the vast navy which it was necessary to keep for the maritime war, in which America had now appeared as a principal enemy, presented perhaps the greatest aggregate of warlike strength ever put forth by any single nation since the beginning of the world. Alison, in his *History of Europe*, says—"The land forces presented a total of 228,000 regular troops, having increased 12,000 even after all the losses of the year 1812, besides 28,000 British soldiers in India, and 93,000 militia in the British islands, in no respect inferior to the army of the line, and 32,000 foreign corps in the British service. The sepoy force in India numbered no less than 200,000 men, presenting a total of 582,000 soldiers in arms, all raised by voluntary enlistment, and exclusively devoted to that as a profession. In addition to this, the local militia, similar to the Prussian landwehr, in the British islands, amounted to no less than 300,000; and the yeomanry cavalry, or landwehr horse, were 68,000! exhibiting a total of 949,000 men in arms, of which 749,000 were drawn from the population of the British islands. Immense as these forces are, the marvel that they should have reached such an amount is much increased, when the magnitude of the naval establishment kept up in the same year is considered, and the limited physical resources of the country which, at the close of a twenty years' war, made such prodigious efforts. The British navy, at the commencement of 1813—and it was kept up at the same level during the whole year—amounted to 244 ships of the line, of which 102 were in commission, and 219 frigates, besides smaller vessels: making in all, 1,009 ships in the service of England, of which 613 were in commission, and bore the royal flag! This immense force was manned by 140,000 seamen, and 18,000 marines; making a total, with the land forces, of ELEVEN HUNDRED AND SEVEN THOUSAND MEN IN ARMS, all raised by voluntary enrolment, of whom above 900,000 were drawn from the population of the British islands! When it is recollected that this immense force was

raised in an empire in Europe, not at that period numbering above 18,000,000 of souls over its whole extent,—that is, considerably under half the population of the French empire, which had a population of 42,000,000 to work upon for its army of 900,000 men, and hardly any naval force afloat to support; it must be admitted, that history has not preserved so memorable an instance of patriotic exertion. But these efforts drew after them a proportional expenditure; and never at any former period had the annual charges of government in the British empire been so considerable. The army alone cost £19,000,000; its extraordinaries, £9,000,000 more: the navy, £20,000,000; the ordnance, £3,000,000; and so lavish had the expenditure become, under the excitement and necessities of the war, that the unprovided expenditure of the year preceding, amounted to no less than £4,662,000. But these charges, great and unprecedented as they were, constituted but a part of the expenses of Great Britain during this memorable year. The war in Germany at the same time was sustained by her liberality; and the vast hosts which stemmed the torrent of conquest on the Elbe, and rolled it back at Leipsic, were armed, clothed, and arrayed by the munificence of the British government, and the resources of the British people. Portugal received a loan of £2,000,000 sterling; Sicily, £400,000; Spain, in money and stores, £2,000,000; Sweden, £1,000,000; Russia and Prussia, £3,000,000; Austria, £1,000,000; besides warlike stores sent to Germany, to the amount of £2,000,000 more. The war on the continent, during this year, cost in all, in subsidies or furnishings to foreign powers, £10,400,000, of which Germany alone received above £6,000,000; and yet so little was Great Britain exhausted by these immense exertions, that she was able at the same time to advance a loan of £2,000,000 sterling to the East India Company. The total expenditure of the year, including Ireland, and reckoning the current vote of credit, reached the amazing and unprecedented amount of ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTEEN MILLIONS."

At this time, lord Wellington was exerting himself, in the most earnest manner, to put the Spanish and Portuguese armies in a state of efficiency. Yet, notwithstanding the great exertions which he made, and the unwearied assiduity with which he applied himself to the discharge of the onerous

duties which he had undertaken, the most virulent attacks continued to be made upon him both in Spain and England. In his correspondence about this period, his lordship mentions an Irish newspaper which had reported a supposed conversation between him and Castanos, in which his lordship consented to change his religion, that he might become king of Spain; and Castanos, in consideration of this apostacy, was made to promise that the Spanish grandees should favour his elevation. He came to the conclusion, that in regard to such calumnies, he could only with propriety pass them by with contempt; but he spoke with bitter disdain of the duke of Ossuna, the duke of Frias, and viscomte de Gante, who had been so foolish as to give importance to the silly invention, by gravely protesting that they were not among the traitors who wished to place his lordship on the throne.

In his efforts to reform the Spanish army, he found himself opposed by the most petty jealousies, the most annoying interference, and the non-fulfilment of promises by the Spanish government. His own correspondence, at this time, gives the best idea of what he must have suffered from these causes, and which, had he not been actuated by a high sense of duty, would have made him throw up the command of the Spanish army in disgust. In a letter to Senor Don Andres Angel de la Vega, a member of the Cortes, and dated the 3rd of April in this year, he says—

"Before I accepted the command of the Spanish armies and went to Cadiz, I wrote a letter to the late regency, on the 4th December, in which I apprised them of my opinion of the state of the armies, of the difficulty which I should find in exercising the command, and of the powers with which it was necessary that the government should intrust me; and after I went to Cadiz I wrote them a second letter on the subject, on the 25th December, in which I explained, and again urged them to agree to what I had proposed in my first letter of the 4th December; and after repeated discussions they did fully agree to these proposals of mine, in a letter from the minister of war, of the 1st January. My object in proposing these measures, was to place the armies of Spain on the same footing of subordination and discipline with the other armies of Europe; and to preclude all chance of the continuance of those intrigues, by applications to the government which had brought

the army to the state in which I found it. I could have no object, or wish of ambition, personal to myself. There are not ten officers in the army whom I know even by sight. I can have no feeling for any but the public interest, connected as it is with the discipline of the army. Another proof that I can have no object of that description, is to be found in my letter to the government, of the 27th of December, in which I proposed that the captains general of the different armies, and not myself, should be the captains general of the provinces allotted for their support; and that in their hands should be vested all the power which the military were to have in the country. I am sorry to have to have to inform you, that whatever my views may have been, they have been entirely frustrated by the departure of the government from every article of their engagements with me, as sanctioned by their letter of the 1st January. First; They have removed officers from their stations, and have placed them in others, without any recommendation from me, or any other superior officer; and without even acquainting me, or the superiors of those officers, that they have made such arrangements. Secondly; They have appointed officers to stations without my recommendation, or that of any other superior officer; and have given them assurances that they should remain in those stations, contrary to their engagements with me; and to the royal *ordenanzas*, by which the powers and responsibility of the captains general of the provinces are regulated. Thirdly; They have, without my recommendation, or sending through me their orders, and even without acquainting me with their intentions, moved corps of cavalry and infantry from the army to which they belonged, to other stations; and this without any reason, that I am acquainted with, of a public nature. By this last measure the greatest inconvenience and confusion have been produced. I had proposed, and the government had consented to, a reform of the cavalry; and they had ordered that it should be carried into execution. I sent orders in consequence, and I might have hoped that the armies would have had a tolerably well organised cavalry by the commencement of the campaign. Instead of that, I find that the government have likewise sent orders to the same corps, different from those which I had sent; and I am informed, but not by the minister at war, that the cavalry which I had

destined to form part of the army of Galicia, at the opening of the campaign in May, had been ordered, some of it on the 6th February, and others on the 6th March, without my knowledge, to the Isla de Leon, there to join a cavalry *depôt*, which has been formed at that station, likewise without my knowledge. Another corps of cavalry, ordered by me to Alicante, to receive its clothing and horse appointments at Alicante, has been ordered by the minister at war into the province of Seville. I have frequently remonstrated upon these breaches of agreement with me, and on the evils likely to result from them; but I have hitherto been unable to obtain from the government any satisfactory reply, whether they intended to conform to their agreement with me or not. To this statement add, that owing to the delays of the government in issuing the orders to the financial department in the provinces, to carry into execution the measures decreed by the cortes, and arranged with me to provide for the support of the armies, that branch of the service is in the same confusion as it was in the end of last year. All the armies are in the greatest distress, for want of pay and provisions; nothing can be realised, even from those provinces which have been longest freed from the enemy; and the expectations of the country, and of the allies, that we should have a good Spanish army in this campaign, will certainly be disappointed. I am fully alive to the importance which has been attached throughout Spain, as well as in England and in other parts of Europe, to the circumstance of my having been intrusted with the command of the Spanish armies; and the officers of the Spanish staff who are here with me will, I am convinced, do justice to the interest, the devotion, and diligence with which I have laboured to place the military affairs of the country in the state in which they ought to be. But I have a character to lose; and in proportion as expectation has been raised by my appointment, will be the extent of the disappointment and regret at finding that things are no better than they were before. I confess that I do not feel inclined to become the object of these disagreeable sensations, either in Spain, in England, or throughout Europe; and unless some measures can be adopted to prevail upon the government to force the minister at war to perform the engagements of the government with me, I must, however unwillingly, resign a situation and trust which I should not

have accepted if these engagements had not been entered into, and I had not believed that they would have been adhered to. I have written you this long story, because I believe you were principally instrumental in producing the unanimous votes of the cortes, that the command of the army should be conferred upon me; and I wish you to communicate this letter to Señor Argüelles and the Conde de Toreno; and to Señor Ciscar, who, I believe, was the person who first moved the subject in the cortes. I wish them to call for all my letters to the minister at war and his answers, from the 1st December last to the present day; and they will learn from them the exact state of the case; and will be able to judge whether any, and what measures ought to be adopted. But I must tell you that, whatever may be their opinion regarding the measures to be adopted by the cortes on this subject, I must reserve to myself the power of acting according to my own judgment; and if the agreement made with me, or something substantially the same, is not adhered to by the regency, I must resign my situation. I have now to tell you, that I propose to take the field at the head of the allied British and Portuguese army, as soon as the rain shall have fallen, and the appearance of the green forage will enable me to support the cavalry of the army; but I am sorry to tell you, that, owing to the measures which are the subject of this letter, I do not believe that a single Spanish soldier will be able to take the field till after the harvest."

The Portuguese government at this time was characterised by the same spirit of arrogance and imbecility which had distinguished it throughout the war; and it was only by the incessant efforts of Wellington, aided by sir Charles Stuart, the English minister at Lisbon, that the resources of the country could be extricated from private pillage, and made available for the exigencies of the public service. During lord Wellington's absence in Spain, all the old abuses had been reviving, the fruit of centuries of corruption and mismanagement. The army in the field received hardly any succour; the field artillery had entirely disappeared, the cavalry was in miserable condition; the infantry reduced in numbers; desertion frequent; pay above six months in arrears, and despondency general; in fact, the entire *morale* of the army destroyed. The civil administration of the country was on a par with the condition of the military ser-

vice. The taxes and regulations for the drawing forth the resources of the country for the military service, were evaded by the rich and powerful inhabitants, especially in the great cities, while every species of exaction and oppression were exercised towards the defenceless husbandmen and poorer classes of the people, as well by the collectors of the revenue, as by the numerous military detachments and convoys which traversed the country. This naturally produced much irritation in the minds of the great body of the people; and this dissatisfaction was eagerly caught hold of by the malcontent democratic party, to inflame the public mind against the English administration. This party even went so far as to accuse Wellington of having designs on the Spanish crown, and aiming at the subjugation of the Peninsula, for the purposes of his criminal ambition. Such was the reward obtained by the English general, for the care and anxiety he was bestowing on their affairs, from a disappointed and thankless faction. But Wellington, conscious of the rectitude of his motives, simply observed, "that every leading man was sure to be accused of criminal personal ambition; and if he was conscious of the charge being false, the accusation did no harm." Disregarding, therefore, altogether these malignant accusations, he strained every nerve to correct the abuses in the civil administration of the country, and to provide funds for, and recruit the army. Ably seconded, as he was, by marshal Beresford in the military, and sir Charles Stuart in the civil service, in a short time he had the gratification to perceive a marked improvement in the affairs of Portugal. Holders of bills on the military chest at Lisbon not having been able to get paid, they in consequence became clamorous for their money, and the bills fell to a discount of fifteen per cent. Sir Charles checked the panic by guaranteeing payment of the bills, and granting interest till the payment was made. Beresford, at the same time, took vigorous measures to check desertion, and restore the efficiency of the army; the militiamen fit for service were drafted into the line; all the artillerymen in the fortresses were forwarded to the army, and their places supplied by ordnance gunners; and the worst cavalry regiments were reduced, and their men incorporated with those in a more efficient state. By these means a large addition was obtained to the military force, which after-

wards proved of essential service in the field ; but the disorders of the civil administration were too deep-seated to be so easily rectified, and Wellington, in April, addressed the annexed memorial on the subject to the prince regent of Portugal, then in Brazil, which remains an enduring memorial of the almost incredible difficulties with which he had to contend, in preparing the means of carrying on his campaigns against the French armies in the Peninsula.

“ Freneda, 12th April, 1813.—I request permission to call the attention of your royal highness to the state of your troops, and of all your establishments, in consequence of the great arrear of pay which is due to them. According to the last statements which I have received, pay is due to the army of operations from the end of last September ; to the troops of the line in garrison, from the month of June ; and to the militia, from February. The transports of the army have never, I believe, received any regular payment, and none whatever since June, 1812. The honour of your royal highness’ arms may perhaps suffer greatly by these evils ; and I have repeatedly called, but in vain, the attention of the governors of the kingdom to this subject. I am now upon the point of opening a new campaign with your royal highness’ army, to which pay is due for a greater space of time than when the last campaign was concluded ; although the subsidy from Great Britain has been hitherto regularly paid, granted especially for the payment and maintainance of a certain body of troops ; and even although it has been proved within the last three months, that the revenue of the state has produced a sum nearer a third than a fourth larger than in any other three months during the whole time I have been *au fait* of this matter. The serious consequences which may probably result from the backwardness of these payments, affecting as much the honour of your royal highness’ arms, as the cause of the allies ; and the uniform refusal of the governors of the kingdom to attend to any one of the measures which I have recommended, either for temporary or permanent relief, have at last obliged me to go into your royal highness’ presence, for the purpose of stating the result of the measures which I have recommended to the governors of the kingdom for the reform of the custom-house, which measures have not been yet carried into full effect, in consequence of the opposition they en-

counter from the chief of the treasury ; although the governors ought to have been convinced there was room for the suggestion of improvements in the several branches of the public administration of the kingdom of Portugal. But I cannot prevail against the influence of the chief of the treasury ; this is what induces me to lay this *exposé* before your royal highness. In order to improve the resources and means of the kingdom, I have recommended the adoption of some method by which the taxes might be actually and really collected, and the merchants and capitalists really pay the tenth of their annual profits as an extraordinary contribution for the war ; the effects of this system being first tried in the great cities of Lisbon and Oporto. I can declare that no one knows better than I do, the sacrifices which have been made, and the sufferings which have been experienced by your royal highness’ faithful subjects during the war, for there is no one who has seen more of the country, or who, for the last four years, has lived so much amongst the people. It is a fact, sir, that the great cities, and even some of the smallest places of the kingdom, have gained by the war ; the mercantile class, generally, has enriched itself by the great disbursements which the army makes in money ; and there are individuals at Lisbon and Oporto who have amassed immense sums. The credit of your royal highness’ government is not in a state to be able to derive resources from these capitals, owing to remote, as also to present circumstances ; and it can obtain advantage only through the means of taxes. The fact is not denied, that the tributes regularly established at Lisbon and Oporto, as also the contribution of ten per cent. upon the profits of the mercantile class, are not really paid to the state ; nor is it denied that the measures which I have proposed would, if efficaciously carried into execution in the above-mentioned cities, furnish the government with great pecuniary resources. It remains for the government, therefore, to explain to your royal highness the reasons why it has not put them in practice, or some other expedient which might render the revenue of the state equal to its expenses.

“ All I have stated to your royal highness respecting the arrear of payment to the troops, is equally undeniable. The only motive to which I can attribute the government not having adopted the measures aforesaid, is the fear that they might not be

popular; but the knowledge I have of the good sense and loyalty of your royal highness' subjects, the reliance I place therein, and my zeal for the cause in which your royal highness is engaged with your allies, induce me to offer myself, not only as responsible for the happy issue of the measures which I have recommended, but to take upon myself all the odium which they might create. I have, nevertheless, not been able to overcome the influence of the treasury. Another measure which I recommended, was the entire abolition of the *Junta de Viveres*, to put an end to a monthly expense of nearly 50 *contos* of *reis*, caused by the junta, under the plea of paying their old debts. Never was any sovereign in the world so ill served as your royal highness has been by the *Junta Viveres*; and I do not think I have rendered a greater service to your royal highness than that which I did in soliciting that it might be abolished. However, after its abolition, under the specious pretext of paying its debts, it has received monthly from the treasury, a little more or less, 50 *contos* of *reis*. It cannot be doubted that the *Junta de Viveres* is very much in debt, and it is of great importance to your royal highness' government that some method of arranging and paying these debts should be adopted. But I request that your royal highness will order the governors of the kingdom to let your royal highness see in detail the manner in which the above-mentioned 50 *contos* of *reis*, granted monthly, have been applied. Have all the accounts of the *Junta de Viveres* been called in and liquidated? Who has performed this operation? To what sum does their debt amount? Has it been classified? Finally, have measures been adopted to know with certainty how much is really due to those to whom something has already been paid upon account of their debt? Is any part of the 50 *contos* of *reis*, which are issued for many months by the treasury, applied to the payment of the salaries of the members of the *Junta de Viveres*, abolished, I believe, by your royal highness' orders. I request that your royal highness will command that an answer be given to each of the questions aforesaid, which will enable your royal highness to see the state of these transactions. But admitting that it be convenient to pay at this time the debts of the *Junta de Viveres*, it would be almost superfluous to propose the question, whether it be more important to pay those debts, or to

pay the army which has to defend your royal highness' kingdom and government, and to protect the honour and property of your royal highness' subjects, and every thing most dear to them in life; without which nothing could escape destruction. This army will neither be able nor willing to fight, if it be not paid.

"Another measure which I have lately recommended, as a remedy capable of putting the government in a condition of paying the army of operations, for some time, in the same manner and to the same period to which their comrades in the British army are paid, is, that there be taken out of the hands of all the collectors of the revenue of the state the balances which they may owe to the royal treasury. My attention was called to this subject by a communication made to me by a military officer in the province of *Tras-os-Montes*, relating to a large sum of money in the hands of the collector of the revenue of *Braganza*, at the time when the enemy made movements towards the *Esla*; and having inquired into this matter, I found that, according to the manner in which the treasury manages its transactions, every one of the collectors of the revenue of the state has always in his possession the amount of the revenue he has received in the space of a month. I recommended that the collectors should be obliged to deliver in, every fifteen days, whatever they had received; but I have not been able to accomplish it. Your royal highness has frequently deigned to make known to the governors of the kingdom your royal desire that they should attend to my advice, and they have as frequently assured your royal highness that they give it every attention. I can assure your royal highness, that when I devote myself to the labour of taking into consideration the affairs of the state, and giving my opinion upon them to the governors of the kingdom, I have no object in doing so, excepting the interest I feel in the good of the nation, and the honour and prosperity of your royal highness; and I am not in any degree induced to do so from objects of personal interest, for none can I have relatively to Portugal; nor can I have any with regard to individuals, for not having any relations, and being almost unacquainted with those who direct or would wish to direct the affairs of your royal highness.

"Although the measures which I have hitherto recommended, and which have at

last been adopted, such as the payment of the interest upon the national debt in paper currency, the reform of the custom houses, the establishment of a military chest, and others which it is unnecessary to mention, have answered the ends of their adoption; and perhaps I might say, that other measures which I could propose, would have similar results; yet I am ready to allow that I may perhaps deceive myself. Nevertheless, I request with great earnestness that your royal highness will deign to be persuaded that the motives which induce me to recommend these measures, and to appeal against the chief of the treasury, are founded upon my wishes to promote and forward the benevolent intentions of your royal highness, as well as the best results to the cause in which your royal highness is engaged. I venture to express again, in the most decided manner, my very ardent wish that your royal highness will be pleased to return to your kingdom, to take charge of its government, which not only myself, but all your royal highness' faithful subjects desire with the greatest anxiety.—May God preserve your highness many years."

Such, then, was the condition of both Spain and Portugal. By indefatigable exertions, however, these evils, so far as the supplies and reinforcements of the army were concerned, were overcome; and Wellington, in the beginning of May, was prepared to take the field with a much larger and more efficient force than had ever been assembled round the British banner since the commencement of the war. Nearly 200,000 allied troops were in readiness in the whole Peninsula, and although not more than one-half of this great force were English, Germans, or Portuguese, upon whom reliance could really be placed; yet the remainder, being now under the direction of Wellington, and acting in concert with his army, proved of the most essential service, by taking upon them the duty of maintaining communications, guarding convoys, blockading fortresses, and cutting off light and foraging parties of the enemy; thereby leaving the Anglo-Portuguese force in undiminished strength, to maintain the serious conflict in front of the advance. What was almost an equal advantage, this great force, which, in the course of the campaign, came to stretch across the whole Peninsula, from the sources of the Ebro in Biscay, to its junction with the ocean, was supported on either flank by a powerful

naval force, the true base of offensive operations for Great Britain, which at once secured supplies without any lengthened land carriage, and protected the extreme flanks of the line from hostile assault.

The approach of great events was now apparent; the chiefs on both sides repaired to their respective head-quarters, and the mutual concentration of troops bespoke the nearness of serious warfare. Joseph had quitted Madrid in the middle of March, and in accordance with the advice of Napoleon, had fixed his head-quarters at Valladolid, from whence he had detached the divisions of Foy, Taupin, Sarrut, and Barbot, to aid Clausel in the reduction of Biscay and Navarre.

Wellington was now engaged in concentrating his forces; the progress of spring having provided ample forage for his horses, he was prepared to march. "Never," says Alison, "had the army been so numerous or so healthy, never its spirits so high: 20,000 men had rejoined their ranks since the troops went into winter-quarters in December, and the meanest drummer was inspired with the belief that he was about to march from victory to victory, till the French eagles were chased across the Pyrenees." In the month of April, Wellington had completed his plan of operations, and on the 14th of that month, he wrote out instructions for sir John Murray to embark his troops, and landing in Catalonia to commence the siege of Tarragona, thus securing ample employment for Suchet's division of the French army. The following is the memorandum of instructions transmitted to sir John:—

"Freneda, 14th April, 1813—1. It is obvious that these operations cannot be commenced with advantage, till the allied British and Portuguese army shall take the field in Castille, which is intended in the first days of the month of May.

2. The troops applicable to these operations are the allied British and Sicilian corps, and the Spanish divisions under major-general Whittingham and major-general Roche, under the command of sir J. Murray; that part of the second army under general Elio, composed of regular troops; and the regular troops of the third army under the command of the duque del Parque.

3. The objects for the operations of the troops on the eastern coast of Spain are first to obtain possession of the open part of the kingdom of Valencia:—secondly, to obtain

an establishment on the sea coast north of the Ebro, so as to open a communication with the army of Catalonia; and eventually, thirdly, to oblige the enemy to retire from the Lower Ebro.

4. Although these objects are noticed in this order, circumstances may render expedient a departure from it, and that the one mentioned in the third instance should precede that mentioned in the second.

5. If sir J. Murray possesses the means of embarking 10,000 infantry and artillery, or more, the first and second objects may be combined with great advantage; that is to say, that the attempt to secure the second object by a brisk attack upon Tarragona with all the British and Sicilian corps, and such part of the division of general Whittingham or general Roche, as can be transported to Tarragona, will necessarily induce Suchet to weaken his force so considerably in Valencia, as to enable general Elio and the duke del Parque to take possession of a great part, if not of all the open country in that kingdom.

6. The first object will then be attained.

7. The second will be a question of time and means. If Suchet, notwithstanding the junction of the troops of the first army with those under sir J. Murray, should be so strong in Catalonia as to oblige that general to raise the siege, and to embark without accomplishing his object, the first object will at least have been gained without difficulty; and the return of sir J. Murray's corps into the kingdom of Valencia will secure it.

8. If sir J. Murray should succeed in taking Tarragona, the first and second objects will have been attained, and a foundation will have been laid for the attainment of the third object.

9. Orders have been sent for the duke del Parque to commence his movement from his position at Jaen, and to proceed to put himself in communication with the second army, either by posting himself at Almanza, or at Yecla.

10. As soon as the corps under the duke del Parque arrives in communication with general Elio, the allied British and Sicilian corps, and general Whittingham's division should embark, to the number of at least 10,000 men, or more if possible, and proceed immediately to the attack of Tarragona, in which they should be aided by the first army.

11. The troops remaining in the kingdom of Valencia, that is to say, those under the

duke del Parque and general Elio, and those of general Whittingham's and general Roche's divisions, and of the allied British and Sicilian corps which should not embark, should continue on the defensive, and retire, even upon the lines at Alicante, if it should be necessary.

12. But as soon as it shall be found that Suchet begins to weaken his force in the kingdom of Valencia, they are to follow him up, and take possession of as large a part of that kingdom as it may be in their power to do.

13. It must be understood, however, by the general officers at the head of these troops, that the success of all our endeavours in the ensuing campaign will depend upon none of the corps being beaten, of which the operating armies will be composed; and that they will be in sufficient numbers to turn the enemy, rather than attack him in a strong position; and that I shall forgive anything, excepting that one of the corps should be beaten or dispersed.

14. Sir J. Murray will take with him to the siege of Tarragona such of the allied British and Sicilian cavalry as he may have horse transports to convey; the remainder, with the cavalry belonging to general Whittingham's division, will remain with the troops under general Elio and the duke del Parque.

15. If general sir J. Murray should be obliged to raise the siege of Tarragona, and embark, or, at all events, when he returns to the kingdom of Valencia, he is to land as far to the north as may be in his power, in order to join immediately on the right of the troops under general Elio and the duke del Parque; and the mules and other equipments belonging to the allied British and Sicilian corps, which must necessarily be left behind at Alicante, are to join that corps at the place of disembarkation.

16. If Tarragona should be taken, it must be garrisoned by a part of the first army under general Copons.

17. In case sir J. Murray should not have the means of embarking 10,000 infantry, at least, the corps of troops to undertake a serious operation on the sea coast in the rear of the enemy's left, will not be sufficient, and the plan must be altered; and the following measures must be adopted to obtain a sufficient force in rear of his right.

18. First, The regiments, as stated in the margin, must be detached from the second and third armies, and must be embarked.

These, with about the same number recently ordered from Galicia, will augment the army of Catalonia sufficiently to enable them, according to the opinion of general Copons, to take the field against the enemy's troops now in Catalonia, and to force them to remain in garrisons.

19. As soon as he shall be joined with these reinforcements, general Copons should make himself master of the open country, particularly between Tarragona and Tortosa, and that place and Lerida.

20. Secondly, the third army of the duque del Parque should be employed to turn the right of the enemy's positions in Valencia, while the allied troops, under sir J. Murray and general Elio, will attack them in front. I imagine that it will be necessary for the duque del Parque to proceed, in this case, as far as Utiel and Requeña, before he will be able to make any impression on the position of the Jucar.

21. In proportion as the allied troops shall gain ground, this operation will be repeated; the third army continuing to move upon the enemy's right till it shall come in communication with the first army on the left of the Ebro. With this object in view, general Copons and the duque del Parque should keep in constant communication.

Note.—It would be very desirable that, if practicable, general Copons should get possession of Mequinenza.

22. When the enemy shall have been forced across the Ebro, either by the maritime operations in rear of his left, or by those just described on his right, it will rest with general sir J. Murray to determine, in the first instance, on the line to be pursued, in view of the local situation of affairs, in respect of the ulterior objects of the operations; whether to establish the Spanish authority in the kingdom of Valencia; by obtaining possession of Murviedro, Peñíscola, or any other fortified posts there may be within that kingdom, or to attack Tortosa or Tarragona, supposing that that place should not have fallen by the maritime operations first proposed.

23. In my opinion, the decision on this point, as far as it depends upon the state of affairs on the eastern coast, will depend much upon the practicability and facility of communicating with the shipping on the coast, without having possession of the maritime posts in Valencia.

24. If that should be practicable, it would

be most desirable to attain the second and third objects of the operations, without waiting to obtain possession of the posts within the kingdom of Valencia; respecting which, it is hoped, there would be no doubt, when the operations of the first army should be connected with those of the second and third, and of the troops under sir J. Murray.

25. The divisions composed of irregular troops attached to the second army, and commanded by generals Duran and Villa Campa, should direct their attention to prevent all communication between the enemy's main army under the king in person, and that under Suchet.

26. The operations of these divisions should be carried on on the left of, and in communication with the duque del Parque; and, in proportion as the third army should move towards the Ebro, the operations of these divisions should be pushed forwards likewise.

27. The division of don Juan Martin must be kept in reserve, nearly in its present situation, and directions shall be sent to don Juan Martin.

28. General Sir J. Murray, having under his command the largest and most efficient body of troops, upon whose movements those of the others will depend essentially, will direct the operations of all the corps of troops referred to in this memorandum, when their operations shall be connected immediately with those of the corps of troops under his command.

29. If general sir J. Murray's allied British and Sicilian corps, and the whole or part of general Whittingham's division should embark, general the duque del Parque will direct the operations ordered in this memorandum to be carried on in the kingdom of Valencia; but, in either case, the general officers commanding the first, second, and third armies, and general Whittingham, must command each their separate corps."

These instructions were accompanied by the following letter to sir John Murray:—

"Freneda, 16th April, 1813—I have received your letters of the 1st April, and I now transmit a memorandum on the operations which I wish should be carried on on the eastern coast of the Peninsula, translated copies of which are gone to the duque del Parque, general Elio, and general Copons. In forming a plan of operation for troops in the Peninsula, it is necessary always to bear in mind their inefficiency, notwithstanding

their good inclinations, their total want of everything which could keep them together as armies, and of the necessary equipments of cannon, &c., &c., and their repeated failures in the accomplishment even of the most trifling objects, notwithstanding the personal bravery of the individuals composing the armies. If I had had to form a plan for the operations of half the numbers, real soldiers, well equipped and prepared for the field, it would have been one of a very different description; but such a plan would not suit, and could not be executed by the instruments with which you have to work.

* * * I beg therefore that you will set to work as soon as you may think proper, as proposed in the enclosed memorandum. I have nothing to say to the equipments or establishments of your troops, or to anything relating to them, excepting their operations, and the occasion and period of quitting the Peninsula if there should be occasion. But if you will send me a regular report of the mules and horses you have purchased, stating the prices, and for what purpose, I will send you the regular authority for the purchase. I still object, however, to your feeding general Roche's, or general Whittingham's, or any other Spanish troops in Spain, as occasioning an useless expense to such an amount as that Great Britain cannot bear it, and as eventually likely to break down your own departments. I am likewise certain that, if those officers take pains, your

* The French forces in the Peninsula, though considerably reduced by the drafts which the necessities of Napoleon, after the disasters of Russia, compelled him to make from his veteran legions in that quarter, were still very formidable, and exhibited a sum total of combatants, both superior in number to, and incomparably more concentrated and better disciplined than the greater part of, the allied forces. The most powerful part of it consisted of the army commanded by Joseph in person, which, by drawing together the whole disposable military power of the French in the Peninsula, had compelled Wellington to evacuate the Spanish territory in the close of the last campaign. Their whole force, which, at the termination of the retreat into Portugal, was still 260,000 thousand strong, was now reduced by drafts into Germany, in March 1813, to 231,000, of whom 29,000 were horse. Of these, only 197,000 were present with the eagles; and 68,000 were under Suchet in Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia. Of the remainder, 10,000 were at Madrid; 8,000 were in Old Castile and Leon, to watch the motions of the Anglo-Portuguese army; and the rest, to the number of 40,000, preserved the communications in the northern provinces, and maintained a painful partisan warfare with the insurrection, which had now assumed a very serious character, in Biscay and Navarre. But although the French forces were thus superior in numerical amount, and

assistance, however loudly they may call for it, is not required. As long as I have served in Spain, I have never done such a thing, and never will. Of all your wants, that of artillery-men appears most extraordinary. Besides the artillery-men which came with the corps from Sicily, which, as the corps came to carry on a siege, I conclude, cannot be inconsiderable in number, you have two companies of British and two of Portuguese artillery belonging to this army; I believe the very same men, in the same numbers, that took Badajoz for us last spring. It would, however, be very desirable, now that the communication is quite secure, if you could send me a regular return of your force. I cannot let you have the artillery-men at Carthagená, as I have nothing else to take care of our stores, &c., there. But, if four companies besides those belonging to Sicily are not enough, I will try to send more from this army."

Everything was now in readiness for the opening of the campaign; the army was in the highest state of discipline. Its *materiel* was magnificent, powerful reinforcements having arrived from England. The life and horse-guards had joined the cavalry, and that arm was increased to nineteen efficient regiments. The infantry had been recruited from the militia regiments at home, the artillery was complete in every requisite for the field; and the soldiers had the most entire confidence in their general.*

greatly stronger from their concentrated position, homogeneous character, and uniform discipline, than the multifarious host of the allies to which they were exposed, yet there were many causes which tended to depress their spirit, and brought them into the field with much less than their wonted vigour and animation. It was universally felt that they had been worsted in the last campaign; that they had lost half, and the richest half of Spain; and that their hold of the remainder had been every where loosened. The charm of their invincibility, the unbroken series of their triumphs, was at an end: the soldiers no longer approached the English but with secret feelings of self-distrust, the necessary consequence of repeated defeats; their chiefs, dreading to measure swords with Wellington, became nervous about their responsibility; and, anticipating defeat, were chiefly solicitous to discover some mode of averting the vials of the imperial wrath, which they were well aware would burst on their heads the moment intelligence of disaster reached Napoleon. Co-operation there was none between the leaders of their armies. Suchet was jealous of Soult, and yielded a tardy obedience to the commands of Joseph himself; Jourdan, who commanded the army of the centre, was a respectable veteran, but wholly unequal to the task of meeting the shock of Wellington at the head of 80,000 men; and Soult, though a most able man in strategy and the preparations for a campaign, had

FOURTH SPANISH CAMPAIGN.

ANNO 1813.

THE campaign of the year 1813 was opened under favourable circumstances for the allies. Andalusia, Estremadura, and the whole south of Spain, and Galicia and the Asturias on the north, were freed from the domination of the enemy.

The operations of the fourth Spanish campaign first commenced on the eastern coast of Spain. While Wellington was in winter quarters, the battle of Castalla had been fought. The course of the feeble operations that led to that event was as follows:—

Though much had been expected from the Anglo-Sicilian army collected on the eastern coast of Spain, as a powerful diversion, it had as yet performed but slight service. The command of it had been held by several officers in rapid succession. Major-general Clinton arrived at Alicante in November, 1812, to take the command from which ill-health had compelled general Maitland to retire. In December, a reinforcement of 4,000 men, British and foreign, arrived from Palermo under major-general James Campbell, who, by seniority, superseded Clinton in the command. Towards the end of February, 1813, lieutenant-general sir John Murray arrived at Alicante from England, and assumed the command soon after his arrival, receiving Wellington's orders to commence operations in conjunction with the Spaniards, on March 6th; he advanced with 18,000 men, consisting of Whittingham and Roche's divisions, about 8,000 men, the rest being British, Germans, Maltese, and Italians, towards the Xucar; along the banks of which river the French army under Suchet were posted, covered by a strongly entrenched camp at St. Felipe. After an unsuccessful attempt to surprise a detachment of the French in the village of Alcoy, he moved forwards, and took up a position near the town of Castalla. The shown himself at Albuera unequal to the crisis of a serious battle: he laboured, also, under heavy suspicions on the part of his royal master, and he had been called to Germany to assist in stemming the torrent of misfortune on the Elbe. The disasters of the Moscow campaign were known, the fatal 29th bulletin had been published, and its effects had become painfully visible in the march of a considerable part of the army across the Pyrenees, to be replaced only by raw battalions and conscripts, very different from the bronzed veterans who had departed. Thus

Murcian army, under Elio, consisting of 12,000 men, moved early in April, on the left, to Yecla and Villena, to co-operate with Murray.

Suchet observing that the posts of the allies were too far apart to support each other, despatched, on April the 10th, Harispe's division to attack the Spaniards at Yecla. At break of day of the following morning, Harispe surprised and destroyed nearly the whole of the Spanish corps posted there; 1,200 of them laying down their arms. Suchet then, with the main body of his force, moving upon Villena, which lay insulated by the movements of the French, the Spaniards withdrew from it, leaving a complete battalion in the castle, which surrendered to the enemy on the morning of the 12th. Sir John Murray immediately withdrew the Majorcan division from Alcoy, and concentrating his force, occupied Castalla; leaving the 2nd battalion, 27th foot, the 1st Italian regiment, and the Calabrian free corps, with a detachment of cavalry, under colonel Adam, to dispute the defile of Biar, by which the road from Villena approached the position of the allies at Castalla. This brigade being turned on both flanks, and attacked by an overwhelming force in front, was, after a resolute resistance for five hours, compelled to retire.

Murray's position was well chosen. His left, consisting of the Majorcan division, under Whittingham, was placed on the rocky and almost inaccessible hills south of Castalla. Adams' and M'Kenzie's brigades were drawn up in the centre, in front of the town and castle of Castalla. The right wing, consisting of Clinton's brigade and Roche's Spaniards, was covered by a deep ravine, which served at the same time as a reserve, and secured the line of retreat.

On the following morning, Suchet, with the army had lost both its consistency and its spirit; its generals were at variance with each other, and each solicitous only for the objects of his separate province; and its supreme direction, divided between the distant commands, often found wholly inapplicable on the spot, of Napoleon, and the weaker judgment of Joseph and Jourdan, was little calculated to stem the torrent of disasters accumulating round a sinking empire and a falling throne.—*Alison's History of Europe.*

three divisions of infantry and two brigades of cavalry, approached the allied position, and about one o'clock, P.M., pushing forward a cloud of skirmishers against the left and front of the position, commenced an attack on the left allied wing, but was repulsed at all points. On the Anglo-Italian position of the left part of the line, the attack was resolute; but when the attacking force came upon the 2nd battalion of the 27th, there was a terrible crash, "for the ground having an abrupt declination near the top, enabled the French to form line under cover close to the British, who were lying down, waiting for orders to charge; but while the enemy were unfolding their masses, a grenadier officer advancing alone, challenged the captain of the 27th grenadiers to single combat. Waldron, an agile vigorous Irishman, and of boiling courage, instantly sprang forward. The hostile lines looked on without firing a shot. The swords of the champions glittered in the sun, the Frenchman's head was cleft in twain, and the next instant the 27th jumping up with a deafening shout, fired a deadly volley, at half-pistol-shot distance, and then charged with such a shock, that, maugre their bravery and numbers, the enemy's soldiers were overthrown, and the side of the Sierra was covered with the killed and wounded." The enemy being now repulsed on all sides, fled with precipitation towards the defile of Biar. M'Kenzie's division, by the order of quarter-master-general Donkin, vigorously pursued the enemy's disordered columns, but at the moment that victory was within the grasp of the allies, was ordered by Murray, in despite of all remonstrance, to fall back on the main body. The consequence of this unaccountable determination was that Suchet regained his fortified camp, having lost about 1,200 men, in killed and wounded; while that of the allies was about 700. Though Elio was but a few miles distant from the field of battle, he made neither any movement to succour his allies, nor to gain the communications of the enemy. Offensive operations were not resumed in this quarter until after the battle of Vittoria.

During this period, the partidas, under Longa, Mina, El Pastor, Morina, El Medico, &c., had been actively and successfully employed. In the north, Longa had captured the garrisons of Bilboa, Pancorbo, and Salinas de Anana, and in the valley of Sedano had surprised a French detachment

returning from a marauding expedition, to Burgos, and slew or made prisoners 1,000 men: indeed, such was their success in this quarter, that all the littoral posts, except Santona and Gueteria, were in the possession of the Spaniards. In Aragon and Navarre, Mina occasioned equal concern to Clausel, who had succeeded to the command of the army of the north; though defeated (May 13th) in the valley of Roncal, with the loss of 1,000 men in killed and wounded, he, on the 22nd, destroyed two French regiments of cavalry near Lerina. In Valencia, Nebot (El Frayle, the friar,) kept the French in constant alarm, and had occasioned much loss to their detachments. In the mean time, Florian, the Spanish partisan in the French service, had defeated, in the neighbourhood of the Carrion and the Tormes, the bands of Mesquinez, the Medico, and other inferior chiefs. On May the 11th, Foy, after a siege of eighteen days, captured the sea-port of Castro de Urdiales, in Biscay, and not only surprised the defenders, but, in the true spirit of the Portuguese campaign, butchered the inhabitants, both men and women, because they had not informed him of the bridge which had been destroyed by the crews of the three English sloops and the schooner, under captain Blaye, who had assisted in the defence, and by which he expected to cross in his assault of the town.

The positions of the hostile armies at the commencement of the campaign were: the main body of the British and Portuguese occupied cantonments along the northern frontier of Portugal to Lamego. The second division, under Hill, and a division of Spaniards, under Murillo, were in Upper Estremadura. The army of Galicia, under Giron, occupied the frontier of that province. The duke del Parque was with a corps of Spaniards in La Mancha; and Elio's corps observed the frontiers of Murcia and Valencia. The recent levies in Andalusia, under O'Donnel, were intended to act as an army of reserve. The French force in Spain was at this time 170,000 effective men; and of these, 70,000 constituted the armies of Portugal, the centre, and the south. The army of Portugal, under Reille, occupied the country between the rivers Esla and Carrion. That on the centre, under Drouet, took post in the second line, on Segovia and Valladolid; and the south, under Gazan, occupied Madrid, Salamanca, Toro, and Zamora. These three armies were nominally under the command of Joseph Buonaparte, assisted by marshal

* *History of the War in the Peninsula.*

Jourdan, as his major-general. Thus, by a glance at the map, it will be seen that the position of the allies formed an extensive semicircle around that of the enemy; but the French having, during the winter, fortified the naturally strong position on the northern bank of the Douro, at every assailable point, by works and entrenchments, they were under little apprehension that the allies could force that barrier, and hoped by the rapid movements of their own contracted forces, they would be enabled to baffle the manœuvres of an enemy acting on so extended a line as that of the allies. From the forward position of the right wing of the allies at Bejar, the French apprehended that Wellington would open the campaign by an attempt to march on Madrid, and had accordingly made their dispositions to counteract the movement. Wellington had entertained a more masterly conception; his plan was to move the left wing of the allied army across the Douro, within the Portuguese frontier, marching it up the right or northern bank of that river, and then crossing the Esla, to unite it to the Gallician forces under Giron, while the centre and right wing, advancing from the Agueda by Salamanca, forced the passage of the Tormes and drove the French from the line of the Douro towards the Carrion; thus taking in reverse all the strong defensive positions of the enemy on the northern bank of the Douro, and intercepting his whole line of communication.

To put this masterly movement into execution, he prepared at Lamego, Torremoncorvo, and San Jos de Pesqueira, means of transport. On May the 15th, he threw five divisions of infantry, and two brigades of cavalry, in all about 40,000 men, under Graham, across the Douro, with orders to march through the province of Tras-os-Montes on Zamora. When Graham was supposed sufficiently advanced, on May the 22nd the main body of the army, about 28,000 men, advanced in two lines towards the Tormes; the right, consisting of the 2nd division and Murillo's corps, under Hill, from Upper Estremadura on Alba de Tormes; and the left, consisting of two divisions of infantry, Amarante's Portuguese divisions of infantry, and five brigades of cavalry, (including the corps of Julian Sanchez,) by Matilla upon Salamanca, under the immediate command of Wellington. The whole army, with high spirits, moved forward to the scenes of their former exploits, the glories of twenty victories playing about

their bayonets. Their chief shared in the general exultation; and in the spirit of prophetic anticipation of the result of his plans, raising himself in his stirrups, and waving his hand, in a burst of feeling exclaimed—"Farewell Portugal."

While the allies were preparing to march, Joseph Buonaparte put the army of the centre in motion, and, followed by those of the south and Portugal, retired slowly on the Ebro. The appearance of the French army was more picturesque than military. It was crowded in its march, and too fanciful both in the character of its equipment and the variety of its costume. The line and light infantry excepted, few of the regiments were similarly dressed. The horse artillery wore uniforms of light blue, braided with black lace. The heavy cavalry were arrayed in green coats, with brass helmets. The chasseurs and hussars, mounted on slight and active horses, were showily and variously equipped. The 'gendarmes à cheval,' a picked body, chosen from the cavalry at large, had long blue frocks, with cocked hats and buff belts; while the *élite* of the dragoons, selected for superior size and general appearance, were distinguished by bear-skin caps, and wore a look of martial determination that their past and future bearing in the battle-field did not belie. Each regiment of the line had its company of grenadiers and voltigeurs—even the light regiments having a company of the former. The appearance of the whole force was soldierly and imposing; the cavalry was, indeed, superb; and the artillery, as to guns, caissons, and appointments, most complete; and, better still, their horses were in excellent condition. Both armies were in the highest state of efficiency, for to both the undivided attention of their commanding officers had been directed; and yet, in their respective equipments, a practised eye would detect a marked dissimilarity. With the British every thing was simple, compact, and limited, as far as its being serviceable would admit; while the French were sadly encumbered with useless equipages and accumulated plunder. Those of the Spanish nobles who had acknowledged the usurper now accompanied his retreat; state functionaries, in court dresses and rich embroidery, were mingled with the troops; calashes, carrying wives or mistresses, moved between brigades of guns; while nuns from Castile and ladies from Andalusia, attired *en militaire* and mounted on horseback, deserted castle and convent, to

follow the fortunes of some soldier or employé. Excepting that of his great brother, when retreating from Moscow, no army since the days of Xerxes was so overloaded with spoil and baggage as that of Joseph Buonaparte.*

The centre and right effected their junction on the 25th of May, at Alba de Tormes, and so rapid had been their march, that the French in Salamanca, consisting of 3,000 infantry and 400 cavalry, under the command of Villatte, were nearly surprised; and in their retreat by the defiles of Aldea Lengua, being overtaken by the British cavalry, under general Fane, they lost about 200 men in killed and wounded, as many taken prisoners, and seven guns, with their tumbrils. The right and centre then advanced, the first towards Zamora, where it was proposed to throw over the bridge; the right was pushed towards Toro, and covered the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo. The army being now halted between the Tormes and the Douro, and the command transferred, *ad interim*, to Lord Hill, Wellington, anxious about his combinations on the Esla, passed, May 30th, at Miranda de Douro—which here runs foaming between two rocks from 400 to 500 feet high—by means of a hammock or cradle slung by rings attached to a rope stretched across from precipice to precipice. On the following day he reached Carvajales, and assumed the direction of the left wing, which was then on the Esla, and in communication with the Gallician army. The difficulties that Graham had encountered on his rugged march through Tras-os-Montes, through bad and narrow roads, deep ravines, and over steep ascents, and rivers, had occasioned a delay which prevented the surprise and separation of the French armies, and the consequent destruction of their divisions; had these movements been effected, and then a rapid push made on Placentia and Valladolid, while Hill marched on Rueda, the French armies would have been caught—to adopt Buonaparte's own expression—“*flagrante delicto*.” During these movements of the main allied army, the Gallician army under Giron, advanced to Benevente, communicating by its right with Graham's corps; O'Donnell, with the army

of reserve of Andalusia, was in movement towards Almaraz, to gain the pass of Baños, on the allied right; and the third Spanish corps, under the duke del Parque, was in motion on the great road from Cordoba to Madrid.

Preparations were now made for passing the Esla. As the opposite banks were watched by pickets of cavalry and infantry, at daybreak of the 31st the hussar brigade (having, as the river was chin-deep, a foot soldier of the 51st and the Brunswick Oels, holding to the stirrup of every horseman), effected the passage with a trifling loss, and captured one of the enemy's pickets. Immediately the pontoon bridge was laid down, and the allies crossed the river. Thus was the formidable line of the Douro turned, and the defensive works of the enemy rendered useless. They immediately destroyed the bridges of Zamora and Toro, and abandoned their posts in haste. The allies entered the first-mentioned town on June 1st, and the second on the following day. Threatened by the advance, the enemy retreated with precipitation; but their rear-guard of cavalry was overtaken by the British hussar brigade, under colonel Grant. The enemy's horse, retreating across the bridge, formed itself into two lines, and awaited the British charge; but the 10th and 18th regiments dashing forward, broke both lines, took above 200 prisoners, and pursued the fugitives until they took shelter under cover of their guns. This affair afforded a proof of the indifference with which a people, familiarized to danger, regard events which in civil life are looked upon with horror. The Spaniards were now so accustomed to sights of war, that though the fighting had been almost in the streets of Morales, within ten minutes after the firing had ceased, the women were spinning at their doors, and the little children at play. On the same evening Julian Sanchez captured a cavalry picket at Castronuño.

The rapid advance of the allies having now placed Joseph's army of the centre in a perilous situation; as if it remained where it was it would be cut off from the army of Portugal, and from its line of communication with France, the usurper hastily quitted Madrid,† and crossing the river at Puenete intruder. Persons of rank were intermixed with all orders of the community, and alike contemptuously treated by the French troops. Many were wretched in appearance, and some of them incapable of undergoing any great degree of bodily fatigue. Their lamentations or declarations were listened to with

* Maxwell.

† The abandonment of Madrid presented one of the remarkable scenes incident to war: the bustle attendant on the march of the troops being accompanied by the confused departure of that portion of its population, who had taken part with the

de Douro, effected a junction with Reille. The concentrated forces seeming disposed to maintain their ground which they had taken up between Torrellobon and Tordesillas, Wellington halted his left wing on 3rd of June at Toro, to afford time to his rear to close up, and the right wing under Hill to cross the Douro. In the course of the afternoon of that day, the artillery and baggage passed by a ford, the infantry by the bridge of Toro; ladders, under the direction of lieutenant Pringle of the engineers, being dropped from each side of the broken arch, and planks being laid from one to the other immediately above the water-level.

On the 4th, the whole army moved forward in a compact form on Valladolid, which the enemy evacuated in the early part of that day, and retreating behind the Carrion, were in full march for Palencia. In Valladolid, Zamora, and Arevalo, they abandoned large magazines of corn and provisions.

On the 7th, the allies crossed the Carrion at Palencia; and still continuing to manœuvre to their left, and menacing the enemy's line of communication, forced them to retreat from their strong position behind the Pisuerga, on the Hormaza. On the 9th, Reille was posted behind that river, his right near Hormillas, his left on the Arlanzan, thus barring the way to Burgos; the armies of the centre and the south were behind Estepar, with the hope of arresting the allied army, until the expected reinforcements, under Foy and Clausel, should come up; but the right of the position being flanked by the light division and the hussar and Ponsonby's brigades; and sir Rowland Hill threatening the heights of Hermaza and Estepar; without waiting to be attacked, the enemy withdrew across the Arlanzan, losing a gun and some prisoners.

They were now covered by the Arlanzan and the Urbell; but not considering themselves secure, in the course of the night of the 14th they retreated to Burgos; and at an early hour of the following morning destroyed the interior of its castle, by exploding the defences. It was their malignant intention to have destroyed both town and castle, but either from hurry or negligence the mines exploded outwards. Many men perished in the town; and a column defiling

at the time under the castle, 300 men were crushed by the falling ruins.

Abandoning Burgos, the enemy retreated in the night by the road of Breviesca behind the Ebro. Having garrisoned the castle of Pancorbo, which stands at a short distance from the rivers, commands the pass of that name and the bridge of Miranda del Ebro, they took up a strong position; the army of the south at Miranda, that of the centre at Haxo, on the left, and that of Portugal on the right; and thus possessed of the rocks, the defile, and castle of Pancorbo, they imagined they might wait for the expected reinforcements from Biscay, Navarre, and Aragon. The army of Portugal was cantoned in divisions as far as Armiñon, for the purpose of observing the movements of the allies, Reille posting Mancune at Frias, Sarrut at Osuna, and himself at Espejo.

The English general, though he had crossed the Tormes, the Esla, the Douro, the Carrion, the Pisuerga, and the Arlanzan, and rocks, and mountains, and ravines, as if they had been dried and levelled lands, aware of the difficulty of the Pancorbo pass, and the strong positions on the Ebro, instead of forcing the passage of that river in face of an army, determined to effect the purpose by the same manœuvres he had put into practice at the Douro, of moving on the flank of the enemy and taking his defensive positions in reverse. For this purpose, he struck to his left, by the road to Santander, and conducting his army by one of the most difficult routes ever traversed by an army—(at one time the labour of a hundred soldiers being required to move forward a piece of artillery; at another the gun was obliged to be dismounted, and lowered down a precipice by ropes, or swayed up the rugged paths by the united efforts of men and horses)—to the bridges of San Martin, Rocamunde, and Puente de Arenas, near the sources of the Ebro, he passed the river on the 14th and 15th. Graham passed on the 14th by the two first-mentioned bridges; the centre followed the same course the next day; and at the same time the right wing crossed at Puente de Arenas. All those passages were much higher up the Ebro than Frias, the highest point the French had thought it necessary to guard. At the same time, the Biscayan guerillas occupied all the passes in the mountains of Reynosa, which lie between the Ebro and the coast. Thus the enemy was not only obliged to abandon all his

stoical indifference, and the bayonets of the French soldiery goaded them forward on their way.—Leith Hay's *Narrative of the Peninsular War*.

defensive positions on the Ebro, but the whole sea coast of Biscay. The allies also obtained a new base of operations close to the scene of action. All the military establishments were, in consequence, removed from Portugal, and the supplies of the army directed to this quarter.

On the 16th, the allies, passing through the rugged and defensible defiles, descended on the great road of Bilboa, and continued their march on Vittoria. Reille, who had been ordered to protect Bilboa, advanced with two divisions in the direction of Orduna, directing Mancune to march with his division from Frias to the same point; but, on reaching Osuna, he was confronted by Graham, with the first and fifth divisions, who was debouching from the mountain pass in his front, and already in possession of the Bilboa road. A sharp skirmish ensued, when the sound of battle coming upon them from beyond the mountains, Reille, suspecting mischief had befallen Mancune, fell back towards Espejo; and on reaching the spot where the mouths of the valley open on each other, masses of Mancune's division burst from the hills in all the confusion of defeat, pursued by the light division, which had been moving in a parallel line with Graham's march. Reille, continuing to be pressed by Graham, retired behind Salinas de Añara.

Mancune's division had sustained a severe defeat; having crossed the Aracena, and cleared its defiles, they had halted on the heights of San Millan, to wait for the remainder of the division which was marching with the baggage, when, most unexpectedly, the British light division presented itself on a ridge directly in front. The ground was unfavourable for an attack, the road being rugged, steep, and narrow, overhung with crags and copsewood, and some straggling cottages, affording cover to the enemy's voltigeurs. But undiscouraged by these disadvantages, the 95th rushed down the hill, supported by the 52nd, and after a sharp fusilade the enemy gave way, closely followed by their assailants; when, on a sudden, the other French brigade debouching from the defile, appeared on the flank of the assailants. Both sides rushed on to gain the crest of the hill, and both reached the summit together. The 52nd, bringing their flank forward in a run, faced sharply round, and charged with the bayonet. The conflict was but momentary; the enemy broke, threw away their knapsacks, and fled with speed towards Espejo, leaving their arms

and baggage in the hands of the victors, and having lost 400 men in killed and prisoners.

Reille and Mancune having effected a junction the same evening, they proceeded in a night march to occupy Subijana de Morillos, on the river Bayas, and about six miles from the Puebla pass, in order to enable the armies of the south and the centre to move safely through the narrow gorge of the Puebla de Arganzan into the valley of the Zadorra, and thus keep open the high road to Bayonne; but while the armies of the centre and south were struggling through the defile, Reille's flank having been turned by the light division, and his front assailed by the fourth division, he was driven over the Zadorra on the armies of the south and centre. On the morning of the 19th, the enemy took post about two miles in front of Vittoria; the army of the centre occupying a range of heights in front of the village of Arinez, that of Portugal on the heights of Zuazo. On the 20th, the whole British army, except the 6th division (Pakenham's), which had been left at Medina del Pomar to cover the march of the magazines and stores, was concentrated on the right banks of the Bayas.

In speaking of the masterly manner in which the movements of the army had been performed in this march, the eloquent author of the *History of Europe* says—"With such accuracy were the marches of all the columns calculated, and with such precision were they carried into effect by the admirable troops, inured to war and all its fatigues, which Wellington commanded, that everything happened exactly as he had arranged before he set out from Portugal; and the troops all arrived at the stations assigned them, in the prophetic contemplation of their chief, in the neighbourhood of Vittoria, at the very time when the French army, heavy laden and dejected, had accumulated its immense files of chariots and baggage-waggons, under the charge of 70,000 men, in the plain in front of that town. No words can do justice to the exquisite beauty of the scenery through which the British troops, especially those on the left wing, passed during this memorable march. The romantic valleys of the mountain region whence the Ebro draws its waters, which at every season excite the admiration of the passing traveller, were at that time singularly enhanced by the exquisite verdure of the opening spring, and

the luxuriance of the foliage which in every sheltered nook clothed the mountain sides. War appeared in these sequestered and pastoral valleys, not in its rude and bloody garb, but in its most brilliant and attractive costume; the pomp of military music, as the troops wended their way through the valleys, blended with the shepherd's pipe on the hills above; while the numerous columns of horse, foot, and cannon, winding in every direction through the defiles, gave

an inexpressible variety and charm to the landscape. Even the common soldiers were not insensible to the beauty of the spectacle thus perpetually placed before their eyes. Often the men rested on their muskets with their arms crossed, gazing on the lovely scenes which lay spread far beneath their feet; and more than once the heads of the columns involuntarily halted to satiate their eyes with a spectacle of beauty, the like of which all felt they might never see again."

BATTLE OF VITTORIA.

VITTORIA, which is the capital city of the province of Alava, stands on the declivity and base of a hill at the end of the basin or valley of Vittoria, and is surrounded with double walls. The valley, which is bounded on the east by the Pyrenees, and on the west by a chain of rugged heights which separate it from Biscay, is about six miles broad by eight long, and is intersected by the Zadorra, an affluent of the Ebro; as also by two ridges of hills, which cross it from east to west. The river runs near the town, and is spanned by several bridges. In the vicinity of this city, namely, the heights on which the French army was posted, the battle of Najara was fought in the commencement of the 14th century, in which the English, under Edward the Black Prince, obtained a complete victory over the Franco-Spanish army of Henry the Bastard, commanded by Bertram du Guesclin, and which seated Pedro the Cruel, the rightful king, on the Spanish throne. Thus, while pursuing the enemy over these heights, which still bear the name of the English Hill (*Inglesmende*), the English soldiers unconsciously trod on the relics of the bones of their ancestors.

Vittoria, on the evening of the 19th, displayed an extraordinary spectacle. The city was brilliantly illuminated in honour of the intrusive king Joseph; its sparkling interior presenting a gay and animated sight. To these appearances of rejoicing, a striking contrast was formed by the symptoms of hurry and alarm which were visible everywhere. All the principal houses and public buildings were occupied by Joseph Buonaparte, his staff, and guards, and the entire


of his court; here also was established the head-quarters of the army of the centre; while the streets were crowded with an immense collection of equipages, intermingled with cavalry, artillery, ambulances, etc. Soldiers and civilians were every moment arriving, vainly seeking for accommodation in a town unequal to afford shelter to half the number who required it.

The English general having, on the afternoon of the 20th, carefully and minutely surveyed the enemy's position, the dispositions for attack were made: the army was to move in four columns at daybreak of the 21st. Hill, with the right wing, consisting of the 2nd division (W. Stewart's), Amarante's Portuguese, Murillo's Spaniards,* and some cavalry, in all about 20,000, was to move on the heights of Puebla de Arganzan, and, advancing through the defile, expand his force as he arrived in the open plain, as soon as he had crossed the Zadorra. The right centre, under the command of Wellington in person, consisting of the light (Alten's) and 4th divisions (Cole's), the heavy cavalry, the hussar brigade, and d'Urban's Portuguese horse, were to proceed through the pass which leads to Subijana de Murillos, and move forward to their points of attack, namely, the bridges of Villodar, Tres Puentes, and Nanclarez. The left centre, under Dalhousie, comprising the 3rd (Picton's) and 7th (Dalhousie's) divisions, was to move direct upon the steeples of Vittoria, on the bridge of Mendoza. The right wing, consisting of the 1st (Howard's) and 5th (Oswald's) divisions, Longa's Spaniards, and Bock's and Anson's cavalry, in all 20,000 combatants, lated, as he conceived, to resist French domination. He had obtained considerable authority over the division of Spaniards under his immediate orders; his courage was undoubted; his devotion to lord Hill, with whom he had long served, unbounded.—*Leith Hay.*

* General Murillo, with all his roughness and his ignorance, was an enthusiastic admirer of everything English. He had raised himself from the lowest ranks by his enterprising courage and cordial exertion in following every scheme or measure calcu-

SALES OF VICTORIA





under Graham, was directed to make a circuit from Murguia on the left, by the Bilboa road, gaining the bridge that crosses the Zadorra at Gamarra Mayor, and, turning the French right wing, intercept the enemy's retreat by the Bayonne road. The whole plain in which the impending battle was about to take place was covered with a rich harvest, already bending to the sickle, but now destined to be reaped by the gleaming sword and fiery breath of war.

The French armies occupied a line nearly eight miles in extent.* Their order of battle was thus:—Their extreme left, consisting of the army of the south, under Gazan, rested on the heights which terminate at Puebla de Arganzan, and on the steep and commanding ridges above the village of Subijana de Alava, having the reserve in the rear at Betoria. Their right, consisting of the army of Portugal, under Reille, was in advance of the Zadorra upon the heights in front of the river, above the villages of Abechuco and Gamarra Mayor. Their centre, consisting of the army of the centre, commanded by Joseph, assisted by Jourdan, covered a range of strong heights on the Zadorra, and a strong reserve was posted in its rear at the village of Gomechas, behind which the greater part of the cavalry was massed and defended by powerful batteries, commanding the bridges of Mendoza, Tres Puentes, Villodar, and Nanclarez. Thus posted, the enemy covered Vittoria, and held the three great roads, which, from Logrono, Madrid, and Bilboa, converge on that city, and thence pursue one line to Bayonne. They had compelled a multitude of Spanish peasants to labour in throwing up field defences to place the guns in battery.

The hostile armies were nearly equal in point of force, the trifling numerical differ-

ence of the allies being counterbalanced by the superior quality of the troops opposed to them, who were all veterans, whereas the Spaniards were mostly fresh levies. The allied force consisted of 35,000 English and Germans, 25,000 Portuguese, and about 18,000 Spaniards. The Spanish force consisted of the infantry of Murillo, Giron, Longa, and d'Espana; its cavalry of Penne Villemure and Julian Sanchez; but, by some unaccountable circumstance, Giron's Gallicians, 12,000, who were designed as a support to Graham, never acted. The French force, which consisted of the armies of the south and centre, four divisions, and all the cavalry of the army of Portugal, part of the army of the north, the Franco-Spanish brigade, and Joseph's Spanish guards, amounted to above 70,000 combatants. A corps of 12,000 French was in the direction of Bilboa, under Foy; and Clausel, with a body of 15,000 men, was at Logrono.

The early part of the morning of the 21st was wet and misty, but as the fog cleared off the sun rose clear and cloudless. At daybreak the allied columns stood to their arms, and marched from their bivouacs on the Bayas towards the Zadorra. Hill, on reaching the Miranda road, detached the first brigade of Murillo's division to drive the enemy from the heights. Under cover of a wood, the Spaniards mounted the steep ascent; but making but slight impression on the position, Hill ordered the 71st and the light infantry of the 2nd division, under Colonel Cadogan, to advance to their support. The enemy, alarmed for the safety of his flank, reinforced this point strongly from the left centre of his line. A severe struggle ensued, in which Cadogan fell mortally wounded;† but the post was won and sustained by the assailants. Under cover of

* The ground on which the battle of Vittoria was fought, formed part of the Spanish general Alava's property, who was aid-de-camp to Wellington, for the purpose of communicating with the Spanish armies. He was the second in command of the Spanish fleet at the battle of Trafalgar.

† This gallant officer, declining to be removed from the field, was carried to a height, and placed with his back leaning against a tree, that he might witness the discomfiture of the foe before his spirit had taken its flight. Lord Wellington deeply lamented his loss. In a letter, written soon after the battle, to sir Henry Wellesley, he says, "I shall ever regret him. His private character, and his worth as an individual, were not greater than his merits as an officer. The concern which I feel upon his loss has diminished exceedingly the satisfaction I should derive from our success." Again he writes, in the course of a few days, "The loss of poor Cadogan has distressed

me exceedingly." And this is not a solitary instance of the same susceptibility of affectionate attachment. His sorrow for the loss of his friends and fellow-soldiers was great. In his letter to general Charles Kent, after the battle of Waterloo, he says, "I am quite heart-broken by the terrible loss I have sustained of my old friends and companions, and my poor soldiers! How many of them have I to regret!" On retracing the field of battle, the thought of his brave companions and their chivalrous achievements, recalled the anguish of his bereavement; surrendering himself to the strong feelings by which the hero was subdued, he burst into a flood of tears. In his letter to the earl of Aberdeen, whose brother was among the slain, "I cannot," he says, "express to you the regret and sorrow with which I look around me, and contemplate the loss which I have sustained, particularly in your brother." His strong susceptibility of affectionate attachment to his associates, is

these heights, Hill occupied the Zadorra at Puebla; and, passing the defile formed by the heights and the river, attacked, with O'Callaghan's brigade, consisting of the 28th, 34th, and 39th, the heights and village of Subijano. As this village covered the left of the line, the enemy made repeated and strenuous attempts to recover it; but all their efforts, though bravely and perseveringly made, were fruitless, Hill remaining in undisputed possession of it throughout the battle.

In the mean time, Wellington had brought up the light and 4th divisions, with the cavalry and the greater mass of the artillery, from the Bayas to the Zadorra; but, as the enemy's centre was strong, and defended by their enormous force of artillery, and that the 3rd and 7th divisions, under Picton and Dalhousie, had not come up, having been delayed by the ruggedness of the country and the difficulty of the communication, he halted the light division opposite the bridge of Villodar, and the 4th in front of that of Nancarez, both being covered by rugged grounds and thickets, the cavalry being placed in reserve; and in this position they waited till the 3rd and 7th divisions should reach their point of attack. Orders were now sent to Hill to arrest the progress of the right till the centre could get into action. As yet the only sound of battle heard in this quarter was that of a smart fusilade between the skirmishers of the light division and the enemy's advanced posts, on the left bank of the Zadorra, about the Villodar bridge.

It was now noon, when Joseph, ascertaining that his left wing was giving way before Hill, and hearing the advancing sound of Graham's cannon in his rear, deeming the flanks of his centre in danger—Hill's success having deprived his left centre of its support, and fearing that Graham's advance would

also exhibited in his letter to the duke of Beaufort, dated the day after the battle, in which occurs the following passage, "The losses I have sustained have quite broken me down, and I have no feeling for the advantages we have acquired. Believe me, nothing, excepting a battle lost, can be half so melancholy as a battle won; the bravery of my troops has hitherto saved me from the greater evil, but to win such a battle as that of Waterloo, at the expense of so many gallant friends, could only be termed a heavy misfortune, but for the result to the public." As has been already stated, in his letter of condolence to sir Edward Paget, who had been captured by the enemy's cavalry during the retreat from Burgos to the frontiers of Portugal, "You cannot conceive," says his kind-hearted chief, "how much I regret your loss. This being the second time I have been deprived of your assistance, I am

intercept his communication with Bayonne, —fell back in successive masses; and thus, with astonishing improvidence, exposing the bridges of Villodar and Nancarez to the allies, withdrew his advanced posts from Villodar, directing Gazan to fall back with the left centre.

At this moment, a Spanish peasant came up, and informed Wellington that the bridge of Tres-Puentes was negligently guarded. Immediately, Kempt's brigade of the light division was ordered to cross, led by the peasant, and to halt in a concealed situation. Kempt, at a run, effected the passage, and establishing himself in a deep ravine, in rear of the enemy's advanced posts, occupying Villodar, was quickly followed by the 15th hussars, who, coming up at a canter, dashed in single file over the bridge. No other attempt was made to dislodge them, except a few round shot thrown—(one of which carried off the peasant's head)—by some French cavalry who approached, but quickly retired. While this bold and rapid movement was in execution, the 3rd and 7th divisions approached the bridge of Mendoza, about half a mile higher up the river than that of Tres-Puentes, under a heavy fire of the French artillery, which was vigorously replied to by the British guns on the other side of the river. At the same moment, a body of the enemy's light troops and cavalry approached. Immediately, Colonel Barnard, with the riflemen of Kempt's brigade, advanced between the French cavalry and the river, and taking the light troops and artillery in flank, engaged them so closely that the English artillery-men, thinking, from their dark uniform, they were enemies, fired on them as well as their opponents. Under cover of Barnard's attack, Colville's brigade of Picton's* division passed the bridge of Mendoza; the other brigades forded the river

almost afraid to wish to have you again; but God knows with what pleasure I shall hear of your being liberated, and shall see you with us."

* The author of the *Memoirs of Sir Thomas Picton* entertains his readers with the following amusing, but rather embellished story. While the 3rd division was waiting to cross the Zadorra, he says that Picton, becoming impatient to receive orders to advance, "inquired of several aides-de-camp who came near him from head-quarters, whether they had any orders for him. His soldiers were anxiously waiting to advance; he knew the spirit of his men, and had some difficulty in restraining it. As the day wore on, and the fight waxed warmer on the right, he became furious, and turning to one of his officers, said, 'D—n it, lord Wellington must have forgotten us.' It was near noon, and the men were getting discontented, for the centre had not yet been engaged.

about half a mile higher up, and were followed by the 7th division and Vandeleur's brigade of the light division. The fourth division immediately crossed at Nancarez, followed by the heavy cavalry; and thus the whole of the British centre was established on the same side of the Zadorra as the enemy, and was immediately marshalled for the attack of the enemy's centre. The cavalry formed in line to support them.

The crash of battle was at hand. The British centre columns were now furiously engaged with the enemy's right centre; Hill was pressing Reille hard in his retreat from Subijana de Alava; and the rolling of Graham's artillery told that he was hotly engaged. So fierce was the encounter that one continued line of fire enveloped the banks of the Zadorra.

The advance of the British centre was made by echellons of regiments. The French retreated on their reserve, posted on the Arinez, on a second range of heights behind Gamecho, under cover of a cloud of tirailleurs, and the powerful batteries with which they had lined those heights. Colville's brigade of the "fighting third" led up the attack, and gallantly not only repulsed the force opposed to it, but encountered its two supporting lines at the bayonet's point, and captured their guns. At the same moment, Picton was ordered to attack the village of Arinez. Advancing at a running pace, with two brigades of his division, followed by Kempt's brigade, diagonally across the front of both armies, a fierce contest ensued, and the 88th were repulsed; but in a second assault by the 45th and 74th, the village was carried by the bayonet. During the contest the 52nd stormed Margarita, and the 87th carried Hermandad.

Defeated in front, and their left flank turned at Subijana de Alava, and over-Picton's blood was boiling, and his stick was going with rapid strokes on the mane of his cob; he was riding backwards and forwards, looking in every direction for the arrival of an aid-de-camp, until at length one galloped up from lord Wellington. He was looking for the 7th division, under lord Dalhousie, which had not yet arrived at its post, having to move over some difficult ground. The aid-de-camp riding up at speed, suddenly checked his horse, and inquired of the general whether he had seen lord Dalhousie? Picton was disappointed: he expected now at least he might move; and in a voice that did not acquire softness from his feelings, he answered in a sharp tone, 'No, sir; I have not seen his lordship; but have you any orders for me, sir?' 'None,' replied the aid-de-camp. 'Then pray, sir,' continued the irritated general, 'what are the orders you do bring?' 'Why,' answered the officer, 'that as

poweringly pressed in front by Hill, the wreck of the armies of the centre and south retired, about six o'clock, P.M., maintaining for near six miles a running fight, facing about at every defensible position to retard the pursuit, to their last defensive height, between the villages of Ali and Armentia, about a mile in front of Vittoria. Here, reforming their columns, they made a desperate resistance, under cover of above 80 cannon. The cannonade and musketry discharges were so incessant and murderous, that the 3rd division, which was most in advance, could scarcely retain its ground; but the 4th division, rushing forward, and the 7th and light divisions charging them in flank, they were driven from their position, and hastily retreated to Metanco, on the Pamplona road. During the raging of the whole storm of the battle, "thousands of carriages and animals, and non-combatants—men, women, and children—were crowding together beyond Vittoria, in all the madness of terror; and as the English shot went booming over head, the vast crowd started and swerved with a convulsive movement, while a dull and horrid sound of distress arose; but there was no hope, no stay, for army or multitude." The non-combatants, consisting of the followers of the camp and the Spanish adherents to the usurper, were not less than 20,000. The animals consisted of droves of bullocks, intermingled with vast quantities of sheep, swine, cows, horses, and mules.

While the right and centre had been vigorously pursuing their success, Graham, who had not, on account of the difficulty and circuitous nature of his line of march, been able to reach his point of attack before eleven o'clock, having dislodged the enemy from the heights above the village of Abucheco, directed Oswald, with the 5th division, to soon as lord Dalhousie, with the 7th division, shall commence an attack upon that bridge (pointing to one on the left), the 4th and 6th [query, the light division, for the 6th was stationed at Medina del Pomar in observation] are to support him.' Picton could not understand the idea of any other division fighting in his front; and, drawing himself up to his full height, said to the astonished aid-de-camp, with some passion; 'You may tell lord Wellington from me, sir, that the 3rd division, under my command, shall in less than ten minutes attack the bridge, and carry it, and the 4th and 6th [query] may support if they choose.' Having thus expressed his intention, he turned from the aid-de-camp, put himself at the head of his men, who were quickly in motion towards the bridge, encouraging them with the bland language, 'Come on, ye rascals! come on, you fighting villains!'

assail Gamarra Mayor, while he attacked Abucheco, both these villages being occupied by the enemy as *têtes-du-pont* to protect the passages of the Zadorra. Gamarra Mayor was carried by Robinson's brigade, which advanced in columns of battalions, under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry. The attack on Abucheco was no less successful. Under cover of two brigades of horse artillery, Halkett's brigade of the German legion drove the enemy from the village, and even carried the bridge, but were repulsed from it by the fire of the enemy's artillery; and a second attempt to possess the bridge was equally unsuccessful. The village of Gamarra Menor was also carried by the Spaniards, under Longa. As Gamarra Mayor commanded the road to Bayonne, the enemy endeavoured to recover its possession, but were driven back. The enemy being too strongly posted in the heights on the left of the Zadorra to render it possible as yet to pass the bridges, Graham awaited the moment until the success of the attacks on the left and centre should compel the withdrawal of the opposing force. No sooner had Wellington penetrated Vittoria in pursuit of the enemy's centre and left, than Graham, pushing across the river, took possession of the road to Bayonne. Reille, fearing to be cut off, hastily quitted his position; and, rallying his troops on his reserve at Betoria, fought his way to Metanco—thus covering the shattered armies of the south and centre in their headlong flight to Pamplona. Graham, availing himself of the withdrawal of the reserve which had prevented him from passing the bridges he had bravely won, immediately pushing across the Zadorra, took possession of the road to Bayonne. The line of retreat being thus intercepted, the only route by which Reille could retire was by the road to Pamplona, by which the armies of the south and centre were fleeing. On this he instantly fell back in haste and disorder. Thus the entire army of the enemy was driven back upon one line of retreat, in great hurry and confusion. The allies pressed forward; but their flight was so precipitate that the infantry could not overtake them; and from the nature of the ground, which was much intersected by ditches and enclosures, had but little opportunity of coming up with them. The chief loss they suffered was from the bullets and shells of a battery of horse artillery, which, from a commanding eminence, was poured upon them. So headlong was their flight,

that they abandoned all their artillery, ammunition, baggage, and the six years' plunder of the three armies. To escape with life was their only object. Gazan, the second in command, admitted that generals, officers, and soldiers, were alike reduced to the clothes on their backs. Very few of the infantry retained their arms, and many threw away even their accoutrements to expedite their flight. But precipitate as their flight was, they took great pains to bear off as many of their wounded as possible, and for this purpose dismounted a regiment of cavalry to carry them forward. They also carefully endeavoured to conceal their dead, stopping occasionally to collect them and throw them into ditches, where they covered them with bushes. Many such receptacles were found, containing from ten to twenty bodies. They had also set every village on the line of their flight on fire, and in many cases had massacred the inhabitants.

The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was, according to their own account, 8,000; that of the allies, 740 killed, 4,174 wounded. Of the killed, 501 were British, 150 Portuguese, and 89 Spaniards; of the wounded, 2,807 were British, 899 Portuguese, and 464 Spanish. The prisoners were 800. The intruder narrowly escaped. The 10th hussars entered Vittoria at the moment he was hastening out of it. Captain Wyndham, with one squadron, pursued and fired into the carriage; and Joseph had barely time to throw himself on his horse and gallop off under the protection of an escort of dragoons.

The spoils of the victors were great: 151 pieces of artillery, 450 caissons, the colours of the 4th battalion of the 106th regiment, an immense amount of military stores, the entire baggage and field equipage of the three armies, the military chest, containing five and a-half millions of dollars, and the enormous accumulated pillage of the three armies and Joseph during the period of six years. The field of battle, and the roads for some miles in the rear, were covered with broken-down waggons, cars, and coaches; some stocked with the choicest wares, others laden with eatables, dressed and undressed, sacks of flour, casks of brandy, barrels and boxes of dollars and doubloons; apparel, silks, laces, satins, plate, jewellery, paintings, and sculpture; books and thickly scattered papers, from the correspondence chests of the various military and civil offices. Whole droves of oxen were roaming the plain, in-

termingled with an endless number of sheep, goats, cows, horses, and mules. The intruder's sideboard of plate, his larder, cellar, wardrobe, and carriages, were among the waifs or derelicts; as were also countesses and concubines, nuns and actresses, parrots, poodles, and monkeys. The number of ladies of pleasure who were among the carriages in the train of the French officers was so great, that it was a common saying afterwards in their army, that it was no wonder they were beaten at Vittoria, for they sacrificed their guns to save their mistresses. Upon the field was found Marshal Jourdan's baton,* as also the sword of the intruder. Two immense convoys of plunder, containing, among other things, the present harvest, had been expedited to the French frontier on the 19th and early on the morning of the battle, escaped the victors.

The baggage was promptly rifled by the soldiers, camp-followers, and the peasantry and people of the town and country. Each seized what he could. Those who took possession of the army-chest loaded themselves with money; but the larger portion of this part of the spoil fell into the hands of the camp-followers, and the Spanish peasantry and population of the town. In a moment were to be seen raggamuffins dressed in state robes, embroidered uniforms, and court dresses, in masquerade triumph. The camp of every division was soon like a fair; benches were laid from waggon to waggon, and there the soldiers held an auction through the night, and disposed of such plunder as had fallen to their share to any who would purchase it. Even dollars became an article of sale, for they were too heavy to be carried in any great numbers: eight were offered for a guinea, being the current gold currency, in consequence of a decree of the regency.

Alison says, "This great battle at one blow destroyed the warlike efficiency of the French army, swept them like a whirlwind from the Spanish plains, and made Joseph's crown drop from his head. No estimate can be formed of the amount of private plunder which was taken on the field, but it exceeded anything witnessed in modern war; for it was not the produce of the sack of a city or the devastation of a province, but the accumulated plunder of a kingdom during five years, which was now at one fell swoop reft from the spoiler. Independent

of private booty, no less than five millions and a half of dollars in the military chest of the army were taken; and of private wealth, the amount was so prodigious, that for miles together the combatants may be almost said to have marched upon gold and silver without stooping to pick it up. But the regiments which followed, not equally warmed in the fight, were not so disinterested: enormous spoil fell into the hands of the private soldiers; and the cloud of camp-followers and sutlers who followed in their train swept the ground so completely, that only a hundred thousand dollars of the whole taken was brought into the military chest! But the effects of this prodigious booty speedily appeared in the dissolution of the bonds of discipline in a large part of the army: the frightful national vice of intemperance broke out in dreadful colours, from the unbounded means of indulging it which were thus speedily acquired; and we have the authority of Wellington for the assertion, that three weeks after the battle, above 12,000 soldiers had disappeared from their colours, though the total loss of the battle was only 5,180, of whom 3,308 were British; and these stragglers were only reclaimed by sedulous efforts and rigorous severity."

Speaking on this subject in a despatch to lord Bathurst, the duke thus expressed himself:—"We started with the army in the highest order, and up to the day of the battle nothing could get on better; but that event has, as usual, totally annihilated all order and discipline. The soldiers of the army have got among them about a million sterling in money, with the exception of about 100,000 dollars which were got in the military chest. The night of the battle, instead of being passed in getting rest and food, to prepare them for the pursuit of the following day, was passed by the soldiers in looking for plunder. The consequence was, that they were incapable of marching in pursuit of the enemy, and were totally knocked up. The rain came on, and increased our fatigues; and I am convinced that we have now out of our ranks double the amount of our loss in the battle, and have lost more men in the pursuit than the enemy have, though we have never in one day made more than an ordinary march. * * *

By the State of yesterday we had discovered by accident, it was brought to Wellington while in the act of closing his despatch to send to England. The gold with which it had been tipped had been taken off by the Jew.

* This prize was found by a drummer of the 87th regiment, in Jourdan's carriage. So ignorant was the finder of its value, that he sold it to one of the Jew camp-followers for a bottle of brandy. Being

12,500 men less under arms, than we had on the day before the battle. They are not in the hospital, nor are they killed, nor have they fallen into the hands of the enemy as prisoners: I have had officers in all directions after them, but have not heard of any of them. I believe they are concealed in the villages in the mountains."

On the arrival in London of the news of this glorious battle, the metropolis was illuminated for three successive nights. Both houses of parliament unanimously voted thanks to Wellington and his companions-in-arms. He was appointed field-marshal in the British army; by a decree of the Spanish cortes, he was created duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, with the annexation in perpetuity of the lordship of Soto de Romano, in Granada. The cortes further resolved, that "the general and extraordinary cortes, wishing to transmit to the most distant posterity the memory of the late glorious victory, which the allied army gained, under the command of the duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, on the 21st of June, over the enemy commanded by the intrusive king, on the field of Vittoria, decree as follows:—1. When circumstances admit of it, there shall be erected in the situations best calculated for that purpose, and in the manner which government shall consider the most proper, a monument which shall record to the latest generations this memorable battle. 2. That the political chief and provincial deputation of Alava shall charge themselves with the execution of this monument."

The prince of Wales sent an autograph letter to his lordship:—

"Carlton House, 3rd July, 1813.

"My dear lord,—Your glorious conduct is beyond all human praise, and far above my reward. I know no language the world affords worthy to express it. I feel I have nothing left to say, but most devoutly to offer up my prayer of gratitude to Providence, that it has, in its omnipotent bounty, blessed my country and myself with such a general. You have sent me, among the trophies of your unrivalled fame, the staff of a French marshal, and I send you in return that of England. The British army will hail it with rapturous enthusiasm, while the whole universe will acknowledge those valourous exploits which have so imperiously called for it. That uninterrupted health and still increasing laurels may continue to crown you through a glorious and long career of life, are the never-ceasing and

most ardent wishes of, my dear lord, your very sincere and faithful friend, G. P. R."

To this, lord Wellington returned the following reply:—

"Lesaca, 16th July, 1813.

"I trust your royal highness will receive graciously my humble acknowledgments for the honour which your royal highness has conferred upon me by your approbation, for the terms in which it is conveyed, and for the last distinguished mark of your royal highness' favour. Even if I had not been supported and encouraged as I have been by your royal highness' protection and favour, the interest which I feel for the cause which your royal highness so powerfully supports, would have induced me to make every exertion for its success. I can evince my gratitude for your royal highness' repeated favours only by devoting my life to your service."

In his despatches, dated "Carvajales, 31st May, 1813," "Ampudia, 6th June," "Villadiego, 13th June," "Subijana, 19th June," and "Salvatierra, 22nd June," the historian of his own campaigns presents a general detail of the operations in the memorable march from the Douro to the Zadorra, and then of the battle of Vittoria, addressed to the earl of Bathurst.

"Carvajales, 31st May, 1813.

"The troops arrived at Salamanca on the 26th instant, and we found the enemy still in the town, with one division of infantry, and three squadrons of cavalry, and some cannon of the army of the south, under the command of general Villatte.

"The enemy evacuated the town on our approach, but they waited longer than they ought on the high ground in the neighbourhood, and afforded an opportunity for the cavalry, under general Fane and general Victor Alten, the former of which crossed the Tormes, at Sta Martha, and the latter at the bridge, to do them a great deal of injury in their retreat. Many were killed and wounded, and we took about 200 prisoners, seven tumbrils of ammunition, some baggage, provisions, &c. The enemy retired by the road of Babilafuente, and near Huerta were joined by a body of infantry and cavalry on their march from Alba. I then ordered our troops to discontinue their pursuit, our infantry not being up. Major-general Long and major-general Morillo, in command of the Spanish division, attacked Alba, from which place the enemy retired.

"In the course of the 27th and 28th, I

established the troops which had marched from the Agueda and Upper Estremadura, between the Tormes and Douro, under the command of lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill, with the view to their early communication and junction with the main body of the army, on the right of the Douro, and in the mean time, to their retaining possession of the Tormes, and of the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo; and I set off myself on the 29th, to join the troops here, and arrived that day at Miranda de Douro; and here on the 30th I found the troops on the Esla, under the orders of sir Thomas Graham, as I had intended, with their left at Tabara, and in communication with the Gallician army, and their right at this place, and all the arrangements made for passing the Esla. The greater part passed that river this morning, the cavalry by fords, and the infantry by a bridge, which it was necessary to throw over the river, as it was so deep that some men, even of the cavalry, were lost in the passage. The English hussars, who crossed first, took an officer and thirty prisoners near Val de Perdices.

"The enemy have evacuated Zamora, and our patrols have been in that town. The troops which were there have fallen back upon Toro, where I understand they have a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry. It appears that the enemy have joined at La Nava del Rey the troops which retired from Salamanca, Ávila, &c., with those which were at Arevalo and Medina del Campo."

"Zamora, 1st June, 1813.

"P.S. This despatch having been detained, I have to inform your lordship, that I moved the head-quarters here this day. The enemy have evacuated Toro, into which place our troops have entered."

"Ampudea, 6th June, 1813.

"The troops have continued to advance since I wrote to your lordship on the 31st of last month, and were on the 1st at Zamora, and on the 2nd they arrived at Toro. The English hussars, being on the advanced guard, fell in, between Toro and Morales, with a considerable body of the enemy's cavalry, which were immediately attacked by the 10th, supported by the 18th and 15th. The enemy were overthrown and pursued for many miles; and 210 prisoners, with many horses, and two officers, fell into our hands. I enclose colonel Grant's report of this gallant affair, which reflects great credit on major Roberts and the 10th hussars, and upon colonel

Grant, under whose directions they acted. In the evening Don Julian Sanchez surprised the enemy's post at Castro Nuño, and took two officers, and 30 cavalry prisoners; and he drove their post from the ford of Pollos.

"The enemy had destroyed the bridges of Zamoro and Toro; and the difficulties in the passage of the Esla had retarded the movement of our rear, while the enemy had concentrated their force to a considerable amount between Torre-Lobaton and Tordesillas. I therefore halted on the 3rd at Toro, in order to bring the light division and the troops under the command of lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill, across the Douro by the bridge of that town, and to close up our rear, and to bring the Gallician army to join our left; and we moved again on the 4th.

"The enemy had commenced collecting their troops towards the Douro when they found we had passed Ciudad Rodrigo; and they crossed the Douro at Tordesillas on the 1st and 2nd. The troops at Madrid, and the detachments on the Tagus, broke up on the 27th, and crossed the Douro at the Ponte de Douro on the 3rd, and Valladolid was entirely evacuated on the 4th. The enemy left considerable magazines of grain at Arevalo, and some ammunition at Valladolid and Zamora. The enemy have passed the Carrion, and are apparently on their retreat towards Burgos."

"Villadiego, 13th June, 1813.

"The army passed the Carrion on the 7th, the enemy having retired across the Pisuergra, and on the 8th, 9th, and 10th, we brought forward our left, and passed that river. The celerity of our march up to this period, and the probable difficulties in, and the necessity of providing for the subsistence of the army in our further progress, induced me to make short movements on the 11th, and to halt the left on the 12th; but on the latter day I moved forward the right under lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill, consisting of the 2nd British, Morillo's Spanish, and Conde de Amarantes' Portuguese divisions of infantry, and the light division under major-general Baron Charles Alten, and major-general Fane's, major-general Long's, major-general Victor Alten's, brigadier-general Ponsonby's, and colonel Grant's (hussar) brigades of cavalry towards Burgos, with a view to reconnoitre the enemy's position and numbers near that town, and to force them to a decision whether to abandon the castle to its fate, or to protect it with all their force.

"I found the enemy posted with a considerable force, commanded, as I understood, by general Reille, on the heights on the left of the Hormaza, with their right above the village of Hormaza, and their left in front of Estepar. We turned their right with the hussars, and general Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry, and the light division from Isar, while general Victor Alten's brigade of cavalry, and colonel the honourable W. O'Callaghan's brigade of the 2nd division moved up the heights from Hormaza, and the remainder of the troops, under the command of lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill, threatened the heights of Estepar. These movements dislodged the enemy from their position immediately. The cavalry of our left and centre were entirely in the rear of the enemy, who were obliged to retire across the Arlanzan, by the high road towards Burgos.

"Although pressed by our cavalry, and suffering considerable loss by the fire of major Gardiner's troop of horse artillery, and obliged to make their movements at an accelerated pace, that they might not give time to our infantry to come up, they made it in admirable order; but they lost one gun and some prisoners, taken by a squadron of the 14th light dragoons, commanded by captain Milles, and a detachment of the 3rd dragoons, which charged their rear. The enemy took post on the left of the Arlanzan and Urbel rivers, which were much swollen with rain, and in the course of the night retired their whole army through Burgos, having abandoned and destroyed, as far as they were able, in the short space of time during which they were there, the works of the castle which they had constructed and improved at so large an expense, and they are now on their retreat towards the Ebro, by the high road of Briviesca and Miranda. In the mean time the whole of the army of the allies has made a movement to the left this day; and the Spanish corps of Galicia, under general Giron, and the left of the British and Portuguese army, under lieutenant-general sir Thomas Graham, will, I hope, pass the Ebro to-morrow at the bridges of Rocamunde and San Martin."

"Subijana, 19th June, 1813.

"The left of the army crossed the Ebro on the 14th, by the bridges of San Martin and Rocamunde, and the remainder on the 15th, by those bridges and that of Puente de Arenas. We continued our march on the

following day towards Vittoria. The enemy assembled on the 16th and 17th a considerable corps at Espejo, not far from the Puente Larra, composed of some of the troops which had been for some time in the Biscayan provinces in pursuit of Longa and Mina, and others, detached from the main body of the army, which were still at Pancorbo. They had likewise a division of infantry and some cavalry at Frias since the 16th, for the purpose of observing our movements on the left of the Ebro. Both these detachments marched yesterday morning; that from Frias, upon San Millan, where it was found by the light division of the allied army, under major-general Charles Alten; and that from Espejo, on Osma, where it met the 5th and 6th divisions, under lieutenant-general sir Thomas Graham. Major-general Charles Alten drove the enemy from San Millan, and afterwards cut off the rear brigade of the division, of which he took 300 prisoners; killed and wounded many, and the brigade was dispersed in the mountains.

"The corps from Espejo was considerably stronger than the allied corps under sir Thomas Graham, which had arrived nearly at the same time at Osma. The enemy moved on to the attack, but were soon obliged to retire; and they were followed to Espejo, whence they retired through the hills to this place. It was late in the day before the other troops came up to the advanced position which those, under lieutenant-general sir Thomas Graham, had taken; and I halted the 4th division, which relieved the 5th, near Espejo. The army moved forward this day to this river. I found the enemy's rear-guard in a strong position, on the left of the river, having his right covered by Subijana, and his left by the heights in front of Pobes. We turned the enemy's left with the light division, while the 4th division, under lieutenant-general sir William Cole, attacked in front; and the rear-guard was driven back upon the main body of the army, which was in march from Pancorbo to Vittoria, having broken up from thence last night. I am informed that the enemy dismantled Pancorbo. Colonel Longa's division joined the army on the 16th, on its arrival at Medina de Pomar."

"Salvatierra, 22nd June, 1813.

"The enemy, commanded by king Joseph, having marshal Jourdan as the major-general of the army, took up a position, on the night of the 19th instant, in front of Vit-

toria, the left of which rested on the heights which end at La Puebla de Arganzon, and extended from thence across the valley of the Zadorra, in front of the village of Aríñez. They occupied with the right of the centre a height which commanded the valley of the Zadorra. The right of their army was detained near Vittoria, and was destined to defend the passages of the river Zadorra, in the neighbourhood of that city. They had a reserve in rear of their left, at the village of Gomecha. The nature of the country through which the army had passed since it had reached the Ebro, had necessarily extended our columns, and we halted on the 20th in order to close them up, and moved the left to Murguia, where it was most likely to be required. I reconnoitred the enemy's position on that day, with a view to the attack to be made on the following morning, if they should still remain in it. We accordingly attacked the enemy yesterday, and I am happy to inform your lordship, that the allied army under my command gained a complete victory, having driven them from all their positions; having taken from them 151 pieces of cannon, waggons of ammunition, all their baggage, cattle, treasure, &c., and a considerable number of prisoners.

"The operations of the day commenced by lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill, obtaining possession of the heights of La Puebla, on which the enemy's left rested, which heights they had not occupied in great strength. He detached for this service one brigade of the Spanish division, under general Morillo; the other brigade being employed in keeping the communication between his main body on the high road from Miranda to Vittoria, and the troops detached to the heights. The enemy, however, soon discovered the importance of these heights, and reinforced their troops there to such an extent, that lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill was obliged to detach, first, the 71st regiment and the light infantry battalion of general Walker's brigade, under the command of lieutenant-colonel the hon. H. Cadogan, and successively other troops to the same point; and the allies not only gained, but maintained possession of these important heights throughout their operations, notwithstanding all the efforts of the enemy to regain them.

The contest here was, however, very severe, and the loss sustained considerable. General Morillo was wounded, but remained

in the field; and I am concerned to have to report, that lieutenant-colonel the hon. H. Cadogan has died of a wound which he received. In him his majesty has lost an officer of great merit and tried gallantry, who had already acquired the respect and regard of the whole profession; and of whom it might have been expected that, if he had lived, he would have rendered the most important services to his country.

"Under cover of the possession of these heights, sir Rowland Hill successively passed the Zadorra at Puebla, and the defile formed by the heights and the river Zadorra, and attacked and gained possession of the village of Subijana de Alava, in front of the enemy's line, which the enemy made repeated attempts to regain.

"The difficult nature of the country prevented the communication between our different columns moving to the attack from their stations on the river Bayas at as early an hour as I had expected; and it was late before I knew that the column, composed of the 3rd and 7th divisions, under the command of the earl of Dalhousie, had arrived at the station appointed for them. The 4th and light divisions, however, passed the Zadorra immediately after sir Rowland Hill had possession of Subijana de Alava, the former at the bridge of Nancarez, and the latter at the bridge of Tres-Puentes; and almost as soon as these had crossed, the column, under the earl of Dalhousie, arrived at Mendoza, and the 3rd division, under lieutenant-general sir Thomas Picton, crossed at the bridge higher up, followed by the 7th division, under the earl of Dalhousie. These four divisions, forming the centre of the army, were destined to attack the height on which the right of the enemy's centre was placed, while lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill should move forward from Subijana de Alava to attack the left. The enemy, however, having weakened his line to strengthen his detachment on the hills, abandoned his position in the valley as soon as he saw our disposition to attack it, and commenced his retreat in good order towards Vittoria.

"Our troops continued to advance in admirable order, notwithstanding the difficulty of the ground. In the mean time, lieutenant-general sir Thomas Graham, who commanded the left of the army, consisting of the 1st and 7th divisions, and general Pack's and Bradford's brigades of infantry, and general Bock's and Anson's of cavalry, and who had been moved on the 20th to

Murguia, moved forward from thence on Vittoria, by the high road from that town to Bilbao. He had, besides, with him the Spanish division, under colonel Longa; and general Giron, who had been detached to the left, under a different view of the state of affairs, and had afterwards been recalled, and had arrived on the 20th at Orduña, marched that morning from thence, so as to be in the field in readiness to support lieutenant-general sir Thomas Graham, if his support had been required.

"The enemy had a division of infantry, with some cavalry, advanced on the great road from Vittoria to Bilbao, resting their right on some strong heights covering the village of Gamarra Mayor. Both Gamarra and Abechuco were strongly occupied as *têtes-du-pont*, and the bridges over the Zadorra at these places. Brigadier-general Pack, with his Portuguese brigade, and colonel Longa, with his Spanish division, were directed to turn and gain the heights, supported by major-general Anson's brigade of light dragoons, and the 5th division of infantry, under the command of major-general Oswald, who was desired to take the command of all these forces.

"Lieutenant-general sir Thomas Graham reports, that in the execution of this service the Portuguese and Spanish troops behaved admirably. The 4th battalion of caçadores, and the 8th caçadores, particularly, distinguished themselves. Colonel Longa being on the left, took possession of Gamarra Menor.

"As soon as the heights were in our possession, the village of Gamarra Mayor was most gallantly stormed and carried by major-general Robinson's brigade of the 5th division, which advanced in columns of battalions, under a very heavy fire of artillery and musketry, without firing a shot, assisted by two guns of major Lawson's brigade of artillery. The enemy suffered severely, and lost three pieces of cannon. The lieutenant-general then proceeded to attack the village of Abechuco with the 1st division, by forming a strong battery against it, consisting of captain Dubourdieu's brigade and captain Ramsay's troop of horse artillery; and under cover of this fire, colonel Halkett's brigade advanced to the attack of the village, which was carried; the light battalions having charged and taken three guns and a howitzer on the bridge. This attack was supported by brigadier Bradford's brigade of Portuguese in-

fantry. During the operation of Abechuco, the enemy made the greatest efforts to repossess themselves of the village of Gamarra Mayor, which were gallantly repulsed by the 5th division, under the command of major-general Oswald. The enemy had, however, on the heights on the left of the Zadorra, two divisions of infantry in reserve; and it was impossible to cross by the bridges till the troops which had moved upon the enemy's centre and left had driven them through Vittoria. The whole then co-operated in the pursuit, which was sustained by all till after it was dark.

"The movement of the troops under lieutenant-general sir Thomas Graham, and their possession of Gamarra Mayor and Abechuco, intercepted the enemy's retreat by the high road to France. They were then obliged to turn to the road towards Pamplona; but they were unable to hold any position, for a sufficient length of time, to allow their baggage and artillery to be drawn off. The whole, therefore, of the latter, which had not already been taken by the troops in their attack of the successive positions taken up by the enemy in their retreat from their first position at Arriñez, and on the Zadorra, and all their ammunition and baggage, and every thing they had, were taken close to Vittoria. I have reason to believe, that the enemy carried off with them one gun and one howitzer only."

In consequence of the favourable issue of the battle of Vittoria, the cortes indicating their intention of calling to account those persons who had adhered to the usurper, and were known by the name of *juramentados*, Wellington addressed a memoir to that body, enforcing the propriety of granting, with a few exceptions, a general amnesty. "I am the last person," said the humane and politic English general, "who will be found to diminish the merits of the Spaniards who have adhered to the cause of their country during the severe trial which I hope has passed, particularly of those who, having remained among the enemy without entering their service, have served their country at the risk of their lives. But at the same time I can appreciate the merits of those individuals, and of the nation at large, I can forgive the weakness of those who have been induced by terror, by distress, or by despair, to pursue a different line of conduct.

"I entreat the government to advert to

the circumstances of the commencement, and of the different stages of the eventful contest; and to the numerous occasions on which all men must have imagined that it was impossible for the powers of the Peninsula, though aided by Great Britain, to withstand the colossal power by which they were assailed, and nearly overcome. Let them reflect on the weakness of the country at the commencement of the contest, on the numerous and almost invariable disasters of the armies, and on the ruinous disorganization which followed; and let them decide, whether those who were witnesses of these events are guilty, because they could not foresee what has since occurred. The majority are certainly not guilty in any other manner; and many, as I have above stated, who were deemed guilty in the eye of the law, as having served the pretended king, have, by that very act, acquired the means of serving, and have rendered important services to their country.

"It is my opinion that the policy of Spain should lead the government and the cortes to grant a general amnesty, with certain exceptions. This subject deserves consideration in the two views, of the effort now making failing, or succeeding in freeing the country from its oppressors. If the effort should fail, the enemy will, by an amnesty, be deprived of the principal means now in his hands of oppressing the country in which his armies will be stationed. He will see clearly that he can place no reliance on any partisans in Spain; and he will not have even a pretence for supposing that country is divided in opinion. If the effort should succeed, as I sincerely hope it may, the object of the government should be to pacify the country, and to heal the divisions which the contest unavoidably must have occasioned. It is impossible that this object can be accomplished as long as there exists a large body of the Spanish nation, some possessing the largest properties in the country, and others endowed with considerable talents, who are proscribed for their conduct during the contest; conduct which has been caused by the misfortunes to which I have above adverted. These persons, their friends, and relations, will, if persecuted, naturally endeavour to perpetuate the divisions in the country, in the hope, at some time, to take advantage of them; and, adverting to their number, and to that power which they must derive from their properties and connexions it must be feared that

they will be too successful. But there are other important views of this question.

"First, Should the effort to free the country from its oppressors succeed at some time or other, some approaches to peace must be made between the two nations; and the amnesty to the persons above described will remove the greatest difficulty in the way of such an arrangement.

"Secondly, Should ever Spain be at peace with France; and should the proscription against these persons be continued, they will remain in France a perpetual instrument in the hands of that restless power, to disturb the internal tranquillity of Spain; and in case of the renewal of war, which will be their constant wish and object, they will be the most active, the most mischievous, and most inveterate enemies of their country; of that country which, by mistaken severity, aggravates her misfortunes by casting off from her thousands of her useful subjects.

"On every ground, then, it is desirable that this measure should be adopted, and that the present moment should be seized for adopting it. I am far, however, from thinking that an amnesty ought to be granted without exceptions and conditions; and I proceed to state, first, the exceptions which, in my opinion, ought to be made; and, secondly, the conditions on which any amnesty ought to be granted.

"The amnesty ought not to extend to the ministers of king Joseph, nor to those who have been most active in his support, and by their influence and persuasions can be proved to have induced others to have espoused his interests; nor to those who have been instrumental in shedding the blood, and in committing acts of cruelty against any Spaniard. Those, likewise, who have deserted any public trust or station to join the intruder, with the exception of non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the army, ought to be liable to the legal consequences of their conduct. All others ought to be pardoned on the following conditions: first, that unless positive evidence should be given to the government of their having served the public during the time they were in the service of the pretended king, they shall reside in the place appointed for their residence, and be under the inspection of the police, and shall not be employed by the public for two years from the date of the amnesty. After that time they should be eligible for employment, unless previously

accused of some act, the proof of which would legally render them incapable of filling an office. In bringing this subject under the consideration of the government, I am, perhaps, intruding my opinion on a subject in which, as a stranger, I have no concern; but having had an advantage enjoyed by few, of being acquainted with the concerns of this country since the commencement of the contest, and having been sensible, both in the last and in the present campaign, of the disadvantages suffered by Spain from the want of a measure of this description, I have thought it proper, as an individual well-wisher to the cause, to bring it under the

consideration of the government; assuring them, at the same time, that I have never had the slightest communication on the subject with the government of my own country; nor do I believe that they have ever turned to it their attention. What I have above stated are my own opinions, to which I may attribute more weight than they merit; but they are formed upon experience and long reflection, and are founded upon a sincere devotion to the interests of this country."

Such noble sentiments came with peculiar grace from a victorious general in the very height of his triumph.

OPERATIONS FROM THE BATTLE OF VITTORIA TO THE BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES.

THE heavy cavalry and D'Urban's Portuguese being left in Vittoria, and Giron detached with the Gallician army in pursuit of the convoy which had moved from Vittoria on the morning of the battle, the pursuit was renewed on the 22nd. On the 24th, in the morning of which day their last gun was captured, the mass of the fugitive French reached Pamplona; but when Joseph and his staff were safely ensconced behind its walls, his fleeing soldiers were refused admittance, and on their attempting to force an entrance over the walls, they were repulsed by a fire of musketry from the garrison. They therefore continued their flight across the Pyrenees; but being furnished with supplies, raised by contributions on the neighbouring Spanish peasantry, they rallied in the fastnesses of the mountains. The heavy rains which had fallen the two days after the battle of Vittoria, had retarded the pursuit of the allies.

On the 26th Pamplona was invested, and as the enemy, finding themselves not hard pressed, had occupied the fertile valley of the Bastan, with three divisions under Gazan; Hill, as soon as he had received intelligence that O'Donnell was marching on Pamplona, moved with two British, and the same number of Portuguese brigades, against them, and drove them successively from every post. The whole line of the Spanish frontiers, from Roncesvalles to the mouth of the Bidassoa, was now occupied by the allies. Thus Wellington stood upon the frontier of another liberated land, as victor,

and its saviour. This was true glory—real philanthropy.

On the 27th, leaving Hill with the 2nd division, in charge of the operations before Pamplona, Wellington marched with the light, 4th, and 7th divisions, and two brigades of cavalry, by Taffalla on Logroña, to cut off Clausel's retreat into France; while general C. Clinton was, with the 6th and 7th divisions, and a body of cavalry, directed to intercept him by way of Salvatierra, should he attempt to escape by that road; but hearing that Clausel had taken the direction of Tudela, he desisted the pursuit, lest Suchet uniting with Clausel and Paris, should operate with a powerful force on the right flank of the allies. Clausel, who had been informed by an alcaide, that Wellington was in possession of Tafalla, expecting him, recrossed the Ebro, and marched on Saragossa, where, destroying his artillery and baggage, he retreated through the Pyrenees by Jaca.

While Wellington was marching against Clausel, Graham was in advance to intercept Foy's retreat; who, collecting the small garrisons in Lower Biscay, and throwing a reinforcement into St. Sebastian, hastily gained Toloso, and attempted to make a stand; but Graham bursting open the gates with artillery, Foy escaped in the dark, and being chased by Giron, fled towards the Bidassoa. The blow struck at Vittoria, had been felt throughout Europe. It broke up the congress assembled, in consequence of the battles of Lutzen and Baut-

zen at Prague, in Bohemia, under the mediation of Austria; and infused spirit and union into the confederated states; and not only occasioned the evacuation of the whole of Spain, south of the Ebro, but the restoration of the forts of Pancorbo, Passages, Guetaria, and Castro Urdiales, to the Spaniards. Suchet evacuated Valencia on the 6th July, leaving garrisons in Saguntum and Peniscola, and assembled his forces between Tarragona and Tortosa. The only fortresses throughout the Peninsula now remaining in the hands of the enemy were Santona, Pamplona, St. Sebastian, and those in Valencia and Catalonia.

But these great successes were accompanied by a reverse—the failure of the Anglo-Sicilian expedition before Tarragona; of which Wellington, on return to his head-quarters at Huerta, received information in the despatches from Sir John Murray.

Wellington's plan of operations for the campaign of 1813, was that while general Elio and the duke del Parque occupied Suchet, on the Xucar, Murray should attack Tarragona, or some other mountain fortress; but should Suchet come down upon him in force before he had established himself in Catalonia, he was to re-embark with all possible expedition, return to Valencia, and seize the strong lines the enemy occupied before they could bring back sufficient troops for their protection. In aid of the attempt, the Spanish generals were to approach the line of the Xucar. In prosecution of this design, the fleet of transports, with Murray's troops on board, sailed from Alicante; and, on the evening of the 2nd, came to anchor at the port of Salon, which is within sight of Tarragona. The troops were landed the next morning, and, by three o'clock in the afternoon of that day, Tarragona was invested. As the only road between Tortosa and Tarragona for the advance of artillery was commanded by the hill fort of San Felipe, on the Col de Belaguer, which is a few miles west of Tarragona, a brigade, under lieutenant-colonel Prevost, was despatched to attack it. Fire was opened against it on the 6th, and a number of shells being thrown into the work, a magazine exploded, which inclined the garrison to surrender on the 7th.

As the French had dismantled the outer line, and destroyed most of the works, when they became masters of Tarragona, only a few hundred troops (the present garrison mustered 700 men,) were necessary for the protection of the inner line. The governor,

however, on the appearance of the allies, hastily repaired and occupied *Fuerte Real* (Fort Royal), and the bastion of San Carlos, both within the outer line. On the 6th, Murray opened two batteries against the fort, and a third on the following day. On the 8th, the place was practicably breached, but it was deemed prudent to delay the assault till the body of the place could be attacked, on which two heavy batteries were opened on the 11th; but Murray, receiving intelligence that Suchet was in march across the mountains to the relief of Tarragona, despatched his cavalry to Altafalla, and proceeded to select a position favourable for battle, leaving orders with major-general Clinton that the outworks should be stormed at nightfall. A report reaching him that generals Decaen and Maurice Mathieu were advancing rapidly from Villa Franca to co-operate with Suchet, he hastily returned to Tarragona and repeated the orders for the assault. The storming party was formed and ready to advance, but Murray countermanded his order, and, notwithstanding the earnest remonstrances of his officers, directed that the batteries should be dismounted and the siege raised. The field artillery and cavalry were sent on to the Col de Belaguer, and the infantry marched to Salon, where they were embarked. The embarkation of the siege artillery—"the honoured train which had battered the gory walls of Badajos"—and the stores, was abandoned. "A strange panic had seized the unfortunate commander, and he madly determined to abandon his battering train, when not an enemy was within leagues of Tarragona. Nothing could surpass the indignation which the disgraceful order caused. The army and navy openly expressed their feelings, the staff officers remonstrated, and the admiral not only refused obedience, but offered, at his own responsibility, to remove the artillery during the night. After wavering for a time, Murray ordered a preconcerted signal to be given, and, as if an overwhelming enemy was at hand, the guns were spiked and abandoned. Unmolested, the British troops effected their embarkation, and many of the stores and horses were shipped on the 13th, without the slightest interruption from the enemy; but eighteen or nineteen battering pieces, whose carriages had been burned, were, with all the platforms, fascines, gabions, and small ammunition, triumphantly carried by the enemy into the fortress, in the

view of the fleet and the army. Sir John Murray, meanwhile, seemingly unaffected by the misfortune, shipped himself on the evening of the 12th, and took his usual repose in bed.”*

On the 13th, a party of French cavalry approaching the out-pickets at Col de Belaguer, Murray landed some infantry at that point, to cover the embarkation of the cavalry and field artillery. On the ensuing day he landed his entire force, hoping to surprise Mathieu's division at Bardillos; but still infirm of purpose, he determined to re-embark, when, at this juncture, the Mediterranean fleet, under sir Edward Pellew, hove in sight, and signalized that lord William Bentinck was on board to take the command. Lord William, on assuming the command, ordered the fort at Col de Belaguer to be dismantled, and the troops to be re-embarked for Alicante.

This disgraceful affair gave much annoyance to Wellington. In his reply to Murray's despatch, detailing the operations, he says:—"I have received your letters of the 14th and 23rd June, and I am much concerned that your matters have turned out so unfortunately. In my official letter, I have stated the points on which we want information; and I recommend to you to write a detailed narrative of all your proceedings. I confess that that which weighs most on my mind in all this is the loss of your artillery and stores, of which you think the least. First, they are very important trophies to the enemy, of which he will make good use, under existing circumstances, and entirely alter the nature of the operation of raising the siege. Secondly, the loss of them entirely cripples our operations on the eastern coast during the campaign, and prevents the army of the eastern coast from taking all the advantage which they may take from our success in this quarter, which, it is probable, will be followed by Suchet's throwing his army on our right flank. However, the consequences are not so important to you as the facts themselves, and I am anxious you should place them in a light to justify you in the eyes of his majesty's government."

In writing to Murray's successor, lord William Bentinck, the commander-in-chief thus expressed himself:—"Sir John Murray's misfortune will create a devil of a breeze; and, according to the information I have at present, I can form no opinion of the merits of the question, and therefore do

not write any to him. I shall send his letters home without any comment on my part, excepting to draw the attention of the government to my instructions, of which they have a copy."

On receiving a detailed account of Murray's ill-conducted operations, Wellington determined to prefer charges against him, and, in a letter to colonel Torrens, dated Lesaca, 8th August, 1813, he gives a summary of the causes for that proceeding:—

"I entertained a very high opinion of ——'s talents, but he always appeared to me to want what is better than abilities, viz., sound sense. There is always some mistaken principle in what he does. I confess I do not know what to make of ——'s charges. Raising the siege I do not care about; it might have been necessary when the enemy approached him; nor do I care much about his embarking, his instructions would warrant his doing so if he raised the siege, and did not think he could fight a decidedly successful action. But what I cannot bear is his leaving his guns and stores; and, strange to say, not only does he not think he was wrong in so doing, but he writes of it as being rather meritorious, and says he did it before at Biar.

"It appears that he knew, on the 7th and 8th, that Suchet was approaching him on one side, and Maurice Mathieu on the other. I shall charge him with having then omitted to make arrangements to raise the siege, and to embark his guns and stores. I shall then charge him with disobedience of his instructions in not having gone to Valencia to join the duque del Parque, when he raised the siege and embarked. If he had raised the siege on the 7th and 8th, or rather had then discontinued to disembark his guns and stores, and had afterwards embarked his corps on the 12th and 13th, on finding Suchet approaching him, and thinking the enemy too strong for him, and had then sailed for the coast of Valencia, he would have obeyed his instructions, and the manœuvre would have answered; that is to say, he would have gained the lines of the Xucar, and probably more ground in Valencia without a battle. Instead of that, after losing his guns, he stayed till the evening of the 17th; then lord William embarked the army, which, since the 12th, had been disembarked at the Col de Belaguer; and, in fact, Suchet, after having obliged sir John Murray to raise the siege of Tarragona, returned and forced the duque del Parque to

* *History of the War in the Peninsula.*

abandon the Xucar before he could be supported by lord William Bentinck. The best of the story is, that all parties ran away. Maurice Mathieu ran away, sir John Murray ran away, and so did Suchet. He was afraid to strike at sir John Murray without his artillery, and knew nothing of Maurice Mathieu, and he returned into Valencia, either to strike at the duque del Parque, or to get the assistance of Harispe, whom he had left opposed to the duque del Parque. I know that in his first proclamation to his army on their success, he knew so little what had passed at Tarragona, that he mentioned the English general having raised the siege, but not his having left his artillery. He could, therefore, have had no communication with the place when he marched, and he must have known of the raising of the siege afterwards only by the reports of the country."

Murray was accordingly ordered to be tried by court-martial for disobedience to

his instructions, and for abandoning his artillery and stores without necessity; but as it was difficult to hold a court-martial in Spain, the trial did not take place till the termination of the war, when, in consequence of defects in evidence and technical informalities, he was acquitted of intentional disobedience, but found guilty of abandoning his artillery and stores, and sentenced to be admonished. In vindication of his abandonment of his artillery, his defence was, that "they were of small value—old iron. He attached little importance to the sacrifice of artillery; it was his principle; he had approved of colonel Adam losing his guns at Biar, and he had also desired colonel Prevost, if pressed, to abandon his battering train before the fort of Belaguer. Such doctrine might appear strange to a British army, but it was the rule with the continental armies, and the French owed much of their successes to the adoption of it."

SIEGE OF ST. SEBASTIAN (FROM COMMENCEMENT TO BLOCKADE.)

WELLINGTON now determined to lay siege to St. Sebastian. On the 11th of July, he established his head-quarters at Ernani, for the purpose of arranging with the commanding officers of the artillery and engineers, the best mode of attack for the reduction of that fortress. The town of St. Sebastian, the capital of Guipuscoa, is built on a low sandy peninsula, projecting into the Bay of Biscay, and formed by the harbour on the one side, and by the Urumea on the other. On the western side, the defences of the town are washed by the sea; on the eastern, the only approach by land is over an isthmus across a double line of works, consisting of a solid curtain of masonry, stretching completely across the isthmus. At the extremity of the peninsula is a rocky height called Monte Orgullo, rising steeply to a point, crowned by the small citadel La Motta. About 700 yards from the land front of the place is a range of heights, upon which stood the convent of St. Bartholomeo, and a small redoubt and circular field work. The southern face of La Motta is covered with batteries, which plunge into the lower defences of the town; but La Motta is commanded by Monte Olia, which stands on the sand hills on the right

bank of the river, about 1,500 yards from the town. On the right bank of the Urumea are considerable sand hills, called the Chofre range, which completely command the northern line of the works, and as the river is for some hours, before and after ebb-tide, not only fordable, but leaves a broad belt of dry land on the left side, so that a hostile force may turn the front, and march close along the eastern wall, it was therefore determined to batter the eastern wall in breach from the sand hills, and to storm the breaches as soon as practicable, by a bold advance along the left of the Urumea, at low water, having previously dislodged the enemy from the convent of St. Bartholomeo and the advanced works.

The commander-in-chief, having examined the defences, and arranged the operations for the siege, entrusted its conduct to sir Thomas Graham, who had approached St. Sebastian on the 29th of June. The guns, ammunition, and stores necessary for the siege had been landed at Passages. The siege instructions were, that the outposts should be first stormed, and then the main attack of the place made on the eastern face of the sea wall.

On the 11th of July, the place was in-

vested. The besieging force consisted of the 5th division (Hay's and Robinson's brigades,) some detachments of the 1st division, and the Portuguese brigades of Bradford and Wilson; in all amounting to about 10,000 men. On the morning of the 14th, a battery of four 18-pounders was opened against the convent of St. Bartholomeo, and one 9-pounder and howitzers on the redoubt on the following day. A practicable breach having been effected in the convent, on the morning of the 17th, an assault was made by the three companies of the royals, and detachments of the 5th, 13th, and 14th caçadores, supported by the 9th regiment, and the enemy was driven in confusion down the hill, carrying with them in their flight a strong reinforcement, which had just left St. Sebastian through the village of San Martin; but the assailants pushing on to the glacis in the pursuit, were driven back by the garrison. The loss of the enemy was 240; that of the allies about 100, of which 7 officers and 60 privates were of the 9th regiment.

As soon as the allies had cleared St. Bartholomeo, two batteries were established on its site; and the batteries marked out on the sand-hills being completed, were armed with 20 heavy guns and 12 mortars and howitzers. The batteries were thrown up during the night in a situation to enfilade and take in the reverse the defences of the town. This in the loose sand was a most difficult work, and the fire of the enemy was directed in great precision to interrupt it. Four sentinels were killed in succession through one loop-hole. The only eminence from which artillery could be brought to bear directly on the town, though still about 100 feet below it, was above the convent, and almost adjoining its walls. Here a battery was erected: the covered way to it passed through the convent, and the battery itself was constructed in a thickly peopled burying ground. "A more ghastly circumstance can seldom have occurred in war; for coffins and corpses, in all stages of decay, were exposed, when the soil was thrown up to form a defence against the fire from the town, and were used, indeed, in the defences; and when a shell burst there it brought down the living and the dead together. An officer was giving his orders, when a shot struck the edge of the trenches above him; two coffins slipped down upon him with the sand, the coffins broke in their fall, the bodies rolled with him for some distance, and when

he recovered he saw that they had been women of some rank, for they were richly attired in black velvet, and their long hair hung about their shoulders and their livid faces. The soldiers, in the scarcity of firewood, being nothing nice, broke up coffins for fuel with which to dress their food, leaving the bodies exposed; and till the hot sun had dried up these poor insulted remains of humanity, the stench was as dreadful as the sight."*

The ruins of San Martin were now occupied, and approaches being struck out to the right or left of it, the enemy abandoned the circular redoubt. A parallel was then commenced on the right, across the isthmus, in cutting which a drain was discovered, about four feet high and three wide, with a pipe running through it to convey water to the town. This was charged as a mine with several barrels of gunpowder, and designed to be fired as a signal for the assault.

The whole of the batteries opened against the walls of the place on the 20th, and two practicable breaches, one 30 yards and the other 10 yards, being effected by the 24th, an assault was ordered to be made on the night of that day; but the houses in front of the breach being discovered to be on fire, it was deferred till the next morning, when it was expected the buildings would be consumed. In the meantime, the enemy had made every possible preparation to repel the assailants; live shells, heavy stones, and combustibles were placed upon the walls, the houses opposite the breach set on fire and reduced to ruins, those behind them loop-holed, and burning planks and beams placed on the breach.

The troops destined for the assault—namely, the 3rd battalion of the royals, under major Frazer; the 9th regiment, under colonel Cameron, as a support; the 38th regiment, under colonel Greville, to assault the small breach; a detachment from the light companies of all those regiments, placed in the centre of the royals, under lieutenant Campbell, of the 9th regiment—being in readiness before dawn of the 25th, the mine formed in the aqueduct was sprung as a signal to rush forward, which so startled and confused the garrison, that they abandoned their posts at the counterscarp and glacis, under which the mine had been placed, and the advances reached the breach with little loss and crowned the summit. Nobly were they led. Major Frazer and

* Southey.

the engineer officer, lieutenant Jones, first topped the breach, followed by a few men of the 1st royals; others were rushing up to join them, but in broken order. A steep descent now presented itself, while flames and smoke burst from the burning houses in their front. At the same moment, the garrison recovered from their panic, and opened a destructive fire in front and flank, from the loop-holed houses and the two towers that flanked the breach, while showers of shells, stones, grenades, and grape, were poured down from the citadel and the flank defences, on the stormers and the dense crowd of assailants at the foot of the breach, the space beneath the wall and the sea being too narrow to admit of any formation of the troops to keep down the musketry from the breaches. The consequence was the breaches and their feet were covered with dead and dying. Major Frazer, and a few men of the 1st royals, who had actually penetrated to the town, were slain amid the burning ruins into which they had thrown themselves; and lieutenant Jones, and the nine brave men of the royals, who stood alone on the breach, were struck down wounded. Lieutenant Campbell, who, with the survivors of his detachment, had twice mounted the ruins, was twice wounded, and all around him killed. The gallant men who had won the breach being all struck down, and the troops at its foot being in such a state of inextricable confusion, as not to be able to ascend the breach, the assailants at length withdrew, with the loss of, in men and officers (among whom was sir Richard Fletcher), 44 officers of the line, and 520 privates, killed, wounded, and missing.

The enemy, stimulated by their success, at daybreak of the 26th, in a *sortie*, surprised and captured 200 Portuguese and 30 British in the trenches.

On this failure being reported to Wellington, he came from his head-quarters at Le-saca; and finding that the ammunition was insufficient for the prosecution of the siege, he determined to convert it into a blockade until the arrival of the expected supply of stores from Portsmouth. To this intent, he ordered the trenches to be held by 800 men, to repel any attempt the enemy might make to destroy the works; the batteries to be dismantled, excepting two guns and two howitzers to be left on the Chofre range and Monte Olia, to keep up the fire on the breaches; and Graham to advance with his disposable forces to support Giron, on the

banks of the Bidassoa, and at the same time to act in observation of the garrison of St. Sebastian.

When Napoleon Buonaparte heard of the battle of Vittoria, he immediately despatched Soult from his camp in Saxony to take the command of the troops assembled in the neighbourhood of Bayonne, and endeavour to restore his power in the Peninsula; that marshal reached Bayonne on the 13th of July, and immediately began to reorganize the French armies, and recruit them with conscripts and national guards. Mustering about 78,000 men, he distributed them into three corps of battle, consisting of nine divisions of infantry, two of heavy dragoons, and one of light cavalry. The left wing, under Clausel, was posted at St. Jean-Pied-de-Port; the centre, under D'Erlon, occupied the heights near Espelette and Ainhoué, with an advanced guard behind Urdax; the right wing, under Reille, was stationed on the mountains above Vera and Sarre. Villatte was in observation on the banks of the Bidassoa. The cavalry were stationed on the Nive and the Adour. The French army thus guarded the whole northern issues of the passes of the Pyrenees, from the pass of Roncesvalles, on the east, to the mouth of the Bidassoa, on the west; Soult's head-quarters were at Ascaïn. Entrenched camps were formed at Bayonne and at St. Jean-Pied-de-Port, for the purpose of rallying the army in the event of defeat.

On the 24th, the French marshal issued a proclamation, couched in the Napoleonic style, in which he told his troops it was the emperor's order "to drive the enemy across the Ebro; and that, whenever the relative duties of a French general and his troops were ably fulfilled, their enemies had commonly no other resource than in flight"—an assertion, as Mr. Southey justly observes, strikingly exemplifying the character of the vain-glorious people whom he was addressing. He himself had been repulsed by a far inferior force at Corunna; had been driven from Oporto, and defeated in the bloody field of Albuera. He was addressing men who had been beaten at Vimiero, beaten at Talavera, beaten at Busaco, beaten at Fuentes d'Onor, routed at Salamanca, and scattered like sheep at Vittoria. They had been driven from Lisbon into France; and yet the general who had so often been baffled, addressed this language to the very troops who had been so often and so signally defeated. His expression that the English "owe their

military character to the French," seems to imply he had forgotten Cressy, Agincourt, Poitiers, Blenheim, Oudenarde, Ramilies. After noticing his own appointment to the command of the army, and Napoleon Buonaparte's recent campaign in Germany, he thus proceeded :—

"While Germany was thus the theatre of great events, that enemy, who, under pretence of succouring the inhabitants of the Peninsula, has in reality devoted them to ruin, was not inactive. He assembled the whole of his disposable force—English, Spaniards, and Portuguese—under his most experienced officers; and, relying on the superiority of his numbers, advanced in three divisions against the French force assembled upon the Douro. With well-provided fortresses in his front and rear, a skilful general, enjoying the confidence of his troops, might, by selecting good positions, have braved and discomfited this motley levy. But, unhappily, at this critical period, timorous and pusillanimous councils were followed. The fortresses were abandoned and blown up; hasty and disorderly marches gave confidence to the enemy; and a veteran army, small indeed in number, but great in all that constitutes the military character, which had fought, bled, and triumphed in every province in Spain, beheld with indignation its laurels tarnished, and itself compelled to abandon all its acquisitions, the trophies of many a well-fought and bloody day. When at length the indignant voice of the troops arrested this disgraceful flight, and its commander, touched with shame, yielded to the general desire, and determined on giving battle near Vittoria, who can doubt, from this generous enthusiasm, this fine sense of honour, what would have been the result had the general been worthy of his troops? had he, in short, made those dispositions and movements which would have secured to any one part of his army the co-operation and support of the other.

"Let us not, however, defraud the enemy of the praise that is due to him. The dispositions and arrangements of their general have been prompt, skilful, and consecutive. The valour and steadiness of his troops have been praiseworthy. Yet do not forget that it is to the benefit of your example they owe their present military character; and that whenever the relative duties of a French general and his troops have been ably fulfilled, their enemies have commonly had no other resource than flight.

"Soldiers! I partake of your chagrin, your grief, your indignation. I know that the blame of the present situation of the army is imputable to others—be the merit of repairing it yours. I have borne testimony to the emperor of your bravery and zeal. His instructions are to drive the enemy from these lofty heights, which enable him proudly to survey our fertile valleys, and chase them across the Ebro. It is on the Spanish soil that your tents must next be pitched, and from thence your resources drawn. No difficulties can be insurmountable to your valour and devotion. Let us, then, exert ourselves with mutual ardour; and be assured, that nothing can give greater felicity to the paternal heart of the emperor, than the knowledge of the triumphs of his army—of its increasing glory—of its having rendered itself worthy of him, and of our dear country.

"Extensive but combined movements for the relief of the fortresses are on the eve of taking place. They will be completed in a few days. Let the account of our success be dated from Vittoria, and the birth of his imperial majesty be celebrated in that city: so shall we render memorable an epoch deservedly dear to all Frenchmen.

"SOULT, duc de Dalmatie,

"Lieutenant de l'Empereur."

In the night of the very day of his return to Lesaca from St. Sebastian, lord Wellington received information that the passes of the Pyrenees had been forced, and that the enemy were penetrating into the valleys in overwhelming force. "We must do the best we can to stop them," was his calm reply to the officer who brought the intelligence; and instantly he proceeded to the scene of action.

The allied army was thus distributed :—Byng's brigade of the 2nd division, and Murillo's Spanish infantry division, were posted on the extreme right, at the pass of Roncesvalles; Cole, with the fourth division, was stationed at Biscaret in second line, to support Byng; and the 3rd division (Picton's) was in reserve at Olague. These troops formed the right wing, and covered the direct approaches to Pamplona from St. Jean-Pied-de-Port. The right of the centre, commanded by sir Rowland Hill, occupied the valley of the Bastan, having Pringle and Walker's brigade of the 2nd division in the Maya Pass, and Amarante's Portuguese division, which formed a part of Hill's corps, in the passes of Col d'Ariette and Col d'Espégas, eastward of Maya, about five leagues

on the west of Roncesvalles. The remainder of the 2nd division was in the valley in reserve. Campbell's Portuguese brigade was stationed at Los Alduides, a post within the French territory. The light and 7th divisions, under Alten and Dalhousie, formed the left centre, and occupied the heights of Santa Barbara, the town of Vera, and the pass of Echelar, from which last point they communicated with the valley of the Bastan. The 6th division (Pack's) was in reserve at San Esteben, ready to support the right or left centre. The left wing, consisting of the 1st (Howard's) and 5th (Oswald's) divisions, Portuguese brigade, under the command of Graham, and Spey's, were engaged in the siege of St. Sebastian, covered by lord Aylmer's brigade, and the brigades of the German legion, who were in position on the road between Irun and Oyarzun, and supporting Freyre's Spanish corps, which covered the heights of San Marcial, and guarded the line of the Bidassoa. Longa's troops kept up the communication from the left of the centre at Vera with Freyre's corps. O'Donnell and d'España, with their respective corps, maintained the blockade of Pamplona; and the allied cavalry, under sir Stapleton Cotton, was distributed in cantonments in the rear of that fortress towards Tafalla; while the guerilla bands of Duran and Mina, in the neighbourhood of Saragossa, covered the right flank and rear of the allied army from Suchet's movements. Wellington's headquarters were at Lesaca, immediately opposite Soult's.

Both armies occupied on opposite heights within their own frontier, a line about eleven leagues in length from the sea on the left, to the mountains on the westward of the pass of Roncesvalles on the eastern side on the extreme right. In some places they were encamped within half cannon shot, and their sentries within 150 yards of each other. During the interval of the cessation of hostilities, the two armies offered no molestation to each other. "The French, gay and alert, as usual, were drumming and trumpeting all day long; the more thoughtful English enjoying the season and the country, looking down with delight on the sea and the enemy's country, and Bayonne in the distance; and sketching, in the leisure which their duties might allow, the beautiful scenery of the Pyrenees."*

The line of the Lower Pyrenees, on the Spanish side of those mountains, is difficult

* Southey.

of defence, in many parts there being no lateral communication, and in others it is long and circuitous. For this reason, the concentration of a sufficient force in any position in rear of the passes, to ensure successful resistance at any one pass when attacked with superior numbers, is attended with difficulty. But the communications on the French side, or Upper Pyrenees, being short and easy, and access free from one part of the line to the other, the enemy was enabled to throw at pleasure the weight of their forces against the weakest part of the allied line, and overwhelm it before succour could, on account of the long circuit it would have to make, assemble in the rear from the remoter parts of the position. Availing himself of this advantage, Soult determined to force one of the passes with an overwhelming force; and then, by pushing forward on the flank and rear of the troops defending the others, force his way to Pamplona.

The Pyrenees, which separate Spain from France, and form a natural barrier between those kingdoms, are a lofty chain or range of mountains, crowded together in all varieties of form, rising abruptly from the Mediterranean Sea, at the Cape of Creux, near the Gulf of Rosas, and extending in a general direction from south-east to north-west, from that sea to the port of Passages, in the Bay of Biscay. Their length is about 270 miles, by an average breadth of about 40 miles. The greatest breadth, about 60 miles, is in the central part; that of the western extremity about 40 miles; while that of the eastern is scarcely 20 miles. Its principal summits range from 9,000 to above 11,000 feet in altitude. La Maladetta (Maudit, Maledictus, accursed), or Pic de Néton, is the highest, being 11,424 feet high, while that of Mont Perdu, said by geographers to be the highest, is but 11,168 feet high. The line of perpetual congelation is between 9,000 and 10,000 feet above the level of the sea. On the loftier mountains glaciers are found; and also avalanches occur, as in the Alps. The principal passes are those of Roncesvalles, famed in war and romance, Maya, San Estevan, and Doña Maria.

The Pyrenees are not merely an isolated chain, running direct from sea to sea, but it has its ramifications; on the west its prolongation forms the mountains of Guipuscoa, Biscay, Asturias, and Galicia, the extremities of which terminate on the Capes of Ortegal, and Finisterre, and the other head-

lands of the north-west of Spain; on the east, its ramifications extend to those of the Cevennes, which possibly form a connecting link with the Alps. The Spanish or southern slope of the Pyrenees is much steeper, and of more rugged and difficult ascent than the northern or French side.

The Pyrenees abound in valleys, rivers, and lakes. The largest of the former are those of the Garonne and Lavedan, in the central Pyrenees. The principal rivers on the southern slope are the Aragon, Cinca, Seyre, Gallego, Ter, and Lobregat, the last two mentioned flowing into the sea near Barcelona, the others into the Ebro. The chief of those, on the north side, are the Adour, Pau, Oleron, Garonne, Bidassoa, Nive, Nevelle, Arriège, and Gers, which fall into the Bay of Biscay; and the Aude, Tet, and Tech, which flow into the Mediterra-

nean. On the French, or northern slope, the lakes are numerous, and some of them on very elevated sites; that of Pic du Midi being 8,813 feet, that of Mont Perdu 8,393 feet, and that of the port of Oo, 8,800 feet elevation. On the Spanish, or southern side, lakes rarely occur.

The Pyrenees are historically associated with celebrated events. Hannibal crossed them, in the beginning of the second Punic war. Cæsar traversed them with his army, in his warfare against the Pompeians in Spain. Among their defiles Charlemagne lost the rear-guard of his army. Edward, the Black Prince, led his army over one of the western passes, in his expedition in defence of Peter the Cruel against Henry of Transtamarre. In the winter of 1813-'14, they were the scene of those desperate contests called "The Battles of the Pyrenees."


THE BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES.


THE Battles of the Pyrenees, which were among the fiercest and the best-contested of the Peninsular contests, were the series of combats and battles entitled the combat of Roncesvalles and Linzoin, that of Maya, the double battle of Sorauren, and the combats of Buena, Doña Maria, Echelar and Ivantelli.


Soult's first object was the relief of Pamplona, which he understood could not hold out longer than ten days. To accomplish this object he determined to attack the passes of Roncesvalles and Maya, the roads from which converge on Pamplona. Accordingly, early on the morning of the 25th of July, he conducted in person a strong column, under Clausel, direct against the pass of Roncesvalles, while Reille led a strong corps along the ridge of Arola, to the left of Roncesvalles, to cut off the retreat of the troops disputing that pass.

At the same moment that Soult advanced from St. Jean Pied-de-Port against the pass of Roncesvalles, D'Erlon, with a column of 15,000 men, advanced to the Maya pass. The troops of both corps were furnished with four days' provisions, which were supposed would last them till they obtained possession of the magazines of the allied armies.

Under cover of some demonstrations against the small passes of Espeque and Lereta, which are to the right of the Maya pass, he conducted his main body by a pathway, which, leading from Espelette, enters the pass of Maya. Near the south-east entrance of the rock, a picket was posted; one mile in rear of the picket lay the light companies of Pringle's brigade; the 34th being two miles and a-half below, and the other regiments still farther. At day-break, the advanced picket received notice that the enemy were close upon them; and in a few minutes, crowning the summit of the mountain, the foe opened a galling fire on the 20th regiment, which general Ross was hastily forming to meet the attack. A company was ordered to charge the enemy and drive them back. Captain Tovey dashed forward against the front of the 6th French light infantry with the bayonet. The French, seeing so few opponents, called out to them to lay down their arms; Tovey's answer was to his men—"Bayonet away; bayonet away!" and the enemy's advance was checked. This gallant exploit, supported by the light companies of the brigade, afforded time for the brigade to form; and in the mean time, the reserves of the 4th







FESTIVAL OF THE VINTAGE



division were brought up. The 34th hastily joined, and the 50th came up to their support; but these gallant battalions were forced, by overpowering numbers, to give way, till the 92nd* advanced to their support, when the contest was continued with stubborn courage, in which unequal struggle, one wing of that regiment was nearly destroyed. Meanwhile, the enemy's numbers increased so rapidly, and covered the mountain with so overwhelming a force, that its defenders were obliged to fall back to a mountain range communicating with Echellar, from which pass they were reinforced at about six o'clock in the evening by Barnes's brigade, which came up from the pass of Echellar. The struggle was renewed, when the enemy were driven back to the first summit of the range. The allies lost in killed and wounded 1,600 men, 140 prisoners, and 4 guns, the only cannon taken from Wellington's army during the Peninsular war. The enemy's loss was so severe, that they did not attempt to advance the next day.

While D'Erlon was proceeding in his attack against Hill, Soult was directing the attack against Byng, who was posted with his brigade of the 7th division, consisting of 1,500 men, on the summit of the craggy ridge of rock at Altobiscar, commanding the higher passes of the Pyrenees. On Soult's approach, the English general detached Murillo's Spanish division to cover the road through Arbaicête, which turned the pass a few miles to the right. As the French swarmed up the heights, Byng's handful of British sent deadly volleys against the assailants, and he resolutely maintained his position against a succession of fresh troops and the weight of numbers, until intelligence was brought him in the evening, that Murillo had been driven back on Cole's division, and that Reille's column having pushed along the ridge of Ariola, had turned the left of the position, when he retired on that division. That part of Cole's division which was posted on the Arola ridge had, though they had held the enemy in check for several hours, been driven back by overwhelming numbers; but the fusilier brigade advancing to their support, Cole recovered his position;

but finding it no longer tenable, his right having been turned by Reille's advance on Mount Ariola, he retreated during the night to the strong ridge of Lincoain, in front of Zubiri, where he was joined by Campbell's Portuguese, from Los Alduides, which Soult had hoped to cut off. In consequence of Cole's retrogression from Roncesvalles, Hill, for the purpose of keeping up his communication with the right wing of the line, made a corresponding retrograde movement from his advanced position at the head of the valley, and fell back during the night of the 25th to Irurita.

Picton receiving intelligence of Cole's retreat, advanced on the following morning with the 3rd division from Olague to his succour; and, as he was senior officer, took the command. The enemy's whole force advancing in the course of the evening, Picton retired to some strong ground which he maintained in order of battle till night-fall; and early on the morning of the 27th fell back, and took up a position on some steep ridges that stretched across the mouths of the Zubiri and Lanz valleys, at Huarte and Villaba, about four miles from Pamplona, for the purpose of covering the blockade of that fortress. Hill, on the evening of the 26th, marched from the Bastan to gain the Marcalaina road. These movements occasioned so much uneasiness to O'Donnel, that he spiked his guns, destroyed his magazines, and would have raised the blockade of Pamplona had not D'Espagne come up with his corps at the critical moment. The garrison availing themselves of his panic, made a sortie, and captured fourteen guns.

In the mean time Wellington was proceeding with all possible speed to the point of danger. Reaching Ostiz, where Long's brigade of light cavalry, which furnished the posts of correspondence in the mountains, was stationed, he issued orders to stop Hill and the 6th and 7th divisions in their march down the valley of the Lanz, until the state of affairs at Huarte should be ascertained. Then at full speed he made for Sorauren. On approaching that village, observing the enemy's columns moving from the heights above on the village, and consequently that

* Napier says, that "the 92nd was principally composed of Irishmen, whose stern valour would have graced Thermopylæ;" but Alison (*History of Europe*) says that he ascertained from the lieutenant-colonel of the regiment, that nine-tenths of the corps were Scotch highlanders; and in his appendix to

the volume, he gives the proportions according to two returns; namely, the Prize List, Vittoria, 1813, and the Inspection Report, 15th of October, 1813. By the first, the total number of Scotch were, 825; by the second, 822; of the Irish, by the first document, 61; by the second, 62.

the troops in the valley of the Lanz would be intercepted, he galloped into the village, and instantly alighting, pencilled a memorandum, directing the march of the imperilled troops by the road of Oricain on Lizasso. Then remounting, he rode out at one end of the place, and the aid-de-camp (lord Fitzroy Somerset) bearing his instructions, quitted it at another, the enemy's light troops pouring down the heights at the same moment, entered it in the centre. As he approached the allied position, "one of Campbell's Portuguese battalions desecring him, raised a cry of joy, and the shrill clamour, caught up by the next regiment, swelled as it ran along the line, into that stern and appalling shout which the British soldier is wont to give on the edge of battle, and which no enemy ever heard unmoved."

Wellington, on reaching the allied position, made no alteration in Picton's disposition of the troops and selection of the battle-ground. The allied line, which extended about two miles, was posted on the Sierra de Oricain, in the form of a curved semicircle, the left extending beyond the road of Roncesvalles, the right to the village of Sorauren. The enemy occupied a parallel ridge; a deep and rugged ravine intervening between the positions. The 3rd division was drawn up on the right, in front of the village of Huarte, and extended to the hills beyond Olaz; and the 4th division, Byng's British and Campbell's Portuguese brigades occupied the left, their right resting on a height which commanded the road from Zubiri to Roncesvalles, their left resting on the heights in front of Villaba, at a chapel beyond Sorauren. The cavalry, under Cotton, were stationed near Huarte on the right, that being the only ground where it was possible for them to act; on which side the enemy's horse were also assembled. Hill, on the 28th, was posted on a ridge between Lizasso and Aresteren, covering the Marcalain and Irzun roads; his left prolonged towards Buena. Dalhousie, with the 7th division, was on his march to join him. The Spanish troops of Murillo and O'Donnel were in reserve, except the regiment of Pravia, which occupied part of the hill on the right of the 4th division above the road from Zubiri. The left of the French line extended from the road of Roncesvalles, and its right to the village of Sorauren. The French cavalry were posted nearly opposite the English horse. D'Erlon was in position of observation at Elizondo.

Scarcely had the allies taken up their position, and Wellington reached the scene of action, than Soult directed an attack on the isolated hill occupied by the 10th Portuguese caçadores, and the Spanish regiment of Pravia, on the right of the 4th division; but though the enemy was repulsed, Wellington deeming the post of importance, reinforced it with the 40th, and the Spanish regiment El Principe. The only other hostile occurrences of this day (27th July), were the occupation of Sorauren by the enemy, and a general skirmish along the line, a terrible storm occurring, which occasioned premature darkness.

Early in the morning of the 28th, the 6th division under Pack came up from San Estevan, and they were immediately formed across the valley of the Lanz, in rear of the left of the 4th division. While in the act of taking up their position, Clausel's first division, covered by a cloud of sharpshooters, rushed down the valley of the Lanz, and turning Cole's left, was preparing to wheel up on his rear, when a Portuguese brigade attached to the 6th division, drove the assailants down the ridge; while "almost at the same instant the main body of the 6th division emerging from behind the same ridge, near the village of Oricain, formed in order of battle across the front. It was the counter stroke of Salamanca. The French, striving to encompass the left of the allies, were themselves encompassed;"* for so destructive a fire was brought upon them, the 4th division plying them with shattering volleys on the right, and Campbell's Portuguese in the rear, whilst the 6th division received them in front; that after several endeavours to make way, they were thrown into disorder, and hastily retreated with great loss.

Clausel's two remaining divisions, and Reille's brigades, now assailed the extremity of the ridge occupied by the left of the 4th division, where the seventh caçadores were posted round an ermeta or chapel behind Sorauren. The Portuguese were driven from their position, but being reinforced by Ross's brigade, the Anglo-Portuguese returned to the charge, and bayoneted the French down the hill. Again the enemy rallied, and the allies were in turn driven back. Wellington observing the struggle, brought Byng's brigade forward at a running pace, and directing the 27th and 40th regiments to charge with the bayonet; Ross having reformed his brigade with the

* Napier

same object, while Campbell rallied the broken Portuguese regiment, the whole fell upon the enemy, and drove them down the hill with a terrific slaughter.

To carry the detached hill on the Roncesvalles road, on the right of the position, was the next object of the enemy; there the Spanish regiment *El Pravia* had been posted, supported by the British 40th. The Spanish troops being driven from the plateau, the 40th was left standing alone. In fourfold numbers the assailants now pressed up, and crowned the summit. The word to advance was given, when, with a thrilling hurrah, on marched the 40th with the bayonet. "In a moment, the leading sections of the French column being annihilated, and the supporting one torn and disordered, they were driven at the point of the bayonet headlong down the heights, and a tempest of bullets followed their hurried flight. Four times the assault was renewed, but the assailants were in vain reformed, and again led forward. At last they recoiled from the position, the bravery of one glorious regiment having rendered it impregnable: three surviving companies of that gallant corps having in the last struggle sufficed to bear down a whole brigade of their opponents."

The battle now became general along the whole front of the heights, occupied by the 4th division, against whom a furious assault was made. The French came on with fixed bayonets and loud shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" They met with no opposition until within a few paces of their opponents, when a shattering volley was poured in, and being immediately charged with the bayonet, they broke and fled precipitately down the heights, suffering a terrible carnage. In this gallant affair every regiment of the 4th made a bayonet charge; the 7th and 23rd fusileers, and the 20th and 40th, four different times. At one point the enemy succeeded in overpowering the 7th Portuguese caçadores, posted around the chapel behind *Sorauren*, but Ross' brigade advancing to the encounter, the foe was hurled down the steep. Again they returned reinforced, and overpowering another (the 10th) Portuguese battalion, stationed on the right of Ross' brigade, they established themselves on the allied line—Ross, now assailed in front and flank, being obliged to withdraw from his post in the line. In this extremity, Wellington ordered the 27th and 48th regiments to charge the hostile column which had established itself on the heights, and Ross

having formed his brigade, and Campbell rallied his broken Portuguese for the same object, the enemy were driven back with great loss; and the 6th division, at the same time, moving forward in the valley of the *Uzama*, threatening the enemy's right flank, this sanguinary and hotly-contested struggle ceased, which "Wellington, fresh from the fight, with homely emphasis called, in a letter to lord William Bentinck, 'bludgeon-work!'"

The day's loss of the allies, in killed and wounded, amounted to 2,600, and no doubt that of the enemy exceeded that number. With their usual modesty they acknowledged it to be 1,800. Throughout this trying day Wellington's post was in that part of the heights where the battle raged fiercest. There he sat upon the ground, exposed within musket range, during the whole of the hottest affairs. Several officers of his personal staff were wounded; and a ball striking the plate of the marquis of Worcester's sword-belt, and throwing him from his horse, glanced off, and grazed Lord Wellington.

No movement took place this day between the contending armies, except the arrival of the 7th division at *Marcalain*, by which the communication between Hill's position and the left of the position of the main army was secured, and strength and unity imparted to the entire force. The French army was also reinforced by D'Erlon's at *Ostiz* on this day.

Soult being thus reinforced, determined, as he could make no impression on the allied front, to try and turn their left. With this view, on the night of the 29th, he reinforced D'Erlon with one division, and passed a strong force across the *Lanz*, on his right, and occupied in strength the crest of the mountains opposite the 6th and 7th divisions; at the same time endeavouring to mask his final object, by drawing in upon his left, the troops which held the mountains opposite the 3rd division. He thus reinforced D'Erlon, and effected a connection between himself and that general. But Wellington, as soon as he observed his antagonist's dispositions, divined his intentions, and determined to defeat them, and dislodge him from his supposed impregnable position. To this end, he directed Dalhousie, with the 7th division, to turn the enemy's right, by possessing himself of the mountain crest before him; while Picton, with the 3rd division, crossed the heights of *Zubaldica*, which the enemy's left had abandoned, and turned

the left of their position, by the valley of the Zubiri. The 4th and 6th divisions stood ready to assail the enemy in front as soon as the effect of the flank movements should appear. The movements of both Picton and Dalhousie were successful. As soon as Dalhousie had driven in the enemy from the mountain in his front, Packenham, who had assumed the command of the 6th division, general Pack having been wounded in the first battle of Sorauren, on the 28th, carried, in conjunction with Byng's brigade, the villages of Sorauren and Ostiz. Both wings having been turned, the front was assailed, when the enemy gave way and retreated, followed vigorously by the allies, until darkness closed the pursuit at Olague.

While the contest was raging on the allied right, D'Erlon appeared in front of Hill, and manœuvring on the left of his position, endeavoured to outflank him, at the same time repeatedly attacking him in front; but he was always driven back with heavy loss, and often charged with the bayonet, the 34th and 92nd distinguishing themselves in those operations. At length the enemy, having filed a large division round the British left flank, Hill leisurely withdrew from the heights behind Lizasso, to a second ridge, about a mile in his rear, near Eguarras, where he repelled every effort to dislodge him. It was now about sunset. The enemy retired in the night, defeated at all points. Soult, assigning to D'Erlon's divisions, who were in good order, the rear-guard, retreated under cover of the night of the 30th, on San Estevan, by the pass of Doña Maria. The allies were in immediate pursuit. Early on the morning of the 31st his rear-guard, consisting of two divisions, and posted at the summit of the pass, was dislodged, after a vigorous resistance, by Hill and Dalhousie, with severe loss. During this operation, Wellington had moved with Byng's brigade and Cole's division on Irurita, by the Pass of Velate. Byng had reoccupied the Maya Pass, and on his march had captured a large convoy of ammunition and provisions, in Elizondo. Early on the 31st, orders had been sent to Alten to head the enemy, if possible, at San Estevan or Sumbella; at all events, to cut in upon their line of march somewhere. At the same time, Longa was ordered to advance to the defiles of Yanzi, and thus aid the light division to block the way on that side; and Graham was advertised to hold his army in readiness to move with the same view. Soult's situation was

now (August 1st) critical; his army was almost enclosed in a net. He was in the deep narrow valley of San Estevan, and three British divisions, with one of Spaniards, under Wellington, were on his right flank, concealed by the mountains; Hill was close behind him; Dalhousie held the pass of Doña Maria, in his rear; Byng was at Maya, at the head of the valley; the light division would, in a few hours, close it up at Estevan; and Graham was marching to close the only other exit from the valley by Vera and Echellar. "A few hours gained, and the French must surrender or disperse. Wellington gave strict orders to prevent the lighting of fires, the straggling of soldiers, or any other indication of the presence of troops; and he placed himself among some rocks, at a commanding point, from which he could observe every movement of the enemy. Soult seemed tranquil, and four of his *gens-d'armes* were seen to ride up the valley in a careless manner. Some of the staff proposed to cut them off. The English general, whose object was to hide his presence, would not suffer it; but the next moment three marauding soldiers entered the valley, and were instantly carried off by the horsemen. Half-an-hour afterwards the French drums beat to arms, and their columns began to move out of San Estevan towards Sumbella. Thus the disobedience of three plundering knaves, unworthy the name of soldiers, deprived one consummate commander of the most splendid success, and saved another from the most terrible disaster."*

Though fortune had delivered the French from a fearful danger, their position was still hazardous. In their march to the defiles of Echellar, a great part of the French army, breaking its ranks and dispersing, Soult endeavoured to form a rear-guard. As he beheld the disorderly mass hurrying forwards—"Cowards," said he, "where are you fleeing to? You are Frenchmen, and you are running away! In the name of honour, halt and face the enemy!" Stung by these reproaches, 1,200 men rallied under the direction of the marshal and his aides-de-camp, and formed a sort of rear-guard; but torrents of fugitives swept impetuously on to the defiles of Yanzi and Echellar, and passed them in the course of the night. But Reille's division, who entered the first-mentioned gorge on the following day, were not to meet with so easy

* Napier.

an escape;* while struggling through the pass, they were assailed by the head of the light division with a destructive fire, from the precipice which overhung the road. A scene of confusion and slaughter ensued, which is thus described by an eye-witness:—"We overlooked the enemy at this point," says captain Cook, in his *Memoirs*, "at a stone's throw, and from the summit of a tremendous precipice. The river separated us, but the French were wedged in a narrow road, with inaccessible rocks on one side, and the river on the other. Confusion, impossible to describe, followed; the wounded were thrown down in the rush and trampled upon; the cavalry drew their swords, and endeavoured to charge up the pass of Echellar, but the infantry beat them back, and several, horses and all, were precipitated into the river; some fired vertically at us, the wounded called out for quarter, while others pointed to them, supported as they were on branches of the trees, on which were suspended great-coats clotted with gore, and blood-stained sheets, taken from different habitations, to aid the sufferers." So piteous was the scene, that the light division ceased to fire, or discharged their pieces with averted gaze, except on those who had muskets and sabres in their hands, and endeavoured to force the passage. The loss was great; the bridges, road, and ravine were heaped with the dead and dying. During the night, Soult rallied his broken and dispirited divisions near the town of Echellar, and took up a strong position in the pass of that name. On the following day, lord Wellington collected the 4th, 7th, and light divisions in front of that post, and moved forward to the attack. Barnes's brigade of the 7th division was the first to reach the ground, when, rushing up the steep height, under a tremendous fire of musketry and artillery, it charged Clausel, commanding the rear-guard of 6,000 men, and drove them from their strong position. Clausel then fell back to a strong ridge beyond the pass of Echellar, covered by the Ivantelly rock, which was strongly occupied. In the evening of the next day, August the 2nd, colonel Barnard, with five companies

of the 95th rifles, and four companies of the 52nd, dislodged the enemy from his last position within the Spanish territory, and Spain was again free. In the course of this day, lord Wellington was nearly taken prisoner. He was standing near the wall of Echellar, examining his maps, escorted by half a company of the 43rd. The French, who were close at hand, sent a detachment to cut the party off, and such was the nature of the ground that the enemy would have fallen unawares on the English general, had not Blood, a serjeant of that regiment, and who was on the look-out in front, rushed down the precipitous rocks on which he was posted, and given his lordship notice; even as it was, the French sent a volley of shot after him as he galloped away.

The loss of the French in these fierce and desperately contested battles exceeded 15,000 men in killed and wounded; themselves admitted that it exceeded 13,000 men, including 2,700 prisoners;† but as 6,000 prisoners, taken in these battles, were shipped for England, the French account must be considered only as an approximation to the truth. The loss of the allies, according to the return, was 881 killed, 5,510 wounded, and 705 missing; not quite two-thirds of whom were British. Large quantities of baggage, a convoy of provisions, as also a few cannon, were captured. Soult, on the 28th, had sent his artillery and wounded to the army of reserve under Villate. On the night of the 2nd of August the British bivouacs were again established on nearly the same positions which the allied army had occupied at the commencement of the severe and bloody conflicts entitled *The Battles of the Pyrenees*. Wellington had narrated many a tale of his exploits, but he never told one of more brilliant performance, deeper interest, and more decisive effect than that of the memorable battles of the Pyrenees, in the despatch, dated "Lesaca, August 1st, 1813," communicating the operations to the secretary of state, the earl of Bathurst, and which was as follows:—

"San Estevan, 1st August, 1813.

"MY LORD,—The allied army was posted, as I have already‡ informed your lordship,

state of exhaustion when they reached the precipice. Many men were so exhausted, that they fell down on the march, and died convulsed and frothing at the mouth. Barbacenas should have moved with his whole brigade of the army of Galicia to the bridge of Yanzi, instead of sending a battalion of caçadores.

† Belmas' *Journaux des Sièges dans la Péninsule*.

‡ In the Despatch dated, "Lesaca, 19th July, 1813."

* The commander-in-chief was much discontented with the result of this day's operations; had his orders been obeyed by Alten and the Spanish leaders Longa and Barbacenas, none of Reille's division could have escaped. The distressing march of forty miles in nineteen consecutive hours, over rugged and precipitous mountains, to which Alten's misapprehension subjected the light division, had reduced them to a

in the passes of the mountains, with a view to cover the blockade of Pamplona, and the siege of San Sebastian. Major-general Byng's brigade of British infantry, and general Morillo's division of Spanish infantry, were on the right in the pass of Roncesvalles; lieutenant-general sir Lowry Cole was posted at Viscaret to support those troops, and lieutenant-general sir Thomas Picton, with the 3rd division, at Olague in reserve. Lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill occupied the valley of Baztan with the remainder of the 2nd division, and the Portuguese division under the conde de Amarante, detaching general Campbell's Portuguese brigade to Los Alduides, within the French territory. The light and 7th occupied the heights of Santa Barbara and the town of Vera, and the Puerto de Echellar, and kept the communication with the valley of Baztan; and the 6th division was in reserve at San Estevan. General Longa's division kept the communication between the troops at Vera, and those under lieutenant-general sir Thomas Graham and Mariscal Campo don P. A. Giron on the great road. The conde de la Bisbal blockaded Pamplona.

"The defect of this position was, that the communication between the several divisions was very tedious and difficult, while the communication of the enemy in front of the passes was easy and short; and in case of attack, those in the front line could not support each other, and could look for support only from their rear.

"On the 24th, marshal Soult collected the right and left wings of his army, with one division of the centre, and two divisions of cavalry, at St. Jean-Pied-de-Port, and, on the 25th, attacked, with between 30,000 and 40,000 men, general Byng's post at Roncesvalles. Lieutenant-general Sir L. Cole moved up to his support with the 4th division, and these officers were enabled to maintain their post throughout the day; but the enemy turned it in the afternoon, and lieutenant-general sir L. Cole considered it to be necessary to withdraw in the night; and he marched to the neighbourhood of Zubiri. In the actions which took place on this day, the 20th regiment distinguished themselves.

"Two divisions of the centre of the enemy's army attacked sir R. Hill's position in the Puerto de Maya, at the head of the valley of Baztan, in the afternoon of the same day. The brunt of the action fell

upon major-general Pringle's and major-general Walker's brigades, in the 2nd division, under the command of lieutenant-general the hon. W. Stewart. These troops were at first obliged to give way, but having been supported by major-general Barnes' brigade of the 7th division, they regained that part of their post which was the key of the whole, and which would have enabled them to re-assume it if circumstances had permitted it. But sir R. Hill having been apprised of the necessity that sir L. Cole should retire, deemed it expedient to withdraw his troops likewise to Irurita, and the enemy did not advance on the following day beyond the Puerto de Maya.

"Notwithstanding the enemy's superiority of numbers, they acquired but little advantage over these brave troops during the seven hours they were engaged. All the regiments charged with the bayonet. The conduct of the 82nd regiment, which moved up with major-general Barnes' brigade, is particularly reported. Lieutenant-general the hon. W. Stewart was slightly wounded. I was not apprised of these events till late in the night of the 25th and 26th; and I adopted immediate measures to concentrate the army to the right, still providing for the siege of San Sebastian, and for the blockade of Pamplona.

"This would have been effected early on the 27th, only that lieutenant-general sir L. Cole and lieutenant-general sir T. Picton concurred in thinking their post at Zubiri not tenable for the time during which it would have been necessary for them to wait in it. They therefore retired early on the 27th, and took up a position to cover the blockade of Pamplona, having the right, consisting of the 3rd division, in front of Huarte, and extending to the hills beyond Olaz; the left, consisting of the 4th division, major-general Byng's brigade of the 2nd division, and brigadier-general Campbell's (Portuguese) brigade of the conde de Amarante's Portuguese division, on the heights in front of Villalba, having their left at a chapel behind Sorauren, on the high road from Ostiz to Pamplona, and their right resting upon a height which defended the high road from Zubiri and Roncesvalles. General Morillo's division of Spanish infantry, and that part of the conde de la Bisbal's corps not engaged in the blockade, were in reserve. From the latter, the regiment of Pravia and that of El Principe were detached to occupy part of the hill on

the right of the 4th division, by which the road from Zubiri was defended.

"The British cavalry, under lieutenant-general sir S. Cotton, were placed near Huarte on the right, being the only ground on which it was possible to use the cavalry. The river Lanz runs in the valley which was on the left of the allied, and on the right of the French army, along the road to Ostiz; beyond this river there is another range of mountains connected with Lizasso and Marcalain, by which places it was now necessary to communicate with the rest of the army.

"I joined the 3rd and 4th divisions just as they were taking up their ground on the 27th, and shortly afterwards the enemy formed their army on a mountain, the front of which extends from the high road to Ostiz to the high road to Zubiri; and they placed one division on the left of that road on a height, and in some villages in front of the 3rd division; they had here, also, a large body of cavalry.

"In a short time after they had taken up their ground, the enemy attacked the hill on the right of the 4th division, which was then occupied by one battalion of the 4th Portuguese regiment, and by the Spanish regiment of Pravia. These troops defended their ground, and drove the enemy from it with the bayonet. Seeing the importance of this hill to our position, I reinforced it with the 40th regiment, and this regiment, with the Spanish regiments, El Principe and Pravia, held it from this time, notwithstanding the repeated efforts of the enemy during the 27th and 28th to obtain possession of it. Nearly at the same time that the enemy attacked this height on the 27th, they took possession of the village of Sorauren on the road to Ostiz, by which they acquired the communication by that road, and they kept up a fire of musketry along the line till it was dark.

"We were joined on the morning of the 28th by the 6th division of infantry, and I directed that the heights should be occupied on the left of the valley of the Lanz, and that the 6th division should form across the valley in rear of the left of the 4th division, resting their right on Oricain, and their left on the heights above mentioned. The 6th division had scarcely taken their position, when they were attacked by a very large force of the enemy which had been assembled in the village of Sorauren. Their front was, however, so well defended by the fire of their own light troops from the heights

on their left, and by the fire from the heights occupied by the 4th division and brigadier-general Campbell's Portuguese brigade, that the enemy were soon driven back with immense loss from a fire on their front, both flanks and rear.

"In order to extricate their troops from the difficulty in which they found themselves in their situation in the valley of the Lanz, the enemy now attacked the height on which the left of the 4th division stood, which was occupied by the 7th caçadores, of which they obtained a momentary possession. They were attacked, however, again by the 7th caçadores, supported by major-general Ross, with his brigade of the 4th division, and were driven down with great loss.

"The battle now became general along the whole front of the heights occupied by the 4th division, and in every part in our favour, excepting where one battalion of the 10th Portuguese regiment of major-general Campbell's brigade was posted. This battalion having been overpowered, and having been obliged to give way immediately on the right of major-general Ross' brigade, the enemy established themselves on our line, and major-general Ross was obliged to withdraw from his post.

"I, however, ordered the 27th and 48th regiments to charge, first, that body of the enemy which at first established themselves on the height, and next, those on the left. Both attacks succeeded, and the enemy were driven down with immense loss; and the 6th division, having moved forward at the same time to a situation in the valley nearer to the left of the 4th, the attack upon this front ceased entirely, and was continued, but faintly, on other points of our line.

"In the course of this contest, the gallant 4th division, which had so frequently been distinguished in this army, surpassed their former good conduct. Every regiment charged with the bayonet, and the 40th, 7th, 20th, and 23rd, four different times. Their officers set them the example, and major-general Ross had two horses shot under him. The Portuguese troops likewise behaved admirably; and I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the Spanish regiments El Principe and Pravia. I had ordered lieutenant-general sir B. Hill to march by Lanz upon Lizasso, as soon as I found that lieutenant-generals sir T. Picton and sir L. Cole had moved from Zubiri, and lieutenant-general the earl of Dalhousie from

San Estevan to the same place, where both arrived on the 28th, and the 7th division came to Marcalain.

"The enemy's force, which had been in front of sir R. Hill, followed his march, and arrived at Ostiz on the 29th. The enemy thus reinforced, and occupying a position on the mountains which appeared little liable to attack, and finding that they could make no impression on our front, determined to endeavour to turn our left by an attack on sir R. Hill's corps. They reinforced, with one division, the troops which had been already opposed to him, still occupying the same points in the mountain on which was formed their principal force; but they drew in to their left the troops which occupied the heights opposite the 3rd division; and they had, during the nights of the 29th and 30th, occupied in strength the crest of the mountain on our left of the Lanz, opposite to the 6th and 7th divisions; thus connecting their right in their position with the divisions detached to attack lieutenant-general sir R. Hill.

"I, however, determined to attack their position, and ordered lieutenant-general the earl of Dalhousie to possess himself of the top of the mountain in his front, by which the enemy's right would be turned; and lieutenant-general sir T. Picton to cross the heights on which the enemy's left had stood, and to turn their left by the road to Roncesvalles. All the arrangements were made to attack the front of the enemy's position as soon as the effect of these movements on their flanks should begin to appear. Major-general the hon. E. Pakenham, whom I had sent to take the command of the 6th division, major-general Pack having been wounded, turned the village of Sorauren as soon as the earl of Dalhousie had driven the enemy from the mountain by which that flank was defended; and the 6th division, and major-general Byng's brigade, which had relieved the 4th division on the left of our position on the road to Ostiz, instantly attacked and carried that village. Lieutenant-general sir L. Cole likewise attacked the front of the enemy's main position with the 7th cacadores, supported by the 11th Portuguese regiment, the 40th, and the battalion under colonel Bingham, consisting of the 53rd and Queen's regiments. All these operations obliged the enemy to abandon a position which is one of the strongest and most difficult of access that I have yet seen occupied by troops. In their retreat from this

position, the enemy lost a great number of prisoners.

"I cannot sufficiently applaud the conduct of all the general officers, officers, and troops, throughout these operations. The attack made by lieutenant-general the earl of Dalhousie was admirably conducted by his lordship, and executed by major-general Inglis and the troops composing his brigade; and that by major-general the hon. E. Pakenham and major-general Byng; and that by lieutenant-general sir L. Cole; and the movement made by sir T. Picton merited my highest commendation. The latter officer co-operated in the attack of the mountain by detaching troops to his left, in which lieutenant-colonel the Hon. R. Trench was wounded, but I hope not seriously.

"While these operations were going on, and in proportion as I observed their success, I detached troops to the support of lieutenant-general sir R. Hill. The enemy appeared in his front late in the morning, and immediately commenced an extended manœuvre upon his left flank, which obliged him to withdraw from the height which he occupied behind Lizasso to the next range. He there, however, maintained himself; and I enclose his report of the conduct of the troops.

"I continued the pursuit of the enemy after their retreat from the mountain to Olague, where I was at sunset immediately in the rear of their attack upon lieutenant-general sir R. Hill. They withdrew from his front in the night; and yesterday took up a strong position, with two divisions to cover their rear, in the pass of Doña Maria. Lieutenant-general sir R. Hill and the earl of Dalhousie attacked and carried the pass, notwithstanding the vigorous resistance of the enemy and the strength of their position. I am concerned to add that lieutenant-general the hon. W. Stewart was wounded upon this occasion. I enclose lieutenant-general sir R. Hill's report.

"In the meantime, I moved with major-general Byng's brigade, and the 4th division, under lieutenant-general the hon. sir L. Cole, by the pass of Velate, upon Irurita, in order to turn the enemy's position on Doña Maria. Major-general Byng took in Elizondo a large convoy going to the enemy, and made many prisoners. We have this day continued the pursuit of the enemy in the valley of the Bidassoa, and many prisoners and much baggage have been taken. Major-general Byng has possessed himself of the

valley of Baztan, and of the position on the Puerto de Maya, and the army will be this night nearly in the same position which they occupied on the 25th of July.

"I trust that H.R.H. the Prince Regent will be satisfied with the conduct of the troops of his Majesty, and of his allies on this occasion. The enemy having been considerably reinforced and re-equipped, after their late defeat, made a most formidable attempt to relieve the blockade of Pamplona, with the whole of their forces, excepting the reserve under general Vilatte, which remained in front of our troops on the great road from Irun. This attempt has been entirely frustrated by the operations of a part only of the allied army; and the enemy has sustained a defeat, and suffered a severe loss in officers and men.

"The enemy's expectations of success, beyond the point of raising the blockade of Pamplona, were certainly very sanguine. They brought into Spain a large body of cavalry and a great number of guns, neither of which arms could be used to any great extent by either party in the battle which took place. They sent off the guns to St. Jean Pied-de-Port, on the evening of the 28th, which have thus returned to France in safety.

"The detail of the operations will show your lordship how much reason I have to be satisfied with the conduct of all the general officers, officers, and troops. It is impossible to describe the enthusiastic bravery of the 4th division; and I was much indebted to lieutenant-general sir L. Cole for the manner in which he directed their operations; to major-general Ross, major-general Anson, major-general Byng, and brigadier-general Campbell, of the Portuguese service. All the officers commanding, and the officers of the regiments, were remarkable for their gallantry; but I particularly observed lieutenant-colonel O'Toole, of the 7th caçadores, in the charge upon the enemy on our left on the 28th; and captain Joaquim Telles Jurdao, of the 11th Portuguese regiment, in the attack of the mountain on the 30th.

"I beg to draw your lordship's attention likewise to the valuable assistance I received throughout these operations from lieutenant-general sir R. Hill; and from lieutenant-general the earl of Dalhousie, and lieutenant-general sir T. Picton, in those of the 30th and 31st of July. To the conde de la Bisbal likewise, I am indebted for every assist-

ance it was in his power to give, consistently with his attention to the blockade. I have already mentioned the conduct of the regiments of Pravia and El Principe, belonging to the army of reserve of Andalusia, in a most trying situation; and the whole corps appeared animated by the same zealous spirit which pervaded all the troops in that position.

"Marshal sir W. Beresford was with me throughout these operations; and I received from him all the assistance which his talents so well qualify him to afford me. The good conduct of the Portuguese officers and troops in all the operations of the present campaign, and the spirit which they show on every occasion, are not less honourable to that nation than they are to the military character of the officer, who, by his judicious measures, has re-established discipline, and renewed a military spirit in the army.

"I have again to draw your lordship's attention to the valuable assistance I received throughout these operations from the quarter-master-general, major-general Murray, and major-general Pakenham, the adjutant-general, and the officers of those departments respectively; from lord Fitzroy Somerset, lieutenant-colonel Campbell, and the officers of my personal staff.

"Although our wounded are numerous, I am happy to say that the cases in general are slight, and I have great pleasure in reporting to your lordship, that the utmost attention has been paid to them by the inspector-general, Dr. McGrigor, and by the officers of the department under his direction. Adverting to the extent and nature of our operations, and the difficulties of our communications at all times, I have reason to be extremely well satisfied with the zeal and exertions of sir R. Kennedy, the commissary-general, and the officers of his department, throughout the campaign; which, upon the whole, have been more successful in supplying the troops than could have been expected.

"I transmit this despatch to your lordship by H. S. H. the hereditary prince of Orange, who is perfectly acquainted with all that has passed, and with the situation of the army; and will be able to inform your lordship of many details relating to this species of operations, for which a despatch does not afford scope. His highness had a horse shot under him in the battle near Sorauren, on the 28th of July.

P. S. I have omitted to inform your lord-

ship in the body of the despatch, that the troops in the Puerto de Maya lost there four Portuguese guns on the 25th of July. Major-general Pringle, who commanded when the attack commenced, had ordered them to retire towards Maya; and when lieutenant-general Stewart came up, he ordered that they might return, and retire by the mountain road to Elizondo. In the mean time, the enemy were in possession of the pass, and the communication with that road was lost, and they could not reach it."

In a letter to sir T. Graham, dated "Lesaca, 4th August," he says:—"Many events turned out unfortunately for us on the 1st instant, each of which ought to have been in our favour; and we should have done the enemy a great deal more mischief than we did in his passage down this valley. But as it is, I hope that Soult will not feel an inclination to renew his expedition, on this side at least. The French army must have suffered terribly. Between the 25th of last month and 2nd of this, they were engaged seriously not less than ten times; on many occasions in attacking very strong positions, in others beat from them or pursued. I understand that the officers say they have lost 15,000 men. I thought so, but as they say so, I now think more. I believe we have about 4,000 prisoners. It is strange enough that our diminution of strength to the 31st does not exceed 1,500 men; although I believe our casualties are 6,000."

During the fierce and protracted struggles between the hostile armies which have been just narrated, and which demanded all the energies and attention of the English general's mind, to baffle the skill and desperate efforts of the enemy, his allies were causing him embarrassment and mystification, and throwing every difficulty in their power to thwart and impede his measures. Though he had been appointed commander-in-chief of the Spanish armies, the Spanish ministry, jealous of his success, interfered with his measures, and often counteracted them. Not one of the engagements the Cortes had entered into, and which Wellington had made the condition of his accepting the command of the Spanish armies, had been adhered to. His recommendations for promotion after the battle of Vittoria were disregarded, orders were sent direct to the subordinate generals, and changes were made in the commands and in the destination of the troops without his concurrence,

and without passing through him as generalissimo. Scarcely had he passed the Ebro, when Castaños was removed from the government, and his nephew, Giron, deprived of his command. On this subject he addressed letters to Don Diego de la Vega Infanzon, and the secretary at war, Don Juan O'Donohu. The two to the secretary at war, for the information of the regency, complaining of the breach of the engagements on the faith of which he had been induced to accept the command of the Spanish army, and of the supersession of Castanos and his nephew, Giron, from their commands, are as distinguished for the clear and resistless reasoning by which they show to the regency the impolicy of the removal of those officers, and point out to them with equal truth and dignity the folly and injustice of their proceedings, both to his coadjutors and to himself, as they are for the calm, moderate, and magnanimous tone and spirit in which they are couched. In their comprehensive spirit, their sound argument, eloquent truth, and vigour of language, they would not, as has been appropriately said, suffer from a comparison with the most perfect compositions extant. "The severity of stricture, the cool and searching inquiry, the admirable tone, the frank yet finely satiric spirit, present a model of epistolary argument which cannot too pointedly be held up to the emulation of diplomatists and statesmen, no less than to soldiers employed in the service of their country."

"Huarte, 2nd July, 1813.

"SIR,—I have had the honour of receiving your excellency's letter of the 15th June, conveying to me the pleasure of the regency, that the captain-general Castanos should be recalled from the command of the 4th army, in order to attend the sittings of the Council of State, as he was not at the head of that army of which the command had been confided to him by the regency; and that general Freyre should be captain-general of Estremadura and Castile, and should command the 4th army; and that general Lacy should be captain-general in Galicia, and should command the troops in that province, independently of the general commanding the 4th army; and that general Don P. A. Giron should be removed to the 1st army.

"As the constitution of the Spanish monarchy has declared the ministers responsible for the acts of the government, I may consider these acts as those of your excellency; and I hope that I may venture to convey a

few observations upon them, which I beg may be laid before the regency.

"Justice towards the character of captain-general Castaños, an officer who has served his country in close concert with me for the last three years, and who, in the whole course of that time, has never differed in opinion from me on any subject of importance, induces me to remind your excellency that the local situation of the 4th army, before the commencement of the campaign, prevented its formation into a corps, of which the captain-general could, with propriety, place himself at the head; that if this formation had been locally practicable, the deplorable state of the finances applicable to the support of the 4th army would have prevented its remaining united in such corps.

"Your excellency must be aware that when there is no money for the support of the troops, a particular district or country may not find it impossible to supply without payment the food for a small body, while it would be quite impossible to supply it for a large one; and for this reason, and others referable to the state of discipline and the peculiar organization of some of the troops, I did not think it proper that more of the troops of the 4th army should be assembled together than the two divisions, comprising the army from Galicia, under the command of Don P. A. Giron.

"It would have been indecorous and improper, adverting to general Castaños' rank and situation, besides being inconvenient, if he had joined these divisions, or any other portion of the fourth army, and he therefore, in the commencement of the operations of the campaign, had his head-quarters at or near mine and the Portuguese head-quarters, by my desire.

"Not only your excellency has not adverted to these circumstances in the decision which you have recommended to the government regarding general Castaños; but you have omitted to revert to others. Besides being commander-in-chief of the fourth army, general Castaños was captain-general of Estremadura and Castile, and Galicia. In that capacity he had duties to perform most important for the political interests, and particularly for the welfare of the army.

"It was his duty to establish the authority of the Spanish government in the different towns and districts, as they should be successively evacuated by the enemy; and from the nature of the army, and the peculiar

march it followed, he could not have performed this duty if he had been what is called at the head of the fourth army, or at my head-quarters, which have moved every day since the 22nd of May, and have never been in any large or capital town, excepting Salamanca, where I left general Castaños, nor even upon the high road.

"It was I, and not general Castaños, who suggested that he should employ himself in this manner; and I must say, that considering the manner in which Don P. A. Giron has commanded the divisions of the army of Galicia in the field, we should have neglected our duty to the state, if we had not chalked out for general Castaños the performance of those duties for which he is now punished and disgraced. In regard to the arrangements made by your excellency for filling the appointments held by general Castaños, and the removal of general Don P. A. Giron, without trial, or even cause assigned, from a situation in which he had been placed by general Castaños by my desire, and in which he had conducted himself entirely to my satisfaction, as I had already reported to the government; I believe that in addition to the inconvenience and injury to the public of all changes of this description in the midst of military operations, it will not be denied, that they are directly in breach of the engagements made to me by the late regency, and confirmed by the existing regency, which engagements your excellency knows well, alone induced me to accept the command of the Spanish army.

"Your excellency knows, also, that this is not the first time that the engagements solemnly entered into with me, after full and repeated discussions, have been broken, and nobody knows better than your excellency, the inconveniences to the service which resulted. You are likewise aware of my disposition and desire to serve the Spanish nation, as far as it is in my power. There are limits, however, to forbearance and submission to injury; and I confess that I feel that I have been most unworthily treated in these transactions by the Spanish government, even as a gentleman.

"It is not my habit, nor do I feel inclined to make a parade of my services to the Spanish nation; but I must say that I have never abused the powers with which the government and the cortes have entrusted me, in any, the most trifling instance, nor have ever used them for any purpose, excepting to forward the public

service. For the truth of this assertion, I appeal likewise to your excellency; and I believe it will be admitted that the circumstances which rendered necessary the formation of these engagements render it necessary to perform them, if it is desired that I should retain the command of the army.—I have the honour to be, &c. “WELLINGTON.”

In reply to this letter, the minister at war informed the English chief, that the regency had directed him to lay his resignation before the cortes; and that further instructions on the subject would be transmitted to him on the assembling of the newly appointed regency.

“Lesaca, 7th August, 1813.

“I have had the honour to receive one letter from your excellency of the 19th July, and three of the 25th, by my aid-de-camp, the chef d’Escadron Croquembourg. I am very much obliged to your excellency for the definition which you have taken the trouble of giving me of the nature of the responsibility of a person filling your office. I had understood it otherwise; and that the organs of the government were responsible for the expediency of all their acts at the moment of performing them, whether legal or otherwise.

“It was on the ground of the inexpediency of removing captain-general Castaños at the moment, and of the injustice of punishing him by that removal, for a supposed offence, that I ventured to address your excellency, and not against the act as being one beyond the power of the government. Neither did I remonstrate against the act as being a breach of the engagement which the regency had made with me in December, 1812, and January, 1813. That engagement does not state one syllable about the removal, by the regency, of officers from their situations; and it would have been very improper for me to endeavour to limit the authority of the government in that respect, and highly inexpedient for the government to consent to limit its authority.

“Neither have I complained, as a breach of an engagement made with me, of the refusal of the government to comply with my recommendation, that certain officers should be promoted; all of them officers deservedly high in the estimation of the army, and of the public, and of the government themselves; all of them employed in high situations, some of them in command of armies to which they have been appointed by the government, and not by me,

and one of them the minister at war. I had hoped, that after such a victory as was gained by the allies on the 28th of June, it would have been deemed gracious on the part of the government to promote certain officers, and I recommended those to the government, who appeared to me, by their services, to be the most deserving. But it belongs to the regency, and not to me, to make the promotion, and I have received their decision with the respectful silence which is due to them; nor should I now notice the matter, only that it forms the subject of one of the letters from your excellency, to which I am now replying; and that I wrote to remove all doubt and ambiguity from my letter of the 2nd July, and from what follows in this. That of which I complain is, that when the regency thought proper to remove captain-general Castaños and general Giron from their situations, they should have selected general Freyre and general Lacy to fill them, contrary to the engagement made with me, in the letter from the minister at war, of January, 1813; that they should have appointed general Giron and general — to serve in the army of Catalonia, contrary to the same engagement; that this engagement appears to exist only that it may be broken; and that the regency should now deny that it ever intended to adhere to the engagement made by its predecessors, when it authorized the late minister at war, Don I. de Carvagal, to write to me on the 28th of March, 1813.

“It has always been my wish, as your excellency knows, to support the existing authority; and there are not wanting instances, since I have held the command of the Spanish army, of my having interposed to prevent officers in high stations from assuming authority not belonging to them, and from using language in their addresses to be laid before the government, more expressive of their irritable feelings than of their respect; such conduct and language is, in ordinary circumstances, quite inexcusable; and the only excuse which can be alleged for its existence (which is none for its continuance) is the state in which the government and army of Spain had been for some time past.

“From this state I hoped, backed by the confidence and support of the government, and by their liberal adherence to the engagements they had made with me, that I should have been able to extricate the army; and in the meantime, I have uniformly, as in

duty bound, in every instance, upheld the authority of the government. I would, however, observe to your excellency, that the government could avoid this evil, if they were to adhere to the fourth article of the engagement of the 1st of January, 1813, which points out the mode in which the reports and applications of the army are to reach the government, and the orders and decisions of the government to reach the army. It would not be in the power, then, of any officer to address them in disrespectful, doubtful, or ambiguous terms, and if such address were to reach them, he who should forward it would be responsible for its contents.

"Nor does it appear that this mode of doing business can prevent the government from having the earliest knowledge of all that passes. I believe that an order has already been given by the government to all officers in command, to send direct to the minister at war copies of all reports made to me, and of all orders sent by me; to which order, if it had passed through the regular channel, I should not have the slightest objection. By enforcing this order, government would have, in an authentic shape, all the information which they could wish, at the earliest possible period of time.

"I acknowledge that I feel some astonishment that the regency, having found it so easy to dismiss captain-general Castaños from his situation for no assigned fault, should have felt any scruple about dismissing the duque del Parque, he being supposed to have written in improper terms.

"It is useless now to trouble your excellency with the motives which induced me to ask the late regency to enter into certain engagements with me, previous to my taking upon myself the command of the Spanish army, to which I had been appointed by the cortes; these reasons are to be found fully detailed in my addresses of the 4th of December, 1812, and every day's experience has convinced me of the expediency of what I asked, in order to enable me to perform my duty. The existing government have broken the engagements into which, it appears by your excellency's letter, they do not consider they ever entered; and it further appears, by your excellency's letter, that they are dissatisfied with that part of the arrangement made with the former regency, which relates to the communication between the government and the army.

"I have above explained myself upon this point, in a manner which will, I hope, prove satisfactory to the regency. But having before been mistaken respecting the intentions of the regency, in regard to the engagements with me as explained by the late minister at war, I trust that your excellency will now be pleased to explain their intentions in language that cannot be misunderstood. I am anxiously desirous of serving the Spanish nation, to which I am indebted for so much favour and kindness, in every way that may be in my power, and I will continue to serve them at the head of the allied British and Portuguese army, whatever may be the decision of the regency on what is now brought before them. I shall be much concerned, for many reasons, into which it is not necessary to enter, if I should be obliged to relinquish the command of the Spanish army, which the cortes and the late regency had confided to me in consequence of the decision of the existing regency; but, if I should, I can only assure your excellency, that I will do it at the period, and in the mode which may be most convenient and agreeable to the regency; and that I will at all times act most cordially with, and assist to the utmost of my power, any officer who may be named to succeed me. It must appear to your excellency to be very desirable to the government, for the welfare of the army, and to myself, to receive their early decision on the contents of this letter.

"I have the honour to be, &c.,

"WELLINGTON."

In reply to the answer of the minister at war, that the new regency were not bound by the act of their predecessors in conferring the command of the Spanish armies on his lordship, in a letter, dated Lesaca, 30th August, 1813, addressed to the minister of war, after requiring that "the existing regency would be pleased to ratify the agreement made by their predecessors, on such terms as he could not be mistaken, as he had been before, regarding the meaning intended to be conveyed by the letter of the former minister of war, when he originally accepted the command of the Spanish armies," he said—"It is really necessary for many reasons connected with the public service, that the government should come to an early decision on this subject, and should have an opportunity of making a new arrangement for the command of their armies, if they should think that they ought

not to comply with what I have now had the honour of submitting to your excellency. Therefore, in case the regency should not consider it proper to comply with my request, I beg leave hereby to resign the command of the Spanish armies, with which the cortes and regency of Spain have honoured me. More than half Spain has been cleared of the enemy above a year, and the whole of Spain, excepting Catalonia and a small part of Arragon, since the months of May and June last; the most abundant harvest has been reaped in all parts of the country; millions of money which have been spent by the contending armies, are circulating everywhere; and yet your armies, however weak in numbers, are literally starving. The allied British and Portuguese army under my command has been subsisted, particularly latterly, almost exclusively upon the magazines imported by sea; and I am concerned to inform your excellency, that besides money for the pay of all the armies, which has been given from the military chest of the British army, and has been received from no other quarter, the magazines have supplied quantities of provisions to all the Spanish armies, in order to enable them to remain in the field at all."

On this subject, in a letter addressed to sir Henry Wellesley, dated "Huarte, 2nd July, 1813," he says, "I enclose copies of the letters which I have received from the minister at war, in regard to the removal of general Castaños, and the consequent arrangements, and the copy of the draft of my answer of this day. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will call together Arguelles, Ciscar, La Vega, Torreno, and any other who may have been concerned in nominating me to the command of the Spanish army, and show them these letters, and tell them that if I have not some satisfaction for the insult offered to me by these arrangements, in breach of all the engagements entered into with me, it will be impossible for me to hold the command. I beg you will tell these gentlemen, at the same time, that I am sincerely desirous of continuing to hold the command, from knowing the importance attached to my continuance in Spain, as well as to the rest of Europe; but I cannot do it under existing circumstances. I consider the gentlemen above mentioned to have been principally concerned in nominating me to the command of the army, and that they are likewise the principal supporters of the ex-

isting government, and I wish that they should be aware of all the circumstances, and should have it in their power to interfere if they should still wish that I should retain the command. If they do not wish it, and will not interfere, it is better that I should resign, to which measure, if I am compelled, I will adopt it, in a manner to do as little injury to the government as may be in my power."

Wellington, committing the charge of the blockade of Pamplona to d'Espagna, now prepared to resume the siege of St. Sebastian; but many circumstances tended to impede his operations. The absence of a naval force on the north coast of Spain, had enabled the enemy to supply the beleaguered fortress with stores and ammunition, and to relieve or withdraw their other garrisons on that coast. The inexpedient removal of the artillery, stores, and provisions from Lisbon and Corunna to the immediate seat of war, had occasioned great inconvenience and injury in the prosecution of the war. Of the negligence and inefficiency with which the maritime department of the war had been conducted, he made repeated charges against the admiralty. His remonstrances to the secretary of state on the same subject were frequent and pressing. Among the numerous letters addressed on this subject to the earl of Bathurst, the following extracts prove the urgency of the case:—

Zubieta, 10th July, 1813.

"I am certain that it will not be denied, that since Great Britain has been a naval power, a British army has never been left in such a situation, and that at a moment when it is most important to us to preserve, and the enemy to interrupt the communication by the coast. If they take only the ship with our shoes, we must halt for six weeks."

* * * *

"I beg your lordship to observe in what manner the blockade of the coast is kept up. I wish to make the siege of San Sebastian, which is one of quite a different description from that of Pamplona; but I cannot undertake it till I shall know whether we are secure at sea. I really believe that this is the first time, of late years, that any British commander on shore has had reason to entertain doubts on this point."

* * * *

"Your lordship will see by my report, that we are still waiting for the battering train, and we have thus lost sixteen days in the month of August, since I should have

renewed the attack on San Sebastian if I had had the means. This is a most important period in the campaign, particularly for the attack of a place in the Bay of Biscay. How we are to attack Bayonne afterwards, I am sure I do not know. A British minister cannot too often have under his view the elements by which he is surrounded, and cannot make his preparations for the operations of a campaign at too early a period."

* * * *

"Lesaca, 4th of August.

"I entreat your lordship to let me know whether the government will or will not send a sufficient naval force to co-operate with the army in this siege."

* * * *

"Lesaca, August 13th.

"The supplies of all kinds from Lisbon and other parts in Portugal, and from Co-runna, are delayed for want of convoy; the maritime blockade of San Sebastian is not kept up at all; the enemy have a constant communication with San Sebastian from St. Jean de Luz and Bayonne."

* * * *

"Lesaca, 19th August.

"If we had a sufficient naval force, we might, if the weather permitted, make an attack from the sea, at the same time that we should make the attack upon the breaches from the land. This would at all events divide the enemy's attention, and would probably prevent much of the loss in the assault of the breaches, if it did not tend to ensure the success of the assault."

The following despatch, dated "Lesaca, August 21st, 1813," was addressed to Lord Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty:—

"I have received your letter of the 28th July. I do not know what sir Charles Stuart has written to government regarding want of naval means on the Lisbon station. What I have written has been founded on my own sense of the want of naval assistance on the coast, as well as on the coast of Portugal; and I assure you that I neither know nor care what has passed, or may pass, in parliament or in the newspapers on the subject.

"I complain of an actual want of necessary naval assistance and co-operation with the army, of which I believe no man will entertain a doubt who reads the facts stated in the reports to government. I know nothing about the cause of the evil; it may be owing to a general deficiency of

naval force for all the objects to which it is necessary to attend in an extensive system of war. It may be owing to a proper preference of other services over this, or it may be owing to the inapplication of the force entrusted to their command by the admirals and captains. I state the fact, which nobody will deny; and leave it to government to apply the remedy or not as they may think proper, hoping only that they will know whether they propose to apply a remedy or not. As far as I am concerned, I have no objection to the whole, or any part of the army, being employed in expeditions against the French and American posts, if government think that policy preferable to that which they have followed lately. I may entertain an opinion upon the subject; but as the commander of the army, I should not think it necessary to say one word on the subject, any more than I shall regarding the deficiency of the naval means to assist us as we ought to be assisted by the navy, when I shall know from government that they do not propose [query purpose] to give us any more. It will then remain for me to see whether the service can be carried on during the winter, under the circumstances of the delays and disappointments to which we are now liable from the want of security for vessels to sail on the coast singly, and from the want of convoys for them to sail together, and to report to government if I should find it correct.

"I beg to observe that the circumstances of the coast of Portugal are very different from those of the channel in regard to the facilities which the enemy has of interrupting the communication, and it is for many reasons much more easy to guard. The inconveniences also to which the public service is exposed, from the want of the secure navigation of the coast of Spain and Portugal, by the army, are of far greater magnitude than those suffered by the want of security on the coasts of the channel. If the insecurity should be of any very considerable duration in point of time, it will affect the army in its bread and corn; and the truth is, that the delay of any one ship affects the operations of the army, as I assure you we have not more of anything than we want; and the delay or loss of some particular ships, loaded with ordnance or military stores, would go [query tend] to impede all the operations of the campaign. For instance, we have done literally nothing since the 2nd of August, because there was

a mistake regarding the preparation of an ordnance equipment, which was afterwards delayed by contrary winds; and the delay for want of convoy, or capture on the coast, of a vessel having on board ammunition or stores, commonly called camp equipments, would just stop the operations of the army till the ammunition or stores could be replaced. For this reason, I acknowledge that I should differ with you *in thinking this the last point to be attended to*. Allowing for the partiality I may be supposed to feel for it, I should think that, considering the expense already incurred in keeping this army in the field, it would be bad policy to

cramp their operations, by leaving their maritime communications insecure.

"I shall not trouble you with the facts, as they will come before you in another quarter. And I believe nobody will deny, that either we have not sufficient naval means, or that they are misapplied. But besides these facts, I assure you that there is not an hour in the day in which some statement does not come before me of the miseries resulting from the want of naval means; and even while writing this letter the commissary-general has been here to complain that his empty provision ships are detained at Santander for want of convoy."

SIEGE OF ST. SEBASTIAN (ITS RESUMPTION AND CAPTURE.)

GENERAL Graham's despatches to lord Wellington, dated 18th and 27th July, detailing the operations against St. Sebastian, the assault on that place, and its failure, were—

"Hernani, 18th July, 1813.

"My Lord,—The convent of San Bartholomeo, and the adjoining work, on the extremity of the steep hill towards the river, were taken yesterday. The natural and artificial strength of these fortified posts, occupied by a large body of troops, and the impossibility of access to either, but by the fronts, made it very desirable to have destroyed the defences as much as possible, and a new battery was begun on the left the preceding evening, but not being ready in the morning, the attack was determined on.

"A column, consisting of the pickets of the 4th caçadores, commanded by lieutenant Antonio de Quairos, of 150 men of the 13th Portuguese regiment, under captain Almeyda, supported by three companies of the 9th regiment, under the command of lieutenant-colonel Craufurd, with a reserve of three companies of the royal Scots, under captain Arquimbeau, was formed on the right to attack the redoubt, under the direction of major-general Hay. Major-general Bradford commanded the left column, composed of 200 men of the 13th Portuguese regiment, under the command of major Snodgrass, of that regiment; an equal number, under lieutenant-colonel Macneagh of the 5th caçadores, and supported by the 9th regiment, under lieutenant-colonel Cameron. The whole of the troops employed in the

service, being under the command of major-general Oswald.

"About 10 A.M., the left column began the attack on the convent, while the right passed the ravine near the river. Both attacks were made with such vigour and determination, that all obstacles were overcome, without the loss that might have been expected. The enemy were driven in confusion down the hill, carrying a strong reinforcement, just sent from St. Sebastian, along with them in their flight through the burnt village of San Martin. The impetuosity of the troops in pursuit could not be restrained by the exertion of the superior officers, who had received major-general Oswald's directions not to pass San Martin, and some unavoidable loss was sustained by those who followed the enemy to the foot of the glacis, on their return to San Martin.

"I need hardly assure your lordship that on this, as on other occasions, major-general Oswald conducted the service in the best manner; and I am equally obliged to major-generals Hay and Bradford, for their conduct of the attacks intrusted to them. But I beg, in justice to the officers, whose distinguished gallantry in leading on the men to overcome the variety of obstacles that were opposed to them, to mention major Snodgrass, captain Almeyda, and lieutenant de Quairos (severely wounded) of the Portuguese service, and lieutenant-colonel Campbell of the 9th foot.

"I cannot conclude this report without ex-

pressing my perfect satisfaction with all the officers and men of the royal artillery, both in the four-gun battery, employed for three days against the convent, and on the opposite bank of the river, where several field-pieces were served with great effect.—I have the honour to be, &c.

“THOMAS GRAHAM.”

“Hernani, 27th July, 1813.

“My Lord,—The attack of the breach in the line-wall on the left flank of St. Sebastian took place on the morning of the 25th, when the fall of the tide left the foot of the wall dry. I am sorry to say, that notwithstanding the distinguished gallantry of the troops employed, some of whom did force their way into the town, the attack did not succeed. The enemy occupied in force all the defences of the place which looked that way, and from which, and from all round the breach, they were enabled to bring so destructive a fire of grape and musketry, flanking and enfilading the column, and to throw over so many hand-grenades on the troops, that it became necessary to desist from the assault.

“The loss sustained was therefore severe, especially by the 3rd battalion royal Scots, the leading one of major-general Hay’s brigade, which being on duty in the trenches, formed the column of attack; major-general Spry’s Portuguese brigade, that of major-general Robinson, and the 4th caçadores of brigadier-general Wilson’s, being in reserve in the trenches; the whole under the direction of major-general Oswald, commanding the 5th division.

“Though the attack has failed, it would be great injustice not to assure your lordship, that the troops conducted themselves with their usual gallantry, and only retired when I thought a further perseverance in the attack would have occasioned a useless sacrifice of brave men. Major-general Hay, major Fraser, colonel the hon. C. F. Greville, and colonel Cameron, commanding the royal Scotch, 38th and 9th regiments, greatly distinguished themselves. Major Fraser lost his life in the breach, with many of his brave comrades.

“The conduct, throughout the whole of the operations of the siege hitherto, of the officers and men of the royal artillery and engineers, never was exceeded in indefatigable zeal, activity, and gallantry; and I beg to mention particularly to your lordship, lieutenant-colonels Dickson, Fraser, and Hay, and major Webber Smith of the royal

artillery; lieutenant-colonel sir R. Fletcher, lieutenant-colonel Burgoyne, and majors Ellicombe and C. F. Smith of the royal engineers.

“Three officers of this corps, employed to conduct parts of the columns of attack, behaved admirably, but suffered severely; captain Lewis has lost his leg; lieutenant Jones was wounded in the breach, and taken; and lieutenant Mitchell, after his return, was killed in the trenches.

“I beg to recommend to your lordship, lieutenant Campbell of the 9th, who led the forlorn hope, and who was severely wounded in the breach. I have the greatest satisfaction, too, in assuring your lordship of the cordial support and assistance afforded by sir George Collier, commanding his majesty’s ships on the coast, and of all the officers and seamen of the squadron employed in them.

“No exertion that could be effected was wanting; and lieutenant-colonel Dickson has remarked to me, in the strongest terms, the steady and gallant conduct of a detachment of seamen on the batteries, under the command of lieutenant O’Reilly (first lieutenant of his majesty’s ship *Surveillante*) and of their exemplary behaviour while on shore. I beg, too, to mention Mr. Digby March, master’s mate, acting as lieutenant in the batteries, after lieutenant Dunlop was severely wounded.—I have the honour to be, &c.

“THOMAS GRAHAM.”

During the suspension of the siege, the garrison had employed every resource that military ingenuity could devise to make a formidable defence. New defences were constructed, the old ones strengthened, and the breaches in the sea-wall repaired. A second or interior rampart, parallel to the outer rampart, and with a perpendicular fall of more than 15 feet to the level of the streets, was constructed behind the great breach, of the ruins of the houses which had been destroyed during the first assault—the ground at the bottom of which was filled with sword blades, placed erect, and all sorts of impediments and combustibles. The houses beyond the breach, and behind the ruined houses, were loop-holed. Traverses, composed of combustibles, were thrown across the streets.

The besiegers had been no less active. The old trenches had been repaired, the heights of San Bartholomeo strengthened, and the convent of Antigua fortified. Preparations were now made for the resumption of the siege. On the 5th August, orders were

issued that the ordnance and stores that had been shipped at Passages should be re-landed. The batteries used at the first siege were enlarged, and new ones erected. "Sailors were employed in this work, and never did men more thoroughly enjoy their occupation. They had a double allowance of grog, as their work required, and at their own cost they had a fiddler; they who had worked their spell in the battery went to relieve their comrades in the dance, and at every shot which fell upon the castle they gave three cheers."

On the 19th, the battering-train, ordnance, ammunition, &c., which had been long expected, arrived from Portsmouth. The same transports brought out a company of sappers and miners.* The tents of the besiegers were placed on the lower range of hills, about two miles and-a-half from the town. The greater part of them were among orchards, valleys, and ravines.

It was now determined to renew the siege on an enlarged scale, both from the isthmus and from the opposite bank of the Urumea; while, on the other side of the bay, a mortar battery should be erected for the attack of the castle. The breach was to be enlarged round the angle of the land front, by laying open the two round towers at each end of the front breach, and connect it with the second on the right, adding to it another on the left, and demolishing a dense bastion by which the approach was flanked, to the left of the whole. The siege was resumed on the 24th, on which day the garrison made a *sortie*, injuring the sap and making a few prisoners.

During the last ten days, the besieging force had been dragging into battery the train of ordnance. On the morning of the 26th, the batteries opened with a salvo of 57 pieces of ordnance. As the rocky islet of Santa Clara, situated at the mouth of the harbour, facilitated the introduction of supplies into the place, and its guns enfiladed

the breach, at three o'clock of the morning of the 27th, 100 of the 1st Royals, under captain Cameron, and a party of seamen, under lieutenant Arbutnot, of the *Surveillante*, were landed from the boats of the fleet to dislodge the garrison, which, though consisting only of 24 men and one officer, inflicted a loss on the assailants exceeding their own number before the place was captured; a loss occasioned by the only landing-place being under a flight of steps, commanded by a small entrenchment on the west point of the islet, and exposed to the whole range of works on the west side of the rock and of the walls.

On the 28th, the garrison made a second *sortie*, but were quickly repulsed at the point of the bayonet, and driven back without being able to effect the least damage. During the whole of the 27th, 28th, 29th, and 30th, a direct fire had been maintained on the place, when the old breach was reduced to its former condition, and a new one effected, about a stone's throw apart. Both were commanded by the guns of the castle, and both were flanked by the bastions of the town wall. On the last-mentioned day the fire of the garrison was nearly silenced; but during the whole time they had been actively employed in endeavouring to repair, during the night, the injury done to the defences. To break the force of the shot of the assailants' batteries, they suspended large solid beams at the points to which the guns were directed. To ascertain the nature and extent of the fire which the enemy could turn on the assaulting columns, and if possible induce them to spring the mines which they were supposed to have prepared under the glacis of the hornwork, a false attack was made on the night of the 29th. For this purpose seventeen men of the royals, headed by lieutenant Marsden, of the 9th regiment, at a rapid pace, all the breaching batteries playing hotly at the time, reached the foot of the breach unperceived, and mounting in extended order,

* Even so late back as February the 11th, 1812, lord Wellington had said, in a letter to the earl of Liverpool, "While on the subject of the artillery, I would beg leave to suggest to your lordship the expediency of adding to the engineers' establishment a corps of sappers and miners. It is inconceivable with what disadvantages we undertake anything like a siege, for want of assistance of this description. There is no French corps d'armée which has not a battalion of sappers and a company of miners. But we are obliged to depend for assistance of this description upon the regiments of the line; and although the men are brave and willing, they want the know-

ledge and training which are necessary. Many casualties among them consequently occur, and much valuable time is lost at the most critical period of the siege." Until this late period of the war, there had been no corps of sappers and miners, or any body of men trained for siege operations. The corps of royal artificers had consisted of handicraftsmen of different descriptions, and the work of the trenches had been performed by the soldiers of the line. The deficiency of the resources of art on this account, compelled the English general to compensate the defect by the courage of the troops; and the fearful expenditure of life was the result.

shouted and fired; the whole party were killed, except their leader, who returned alone to the trenches.

On the 30th, the breaches being declared practicable, lord Wellington, who had frequently come over from Lesaca to inspect the progress of the siege, ordered an assault to be made on them at eleven o'clock of the following day. To prepare the way for the attack, about two hours after midnight, the three mines which had been run in front of the batteries, under the sea-wall, for the purpose of counteracting any mines the enemy might have made at the great breach, were exploded, which blew down the sea-wall to the extent of 500 feet.

Until the present night, only one ford, and that at some little distance from both breaches, had been discovered. By examining the stream by a telescope, major Snodgrass, of the 52nd, who commanded a battalion of Portuguese caçadores, conceived the idea that there must be another ford, so far above the one already known, as to lead direct to the foot of the lesser breach.

* The party consisted of 150 men of the light division, under lieutenant-colonel Hunt, of the 52nd regiment; 200 of the brigade of guards, under lieutenant-colonel Cooke; 200 of the German legion, under major Robertson; and 200 of the 4th division, under major Rose, of the 20th foot. When the order was read to the 4th division, and those who were desirous to volunteer were desired to step some paces to the front, the whole division moved forward. The divisions named for the assault leave their knapsacks on the camp-ground, under a guard, that they may be less incumbered in their formidable enterprise. The head of the column of attack is formed of the storming party, consisting of 300 men, with officers in proportion, from the different regiments of the division ordered for the assault. They are volunteers, and, as may be supposed, are fellows whom a small matter will not frighten or daunt, or send to the right about. From these 300, a party of from twenty-five to thirty is to precede the advance of the remainder of this storming party. The subaltern officer who has volunteered the command of it, generally selects these men from his own regiment, and attaches to it sergeants on whose zeal and support he can rely. This little band is called by the well known and rather melancholy name of "Forlorn Hope." They are prepared for the worst, but hope the best. As the instructions to the officer commanding this party are to lead the column to the breach, and to make a lodgment in it, he previously examines the ground well, so that the darkness of the night shall not lead him into error. The attack generally commences on a preconcerted signal of so many guns from a particular battery. He must be a stout-hearted fellow whose pulse does not rattle on at a gallop as these signal guns go off. The officer who leads gives the word, "Follow me!" then leads straight to the glacis, to the point he had intended, where, from its being ploughed up from the fire from the batteries, there is no doubt where he is when

Though the moon was in her first quarter, and gave a very considerable light, he devoted the whole of the night of the 30th to a personal trial of the river, and he found it as he expected, fordable at low water immediately opposite the smaller breach. Crossing the ford, the water reaching up to his waist, he clambered up the face of the breach at midnight, gained its summit, and looked down on the town.

The morning of the 31st broke gloomily and enveloped in fog; the fog, however, cleared off about nine o'clock, when the sun shone forth brilliantly, but with a close and oppressive heat, so that the very animals were silent in the camp and on the hills, as if struck with an instinctive feeling of the approaching conflict. The column of attack was formed; it consisted of the brigades of Robinson and Hay, of the 5th division, the Portuguese caçadores, and 750 volunteers,* from the fifteen regiments of the 1st, 4th, and light divisions, and who had come down from the main army on the frontier; "men who," as Wellington ex-

he is there. No time is to be lost, and all jump into the ditch to avoid the fire of the place, which, from the assault being now discovered, deals out death in all shapes wholesale. Fire-balls are thrown out, and the darkest night becomes light as day, presenting to the open view of the besieged, the steady march of the column which follows the storming party, under cover of the riflemen and sharpshooters lying on the glacis, who keep up a fire on the ramparts to those who show their heads above them, or in the embrasures. The column, however, presents too great a mass to escape without the concentrated fire upon it from the bastions making dreadful chasms in it; but the grand tug of war is in the breach, opposite which deep trenches are cut, and traverses thrown up, completely separating the parts of the wall breached from the rest of the rampart, and from the body of the place, where parties posted on the sides of it, and from loopholed houses in its front, keep an incessant fire on the top, whilst the poor "forlorn hope," supported by the storming-party, scramble up the rugged breach, where they are either knocked on the head, tumbled headlong down, or maintain their ticklish pre-eminence till the main column forces them on the rampart. St. Sebastian presents a significant illustration of the fate and fortune of the greater portion of the stormers and the main column; of the former, consisting of 750 heroic men, "such as could show others how to mount a breach," in the course of a few minutes more than one-half were struck down. They had been selected, on account of lord Wellington's disapprobation of the conduct of the volunteers who led the first assault. The reason they did not lead the assault, but were in support of the 2nd brigade of the 5th division in that operation, was the discontent of lieutenant-general Leith, who assigned the honour to his own brigade; it being an article of his belief, that no British troops could fail in anything they undertook. The following occurrence, which

pressed himself, "could show other troops how to mount a breach." Robinson's brigade (2nd) led, supported by the volunteers, having in reserve the two remaining brigades of the 5th division, consisting of Hay's brigade (1st), and Spry's Portuguese brigade, and the 5th Portuguese caçadores, under major Hill. Leith commanded the whole column; Graham took his post by the batteries, on the other side of the Urumea, from which he could overlook and direct the operations. The orders were, to be ready for the assault at the time appointed, which was the hour of low water, and these orders all who heard them cheerfully prepared to obey.

The forlorn hope, consisting of thirty men, commanded by lieutenant M'Guin, of the 4th regiment, took its station at the debouche of the most advanced trench. The tide was now fast ebbing, and gave evidence that the river might be forded. The word to advance was given. Silently the assaulting columns* moved forward, and had scarcely reached the mid-space of the river when they were assailed by so violent a tempest of grape, musketry, canister, and round shot, that in the space of a couple of minutes the bed of the river was covered with the bodies of the killed and wounded. Nowise daunted, the survivors pushed on, but as they advanced, the enemy exploded the two mines on the flank of the front line of the works, which blew down a considerable extent of the counterscarp and the retaining wall, forming the ditch of the hornwork next the sea; but as the men were in loose order, only about thirty were killed. The progress of the assailants nowise checked, they rushed forward and mounted the breach; but such was the hurricane of fire poured upon them, that all their heroic daring was in vain; a withering discharge of musketry was kept up from the line of retrenchment behind the breach, took place at the selection of the storming party for the siege of St. Sebastian, is too interesting to be omitted:—"There was nothing but confusion here last night (with the light and the 4th divisions) from the eagerness of the officers to volunteer, and the difficulty of determining who were to be refused, and who allowed to go, and run their heads into a hole in the wall, full of fire and danger. Major Napier was here quite in misery, because, though he had volunteered first, lieutenant-colonel Hunt of the 52nd, his superior officer, insisted on his right to go. The latter said that Napier had been in the breach at Badajos, and he had a fair claim to go now. So it is among the subalterns; ten have volunteered where two are to be accepted. Hunt, being lieutenant-colonel, has nothing but honour to look to; as to promotion, he is past that. The men say they don't

the traverses, the ramparts, and the ruined houses, as well as from every part of the walls from which the assailants could be seen, while grape, canister, shells, and round-shot from the Mirador and Del Principe batteries on the castle-hill swept the approaches, and showered death on the column at the foot of the breach; the forlorn hope was cut off to a man, and the heads of the column annihilated as they ascended. In vain the officers rushed forward; in vain they were devotedly followed by their men; in vain a succession of supports was brought forward from the trenches; the murderous fire swept them all away, as fast as they showed themselves on the crest of the breach. No man outlived the attempt to gain the ridge. The face and foot of the breach were covered with the dying and the dead, and the debouches from the trenches were so choked up with corpses as to prevent the passage of the troops. "The volunteers, who had, with difficulty, been restrained in the trenches, calling out to know, why they had been brought there, if they were not to lead the assault, being now let loose, went like a whirlwind to the breaches, and again the crowded masses swarmed up the face of the ruins, but reaching the crest-line they came down like a falling wall; crowd after crowd were seen to mount, to totter, and to sink, the deadly French fire was unabated, the smoke floated away, and the crest of the breach bore no living man."† The deadly strife had now raged for two hours, and not a man was to be seen on the breach. A battalion of Portuguese (13th caçadores) under major Snodgrass, supported by a detachment of the 24th, under lieutenant-colonel M'Bean, forded the river, under the fire of St. Ulmo, the castle, and the infantry on the walls, and assaulted the lesser breach to the right of the main one; but here, too, the obstacles care what they are to do, *but they are ready to go anywhere.*"—Larpen's Private Journal during the Peninsular War, from 1812 to its close.

* "While the head of the column was still gathering on the strand, about thirty yards from the salient angle of the hornwork, twelve men, commanded by a serjeant whose heroic death has not sufficed to preserve his name, running violently forward, leaped upon the covered-way, with intent to cut the sausage of the enemy's mines. The French, startled by this sudden assault, fired the train prematurely, and though the serjeant and his brave followers were all destroyed, and the high sea-wall was thrown with a dreadful crash upon the head of the column, not more than forty men were crushed by the ruins, and the rush of the troops was scarcely checked."—Napier. † Napier.

were insurmountable. The crisis was imminent. The tide was rising, and the river would soon be impassable. The circumstances being desperate, a desperate remedy was adopted. Lieutenant-colonel Dickson, the chief officer of artillery, commenced firing his own artillery from the Choffre batteries on the high curtain of the breach, a few feet above the heads of the assailants, who were astonished at hearing the roar of cannon in their rear; but observing the enemy swept from the curtain, the intent was soon fully intelligible. This fire was kept up with admirable precision against the high curtain and traverses, sweeping away the enemy and their defences, and strewing the rampart with the mangled limbs of the defenders; but it had not been continued twenty minutes, when an explosion took place, which, for a moment, confounded the combatants on both sides. A shell from one of the British mortars, falling among a heap of fire barrels, live shells, hand-grenades, and other combustibles, accumulated behind the traverses, suddenly exploded, at the same time communicating with a mine placed under the breach, which was intended to be sprung, as soon as the assailants established themselves on the summit. Three hundred French grenadiers, who stood over it, were blown to atoms. The explosion was accompanied by smoke so dense as to obscure all vision. In the confusion which ensued, the assailants, with an appalling shout, rushing through the smoke and dust, rendered themselves masters of the first traverse. Animated by this success, they soon, in spite of a fierce resistance, pushed up the high curtain in great numbers, and assisting one another, lowered themselves into the town by the ruins. In the very heat and fury of the explosion, the stormers of the light division, under Hunt, had effected a lodgment in some of the ruined houses. The French colours on the cavalier were torn down by lieutenant Gethen of the 11th regiment. At the same time Snodgrass with the Portuguese had effected a lodgment in the small breach to the right. The enemy now attempted to defend the numerous intrenchments in the streets, by exploding the combustibles of which the traverses were formed. But after a long and obstinate resistance, being on all sides impetuously attacked, and driven from all their defences, except the convent of Santa Teresa, they retreated into the castle, leaving 700 prisoners in the hands of the assailants. Just as the

ramparts were carried, a fierce tempest of thunder, lightning, and rain, fell upon the devoted town; the elemental crash added additional terror to the fury and uproar of the assault. No sooner was the town won, than a fearful spectacle of the horrors of war and wickedness, of rapine and outrage succeeded. The camp-followers, and the people of the surrounding country, pressed into the town to add to the violence of the drunken and licentious troops. Fortunately there were but few females in the place, but these few were basely treated. The wine and spirit cellars were broken open, houses were everywhere ransacked, and furniture wantonly destroyed. When night set in, the darkness was effectually dispelled by the glare of the burning houses, which one after another took fire. Before midnight, it was one sheet of flame, and by noon on the following day little remained of it, except its smoking ruins. When the siege was first begun, the houses exceeded 600; now nine-tenths of them had been consumed. The spectacle which this scene presented, was horrible. The strong light which fell from the burning houses disclosed crowds of dead, dying, and intoxicated men, huddled together. Heaps of dead were lying everywhere, English, Portuguese, and French, one upon another. The few inhabitants that were to be seen seemed stupefied with horror; they had suffered so much, that they looked with apathy on all around them. "Carpets, rich tapestry, beds, curtains, wearing apparel, and every kind of valuable property," says an eye-witness of the fearful scene, "were carelessly scattered about upon the bloody pavements, while ever and anon fresh bundles of these articles were thrown from the windows of the burning houses. Here you would see a drunken fellow whirling a string of watches around his head, and then dashing them against the wall; then another more provident, stuffing his bosom with the smaller articles which he most prized. Next would come a party rolling a cask of wine and spirits before them, with loud acclamations, which in an instant was tapped, and in an inconsiderably short space of time emptied of its contents. The careless hum of conversation, and the occasional laugh, and wild shout of intoxication, the pitiable cries, or deep moans of the wounded, and the unintermitted roar of the flames, produced such a concert as no man, who listened to it, can ever forget. Of these various noises the greater number began gradually to sub-

side as night passed on, and long before dawn there was a fearful silence. Sleep had succeeded inebriety with the bulk of the army; of the poor wretches who groaned and shrieked three hours ago, many had expired, and the very fire had wasted itself by consuming every thing on which it could feed."

Lieutenant-general sir Thomas Graham's detail of the siege and capture of St. Sebastian was, in the following despatch, addressed to the marquis of Wellington.

"Oyarzun, 1st September, 1813.

"My Lord,—In addition to your lordship's orders of the preceding day, to attack and form a lodgment on the breach of San Sebastian, which now extended to the left, so as to embrace the outermost tower, the end and front of the curtain immediately over the left bastion, as well as the faces of the bastion itself, the assault took place at 11 o'clock, A.M., yesterday; and I have the honour to report to your lordship, that the heroic perseverance of all the troops concerned was at last crowned with success. The column of attack was formed of the 2nd brigade of the 5th division, commanded by major-general Robinson, with an immediate support of detachments of volunteers, and having in reserve the remainder of the 5th division, consisting of major-general Spry's Portuguese brigade, and the 1st brigade under major-general Hay, as also the 5th battalion of caçadores of general Bradford's brigade, under major Hill, the whole under the direction of lieutenant-general sir James Leith, commanding the 5th division. Having arranged every thing with sir James Leith, I crossed the Urumea to the batteries of the right attack, where everything could be most distinctly seen, and whence the orders for the fire of the batteries, according to circumstances, could be immediately given.

"The column in filing out of the right of the trenches was as before exposed to a heavy fire of shells and grape-shot, and a mine was exploded in the left angle of the counterscarp of the hornwork, which did great damage, but did not check the ardour of the troops in advancing to the attack. There never was any thing so fallacious as the external appearance of the breach; without some description, the almost insuperable difficulties of the breach cannot be estimated. Notwithstanding its great extent, there was but one point where it was possible to enter, and there by single

files. All the inside of the wall to the right of the curtain formed a perpendicular scarp of at least twenty feet to the level of the streets; so that the narrow ridge of the curtain itself, formed by the breaching of its end and front, was the only accessible point. During the suspension of the operations of the siege, from want of ammunition, the enemy had prepared every means of defence which art could devise, so that great numbers of men were covered by intrenchments and traverses, in the hornwork, on the ramparts of the curtain, and inside of the town opposite to the breach, and ready to pour a most destructive fire of musketry on both flanks of the approach to the top of the narrow ridge of the curtain. Every thing that the most determined bravery could attempt was repeatedly tried in vain by the troops, who were brought forward from the trenches in succession. No man outlived the attempt to gain the ridge; and though the slope of the breach afforded shelter from the enemy's musketry, yet still the nature of the stone rubbish prevented the great exertions of the engineers and working parties from being able to form a lodgment for the troops, exposed to the shells and grape from the batteries of the castle, as was particularly directed, in obedience to your lordship's instructions; and, at all events, a secure lodgment could never have been obtained without occupying a part of the curtain.

"In this almost desperate state of the attack, after consulting with colonel Dickson, commanding the royal artillery, I ventured to order the guns to be turned against the curtain. A heavy fire of artillery was directed against it; passing a few feet only over the heads of our troops on the breach, and was kept up with a precision of practice beyond all example. Meanwhile I accepted the offer of a part of major-general Bradford's Portuguese brigade to ford the river near its mouth. The advance of the first battalion, 13th regiment, under major Snodgrass, over the open beach, and across the river; and of a detachment of the 24th regiment, under lieutenant-colonel M'Bean, in support, was made in the handsomest style, under a very severe fire of grape. Major Snodgrass attacked, and finally carried the small breach on the right of the great one, and lieutenant-colonel M'Bean's detachment occupied the right of the great breach. I ought not to omit to mention, that a similar offer was made by the 1st Portuguese regiment of

brigadier-general Wilson's brigade, under lieutenant-colonel Fearon; and that both major-general Bradford, and brigadier-general Wilson, had, from the beginning, urged most anxiously the employment of their respective brigades in the attack, as they had had so large a share in the labour and fatigues of the right attack. Observing now the effect of the admirable fire of the batteries against the curtain, though the enemy was so much covered, a great effort was ordered to be made to gain the high ridge at all hazards, at the same time that an attempt should be made to storm the hornwork.

"It fell to the lot of the 2nd brigade of the 5th division, under the command of colonel the hon. C. Greville, to move out of the trenches for this purpose, and the 3rd battalion of the royal Scots, under lieutenant-colonel Barns, supported by the 38th, under lieutenant-colonel Miles, fortunately arrived to assault the breach of the curtain

about the time when an explosion on the rampart of the curtain, (occasioned by the fire of the artillery) created some confusion among the enemy. The narrow pass was gained, and was maintained, after a severe conflict, and the troops on the right of the breach having, about this time, succeeded in forcing the barricades on the top of the narrow line wall, found their way into the houses that joined it. Thus, after an assault which lasted above two hours, under the most trying circumstances, a firm footing was obtained. It was impossible to restrain the impetuosity of the troops, and in an hour more the enemy were driven from all the complication of defences prepared in the streets, suffering a severe loss on their retreat into the castle, and leaving the whole town in our possession."

The despatch then proceeds to particularize the officers who had distinguished themselves during the siege.

THE BATTLE OF SAN MARCIAL AND THE COMBAT OF VERA.

SOULT determined to make another effort for the relief of St. Sebastian, or at least to draw off its garrison. Quitting his camp behind the formidable works which he had thrown up in advance of St. Jean de Luz, covering the great road to Bayonne, on the night of the 30th of August, he marched with the purpose of assailing the army covering the siege of that fortress. Reille, with two divisions, and a strong reserve, under Villatte, was directed to cross the Lower Bidassoa, and carry the heights of San Marcial, while Clausel, with five divisions, passed the river at Vera, and pushed on to turn the Haya mountain. Three divisions of Spaniards, under general Freyre, occupied the heights and the town of Irun, thus covering the high road to the besieged fortress, and observing the fords by which the enemy could approach the position. The position was strong, the front and left being covered by the river, and their right appuying on the Sierra de Haya. The 1st division, under major-general Howard, and lord Aylmer's brigade, in rear of Irun, formed a reserve to the left of the Spaniards, and Longa's division near the Sierra, a reserve to their right. Still further to secure them, lord Wellington, receiving information that during the 29th and following day, a large

force of the enemy was assembling at Vera, ordered two brigades (Anson's and Ross's) of the 4th division, to occupy the heights on the right of the Sierra in support of Longa's division; at the same time the Portuguese, forming the other brigade of the 4th division, was directed to take post between the convent of Vera and Lesaca; and general Inglis's brigade of the 7th division was ordered to close to the left, and occupy the bridge on the Bidassoa, below Lesaca; while, to occupy the attention of the enemy, under D'Erlon, to their own left, the allied troops occupying the passes of Echellar, Zugarramurdi, and Haya, were directed to attack the weakened posts in front of their position. Hill was ordered to push the heads of his columns towards St. Jean Pied-de-Port.

At day-break of the morning of the 31st, the enemy was discovered advancing against the Spanish position. One column was already at the foot of the San Marcial height, another was in the act of fording the stream, and a third, under protection of batteries which they had thrown up during the night, were constructing a pontoon bridge over the river, about three-quarters of a mile from the high road to St. Sebastian. A heavy fire of artillery opened on both sides. The

two divisions, under Reille, as soon as formed, pushed forward to the attack of the Spaniards, anticipating an easy victory. The Spaniards calmly awaited the attack, till the assailants had nearly reached the summit of the steep, then impetuously charging them with the bayonet, drove them headlong down the face of the heights. As often as the French repeated the attack, so often were they driven back, some of them even across the river, where many of them, in their haste, lost the direction of the fords, and perished. During this conflict, Villatte's reserve having crossed the pontoon bridge, advanced to the support of their defeated comrades. Encouraged by this assistance, Reille's divisions again advanced to the charge, and one brigade succeeded in gaining the chapel of San Marcial, on the summit of the left of the line. At this critical moment lord Wellington came upon the field; when, ordering the 85th regiment to repel the attack, and riding forward with his whole staff to the menaced point, he was greeted with the most enthusiastic vivas by the whole of the Spanish line. Animated by his presence—for the supernatural effects of the talisman in the fable were hardly more powerful than the presence of Wellington in battle or the face of danger,—it reassured the infirm of purpose and gave fresh vigour to the brave—they again charged the enemy, and drove them in so great confusion, that, panic-stricken, they plunged headlong into the river, and so crammed the bridge and the pontoon boats which had come across to their assistance, that many perished in the depth of the water, by the giving way of the bridge, and the sinking of the boats.

Simultaneously with this attempt to gain the direct road to St. Sebastian, Clausel, who, with four divisions, had crossed the river higher up, near Vera, endeavoured to pass to the right of the Haya mountain, where another road leads to St. Sebastian, through Oyarzun. The Portuguese brigade, stationed on the right of the Haya mountain, was immediately attacked, and though Inglis moved to its support with his brigade, the post, on account of the vast superiority of the enemy's force, not being tenable, the allies withdrew to a stony ridge in front of the convent of Antonio, commanding the intersection of the roads, in which position

they remained unassailable. The light division, and Barnes's brigade of the 7th division, coming up in the course of the night, Clausel finding his position becoming every moment more critical, fell back under cover of the night; but, on reaching the Bidassoa at dawn, and finding it so swollen by the heavy rain which had fallen during the preceding day, as not to be fordable, he attempted his passage by the bridge of Vera, where a detachment of the light division being posted in a fortified house on a high rock just above the town, opened a fire upon the retreating columns, which occasioned a loss to them of 200 men.

The loss of the French in these operations was 3,600 men, including two generals killed and three wounded. That of the allies was 400 killed, 2,060 wounded, and 150 missing; above 1,600 of these being Spaniards. The moral effect of the failure of the attack on the heights of San Marcial was sensibly felt both by the French and Spaniards during the rest of the war. It made the French feel that San Marcial would give the Spaniards the same confidence in themselves which the Portuguese had learned at Busaco.

While the heights of San Marcial were the scene of contest, the whole French line in front of the passes of Echellar, Zugarramurdi, and Haya, were assailed. Two Portuguese brigades of the 6th and 7th divisions, directed by Colville and Dalhousie, at day-break of the 31st, drove the enemy from their camp behind Urdax, and burned it; but at the same moment, Abbé collecting his force in front of Ainhoë, repulsed the 6th division with severe loss. The loss of the enemy in these affairs was between 300 and 400 men.

During these combats, and the battles of San Marcial, a tempest of uncommon violence had raged. "Huge branches were torn from the trees, and whirled through the air like feathers on howling winds, while the thinnest streams swelling into torrents, dashed down the mountain, rolling innumerable stones along with a frightful clatter."* Amidst the turmoil and cover of the night, the French engaged in the battle of San Marcial, recrossed the Bidassoa, and Soult's head-quarters were fixed at St. Jean de Luz.

* Napier.

THE CAPTURE OF THE CASTLE OF ST. SEBASTIAN.

THE day after the assault of the town, preparations were made for carrying the castle; but the operations were retarded by the necessity of endeavouring to quench the conflagration which had spread through the whole town, and was still increased by the garrison's fire on it.

Lord Wellington, who, on account of the injury the inhabitants would have sustained, had refused to bombard the town, gave orders to prepare for the bombardment of the castle, and should that fail of producing a capitulation, to breach the main points of the castle-defences, and assault the garrison. Batteries were accordingly erected on the works of the town, and two twenty-four pounders and a howitzer placed on the islet of Sta. Clara. The remains of the ruined houses were loop-holed for musketry. From these points a fire was kept up with but little intermission for five successive days. On the night of the 7th September, the breaching batteries were completed and armed; and on the morning of the 8th, fifty-nine breaching-pieces, including mortars, opened with an appalling crash on the citadel. After a rapid and well-directed fire, for two hours, the white flag was hung out on the Mirador battery, and the chamade beat. The garrison, amounting to 1,800 men, including officers, being one-third of the original complement of the garrison, marched out with the honours of war, and laid down their arms on the glacis. By the terms of capitulation, the garrison became prisoners of war, to be sent to England. "When the kindness shown to the captive officers was acknowledged to the commandant of the place, who had been uniformly attentive to those who had been prisoners, he said that he had been twice prisoner in England; that he had been fifty years in the service, and on the 15th of the passing month he should have received his dismissal; that he was now sixty-six years old, and should never serve again; and if he might be permitted to return into France, instead of being sent to England, he should be the happiest of men. Sir Thomas Graham wrote to lord Wellington in favour of the kind-hearted old man; and it may be believed that the application was not made in vain."* Captain Songeon, who on the

day of the first assault, had descended the breach to assist the wounded, was also sent to France. Another instance of humanity and its reward, that occurred during this siege, took place in the person of colonel St. Angelo. On the failure of the first assault, and the retreat of the allied troops to the trenches, the garrison advanced beyond their trenches, or clustered on the ramparts, shouting defiance, and threatening a descent in pursuit. To check the intention, an animated fire of round and grape-shot was opened from the allied battery, the thickest of which fell on a particular part of the breach, where lay a grenadier of the royals, shot through both legs, and unable to extricate himself from his perilous situation. His fate appearing inevitable, St. Angelo stepped forward, walked coolly through the hottest of the fire, and lifting his wounded enemy in his arms, carried him into the town. On the fall of the fortress, he was sent among the other prisoners to England, but was, on arriving there, instantly liberated, and sent to France.

The garrison, at the time of its surrender, amounted to 1,800 men, being one-third of its complement at the commencement of the siege. The loss of the allies in the course of the siege and assaults was 951 officers and men killed, and 2,490 officers and men wounded. The loss would have been much greater had the tower of Los Hornos on the front of the outer wall, and about the middle of the great breach, which was mined and charged with 1,200 lbs. of powder, been exploded, which was prevented by an accidental shot having cut its saucisson.

The governor of St. Sebastian, general Rey, has been much, and justly, condemned for his breach of the laws of war, for the exposure of the allied prisoners in the reparation of the works to the fire of the besiegers' batteries; as also for not protecting them in their confinement by hoisting the black flag over the place where they were shut up. The consequence was, that they suffered more severely than the garrison; for the officer charged with their custody, refused them leave to throw up cover for their protection; neither would the governor permit the black flag to be hoisted, to avert the fire from their place of confinement.

The destruction of the town of St. Sebas-

* Southey.

tian has been the cause of much misrepresentation. The libels of the *Duende*, the *Redactor*, and other journals, were grounded on an official complaint made to the government by the xefe politico (the political chief) of the province of Guipuscoa, which contained the falsehood that the British officers encouraged the conflagration because St. Sebastian was favourable to French commerce, to the exclusion of British merchants; and that the plundering and excesses lasted for several days. Lord Wellington was well aware that these accusations were either written or sanctioned by the count Villa Fuentes, and under the direction of O'Donohu, the secretary at war, for the purpose of reconciling the Spanish people to his removal from the command of their armies. Indignant at the calumny of himself and his officers, which he justly stigmatized as an infamous libel, he refuted it in the following letter, dated Lesaca, 9th October, 1813, addressed to his brother, sir Henry Wellesley, the British minister to the Spanish government at Cadiz:—

“I enclose a letter which I have received from the minister of war of the 28th September, in which he has enclosed the copy of one of the 5th September, from the conde de Villa Fuentes, the xefe politico of the province of Guipuscoa, complaining of the conduct of the allied British and Portuguese army in the storm of the town of San Sebastian; and, as I received at the same time the enclosed newspaper [*The Duende*, published at Cadiz], which contains the same charges against that army in a more amplified style, and both appear to proceed from the same authority, I shall proceed to reply to both complaints; and I trouble your excellency on this subject, as it is one upon which your excellency will recollect that I have orders to correspond with his majesty's minister alone. I should have wished to adopt another mode of justifying the officers concerned on this occasion; but as there is no redress by the law for a libel, I must be satisfied with that which is in my hands. I shall begin with that charge which the inclosed newspaper contains, and which is not made in direct terms in the letter, from the xefe politico, though it is directly charged against lieutenant-general sir Thomas Graham, that he intended to burn the town; viz., that the town of St. Sebastian was thus ill-treated, because its former trade had been exclusively with the French, and to the disadvantage of Great Britain.

“This charge cannot be intended to apply to the common soldiers, who cannot be supposed to know or reflect much upon what passed before they attacked the place. This infamous charge applies exclusively to the principal officers who, from motives, not of commercial policy, but of commercial revenge, are supposed so far to have forgotten their duty as to have ordered or suffered the sack of this unfortunate town, and thus to have risked the loss of all they had acquired by their labours and their gallantry; and you will more readily conceive, than I can venture to describe, the feelings of indignation with which I proceed to justify the general and other officers of this army from a charge officially made by a person in a high office, that they designed to plunder and burn the town of St. Sebastian.

“I need not assure you that this charge is most positively untrue. Everything was done that was in my power to suggest to save the town. Several persons urged me in the strongest manner, to allow it to be bombarded, as the most certain mode of forcing the enemy to give it up. This I positively would not allow, for the reasons that I did not allow Ciudad Rodrigo or Badajos to be bombarded. Neither is it true that the town was set on fire by the English and Portuguese troops. To set fire to the town was part of the enemy's defence. It was set on fire by the enemy on the 22nd of July, before the final attempt was made to take it by storm; and it is a fact that the fire was so violent on the 24th of July, that the storm which was to have taken place on that day, was necessarily deferred till the 25th, and, as it is well known, failed.

“I was at the siege of St. Sebastian on the 30th of August, and I aver that the town was then on fire. It must have been set on fire by the enemy, as I repeat that our batteries, by positive orders, threw no shells into the town; and I saw the town on fire on the 31st of August, before the storm took place.

“It is well known that the enemy had prepared for a serious resistance, not only on the ramparts, but in the streets of the town; that traverses were established in the streets, formed of combustibles, with the intention of setting fire to and exploding them during the contest with the assailants. It is equally known that there was a most severe contest in the streets of the town

between the assailants and the garrison; that many of these traverses were exploded, by which many lives on both sides were lost; and it is a fact, that these explosions set fire to many of the houses.

"The xefe politico, the author of these complaints, must have been as well aware of these facts as I am, and he ought not to have concealed them. In truth, the fire in the town was the greatest evil that could befall the assailants, who did every thing in their power to get the better of it; and it is a fact, that owing to the difficulty and danger of communicating through the fire with the advanced posts in the town, it had very nearly become necessary at one time to withdraw those posts entirely. In regard to the plunder of the town by the soldiers, I am the last man who will deny it, because I know that it is true. It is one of the evil consequences attending the necessity of storming a town, which every officer laments, not only on account of the evil thereby inflicted on the unfortunate inhabitants, but on account of the injury it does to discipline, and the risk which is incurred of the loss of all the advantages of victory, at the very moment they are gained. It is hard that I and my general officers are to be so treated as we have been by the xefe politico, and unrestrained libellers, because an unavoidable evil has occurred in the accomplishment of a great service, and in the acquirement of a great advantage. The fault does not lie with us; it is with those who lost the fort, and obliged us, at great risk and loss, to regain it for the Spanish nation by storm.

"Notwithstanding that I am convinced it is impossible to prevent a town in such a situation from being plundered, I can prove that upon this occasion particular pains were taken to prevent it. I gave most positive orders upon the subject, and desired that the officers might be warned of the peculiar situation of the place, the garrison having the castle to retire to, and of the danger that they would attempt to retake the town if they found the assailants were engaged in plunder. If it had not been for the fire, which certainly augmented the confusion, and afforded greater facilities for irregularity, and if by far the greater proportion of the officers, particularly of the principal officers who stormed the breach, had not been killed or wounded, in the performance of their duty in the service of Spain, to the number of 170 out of 250;

I believe that the plunder would have been in great measure, though not entirely, prevented.

"Indeed, one of the subjects of complaint, that sentries were placed at every house, shows the desire at least of the officers to preserve order. Those sentries must have been placed by order; and unless it is supposed, as charged, that the officers intended that the town should be plundered and burned, and placed the sentries to secure that object, it must be admitted, that their intention in placing those sentries was good. It likewise most unfortunately happened, that it was impossible to relieve the troops which stormed the town till the 2nd instant, instead of immediately after the town was in our possession. Those who make these complaints forget, that on the 31st of August, the day this town was stormed, the whole of the left of the army was attacked by the enemy. I do not believe that I should have been congratulated and thanked for having successfully done my duty on that occasion, if I had either risked the blockade of Pamplona, or the loss of the battle fought on the 31st of August, by keeping at St. Sebastian troops to relieve those which had stormed, in order that the inhabitants of St. Sebastian might suffer rather less by their irregularities. In fact, it was not possible to allot troops to relieve them till the 2nd, at which time I assert that all irregularity had ceased, as I was at St. Sebastian on that day.

"In regard to the injuries done to the inhabitants by the soldiers with their fire-arms and bayonets, in return for their applause and congratulations, it appears to me extraordinary that it did not occur to the complainants that those injuries, if they were really done, were done by accident, during the contest in the streets with the enemy, and not by design. In regard to the charge of kindness to the enemy [namely, the granting of life to the 700 prisoners taken], I am afraid it is but too well-founded; and that till it is positively ordered by authority, in return for the ordonnance of the French government, adverted to in my despatch of the 10th of September, that all the enemy's troops in a place taken by storm shall be put to death, it will be difficult to prevail upon British officers and soldiers to treat an enemy, when their prisoners, otherwise than well. I wish that the xefe politico had not made the charge against so respectable a character as lieutenant-general sir

Thomas Graham, that he omitted to apply for his assistance to extinguish the fire in the town till it was entirely destroyed, leaving the inference to be drawn, that he therefore wished that the town should be destroyed, as it would have saved me the pain of observing, that the total neglect of the Spanish authorities to furnish any assistance whatever that was required of them to carry on the operations of St. Sebastian did not encourage sir Thomas to apply for the assistance of the *xefe politico* in any shape. In fact every thing was done that could be done to extinguish the fire by our own soldiers; and I believe that the truth is, that the assistance was asked by me, not only to endeavour to extinguish the fire, but to bury the dead bodies* lying about the town and ramparts; and it was not made sooner, because the want of it was not felt at an earlier period.

"I certainly lament, as much as any man can, the evils sustained by this unfortunate town, and those who have reason to complain of their fate, and deserve the relief of government; but a person in the situation of a *xefe politico* should take care, in forwarding these complaints, not to attack the characters of honourable and brave men, who are as incapable of entertaining a design to injure the peaceable inhabitants of any town, as they are of allowing their conduct to be influenced by the infamous motives attributed to them by the enclosed libel.

"I hear frequently of the union of the two nations; but I am quite certain that nothing is so little likely to promote that union as the encouragement given to such unfounded charges, and the allowing such infamous libels to pass unpunished.

"I have only to add, to what I have already stated in this letter, in answer to the minister-at-war's inquiries regarding the punishment of the offenders on this occasion, that several soldiers were punished. How many, it is not in my power at present to state."

In a subsequent letter, dated "Vera, 23rd October, 1813," addressed to the same person, he says:—

"When I wrote to you last, in regard to the complaints made to the Spanish govern-

ment of the conduct of the officers of the British army, in the storm of St. Sebastian, I had directed that major-general Hay, who commanded in the town after the storm, should be called upon to account for his conduct; and having afterwards heard that an officer of the 5th division had written to a friend in Vittoria, exulting over the misfortunes that the town had suffered, I directed that particular inquiry might be made respecting the writer of the supposed letter.

"I have now the honour to inclose major-general Hay's answer, with its several enclosures, being letters from the officers in the temporary command of brigades, the general officers who commanded them having been wounded, and from the officers commanding regiments, from which you will see the total want of foundation for the charge that the mischief which the town has sustained was done by the allied troops. In fact, the officers and the troops did every thing in their power to stop the progress of the fire, which was set to the town by the enemy; and many lost their lives in the attempt, owing to the fire of musketry kept up upon the roofs of the houses by the enemy in the castle.

"In the course of the inquiry upon this subject, a fact has come out, which I acknowledge that I had not heard of before, and as little suspected; but it is sufficiently the cause of the groundless complaints upon the subject, of the aggravation with which they have been brought before the public, and of the channel in which they have been conveyed to the public notice; viz., that the inhabitants of the town of St. Sebastian co-operated with the enemy in the defence of the town, and actually fired upon the allies. This appears not only from the statements of the officers, but is fully corroborated by that of the chevalier de Songeon, and the officers of the French garrison, who signed the enclosed certificate of his conduct. It is not astonishing that the inhabitants *from whom* the town was taken for the nation, should complain of those who took it from them."

In another letter, dated "Vera, 30th October," he thus gave expression to the indignant feeling aroused in his breast by these

* Heaps of dead were lying everywhere—English, French, and Portuguese—one upon another. Very many of the assailants lay dead upon the roofs of the houses which adjoined the breach. The bodies were thrown into the mines and other excavations and

then covered over so as to be out of sight, but so hastily and slightly, that the air far and near was tainted, and fires were kindled in the breaches to consume those which could not be otherwise disposed of.

infamous accusations:—"I acknowledge, that if such a paragraph as appeared in the *Duende* of the 4th instant, signed 'Mercedes,' had been published by an officer of the government before I entered Spain in 1812, and the author had not been punished, or formally denounced by the government, I should never have entered Spain, and the siege of Cadiz would never have been raised, nor any of the other events occurred which have delivered Spain from the enemy. * * *

* * * It will rest with the king's government to determine what they will do on a consideration of all the circumstances of the case; but if I was to decide, I would not keep the army in Spain for another hour."

And he was not only exposed to the enmity and malignity of the minister-at-war and his satellites; the whole of the factious part of the cortes and the public press circulated libels imputing to him the most sinister views. They asserted that every concession made to the English general was an offence against the dignity and independence of the nation. To so rancorous a pitch did they carry their enmity and hate, that "if he was active in the field, he was intent to subjugate Spain rather than defeat the enemy; if he was careful in preparation, his delay was to enable the French to conquer; if he was vigorous in urging the government to useful measures, his design was to enforce his own laws; if he neglected the Spanish armies, he desired they should be beaten; if he meddled with them usefully, it was to gain the soldiers, turn the army against the country, and thus render Spain dependent on England." So extravagant were their perfidious insinuations, that a report was spread, that he was about to assume the Spanish sceptre, which produced a vehement protest by the silly dukes Ossuna and Frias, the conde de Gante, and other of their grandees. To this silly and insidious affair, he alludes in the following passage in the letter, dated Vera, 16th October, 1813, and addressed to his brother, sir Henry Wellesley:—"There is no end of the calumnies against me and the officers of the army. Very lately the newspapers took the occasion of a libel in an Irish newspaper, reporting a supposed conversation between Castaños and me (in which I am supposed to have consented to change my religion to become king of Spain, and he to have promised the consent of the grandees) to accuse me of this intention; and then those fools, the

duke de — and de —, and the viscomte de — protest formally that they are not of the number of grandees who had given their consent to make such an arrangement! What can be done with such libels and such people, except despising them, and continuing one's road without noticing them?"

The truth is, that the burning of St. Sebastian was occasioned by the enemy, and was part of their system of defence; they had done so on the 22nd of July, when the first attempt was made to storm the town; and the conflagration continued so fierce for two days afterwards, when the assault was to have taken place, that it was of necessity deferred. According to general Rey's own statement, the town was on fire in six different places when the first assault was made; and was one of the great obstacles the besiegers had to encounter. Besides, the explosion of the combustibles laid at the traverses in the streets, and the shells thrown from the castle, contributed to promote the conflagration. The violent tempest of thunder, rain, and wind, which lasted the whole night of the assault, favoured, also, the conflagration of the houses which were on fire. Both general Robinson, who led the storming party, and general Hay, who commanded in the town immediately after the storm, bore testimony that both officers and men exerted themselves to the utmost to stop the progress of the flames; and that many lives were lost in the attempt from musketry-fire, as well by the inhabitants themselves, from the roofs and windows of their houses, as from the fire of the enemy in the castle. It was equally untrue, that the outrages continued for several days; they ceased on the 2nd of September, as lord Wellington says in his letter, and would have ceased sooner had the covering army not been engaged in the battle of San Marcial. It is probable that the troops engaged in the storming were irritated that the inhabitants had not only taken part with the garrison in the defence of the town, but actually fired on the allied troops after they had effected an entrance; a fact admitted by captain de Songeon and other French officers. The story of the massacre of the townspeople and the garrison is refuted by the fact, that 700 were admitted to surrender, who, by the laws of war, were liable to be put to the sword. The few that were slain or injured, were so slain or injured by accident, during the contest in the streets. The assertion, also, that the pillage con-

tinued for several days, is equally false. On the morning of the 2nd of September order was restored. "Those emblems of preparation for punishment, the gallows and halberds, were exhibited on that morning on the Plaza, fronting the entrance of the town from the isthmus, and a provost's guard was in attendance.* That excesses were committed it would be untrue to deny. But, as Mr. Southey observes, the difference between the conduct of the British at St. Sebastian and that of the French at Oporto, Tarragona, and other places, is this, that the crimes which the former perpetrated were checked as soon as they could be by the officers, acknowledged by the generals as evils which they had not been able to prevent, severely condemned by them, and punished; those of the French had been systematic and predetermined; the men were neither checked nor reproved by their generals; and so far were the generals from receiving any mark of disapprobation from their government, that the acts themselves were ostentatiously proclaimed in bulletins and official reports, in the hope of intimidating the Portuguese and Spaniards, and without any sense of shame. There are few assaults on record, as colonel Gurwood, in his *Introduction to the Despatches*, says, which were followed by less wantonness or vengeance than those of Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and St. Sebastian.

At this time, reinforcements to the extent of 5,000 men, among which was the brigade of guards, under the command of lord Aylmer, joined the British army; and during the siege of St. Sebastian, a few hundred men, the remains of Romana's army in Holstein, returned to Spain.

Lord Wellington's narrative of the assault of St. Sebastian, and of the battle of San Marcial, the combat of Vera, and the assault of the French line in front of the Puertos of Echellar, Zugarramurdi, and Maya, is detailed in the despatch addressed to the earl of Bathurst:—

"Lesaca, 2nd September, 1813.

"My Lord,—The fire against the fort of St. Sebastian was opened on the 26th of August, and directed against the towers which flanked the bastion on the eastern face, against the demi-bastion on the south-east angle, and the termination of the curtain of the south face. Lieutenant-general sir Thomas Graham had directed that an

* Leith Hay's *Narrative of the Peninsular War*.

establishment should be formed on the island of Sta Clara, which was effected on the night of the 26th, and the enemy's detachment on the island were made prisoners. Captain Cameron, of the 9th, had the command of the detachment which effected this operation, and lieutenant-general sir Thomas Graham particularly applauds his conduct, and that of lieutenant Chadwick, of the royal engineers. The conduct of lieutenant the honourable James Arbuthnot, of the royal navy, who commanded the boats, was highly meritorious, as likewise that of lieutenant Bell, of the royal marines. All that was deemed practicable to carry into execution, in order to facilitate the approach to the breaches before made in the wall of San Sebastian, having been effected on the 30th of August, and the breach having been made at the termination of the bastion, the place was stormed at eleven o'clock in the day of the 31st, and carried. The loss on our side has been severe. Lieutenant-general sir James Leith, who had joined the army only two days before, and major-generals Oswald and Robinson, were unfortunately wounded in the breach; and colonel sir Richard Fletcher was killed by a musket-ball at the mouth of the trenches. In this officer, and in lieutenant-colonel Craufurd, of the 9th regiment, his majesty's service has sustained a severe loss.

"I have the honour to enclose lieutenant-general sir Thomas Picton's report of this operation, in which your lordship will observe, with pleasure, another distinguished instance of the gallantry and perseverance of his majesty's officers and troops under the most trying difficulties. All reports concur in the praise of the conduct of the detachment from the 10th Portuguese brigade, under major Snodgrass, which crossed the river Urumea, and stormed the breach on the right, under all the fire which could be directed upon them from the castle and town. The garrison retired to the castle, leaving about 700 prisoners in our hands; and I hope I shall soon have the pleasure of informing your lordship that we are in possession of that fort. Since the fire against San Sebastian had been recommenced, the enemy had drawn the greater part of their force to the camp of Urogne; and there was every reason to believe that they would make an attempt to relieve the place. Three divisions of the fourth Spanish army, commanded by general Don Manuel Freyre,

occupied the heights of San Marcial and the town of Irun, by which the approach to San Sebastian by the high road was covered and protected; and they were supported by the 1st division of British infantry, under general Howard, and lord Aylmer's brigade, on their left and in the rear of Irun; and by general Longa's division, encamped near the Sierra de Aya, in rear of their right. In order to secure them still further, I moved two brigades of the 4th division, on the 30th, to the convent of San Antonio, one of which (general Ross's) under lieutenant-general sir L. Cole, the same day, afterwards moved up to the Sierra de Aya, and the other on the morning of the 31st, leaving the 9th Portuguese brigade on the heights between the convent of Vera and Lesaca. Major-general Inglis's brigade of the 7th division was moved, on the 30th, to the bridge of Lesaca, and I gave orders for the troops in the Puertos of Echellar, Zugaramurdi, and Maya, to attack the enemy's weak posts in front of these positions.

"The enemy crossed the Bidassoa by the fords between Andarra and the destroyed bridge on the high road before daylight on the morning of the 30th, with a very large force, with which they made a most desperate attack along the whole front of the position of the Spanish troops on the heights of San Marcial. They were beat back, some of them even across the river, in the most gallant style by the Spanish troops, whose conduct was equal to that of any troops that I have ever seen engaged; and the attack having been frequently repeated, was, upon every occasion, repelled with the same gallantry and determination. The course of the river being immediately under the heights on the French side, on which the enemy had placed a considerable quantity of cannon, they were enabled to throw a bridge across the river, three-quarters-of-a-mile above the high road, over which, in the afternoon, they marched again a considerable body, who, with those who had crossed the fords, again made a desperate attack upon the Spanish positions. This was equally beat back; and at length, finding all their efforts on that side fruitless, the enemy took advantage of the darkness of a violent storm to retire their troops from this front entirely.

"Notwithstanding that, as I have above informed your lordship, I had a British division on each flank of the 4th Spanish army, I am happy to be able to report that

the conduct of the latter was so conspicuously good, and they were so capable of defending their post without assistance, in spite of the desperate efforts of the enemy to carry it, that, finding that the ground did not allow of my making use of the 1st or 4th divisions on the flanks of the enemy's attacking corps, neither of them were in the least engaged during the action.

"Nearly at the same time that the enemy crossed the Bidassoa in front of the heights of San Marcial, they likewise crossed that river with about three divisions of infantry in two columns, by the fords below Salin, in front of the position occupied by the 9th Portuguese brigade. I ordered general Inglis to support this brigade with that of the 7th division under his command; and as soon as I was informed of the course of the enemy's attack, I sent to lieutenant-general the earl of Dalhousie, to request that he would likewise move towards the Bidassoa with the 7th division; and to the light division to support major-general Inglis by every means in their power. Major-general Inglis found it impossible to maintain the heights between Lesaca and the Bidassoa, and he withdrew to those in front of the convent of San Antonio, which he maintained. In the mean time major-general Kempt moved one brigade of the light division to Lesaca; by which he kept the enemy in check, and covered the march of the earl of Dalhousie to join general Inglis.

"The enemy, however, having completely failed in their attempt upon the position of the Spanish army on the heights of San Marcial, and finding that major-general Inglis had taken a position from which they could not drive him, at the same time that it covered and protected the right of the Spanish army, and the approaches to San Sebastian by Oyarzun, and that their situation on the left of the Bidassoa was becoming at every moment more critical, retired during the night.

"The fall of rain during the evening and night had so swollen the Bidassoa, that the rear of their column was obliged to cross the bridge of Vera. In order to effect this object, they attacked the posts of major-general Skerrett's brigade of the light division, at about three in the morning, both from the Puerto de Vera, and from the left of the Bidassoa. Although the nature of the ground rendered it impossible to prevent entirely the passage of the bridge after daylight, it was made under the fire of a great

part of major-general Skerrett's brigade, and the enemy's loss in the operation must have been very considerable.*

"While this was going on upon the left of the army, Mariscal de Campo don P. A. Giron attacked the enemy's posts in front of the pass of Echellar on the 30th and 31st. Lieutenant-general the earl of Dalhousie made general Le Cor attack those in front of Zugarramurdi with the 6th Portuguese brigade on the 31st, and major-general the hon. C. Colville made colonel Douglas attack the enemy's posts in front of the pass of Maya on the same day, with the 7th Portuguese brigade. All these troops conducted themselves well. The attack made by the earl of Dalhousie delayed his march till late in the afternoon of the 31st; but he was, in the evening, in a favourable situation for his further progress; and in the morning of the 1st in that allotted for him.

"In these operations, in which a second attempt by the enemy to prevent the establishment of the allies upon the frontier has been defeated by the operations of a part only of the allied army, at the very moment at which the fort of San Sebastian was taken by storm, I have had great satisfaction in observing the zeal and ability of the officers, and the gallantry and discipline of the troops. The different reports which I have transmitted to your lordship, from lieutenant-general sir T. Graham, will have shown the ability and perseverance with which he has conducted the arduous enterprise intrusted to his direction, and the zeal and exertion of all the officers employed under him."

Official Return of the Allied Army serving in the Peninsula, on the 30th of August, 1813.

General-in-chief—Field-marshal the marquis of Wellington, K. G. *Quarter-master-general*—Sir George Murray, K. B. *Adjutant-general*—Sir Edward Packenham, K. B. *Chief-engineer*—Lieutenant-colonel Fletcher, bart. *Senior officer of artillery*—Lieutenant-colonel Dickson.

CAVALRY.—*Lieutenant-general*—Sir Stapleton Cotton, K. B. *Assistant adjutant-general*—Colonel Elley.—*Major-general* Lord Edward Somerset: 1st

* According to the author of the *History of the War in the Peninsula*, this statement of the despatch is not correct, in which the French are described as passing under the fire of a great part of general Skerrett's brigade; for that officer remained in order of battle on the lower slopes of Santa Barbara, half a-mile distant, and allowed the enemy to escape. When general Vandermoesen, who commanded the rear of the retreating column, approached the bridge of Vera, his advanced guard "was driven back by a rifle company, posted in the fortified house. This happened about three in the morning, and the riflemen defended the passage till daylight, when a

life-guards, 2nd life-guards, royal horse-guards (blue).—*Major-general* William Ponsonby: 5th dragoon-guards, 3rd dragoons, 4th dragoons.—*Major-general* Fane: 3rd dragoon-guards, 1st, or royal dragoons.—*Major-general* baron Bock: 1st dragoons, king's German legion, 2nd dragoons, king's German legion.—*Colonel* Grant: 10th hussars, 15th hussars.—*Major-general* Vandeleur: 12th light dragoons, 16th light dragoons.—*Major-general* Lang: 13th light dragoons, 14th light dragoons.—*Major-general* Victor Alten: 1st hussars, king's German legion, 18th hussars.—*Brigadier-general* D'Urban: 1st Portuguese dragoons, 11th Portuguese dragoons, 12th Portuguese dragoons.—*Brigadier-general* Otway: 4th Portuguese dragoons, 10th Portuguese dragoons.—*Brigadier-general* Madden: 5th Portuguese dragoons, 8th Portuguese dragoons.

INFANTRY: FIRST DIVISION.—*Lieut. general*—Sir Thomas Graham, K. B. *Assistant adjutant-general*—Lieutenant-colonel Bouverie. *Assistant-quarter-master-general*—Colonel Upton. *First brigade*—*Major-general* Howard: 1st guards (1st battalion), 1st guards (2nd battalion). *Second brigade*—*Major-general* Hon. Edward Stopford: Coldstream guards, 3rd guards. *Third brigade*—Colonel Halkett: 1st light battalion, German legion, 2nd light battalion, German legion, 1st battalion of the line, German legion, 2nd battalion of the line, German legion, 5th battalion of the line, German legion.

SECOND DIVISION.—*Lieutenant-general*—Sir Rowland Hill, K. B. *Lieutenant-general*—Sir William Stewart, K. B. *Assistant adjutant-general*—Lieutenant-colonel Rooke. *Assistant-quarter-master-general*—Lieutenant-colonel hon. A. Abercrombie. *First brigade*—*Major-general* Walker: 50th regiment, 71st regiment, 92nd regiment. *Second brigade*—*Major-general* Byng: 3rd regiment, 57th regiment: provisional battalion, 31st regiment, 60th regiment. *Third brigade*—Colonel O'Callagan: 28th regiment, 34th regiment, 39th regiment.

PORTUGUESE DIVISION.—*First brigade*—Lieutenant-general Hamilton: 2nd regiment of the line, 14th regiment of the line, 5th regiment of the line, 5th caçadores. *Second brigade*—Brigadier-general Campbell: 4th regiment of the line, 10th regiment of the line. *Third brigade*—Colonel Ashworth: 6th regiment of the line, 18th regiment of the line, 6th caçadores.

THIRD DIVISION.—Lieutenant-general sir Thomas Picton, K. B. *Assistant adjutant-general*—Lieutenant-colonel Stovin. *First brigade*—Major-general Brisbane: 45th regiment, 74th regiment, 88th regiment. *Second brigade*—Major-general the hon. Charles Colville: 5th regiment, 83rd regiment, 87th regiment, 94th regiment. *Third brigade* (Portuguese)—9th regiment of the line, 21st regiment of the line.

FOURTH DIVISION.—*Lieutenant-general*—the second company and some Portuguese caçadores came to their aid. But the French reserve left at Vera, seeing how matters stood, opened a fire of guns against the fortified house from a high rock just above the town, and their skirmishers approached it on the right bank, while Vandermoesen plied his musketry from the left bank. The two rifle captains and many men fell under this cross fire, and the passage was forced; but Vandermoesen, urging the attack in person, was killed, and more than 200 of his soldiers were hurt." As the matter refers to the division in which colonel Napier served, his correction of the despatch is, more than probable, correct.

hon. sir Lowry Cole, K. B. *Assistant-adjutant-general*—Lieutenant-colonel Bradford.—*First brigade*—Major-general Anson: 27th regiment, 40th regiment, 48th regiment; provisional battalion, 2nd (Queen's), 53rd regiment. *Second brigade*—Major-general Ross: 7th royal fusiliers, 20th regiment, 23rd regiment. *Third brigade (Portuguese)*—Brigadier-general Harvey: 11th regiment of the line, 23rd regiment of the line, 10th caçadores.

FIFTH DIVISION.—*Lieutenant-general*—Sir James Leith, K. B. *Assistant-adjutant-general*—Lieutenant-colonel Berkeley. *Assistant-quarter-master-general*—Lieutenant-colonel Gomm. *First brigade*—Major-general Hay: 1st royal Scots, 9th regiment, 38th regiment. *Second brigade*—Major-general Robinson: 4th (king's own) regiment, 47th regiment, 59th regiment. *Third brigade (Portuguese)*—Major-general Spry: 3rd regiment of the line, 15th regiment of the line, 8th caçadores.

SIXTH DIVISION.—*Lieutenant-general*—Henry Clinton. *Assistant-adjutant-general*—Lieutenant-colonel Tryon. *Assistant-quarter-master-general*—Major Vincent. *First brigade*—Major-general Pack: 42nd royal Highlanders, 79th regiment, 91st regiment. *Second brigade*—Major-general Lambert: 11th regiment, 32nd regiment, 36th regiment, 61st regiment. *Third brigade (Portuguese)*—8th regiment of the line, 12th regiment of the line, 9th caçadores.

SEVENTH DIVISION.—*Lieutenant-general*—the earl of Dalhousie, K. B. *Assistant-adjutant-general*—Lieutenant-colonel D'Oyley. *First brigade*—Major-general Barnes: 6th regiment; provisional battalion, 24th regiment, 54th regiment, chasseurs Britannique. *Second brigade*—Colonel Mitchell: 51st regiment, 68th regiment, 82nd regiment. *Third brigade (Portuguese)*—Major-general Le Cor, 7th regiment of the line, 19th regiment of the line, 2nd caçadores.

LIGHT DIVISION.—*Major-general*—Charles Baron Alten. *Assistant-adjutant-general*—Major Marlay. *Assistant-quarter-master-general*—Major Stewart. *First brigade*—Major-general Kempt: 43rd regiment, 95th rifles (1st battalion), 95th rifles (2nd battalion). *Second brigade*—Major-general Skerrett: 52nd regiment, 95th rifles (2nd battalion). *Portuguese troops attached to the light division*—20th regiment of the line, 1st caçadores, 3rd caçadores.

Unattached British brigade—Major-general lord Aylmer: 76th regiment, 84th regiment, 85th regiment. *Unattached Portuguese brigades*—Major-general Bradford: 13th regiment of the line, 24th regiment of the line, 5th caçadores. Brigadier-general Wilson: 1st regiment of the line, 16th regiment of the line, 4th caçadores.

Royal Staff Corps—Lieutenant-colonel hon. R. L. Dundas; Lieutenant-colonel Sturgeon.

Staff corps of cavalry—Lieutenant-colonel Scovell. The 60th regiment (5th battalion), and the regiment of Brunswick Oels attached, in companies, to the different brigades of the army.

The army in the field was formed into divisions, brigades, and corps, its staff military and civil, and its *matériel*. Each division was commanded by a lieutenant-general, or a major-general having local rank as such. Each division was formed of two or more brigades; each brigade consisting of two, three, or four battalions; the light companies of which were formed, when

in presence of the enemy, under the command of a field-officer or senior captain of the light companies of each brigade. Each brigade was commanded by a major, or brigadier-general, or colonel on the staff. To each division of infantry, a brigade of artillery was attached under the immediate orders of the general commanding the division. The cavalry was also composed of divisions, each division consisting of two or more brigades, and each brigade of two or more regiments of heavy or light cavalry. To each brigade of hussars, or light cavalry, a troop of horse-artillery was usually attached, when in advance or before the enemy, under the immediate orders of the general commanding the brigade.

The personal staff of the commander of the forces consisted of the military secretary, the commandant at head-quarters, and the aides-de-camp. *The adjutant-general's department* consisted of the adjutant-general, the deputy-adjutant-general, the assistant-adjutant-general, and the deputy-assistant-adjutant-generals. The officers of this department were charged with all the details of duties, returns, correspondence, discipline, &c. *The quarter-master-general's department* consisted of the quarter-master-general, the deputy-quarter-master-general, the assistant-quarter-master-generals, and the deputy-assistant-master-generals. The officers of this department were charged with the embarkation, disembarkation, equipment, quartering, hutting, encamping, route-marching, and the occupation of positions of the different divisions, and of the troops at the stations to which they were respectively attached, under the authority and responsibility of the general or other superior officer in command of them. *Staff attached to head-quarters*.—An assistant in the quarter-master-general's department, having the superintendence of the billeting, and of the quarters at the head-quarters, and of the baggage of the army; a staff-surgeon, a chaplain, an assistant-commissary-general, an assistant-provost-marshal, and an assistant baggage-master.

Corps attached to head-quarters.—The officer commanding the royal artillery, with the staff of his corps, having a general superintendence of the artillery and ammunition attached to the corps and divisions, as also of the battering-train, reserve-artillery, and ammunition. The commanding royal engineer, with the staff and other officers belonging to his corps, having a general super-

intendence over the officers of engineers, the corps of sappers and miners, pontoons, and the engineers' park, consisting of *matériel* for sieges, entrenching tools, &c., belonging to the army. The officer commanding the corps of guides; in charge also of the post-office, and of the general communications of the army. The officer commanding the staff-corps of cavalry, being in charge of the police of the army, and of other duties of a confidential nature. The provost-marshal and his assistants, having charge of all prisoners of war, deserters from the enemy, and all prisoners tried, or to be tried, by a general court-martial; and having the authority of inflicting summary punishment for all offences whatever committed under their observation.

Civil departments attached to head-quarters.—1. The medical department, consisting of inspector of hospitals, deputy-inspector, physicians, staff surgeons, apothecaries, dispensers, assistant-staff surgeons, hospital assistants, &c. 2. The purveyor's department, consisting of a purveyor to the forces, with deputies and assistants, in charge of the hospitals, hospital *matériel*, of the arms, accoutrements, clothing, and necessaries of the men in hospital, and of the burial expenses of the men who die in hospital. 3. The paymaster-general's department, consisting of paymaster-general, assistants, &c. 4. The commissariat's department, consisting of commissary-general, deputy-commissary-generals, assistants, deputy-assistants, commissariat clerks, and other clerks. This department was divided into two branches, stores and accounts. 5. The storekeeper-general's department, consisting of storekeeper-general and his assistants, having charge of the field equipments, tents, &c., and the heavy baggage of the army. 6. The comptroller of army accounts, with inspectors and examiners, to whom all accountants, those of the commissariat excepted, rendered their accounts in the same manner as previously to the commissariat of accounts. 7. The post-office, under charge of the officer commanding the corps of guides. 8. The press, for the greater facility in circulating the general orders, &c., attached to the adjutant-general's department.

The matériel attached to the army consisted of—1. The battering-train, under the orders of the officer commanding the royal artillery. 2. The pontoon train, under the orders of the commander of the royal engineers. 3. The engineer's park, *matériel* for

sieges, &c. 4. The waggon-train, under the order of the quarter-master-general attached to the hospitals, commissariat, &c., or to divisions, as circumstances might require. 5. The ordnance stores train. 6. The commissariat waggon-train. 7. The other transport of the army.

In the principal towns through which the army passed on the line of the resources, and place of embarkation or disembarkation, a hospital station was usually formed, to which, besides the necessary medical and hospital staff, a *dépôt* staff was generally attached, consisting of a captain, as commandant, a subaltern as adjutant, an assistant-commissary-general, and an assistant-provost-marshal. The port of embarkation and disembarkation, and the chief *dépôt* of the army, was generally under the command of a superior officer, with officers of adjutant and quarter-master-general departments attached to him; exclusive of the garrison staff of town-major, town-adjutant, provost-marshal, &c.; and of the commandant of the *dépôt* of convalescents, drafts, &c., to whom a local staff of adjutant, paymaster, and quarter-master was attached. Officers of the quarter-master-general's department, officers of the royal engineers, and of the royal staff corps, were employed on topographical surveys, reports of roads, bridges, and resources of the country. And regimental officers were employed by the generals commanding divisions, as officers in observation beyond the outposts of their respective divisions; to obtain information in respect to the movements of the enemy in front, and for the purpose of reporting on the resources, roads, rivers, bridges, and other military features of the country occupied between the outposts of the two armies.

The staff attached to a lieutenant-general, or a major-general, having local rank as such, consisted of two aides-de-camp, one assistant-adjutant-general, one deputy-assistant-adjutant-general, one assistant-quarter-master-general, one deputy-assistant-quarter-master-general, one or two officers of the royal engineers, one staff-surgeon, one chaplain; one assistant-commissary, with deputy assistants, clerks, &c.; one assistant-provost-marshal, one baggage-master, with assistance from the staff-corps of cavalry; one storekeeper of ordnance, in charge of the reserve ammunition, under the officer commanding the artillery attached to the division. *The staff attached to a major or brigadier-general,*

or colonel on the staff, consisted of one aide-de-camp, one brigade-major, one deputy-assistant-commissary-general, with clerks and assistants in that department. The

general officer commanding the cavalry had a staff attached to him similar to that of the superior general officer commanding a corps.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE ANGLO-SICILIAN ARMY ON THE EASTERN COAST OF SPAIN.

WHEN the news of the battle of Vittoria reached Napoleon Buonaparte in his camp on the Elbe, he sent orders to Suchét to evacuate Valencia, and having garrisoned the fortresses, to retire behind the Ebro. On the 5th of July, the French marshal put his orders into execution, and garrisoning Saguntum, Lerida, Murviedro, Tortosa, Mesquinenza, Peniscola, Monçon, and Denia, concentrated his forces in Catalonia and on the Lower Ebro. At the same time he evacuated Aragon, the castle of Saragossa having surrendered to the patriots. In the mean time, the duque del Parque and Elio had been defeated on the Xucar by Habert, with considerable loss, though the attacking force of the assailants amounted to 28,000 men, and that of the enemy was not 9,000.

Lord William Bentinck, in obedience to Wellington's instructions to lay siege to Tarragona, followed Suchét into Catalonia. On the 30th July, leaving the blockade of the fortresses to Elio's corps in his rear, he advanced from Alicante with the Anglo-Sicilian army, and crossed the Ebro at Amposta on flying bridges. Being joined, on the 3rd of August, by the army of the duque del Parque, and on the 11th by the Catalan force, under Sarsfield, he invested Tarragona; but before ground was broken, Suchét, having formed a junction with Decaen, and assembled every disposable soldier that Barcelona and the other garrisons could spare, advanced for its relief, with an army amounting to 24,000 men. A position was taken up by the allies in front of Tarragona, with the intent of giving battle to the enemy; but Bentinck ascertaining the strength of the hostile army as it approached, raised the siege on the 15th, and, in the course of the following night, fell back to Cambrils. Suchét entered Tarragona on the 18th, and immediately blowing up its fortifications and several portions of the walls, retired again behind the Llobregat, taking with him the garrison and above 200 pieces of artillery. He strengthened

his position with a tête-de-pont at Molinos del Rey, and several redoubts on the right bank of the river. The allies now returned to the desolated and ruined city, and for the convenience of its bay, it became the rendezvous of the English fleet and store ships to the end of the war. In the beginning of September, the English general, for the purpose of observing the enemy, moved forward to Villa Franca, and pushed forward an advanced guard of the second battalion of the 27th, a Calabrian, and three Spanish battalions, under colonel Adam, to the pass of Ordal, for the purpose of communicating with Copon's army, which was hanging on the enemy's right flank at Martorel. This post is of considerable strength, commands the high road from Barcelona, is ten miles in advance of Villa Franca, and about the same distance from the French position on the Llobregat. Against this post Suchét advanced with Harispe and Habert's divisions, at midnight of the 12th, and driving in the pickets, suddenly assailed the main body, who were reposing in position. The 27th British, suddenly starting up, poured in a destructive volley on the enemy, and then charged with the bayonet. The rest of the allies made a stout resistance; but being overpowered by numbers, and at the same time attacked by cavalry, lost about 1,000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Captain Waldron, with 80 men of the 27th, and captain Muller, with the same number of Germans, effected an orderly retreat; but the rest of the allies escaped in the greatest confusion. On the day following this disaster, Suchét marched upon the left flank of the allied army, and coming up with it on its retreat over the plains of Villa Franca, where a halt had been made on a favourable spot for closing up the ranks, brought on an affair of cavalry, in which the charge of French cuirassiers was gallantly repelled by the 20th light dragoons and a regiment of Brunswick hussars, under lord Frederick Bentinck. Suchét,

then desisting from the pursuit, retired to his position behind the Llobregat, and the English general conducted the allied army by Atafulla, on Tarragona; under the dismantled walls of which town the allies encamped on the morning of the 14th. Two days afterwards, lord William Bentinck transferred his command to lieutenant-general Clinton, and quitted Spain to resume his command in Sicily.*

Clinton, in succeeding to the command, endeavoured to render Tarragona once more defensible. Towards the end of October, for the purpose of availing themselves of the resources about Villa Franca, which is midway between Tarragona and Barcelona, and the neighbouring districts, and which afforded the only available means of support of the Spanish armies, Clinton advanced to Villa Franca for their protection. On the 1st of December, Suchêt, in the hope of surprising the allies in their cantonments, advanced to their position; but finding Clinton ready for his reception, he again retired behind the Llobregat. The harvest having been now gathered in, Clinton returned to Tarragona, and put it in a

proper state of defence; but on an application to the Spanish government to equip the town with the requisite artillery and stores, they refused to provide a single piece of ordnance or any stores for its defence; and even when admiral Halloway brought some ship guns from Port Mahon, the minister-at-war, O'Donohu, expressed his disapprobation, observing, with a sneer, that the necessary guns might be provided from the Spanish ordnance moved into Gibraltar by general Campbell, when he destroyed the lines of San Roque. On the 3rd of December, Suchêt made a general movement of his forces to cover the pillage of the town of Martorel,† the inhabitants of which had incurred his displeasure. This was the last offensive effort of the French in Catalonia. When informed, by Soult's letter, of the defection of the Nassau battalions in front of Bayonne, he ordered all the German and Italian regiments in the French service to be disarmed and marched to France. In this state of affairs, the duque San Carlos arrived at Suchêt's head-quarters, bearing the treaty of Valençay for the restoration of Ferdinand VII.

OPERATIONS PRECEDING THE INVASION OF FRANCE.

At this time the congress being about to assemble at Prague, in which Napoleon Buonaparte intended to propose that persons, accredited by Joseph and the cortes, should submit the arrangements for a peace between his brother and the Spanish pa-

triot; the British government apprehending, that the proposal to partition Spain would meet with little opposition from the northern powers, the command of an army in Germany, to oppose Buonaparte, was offered to lord Wellington. His reply was,

* Lord William Bentinck, on his assuming the command of the Anglo-Sicilian army, renewed his proposal to lord Wellington of withdrawing that force from Spain, and employing it in the protection of Sicily, and of revolutionizing it, in conjunction with Murat's co-operation. Lord Wellington's curt reply to the first proposal was:—"My Lord,—In answer to your lordship's despatch of the 20th, I have to observe, that I conceive the island of Sicily is, at present, in no danger whatever. I have, &c." To the second proposal, the answer was:—"I entertain no doubt that the English and Murat, or the English and any other power, that could put thirty or forty thousand men in the field, could create a revolution in Italy. * * * * It is very difficult to form an opinion of Murat's sincerity; but I am quite certain he will do nothing unless the emperor of Austria will take a line with the allies. In that case, he will probably conclude with you. If he should conclude with you, I authorize you to embark from Spain all your Anglo-Sicilian corps, and take them where you please, in order to carry into execution your treaty with Murat."

† When lord W. Bentinck retreated from Villa Franca, Suchet levied a heavy contribution on the inhabitants. The extent of his peculations may be easily imagined from the single fact, that immediately after the occupation of Valencia, in 1811, he imposed, for the subsistence of the troops, an extraordinary contribution—that is, one beyond the regular annual taxation of two hundred millions of reals; one moiety of which exhausted all the money, gold, silver plate, and jewels of the province; the other moiety was taken in grain, stuffs, clothing, and other articles. In Aragon the requisitions were irrecoverable, on account of their excessive magnitude. For some years before the French had been driven out of Navarre, the requisitions had often exceeded 200 per cent. of the revenue of the landholders and farmers. By the accounts of the royal commissary of Joseph, the count Masilano, the sums levied on the different communes of Andalusia, from the period of the entry of the French in July, 1810, till August, 1812, amounted to six hundred millions of reals. The exactions on the other provinces were of equal extent.

"In regard to my going to Germany, I am the prince regent's servant, and will do whatever he and his government please. But I would beg them to recollect, that the great advantages I enjoy here, consist in the confidence which every body feels, that I am doing what is right, which advantage I should not enjoy, for a time at least, in Germany. Many might be found to conduct matters as well as I can, both here and in Germany; but nobody would enjoy the same advantage here, and I should be no better than another in Germany. If a British army should be left in the Peninsula, therefore, it is best that I should remain with it." About the same time he received a proposition from the duc de Berri, to join the allied army with 20,000 men, already organised and armed in the south of France; but as the English general had no faith in the reality of the existence of that force, he referred the duke to the British secretary for foreign affairs, and at the same time stated his ideas on the subject to lord Bathurst in the despatch, dated Lesaca, August 8th. This letter is characterized by the usual clear-sightedness of the duke, and shows that no success, however great, was capable of obscuring his judgment. In it he says—

"My Lord,—It is a very common error, among those unacquainted with military affairs, to believe that there are no limits to military success. After having driven the French from the frontiers of Portugal and Madrid to the frontiers of France, it is generally expected that we shall immediately invade France; and some even here expect that we shall be at Paris in a month. None appear to have taken a correct view of our situation on the frontier, of which the enemy still possess all the strongholds within Spain itself; of which strongholds, or at least some of them, we must get possession before the season closes, or we shall have no communication whatever with the interior of Spain. Then in France, on the same great communications, there are other strongholds, of which we must likewise get possession.

"An army which has made such marches, and has fought such battles, as that under my command has, is necessarily much deteriorated. Independently of the actual loss of numbers by death, wounds, and sickness, many men and officers are out of the ranks for various causes. The equipment of the army, their ammunition, the soldiers' shoes, &c., require renewal; the magazines for the

new operations require to be collected and formed, and many arrangements to be made, without which the army could not exist a day, but which are not generally understood by those who have not had the direction of such concerns in their hands. Then observe, that this new operation is only the invasion of France, in which country everybody is a soldier; where the whole population is armed and organized, under persons, not, as in other countries, inexperienced in arms, but men who, in the course of the last twenty-five years, in which France has been engaged in war with all Europe, must, the majority of them, at least, have served somewhere. I entertain no doubt that I could tomorrow enter France, and establish the army on the Adour, but I could go no farther, certainly. If peace should be made by the Powers of the North, I must necessarily withdraw into Spain; and the retreat, however short, would be difficult, on account of the hostility and the warlike disposition of the inhabitants, particularly of this part of the country, and the military direction they would receive from the gentry, their leaders. To this add, that the difficulty of all that must be done to set the army to rights, after its late severe battles and victories, will be much increased by its removal into France at an early period; and that it must stop short in the autumn, if it now moves at too early a period.

"So far for the immediate invasion of France, which, from what I have seen of the state of the negotiations in the north of Europe, I have determined to consider only in reference to the convenience of my own operations. The next point for consideration is the proposal of the duc de Berri to join this army, taking the command of the 20,000 men who, he says, are ready, organized, and even armed, in order to act with us. My opinion is, that the interests of the house of Bourbon and of all Europe are the same, viz., in some manner or other, to get the better and rid of Buonaparte.

"Although, therefore, the allies in the north of Europe, and even Great Britain and Spain, might not be prepared to go the length of declaring that they would not lay down their arms till Buonaparte should be dethroned, they would be justified in taking this assistance from the house of Bourbon, and their French party who are dissatisfied with the government of Buonaparte. It might be a question with the house of Bourbon, whether they would involve their

partisans in France upon anything short of such a declaration, but none with the allies whether they would receive such assistance. Indeed, there would scarcely be a question for the princes of the house of Bourbon, if they are acquainted with the real nature and extent of Buonaparte's power: He rests internally upon the most extensive and expensive system of corruption that was ever established in any country, and externally upon his military power, which is supported almost exclusively by foreign contributions. If he can be confined to the limits of France by any means, his system must fall. He cannot bear the expense of his internal government and of his army; and the reduction of either would be fatal to him. Any measures, therefore, which should go only to confine him to France would forward, and ultimately attain, the objects of the house of Bourbon and of their partisans.

"If the house of Bourbon and the allies, however, do not concur in this reasoning, we must then, before the duc de Berri is allowed to join the army, get from the allies in the north of Europe a declaration how far they will persevere in the contest with a view to dethrone Buonaparte; and the British government must make up their minds on the question, and come to an understanding upon it with those of the Peninsula."

From the fall of St. Sebastian to the resumption of hostile operations, above one month elapsed.* Many causes concurred to the suspension. Among these the following were the most prominent. The organising anew of the regiments that had suffered most in the recent siege and battle; the concentrating of the divisions; the replacing exhausted stores; and perfecting the whole *matériel* of the army. To assume the offensive on the whole line of the operations, until Pamplona surrendered, would have been hazardous, for as the French were still in possession of the fortresses of Jaca, Lerida, Mesquinenza, Figueras, Gerona, Hostalrich, Barcelona, Tortosa, Peniscola, Saguntum, Denia, &c., on the eastern coast of Spain, and Santona on the western, Suchet might advance to the relief of that fortress. The mistake of the officer of engineers in trans-

mitting the orders for the collection of the pontoon-train, and the inclement state of the weather, had also delayed the movements. But being urged by the British cabinet, in consequence of the rupture of the congress of Prague, and the accession of Austria to the coalition of the confederated German states, Wellington determined to make a forward movement on the French frontier, as a diversion in favour of the German allied movements; and, for this purpose, he determined to dispossess the enemy of an advanced position on the right of the Bidassoa, consisting of a range of heights, the key of which was a high steep mountain, called La Rhune, in front of the passes of Vera and Echellar. A few miles in the rear of this advanced position was a strongly fortified line of works along the Nivelle, which the enemy had been engaged in constructing since the battles of the Pyrenees. Nature had provided the strongest means of defence of this position; everywhere rocks, and torrents, and ravines were crowded together. Art also had exerted its utmost ingenuity for the same purpose. Entrenchments on entrenchments covered the vast slopes of the mountains, which, from their natural steepness were so difficult of access, that it was laborious work even for an unarmed man to reach those points which were now to be assailed in the face of an enemy perfectly prepared.

To attack this position, it was necessary to cross the Bidassoa, which here forms the boundaries of Spain and France, taking its rise in Mount Belat, and flowing down the valley of Bastan, after a circuitous course, falls into the Bay of Biscay, near Fuenterrabia. But there was some difficulty to discover fords near the mouth to pass over the infantry. For this purpose some Spanish fishermen were prevailed on to wade through the channel at low water. By their exertions four fords were discovered between the Isle of Conference, or, as it is otherwise called, the Isle of Pheasants, and the mouth of the river. Wellington determined to possess himself of this advanced position preparatory to his operations in France. For this purpose the left wing of the allied army was destined.

* The people of England, unaware of the difficulties which beset their general, even in the midst of his successes, began to be discontented at his not marching direct to the walls of Paris. The public press conducted to the diffusion of the illusion, and occasioned Wellington to observe, sarcastically, "If I had been at any time capable of doing what these gentlemen expected, I should now, I believe, have

been in the moon. They have long ago expected me at Bourdeaux; nay, I understand that there are many of their wise readers—amateurs of the military art—who are waiting to join the army till the headquarters shall arrive in that city; and when they shall hear of the late Spanish battle, I conclude that they will defer their voyage till I arrive at Paris."

THE PASSAGE AND BATTLE OF THE BIDASSOA.

At three o'clock of the morning of the 7th of October, the troops appointed for the attack stood to their arms. Those destined to force the passage of the river on the left were marched to their positions some hours before day-break, with strict orders to remain concealed. One brigade of the 5th division was posted in the ditch on the western side of Fuenterrabia; the other brigade of this division, with lord Aylmer's British, and Spry's Portuguese brigades, were concealed behind embankments which secured the meadows bordering the river from inundation between that town and Irun; and the 1st division, with Wilson's Portuguese brigade, were drawn up under shelter of some eminences between Irun and the foot of the heights of San Marcial. The dispositions for attack were, the extreme left of the army, consisting of the 1st and 5th divisions, and Wilson's brigade of Portuguese, fording the river at the points discovered near its mouth, was to attack the entrenchments near and about the village of Andaye. Freyre, with his Spaniards, was to cross at the fords in front of Biriatu, and, attacking the works on the Montagne Verte, and on the heights of Mandalle, turn the enemy's flank in his camp before Urogne. The light division, and Longa's Spaniards, were directed to dislodge the enemy from the Commissari mountain and the pass of Vera; while on the extreme right, the Andalusian army, under Giron, was to advance against the entrenched position on La Rhune. To ensure support and co-operation of the different columns, a rocket was fired from the church steeple at Fuenterrabia, as the signal for their simultaneous advance.

The night had been one of storm and darkness, accompanied with thunder. Thus, not only the movement of the artillery to the heights of San Marcial, and of the pontoon train to the water edge was unperceived by the enemy, but also the advance of the attacking columns. As there was a considerable bend in the river inwards, on the extreme left of the allied line, the troops forming that portion were instructed to advance first, so that the attack might be simultaneous. At seven o'clock, lord Aylmer's brigade, which led the advance on

the extreme left, and the 5th division, emerging from their places of concealment, advanced to the fords which had been pointed out for them to cross; the one taking the ford pointing towards the heights of Andaye, the other that opposite the French position at Sans Culottes. When they had reached the middle, the rocket rose from the steeple of Fuenterrabia, and the guns and howitzers on the heights of San Marcial opened their thunder. Immediately, the different columns of attack rushed down to the banks of the river, and plunging into the stream, reached the opposite side, under cover of the artillery. The 5th division, and Aylmer's brigade, gaining the right bank, drove in the French picquets, in spite of the heavy fire they kept up from the hedges, ditches, and the walls and windows of the houses round Andaye. By some artillery, from an entrenchment thrown up opposite to the old bridge, the enemy was quickly dislodged from the looped houses that defended the passage. The 1st division then crossed in support of the 5th, which was now preparing to attack the enemy's line on the nearest range of hills. All the enemy's successive works and entrenchments were now rapidly carried. The 9th regiment, under colonel Cameron, particularly distinguished itself; it stormed the heights of Croix des Bouquets, at the point of the bayonet. The 2nd brigade of guards, and the detachment of the German legion, having effected the passage, covered the formation of a pontoon bridge for the passage of the artillery.

By this time, Freyre's Spaniards had gained the heights of Mandalle, when the lines that had formed to resist Maitland's 1st brigade of guards, and Wilson's Portuguese, finding both their flanks turned, retreated in so great a hurry that they left three guns unspiked. The light division assaulted the position of Vera and the Commissari mountain with much ardour and resolution, though the ascent up the heights was by a steep and narrow zigzag pass, defended by five strong redoubts on the summits of the steep mountains, domineering one over the other. Colburn, placing himself at the head of his brigade, consisting of the 52nd, the 2nd battalion of the 95th, and a battalion of

Portuguese caçadores, at the point of the bayonet, drove the enemy from their works successively, and finally dislodged them from their formidable entrenched camp on the summit: 500 prisoners and three pieces of cannon were taken at this point.

The Andalusian forces, under Giron, carried the entrenchments of the lower slopes of La Rhune, till they arrived at the foot of the lofty rock, on which a chapel had been converted by the enemy into a military post; here, after a long and resolute contest, in which the flash of the musketry was so incessant, that the conical outline of the mountain had all the semblance of being brilliantly illuminated, and the chapel was visible in the blaze to a great distance, when darkness compelled them to desist their efforts. But Wellington, reconnoitring the position on the following morning, found that the rock might be approached by its right, and that the attack might be combined with that of the works in front of the camp at Sarre. Accordingly, he concentrated the Andalusian army on their right, when Giron carried the post upon the rock; and following up his success, stormed a hill entrenchment that protected the right of the camp; but he was still unable to force the summit of the mountain, which was now deemed to be inaccessible on all sides excepting that of Ascain. In the night, however, the enemy withdrew both from the chapel and the camp of Sarre. The enemy had thus been dislodged from all their works in advance of the entrenched camps at Urogne; and the whole allied army occupied a range of commanding position from which they could assail the French territory simultaneously at different points.

On the following day, a detachment of the 7th division having imprudently pushed forward into the village of Sarre, was attacked by a superior force, and suffered severely; but a few Spanish regiments advancing to their aid, the French were repulsed, and the detachment enabled to retain its position; but on the 12th, a redoubt in advance of the camp of Sarre, held by an advanced party of Spaniards, and which had been abandoned on the 8th, was surprised; but as it was too far in advance of the allied position, the enemy was allowed to retain it.

In the passage and battle of the Bidassoa, the loss of the allies in killed and wounded was 1,500, and that of the enemy 100 less; the disparity arising from their protection

behind the entrenchments. While the left wing of the army was engaged in deadly conflict, the officers of Hill's corps on the right had races on the plains of Burquete.

During these desperate contests, many displays of heroism were exhibited; but there was one eminently conspicuous. The French garrison, consisting of 300 men, having abandoned a strong field-work which covered the right of the Bayonette ridge, were observed by colonel Colborne to hurry off in evident confusion. He galloped forward, attended by his staff and about half-a-dozen riflemen, and, intercepting them, ordered them to surrender. Believing that he was in advance of a force too strong to be resisted, the men throwing down their arms, submitted. Another instance of heroic conduct occurred on this day. Two French regiments pouring a heavy fire on Giron's Spaniards as they fought their way up abreast with the British near the saddle ridge, to the right of the Vera pass, the Spaniards stopped, and "though the adventurer Downie, who was now a Spanish general, encouraged them with his voice, they seemed irresolute, and did not advance. There happened to be present an officer of the 43rd regiment, named Havelock, who being attached to general Alten's staff, was sent to ascertain Giron's progress. His fiery temper could not brook the check. He took off his hat, he called on the Spaniards to follow him, and putting spurs to his horse, at one bound cleared the abattis, and went headlong amongst the enemy. Then the soldiers shouting for "El chico blanco," the fair boy, so they called him, for he was very young and had light hair, with one shock broke through the French, and this at the very moment when their centre was fleeing under the fire of Kempt's skirmishers from the Puerto de Vera."* Neither is the following incident the least unworthy of notice of the transactions connected with the battle just described. General Freyre having pointed out an impassable ford to the officer who was to lead the column consisting of the brigade to the right across the river, the column was thus obliged to retrace its steps; when captain Mann, of the royal staff corps, leaving his horse sticking in the mud, descended the stream to a ford about a quarter of a mile lower, and wading breast-high through the stream, followed by the column, quickly gained the French side of the river.

* Napier.

The village of Urogne having been burnt and pillaged by some of the allied troops during the battle, on the next day the following general order was published, confirming the republication of the order issued at Irurita on the 9th of the preceding July, as some of the troops in the pursuit from Vittoria, had, at that time, penetrated the passes, and established posts in the French territory :—

“Lesaca, 9th October, 1813.

“1. The commander of the forces is concerned to be under the necessity of publishing over again his orders of the 9th July last [dated from Irurita], as they have been unattended to by the officers and troops which entered France yesterday.

“2. According to all the information which the commander of the forces has received, outrages of all descriptions were committed by the troops in presence even of their officers, who took no pains whatever to prevent them.

“3. The commander of the forces has already determined that some officers, so grossly negligent of their duty, shall be sent to England, that their names may be brought before the attention of the prince regent, and that his royal highness may give such directions respecting them as he may think proper, as the commander of the forces is determined not to command officers who will not obey his orders.”

The following is the order referred to :—

“Irurita, 9th July, 1813.

“1. The commander of the forces is anxious to draw the attention of officers of the army to the difference of the situation in which they have been hitherto among the people of Portugal and Spain, and that in which they may hereafter find themselves among those of the frontiers of France.

“2. Every military precaution must henceforth be used to obtain intelligence, and to prevent surprise. General and superior officers at the head of detached corps will take care to keep up a constant and regular communication with the corps on their right and left, and with their rear; and the soldiers and their followers must be prevented from wandering to a distance from their corps and cantonments on any account whatever.

“3. Notwithstanding that these precautions are absolutely necessary, as the country in front of the army is the enemy's, the commander of the forces is particularly desirous that the inhabitants should be well

treated; and that private property must be respected, as it has been hitherto.

“4. The officers and soldiers of the army must recollect that their nations are at war with France solely because the ruler of the French nation will not allow them to be at peace, and is desirous of forcing them to submit to his yoke; and they must not forget that the worst of the evils suffered by the enemy in his profligate invasion of Spain and Portugal, have been occasioned by the irregularities of the soldiers, and their cruelties, authorized and encouraged by their chiefs, towards the unfortunate and peaceful inhabitants of the country.

“5. To revenge this conduct on the peaceable inhabitants of France would be unmanly and unworthy of the nations to whom the commander of the forces now addresses himself; and, at all events, would be the occasion of similar and worse evils to the army at large than those which the enemy's army have suffered in the Peninsula; and would eventually prove highly injurious to the public interests.

“6. The rules, therefore, which have been observed hitherto, in requiring, and taking, and giving receipts for supplies from the country, are to be continued in the villages on the French frontier; and the commissaries attached to each of the armies of the several nations, will receive the orders from the commander-in-chief of the army of their nations, respecting the mode and period of paying for such supplies.”

These orders were repeatedly read in English, Portuguese, and Spanish, at the heads of the respective regiments, and were translated into the French and Basque languages. The following proclamation, which was also translated into the Basque language, was addressed, November 1st, to the French people, signifying that the commander of the forces would punish all persons who should plunder or molest them, as long as they remained peaceably in their villages.

“Proclamation Ire, aux Françaises, par le feld-maréchal marquis de Wellington, général en chef des armées alliées.

“Au quartier général, ce 1 Nov., 1813.

“Entrant dans votre pays, je vous annonce que j'ai donné les ordres les plus positifs, dont y il a-ci dessous traduction, pour prévenir les malheurs qui sont ordinairement la suite de l'invasion d'une armée ennemie (invasion que vous connaissez être la conséquence de celle que votre gouverne-

ment avait fait de l'Espagne), et des succès des armées alliées sous mes ordres. Vous pouvez être assurés que je mettrai à exécution ces ordres; et je vous prie de faire arrêter et conduire à mon quartier général tous ceux qui, contre ces provisions, vous font du mal. Mais il faut que vous restiez chez vous, et que vous ne preniez aucune part dans les opérations de la guerre dont votre pays va devenir le théâtre. WELLINGTON."

This proclamation was accompanied by the translation of the above specified orders.

The translation of the proclamation was as follows:—

"Proclamation to the French, by field-marshal the marquis of Wellington, general-in-chief of the allied armies. Head-quarters, 1st of November, 1813.

"On entering your country, I make known to you that I have given the strictest orders, of which a translation is subjoined, to avert the misfortunes which are generally the consequence of the invasion of an enemy's army (an invasion which, you are aware, has resulted from that made by your government on Spain), and of the success of the allied armies acting under my orders.

"You may rest assured, that I will carry these orders into effect; and I request that you arrest and conduct to my head-quarters all those who, in disobedience of them, may do you any injury. But it is necessary that you should remain in your houses, and should not take any part in the operations of the war of which your country is about to become the theatre. WELLINGTON."

The outrages still continuing, even after the battle of the Nivelle, for their more effectual suppression the following proclamation was issued:—

"Proclamation, No. 18.

"Au quartier général,
ce 23 Février, 1814.

"1. Les habitants qui desirent former une garde pour la conservation de l'ordre public, et pour la protection de leurs biens; sont invités à faire savoir leurs intentions au commandant-en-chef; et en même temps à lui notifier la force de la garde communale qu'ils proposent former dans leurs communes respectives.

"2. Cette garde communale sera sous les ordres du maire, qui sera tenu responsable pour sa conduite.

"3. MM. les maires sont invités à faire arrêter par cette garde communale les traîneurs, muletiers, et autres des armées alliées, qui font aucun mal ou dégât; et de les con-

duire au quartier général, ou à l'officier qui commande des troupes alliées dans les environs. Chaque plainte doit être accompagnée d'un procès verbal des circonstances de l'arrestation, pour que les coupables soient punis et forcés à payer pour ce qu'ils ont pris ou détruit. WELLINGTON."

This proclamation was translated into the English language, and was accompanied by the following order:—

"St. Sever, 5th March, 1814.

"The commander of the forces requests the attention of general officers, and officers commanding regiments, to the following translation of a proclamation, which he has addressed to the country, directing the magistrates to form a guard in each parish, for the preservation of peace and property within the district of each: and requests that every assistance may be given to the magistrates to carry into execution the objects of this proclamation:—

Translation of a proclamation by field-marshal the marquis of Wellington, commander-in-chief, &c. &c., numbered 18, and dated Head-quarters, 23rd Feb., 1814.

"1. The inhabitants of such districts as are desirous of forming a guard within their respective parishes, for the preservation of order and for the protection of their property, are desired to make known their wishes to the commander-in-chief, specifying, at the same time, the numbers of which they propose the guard to consist.

"2. The guard is, in all cases, to be under the protection of the mayor, who will be held responsible for its conduct.

"3. Whenever either stragglers, muleteers, or followers of the army, commit any sort of depredation, the mayors are hereby directed to have them arrested by this guard, and sent to the head-quarters of the army, or to the general officer commanding the nearest division, accompanied by a statement of the damage done, and of the circumstances attending the transaction, in order that those who may be convicted may be punished for their offences, and be forced to pay the value of what they may have taken or destroyed. WELLINGTON."

In consequence of these humane and prudent orders, the inhabitants of the country soon established a peaceful and lucrative traffic in supplies necessary for the army.

"In no part of Spain," says the English general to lord Bathurst, in a letter dated St. Jean de Luz, 21st November, 1813, "have we been better, I might say so well,

received; and it is a fact that we really draw more supply from the country than we ever did from any part of Spain. The inhabitants, who had at first left their habitations, have in general returned to them, many of them at the risk of their lives, having been fired at by the French sentries at the outposts; and they are living very comfortably and quietly with our soldiers cantoned in their houses.

"The Spaniards plundered a good deal, and did a good deal of mischief, on the first two days; but even this misfortune has been of service to us. Some were executed, and many punished; and I sent all the Spanish troops back into Spain to be confined, which has convinced the French of our desire not to injure individuals."

As there was hardly a soldier in the Spanish or Portuguese service who could not tell a tale of a parent or brother murdered, a sister or daughter ravished, or a patrimony destroyed, from the violence of the French soldiers, or the more lasting scourge of their contributions, the Spaniards and Portuguese talked of retribution and revenge, and looked forward to the plunder of France as a measure of just retaliation for all the misery the French had inflicted on Spain and Portugal. But lord Wellington's letters to the Spanish generals, Murillo, Freyre, Mina, &c., convinced them, notwithstanding their reluctance to carry them into execution, and even remonstrances against them, that he would not allow any act of the kind. "Where I command," says he to Freyre, in a letter dated St. Jean de Luz, 21st December, 1813, "I declare that no one shall be allowed to plunder. If plunder must be had, then another must have the command.* You have large armies in Spain, and if it is wished to plunder the French peasantry, you may enter France, but then the Spanish government must remove me from the command of their armies.* * * * It is a matter of indifference to me whether I command a large or a small army, but whether large or small, the army must obey me, and above all, must not plunder."

Excesses being committed, he punished with summary military law, whether the offenders were British, Spanish, or Portuguese; and in the case of British offence, the whole regiment or brigade to which the

* He had been re-instated in the command of the Spanish armies. In December, the new cortes, appreciating the consequences of being left to themselves, decided that he should retain the command of their armies, and the regency be bound to fulfil the engagements of its predecessors.

offender belonged was kept under arms to prevent further offence. The whole of the Spaniards, except Murillo's division, which had not been guilty of outrage, namely Freyre's Galicians, Giron's Andalusians, and Longa's and Mina's troops, were sent back to their own country. On the very day of the battle they had been guilty of marauding, and had murdered several of the French peasants. Their indulgence of vengeance may appear from a single anecdote. "Hearing screams," says the author of the *Subaltern*, "we ran up, and found a poor old French peasant lying dead at the bottom of the garden. A bullet had passed through his head, and his thin grey hairs were dyed with his own blood. A *caçadore* rushed out, and attempted to elude us. On entering, we saw an old woman, the wife of the peasant, lying dead in the kitchen. The desperate Portuguese did not attempt to deny having perpetrated these murders; he seemed, on the contrary, wound up to a pitch of frenzy: 'they murdered my father,' said he; 'they cut my mother's throat; and they ravished my sister before my eyes; and I vowed at the time I would put to death the first French family that fell into my hands. You may hang me if you will; but I have kept my oath, and care not for dying.' He was hanged; indeed, no fewer than eighteen were suspended on this and the following days, to the branches of trees. Measures so extreme were requisite to check the ardent thirst of vengeance in the Peninsular soldiers. On the 12th though in hourly expectation of a battle, lord Wellington caused all the Spanish and Portuguese marauders, taken in the act, to be executed.

On the day following the battle, Freyre's and Longa's men had pillaged and murdered several persons in Ascain; and the next day the whole of the Spanish troops continued their excesses in several directions. Mina's men made a plundering and marauding excursion towards Hellette, and were in so formidable a state of mutiny, that it was necessary to disarm them. During the battle, adjutant-general Packenham, detecting two British soldiers plundering in Ascain, caused them to be hung on the two trees nearest to the spot, with papers affixed to their breasts detailing for what offence this summary justice was inflicted; and several officers were sent to England for not having repressed the misconduct of their men.

Soult, who had not only sanctioned and permitted the French troops in their un-

manly violence and outrage on the people of Spain, but had been guilty of the same himself, now that he was in his own country, affected a display of moderation and justice. When the French troops, who preserved the same predatory habits among their own countrymen for which they had been long and uniformly licensed and encouraged by their officers in Spain, were quitting St. Jean de Luz after their discomfiture on the Nivelle, a woman complained to an officer whose company had been quartered there, that his men were plundering her house; he disregarded her entreaties to restrain them; and the woman, in her emotion at seeing her little property rifled by her own countrymen, exclaimed, "that if those who ought to be the defenders of the inhabitants would not protect them, but robbed them, the English might as well be there at once." "Oh!" replied the officer, "if you are the friend of the English, you shall see how I will protect you!" and immediately he set fire to her house. A *gen-d'arme* who was present took the woman's part, and promised to report the circumstance to marshal Soult; he did so; and the officer was brought to a court-martial, condemned, and shot.

Winter had now set in in its sternest mood; a season of unusual severity had commenced. The cold became so intense that the sentries were frozen at their posts on the bleak and dreary summits of the Pyrenees. Perished with wet and cold, a spirit of discontent was engendered among the troops. The days were hot in the extreme, followed by nights that were piercingly cold and frosty.* Their picket and night duties were incessant and very harassing. The dulness of their camps and bivouacs, the wearisome duties of guard and

* In the camp and the bivouac all goes on merrily, but there come moments of which the bare remembrance recalls ancient twitches of rheumatism, which the iron forms of the most hardy cannot always resist. On the night previous to Craufurd's affair on the Coa, on those previous to the battle of Salamanca, and the battle of Waterloo, and on many other less anxious nights, not hallowed by such recollections, deluges of rain not only drenched the earth, but unfortunately all that rested, or tried to rest, upon it; the draining through the hut from above, by some ill-placed sticks in the roof, like lightning conductors, conveyed the subtle fluid where it was least wanted, while the floods coming under, drove away all possibility of sleep: repose was, of course, out of the question, when even the worms would come out of the earth, it being far too wet for them. "In such a night as this" it was weary work to wait the lagging dawn with a craving stomach, and worse still to

fatigue, and the sufferings from frost and sleet, tired the patience, and shook the constancy of the best soldiers. Oftentimes, as the chill mist upon the mountains was for a few hours dissipated by the sun or wind, the fertile plains of France were seen beneath in all the tempting luxuriance of sunshine; and the eye of the longing sentinel, freezing at his post, could discern the smoke of towns and villages, and scattered homesteads, lying in pleasant and warm valleys. No trial, as it has been justly observed, is more severe on the moral character of the soldier than a state of inaction in the field, when accompanied by tiresome duties and severe privations. Many a brave man who, in the presence of an enemy, would only abandon his colours with his life, under these circumstances loses spirit and principle, and alike regardless of the impulses of honour and the obligation of an oath, adopts a desperate resolution, and in despair goes over to the enemy. Thus many an idle rover, without principle to endure to the end, was tempted away, and deserted to the enemy. In less than four months, above 1,200 men had gone over to the enemy; according to Mr. Southey's statement, on the average weekly proportion of twenty-five Spaniards, fifteen Irish, twelve English, six Scotch, and half a Portuguese.

The cause of some of these desertions was singular. Men who feared neither the French nor any human being, had deserted from a dread of ghosts or dead bodies. The author of the *Subaltern* says: "As this was an event that had rarely occurred before, many opinions were hazarded as to its cause. For my part, I attributed it entirely to the operation of superstitious terror in the minds of the men; and for this reason, it is generally the custom, in placing sentries in the

find nothing but a bellyful of bullets for breakfast. But, on the Pyrenees, in the more fortunate and healthy days of tents, it was not unusual, when the mountain blasts and torrents of rain drew up the pegs of the tents, which then fall, as nothing in nature falls, squash upon the soldier, who lies enveloped and floundering in the horrible wet folds of the canvas, that nothing but the passing joke of "Boat a-hoy!" or the roars of laughter caused by some wag who turns this acme of misery into mirth, could reanimate to the exertion of scrambling out of these clumsy winding-sheets. Here, often in the morning, the soldier called up in his blanket, which, from the insensible perspiration, had become stiff and frozen, awoke, covered with hoar frost, like a twelfth-cake. Indeed, it was often with some difficulty that he could get out of his frozen envelope of blanket.—*Gurwood's Introduction to the Wellington Orders*

immediate presence of the enemy, to station them in pairs, so that one may patrol as far as the next post, while the other remains steady on his guard. Perhaps, too, the wish of giving greater confidence to the men themselves may have some weight in dictating the measure; at all events, there can be no doubt that it produces that effect. Such, however, was the nature of the ground covered by our pickets among the Pyrenees, that in many places there was hardly room for a couple of sentinels to occupy a single post, while it was only at the mouths of the various passes that two were more desirable than one for securing the safety of the army. Rugged as the country was, however, almost every part of it had been the scene of action, while the dead, falling among rocks and cliffs, were left in various instances, from necessity, unburied; and exactly in those posts where the dead lay unburied, single sentinels were planted. That both soldiers and sailors are frequently superstitious, every person knows; nor can it be pleasant for the strongest minded among them to spend two or three hours of a stormy night beside a mangled and half-devoured carcase; indeed, I have been myself, more than once, remonstrated with, for desiring as brave a fellow as any in the corps to keep guard near one of his fallen comrades; 'I don't care for living men,' said the soldier, 'but for God's sake, sir, don't put me beside *him*;' and wherever I could yield to the remonstrance, I invariably did so. My own opinion, therefore, was, that many of the sentries became so overpowered by superstition, that they could not keep their ground. They knew, however, that if they returned to the picket, a severe punishment awaited them; and, therefore, they went over to the enemy, rather than endure the misery of a diseased imagination. As a proof that my notions were correct, it was remarked, that the army had no sooner descended from the mountains, and taken up a position which required a chain of double sentinels to be renewed, than desertion in a very great degree ceased. A few instances, indeed, still occurred, as will always be the case where men of all tempers are brought together, as in the army; but they bore not the proportion of one to twenty to those which took place among the Pyrenees."

At this period the following letter was addressed to lord Bathurst, which is as distinguished for its kind motives, and con-

sideration of the interests of those in whose behalf it was penned, as for its justice and necessity.

"Vera, 10th October, 1813.

"My Lord,—I wish to draw your attention to the situation of sir Rowland Hill and sir John Hope. They, each of them, command very large corps, and great expenses must be incurred by them; and I know that the former, and I believe the latter, have not the means of defraying their expenses. The general officers of the British army are altogether very badly paid; and adverting to the deductions from their pay, they receive less than they did fifty years ago, while their expenses are more than doubled; and their allowances of all kinds are smaller than those of corresponding ranks in other services, while, from the custom of the British army, they are all obliged to keep tables for their staff; and their expenses are greater.

"It would not, probably, be possible to increase the pay of general officers generally; but I earnestly recommend that sir John Hope and sir Rowland Hill should have an allowance each, equal to that of the second in command in Sicily, or to that of the commanding officer at Cadiz.

"I would beg your lordship to observe likewise that the expenses of an officer who must spend more than he receives here, are vastly increased by the disadvantageous rate at which he is obliged to draw his money; and I believe that, in this way, even sir Thomas Graham, who has a large private fortune, has been frequently in distress here.—Believe me, &c. WELLINGTON."

The position of the allied army was now as follows: the 1st and 5th divisions, lord Aylmer's British brigade, Bradford and Wilson's Portuguese brigades, and the Spanish force under Giron, were encamped in France, extending to the greater La Rhune. The light and 4th divisions occupied the heights in front of Vera. The army of reserve of Andalusia, and the 7th division, were posted near Echellar. The 3rd division was near Echellar and Maya. The 6th division was in position at Maya, with Hamilton's Portuguese division at Ariscoen. One brigade of the 2nd division was at Alduides; the remainder of that division, and the Spanish corps of Murillo, were at Roncesvalles. The cavalry were principally cantoned in the valley of the Ebro. Head-quarters were at Vera.

The despatch detailing the passage and battle of the Bidassoa, which equalled in boldness of conception, the passage of the

Douro, and surpassed it in execution, addressed to lord Bathurst, was—

“Lesaca, 9th October, 1813.

“My Lord,—Having deemed it expedient to cross the Bidassoa with the left of the army, I have the pleasure to inform your lordship that that object was effected on the 7th instant. Lieutenant-general sir Thomas Graham directed the 1st and 5th divisions, and the 1st Portuguese brigade under brigadier-general Wilson, to cross that river in three columns below, and in one above, the site of the bridge, under the command of major-general Hay, colonel the hon. C. Greville, major-general the hon. Edward Stopford, and major-general Howard; and lieutenant-general don Manuel Freyre directed that part of the fourth Spanish army, under his immediate command, to cross in three columns at fords above those at which the allied British and Portuguese troops passed. The former were destined to carry the enemy's entrenchments about and above Andaye; while the latter should carry those on the Montagne Verte, and on the heights of Mandale, by which they were to turn the enemy's left.

“The operations of both bodies of troops succeeded in every point; the British and Portuguese troops took seven pieces of cannon in the redoubts and batteries which they carried, and the Spanish troops one piece of cannon in those carried by them. I had particular satisfaction in observing the steadiness and gallantry of all the troops. The 9th British regiment were very strongly opposed, charged with bayonets more than once, and have suffered, but I am happy to add, that in other parts of these corps our loss has not been severe. The Spanish troops, under lieutenant-general Don M. Freyre, behaved admirably, and turned and carried the enemy's entrenchments on the hills with great dexterity and gallantry; and I am much indebted to the lieutenant-general, and to lieutenant-general Sir T. Graham, and to the general and staff-officers of both corps, for the execution of the arrangements for this operation.

“Lieutenant-general sir T. Graham, having thus established within the French territory the troops of the allied British and Portuguese army, which had been so frequently distinguished under his command, resigned the command to lieutenant-general sir J. Hope, who had arrived from Ireland on the preceding day. While this was going on upon the left, major-general C. Baron

Alten attacked, with the light division, the enemy's entrenchments in the Puerto de Vera, supported by the Spanish division under brigadier Longa; and the Mariscal de Campo, Don P. A. Giron, attacked the enemy's entrenchments and posts on the mountain called La Rhune, immediately on the right of the light division, with the army of reserve of Andalusia.

“Colonel Colborne, of the 52nd regiment, who commanded major-general Skerrett's brigade in the absence of the major-general on account of his health, attacked the enemy's right, in a camp which they had strongly entrenched. The 52nd regiment, under the command of major Mein, charged, in a most gallant style, and carried the entrenchment with the bayonet. The 1st and 3rd caçadores, and the 2nd battalion 95th regiment, as well as the 52nd regiment, distinguished themselves in this attack. Major-general Kempt's brigade attacked by the Puerto, where the opposition was not so severe; and major-general C. Alten has reported his sense of the judgment displayed both by the major-general and by colonel Colborne in these attacks.

“The light division took 22 officers, and 400 prisoners, and 3 pieces of cannon; and I am particularly indebted to major-general C. Baron Alten for the manner in which he executed this service. On the right, the troops of the army of reserve of Andalusia, under the command of Don P. A. Giron, attacked the enemy's posts and entrenchments on the mountain of La Rhune in two columns, under the command of Spaniards only. These troops carried everything before them in the most gallant style, till they arrived at the foot of the rock on which the hermitage stands; and they made repeated attempts to take even that post by storm; but it was impossible to get up; and the enemy remained during the night, in possession of the hermitage, and on a rock on the same range of the mountain with the right of the Spanish troops. Some time elapsed yesterday morning before the fog cleared away sufficiently to enable me to reconnoitre the mountain, which I found to be least inaccessible by its right, and that the attack of it might be connected with advantage with the attack of the enemy's works in front of the camp of Sarre. I accordingly ordered the army of reserve to concentrate to their right, and as soon as the concentration commenced, Mariscal de Campo, Don P. A. Giron, ordered the bat-

talion *de las Ordenes* to attack the enemy's post on the rock, on the right of the position occupied by his troops, which was instantly carried in the most gallant style. These troops followed up their success, and carried an entrenchment on a hill, which protected the right of the camp of Sarre; and the enemy immediately evacuated all their works to defend the approaches to the camp, which were taken possession of by detachments from the 7th division, sent by lieutenant-general the earl of Dalhousie through the Puerto de Echellar, for this purpose. Don P. A. Giron then established the battalion of *Las Ordenes* on the enemy's left, on the rock of the hermitage. It was too late to proceed farther last night; and the enemy withdrew from their post at the hermitage, and from the camp of Sarre, during the night.

"It gives me singular satisfaction to report the good conduct of the officers and troops of the army of reserve of Andalusia, as well in the operations of the 7th instant,

as in those of yesterday. The attack made by the battalion of *Las Ordenes*, under the command of colonel Hore, yesterday, was made in as good order and with as much spirit as any that I have seen made by any troops; and I was much satisfied with the spirit and discipline of the whole of this corps. I cannot applaud too highly the execution of the arrangements for these attacks, by the Mariscal de Campo, Don P. A. Giron, and the general and staff-officers under his directions. I omitted to report to your lordship, in my dispatch of the 4th instant, that when on my way to Roncesvalles, on the 1st instant, I directed brigadier-general Campbell to endeavour to carry off the enemy's pickets in his front, which he attacked on that night; and completely succeeded, with the Portuguese troops under his command, in carrying off the whole of one picket, consisting of seventy men. A fortified post, on the mountain of Ariola, was likewise stormed, and the whole garrison put to the sword."

SURRENDER OF PAMPLONA.

PAMPLONA, after a blockade of four months and ten days, surrendered on the 31st of October. During the blockade, the garrison had made several sorties for the purpose of collecting provisions, and impeding the progress of the blockade, encouraged by the sound of Soult's guns, as he pursued the 4th and 5th divisions under Picton to Huarte. On that made on the 26th July, the governor vigorously attacked O'Donnel, who, retreating from some of his trenches, spiking a number of his guns, and destroying a quantity of ammunition, would have abandoned the blockade, had it not been for the timely arrival of D'Espagna with his corps. On the first of the following month the blockade was resumed; and in the middle of September the prince of Anglona's division of Del Parque's army arrived to relieve the Andalusian force, who then joined the rest of that army near Echellar. On the 3rd of October, the governor wished to turn the remaining inhabitants out of the town; but this D'Espagna would not allow. Foiled in this design, he sent word that 7,000 rations must be supplied for the inhabitants of the place, as he would no longer feed them. The Spanish general replied, that unless

the inhabitants were fed as well as the garrison, while any food lasted, he would hold the governor responsible for their treatment, and should strictly inquire into the fact when the place should be surrendered. Thus foiled again, Cassan caused it to be reported that he would blow up the citadel, having already undermined some of the bastions, and would cut his way through the besieging force into France. Wellington, indignant at the design, sent orders to D'Espagna, to inform Cassan, that if he attempted to carry his design into execution, he would hold him responsible for the act, "as it could be no otherwise considered than as a desire to inflict a sensible injury on the Spanish nation, against all the laws of war, and afterwards throw themselves upon the generosity of the allied army. But I warn you, general, that I have no disposition to such a sentiment for those who shall conduct themselves in the manner supposed, and I therefore desire that you will grant neither capitulation nor favour of any kind to the garrison of Pamplona, if they do the slightest damage to the place, but, without waiting for further orders, will put to death the governor, officers, and non-commis-

sioned officers, and will decimate the soldiers." At the same time, he immediately ordered up a reinforcement of cavalry, under sir Stapleton Cotton, and directed them to show themselves on the plains near Pamplona. This stern order and precaution no doubt had their influence on Cassan, who now proposed terms of surrender, which being rejected, he and his garrison loudly proclaimed, in an official declaration, their resolution, to bury themselves under the ruins of the fortress; but in five days afterwards, they laid down their arms and colours, and surrendered themselves, 3,000 in number, as prisoners of war. D'Espagna refused to accede to the capitulation, till he had ascertained that none of the inhabitants had perished during the blockade, either through ill treatment or for want. The garrison and inhabitants had for many weeks subsisted on rations of four ounces of horse-flesh for each person, and at last dogs and cats were esteemed dainties, and rats and mice had long been sought after with avidity.


Pamplona, the capital of Navarre, is partly situated on an eminence, and partly in a plain on the banks of the small river Agra, which washes the northern and eastern fronts of the fortress, the defences on those sides consisting only of walls edging the perpendicular rocky bank of the river; but on the other parts it is regularly fortified. The city is surrounded on all sides by a circle of mountains, about eight miles distant; and has two castles, one within the city, the other without the walls. A deep trench of considerable extent renders the approaches to it difficult on the side on which it is attackable. Lord Wellington was, at this time, subject to much embarrassment and difficulty, occasioned not only by his ungrateful and faithless allies, but also by the conduct of the ministry of his own country.

The sterile nature of the country, particularly Les Landes, and its coast, which is open to the prevailing winds, being unapproachable in stormy weather, supplies could not be trusted to from the sea;* even in the sheltered harbour of Passages, the transports

could with difficulty ride to their moorings, in consequence of the heavy swell that tumbled in from the Atlantic; and that difficulty was much increased by the British ministry neglecting to keep a sufficient naval force on the coast. This neglect not only operated to the injury of the allies, but enabled the enemy's army to obtain abundant supplies by means of its coasting vessels between Bourdeaux and Bayonne; besides affording them facility to recruit their cavalry and infantry with those horses and men which must have been employed in the conveyance of their stores, had they been compelled to obtain them by land conveyance. On this subject the English general again urged the foreign secretary of state and the English government in the following emphatic terms:—"I beg leave once more to impress on your lordship the absolute necessity that we should have the maritime communication constant and secure, notwithstanding the inconvenience, the difficulty, and the danger, if it is intended by his majesty's government, that I should maintain a large army upon this frontier; and it is obvious from what I have above stated, that stinted naval means will not answer."

Since April more than twenty applications and remonstrances on this subject had been made by lord Wellington to the government and the admiralty, but they had all been unheeded. The consequence was, that when snow and rain were falling copiously on the Pyrenees, and the plains where the left wing of the army was hutted, the troops were without proper clothing, because the ships containing the great coats, shoes, and other indispensables, could not leave the ports of Lisbon and Oporto for fear of capture by cruisers issuing from Santona, Bayonne, and Bordeaux. Because the ordnance store-ships could not sail from Lisbon for want of convoy, the British troops, after the battle of Vittoria, were obliged to use French ammunition, though too small for English muskets. Such were the negligence and incapacity of the government officials of the time, that when they sent a battering train, consisting of 117 pieces, for the siege of St. Sebastian, "with characteristic negligence," shot and shell for only one day's consumption were sent for the use of the besiegers.

* At this time, the supplies for many of the corps of the allied armies were carried to the mountain encampments on the heads of men and women, long strings of whom were to be seen toiling up the steep and slippery ascents.







THE INVASION OF FRANCE.

ANNO 1813.

It was a bright honour, and a rich reward to the army of England, and its patient and persevering allies, after five years of severe warfare, to carry forward their triumphant standards into the territory of the common foe.* The spirit in which their illustrious leader, as announced in his memorable order to the army, dated 9th July, 1813, led them forth to victory, and the preservation of the independence of Europe, was as calm and noble as the honourable sentiments which it breathed were dignified and enlightened.

Since the battles of the Pyrenees, the enemy had been labouring with incessant diligence in constructing a formidable line of defence, to prevent the advance of the allies into France. It consisted of three successive lines of heights, the entire front of each being defended by abattis, retrenchments, and a chain of redoubts. The first line covered St. Jean de Luz; in front of which town, the right of the position rested on the sea, having in the rear the fort Socoa as a support. From this point the line stretched, in a half-circle, twelve miles inland, crossed the Nivelle, and terminated on a strong height behind the village of Ainhoë. The second line stretched from St. Jean de Luz on the right, to Cambo on the left; and the third line was established behind St. Pé on the road to Ustaritz. The mountain La Petite Rhune formed a strongly entrenched advanced post in front of the village of Sarre, and was covered with two formidable redoubts, and strong interior lines. The bridge at Ascain, and that below it, were covered by strong *têtes-de-pont*; and the space included in the bend of the Nivelle to the heights of Ainhoë, was studded with redoubts and lines of retrenchments. In a word, the whole of the position was strong by nature, and had been fortified by skill. In many parts it was impregnable in front, and was much stronger and more inaccessible than the lines of Torres Vedras were, which Massena, after eight weeks' blockading, had been fearful to assail.

This formidable position, besides being covered on every assailable point with re-

trenchments, and that the Sierras and every eminence were crowned with numerous field-works, in the intersecting valleys and spaces of level surface the enemy were formed in great strength, some in lines, some in columns, according as the nature of the ground would allow, with *tirailleurs* covering the slopes half-way down their descents. Their troops were collected in vast entrenched camps at Sans Culottes, Bourdegain, Serres, Ainhoë, &c. The first camp was occupied by three divisions, stretched inland along the summits of a series of detached heights towards the foot of the Little Rhune. To the left of that camp was another at Ascain and Serres, on both banks of the Nivelle, occupied by a division. A camp occupied by three divisions, under Clausel, was posted on the heights behind Sarre. Five miles to the left of Sarre, behind Ainhoë, was a camp of two divisions under D'Erlon. The division of Foy was at Bidarry on the Nive; and that of Paris was posted in the neighbourhood of St. Jean-Pied-de-Port. The Little Rhune was held by a brigade. Thus the great road to Bayonne, and those from Vera by Echellar, from Maya and Pamplona, were all guarded.

During the construction of these works, Soult, in addition to the reinforcements drawn from the general conscription throughout France, had received a special force of 30,000 conscripts, which had been levied in the provinces bordering on the Pyrenees. His position was now occupied by 70,000 combatants. The French cavalry was posted at Orthes. Soult's light division was on the heights of Cambo. An organized national guard was stationed at the issues of all the valleys of St. Jean-Pied-de-Port. The Franco-Spanish partisan, Casa Palacio, commanded the remains of Joseph's Spanish guard. Since the passage and battle of the Bidassoa, the weather had been extremely inclement; continual rain falling near the coast, where the left wing of the allied army was cantoned, and snow in mountainous regions where its right wing was posted. "Quel terrible temps!" exclaimed lord Wellington, in a letter to the Spanish general Freyre; "le général Hill ne peut pas se mettre

* Sherer's *Military Memoirs of Wellington*.

en mouvement, étant jusqu'aux genoux dans le neige;" and to sir John Hope he said, when speaking of what was passing in his own immediate quarters, "the rain will destroy us if it lasts much longer."

The heavy autumnal rains at length being over, and the weather clearing up, the English general prepared to act against the enemy. Hill was accordingly ordered to descend from his mountain position, and move into the valley of the Bastan. The army having been concentrated during the 6th and 7th instant, was organized into three grand divisions. The right wing, which consisted of the 2nd (Stewart's) and 6th (W. Clinton's) divisions, Hamilton's Portuguese division, the Spanish division of Morillo, Grant's cavalry brigade, a brigade of Portuguese artillery, and three mountain guns, was commanded by Hill. The centre was divided into two columns; the left of which consisted of the light division, under Charles Alten, supported by Longa's Spaniards; and the right column was composed of the 3rd (Colville's, in the absence of Picton), the 4th (Cole's) and the 7th (the Portuguese Mariscal del Campo Le Cor's, in the absence of lord Dalhousie) divisions. Giron's Andalusian army of reserve, and Victor Alten's brigade of light cavalry, with six mountain guns, under sir Stapleton Cotton, and three brigades of British artillery, were posted as a reserve between the two columns of the centre. The left wing, which consisted of the 1st (Howard's), and the 5th (Hay's) divisions, lord Aylmer's independent brigade, and the Portuguese brigades of Wilson and Bradford, Vandeleur's light cavalry brigade, and the heavy German cavalry, with fifty-four guns, was commanded by Hope. The right wing was collected in the valley of the Bastan, the posts of Roncesvalles, Altobiscar, and the Alduides, which had been held by Hill's troops, being given over to those of Mina. The right centre was collected about the passes of Echellar and Zugarramurdi; and the left centre occupied the mountain La Rhune. The left wing occupied a strong defensive position on the range of heights from which the enemy had been dislodged at the battle of the Bidassoa. Freyre, with the army of Galicia, was posted on the heights of Mandale towards Ascaín, thus connecting the centre and left wing.

Wellington having carefully reconnoitred the enemy's position, arranged his plan of attack. Deeming his right too strong to

justify an attack, he determined to divert him by feigned attempts on that quarter, while he forced the centre—(particularly the opening between the Rhune mountains and the bridge of Amotz, on the right of which D'Erlon's divisions were posted, and on the left Clausel's)—and left, and thus turned the right. In the event of this object being gained, it was possible, by establishing the assailing columns in the rear of the enemy's right, his retreat to Bayonne might be intercepted. To accomplish this purpose the right wing was to assail the enemy's left; the right centre was to direct its attack against the redoubts in front of Sarre, and the heights behind that village; and the left centre the heights of the lesser Rhune, and having carried them, to co-operate in the general attack on the enemy's centre; while Giron's Andalusians were to attack the slopes of the Rhune situated to the westward of Sarre. The left wing was to engage the attention of the enemy by a feigned attack on their right, on the hills in front of St Jean de Luz. Freyre's Spaniards were to effect the same purpose, and prevent reinforcements being sent from the camp at Sarre to Clausel's assistance. And the squadron of sir George Collier, with whom arrangements had been made for the purpose, was to throw shells from off St. Jean de Luz into the enemy's camp, and the Socoa fort. The attack was to commence at the dawn of the morning of the 10th of November.

Soon after midnight of the 9th, the troops having formed under arms, advanced to the verge of the line of the enemy's outposts, preparatory to the attack at dawn. As the columns moved forward, the stillness of the surrounding scene was felt by all to be impressive. The village clocks striking the hours amid the darkness increased the general anxiety for day-break; and the first streaks of light in the east were watched by many thousand eyes with strong and almost feverish impatience. On reaching their stations, the troops were ordered to lie extended upon the ground. The columns were so posted that the intervening ground concealed them from the enemy.* The centre was formed in columns of attack pointing towards Sarre, and lay, for several hours, in a ravine separating the great and little Rhune mountains, within half musket-shot of the entrenchments with which the face of the latter was covered.

* *Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns.*

BATTLE OF THE NIVELLE.

LORD WELLINGTON, quitting his head-quarters at Vera soon after midnight, joined Beresford before break of day; and with his staff remained under cover of a small wood about 600 yards from the redoubt which was to be the first object of assault. With the first ray of light, the three signal-guns were fired in rapid succession from the summit of the Atchubia. Instantly a brisk cannonade opened, and a skirmish of pickets commenced along the whole line. About seven o'clock an impression having been made by the artillery on the redoubts in front of Sarre, the soldiers of both columns of the centre leaping up, with a stern shout, rushed to their points of attack: the left column against the Rhune, the right against the redoubts and the village of Sarre. The light division, with the 43rd among its foremost assailants, attacking with irresistible impetuosity, stormed all the entrenchments of the mountain. The 4th and 7th divisions carried the two redoubts of St. Barba and Granada, which commanded the approach to Sarre, advanced against that village, when the third appearing on its flank, it was abandoned by the enemy without an effort to save it. It was now eight o'clock, and the whole centre was united and established on the brow of La Petite Rhune.*

The enemy's outworks having been carried, the right and left centre moved forward in six columns against the enemy's en-

* "In a few minutes," says an officer engaged in the attack on the smaller Rhune, "we reached the summit of the mountain, within twenty yards of the walls of the first fort. The soldiers and officers gasped for breath; many of the former, from the weight of their knapsacks and accoutrements, staggered and fell, and before they could recover their feet, were pierced with bullets, to rise no more; the officers led on in a group, and carried the first fort. The second was then attacked hand to hand, the French using their bayonets and the butt end of their pieces; one of our officers gallantly jumped into the second fort, and a French soldier thrust a bayonet through his neck-kerchief, transfixing him to the wall, and then fired his piece, which blew away the officer's collar, who immediately jumped up unhurt. Another officer, while clambering up the wall, received a severe blow on the fingers with the butt end of a fire-lock, which compelled him to drop from his hold. Indeed we were so hard pressed, that several officers seized the dead soldiers' firelocks, and fought with them bludgeon-wise. Amongst others, sir Andrew Barnard, of the rifles, joined in this hard fight. As the enemy rushed out of the second fort, a little athletic man,

trenched range of heights in rear of Sarre, extending about twelve miles from Ascain to Mondarrain, and which was the strongest part of his position, every ridge being defended by a redoubt; and the whole face of it covered with abattis and lines of retrenchment; while bodies of troops, some in line, some in column, filled up the intervals, and tirailleurs swarmed on its more accessible holes. Towards the top, the ascent was so steep, that the assailants were obliged to use their hands as well as feet in climbing. Though the enemy poured a heavy fire from the various fortifications on the assaulting columns, nothing arrested their impetuous valour. The enemy, driven from point to point, from redoubt to redoubt, escaped only because the assailants were, from their excessive toil, too breathless to pursue them. The third redoubt, termed Donjon, though protected by a ditch or cleft in the rock, fifteen feet deep, was resolutely assailed by the 43rd, who leaping into the cleft, scaled the walls, and in a few minutes the British colours were planted on the castle. In only one redoubt did they make a resolute stand, namely, the signal redoubt. When the 52nd reached the top of the hill, upon which this formidable redoubt was placed, they rushed forward to escalade it, "but a wide ditch, thirty feet deep, well fraised and pallisaded, stopped them short, and the fire of the enemy stretched all the

with red hair, eagerly followed a French officer; the Frenchman parried two of his thrusts, but finding his men give way, he turned suddenly round, and made off; the soldier, fearing his prey would escape, hurled his firelock at him; the bayonet pierced the Frenchman's body, when he fell heavily on his face with the weight of the musket, the bayonet still sticking in him. Another French officer, who had shown a noble example of heroism, stood upon the top of the wall, with both his eyes hanging on his cheeks, with his short cloak flapping in the wind, and not daring to move from his perilous position, lest he should tumble down the steep precipice of many hundred feet in depth. The forts being now carried, I seized the hand of an officer, and congratulated him on his escape; the next instant he was down with a horrible wound, and a ball grazed my left cheek. It was one of the best-contested fights I ever saw; ten officers and nearly one hundred men were killed and wounded in a few minutes. General sir James Kempt and his aid-de-camp, the hon. C. Core, had urged their horses up the rocks, with their hats off, and were cheering us on while carrying the third fort, when the general was wounded."

foremost men dead. The intrepid Colborne, escaping miraculously, for he was always at the head and on horseback, immediately led the regiment under cover of the brow to another point, and thinking to take the French unawares, made another rush, yet with the same result. At three different places did he rise to the surface in this manner, and each time the French fire swept away the head of his column. Resorting then to persuasion, he held out a white handkerchief, and summoned the commandant, pointing out to him how his work was surrounded, and how hopeless his defence; Beresford having led a column in their rear, so as to intercept their retreat, whereupon the garrison yielded, having had only one man killed, whereas on the British side there fell 200 soldiers of a regiment never surpassed in arms since arms were first borne by men.* The garrison consisted of a complete battalion, containing above 500 men. The fleeing enemy who had defended this part of the position, were now chased into the lower grounds, towards the bridges of Amotz, Ascaïn, and St. Pé, over the Nivelle.

On the right, Hill had been no less successful. He advanced against the heights of Ainhoüé in echellons of divisions. Clinton, with the 6th, supported by Hamilton's Portuguese, forded the Nivelle, and without firing a shot, drove the enemy drawn up in front of their works from their position, and breaking through his defences, carried three of the five redoubts on that flank. The 2nd division, led by Stewart, was equally successful, driving the enemy from a parallel ridge, defended by a strong field-work. Hill then led both divisions with their support on Espelette, when the enemy, fearful of being intercepted, abandoned their advanced line in front of Ainhoüé, and retreated in confusion towards Cambo. By two o'clock, the whole of the enemy's position behind Sarre and Ainhoüé was in possession of the allies, who were now established in the rear of the enemy's original position, and had driven back their centre on their right.

Wellington now observing a large force of the enemy concentrated on the heights above St. Pé and Ascaïn, and drawn up in battle order, ordered the 3rd and 7th divisions to advance on this position by the left bank of the Nivelle, and the 6th on the right; the movement being covered by the

* Napier.

2nd and Hamilton's Portuguese on the one side, and the 4th and light divisions, with Giron's Andalusians, who held the heights above Ascaïn, on the other. The enemy defended the position for a short time with a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, but as soon as the allied columns closed upon them, they retreated in disorder to the third line of their defence on the heights of Bidart, about eight miles in rear of their first line, evacuating St. Jean de Luz, Ascaïn, and six miles of retrenchments, and breaking down the bridges on the Nive. Under cover of the night, Soult withdrew from the impregnable part of his position, and then the allies were left masters of the whole line. Hope, so far distant that the sound of his guns could not be heard by the right and the centre, had had his share in the honours of the day. His demonstration against the camps of Sans Culottes and Bons Secours, at Urogué, had been successful. He had beaten the enemy out of that position, and had pushed as far as the inundations which covered the entrenchments in front of Bourdegian and Siboure. So completely had he, in these operations, occupied Soult's attention, that the French marshal imagined his attack, from its vigour and pertinacity, was the principal object of Wellington; and therefore did not dispatch any succour to his left and centre, until they were driven from every position, and on the point of being cut off. As the left and centre of the allies were now established in the enemy's rear, the defendants of the right of their position were obliged to follow the retreat of their countrymen. With the approach of night, the firing ceased in every part of the allied line. During these operations, a detachment of Spaniards under Mina, whom Hill had left to guard the passes of Roncesvalles and Altobiscar, and Los Alduides, moved along the heights of Maya, and attacked and carried the advanced posts of the enemy in that direction; but the French being reinforced, returned to the assault, and beat them back to the village of Maya. The Spaniards lost 100 men in killed and wounded, the French 150. The loss of the enemy in the battle had been about 3,000 killed and wounded, 1,600 prisoners, 51 guns, and a large quantity of field magazines, stores, and provisions. That of the allies, in killed and wounded, 2,694. The able management of the artillery, under colonel Dickson, had contributed in no small degree to the

success of the allies. Guns had been dragged up precipices, or let down from the summits of rocks; while mountain pieces, on swivel carriages, harnessed on the backs of mules trained to the purpose, showered down destruction from points from which no attack had been expected.

During the remainder of this month, no transaction of importance occurred than an occasional reconnoissance or affair of posts. In one on the 18th, brigadier-generals Wilson and Vandeleur were wounded; and on the 23rd, it being necessary to put forward the advanced pickets of the light division, the troops advanced further than was intended, eighty men and an officer of the 43rd were taken in front of the village of Arcangues.

The following is the despatch of the battle of the Nivelle:—

“ St. Pé, 13th Nov. 1813.

“ My Lord,—The enemy had, since the beginning of August, occupied a position with their right upon the sea, in front of St. Jean de Luz, and on the left of the Nivelle, their centre on La Petite Rhune, and on the heights behind that village; and their left, consisting of two divisions of infantry, under count D'Erlon, on the right of that river, on a strong height in rear of Ainhoué, and on the mountain of Monderam, which protected the approach to that village. They had had one division under general Foy at St. Jean-Pied-de-Port, which was joined by the army of Aragon, under general Paris, at the time the left of the allied army crossed the Bidassoa. General Foy's division joined those on the heights behind Ainhoué, when sir R. Hill moved into the valley of Baztan. The enemy, not satisfied with the natural strength of this position, had the whole of it fortified; and their right in particular had been made so strong, that I did not deem it expedient to attack it in front.

“ Pamplona having surrendered on the 31st of October, and the right of the army having been disengaged from covering the blockade of that place, I moved lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill on the 6th and 7th into the valley of Baztan, as soon as the state of the roads, after the recent rains, would permit, intending to attack the enemy on the 8th, but the rain which fell on the

7th having again rendered the roads impracticable, I was obliged to defer the attack till the 10th, when we completely succeeded in carrying all the positions on the enemy's left and centre, in separating the former from the latter, and by these means turning the enemy's strong positions, occupied by their right on the lower Nivelle, which they were obliged to evacuate during the night, having taken 51 pieces of cannon and 1,400 prisoners.

“ The object of the attack being to force the enemy's centre, and to establish our army in rear of their right, the attack was made in columns of divisions, each led by the general officer commanding it, and each forming its own reserve. Lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill directed the movements of the right, consisting of the 2nd division, under lieutenant-general the hon. sir William Stewart; the 6th division, under lieutenant-general sir Henry Clinton; a Portuguese division, under lieutenant-general sir John Hamilton; and a Spanish division, under general Morillo, and colonel Grant's brigade of cavalry, and a brigade of Portuguese artillery, under lieutenant-colonel Tulloh, and three mountain guns, under lieutenant Robe, which attacked the position of the enemy behind Ainhoué.

“ Marshal sir William Beresford directed the movements of the right of the centre, consisting of the 3rd division, under major-general the hon. C. Colville; the 7th division, under mariscal de Campo le Cor; and the 4th division, under lieutenant-general the hon. sir Lowry Cole. The latter attacked the redoubts in front of Sarre, that village, and the heights behind it, supported on their left by the army of reserve of Andalusia, under the command of mariscal de Campo don P. A. Giron, which attacked the enemy's positions on the right of Sarre, on the slopes of La Petite Rhune, and the heights behind the village on the left of the 4th division.

“ Major-general Charles Baron Alten, attacked, with the light division, and general Longa's Spanish division, the enemy's positions on La Petite Rhune; and having carried them, co-operated with the right of the centre in the attack of the heights behind Sarre.*

“ General V. Alten's brigade of cavalry,

* In the report of the battle of the Nivelle, the author of the *History of the War in the Peninsula* says, that Lord Wellington, from some oversight, did but scant and tardy justice to the light division.

“ Acting alone, for Longa's Spaniards went off towards Ascaín and scarcely fired a shot, this division furnishing only 4,000 men and officers, first carried the smaller Rhune defended by Barbot's brigade, and

under the direction of lieutenant-general sir Stapleton Cotton followed the movements of the centre; and there were three brigades of British artillery with this part of the army, and three mountain guns with general Giron, and three with major-general C. Alten. Lieutenant-general don M. Freyre moved in two columns from the heights of Mandale towards Ascain, in order to take advantage of any movement the enemy might make from the right of their position towards their centre; and lieutenant-general sir J. Hope, with the left of the army, drove in the enemy's outposts in front of their entrenchments on the lower Nivelles, carried the redoubt above Urrugne, and established himself on the heights immediately opposite Siboure, in readiness to take advantage of any movement made by the enemy's right.

"The attack began at daylight; and lieutenant-general sir L. Cole having obliged the enemy to evacuate the redoubt on their right, in front of Sarre, by a cannonade, and that in front of the left of the village having been likewise evacuated on the approach of the 7th division, under general Le Cor, to attack it. Lieutenant-general sir L. Cole attacked and possessed himself of the village, which was turned on its left

then beat Taupin's division from the main position, thus driving superior numbers from the strongest works. In fine, being less than one-sixth of the whole force employed against Clausel, they defeated one-third of that general's corps. Many brave men they lost, and of two who fell in this battle I will speak: the first, low in rank, for he was but a lieutenant; rich in honour, for he bore many scars, was young of days. He was only nineteen; but he had seen more combats and sieges than he could count years. So slight in person, and of such surpassing and delicate beauty, that the Spaniards often thought him a girl disguised in man's clothing, he was yet so vigorous, so active, so brave, that the most daring and experienced veterans watched his looks on the field of battle, and implicitly following where he led, would, like children, obey his slightest sign in the most difficult situations. His education was incomplete, yet were his natural powers so happy, the keenest and best furnished intellects shrunk from an encounter of wit, and every thought and aspiration was noble, indicating future greatness, if destiny had so willed it. Such was Edward Freer of the 43rd, one of three brothers who, covered with wounds, have all died in the service. Assailed the night before the battle of the Nivelles with that strange anticipation of coming death, so often felt by military men, he was pierced with three balls at the storming of the Rhune rocks, and the sternest soldiers in the regiment wept, even in the middle of the fight, when they heard of his fate. On the same day, and at the same hour, was killed colonel Thomas Lloyd. He likewise had been a long time in the 43rd. Under him Freer had learned the rudiments of his profession, but in the

by the 3rd division, under major-general the hon. C. Colville; and on its right, by the reserve of Andalusia, under don P. A. Giron; and major-general C. Baron Alten carried the positions on La Petite Rhune. The whole then co-operated in the attack of the enemy's main position behind the village. The 3rd and 7th divisions immediately carried the redoubts on the left of the enemy's centre, and the light division those on the right, while the 4th division, with the reserve of Andalusia on their left, attacked their positions in their centre. By these attacks the enemy were obliged to abandon their strong positions which they had fortified with much care and labour; and they left in the principal redoubt, on the height, the 1st battalion of the 88th regiment, which immediately surrendered.

"While these operations were going on in the centre, I had the pleasure of seeing the 6th division, under lieutenant-general sir H. Clinton, after having crossed the Nivelles, and having driven in the enemy's pickets on both banks, and having covered the passage of the Portuguese division, under lieutenant-general sir J. Hamilton, on its right, make a most handsome attack upon the right of the enemy's position behind Ainhoué, and on the right of the Ni-

course of the war promotion placed Lloyd at the head of the 94th, and it was leading that regiment he fell. In him, also, were combined mental and bodily powers of no ordinary kind. A graceful symmetry combined with herculean strength, and a countenance at once frank and majestic, gave the true index of his nature, for his capacity was great and commanding, and his military knowledge extensive, both from experience and study. On his mirth and wit, so well known in the army, I will not dwell, save to remark, that he used the latter without offence, yet so as to increase his ascendancy over those with whom he held intercourse; for though gentle he was valiant, ambitious, and conscious of his fitness for great exploits. He, like Freer, was prescient, and predicted his own fall, yet with no abatement of courage. When he received the mortal wound, a most painful one, he would not suffer himself to be removed, but remained watching the battle and making observations on the changes in it, until death came. It was thus at the age of thirty, that the good, the brave, the generous Lloyd died. Tributes to his merit have been published by lord Wellington, and by one of his own poor soldiers! by the highest, and by the lowest! To their testimony I add mine; let those who served on equal terms with him say whether in aught I have exceeded his deserts." Every reader of taste and feeling must appreciate these graceful and glowing tributes of friendship. To have his memory perpetuated, and his patriotic services commemorated in so beautifully and touchingly expressed eulogy, is enough to make every high-spirited youth covet the soldier's death, in the glorious strife of the battlefield.

velle, and carry all the entrenchments, and the redoubt on that flank. Lieutenant-general sir J. Hamilton supported, with the Portuguese division, the 6th division on its right; and both co-operated in the attack of the second redoubt, which was immediately carried.

"Major-general Pringle's brigade of the 2nd division, under the command of lieutenant-general sir W. Stewart, drove in the enemy's pickets on the Nivelle and in front of Ainhoûé, and major-general Byng's brigade of the 2nd division carried the entrenchments and a redoubt further on the enemy's left: in which attack, the major-general and these troops distinguished themselves. Major-general Morillo covered the advance of the whole to the heights behind Ainhoûé, by attacking the enemy's posts on the slopes of Mondarrain, and following them towards Itsassu. The troops on the heights behind Ainhoûé were, by these operations, under the direction of lieutenant-general sir R. Hill, forced to retire towards the bridge of Cambo, on the Nive, with the exception of the division on Mondarrain, which, by a march of a part of the 2nd division, under lieutenant-general sir W. Stewart, was pushed into the mountains towards Baygorry.

"As soon as the heights were carried on both banks of the Nivelle, I directed the 3rd and 7th divisions, being the right of our centre, to move by the left of that river upon St. Pé, and the 6th division by the right of the river on the same place, while the 4th and light divisions, and general Giron's reserve, held the heights above Ascain, and covered this movement on that side, and lieutenant-general sir R. Hill covered it on the other. A part of the enemy's troops had retired from their centre, and had crossed the Nivelle at St. Pé; and as soon as the 6th division approached, the 3rd division, under major-general the hon. C. Colville, and the 7th division, under general Le Cor, crossed that river, and attacked, and immediately gained possession of, the heights beyond it. We were thus established in the rear of the enemy's right; but so much of the day was now spent, that it was impossible to make any further movement; and I was obliged to defer our further operations till the following morning.

"The enemy evacuated Ascain in the afternoon, of which village lieutenant-general don M. Freyre took possession, and quitted

all their works and positions in front of St. Jean de Luz during the night, and retired upon Bidart, destroying all the bridges on the lower Nivelle. Lieutenant-general sir J. Hope followed them with the left of the army as soon as he could cross the river; and marshal sir W. Beresford moved the centre of the army as far as the state of the roads, after a violent fall of rain, would allow; and the enemy retired again, on the night of the 11th, into an entrenched camp in front of Bayonne.

"In the course of the operations, of which I have given your lordship an outline, in which we have driven the enemy from positions which they had been fortifying with great labour for three months, in which we have taken fifty-one pieces of cannon and six tumbrils of ammunition, and 1,400 prisoners, I have great satisfaction in reporting the good conduct of all the officers and troops. The report itself will show how much reason I had to be satisfied with the conduct of marshal sir W. Beresford, and of lieutenant-general sir R. Hill, who directed the attacks of the centre and right of the army; and with that of lieutenant-generals sir L. Cole, sir W. Stewart, sir J. Hamilton, and sir H. Clinton; major-generals the hon. C. Colville, and C. Baron Alten; mariscal de Campo F. Le Cor, and mariscal de Campo don P. Morillo, commanding divisions of infantry; and with that of don P. A. Giron, commanding the reserve of Andalusia.

"Lieutenant-general sir R. Hill, and marshal sir W. Beresford, and these general officers, have reported their sense of the conduct of the generals and troops under their command respectively; and I particularly request your lordship's attention to the conduct of major-general Byng, and of major-general Lambert, who conducted the attack of the 6th division. I likewise particularly observed the gallant conduct of the 51st and 68th regiments, under the command of major Rice and lieutenant-colonel Hawkins, in major-general Inglis' brigade, in the attack of the heights above St. Pé, in the afternoon of the 30th. The 8th Portuguese brigade, in the 3rd division, under major-general Power, likewise distinguished themselves in the attack of the left of the enemy's centre; and major-general Anson's brigade of the 4th division, in the village of Sarre and the centre of the heights.

"Although the most brilliant part of this service did not fall to the lot of lieutenant-

general sir J. Hope and lieutenant-general don M. Freyre, I had every reason to be satisfied with the mode in which these general officers conducted the service of which they had the direction.

"Our loss, although severe, has not been so great as might have been expected, considering the strength of the positions attacked, and the length of time, from daylight in the morning till night, during which the troops were engaged; but I am concerned to add that colonel Barnard, of the 95th, has been severely, though I hope not dangerously, wounded; and that we have lost in lieutenant-colonel Lloyd, of the 94th, an officer who had frequently distinguished himself, and was of great promise.

"I received the greatest assistance in forming the plan for this attack, and throughout the operations, from the quarter-master-general, sir G. Murray, and the adjutant-general the hon. sir E. Pakenham; and from lieutenant-colonels lord Fitzroy Somerset and Campbell, and all the officers of my personal staff, and H.S.H. the prince of Orange. The artillery, which was in the field, was of great use to us; and I cannot sufficiently acknowledge the intelligence and activity with which it was brought to the point of attack, under the directions of colonel Dickson, over the bad roads through the mountains in this season of the year."

Soult thus manœuvred out of his doubly entrenched position—on which the whole army had for the preceding three months laboured incessantly, and all the resources of the country, whether of materials or working men, had been called out by requisition—and his troops beaten at all points, he, during the night which followed the battle, withdrew his right wing from the position in front of St. Jean de Luz, and the lower Nivelle, and fell back on his third line of fortified camps, the right of which rested on the sea-coast at Bidart, and the left at Ustaritz on the Nive; having, before he began his retreat, partially broken down a part of the bridge connecting St. Jean de Luz with its suburb Siboure, and totally

destroyed all the bridges of communication between the town and the vicinity of St. Pé. Thus, though the allies were left masters of the whole line of defence, both pregnable and impregnable, much delay was occasioned to them; and it was above twelve o'clock before the left wing could ford the river. But the men were in high spirits, and crossing the deep water by platoons, and forming on the opposite bank, the army advanced in order of battle. Hope with the left marched on Bidart, Beresford with the centre moved on Arbonne, and Hill took possession of Suraide and Epilette, a position about twelve miles distant from Bayonne. Again, in the night of the 11th, Soult withdrew from his position at Bidart, and retreated to his entrenched camp in front of Bayonne, leaving Paris's division at St. Jean Pied-de-Port, and a strongly fortified line of posts on the right bank of the Nive, supported by a considerable force cantoned at Ville Franque, Mouguerre, and the adjacent villages between the Nive and the Adour.

The weather had now become extremely inclement; the rivulets had, from the incessant rain, swelled into broad and deep streams, and the roads perfectly impracticable for any general movement of the army. The Anglo-Portuguese troops were therefore placed in cantonments between the Nive and the sea; and as only two miles intervened between their position and the enemy at Bayonne, a defensive line of outposts from the sea to Cambo was formed in their immediate front to protect them from sudden attack. The Spanish troops having totally disregarded the orders forbidding marauding, and having committed many excesses, were ordered to return to Spain. Longa's men made their retrograde march to Medina del Pomar, Mina's to Roncesvalles, Freyre's to St. Sebastian, and Giron's to the valley of the Bastan, Morillo's corps having not yet indicated a disposition to pillage and revenge, were retained with the army. Head-quarters were established at St Jean de Luz,* a

* Arcangues formed the centre of the position, and through this centre passed the communication to and from the head-quarters. It was also the centre of everything that was impassable; for between Arcangues and a house called "Garat's house" (so called from its owner, one of the historians of the French revolution), there was a space of boggy ground which required a detour of a league or two to avoid it, and then only by a doubtful tract through a country of the same soil. From November to February, the

constant communications through the centre had well worked up this boggy ground into a sort of hasty pudding mixture that became the dismay of every one who had to pass it. The muleteer devoutly said his prayers before he attempted it; and the mules and horses, which, poor devils, lacked both corn and courage, smelled the passage at Garat's house a mile off, and pricked their ears always in fright at the reasonable anticipation of leaving their bones there. This infernal spot, named "Jackass Hole," was well

picturesque town situated on the bay of Biscay. Here Wellington was to be daily seen taking his usual walks on the promenade formed by the sea-wall for the protection of the town from the effect of the heavy gales that blow in upon that coast at certain seasons of the year. It was not without astonishment that the inhabitants beheld the generalissimo of the armies of Great Britain, Portugal, and Spain, habited in a plain blue frock coat, without a single decoration, take his daily, and sometimes solitary walk, on the esplanade overlooking the sea, saluting affably, and often entering into conversation with those who approached him. "Could this courteous and unassuming person, thought they, be the great captain who had defeated generals glittering in gold, covered with embroidery and orders, and who never stirred out without a numerous train of aides-de-camp and orderlies?"*

The constituted authorities and notables, as well as the inhabitants generally of St. Jean de Luz, soon justly appreciated the character of the British general, and a few days after he had fixed his head-quarters in their town, they presented him the following address:

"Monseigneur,—Les notables des communes, de St. Jean de Luz et Siboure, se presentent devant votre seigneurie pour lui exprimer la reconnaissance de tous les habitants pour la faveur qu'ils ont de la posséder dans leurs seins. Une guerre affreuse fait gémir en secret toute la France, que n'a d'autre désir, d'autre besoin, que de paix. Nous savons, monseigneur, que tous vos soins ne tendent, qu'à attendre ce but. Puis-iez vous réussir dans un si noble projet! Vous aurez mérité des droits à la reconnaissance de l'univers; et nous ne cesserons d'adresser des vœux au ciel, pour qu'il daigne conserver long temps un héros aussi grand que sage."

(Here follow the signatures.)

The following is the translation:—

"My Lord,—The notables of the communes of St. Jean de Luz and Siboure present themselves to your lordship, to express the gratitude of all the inhabitants for the known to the right wing of the army, the animals of which had to cross it to go to head-quarters for English hay and oats, when they could get them. In this deplorable turnpike of communication, the long-eared tribe might be counted in hundreds in all stages of decomposition. Accordingly, the first question to any arrival on the right, or from the anxious master to his driver was, "How the deuce did you get over 'Jackass Hole?'" Those who saw no mule return, asked no question, for, alas! the melancholy anticipations were too fatally solved the next time

favour which they enjoy in having you amongst them. France, secretly groaning under the evils of a dreadful war, has no other desire, no other want, than peace. We know, my lord, that all your endeavours are directed to attain this object. May you succeed in so noble a design! You will have earned the gratitude of the universe; and we shall not cease to address our prayers to heaven for the preservation of a hero as great as he is wise.

("Signed," &c.)

On the prospect of the entrance of the allies into St. Jean de Luz, the mass of the inhabitants had deserted it with the French army, under the impression that the same cruelties and pillage would be exercised upon them, that their countrymen had practised towards the people of the Peninsula. But when they heard of the punishment of those who had been guilty of marauding and outrage, and that the English army respected private property, and scrupulously paid for their supplies, they returned back to their dwellings; the town soon became a bustling scene of traffic; and as provisions grew scarce, the women from the mountainous country round St. Andero might be seen with their truck baskets slung over their shoulders, bringing in honey, chocolate, and other necessary articles of consumption. Indeed, so amicable an intercourse was established between the English army and the people of the country, that the French peasants sought that protection within the British lines, that they could not find from their own soldiery. "It is a curious circumstance," says the English chief, in one of his epistolary communications, "that we are the protectors of the property of the inhabitants against the pillage of their own armies, and that their cattle, property, &c., are driven into our lines for protection." "Every peasant," says Pellot, Soult's commissary-general, angrily, "wishes to be under his [Wellington's] protection."

At this time, while exerting all his energies to secure the independence and they had to cross. Even the duke himself, who, in his rides, was seldom dismayed by difficulty, thought twice on going to the right, and rarely passed this rubicon of dead asses, mules, and mud; and it was easy to judge how unpopular it was with the head-quarter staff, as he was seldom accompanied by any other, than he who was always by his side, poor Alexander Gordon, who fell at Waterloo.—*Gurwood's Introduction to the Wellington Orders.*

* Jackson and Scott's *Military Life of Wellington.*

promote the welfare of the Spaniards and Portuguese, the English general was treated with baseness and ingratitude by his faithless and fickle allies. His designs were thwarted; obstacles were thrown in the way of his measures; and he and his army slandered and maligned, not only by the Spanish government, but by the provincial authorities. Libellous pamphlets, in which the Spanish people were invited to revenge the conduct of the British army, who were accused of having committed all sorts of atrocities, from sir John Moore's retreat to the storming of St. Sebastian, were industriously circulated, and when their publishers were prosecuted, on the complaint of the British minister to the Spanish government, they were exempted from punishment. The civil magistrates not only refused to lend their allies the least assistance, but they positively ordered the inhabitants not to supply anything for even payment; and when robberies were discovered, the law was violated, and possession withheld; as, among other instances, at Toloso. At Fuenterrabia it had been settled with the authorities that the British and Portuguese hospitals should be established in a building which had been formerly used by the Spaniards for the same purpose; in giving it up, however, to the English, the Spanish officer in charge endeavoured to carry off, and burn for firewood, the boards which formed the beds, in order that the allied sick and wounded soldiers might not have the use of them; "and yet," as Wellington indignantly exclaimed, "these were the people whom we have supplied with food, clothes, arms, money, medicines; whom, when wounded and sick, we took into our hospitals; to whom we rendered every kindness in our power after having recovered their country from a cruel and an oppressive enemy!" The jealousy and hatred of England had indeed become so predominant and undisguised, that the word "Inglesismo" was used as a term of contempt." All classes longed to shake off the burthen of gratitude. Posterity will scarcely believe that when lord Wellington was commencing the campaign of 1813, the cortes was with difficulty, and by threats rather than reason, prevented from passing a law forbidding foreign troops to enter a Spanish fortress. Alicante, Tarifa, Cadiz itself, where they held their sittings, had been preserved; Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, had been retaken for them by British valour; English money had restored their

broken walls, and replenished their exhausted magazines; English and Portuguese blood still smoked upon their ramparts; but the men from whose veins that blood had flowed, were to be denied entrance at gates which they could not approach without treading on the bones of slaughtered comrades, who had sacrificed their lives to procure for this sordid ungrateful assembly the power to offer the insult."*

This ungrateful and inimical conduct at length occasioned so much uneasiness to the English general, that he made the following communication to the English secretary of state, the earl of Bathurst:—"The persons who propagate the libels against the British army in Spain, are not the people of the country, but the officers of the government, who would not dare to conduct themselves in this manner if they did not know that their conduct would be agreeable to their employers. If this spirit is not checked, we must expect that the people at large will behave to us in the same manner; and we shall have no friend, or none who will aver himself as such, in Spain. A crisis is approaching in our connection with Spain; and if you do not bring the government and nation to their senses before they go too far, you will inevitably lose all the advantages which you might expect from the services you have rendered them. I recommend to you to complain seriously of the conduct of the government and their servants; to remind them that Cadiz, Carthage, and, I believe, Ceuta, were garrisoned with British troops at their own request; and that if they had not been so garrisoned, they would long ere this have fallen into the hands of the enemy, and Ceuta of the Moors. I recommend to you to demand, as a security for the safety of the king's troops, against the criminal disposition of the government and their servants, that a British garrison should be admitted into San Sebastian, with the intention that, if this demand is not complied with, the troops should be withdrawn. And if this is not conceded, I recommend you to withdraw the troops, be the consequences what they may, and to be prepared accordingly." The appearance of an intimation of the part of the cortes to remove the existing government being manifested, lord Wellington recommended the suspension of the measures suggested, but that power should be left with the British ambassador to make the demands or not,

* Napier.

according as he should deem the most advisable.

Nor were ingratitude and disaffection confined to the Spaniards. The intrigues of the Souza and the Patriarch faction were equally rife in Portugal. Those plotters, angry that the revenue arising from the imports of British commodities for the use of the army had been removed from the ports of Portugal to those of Spain, and which produced nine-tenths of the revenue of Portugal, acted with violence against the persons and property of British subjects, and gave currency to tales of disorders perpetrated by the military detachments on the lines of communication, insinuating that they were the result of secret orders from Wellington, to gratify his personal hatred of the Portuguese. Their anger and animosity were also increased by the exposure by lord Wellington and sir Charles Stuart, of their nonapplication of the British subsidy for the support of the Portuguese troops. But the firm and determined remonstrances of lord Wellington and sir Charles Stuart soon brought the caballers to their senses. Such disgust was, however, created in the bosom of the English general, that he gave the following expression to his indignation:—"The British army which I have the honour to command, has met with nothing but ingratitude from the government and authorities in Portugal for their services. Everything that could be done has been done by the civil authorities lately, to oppress the officers and soldiers on every occasion in which it has, by any accident, been in their power. I hope, however, that we have seen the last of Portugal."

At this period of the war an opportunity presented itself to the English chief of exhibiting the lofty disinterestedness and genuine patriotism of his character. In consequence of the insidious design of Napoleon Buonaparte, in proposing the liberation of his prisoner, Ferdinand VII.; and the equally insidious design of acceding to a general peace under the mediation of Austria, the English ministry, with whom the question of the restitution of the Bourbons was under consideration, solicited the opinion of lord Wellington on the subject, as also on the tone of popular opinion in France regarding the continuance of the Buonapartean dynasty, and the restitution of that of the Bourbons. This important subject he expounded with uncommon sagacity and the most exalted patriotism in the following extracts from the letter dated "St. Jean de

Luz, 21st Nov. 1813," addressed to the secretary of state, the earl of Bathurst:—

"I have not myself heard any opinion in favour of the house of Bourbon. The opinion stated to me upon that point is, that twenty years have elapsed since the princes of that house have quitted France; that they are equally, if not more, unknown to France than the princes of any other royal house in Europe; but that the allies ought to agree to propose a sovereign to France instead of Napoleon, who must be got rid of, if it is hoped or intended that Europe should ever enjoy peace; and that it was not material whether it was of the house of Bourbon or of any other royal family.

"I have taken measures to open correspondence with the interior, by which I hope to know what passes, and the sentiments of the people, and I will take care to keep your lordship acquainted with all that I may learn. In the meantime, I am convinced more than ever that Napoleon's power stands upon corruption, that he has no adherents in France but the principal officers of his army, and the *employés civils* of the government, and possibly some of the new proprietors; but even these last I consider doubtful. Notwithstanding this state of things, I recommend to your lordship to make peace with him if you can acquire all the objects you have a right to expect. All the powers of Europe require peace possibly more than France, and it would not do to found a new system of war upon the speculations of any individual on what he sees and learns in one corner of France. If Buonaparte becomes moderate, he is probably as good a sovereign as we can desire in France; if he does not, we shall have another war in a few years, but if my speculations are well founded, we shall have all France against him; time will have been given for the supposed disaffection to his government to produce its effects; his diminished resources will have decreased his means of corruption, and it may be hoped that he will be engaged single-handed against insurgent France and all Europe.

"There is another view of this subject, however, and that is, the continuance of the existing war, and the line to be adopted in that case. At the present moment it is quite impossible for me to move at all, although the army was never in such health, heart, and condition, as at present, and it is, probably, the most complete machine, for its numbers, now existing in Europe. The

rain has so completely destroyed the roads that I cannot move; and, at all events, it is desirable, before I go farther forward, that I should know what the allies purpose to do in the winter, which, I conclude, I shall learn from your lordship as soon as the king's government shall be made acquainted with their intentions by the king's diplomatic servants abroad. As I shall move forward, whether in the winter or the spring, I can inquire and ascertain more fully the sentiments of the people; and the government can either empower me to decide to raise the Bourbon standard, or can decide hereafter to raise the question themselves, after they shall have all the information which I can send them of the sentiments and wishes of the people.

"I can only tell you that, if I were a prince of the house of Bourbon, nothing should prevent me from now coming forward, not in a good house in London, but in the field in France; and if Great Britain would stand by him, I am certain he would succeed. This success would be much more certain in a month or more hence, when Napoleon commences to carry into execution the oppressive measures which he must adopt in order to try to retrieve his fortunes. I must tell your lordship, however, that our success, and everything, depends upon our moderation and justice, and upon the good conduct and discipline of our troops. Hitherto they have behaved well, and there appears a new spirit among the officers, which I hope will continue, to keep the troops in order. But I despair of the Spaniards. They are in so miserable a state, that it is really hardly fair to expect that they will refrain from plundering a beautiful country, into which they enter as conquerors, adverting to the miseries their own country has suffered from its invaders. I cannot, therefore, venture to bring them back into France, unless I can feed and pay them; and the official letter which will go to your lordship by this post will show you the state of our finances, and our prospects. If I could now bring forward 20,000 good Spaniards, paid and fed, I should have Bayonne. If I could bring forward 40,000, I do not know where I should stop. Now I have both the 20,000 and the 40,000 at my command, upon this frontier, but I cannot venture to bring forward any for want of means of paying and supporting them. Without pay and food they must plunder, and if they plunder they will ruin us all."

The friendly habits and generous intercourse which had long been established between the contending troops at the outposts were now put into practice. During the short term of inaction that the inclemency of the weather had occasioned, one of those occurrences of conventional civility, and observance of the proprieties of war, which occasionally occurred between the contending armies during the war in the Peninsula, now took place between the French and the allied outposts. "A disposition had for some time been gaining ground with both armies, to mitigate the miseries of warfare, as much as was consistent with each doing their duty to their country; and it had by this time proceeded to such an extent, as to allow us to place that confidence in them, that they would not molest us even if we passed their outposts. * * * The next day, there being no firing between us and those in our front, three French officers, seemingly anxious to prove how far politeness and good breeding could be carried between the two nations, when war did not compel them to be unfriendly, took a table and some chairs immediately in our front, out of a room we had lately occupied as a barrack, and bringing them down into the middle of the field which separated the advance of the two armies, sat down within one hundred yards of our picket, and drank wine, holding up the glasses, as much as to say, 'Your health,' every time they drank. Of course we did not molest them, but allowed them to have their frolic out. During the day, also, we saw the soldiers of the three nations, namely, English, Portuguese, and French, all plundering at the same time in one unfortunate house, where our pie, our pigs, and our wine had been left. It stood about 150 or 200 yards below the church, on a sort of neutral ground between the two armies; hence the assemblage at the same moment of such a group of motley marauders. They plundered in perfect harmony, no one disturbing the other on account of his nation or colour. Indeed, perfect confidence subsisted between us. The French used to get us such things as we wanted from Bayonne, particularly brandy, which was cheap and plentiful, and we, in return, gave them occasionally a little tea, of which some of them had learned to be fond." Other instances of these proprieties of warfare, and the interchange of kind civilities, were, as has been before stated, of no unfrequent occurrence in the course of the Peninsular war.

While Hasparen was the head-quarters of the 5th division, the pickets of both armies avoided every appearance of hostility, it being an understood condition in generous warfare, and among gallant soldiers, that the outposts of opposing armies should not be attacked, with the view to the paltry advantage of destroying or taking fifty to a hundred men, except with the ulterior view of surprising also the posts which they cover, and which could not be gained in any other manner. Each occupied a hill with sentries about two hundred yards apart. The French, on one occasion, pushed forward their videttes, and seemed as if they designed to trespass on the neutral ground. The captain of the English picket reported this encroachment, and received orders not to allow it. On the following morning he observed that the French vidette had been advanced about fifty yards, and he thought it most advisable to demand an interview with the French captain of chasseurs. A peasant was despatched, and returned with a message, that the commandant would wait on the English officer immediately, and in a few minutes the parties met upon neutral ground. The Briton stated the orders he had received, and explained that, to avoid so *laché* a proceeding as to fire on a vidette, he had solicited a meeting with the French chasseur. The Frenchman expressed himself in the most flattering terms, and begged that the hussar might point out a situation which would be agreeable to him. A thorn bush, about one hundred yards behind the spot upon which the French vidette was posted, was mentioned as equally advantageous for the security of the French picket, while it would reach as far as the hussar was permitted by his orders to allow. The chasseur gave orders accordingly; the vidette was placed upon the very spot recommended, and the Frenchman having expressed his satisfaction at the interview, produced a bottle of cognac; two or three officers on each side soon joined the party; a happy termination to the war was drunk; and the French officers said, at parting, that they trusted that it would not be the fate of war to bring into collision the parties who had met in so amicable a manner.*

Again,—during the passage of the advance of the army across the Pyrenees, we perceived, not twenty yards off, a wounded voltigeur extended on the ground, and a young comrade supporting him. The Frenchman never attempted to retreat; but

smiled as we came up, as if he had been expecting us. “‘Good morning,’ he said, ‘I have been waiting for you, gentlemen. My poor friend’s leg is broken by a shot, and I could not leave him till you arrived, lest some of those Portuguese brigands should murder him.—Pierre,’ he continued, ‘here are the brave English, and you will be taken care of. I will leave you a flask of water, and you will soon be succoured by our noble enemy. Gentlemen, will you honour me by emptying this canteen. You will find it excellent, for I took it from a portly friar two days ago.’ There was no need to repeat the invitation; I set the example; the canteen passed from mouth to mouth, and the monk’s brandy vanished. The conscript—for he had not joined above a month—replenished the flask with water from a spring just by. He placed it in his comrade’s hand, bade him an affectionate farewell, bowed gracefully to us, threw his musket over his shoulder, and trotted off to join his regiment, which he pointed out upon a distant height. He seemed never for a moment to contemplate the possibility of our sending him in durance to the rear; there were about him so much kindness and confidence, that on our part no one ever dreamed of detaining him. And these are but a few of the kind and humanizing feelings, with which the horrors and privations of war were mitigated in the great Peninsular struggle.”

On one occasion, a sentry of the 52nd being posted within a few yards of a French sentry, made his enemy understand, in a sort of Spanish gibberish, that he was much in want of tobacco. The French, with national politeness, offered to supply his wants, if he would give him the money to buy some in the rear of his post; then a five-franc piece was forked out, but, before given, it was necessary to have a guarantee for the fulfilment of the treaty. The Frenchman agreed to leave his firelock in pledge; but then another difficulty arose: the French sentry said, “But who is to keep my post?” The Englishman immediately solved the question, by exclaiming, “Oh, never mind that; I am the only one opposed to you, and I will keep your post till you return.” The assurance being accepted, the French soldier hurried off to execute his commission; but an hour passed away without his return. It afterwards appeared, that the vivandière, who sold the tobacco, had also a bottle of brandy, and the change

* *Recollections of a Subaltern.*

of the five-franc piece appeared too great a temptation to resist—the military honour of the Frenchman was drowned in *eau-de-vie*, and he was discovered dead drunk by his picket. He was, of course, asked where his firelock was, and who had it.

His explanation was with difficulty believed; but on a communication between the officers commanding the opposing pickets, the preliminaries of an amicable treaty were duly exchanged and ratified, with a present of the tobacco.*

THE PASSAGE OF THE NIVE, AND THE BATTLES IN FRONT OF BAYONNE.

THE weather having cleared up, and the state of the roads become capable of passage, the English general determined to resume active operations, as well to relieve himself from the sterile tract of country to which he was confined, between the sea and the Nive, and extend his cantonments, as to intercept the navigation of the Adour, and thus prevent his antagonist from deriving supplies from the interior of France, by the medium of that river, from Bordeaux to Bayonne; the culpable neglect of the British admiralty to maintain a sufficient naval force on that coast affording the enemy all the facility he desired. The result of the movements of the confederated powers on the other side of France, and the intelligence received in the early part of this month that Hanover was freed from French domination, and that the Dutch had risen against their oppressors, gave additional stimulus to urge on the undertaking.

The requisite preparations having been completed, orders were issued on the 7th of December for forcing the passage of the Nive, and thus turning the enemy's position in his entrenched camp in front of Bayonne; and the 9th was appointed for carrying the object into execution.

* The following anecdote is related by Cadell, as occurring while the troops were in cantonments before Bayonne. A daring fellow, an Irishman, named Tom Patten, performed a singular feat. At the barrier there was a rivulet, along which our lines of sentries were posted. To the right was a thick low wood, and during the cessation of hostilities our officers had again become intimate with those of the French, and the soldiers had actually established a tariff in tobacco and brandy in the following ingenious manner. A large stone was placed in that part of the rivulet screened by the wood, opposite to the French sentry, on which our people used to put a canteen with a quarter-dollar, for which it was very soon filled with brandy. One afternoon, about dusk, Patten had put down his canteen with the usual money in it, and retired, but, though he returned several times, no canteen was there. He waited till the moon rose, but still he found nothing on the stone. When it was near morning, Tom thought he saw the same sentry who was there when he put his

The enemy's position was formidably strong; it consisted of the fortified town of Bayonne, and an entrenched camp in its front. Bayonne—which is memorable in military history for the invention of bayonets—is situated about four miles from the sea, at the junction of the Nive with the Adour, the city being on the left bank, and the citadel and suburbs of St. Esprit on the right of the last-mentioned river. The town is strongly fortified: the Adour covers it on one side; the three others are fortified. On the left bank of the Adour, a strong bastioned line extends in a curve from the river above to the river below the town, and incloses the suburb. The town is approachable only by the two royal paved roads, that from St. Jean de Luz, on the coast, and that from St. Jean-Pied-de-Port, under the mountains. The entrenched camp was at some distance in front of this line, and nearly parallel to the ramparts. The right of this entrenched camp rested on the Adour, and was covered in front by an impenetrable morass, formed by a rivulet which falls into the Adour. The centre extended from this morass to the Nive; and the enemy's left wing was posted between the Nive and the Adour, thus com-

canteen down; so he sprang across the stream, seized the unfortunate Frenchman, wrested his firelock from him, and, actually shaking him out of his accoutrements, recrossed, vowing he would keep them until he got his canteen of brandy, and brought them to the picket-house. Two or three hours afterwards, just as we were about to fall in, an hour before day-break, the sergeant came to say that a flag of truce was at the barrier: I instantly went down, when I found the officer of the French picket in a state of great alarm, saying, that a most extraordinary circumstance had occurred (relating the adventure), and stating, that if the sentry's arms and accoutrements were not given back, his own commission would be forfeited, as well as the life of the poor sentry. A sergeant was instantly sent to see if they were in the picket-house, when Patten came up scratching his head, saying, "He had them in pawn for a canteen of brandy and a quarter-dollar," and told us the story in his way; whereupon the things were immediately given over to the French captain.

municating with Paris's division of the army of Catalonia, posted at St. Jean-Pied-de-Port. In Villefranque and Mouguerre, as before stated, considerable corps were cantoned, with advanced posts from their right in front of Anglet and towards Biarritz. Soult, from the facility which his position afforded him of masking his operations and concentrating his forces, having an interior and protected line of communication, so as to enable him to throw at pleasure, from one flank to another, their whole weight upon any part of his opponent's position, with sanguine expectation desired the minister at war, in a despatch addressed to him on the 9th, "to expect good news from him on the next day." But the event proved that he was no prophet; his experience of his antagonist should have inclined him to have been more cautious in his prediction.

The dispositions of the English general for the attack, by which he contemplated to manœuvre Soult out of his formidable position, were:—on the left, sir John Hope, with the 1st, 5th, and light divisions;—the unattached brigade, Vandeleur's cavalry, and twelve guns, was to advance from St. Jean de Luz, and make a strong reconnaissance of the enemy's entrenched camp, for the purpose of withdrawing their attention from the principal attack on the right, in order to force the passage of the Nive. On the right, sir Rowland Hill, with the 2nd division, Hamilton's three Portuguese brigades, Vivian's and Victor Alten's cavalry, Ross's horse artillery, and Tulloh's brigade of Portuguese artillery—in all, fourteen guns, was to force the barrier of the Nive by the ford above Cambo; while, in the centre, Beresford, with the 3rd and 6th divisions, should cross the river by means of a pontoon bridge, at Ustaritz, for the purpose of covering the passage of Hill. The 4th and 7th divisions were in reserve in the rear.

In pursuance of this plan of attack, three hours before daylight of the morning of the 9th, the columns which had much extent of ground to move over, preparatory to their formation for the advance, stood to their arms, and marched to their respective points of assembly. At dawn, a fire, lighted on a height behind Cambo, gave the signal of attack, and instantly the army was in motion.

At eight, after a laborious march through

heavy rain, the allied left wing began the battle by a spirited fire from the whole line of light troops upon the enemy, who returned the assault with equal vigour and determination. By one o'clock in the afternoon, the enemy's advanced posts were driven back, and the 1st division had gained the heights opposite Anglet, while the 5th division swept the whole space from those heights to the banks of the Adour. Alten, with the light division making a corresponding advance, had driven the enemy from behind a deep morass that covered their posts in front of the plateau of Bassussary, and compelled them to retreat to the château de Marrac.

Simultaneously with Hope's attack, Hill and Beresford's columns advanced. The 6th division, under a heavy fire of artillery, forced their passage over the pontoon bridge, and drove back D'Armagnac's brigade; and at the same moment, Hill's right wing forced their passage at a ford above Cambo, and his left wing at Halsion. The enemy in front of Hill, fearing lest they should be cut off by the 6th division, retired so hastily upon Bayonne, that their leader, Foy, was separated from his command, and wandered with a few followers for some time. One regiment was also driven from the road, and avoided being cut off by making a detour across the country. The passage of the Nive was thus forced, and the allies established on the high road to St. Jean Pied-de-Port. The day was now at its close, when the enemy, under cover of the darkness, drew all his posts into the camp before Bayonne, and Hill was forced to content himself with the ground he had won. On the following morning the 6th division recrossed the river, retaining their communication with Hill. As the movements of Hope had been intended to favour the operations for the forcing the passage of the river, his instructions had been to return to his cantonments at six in the evening unless he received counter-orders. Accordingly he began his retrograde march.

The 1st division (consisting chiefly of the guards and the German troops), did not reach St. Jean de Luz till late at night, the roads being so broken up by the passage of the artillery and cavalry, and so deluged with the heavy rains* as to be

* That part of France, called Le Pays Basque, in the neighbourhood of Bayonne, has a bad reputation as to weather; it rains one half the year; and it was during that half the British army occupied it.

One of those unforeseen effects which frequently arise, when men interfere on a large scale with the works of nature, has rendered this country liable to inundations in spring and winter, and to drought in

knee-deep in mud in some of the hollows. The consequence was that the march was attended with so incredible fatigue, that inured as the troops were to such diversity of weather and exertion, many of them dropped down powerless by the road-side; and the whole body of them reached their cantonments in the most exhausted and deplorable condition. The light division had had orders to retire to Arbonne, near four miles in the rear, and the second brigade had already prepared to march; but Kempt, suspicious of the enemy's movements, delayed obedience until he could discern what was going on in his front, and for that reason retained them in their old cantonments about Arcangues and Bassussary. The 5th division and Bradford's Portuguese brigade were stationed upon the plateau of Barouilhet, having Campbell's Portuguese in advance; one battalion of which, under colonel Williams, formed the outposts. Aylmer's brigade was near Bidart. The right wing under Hill, and the centre, consisting of the 3rd and 6th divisions, were on the other side of the Nive. The 4th and 7th were considerably in the rear as a reserve, the 4th about a mile in rear of Arcangues, and the 7th between Arcangues and St. Pé; and the Spanish division of Murillo and Vivian's brigades of cavalry were in observation; the former at Urcuray, the latter at Hasparen. This wide and disconnected disposition of the allied army gave Soult hopes of verifying his prediction of sending good news to the minister at war on the morrow.

On the morning of the 10th, Wellington perceiving that the enemy had retired from their position of the previous day, ordered Hill to establish his troops on their intended position; Hill's left now rested on the heights above the village of Villefranque, the centre in front of the village of St. Pierre, covering the road from Bayonne to St.

Jean-Pied-de-Port, and the right rested on the Adour. The whole of the allied forces were disposed in the form of a crescent, or of the arc of a semicircle, but their communications were by cross roads; whereas those of the enemy were short and easy, and his troops were posted in a crescent or an arc of a semicircle within that of the allies, the extent of which was not more than one-fourth of theirs. Availing himself of this advantage, at daybreak of the 10th, he marched the main body of his army, consisting of 35,000 men, formed in two columns of attack; one under Clausel advanced against the light division posted in the plateau of Bassussary; the other under Reille against the 5th division, and Bradford's and Campbell's brigades on the plateau of Barouilhet, which protected the main road to St. Sebastian.

The position of the light division was first attacked. Soon after day-break, the enemy were observed lining the hedge-rows, and silently stealing up the wooded hollows, in front of the village of Arcangues. Kempt, who was with the pickets, ordered the reserve to occupy the church and village. His orders had been scarcely put into execution, before the enemy rushed on the pickets with loud and confident cries. On reaching the plateau of Bassussary, in front of Arcangues, a cloud of skirmishers was sent forward against the pickets of the light division, who swiftly fell back about a mile, firing all the way; but no sooner had they gained the open ground in front of Arcangues, than they faced about and presented an impenetrable front to the enemy.

While Clausel was occupying the attention of the light division, so as to favour his assault on the right flank of the allies, posted on the plateau of Barouilhet, Reille pushed rapidly forwards against that plateau. Williams' Portuguese battalion of Campbell's brigade made a brave resistance,

summer. About the middle of the seventeenth century a speculator (the father of the author of *Voyages dans l'Amerique Septentrionale*) undertook to supply the French government with ship timber from the Pyrenees; to effect this it was necessary to increase the waters of the two rivers, as they are there called, *Gaves*, of Pau and Oleron; and by turning into them the course of numerous rivulets, he doubled the volume of the latter stream, and increased the current of the Adour so much that a fifty gunship could pass the bar of Bayonne with less difficulty than before that time was experienced by a vessel with 10 guns. He expended 300,000 crowns on this scheme, succeeded in it, and ruined his family. But permanent evil was occasioned to the

country; for when the mountains were clothed with woods, the snow which was collected there melted gradually under their shade, and fed the streams during the whole year; afterwards, when the snow was exposed to the sun and rain, the streams poured down in torrents, rendering the rivers destructive during the winter and spring, and scarcely supplying water enough in summer for navigation.—*Southey*. The consequence is, the soil is swampy, and it is hardly thought bad walking if the waters are not more than knee deep. The bye-roads are quite impassable. During the occupation of the country by the British troops, the infantry often sank in the mud and clay to the middle, the cavalry above the horses' knees, and even to the saddle-girths in some places.

and thus gave time for Robinson's brigade of the 5th division, to move up from their cantonments to their support. A desperate conflict ensued. While this sanguinary encounter was enduring, on the front of the gallant 5th, the main body of Clausel's column having penetrated the valley that intervened between the positions of the 5th and light divisions, made a furious attack on the right flank of the former. This brave division, though attacked both in front and flank, resolutely maintained its ground for two hours, until Bradford's Portuguese and Aylmer's British brigade breathlessly came up to its assistance. The enemy, however, at one period of the battle, forced their way through a wood, and entered on the right of Barouilhet, in so strong a force, as to overpower a body of its brave defenders, and to penetrate beyond the front of the position; but the success was momentary. A Portuguese battalion posted on the left flank, boldly moved forward on the high road, and wheeled round a wood which bounded the road on the right; and the gallant 9th British, which was on the extreme right, facing about at the same time, both regiments charging the enemy in the rear, by this bold and well timed manœuvre, checked the assailants. It was now between two and three o'clock, when the first division, who, when the action began, were at rest in St. Jean-de-Luz, came up; and at the same moment, Wellington, as soon as he heard from the right bank of the river, the cannonade on the left of the Nive, ordered the 6th division to repass the river, and instantly hurried to the scene of action. When the tide of battle seemed to ebb in favour of the enemy, Wellington rode up to the wavering regiment—"You must keep your ground, my lads, there is nothing behind you—charge." Instantly, a loud hurrah was raised, the fugitive Portuguese battalions rallied, and the reformed line presented an impenetrable front.

Night came, and found the allies maintaining nearly the same ground they had occupied in the morning, both at Barouilhet and Arcangues. The only advantage that had been gained by the enemy, was the occupation of the ground, from which the allied pickets had been driven. Both sides rested on their arms upon the field of battle, during the night that followed this hard contested day. Three German battalions of the regiments of Nassau and Frankfort, receiving intelligence of the liberation of their country from the French yoke, came over

from the enemy, on condition of their being sent to join their countrymen in Germany. The 5th had suffered severely; for when the action began, the ammunition mules were absent; and when the pickets were forced back, they had scarcely a round remaining. The 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 7th, were so posted in reserve (namely, the 3rd at the bridge of Urdains; the 4th, about a mile in rear of Arcangues; the 6th at Ustaritz; and the 7th between Arcangues and St. Pè), so as to be ready to support either the defenders of Barouilhet or Arcangues, on the morrow.

On the morning of the 11th, which, like the preceding day, came on wet and stormy, Wellington, judging from the appearance and movements of the enemy, that a heavy attack was meditated against the light division at Arcangues, moved the 1st division to Bidart, to the support of the position held by the light division. Soon after day-break, the enemy's pickets on the plateau of Basussary, and on its continuation in front of Barouilhet, were driven in, and the allied sentries were pushed to their former line. Some skirmishing followed both at Barouilhet and Arcangues; but about noon, the firing ceased on all sides; when, the weather clearing up, the troops received their rations, and fatigue parties were sent out to cut wood for cooking.

Suddenly a movement was observed in the enemy's line. Staff officers were seen riding rapidly to and fro, and pioneers cutting gaps in the fences. Presently the pickets were furiously forced back along the Bayonne road, and it was evident that the Barouilhet ridge was about to become the scene of a sanguinary conflict. At the first rush of the enemy, a general shout of "To arms" being raised in the allied lines, the soldiers who had gone out to cut fuel hurried back to the rear, to accoutre themselves. The French, supposing that the cause of the rush to the alarm-posts was occasioned by panic, set up an exulting cheer, and rushed forward with loud and exulting cries of "*En avant! En avant!*" Such of the allies as were prepared, met the first fury of the assault with unshrinking firmness and resolution; in a few minutes the rest were under arms, and before any impression could be made, the whole left wing had formed in perfect order of battle. The battle lasted, with little intermission, till nightfall; yet, when darkness separated the combatants, they stood exactly on the same ground they had occupied on the previous night. With

the close of the day the rain began to fall as heavily as it had during the preceding nights. The 5th division, which had again borne the brunt of the action, was relieved in the course of the night by the 1st division, and took post in the second line.

The morning of the 12th opened exceedingly bright and cheering. The movements of the enemy on the heights opposite Barouilhet seemed to indicate a third attack on the allied left wing. About two o'clock a multitude of tirailleurs started out from the crest of their position, and in a few minutes a hot fire commenced along the whole line of pickets, and an animated skirmishing continued during the greater part of the day between the light troops. The reason, probably, that Soult did not venture to advance his main body, was the appearance of the 4th and 7th divisions moving forward to the point of attack. The French marshal having been again baffled and outgeneralled by his skilful and vigilant opponent, retired, under cover of the darkness of night, to his entrenched camp, leaving only a cordon of outposts in front of the left wing of the allies.

Soult having been foiled in his attempts on the left of the allies, thinking that Wellington would not expect an attack on his right, in the course of the night of the 12th drew off all his forces in Hope's front, and crossing the Nive by the bridges covered by his entrenched camp, concentrated his columns there until the morrow's operations. But his vigilant adversary, observing the gradual extinction of the watch-fires of the enemy, and discovering by patrols that the main body had quitted their ground, leaving only a weak cordon of troops in front of the allied left, divining the object of the French marshal, despatched Beresford with the 6th division across the Nive at daylight, by the boat-bridge at Villa Franque, to support the right wing, and ordered the 4th division and the greater part of the third, to be in readiness upon the left bank of the same river. At daylight of the 13th, the French marshal poured out from his entrenchments 35,000 men, and led them in three massive columns of attack upon Hill's position, which was about a league from Bayonne, and extended, in the form of a crescent, about four miles between the Nive and the Adour. Hill's little army mustered about 13,000 men. His left, consisting of Pringle's brigade, containing the 28th, 34th, and 39th regiments, was posted on a ridge of hills in

front of Villa Franque, bounded by the Nive on one side, and on the other by large mill-dams in a deep hollow, that separates it from the heights of Petit Mouguerre. Byng's brigade, consisting of the 3rd, 31st, 57th, and 66th, was stationed on the right, in front of the village of Vieux Mouguerre, on high ground, with the Adour on its right, and several mill-dams on its left. In the centre was Ashworth's Portuguese brigade, on a range of heights opposite to the village of St. Pierre; and Barnes's brigade, consisting of the 50th, 71st, and 92nd, was stationed on the heights of Petit Mouguerre. A reserve of two Portuguese brigades, under Le Cor, was formed in the rear of Villa Franque. Under cover of a mist, Soult formed his order of battle; and, at half-past eight o'clock—the sun bursting out in full splendour at the same moment—throwing out a cloud of tirailleurs, pushed in full strength up the slopes, in front of the central heights. The centre column advanced on St. Pierre, those on the flanks towards the points of the crescent of the allied position, with the intention of advancing along the two horns, and closing on the centre.

His plan of attack on the centre being now developed, Hill instantly directed Byng to hasten with the whole of his brigade, except the Buffs, or 3rd regiment, and the light companies of the brigade, to the support of the centre-right, while one of the Portuguese reserve brigades, in the rear of Villa Franque, was ordered up to the centre-left; at the same time an aide-de-camp being despatched with orders for the 6th division to move up to the support of his little army, which was now opposed to seven divisions of the enemy in front, while an 8th division, under Paris and Soult, and Pierre's cavalry, menaced it in the rear. But nowise daunted, or even discouraged, though his communication with the left bank of the river had been cut off (the boat-bridge at Villa Franque, over the Nive, having been carried away), Hill calmly awaited the attack. While these movements were in progress, the French column, under Abbé, having driven in the pickets and the light troops despatched to their support, rushed up the slopes that led to the allied centre at a rapid pace, in the firmest order, amidst a crashing storm of grape and bullets that carried havoc into their ranks, till the main road that leads from St. Jean-Pied-de-Port to Bayonne actually ran with blood. A fierce and stubborn conflict now took place. At one

time, the enemy having driven back Ashworth's Portuguese brigade, had established themselves on the crest of the centre of the allied position, and were gaining ground, by the force of weight and numbers, when the brigades marching from the flanks, arrived at the very moment they were needed, and joined battle.

While this bloody conflict was raging in the centre, Soult, taking advantage of Byng's advance from the right flank to the support of the centre, pushed forward a whole division, under d'Armagnac, against the 3rd regiment and light companies posted at Vieux Mouguerre. The post being nearly denuded of troops, the enemy succeeded in gaining possession of the heights and village; to which misfortune the conduct of the colonel of the Buffs materially contributed, he having withdrawn his regiment from out of fire, and at the same moment the colonel of the 71st was guilty of the same misconduct.* To restore the battle, Hill, descending from his post of observation, rallied both regiments, and in person led on one brigade of Le Cor's Portuguese infantry to support Barnes's men in the centre, while the other was despatched to aid the right on Vieux Mouguerre, against

D'Armagnac. This brigade ascending the reverse side of Vieux Mouguerre, under a raking fire, recovered their position, and made many prisoners, notwithstanding the fearful superiority of the enemy.

Hill leading the 71st to their position, the battle was renewed in the centre with increased fury. All the regiments behaved nobly. When the enemy were established on the crest of the position, the 92nd, who were in reserve in the rear of St. Pierre, charged two French regiments, and broke and repulsed them; but being assailed by a powerful battery and an overwhelming body of infantry, they were obliged to fall back to their old position, but quickly re-forming, they advanced, with colours flying and music playing, against a heavy mass of the enemy, who, intimidated with their dauntless bearing, faced about and retreated. At half-past twelve o'clock, the 6th division, who had marched without intermission since daylight, appeared, led on by Wellington, over the mount from which Hill had descended to restore his battle, rapidly followed by the 3rd and 4th divisions. At this moment the French, who had struggled hard and gallantly† for victory, and tested the invin-

* Those two ill-fated gentlemen were dismissed the service. For the fair repute of their friends and descendants, let their names be buried in oblivion.

† It may not be uninteresting, and without its use, to state the military qualities and warlike peculiarities of the French and the English soldier. The French soldier possesses high courage, great personal activity, considerable intelligence, and mental resources. Their buoyancy of spirits, chivalrous enthusiasm, and exalted national devotion, teach them to regard warfare, like the Romans of old, as a pastime and a recreation. They have an inordinate love of military fame and glory, which leads them to undertake the most daring and difficult enterprises. In mounting defended steep—forcing on under fire—in making attacks in large bodies—no troops exceed them in spirit and determination; but in close conflict with British troops all their efforts are paralyzed, their transient bursts of heroism subside, and their effervescence of spirits evaporates and dies away. During the late war in the Peninsula, the French troops would expose themselves to a raking and destructive fire, at the smallest distance, as long as ourselves, but a hurrah and a rush forward with the bayonet caused their instant flight, with the exception of a few desperate men in the rear of a flying column. The dread of close conflict with the British was invariably so thoroughly evinced by the French troops, that a shout was sufficient throughout the Peninsular war, as it had been at the Pass of Muidá, to disperse a forming column, and compel it to seek its safety in flight. But though the French, as a nation, are naturally brave and heroic, they are individually the most gasconading race on the face of the earth. In the indulgence of their vapouring bluster and bravado, they never acknowledge that they

have been defeated; and this spirit is fostered by their officers continually dinning in their ears that they are nationally and individually the bravest of the human race. With all their defects, however, they possess one qualification of the soldier in an unrivalled degree. Under defeat and discomfiture they never succumb and despair; their inordinate stock of national vanity and boisterous confidence in their individual efforts, enable them to keep up their spirits and to make fresh and redoubled efforts to retrieve their losses and disgrace. Never was a brighter specimen of this invaluable endowment exhibited than in Soult's calamitous retreat from Oporto. Such are the endowments and qualifications of the French soldier; let us inquire what are those of our countrymen. A thousand well-fought battle-fields furnish incontestable evidence that the English soldier possesses unrivalled and indomitable courage, both animal and moral—the most perfect contempt of death, and the most devoted and unshaken patriotism. His cool, composed, enduring patience and fortitude in defence and holding out—his irresistible power and impetuosity in attack, and venturing on danger—his full and appalling shout, and strong and unwavering charge, are unequalled by the soldiery of any nation that has ever appeared on the face of the earth. Steadily, calmly, and silently, he awaits the advance of his enemy, and repels him with certain discomfiture, and the most decisive overthrow. His only thought is an heroic determination to exert himself to the utmost. No blustering or bravadoing is to be found in his mouth. He is neither heated with brandy, stimulated by the hope of plunder, nor inflamed by the deadly feeling of revenge. He does not even indulge an expression of animosity against his foe. He moves forward confident of victory:

cibility of English troops, were driven headlong down the heights with terrible slaughter. The left, under Pringle, on the heights before Villa Franque, though their attention was occupied by a swarm of Daricau's tirailleurs, was no further engaged than by a lively fire of the enemy's infantry; but as his line of position was nearly at right angles to the enemy's advance on the allied centre, he poured in a flanking fire of artillery on the columns assaulting that part of the position.

so strong and fixed is this impression in the mind of the English soldier, that he is always a difficult subject to manage in a retreat. He does not love retrograding; his spirits flag; he becomes sulky, growls and grumbles, because he is not allowed to turn and fight—never dreams of the possibility of defeat, so undoubting is his faith in the superiority of the army of old England—and braves death, with all its accompanying horrors of laceration and torture, with the most cheerful intrepidity; and he endures all this from a belief that it is conducive to the honour and welfare of his country. Another great quality which the scorned and slighted English "common (!) soldier" possesses over all the soldiers of the world—on gaining the ascendancy, a fallen foe never implores mercy in vain at his hands. Except in paroxysms of drunkenness, he is never cruel; his utmost personal outrage is a blow, and that, too, with no other weapon than his fist. But in no point are the French and British soldier more marked than when in the presence of the enemy. The French are all excitement and hubbub; but the English soldier is silent, stern, sedate, statue-like; not a sound is to be heard; the drum is hushed; the only solitary note is that of the bugle. The colours are always in their cases. In the process of the charge, the distinctive character of the two nations is as marked. The French advance steady and in silence, but when within one or two hundred yards of the point to be assailed, they rush forward with a loud but discordant yell, in which every man halloo for himself, without any regard to tone or time of those about him; on the other hand, the English advance coolly and steadily; the only sound heard is one wild and terrible "hurra!" the mere precursor of victory. To the idle and unworthy observation of flippant and shallow-minded writers, that English soldiers are destitute of the intelligence and mental resources of the French soldiery, and understand nothing but their mechanical duties, the best refutation that can be given is that of the author of the *History of the War in the Peninsula*, an authority admitted on all hands, not disposed to concede too large a meed of praise to his gallant but calumniated countrymen:—"It has been said, that British soldiers are less intelligent in providing for themselves, and less able to sustain themselves than the soldiers of any other nation. This is one of the many vulgar errors which have been promulgated respecting them. That they should be constantly victorious, and yet inferior to all other nations in military qualifications, does not, at first sight, appear a very logical conclusion; but the truth is, that, with the exception of the Spanish and Portuguese, who are undoubtedly more sober, the English soldier possesses all the most valuable qualities in as high, and many in a much higher

Hill now assumed the offensive. Byng, supported by Buchan's Portuguese brigade, was ordered to dislodge the enemy, who still continued in great force on some rising ground in front of the allied position, from which point a warm cannonade was kept up on the centre of the allies. Unchecked by a storm of grape and musketry, Byng advanced with the two brigades, bearing the colours of the 66th regiment in his hand, and planted them in position. The enemy was driven headlong from the post, with

degree, than any other soldier. They are as rapidly intelligent as the French, as obedient as the Germans, as enduring as the Russians, and with respect to food, as patient in enduring its want as the soldier of any other nation." The English soldier, as the same author justly observes, is not only calm and resolute in danger, and supports fatigue and the extremes of wet, and cold, and hunger, beyond that of any other troops, but his mind is not unworthy of the outward man; he is full of resources under difficulties. His intelligence and expertness are well illustrated in the following additional observations:—"Seven minutes sufficed for the troops of the light division to get under arms in the middle of the night; a quarter of an hour, night or day, to bring them in order of battle to the alarm posts, with baggage loaded, and assembled at a convenient distance in the rear." It has been said by those who are fond of attributing marvels and prodigies to French soldiers, and the idle tale has been re-echoed a thousand times over by those who form their opinions on hearsay and idle report, that the French have, above all other troops, the faculty of rallying under the worst and most discouraging circumstances: "if defeated one hour, they will rally the next, and be as ready and prompt for action as ever; and this qualification," say they, "is possessed by no other troops." Had those oracular gentlemen had the opportunity of witnessing the conduct of the British troops in the Peninsular war, they would have hesitated to propound wisdom of the kind.

"It is a mistaken popular notion," said the late duke, "that the Spanish or any other troops can subsist on a smaller quantity or a coarser kind of food than the British. I have had the opportunity of knowing, that the Spanish are more clamorous for it, and are more exhausted, if they did not receive it regularly, than the British are."—*Gurwood's Dispatches*. There is discretion, it is true, in giving the English soldier a good dinner—a pound of beef and a pint of porter; but experience (*ex gr.* the Peninsular war) has proved that he will do his duty with only the expectation of that substantial fare. The popular opinion, that he must be well dined and fed—have rations and something "to keep his courage cheery," to enable him to resist the balls and blades of the foes of his country—is as unfounded and irrational, as that his brave opponent the French soldier lives on frogs and soup maigre. In a word, and in truth, "When completely disciplined, the whole world cannot produce a nobler specimen of military bearing," or one imbued with the soldierly and self-sacrificing spirit beyond the English foot soldier. "English soldiers," says the eloquent and liberal general Foy, "are magnificent soldiers, superior to the best legions under Cæsar."

the loss of two cannon and many prisoners. Soult then withdrew into his entrenched camp, and Wellington pushed his advanced posts to the very verge of the ravine in front of the enemy's camp.

In this fiercely-contested battle, the loss of the allies was, in killed, 650; in wounded, 3,907; and prisoners, 504—not "one more," although Soult's report to the minister at war stated that the loss of the allies, on the 10th and the 11th, amounted to 12,000 men, and 1,200 English prisoners taken in the affair of the 10th alone. According to his despatch, he took 2,000 from the 10th to the 13th, inclusive. He states his own loss at 6,000; and notwithstanding the gross inaccuracy of the other parts of his report, this number has been generally accepted, both by French and English historians, as a correct return. One of the French historians (De Beauchamps), however, estimates his loss at 15,000 men, alleging, that on the 13th alone, the loss was nearly 5,000 men. Another (Lapène) estimates it at 10,000; but the same writer states that the loss of the allies was 16,000. Some of the French authors will not allow the loss of their countrymen to have been more than between 4,000 and 5,000 men. This is a proof of the dependence to be placed on French accounts.

Five allied generals were wounded; namely, Hope, Barnes, Robinson, Ashworth, and Le Cor. Hope was wounded in the leg, and contused in the shoulder; his clothes and hat were pierced with musket-balls; and two horses were killed under him. Lord Wellington was constantly exposed to fire during the battle of the 11th; for no eminence being at hand from which he could survey the fight, he was compelled to be in constant transition from one position to another, in order to ascertain where the grand effort of the enemy would be directed, and provide for it accordingly. Wellington, as soon as he reached the field of battle, warmly approved of Hill's plan of disposition.

The fierce and stormy contest, which had lasted for five days in front of Bayonne, and had equalled in obstinacy and duration that of the Pyrenees, was officially detailed by the victor in the following dispatch, dated St. Jean de Luz, 14th December, 1813, addressed to lord Bathurst.

"Since the enemy's retreat from the Nivelle, they had occupied a position in front of Bayonne, which had been entrenched with great labour, since the battle

fought at Vittoria in June last. It appears to be under the fire of the works of the place: the right rests upon the Adour; and the front in this part is covered by a morass, occasioned by a rivulet, which falls into the Adour. The right of the centre rests upon this same morass, and its left upon the river Nive; the left is between the Nive and the Adour, on which river the left rests. They had their advanced posts from their right in front of Anglet, and towards Biarritz. With their left they defended the river Nive, and communicated with general Paris' division of the army of Catalonia, which was at St. Jean-Pied-de-Port, and they had considerable corps cantoned in Villa Franque and Mouguerre.

"It was impossible to attack the enemy in this position, as long as they remained in force in it, without the certainty of great loss, at the same time that success was not very probable, as the camp is so completely protected by the works of the place. It appeared to me, therefore, that the best mode of obliging the enemy, either to abandon the position altogether, or at least so to weaken his force in it, as to offer a more favourable opportunity of attacking it, was to pass the Nive, and to place our right upon the Adour; by which operation, the enemy, already distressed for provisions, would lose the means of communication with the interior afforded by that river, and would become still more distressed. The passage of the Nive was likewise calculated to give us other advantages; to open to us a communication with the interior of France for intelligence, &c., and to enable us to draw some supplies from the country.

"I had determined to pass the Nive immediately after the passage of the Nivelle, but was prevented by the bad state of the roads, and the swelling of the rivulets, occasioned by the fall of rain in the beginning of that month; but the state of the weather and the roads having at length enabled me to collect the materials, and make the preparations for forming bridges for the passage of that river, I moved the troops out of their cantonments on the 8th, and ordered that the right of the army, under lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill, should pass on the 9th, at and in the neighbourhood of Cambo, while marshal sir William Beresford should favour and support his operation by passing the 6th division, under lieutenant-general sir H. Clinton, at Ustaritz. Both operations succeeded completely. The

enemy were immediately driven from the right bank of the river, and retired towards Bayonne, by the great road of St. Jean Pied-de-Port. Those posted opposite Cambo, were nearly intercepted by the 6th division, and one regiment was driven from the road, and obliged to march across the country.

"The enemy assembled in considerable force on a range of heights, running parallel with the Adour, and still keeping Villa Franque by the right. The 8th Portuguese regiment, under colonel Douglas, and the 9th caçadores, under colonel Brown, and the British light infantry battalion of the 6th division, carried this village, and the heights in the neighbourhood. The rain which had fallen the preceding night, and on the morning of the 8th, had so destroyed the road, that the day had elapsed before the whole of sir Rowland Hill's corps had come up; and I was therefore satisfied with the possession of the ground which we occupied.

"On the same day, lieutenant-general sir John Hope, with the left of the army under his command, moved forward by the great road from St. Jean de Luz, towards Bayonne, and reconnoitred the right of the entrenched camp under Bayonne, and the course of the Adour below the town, after driving in the enemy's posts from the neighbourhood of Biarritz and Anglet. The light division, under major-general Alten, likewise moved forward from Bassussary, and reconnoitred that part of the enemy's entrenchments. Sir John Hope and major-general Alten retired in the evening to the ground they had before occupied.

* The author of *The History of the War in the Peninsula*, seemingly dissatisfied with the brief notice of the share which the light division had in the battle of Bayonne, and the misapprehension of French and English writers, misled by an inaccurate phrase in the despatch, who have stated that the whole "was driven back into its entrenchments, whereas it was the pickets only that were forced back." His narrative of the part played by the light division on that memorable occasion is as follows:—

"Soon after dawn the French infantry were observed, by the pickets of the 43rd, pushing each other about, as if at gambols, yet lining by degrees the nearest ditches. A general officer was also seen behind a farmhouse close to the sentinels, and at the same time the heads of columns could be perceived in the rear. Thus warned, some companies of the 43rd were thrown on the right into the basin, to prevent the enemy from penetrating that way to the small plain between Bassussary and Arcangues. General Kempt was with the pickets, and his foresight in delaying his march to Arbonne now saved

"On the morning of the 10th, lieutenant-general sir R. Hill found that the enemy had retired from the position which they had occupied the day before on the heights, into the entrenched camp on that side of the Nive; and he therefore occupied the position intended for him, with his right towards the Adour, and his left at Villa Franque, and communicating with the centre of the army under marshal sir W. Beresford by a bridge laid over the Nive; and the troops under the marshal were again drawn to the left of the Nive. General Morillo's division of Spanish infantry, which had remained with sir R. Hill when the other Spanish troops went into cantonments within the Spanish frontier, was placed at Urcuray with colonel Vivian's brigade of light dragoons at Hasparen, in order to observe the movements of the enemy's division under general Paris, which upon our passage of the Nive had retired towards St. Palais.*

"On the 10th, in the morning, the enemy moved out of the entrenched camp with their whole army, with the exception only of those who occupied the works opposite to sir R. Hill's position, and drove in the pickets of the light division and of sir J. Hope's corps, and made a most desperate attack upon the post of the former at the chateau and church of Arcangues, and upon the advanced posts of the latter on the high road from Bayonne to St. Jean de Luz, near the mayor's house of Biarritz. Both attacks were repulsed in the most gallant style by the troops, and sir J. Hope's corps took about 500 prisoners. The brunt of the action with sir J. Hope's advanced post

the position, for he immediately placed the reserves of his brigade in the church and mansion-house of Arcangues. Meanwhile the French, breaking forth with wild cries and a rattling musketry, fell, at a running pace, upon the pickets of the 43rd, both on the tongue and in the basin, and a cloud of skirmishers descending on their left, penetrating between them and the 52nd regiment, sought to turn both. The right tongue was in like manner assailed, and at the same time the picket at the bridge near Garrat's house was driven back. The assault was so strong and rapid, the enemy so numerous, and the ground so extensive, that it would have been impossible to reach the small plain beyond Bassussary in time to gain the church of Arcangues, if any serious resistance had been attempted; wherefore, delivering their fire at pistol-shot distance, the pickets fell back in succession, and never were the steadiness and intelligence of veteran soldiers more eminently displayed; for, though it was necessary to run at full speed to gain the small plain before the enemy, who was continually outflanking the line of posts at the basin—

fell upon the 1st Portuguese brigade, under major-general Arch. Campbell, which were on duty, and upon major-general Robinson's brigade of the 5th division; which moved up to their support.

"Lieutenant-general sir J. Hope reports most favourably of the conduct of these, and of all the other troops engaged; and I had great satisfaction in finding that this attempt made by the enemy upon our left, in order to oblige us to draw in our right, was completely defeated by a comparatively small part of our force. I cannot sufficiently applaud the ability, coolness, and judgment of lieutenant-general sir J. Hope, who, with the general and staff officers under his command, showed the troops an example of gallantry which must have tended to produce the favourable result of the day. Sir J. Hope received a severe contusion, which, however, I am happy to say, has not deprived me for a moment of the benefit of his assistance. After the action was over, the regiments of Nassau and Frankfort, under the command of colonel Krüse, came over to the posts of major-general Ross' brigade of the 4th division, which were formed for the support of the centre.

"When the night closed, the enemy were

though the ways were so deep and narrow that no formation could be preserved—though the fire of the French was thick and clear, and their cries vehement as they rushed on in pursuit, the instant the open ground at Bassussary was attained, the apparently disordered crowd of fugitives became a compact and well-formed body, defying and deriding the fruitless efforts of their adversaries. The 52nd being only half a mile to the left, though only slightly assailed, fell back also to the main ridge; for, though the closeness of the country did not permit colonel Colborne to observe the strength of the enemy, he could see the rapid retreat of the 43rd, and thence judging how serious the affair was—so well did regiments of the light division understand each other's qualities—withdraw his outposts to secure the main position. And in good time he did so.

On the right-hand tongue the troops were not so fortunate, for, whether they delayed their retreat too long, or that the country was more intricate, the enemy, moving by the basin, reached Bassussary before the rear arrived, and about a hundred of the 43rd and riflemen were intercepted. The French were in a hollow road, and careless, never doubting that the officer of the 43rd, ensign Campbell, a youth scarcely eighteen years of age, would surrender; but he, with a shout, broke into their column, sword in hand, and though the struggle was severe, and twenty of the 43rd, and thirty of the riflemen, with their officer, remained prisoners, reached the church with the rest. D'Armagnac's division of D'Erlon's corps was now pushed close up to the bridge of Urdains, and Clausel assembled his three divisions by degrees at Bassussary, opening meanwhile a sharp fire of musketry.

still in large force in front of our posts, on the ground from which they had driven the pickets. They retired, however, during the night, from lieutenant-general sir J. Hope's front, leaving small posts, which were immediately driven in. They still occupied in force the bridge on which the pickets of the light division had stood, and it was obvious that the whole army was still in front of our left; and about three in the afternoon they again drove in lieutenant-general sir J. Hope's pickets, and attacked his post. They were again repulsed with considerable loss. The attack was recommenced on the morning of the 12th, with the same want of success. The 1st division, under major-general Howard, having relieved the fifth division, the enemy discontinued it in the afternoon, and retired entirely within the entrenched camp on that night. They never renewed the attack on the posts of the light division after the 10th.

"The first division, under major-general Howard, were not engaged till the 12th, when the enemy's attack was more feeble; but the guards conducted themselves with their usual spirit. The enemy, having thus failed in all their attacks with their whole force upon our left, withdrew into their intrench-

The position, however, was safe. The mansion-house on the right, covered by abattis, and not easily accessible, was defended by a rifle battalion and the Portuguese. The church and churchyard were occupied by the 43rd, who were supported with two mountain guns, their front being covered by a declivity of thick copse-wood, filled with riflemen, and only to be turned by narrow hollow roads leading on each side to the church. On the left the 52nd were supported by the remainder of the division, spread as far as the great basin that separated the right wing from the ridge of Barouilhât, towards which some small posts were pushed; but there was still an interval between Alten's and Hope's positions. The skirmishing fire grew hot; Clausel brought up twelve guns to the ridge of Bassussary, with which he threw shot and shells into the churchyard of Arcangues, and four or five hundred infantry then made a rush forward, but a heavy fire from the 43rd sent them back over the ridge where their guns were posted. Yet the position of the latter, well directed at first, would have been murderous if the musketry from the churchyard had not made the French gunners withdraw their pieces a little behind the ridge, which caused their shot to fly wild and high. General Kempt, thinking the distance too great, was at first inclined to stop this fire, but the moment it lulled, the French gunners pushed their pieces forward again, and their shells knocked down eight men in an instant. The small arms then recommenced, and the shells again flew high. The French were in like manner kept at bay by the riflemen in the village and mansion-house, and the action, hottest where the 52nd fought, continued all day."

ments on the night of the 12th, and passed a large force through Bayonne; with which, on the morning of the 13th, they made a most desperate attack upon lieutenant-general sir R. Hill. In expectation of this attack, I had requested marshal sir W. Beresford to reinforce the lieutenant-general with the 6th division, which crossed the Nive at daylight in the morning; and I further reinforced him by the 4th division, and two brigades of the 3rd.

"The expected arrival of the 6th division gave the lieutenant-general great facility in making his movements; but the troops under his own immediate command had defeated and repulsed the enemy with immense loss before their arrival. The principal attack having been made along the high road from Bayonne to St. Jean Pied-de-Port, major-general Barnes' brigade of British infantry, and the 5th brigade of Portuguese infantry, under brigadier-general Ashworth, were particularly engaged in the contest with the enemy on that point; and these troops conducted themselves admirably. The Portuguese division of infantry, under the command of mariscal de Campo F. Le Cor, moved to their support on their left in very gallant style, and regained an important position between those troops and major-general Pringle's brigade engaged with the enemy in front of Ville Franque. I had great satisfaction also in observing the conduct of major-general Byng's brigade of British infantry, supported by the Portuguese brigade under the command of major-general Buchan, in carrying an important height from the enemy on the right of our position, and maintaining it against all their efforts to regain it.

"Two guns and some prisoners were taken from the enemy, who, being beaten in all points, and having suffered considerable loss, were obliged to retire upon their intrenchments. The enemy marched a large body of cavalry across the bridge of the Adour yesterday evening, and retired their force opposite to sir R. Hill this morning towards Bayonne."

The weather now became very wet, inclement, and wintry. The streams had swollen into impassable torrents. The Nive, the Adour, the Pau, the Gaves of Oleron and Mauleon, and numerous other streams that pervade Béarn and the Basques, had overflowed their banks, rendering the low ground in their vicinity one continued marsh. The cross roads had become impassable. The

high roads were in possession of the enemy, and protected by strong fortresses. The allied army was therefore obliged to suspend all active operations against the enemy. The position of the hostile armies was now as follows: Soult considering his position before Bayonne to be impregnable—his entrenched camp before that city being defended by a strong chain of retrenchments and redoubts masked with a formidable artillery, beyond which was a broad and deep morass, passable only at two places, and both which were protected by strong redoubts—determined to pass to the right bank of the Adour, to guard against any attempt to cross that river. Leaving his right wing, consisting of four divisions, under Reille, in the entrenched camp, he extended his centre, under d'Erlon, on the right bank of the Adour to Port-de-Lanne; while his left, under Clausel, rested on the right of the Bidouse from its confluence with the Adour, to St. Palais. Two divisions of cavalry were in reserve covering his flanks. Harispe was posted at St. Jean Pied-de-Port, with a division of infantry and a body of national guards. The right of the Adour, from Bayonne to Port de Lanne, a distance of eighteen miles, was covered with redoubts, and armed; Dax and Hastings were strongly retrenched. The bridges at Gueche, Bedache, and Came on the Bidouse, as also Peyrehorade, a town situated at the junction of the Gave de Pau and the Gave d'Oleron, were protected by têtes-de-pont, or bridge heads.

The allies occupied a line from Bidart on the left to Arcangues and Villa Franque; the right, which rested on the Adour, was thrown *en potence* to Urcuray, on the road to St. Jean de Luz. To secure the rear of the right wing, the 3rd division was posted at Urcuray to observe the advanced posts of the enemy between St. Palais and Hasparren; Buchan's brigade of Portuguese was stationed on both sides of the Joyeuse; while Mina's Spaniards, consisting of three battalions, were on the left of the Nive, at the villages of Bidarray and Baygorry, in observation of the enemy's movements from St. Jean Pied-de-Port. The rest of the army resumed the cantonments they had occupied previous to the battles of Bayonne. To guard against surprise, a chain of telegraphs was formed from the Nive to St. Jean de Luz. The telegraphs consisted of flags and barrels suspended on lofty signal posts. Look-out stations were appointed at the

churches of Guethery, Arcangues, and Vieux Mouguerre, and these communicated with one on a high sand hill, on the north side of St. Jean de Luz, near the entrance from the Bayonne road; so that notice of any hostile attempt might almost instantaneously be communicated to head-quarters. Works were also thrown up at Bidart, at Arcangues, and almost on every knoll. To afford every alleviation to the troops from the inclemency of the weather, the duty at the outposts was made as light as possible, being taken alternately by the different brigades in each division, the remainder in the intervals returning to their cantonments. The allied advance posts were now close to those of the enemy. Immediately after the battle of St. Pierre, Wellington had despatched orders for two brigades of the Andalusian army of reserve to cross the frontier and occupy Itsassu, for the purpose of covering the rear of the allied army on the side of St. Jean Pied-de-Port, and to Freyre to move forward two divisions of the Gallician army from Irun to Ascain, to support the allied left wing. And to prevent the recurrence of the outrages the Spanish troops had already committed, he directed that they should be supplied with provisions from the magazines of the English army. In the middle of December, Freyre's corps was placed in reserve at St. Pé, while Morillo's corps, supported by Giron's Andalusians, watched the valley of the Nive. Morillo having obtained, on a false excuse, the assistance of two squadrons of the 18th hussars, made a marauding excursion towards Mendionde, attacked the enemy's pickets, and provoked a general skirmish; and when he had compromised the English cavalry, he suddenly withdrew his infantry, and left the English cavalry to their fate. By desperate fighting the deserted squadrons, with great difficulty, escaped from being captured; several of their officers, and a large proportion of their men, were killed and wounded. On the very first day (December 9th) of the fierce and stormy five days' battles before Bayonne, Morillo's Spaniards, besides other atrocities, had murdered fifteen peasants, among whom were men, women, and children, near Hellette, in the very first village they entered.

* It has been before stated that the Spanish marauders, taken in the act of committing the outrages on the night of the 11th and morning of the 12th of November, after the battle of the Nivelle, were executed. In the case above stated, besides the

Mina's troops, on rejoining the allied army, committed the most shocking outrages in the Vals des Baygorry and des Osses. For the suppression of these outrages, Morillo's corps was placed under arms an hour before daylight every morning, and remained under arms till an hour after dark.* The order was issued by the adjutant-general on the 18th of December, and remained in force till the 22nd. After it had been recalled, lord Wellington received a letter of remonstrance from general Freyre, enclosing Morillo's complaints. Before reading Morillo's letter, the English chief sent the following reply to Freyre, dated "à St. Jean de Luz, ce 24th December, 1813, à 11 heures du soir."

"La question entre ces messieurs et moi est, s'ils pilleront ou non les paysans Français. J'ai écrit, et j'ai fait écrire, plusieurs fois au Général Morillo pour lui marquer ma désapprobation sur ce sujet, mais en vain; et enfin j'ai été obligé de prendre des mesures pour m'assurer que les troupes sous ses ordres ne feraient plus de dégâts dans le pays. Je suis fâché que ces mesures soient de nature à déplaire à ces messieurs; mais je vous avoue que je trouve que la conduite, qui les a rendues nécessaires, est bien plus déshonorante que les mesures qui en sont la conséquence.

"Je vous prie de croire que je ne peux avoir aucun sentiment sur votre lettre que celui de la reconnaissance; et aussitôt que j'aurai lu toutes celles incluses dans votre lettre officielle, je vous enverrai réponse. En attendant je vous dis que je suis, et de toute ma vie ai été, trop accoutumé aux libelles pour ne pas les mépriser; et si je ne les avais pas méprisés, non seulement je ne serais pas où je suis, mais le Portugal au moins, et peut-être l'Espagne, serait sous la domination Française. Je ne crois pas que l'union des deux nations dépend des libellistes; mais si elle en dépend, pour moi, je déclare que je ne désire pas un commandement, ni l'union des nations, si l'un ou l'autre doit être fondé sur le pillage. J'ai perdu 20,000 hommes dans cette campagne, et ce n'est pas pour que le général Morillo, ni qui que ce soit, puisse venir piller les paysans Français; et, où je commande, je déclare hautement que je ne le permettrai

punishment inflicted, severe reproaches and threats of disgrace were added, in despite of the discontent of the marauding generals, and a firm determination expressed to repress them, and punish all future offence.

pas. Si on veut piller, qu'on nomme un autre à commander; parceque, moi, je déclare que, si on est sous mes ordres, il ne faut pas piller.

"Vous avez des grandes armées en Espagne; et si on veut piller les paysans Français, on n'a qu'à m'ôter le commandement, et entrer en France. Je couvrirai l'Espagne contre les malheurs qui en seront le résultat; c'est à dire, que vos armées, quelques grandes qu'elles puissent être, ne pourront pas rester en France pendant 15 jours. Vous savez bien que vous n'avez ni argent, ni magasins, ni rien de ce qu'il vous faut pour tenir une armée en campagne; et que le pays où vous avez passé la campagne dernière est incapable de vous soutenir l'année prochaine. Si j'étais assez scélérat pour permettre le pillage, vous ne pouvez pas croire que la France (toute riche qu'elle est) puisse soutenir votre armée, si le pays est pillé. Pour ceux qui désirent vivre des contributions du pays (ce qui je crois est votre objet dans la campagne prochaine), il paraît essentiel que les troupes ne soient pas autorisées à piller. Mais, malgré tout cela, on croirait que je suis l'ennemi, au lieu d'être le meilleur ami de l'armée, en prenant des mesures décisives pour empêcher le pillage, et que ces mesures la déshonorent! Je pourrais dire quelque chose aussi en justification de ce que j'ai fait, qui regarderait la politique; mais j'ai assez dit, et je vous répète, qu'il m'est absolument indifférent que je commande une grande ou une petite armée; mais que, qu'elle soit grande ou petite, il faut qu'elle m'obeisse, et surtout, *qu'elle ne pillé pas.*"

The following is the translation:—

"The question at issue between these gentlemen and myself is whether or not they shall pillage the French peasantry. I have written several times to general Morillo, stating my dissatisfaction on this point, but in vain; and at last I have been obliged to take measures to prevent the troops under his command from doing further mischief to the country. I am sorry if my measures displease these gentlemen, but I consider the conduct that rendered them necessary much more dishonourable than the measures that are its consequence. I have lost 20,000 men in this campaign, and it was not that general Morillo, or anybody else, might plunder the French peasantry; and I distinctly declare, that I will not suffer it where I command. You have large armies in Spain; if you desire to plunder, deprive

me of the command, and bring them into France. I will protect Spain from the misfortunes which will be the result; for your armies, large though they be, would be driven out in a fortnight. You know very well you have neither money nor stores, nor anything necessary to maintain an army. Were I so base as to allow pillage, France, rich as she is, could not support you if the country was plundered. One would think I am your enemy instead of your best friend, because I take decisive measures to prevent pillage. I repeat once more, that I am quite indifferent whether I command a large or a small army; but large or small, I will be obeyed, and I will not suffer pillage."

To the remonstrance of Morillo to the orders requiring him to keep his corps under arms to prevent their spirit of plunder and revenge, the commander-in-chief's reply was, in a letter dated "St. Jean de Luz, 23rd December, 1813:—

"Before I gave the orders of which you and the officers under your command have made such repeated complaints, I warned you repeatedly of the misconduct of your troops, in direct disobedience of my orders, which I told you I would not permit, and desired you to take measures to prevent it. I have sent orders to countermand those which I gave on the 18th; but I give you notice that, whatever may be the consequence, I will repeat those orders, if your troops are not made by their officers to conduct themselves as well-disciplined soldiers ought.

"I did not lose thousands of men to bring the army under my command into the French territory, in order that the soldiers might plunder and ill-use the French peasantry, in positive disobedience of my orders; and I beg that you and your officers may understand, that I prefer to have a small army that will obey my orders, and preserve discipline, to a large one that is disobedient and undisciplined; and that, if the means which I am obliged to adopt to enforce obedience and good order occasion the loss of men, and the reduction of my force, it is totally indifferent to me; and the fault rests with those who, by the neglect of their duty, suffer their soldiers to commit disorders which must be prejudicial to their country. I cannot be satisfied with professions of obedience. My orders must be really obeyed, and strictly carried into execution; and if I cannot obtain obedience in one way, I will

in another, or I will not command the troops that disobey me."

Morillo, displeased with this rebuke, complained to his countryman, Freyre, at the same time expressing a doubt of the English general's extent of authority. To Freyre's communication, lord Wellington replied, in a letter dated St. Jean-de-Luz, 25th December, 1813:—

"In consequence of the repeated complaints of the conduct of the troops under the command of general Morillo, it appears, by the papers enclosed, that I took measures to call his attention to the subject, and I desired that he and his officers would prevent his men from plundering the country. Finding that all my remonstrances were vain; that the disorders complained of still continued; and that I received warning from various quarters of the danger to general Morillo and others from their continuance, I directed that Morillo's troops should be kept under arms during the day till further orders, in order to ensure good order in future.

"Notwithstanding the doubts of general Morillo that I have a right to give such orders, I believe that he will find that every officer in command has not only a right, but that it is his duty, to order the troops under his command under arms whenever he thinks it proper or necessary; and it is the first time I have heard that it is disgraceful to officers and soldiers to be ordered under arms. General Morillo is mistaken in supposing that the same orders have never been given to the soldiers of the other allied nations. If he will inquire, he will find that it has been done constantly; and if he reflects a little, he will discover that the disgrace does not consist in having received those orders, but in conduct that has rendered them necessary."

Morillo still persisting in the vindication of the conduct of his division, in a letter addressed to Freyre, dated St. Jean-de-Luz, 26 Dec. 1813, lord Wellington sarcastically replied:—

"Je viens de recevoir votre lettre du 26. Il paraît, par les lettres du général Morillo que vous m'avez envoyées, que j'avais averti le général Morillo par différentes manières, pas moins que quatre fois, des plaintes que j'avais reçues contre ces troupes; et malgré que le général nie que ses troupes aient fait du mal, il a dit lui-même au général Hill que 'c'était impossible de l'empêcher, parcequ'il n'y avait pas un soldat ni un officier

qui ne reçut des lettres de sa famille en Espagne, pour lui dire que, se trouvant en France, il devait faire fortune.' Cela étant, il reste à moi de tâcher de l'empêcher.

* * * *

"Sur ces désordres j'ai reçu toutes les preuves que je pouvais avoir; et je vous dis que dans trois différens endroits j'ai reçu l'avertissement que je devais prendre garde à la division du général Morillo, parceque les paysans Basques commençaient à parler de vengeance; et que, si une fois ils prenaient les armes en main, il serait difficile de leur faire mettre bas. C'est à dire, à Ustaritz, à Herauritz, et St. Jean-de-Luz."

* * * *

"Demandez à Mina la jolie manière avec laquelle les paysans de Baygorrý l'ont attaqué par surprise dans leur village, et vous verrez que l'inimitié des paysans n'est pas à mépriser quand les troupes sont en cantonnement."

Morillo again appealing to Freyre in vindication of the conduct of his troops, to Freyre's communication of his countryman's justification, the indignant reproof of the English general in reply, dated St. Jean-de-Luz, 8th of January, 1814, which closed the mouths of the marauding Spaniard and his coadjutors, says—

"It would be very satisfactory to me to allow this subject to drop; but the letter from general Morillo contains some assertions which I cannot allow to pass unnoticed, and several misconceptions; and I think proper to trouble you again upon this subject. I deny that the order of the 18th of December ought to be viewed in any other light than as a measure to prevent a great evil and a misfortune. Let general Mina state in what kind of a situation he finds himself involved in his warfare with the French peasantry, and it will then be seen how necessary such measures were to prevent a similar warfare with the division under general Morillo. I knew that this misfortune would have occurred; and it became my duty to take effectual means to prevent it; and I am only sorry that these measures were disagreeable to the officers of general Morillo's division.

"In regard to the particular expression in the order of the 18th of December, to which general Morillo refers, I have no hesitation in stating the reason why I directed it might be used. I had repeatedly sent to general Morillo, through sir Rowland Hill and other channels, to request that he would keep his troops in order in

answer to which, the general stated to sir Rowland Hill that it was impossible, *as the officers and soldiers received, by every post, letters from their friends congratulating them upon their good fortune in being in France, and urging them to take advantage of their situation to make their fortunes.* This sir Rowland Hill told me, and I therefore saw there was no remedy but a strong one.

"I can assure you that, in my opinion, it was essentially necessary to put an effectual stop to the evils complained of; and I can equally assure you, that neither in the measure adopted nor in the orders given to carry that measure into execution, had I the most distant intention to insult or injure the officers. I considered what general Morillo told general Hill as an acknowledgment that neither he nor his officers could stop the evil, and I acted accordingly. I might satisfy myself with this answer to general Morillo's complaints, and justify myself as the commander-in-chief of the British army to those who have a right to call upon me for such justification.

"General Morillo is, however, entirely mistaken in his assertions respecting the measures adopted to preserve discipline among the British troops; and instead of asserting, as he has, that they may commit what crimes they please with impunity, he ought, if informed, to say that no crime ever goes unpunished when the criminal can be discovered. Hundreds of times, in Spain and Portugal, whole corps and divisions have been placed and kept under arms, not only to prevent disorder, but to obtain the discovery of criminals; and in no instance has a criminal been discovered that he has not been tried, and the sentence of the court-martial put into execution. I defy general Morillo, I defy any man, to show an instance in which injury has been done to any individual, of which proof could be adduced, that the officer or soldier doing it has not been punished. Let him inquire how many soldiers have been hanged in Spain for plundering, and how many have been otherwise punished and made to pay for the damage done, and he will find there is no reason to complain on this ground.

"I have already sent to general Hill the complaints which he has made of the two soldiers of the 71st for the murder of a Spaniard, and have ordered that they might be tried; and if I am not misinformed by general Hill, there is no instance of complaint made by general Morillo that redress

has not been given when the criminal could be discovered; and in a very recent instance of an officer of dragoons, general Morillo himself requested that the complaint might not be forwarded to me, as the officer had begged his pardon for the improper conduct. The British officers and soldiers, like others, require to be kept in order, and, until I read general Morillo's letter, I imagined that the last accusation that could be made against me was, that I neglected this duty. But, however I may endeavour to perform it, I must admit that, in a large and widely-extended army, evils and injuries may be committed without my knowing it; but with this admission I must say, that it is quite groundless to assert, or suppose that British officers and soldiers are allowed to do what they please with impunity.

"I beg your excellency to ask the question whether the British officers and soldiers have no ground of complaint? During the summer and winter there were frequent instances of officers and soldiers shot at and robbed by the Spanish troops on the roads; and one soldier was murdered between Oyarzun and Lesaca. Our stores and convoys are frequently robbed; and only yesterday the account was received of an officer put to death at Vittoria; and a few days ago I had accounts of others ill-treated at Santander; and other events of the same kind occur frequently.

"I must produce some much stronger proof of a design to ill-treat the officers and soldiers of the British army than the death and ill-treatment of those individuals would give, supposing that I were inclined to assert that such design existed, and yet this proof would be stronger than any general Morillo could adduce to support his assertion; as I again defy him to produce a single instance of complaint made, and proof adduced, and a denial, and even a delay of redress. General Morillo has made two complaints, one of injustice and breach of the *ordonanza* of the Spanish army by me, the other of unjust and improper conduct in allowing officers and soldiers of the British army to misconduct themselves with impunity.

"I hope this letter will show the general that there is no foundation for either complaint, and that he will withdraw them, as made in a moment of irritation, to which every man is liable. If he does not do so, I hope that he is prepared to prove them. I feel the same respect and regard for

general Morillo and his troops, that I do for all the troops under my command, and I do every thing in my power for them. This very regard must prevent me from allowing these charges of injustice to remain unrefuted, and they must be proved, or formally withdrawn."

To this letter containing truths incapable of refutation, the marauding Spaniards deemed silence a more prudent measure, than any attempt to disprove the magnanimous sentiments with which it abounds.

But the outrages of his allies, the faithlessness of their governments, and the obstacles they threw in his way in the prevention of the measures for the liberation of their countries, were not the only difficulties the English general had to contend with; he had even to encounter the mistaken projects, to combat the false views of his own countrymen in power, at variance with the interests, and prejudicial to the public service and the success of the great cause in which he was engaged for the welfare of his country and that of mankind. How admirably and cogently are the suggestions of the English secretary of state for adopting another scene of action, namely, transferring the peninsular army to Germany, and the design of the government to withdraw part of his force to invade Holland, and send an expedition to Hanover, proved inimical to the interests of the allies, in the following letter, dated St. Jean de Luz, 21st December, 1813:—

"Assure the Russian ambassador that there is nothing I can do to forward the general interest that I will not do. I am already further advanced on the French territory than any of the allied powers; and I believe I am better prepared than any of them to take advantage of any opportunities which may offer of annoying the enemy, either in consequence of my own situation, or of the operations of the armies of the allies.

* * * *

"In military operations there are some things which cannot be done; one of these is to move troops in this country during or immediately after a violent fall of rain. I believe I should not only lose many more men than I shall ever replace, by putting my troops in camp in this bad weather, but I should be guilty of an useless waste of men, if I were to attempt an operation during the violent falls of rain which we have had.

"In regard to the scene of the operations of the army, it is a question for the government, and not for me. By having kept in the field above 30,000 men in the Peninsula, the British government have now for five years given employment to at least 200,000 French troops of the best Napoleon had, as it is ridiculous to suppose that either the Spaniards or the Portuguese could have resisted a moment, if the British force had been withdrawn. The armies now employed against us cannot be less than 100,000 men, indeed more including garrisons; and I see in the French newspapers, that orders have been given for the formation at Bordeaux of an army of reserve of 100,000 men. Is there any man weak enough to suppose that one-third of the number first mentioned would be employed against the Spaniards and Portuguese, if we were withdrawn? They would, if it were still an object with Buonaparte to conquer the Peninsula. And he would succeed in his object; but it is much more likely that he would make peace with the powers of the Peninsula, and then have it in his power to turn against the allied armies the 200,000 men, of which 100,000 men are such troops as those armies have not yet had to deal with. Another observation I have to submit is, that in a war in which every day offers a crisis, the result of which may affect the world for ages, the change of the scene of the operations of the British army would put that army entirely *hors-de-combat* for four months at least, even if the new scene were Holland; and they would not then be such a machine as this army is.

"Your lordship very reasonably, however, asks what objects we propose to ourselves here, which are to induce Napoleon to make peace? I am now in a commanding situation on the most vulnerable frontier of France, probably the only vulnerable frontier. If I could put 20,000 Spaniards in the field, which I could do if I had money, and was properly supported by the fleet, I must have the only fortress there is on this frontier [i.e. Bayonne], if it can be called a fortress, and that in a very short space of time. If I could put 40,000 Spaniards into the field, I should most probably have my posts on the Garonne. Does any man believe that Napoleon would not feel an army in such a position more than he would feel 30,000 or 40,000 British troops laying siege to one of his fortresses in Holland? If it be only the resource of men and money, of which

he will be deprived, and the reputation he will lose by our being in this position, it will do ten times more to produce peace than ten armies on the side of Flanders. But if I am right in believing that there is a strong Bourbon party in France, and that that party is the preponderating one in the south of France, what mischief must not our army do him in the position I have supposed, and what sacrifices would he not make to get rid of us?

"It is the business of the government, and not my business, to dispose of the resources of the nation; and I have no right to give an opinion on the subject. I wish however to impress on your lordship's mind, that you cannot maintain military operations in the Peninsula and in Holland with British troops; you must give up either the one or the other, as, if I am not mistaken, the British establishment is not equal to the maintenance of two armies in the field. I began last campaign with 70,000 British and Portuguese troops; and taking away from me the German troops, and adding to me what could be got from the militia, and by enabling me to bring up the Portuguese recruits, I expected to take the field with 80,000 men; but this is now quite out of the question. If you should form the Hanoverian army, which is in my opinion the most reasonable plan to go upon, I shall not take the field with 50,000 men, unless I shall receive real and efficient assistance to bring up the Portuguese recruits; and it then will be about 55,000, or if our wounded recover well, about 60,000 men.

"Then I beg you to observe, that whenever you extend your assistance to any country, unless at the same time fresh means are put into action, the service is necessarily stinted in all its branches on the old stage. I do not wish to make complaints, but if you will look at every branch of the service here now, you will find it stinted, particularly the naval branch, and those supplies which necessarily come from England. I lately sent you a return of the supply of clothing received for the Spanish army for the year 1813, from which you will see how that branch stands; and I have not heard of the arrival at Plymouth of the 25,000 suits said to be lodged there, which will leave a deficiency of 3,000 suits for 1813; 7,800 suits having arrived lately at Coruña. Nearly all the great coats are deficient. The reason of this is that the inferior departments do not observe, that

when British exertion is to be made on a new scene, the old means are not sufficient. New engines must be set at work, otherwise the service must be stinted in one or both scenes, and there must be complaints.

"The different reports I have sent your lordship will show how we stand for want of naval means; and I beg you to take the state and condition of the ships *on the stations*, striking out those coming out and going home, which the admiralty will insert on the 1st and 15th of every month since June last, and you will see whether or not there is reason to complain. But whatever may be the numbers employed, I complain that there are not enough, because they do not perform the service. This is certainly not the intention of the admiralty. Since we have established our posts on the upper part of the Adour, the French have again begun to use the navigation of the coast from Bordeaux to Bayonne. Your lordship is also acquainted with the state of our financial resources. We are overwhelmed with debts; and I can scarcely stir out of my house on account of the public creditors waiting to demand payment of what is due to them. Some of the muleteers are twenty-six months in arrears; and, only yesterday, I was obliged to give them bills upon the treasury for a part of their demands, or lose their services; which bills, they will, I know, sell at a depreciated rate of exchange to the *sharks* who are waiting at Passages, and in this town, to take advantage of the public distresses. I have reason to suspect that they became thus clamorous at the instigation of British merchants. I draw your lordship's attention to these facts, just to show that Great Britain cannot extend her operations by British troops, or even her pecuniary or other assistance, without starving the service here, unless additional means and exertion should be used to procure what is wanted."

His letters dated St. Jean de Luz, 15th December, 1813, and addressed to the duke of York and lord Bathurst, relative to their proposal to withdraw the veteran battalions from the Peninsula are worthy of perusal.

Thus—to adopt the forcible and emphatic language of the author of *The History of the War in the Peninsula*, when speaking of the obstacles and difficulties which the English general had to contend with from his own government—"even at the eleventh hour was the giant Wellington measured by the political dwarfs; those self-sufficient men

looking on him as a person whose views were wild and visionary, requiring the corroboration of older and wiser heads before they could be assented to. And be it remembered, that these dangers and difficulties, these vexations and oppositions, did not happen one after another, but altogether; that it was when crossing the Bidassoa, breaking through the mountain fortifications of Soult; passing the Nive, fighting the battles in front of Bayonne; and when still greater and more intricate combinations were to be arranged, that all these vials of folly and enmity were poured upon his head. Who, then, shall refuse to admire the undaunted firmness, the unwearied temper and vigilance, the piercing judgment with which he steered his gallant vessel, and with a flowing sail, unhurt through this howling storm of passion—this tumultuous sea of folly.”*

Wellington now finding himself in firm possession of the ground he had won by his skill and dexterity, published a proclamation declaring St. Jean de Luz and the ports of French Navarre south of the Adour, free and open to all nations not at war with the allies, and affording protection to all vessels, even French, which had been or might be found in the Nivelle or the Adour, and fixing a duty of 5 per cent. *ad valorem* on all articles, except grain and salt, and stores for the use of the army. The consequence of these wise measures was, that the harbour of St. Jean de Luz was crowded with vessels of all nations, laden with all that was necessary for the maintenance of the army.

During the continuance of head-quarters at St. Jean de Luz, the English general, accompanied by all his staff, attended divine service every Sunday on the sandy beach of the bay, the brigade of guards forming a square around, while the breaking of the distant surf on the shore bore a rough burthen to the prayer of the martial congregation.

In closing our account of this campaign, we cannot refrain from laying before the reader the eloquent observations of Alison on the expulsion of the French armies from the soil of Spain:—

“The campaign of Vittoria is the most glorious, both in a moral and political point of view, which is to be found in the British annals. When we reflect that at its commencement the English forces were still on

the Coa and the Agueda, and the French armies occupied more than one-half of Spain, including the whole of its northern fortresses, and that at its conclusion they had been wholly expelled from Spain, the mountain barrier of the Pyrenees forced, and their troops maintaining a painful defensive warfare on the banks of the Adour—it is hard to say whether we have most cause to admire the ability of the chief who, in so short a time, achieved such unparalleled successes—the hardihood of the soldiers who followed him, unwearied, through such toils and dangers, or the strength of the moral reaction which, in so brief a space, produced such astonishing results. They must appear the more wonderful, when it is recollected that, at the commencement of the campaign, the Anglo-Portuguese army could muster only 70,000 combatants, and the British and Germans in Valencia 10,000 more; that the Spaniards were incapable of being trusted in serious conflict, while the French had 197,000 men present with the eagles, not, as in former campaigns, disseminated over an immense surface from the Pyrenees to Gibraltar, but concentrated in the plains of old Castile and the north of Spain, and in possession of all its frontier fortresses. In three months, the vast fabric, erected with so much toil and bloodshed during five years of previous warfare, was overthrown, and the French armies, which so long, in the pride of irresistible strength, had oppressed the Peninsula, were driven like chaff before the wind into their own territories. The march from the frontiers of Portugal to the Ebro, with the left constantly in advance, so as to compel the French to evacuate all the defensive positions which they took up; the skill with which the troops were disposed who gained the decisive battle of Vittoria; the moral courage and quick determination which arrested the torrent of Soult’s successes in the Pyrenees; the persevering energy which broke through the mountain barrier of France, and established the British standards under the walls of Bayonne—are so many examples of the highest military ability, which never were surpassed. But it would have been in vain that her chief was endowed with all these rare qualities, if the troops of England, which he commanded, had not been adequate to the duties to which they were called; but such was the admirable state of discipline and efficiency to which the British and Portu-

* Napier.

guese soldiers had now arrived, and such the heroic spirit with which they were animated, that it may safely be affirmed they never were surpassed in the annals either of ancient or modern war.

"The national historians of Spain and Great Britain differ widely, and will probably always differ, as to the comparative merit to be assigned to the efforts of their respective nations for the deliverance of the Peninsula; and the French military writers, more jealous of the fame of the descendants of those who fought at Cressy and Agincourt, than of the comparatively dim light of Spanish glory, are anxious to ascribe it chiefly to the consuming effects of the guerrilla warfare. Perhaps the English military historians, and those especially who were actually engaged in the conflict, and witnessed the innumerable defeats of the Spanish armies, and the unworthy jealousy with which they were actuated, both towards the generals and troops of this country, have gone into the other extreme, and both unduly overlooked the patriotic ardour, and underrated the military influence of the indomitable spirit of hostility to French aggression, which for so long a period animated a large portion of the Peninsular people. Impartial justice will probably ascribe to both their due share in this glorious deliverance: it will admit that the power of Spain was utterly prostrated until England entered as a principal into the strife, and that the prolonged resistance of its people was mainly owing to the necessity of concentrating the French troops on the Portuguese frontier from the effects of Wellington's victories; but that, notwithstanding all the heroism of the Anglo-Portuguese army, and all the ability of its chief, it never could have effected the deliverance of the Peninsula against the forces, generally three, often four times superior, of the French empire, unless the indomitable perseverance and resolute hostility of the Spanish character had come to their aid, by the distraction which they occasioned to the French armies.

"But there is one glory connected with the Peninsular war, which the British empire shares with no other power, and which

the biographer of Wellington is entitled to claim as exclusively his own. During all the difficulties of the contest, and in the midst of the almost overwhelming embarrassments which arose from the long continuance and oppressive burdens of the war, England never adopted the odious revolutionary principle, of drawing the resources for the contest from the country in which it was carried on; and from first to last firmly, to her own great immediate loss, repudiated the maxim that war should maintain war. Whatever she did, she did with her own forces and from her own means alone: no ravaged country had to rue the day when her standards appeared among them; no wasted realm showed where her armies had been; no tears of the fatherless and the widow, mourning cold-blooded massacres, dimmed the lustre of her victories. If disorders occurred, as occur they did, and occur they will, it was against her system of warfare, and despite the utmost efforts of her chief. With unconquerable constancy, Wellington and the British government adhered to this noble system, in the midst of pecuniary difficulties which would have crushed any other man, and financial embarrassments which would have overwhelmed any other nation. During all this time, Napoleon's generals and armies were reveling in wealth and affluence, and France itself was enjoying comparatively light taxation, the fruit of the unbounded and systematic extortion which they practised in all the countries which their armies occupied. But mark the end of these things, and the final opposite effect of the gains of oppression and the rule of justice upon the fortunes of nations. Napoleon, driven with disgrace behind the Rhine and the Pyrenees, was unable to protect even the mighty empire he ruled from the aroused and universal indignation of mankind; while Wellington, commencing from small beginnings, had at length burst, with an overwhelming force, through the mountain barrier of the south, liberated the whole Peninsula from the oppressor's yoke, and planted his victorious standard, amidst the blessings of a protected and grateful people, on the plains of France."

PROPOSED RESTORATION OF FERDINAND.

At this time, a secret negotiation was going on between Napoleon Buonaparte and Ferdinand; and a royalist movement was in active organization in the south of France for the restoration of the Bourbons. The object of Buonaparte's negotiation was to create divisions among the allies, detach Spain from the coalition, and render Suchât's force in Catalonia available for his necessities in Germany, where affairs were assuming a formidable aspect against him.

He accordingly sent to Valençay an envoy, M. de la Forest, formerly ambassador to Madrid. This person assumed for the occasion, the name of M. Dubois, and performed his part so adroitly, that a negotiation with Ferdinand was brought to a close, without its being suspected by the English, or the Spanish cortes, that anything of the kind was on foot. La Forest required Ferdinand to concert means for sending the English out of the Peninsula altogether. To this Ferdinand was forced to reply, that he could take no step towards effecting such an object, without the consent of the Spanish regency, and he knew nothing of the present state of Spain, but what he had read in the French journals. He was assured by the envoy that on those representations, he might place reliance. Such a statement, however, could hardly impose on the weak-minded Ferdinand. La Forest then endeavoured to inspire him with disgust for the cortes, whose democratic tendencies, he described to be such as would prove most fatal to Spanish monarchy, and who were wholly in the interest of Great Britain, by whose means they were kept together. Great Britain, he reported to be herself little better than a republic, and under her auspices, Jacobinism and anarchy reigned in the Peninsula. It was this lamentable state of things, La Forest said, which his master deplored, and was anxious to terminate by concluding a treaty of alliance with Ferdinand, and placing him on the throne of his ancestors. Ferdinand was so far moved by the representations of Buonaparte's emissary, that he consented to a Spanish nobleman then in France, being named to meet M. la Forest. In consequence of this the duke of San Carlos was sent by Buonaparte to Valençay, where a treaty was prepared, and signed 11th December, 1813, which

provided that the emperor of the French, should recognise Ferdinand VII. and his successors as kings of Spain and of the Indies, and also the Spanish territory, such as it was before the war. On the part of Napoleon, the provinces and fortified places still in the hands of the French, were to be restored, and Ferdinand engaged to maintain the integrity of his territory, and to make the English evacuate every part of his dominions. The two contracting parties pledged themselves to assert their maritime rights against England, and it was agreed that all Spaniards who had given in their adhesion to Joseph Buonaparte, should be reinstated in the honours, offices, and privileges which they enjoyed under him. Ferdinand was to pay annually to king Charles, his father, thirty million of reals, and in the event of his death, to secure an annuity of two million of reals to the ex-queen, his mother. All prisoners that had been made in the course of the Peninsular war, on either side, were to be immediately exchanged.

Distinguished, however, as this scheme was by artful cunning, it must be regarded as a very puny effort to deceive and cajole, as the trickery was so obvious, that the cortes, if they retained any share of understanding, could not be expected to subscribe to it. Ferdinand, since his arrival at Bayonne, had never been permitted to correspond with the regency or the cortes. To the former body he now addressed a letter, in which he made no mention of the latter, and he is believed to have wished that that body should be relieved from the care of public business altogether. Through Madame Talleyrand, he is said to have been made acquainted with the perilous situation of Buonaparte, and led to expect his final overthrow; and under these circumstances, to have been well content to remain where he was till the event took place. This has been denied by the Spanish liberals, who describe Ferdinand as having been willing to remain the menial of Buonaparte, still desiring to take a wife from the Buonaparte family, and, regardless of what might be thought of him by his contemporaries or posterity, eager to play the despotic bigot, by establishing his power, and restoring the holy inquisition, and revenging himself

for the wrongs which the royal dignity had sustained, from the advocacy of free institutions in Spain. The bearer of his letter to the regency, the duke de San Carlos, was secretly charged to ascertain the true characters of those who composed the regency and the cortes. In the event of its being proved that the regency consisted of men whose piety, loyalty, and discretion, might be depended upon, the duke was to assure them in private, that it was his majesty's royal pleasure that the treaty should be ratified; if to do this would not commit Spain with her allies, and give offence to the Spanish nation. Further, he wished it to be intimated that if the regency were disposed to approve of the treaty for the time being, on an understanding with England that as no ratification would be valid till he was at liberty, he on his return would declare it to be null and void,—in that case he wished the ratification to be given, as he could not be reproached for putting it aside, on obtaining information after his return which had been withheld from him while in captivity. On the other hand, if the duke should be satisfied that the regency and the cortes were well-disposed towards Jacobinism, and wanting in regard to the church, he was merely to ask that the treaty should be ratified. It will thus be seen, that whatever other weaknesses may be charged on Ferdinand VII., thoughtless sincerity formed no part of his character. He contemplated at the moment when he recommended the ratification of an amicable treaty, a continuance of the war on his return to Spain, if the wishes and the good faith of his people should require it.

San Carlos hastened to Spain, travelling under an assumed name, that of M. de la Forest. He reached Suchet's headquarters, carrying with him the treaty, and a letter from Ferdinand. Thence he proceeded to the Spanish capital. His presence was believed to have rendered no service to the allies, as an impression was created, that Buonaparte was disposed to make an amicable arrangement, which would secure to Spain all she had been fighting for, and render the presence of a foreign army unnecessary. In consequence of this, general Copons refrained from co-operating with general Clinton, as he had previously intended. It is further said, that the former would have concluded an armistice with Suchet, had the cortes not acted with more vigour and prudence than they usually dis-

played, and at once declared that no treaty concluded by Ferdinand, while he remained the captive of Buonaparte, could be ratified. The regency were directed by the cortes to make this known to Ferdinand, and a letter was accordingly addressed to him, which, after declaring the loyal and affectionate feelings by which the Spanish people were then animated, added, that though they were prepared to make new sacrifices to establish his throne on love and justice, for the present they must decline acting on his recommendation, and could only send to him the assurance that he was the beloved and desired of the Spanish people. This was accompanied by a peremptory rejection of the treaty.

So eager was Napoleon to carry his point, that lest San Carlos should fail, he took measures for bringing it about by other means. General Palafox and General Zayas had become his prisoners. Buonaparte now dispatched them to Valençay to press upon the royal prisoner the expediency of recommending that an armistice between Suchet and the commanders opposed to him, should be concluded without delay. Escoiquiz was also sent on the same errand to Valençay, as was Don Pedro de Macanas. The professed object of Buonaparte was pressed with much earnestness, and some success. The canon Escoiquiz and Don Pedro de Macanas approved of what was suggested, and Palafox was willing to go to Spain, and there recommend that the offer now made should be accepted. This took place before news had been received of the failure of San Carlos' mission, and Ferdinand gave Palafox a duplicate of the former envoy's instructions, together with a letter, in which he expressed his hope that the treaty of which the duke was the bearer, had been ratified. Ferdinand instructed Palafox that he should seek an opportunity for communicating with the English ambassador at Madrid, and assure him the treaty was nothing more than a hoax. The mission of Palafox was soon concluded. Having arrived in Madrid, he was told by the cortes, that his majesty could only be referred to their former letter, and to the decree which they had passed against accepting any treaty which might be assented to by Ferdinand in his then situation.

Thus ended the year 1813, a year of battles; full of real glory and honour for the arms of England: and another, "big with the fate of empires," was about to be ushered in.

INVASION OF FRANCE ON ITS NORTH-EASTERN FRONTIERS,

BY THE ALLIED RUSSIANS, GERMANS, ETC.

WHILE the allied armies of England, Spain, and Portugal, were invading the south-west provinces of "the sacred territory," those of Russia, Germany, and Sweden were preparing to assail it on its north-eastern frontiers. To meet the threatened danger, "the man of destiny," he for whom "it was written,"—as he profanely expressed himself to the Abbe de Pradt, at Warsaw, in the course of his flight to Paris, after the abandonment of the miserable remnant of his army at Smorgoni—"in heaven to marry an archduchess," prepared to call forth all the energies and resources of France.

At a levee held at nine o'clock in the morning (December 19th), succeeding the night of his reaching Paris, he told the members of the council of state, convoked on the occasion, that "all had gone well—Moscow was in our possession," said he, "the conflagration had produced no change in the flourishing condition of the French army; but the winter had been productive of a general calamity, in consequence of which the army had sustained very great losses." With this information, and the presence of their emperor, the complacent and obsequious auditors seemed consoled for the loss of nearly half a million of men of their grand army, above 250,000 of whom had been killed, or perished of disease and famine. Alluding to the enormous loss of human life occasioned by his insane invasion of Russia, and especially of that grand army which he had led from France, Bernadotte, in a letter adjuring him to desist from his insane project of universal conquest, and promote a general peace, asks him, "where is that army?—the *élite* of France, Italy, and Germany no longer exist. On the cold and inhospitable plains of Russia lie the remains of those brave men, who saved France at Fleurus, who conquered in Italy, survived the burning climate of Egypt, and chained victory to the imperial standards at Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland;

there they lie without sepulture, and their bones whitening by the rigid blasts of the north." But the promulgation of the twenty-ninth bulletin, which, though dispatched from Smorgoni some hours before its writer quitted that place, did not arrive till the forenoon of the day of Napoleon's return, drew aside the veil which had with a reluctant hand been just before partially raised by its author; and revealed the magnitude of the disaster, the extent of the calamity, the dreadful and overwhelming catastrophe of the six months' terrific Russian campaign, which was to throw France into universal mourning. There was scarcely a family that had not lost a friend or relative. Never, perhaps, had a single campaign caused so dismal a desolation in the homes of a nation. Adulatory congratulations of the senate, the magistrates, and public functionaries of Paris, whose power and profit were dependent on their voices, however, poured in on the man who had just mercilessly sacrificed half a million of his fellow-creatures on the altar of his insatiable ambition, and were accepted as the truthful representations of thirty-four millions of people. The magistrates of the principal cities of the empire, among which Rome, Milan, Florence, Turin, Hamburg, and Amsterdam, were particularly obsequious, joined in the general asseveration. But the praises of servitude are too suspicious and apocryphal to be entitled to credence. To the few who ventured to express a murmur at the astounding national disaster, and the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of their brave and heroic countrymen, the god of French idolatry calmly said that those hundreds of thousands of his fellow-countrymen, and comrades in-arms, were at rest under the snows of Russia, and had acquired as much glory for their country as the successful armies of former days.

Malet's* conspiracy, in conjunction with the discontent, and even absolute disaffection,

* Malet, who was one of the ancient French noblesse, had served in the mousquetaires of the royal household before the revolution, and had commanded one of the first battalions of the Jura at the

commencement of the revolution. In consequence of his connection with a society called the *Philadelphes*, which sprung up in the French army, at the time Napoleon Buonaparte usurped the supreme

which had shown itself in different directions,—even some of the marshals and generals, among whom were Massena, Augereau, and others, being suspected by the secret police,—having given demonstrative evidence, that the stability of his dynasty, and his son's succession to the throne, rested on a very sandy foundation, he deemed it necessary to read his willing slaves an edifying lecture, on the divine and indefeasible right of kings and emperors. A few days after his arrival, in a council of state, convened for the purpose, "Gentlemen," said the arch-plotter, "we must no longer believe in miracles; attend to the report of M. Real on Malet's conspiracy." The report being read, he resumed, "This is the consequence of the want of habit and proper ideas in France on the subject of succession. Sad effects of our revolutions! At the first word of my death, at the first command of an unknown individual, officers lead the regiments to force the jails, and make prisoners of the highest authorities. A jailor quietly incloses the minister of state within his doors. A prefect of the capital, at the command of a few soldiers, lends himself to the preparation of his great hall for the assembly of I know not what factious wretches. And all this while the empress is on the spot; while the king of Rome is alive; while the ministers and all the great officers of state are at hand. Is a man then everything here? Are revolutions nothing? oaths nothing? It is to ideology [*i.e.* the doctrine which teaches the duty of resistance to the indefeasible and divine right of kings and emperors], that we are to attribute all these misfortunes; it is the error of its professors that necessarily induced, and in fact brought on the reign of

power, and had for its immediate object his deposition. Some of the members contemplated the restoration of a republican government, and others, of whom Malet was one, the recal of the Bourbon family. He was, in 1808, committed to prison, and he was still in custody in a *Maison de Santé*. Here, with only two accomplices—Lafox, an old abbé, and Ratsoeau, a young corporal on guard—he conceived the daring project of forging a *senatus consultum*, announcing the fall of Napoleon Buonaparte in battle in Russia; and by virtue of which document the imperial government was abolished, he created governor of Paris, and a provisional government established. On the 23rd of October, 1812, at night, eluding the surveillance under which he was detained, he presented himself, dressed in the uniform of a general of brigade, and, accompanied by the corporal, in the dress of an aid-de-camp, he repaired to the prison of La Force, where he demanded and obtained the liberation of generals Lahorie and Guidal, who were

blood. Who proclaimed the principle of insurrection as a duty? Who cast adulation before the people, in elevating them to a sovereignty which they were incapable of exercising? When one is called to regenerate a state, it is principles diametrically the reverse which require to be followed. History paints the human heart; it is in history we must seek for the mirror of the advantages or evils of different species of legislation. Frochot is an honourable man; he is attached to the empire; but his duty was to have devoted himself to death on the steps of the Hotel de Ville. A great example is required from all functionaries. The noblest of deaths would be that of a soldier on the field of honour, if that of a magistrate perishing in defence of the throne and the laws were not more glorious still."

This key-note formed an admirable theme for the flourishes of the various counsellors of the sections, to whom the fate of Frochot, the peccant prefect of the Seine, who had put Malet's conspirators in possession of the tower of St. Jacques, from which the tocsin was usually sounded, and had prepared an apartment in the Hotel de Ville for the reception of the new administration, had been submitted with reference to the extent of his crime and punishment. "What is life," said the count of Chabrol, who had been created prefect of Paris instead of Frochot, "in comparison to the interests which rest on the sacred head of the heir of the empire?" It was the opinion of M. des Fontagnes, senator, peer of France, and grand master of the imperial university, that "reason pauses with respect before the mystery of power and obedience, and abandons all inquiry into its nature to that religion which made the persons of kings

confined for the same cause as himself. They then went to the Minims barrack of the 2nd regiment, and 10th cohort. Malet assuming an air of absolute authority, the obedience of the men was demanded, and the drums ordered to beat. He assumed the command; and the party marching in different directions, in an instant Savary, minister of police, and some other of the principal functionaries, were arrested and conducted to prison. Malet's party took possession of the Hotel de Ville, and ordered Frochot, the prefect of the Seine, to have prepared an apartment ready for the reception of the new government; but being recognised by Laborde, the chief of the military palace, he was seized and confined. Next day, Malet, Lahorie, Guidal, and eleven other of the conspirators, were shot on the plain of Grenelle, by order of a military tribunal. Malet met his death with great courage, and generously exculpated his fellow-sufferers, by declaring that he alone conceived the conspiracy, and had had no associates.

sacred, after the image of God himself. It is his voice that humbles anarchy and faction, in proclaiming the divine right of kings; it is the Deity himself who has made it an unalterable maxim of France; it is nature who appoints kings to succeed one another, while reason itself declares that the royalty itself is immutable." Under cover of these violent protestations of devoted loyalty, Frochot was permitted to retire from office to prosecute his studies in ideology, or indoctrinate himself into more deep acquaintance in the mysteries of hereditary right than he had shown himself possessed of.*

Aware of the influence of religious prejudices and superstition on the feelings and fears of mankind, and the proneness of human nature to bow to the delusion and imposture of priestcraft, and fearful his disputes and treatment of the pope would be turned by his enemies to the furtherance of their views and the injury of his designs, six days after his arrival, he endeavoured to conciliate the Roman pontiff. The cause of that dispute was, the pope's refusal to consent to the alienation of his secular dominions, and unwillingness to acknowledge the validity of Buonaparte's second marriage, and ratify the legitimacy of his son. For that refusal he was seized in July, 1809, and after being removed to different places, was put in confinement at Fontainebleau. Now the principal points in dispute between the parties were settled by a concordat. By the requisition of the pope's renunciation of his temporal power, it had been the intention of the Frenchman, in his reveries of universal empire, to assume the papal temporal authority himself, and constitute Paris the capital of the world, where the residence of the pope would have been fixed for the exercise of his ecclesiastical power.

But more urgent causes than lectures on ideology, and squabbles with the keeper of the keys of heaven, now demanded his attention. Russia was rapidly approaching the French frontier; Prussia was indicating an intention of shaking off the yoke; the spirit which was prompting the inhabitants of Germany to regain their respective nationalities, presaged a dreadful approaching contest. To provide for the coming danger, Napoleon instructed his agents to demand of the legislative body an immediate addition of 350,000 men to the armies. "The insolence of the conquerors of Louis XIV., and the

humiliation of the treaties of Louis XV.," said the government orator, Regnaud St. Jean Angely, "seem again to threaten us; we are called on to save France from those ignominious days." The amount of the conscription demanded, was granted January 9th.

This conscription consisted of 100,000 conscripts of the first ban of national guards, who had been placed in the frontier garrisons, with the understanding that their services were not to be required beyond the limits of France; they were now converted into soldiers of the line, and destined to fill the one hundred and fifty skeleton regiments that had been brought from Spain after lord Wellington's retreat from Burgos. Besides these, 100,000 were ordered to be taken from the conscription of 1813; 100,000 from the classes liable to conscription in the preceding four years; and 150,000 from those arriving at the legal age in 1814. The same measures were, with extraordinary activity, put into execution by the viceroy Eugene Beauharnais in Italy; and the princes of the Rhenish confederacy were required to furnish their contingents as quickly as possible. Forty thousand seamen and naval gunners of the fleet were drafted for artillery service, and transferred to the land forces; a large body of mariners were regimented as a division of infantry; and four regiments of the imperial guards, a legion of veteran *gend'armes*, and a large body of Polish light horse, were withdrawn from Spain. Thousands of horses were impressed in every province. The artillery and *matériel* of the army were put in the most effective condition. In the month of April, the military force at the command of Buonaparte was, with the new levies, the troops throughout France, and the large garrisons in the fortresses of Dantzic, Thorn, Modlin, Zamosc, Guadentz, Czenstschau, Custrin, Magdeburg, Posen, Spandau, Torgau, Gloggen, &c., in Polish and Proper Prussia, on the Vistula, the Oder, and the Elbe, augmented as it was by the woe-stricken and corpse-like fugitives of the grand army, nearly 800,000 men. The garrison of Dantzic alone numbered among its defenders the wreck of one hundred regiments, of twenty-two different nations. So fearful and destructive had been the merciless and insatiable ambition of its leader on the most splendid and powerful army that ever had marched under the banners of any nation, ancient or modern.

* Scott.

Promises were made to the representative legislature, that no augmentation should be made to the national burthens; but all sorts of violent expedients were resorted to to raise money. Among these was the sale of all the heritable property belonging to the municipalities, public hospitals, and communes; the treasury receiving the price, and the incorporated bodies being inscribed, for the amount of the price received, as creditors in the books of the public funds; the accounts to be rendered every three years to the deputies of all the provinces of the empire, who should be then assembled in the capital. To supply the deficiency, the profuse treasures which had been accumulated in the vaults under the Tuilleries, from the sack and pillage, and war contributions of the conquered countries, contributed three hundred millions of francs. On the 22nd of March, the *corps législatif* declared, in an obsequious and adulatory address, that all that they and the French nation had done for their emperor was too little.

In the tremendous loss which had occurred in the disastrous retreat from Moscow to the Niemen,* the Prussian and Austrian contingents, which formed the flanks of the grand army, had sustained little or no participation. The first had been left under the command of marshal Macdonald, in Courland, to hold in check the garrisons of Riga and St. Petersburg; but his right flank being uncovered by the repassage of the shattered remnant of the grand army over the Niemen, and the advance of the Russians under Wittgenstein, he retreated towards Tilsit, followed by the Russian general, Diebitch, who, by a skilful manœuvre, intervened his force between the Prussians under D'Yorck and the other portion of Macdonald's army, consisting of the German contingent troops, and despatched a flag of truce to Yorck, proposing to allow him to retreat in safety. A convention was accordingly entered into at Potcheran, December 30th, by virtue of which an armistice was agreed to, that the Prussians should be cantoned in the Prussian territory, and

remain neutral for two months. An armistice was also concluded with Schwarzenberg, (between whom and the Russians, since the repassing of the Niemen by the French, no other encounters or warlike measures seem to have taken place than a series of manœuvres, marches, and countermarches, so as to give a semblance of hostile movements,) that the Austrian contingent force should retire into Galicia, in the Austrian territory. When the news of D'Yorck's armistice reached Berlin, the convention was formally disowned; he was ordered to be arrested and sent for trial to the capital, to be tried for disobedience, and general Kleist was directed to conduct the Prussian contingent as quickly as possible to the head-quarters of the grand army. The Prussian minister, Hardenberg, to indicate to his master's ally, Buonaparte, his fidelity, proposed to the French ambassador at Berlin to raise the Prussian contingent to 60,000 men; and to consolidate the friendship of the two courts, he suggested the marriage of the prince royal of Prussia with a princess of the Buonaparte family. But as crowned heads have but little faith in their promises and treaties, the Prussian monarch secretly, on January 22nd, 1813, quitted his capital for Breslaw, Augereau being stationed in Berlin with a strong force, to watch the Prussian cabinet, and overawe the inhabitants. At Breslaw the king, in an interview with the emperor Alexander, vented in tears his penitence for having acted against his royal brother during the recent campaign. After the interview he proposed to Buonaparte an armistice, on condition that the French evacuated Dantzic and the other fortresses on the Oder, and retired behind the Elbe into Saxony; the Czar would stop the march of his armies, and remain behind the Vistula. This proposition being rejected, on the 30th of the same month he declared war against his former confederate, and published a proclamation calling on his subjects to arm and rally round his standard for the maintenance of national independence. This proclamation roused in the

* The appearances which this disastrous retreat presented were truly awful. The roads were choked with the dead and the dying, and the atmosphere was completely tainted. The ill-fated troops suddenly fell down, in a perfect state of exhaustion, on the road and by the watch-fires, the blood gushing from their eyes and mouths. Others thrust their frozen and benumbed limbs among the embers, and were burnt to the bone without being conscious of the injury. Around every bivouac, the morning disclosed a circle

of dead bodies—ministers of state, generals, and private soldiers—huddled as close together as possible, to derive warmth from one another's bodies. It is reported by more than one eye-witness, that at their ghastly bivouacs, many took their loathsome repast from the quivering flesh of their dying comrades. The loss had been immense. When the wretched wreck reached the Niemen, only 50,000 men, including the reinforcements, survived, and nearly 20,000 of these died in the hospitals and towns of Prussia.

highest degree the military spirit of the country. Tired with a detestation of their oppressors, and a desire of revenge, the youth of every class rushed to fill the ranks, and recover the lost liberty and tarnished honour of their country. On all sides there was a universal cry for arms. The Tugendbund, the Burchenschaft, and the other secret political societies, actively and enthusiastically preached a national crusade against the hated foe of their country, and exerted themselves with all their energy and might, to animate the great body of the people with their own patriotic devotion.

This astonishing outbreak of national enthusiasm was responded to by every male throughout the nation: even boys of nine and ten years of age offered themselves to be enrolled, and when refused acceptance, gave expression to their disappointment in floods of tears. The poet, Körner, excited the national enthusiasm to the highest pitch of vehemence in his animated strains of "Men and Cowards," and the "Song of the Sword." Seven years of oppression and tyranny now united every heart, and upraised every hand against the foe.*

The merciless rapacity of the war contributions and requisitions since the peace of Tilsit, had robbed the whole country of its subsistence; and their rapacious oppressors, under the terrors of military execution, had wrenched from the inhabitants their property, and the whole of the cattle, horses, and carriages in their possession. Atrocious acts of cruelty had added a deeper hue to the general feelings of execration with which

* The devoted spirit and exalted patriotism which animated the hearts of those noble youths, were upheld and inspired by devotional feelings. "We marched," says one of the volunteers, the poet Körner, "in parade from Zoblén to Rogau, a Lutheran village, where the church with great simplicity, but also with great taste, had been decorated for the convention of the volunteers. After singing a hymn of my composition, the clergyman of the parish delivered an address, full of manly vigour and public enthusiasm. Not a dry eye was to be seen in the whole assembly. After the service, he pronounced the oath before us, for the cause of humanity, of fatherland, of religion, to spare neither substance nor soul, to conquer or die for the right. We swore! He then fell on his knees, and besought God for a blessing on his champions. It was a moment when the thought of death kindled flame in every eye, and awoke heroism in every heart. The oath, solemnly repeated by all, and sworn on the swords of the officers, and Luther's hymn, *Ein feste burg ist unser Gott* (A stronghold is our God), concluded the ceremony; on which a thundering *vivat* burst from the congregation of champions for German freedom, while every blade leaped from its scabbard, and gleams of

French tyranny and violence were regarded. Among those acts were the massacre of eleven officers of Schill's corps, for their adherence to his cause; and the transportation of the volunteers of the queen's regiment, chained together by the neck, to the dépôt of galley slaves at Cherbourg, where they were condemned to hard labour, in the convict dress, with a 24-pound cannon-ball fastened to the ankle of each, among the common malefactors.

On the 1st of March, a treaty, offensive and defensive, was concluded at Kalisch between the emperor of Germany and the king of Prussia.

By a proclamation,† dated March 19th, Russia and Prussia dissolved the confederacy of the Rhine, and called on all the Rhenish confederated states to join in a great league for the deliverance of Germany from the domination of France, under pain of losing their nationality.

In December, the Russian army advanced in two grand divisions; the one direct on Warsaw, the other on Königsberg and the other provinces of Prussia, masking the fortresses as they advanced. When the armies of Russia and Prussia were united, their light troops soon overran the eastern and northern provinces of Germany, at the same time spreading proclamations, calling on the inhabitants to join in the liberation of captive Europe from the thralldom of the oppressor. Berlin, Dresden, and the towns of the Hanseatic league, Hamburgh, Lubeck, Luneburg, &c., declared for the allies, and received their troops. The recovery

warlike light shone through the sanctuary. The hour was so much more impressive, that most of us went out with the conviction that it was the last time we should ever meet." To indicate the solemnity of the duty they had undertaken, and their readiness to meet death in the cause in which they had engaged, the uniform of the university volunteers was black. They were officered by their respective tutors and professors.

† It is worthy of remembrance that all the proclamations of the allied sovereigns, at this time, were loud in advocating the principles of liberty, and in denouncing despotism in all its forms. Princes who had long borne arms against and persecuted and proscribed liberal doctrines, now became the patrons of societies for the dissemination of free opinions, and invoked the intelligence and patriotism of those, in whom, but in the short space of a few following months, it was deemed criminal to question the custom or justice of authorised government, or to maintain that man had rights which were at variance with existing laws and institutions. After the people had achieved the victory for them, what a memorable refutation of their professions did the Holy Alliance present of their sincerity and intention!

of this last-mentioned place was connected with an incident of peculiar and romantic interest. The people of the town, encouraged by the liberation of Hamburg by the Cossacks, under Tetterborn, and the appearance of an English detachment of 200 men, who, landing from Heligoland, had possessed themselves of the batteries of Bloxten and Bremerlake, at the mouth of the Werer, rose against the French garrison, and expelled it. Morand, who lay at Bremen with 3,000 men, determined to inflict vengeance on the revolted patriots, marched against them, and quickly overcame their feeble resistance; twenty-seven of the principal inhabitants were seized and condemned to be shot next day in the principal square of the city.

On the following morning they were drawn out, with the fatal bandages on their eyes, for execution, in the presence of Morand; but at the moment, a sudden "hurrah" was heard, and a violent rattle of musketry at the gates announced that succour was at hand. The French troops hastened to the ramparts, leaving the prisoners with their eyes bandaged and their arms pinioned on the spot designed for their execution. Soon a loud shout announced that the town was carried, and instantly the Cossacks, under Chevalicheff, rushing into the centre of the square, unbound the terrified prisoners and restored them to their weeping friends; while 2,000 French prisoners, and 1,000 killed and wounded, among whom was Morand, graced the first triumph of the arms of freedom in Germany.

A treaty of alliance, which was the basis of the Grand Alliance, ratified by the treaty signed at Reichenback, 14th June, 1813, was entered into in the early part of April, between England, Russia, Prussia, and Sweden, by virtue of which, in conjunction with supplemental treaties, the first mentioned power undertook to supply the three other powers with subsidies to the extent of many millions, either in sterling money, issues of paper, or bills of credit, for the maintenance of the respective armaments which these powers were by the treaty bound to supply for the promotion of the common cause. Long prior, however, to any diplomatic connection having been formed, immense supplies of arms, ammunition, and warlike stores, had been dispatched from the Thames to the mouth of the Elbe, to be distributed among the northern powers of Germany. Bernadotte, in the course of


the preceding year, at the conference at Abo, had engaged with the Russian emperor to join in a coalition against Buonaparte, in hopes of being declared successor to the imperial throne of France; but by virtue of the recent treaty, he was to be indemnified with Norway for his loss of Finland.

Prior to his quitting Paris, Buonaparte endeavoured to conciliate Murat, and persuade him to take the command of the cavalry of the army assembled at Erfurth. Jealousies and grudges had for some time subsisted between the two brothers-in-law, and Murat had not forgotten that Buonaparte had vilified his military conduct, and accused him of having abandoned the wretched remnant of the grand army surviving from the Moscow campaign. It has been before stated, that Murat, on reaching Königsberg, had, in discontent at Buonaparte's slight of his complaint of having received insult from Ney and Davoust, hurried forward to Posen, and there, on the 16th of January, abruptly quitted the army, and returned to Naples. The emperor, on hearing of his desertion, appointed Eugene to the chief command; and at the same time wrote to his sister Caroline, Murat's wife, "Your husband is extremely brave on the field of battle; but out of sight of the enemy he is weaker than a woman; he has no moral courage." To Murat himself he wrote, "I do not suspect you to be one of those who think that the lion is dead, but if you have counted on this, you will find yourself mistaken. Since my departure from Wilna, you have done me all the evil you could; your title of king has turned your head." A furious correspondence now ensued between the two brothers-in-law. Buonaparte, in a subsequent letter to his sister, accused Murat of being a traitor—called him a fool—said he was unworthy of his family connections with him. To these imputations, "his majesty of Naples," indignantly returned answer—"The wound on my honour is inflicted, and it is not in the power of your majesty to heal it: you have insulted an old companion in arms, faithful to you in your dangers, not a small means of your victories, a supporter of your greatness, and the reviver of your wandering courage on the 18th Brumaire. Your majesty says that when one has the honour to belong to your *illustrious* family, one ought to do nothing to hazard its interests or obscure its splendour. And I, sire, tell you in reply, that your family received from me quite as much



KÖNIGSLEITEN.

IN THE OCCUPATION OF THE FRENCH



honour as it gave in uniting me in matrimony with Carolina. A thousand times, though a king, I sigh after the days when, as a plain officer, I had superiors, but no master. Having become a king, but finding myself in this supreme rank, tyrannized over by your majesty, and domineered over in my own family, I have felt more than ever the need of independence, the thirst of liberty. Thus you afflict, thus you sacrifice to your suspicion the men most faithful to you, and the men who have best served you in the stupendous road of your fortune; thus Fouché has been immolated by Savary, Talleyrand sacrificed to Champagny, Champagny himself to Bassano, and Murat to Beauharnais,—to Beauharnais, who has with you the merit of mute obedience, and that other merit (more gratifying to you because more servile) of having cheerfully announced to the senate of France your repudiation of his own mother. I can no longer deny to my people [this was an allusion to the Berlin decrees prohibiting all internal commerce] some restoration of commerce, some remedy for the terrible evils inflicted on them by the maritime war. From what I have said of your majesty, and of myself, it results that our old mutual confidence and faith are gone. Your majesty will do what you most like, but whatever may be your wrongs towards me, I am still your honest and faithful brother-in-law,—JOACHIM."

The effects of this correspondence ranking in Murat's breast, and also influenced by the hope of a timely defection from the declining fortunes of Buonaparte, that he might secure to himself and his descendants the crown of Naples, by joining the confederacy

which eventually took the designation of "The Grand Alliance," he alleged that his own dominions were in too agitated a state to admit of his absence for the present.

Fearful of the recurrence of an attempt similar to that of Malet, while he was absent on the Moscow campaign, Buonaparte established a council of regency, and appointed his wife, Marie Louise, regent, reserving to himself exclusively the privilege of prescribing all measures to be passed by the senate. Having made this arrangement, he quitted Paris on the 15th of April, and hurried to Mayence, where he halted for eight days, to give time for collecting the troops, which had been organized in France and Italy, and were converging towards that city from the Rhine and the Alps to the Elbe, and had been directed to concentrate at Erfurth. He reached the camp at that town on the 25th, and on the 28th he opened the campaign by advancing towards the enemy, who occupied Halle, Leipsic, and all the adjacent roads. To prevent the enemy's advance to Leipsic, the allies moved forward to give him battle on the plains of Lutzen. On the 29th, Ney had taken Weissenfels, and driven back the advanced guard of the allies to the right bank of the Saale, thus re-establishing the communication with Eugene, who, on succession to the command of the wreck of the grand army, had retired on Magdeburg, for the purpose of forming a junction with the new levies as they came up from the Rhine and Italy, which the operations of the enemy had interrupted. On the 30th, Eugene crossed the Saale, and effected a junction with the main army.

BATTLES OF LUTZEN AND BAUTZEN.

THE first collision between the hostile armies took place, May 1st, in crossing the defile of Grûnebach, leading to the plains of Lutzen, when the head of Souham's division of Ney's corps being assailed by the battery on the heights of Poserna, 300 men were struck down; but at length the leading square effecting its passage, the allied vanguard retreated, and the French army entering the plain, bivouacked for the night around Lutzen, and the adjacent villages. In this encounter marshal Bessières, duke of Istria, and colonel of the imperial guards,

was killed. Being among the foremost who advanced to reconnoitre the position of the allies, the brigadier of his escort was killed by his side, being struck by a cannon-ball. "Inter that brave man!" said the marshal. The words had scarcely passed his lips when a second cannon-ball struck himself on the breast, and laid him dead on the spot. Bessières was one of Napoleon's most esteemed generals, and had, in different ranks, commanded the guard which accompanied him in his battles. The body of the marshal was covered with a white sheet to con-

ceal the calamity from his soldiers, and no one spoke of the event even at the imperial head-quarters—an ominous practice, which was commenced during the disastrous Moscow retreat, and was continued in this campaign, in order that the fearful consumption of men by which it was characterised might be less observed.

On the morning of the 2nd, the French army was thus placed:—Ney's corps was stationed in the centre, of which the village of Kaya formed the key, sustained by the imperial guards, who were drawn up before Lutzen, celebrated for the death of Gustavus Adolphus two centuries before, and whose tomb is situated in its neighbourhood, shaded by trees and evergreens. The young and old guard, under Marmont, formed the right, extending as far as the defile of Poserna, and resting on Kaya. Eugene's troops formed the left wing, reaching from Kaya to the Elster.

The allies, who had bivouacked for the night within two leagues of the enemy, early in the morning of the 2nd, crossed the Elster near Pegau, and making a furious attack on Kaya, the enemy was driven out of the village, and the centre of the army broken. Ney was contemplating a retreat; Buonaparte was at the moment pressing forward with the right wing in column, with the intention of possessing himself of Leipsic, and though attacked in flank, he pushed forward sixteen battalions of the young guard, preceded by eighty pieces of artillery, and followed by the whole of the reserve cavalry. Kaya was regained. At the same time the two wings of the French army prepared to wheel up and outflank those of the allies. The battle lasted till darkness had enveloped the field. The allies, to save themselves from being surrounded, fell back a short distance. The contest had been furious and bloody. Amidst the ruins of the burning villages, the flower of the Prussian youth, who had left their universities to support the cause of national honour and freedom, and the French conscripts, many of whom were students in the universities, or of the best families, met in dreadful conflict, each side struggling gallantly for victory, until nearly half of their numbers found an untimely grave. Each army bivouacked on the field of battle amidst the smoking ruins of the villages that had been destroyed. The French reposed in squares, with their arms beside them, in case of surprise in the night. On the

following morning, the allies retreated to Leipsic without the loss of prisoners, standards, or cannon. The enemy's loss was in killed 6,000, in wounded 12,000, and 700 prisoners. That of the allies was 15,000, among whom was Scharnhorst, one of the most accomplished strategists and staff-officers in Europe. Among the dead lay many of the landwehr and landsturm in their dresses from the plough. Ere the battle was scarce finished, Buonaparte despatched couriers to all the courts of Europe, even as far as Constantinople, to blazon exaggerated reports of his victory. Wittgenstein, who had succeeded to the chief command of the allied forces, on the death of Kutusoff, commanded at the battle of Lutzen. The outrages of the French, both on their march and in the neighbourhood of the battle, had been great. All the miseries of war, arising from pillage and outrage, were inflicted on the unhappy inhabitants on every side. Under the very windows of the chamber of the hotel at Eckartsberg, where Buonaparte slept on the night preceding the battle, the licentious soldiers, with loud shouts and desperate cries, throughout the night, threw on a huge fire the furniture, beds, and property of the inhabitants, into whose houses they had broke. On the morning following the battle the allies slowly retired to Dresden, and crossing the Elbe, marched for their strongly entrenched camp at Bautzen, without having sustained the loss of a single piece of artillery, or any prisoners, during their retreat. Buonaparte entered Dresden on the 8th, and was received as a friend and conqueror by the magistrates and populace, who only a few days before had hailed with the most enthusiastic acclamations the emperor of Russia and the king of Prussia as liberators of Germany. On the magistrates obsequiously presenting themselves to him—"Who are you?" said he, in a quick and rude tone of voice. "Members of the municipality," replied the trembling burgomasters. "Have you bread?" "Our resources have been entirely exhausted by the requisitions of the Russians and Prussians." "Ha! it is impossible, is it? I know no such word; get ready bread, meat, and wine." On the 12th his faithful vassal, the king of Saxony, presented himself, who was welcomed with extraordinary pomp, and entertained with a military fête, as a token of his esteem, for being the only one of his dependent princes who still contributed to indulge him in his dream of universal and absolute dominion.

The dismantled arches of the Dresden bridge being restored, the troops and artillery crossed to the right bank of the river; and on the 16th, Ney was despatched from Torgau with a corps of 60,000 men to march by a circuitous route, to be ready to assail the right flank of the allied army, as soon as Buonaparte was sufficiently advanced with the main body of the grand army to attack the centre and left. On the 18th, Caulincourt was sent on a mission to the head-quarters of the czar, with proposals for an accommodation, among which was the proposition to despoil Napoleon's submissive vassal, the Saxon king, of his recently acquired dominions, by depriving him of the grand ducal crown of Poland. Buonaparte's perfidy to the Poles was equally detestable. While professing to restore to that unhappy nation its lost nationality, he proposed to the czar that a condition of their amicable relations should be, that the grand duchy of Warsaw should be incorporated with the Prussian monarchy, and that Warsaw should be the capital of Prussia. His proposal met with no acceptance from the czar.

On the 19th May, the French army was in presence of the allies, and bivouacked on the left bank of the Sprey. Under a powerful array of artillery, dispersed along every projection that commanded the opposite bank, temporary bridges were constructed, the passage of the river was effected, and immediately, for the purpose of opening a communication with Ney's troops on the right flank of the allies, Bertrand's Italian corps was detached; but these troops lying in loose order after partaking of a repast in a wood, were surprised by Barclay de Tolly. They immediately took refuge in the neighbouring neutral territory of Bohemia, but with the loss of 2,000 prisoners and sixteen cannon. At the same moment, D'Yorck, who was advancing against Lauriston's division, which formed the head of Ney's column, was repulsed by that general with a loss equal to that which Bertrand sustained.

The right of the allied army rested on strongly fortified eminences; their left on a chain of wooded hills. The Prussians, under Blücher, occupied the right; the Russians, under the command of the czar, held the left. The right formed the key of the position.

By five o'clock of the morning of the 20th, the French advanced to the attack. Ney was ordered to make a circuit round the allied extreme right, and turn that

flank; and Oudinot simultaneously to engage the left, while Soult and Buonaparte attacked the centre. For four hours the struggle was maintained with unflinching obstinacy; the heights were repeatedly won, lost, and regained. Ney having now turned the right flank of the position, and Oudinot preparing to perform the same manœuvre on the left flank, the allies, to prevent being attacked in both rear and front, abandoned their entrenched position, and retired in two massive columns, repelling every charge of the French cavalry, and replying with equal rapidity and effect to the artillery of their pursuers. So skilfully was their retreat conducted, that on the morning following the battle, the allied rear-guard held the heights of Weissenberg, which are within cannon-shot of the field of Bautzen; every eminence, ravine, and obstacle being made available to arrest the pursuit of the enemy. The allies continued their retreat towards their entrenched camp near Schweidnitz, in Upper Silesia, where they determined to remain till the reinforcements on their march from Russia and Prussia should come up, and that time might be afforded to Austria to join the coalition. Fresh attacks were made on the following day on the rear of the allies, which were constantly repelled. Napoleon, though he might claim to be victor, was much dissatisfied with the result of these operations. His ill-humour broke out in angry reproaches. To one of his generals he addressed the coarse speech, "You creep—scoundrel!" and he expressed bitter vexation at finding no guns and no prisoners remained in his power, after all the blood that had been shed. On the heights of Reichambach, where the Russian rear-guard made a halt, the French general, Bruyeres, a veteran of the army of Italy, was struck down by a bullet, and afterwards Duroc received a mortal wound from a ball which had shivered a tree close to which Napoleon had been standing, and which in its rebound killed general Kirchenner. Buonaparte visited his dying follower and confidant, whose entrails had been torn by the shock, and is said to have been greatly affected by his fate. An interesting dialogue was published as having passed between them, which, however, general Rapp told Bourrienne was purely an effort of invention, as Duroc had only requested his emperor to suffer him to die in peace.

The loss of the allies in killed and wounded was 15,000; that of the enemy

5,000 killed, 1,500 prisoners, and 20,000 wounded, who were lodged in Bautzen, and the villages in its environs. The army of the allies amounted to 90,000 men, that of the French to 150,000. The czar was commander-in-chief of the allied forces.

On the eve of the night preceding the battle of Bautzen, an armistice was proposed by the allies, for the settlement of disputes, under the mediation of Austria. On 4th June, a convention for a six weeks' truce was signed at Pleswitz, a village in the circle of Striegau, and a general congress of diplomatists was appointed to take place at Prague. On the day that this congress was held, the details of the battle of Vittoria reached the belligerents, and had an important influence on subsequent events. The preliminaries being settled, Buonaparte returned to Dresden.

This city now assumed a Frenchified appearance. Parisian costumes, manners, and equipages, were predominant. The theatres were filled with actors and actresses from the Theatre Française, or the Opera Comique. French licentiousness and immorality inundated the city, and inflicted a moral gangrene on the proverbial honesty of the Saxon character. The ladies of pleasure became so numerous, and their gains so large, that despite the habitual extravagance and improvidence of that section of "the fair defects of nature," their expenses could not keep pace with their receipts, and many of them in a few weeks became eminent capitalists, imbued with the proper commercial spirit.*

Austria, who had for some months been veiling her preparations for assuming a formidable attitude, under the specious pretext of mediation, now deemed the time favourable for declaring her intentions. Count Metternich, on the part of Austria, had an interview with the French emperor on the 28th of June. The latter would at first hear of nothing but the resumption of hostilities, or peace upon such terms as he might be pleased to dictate. He complained that Austria was neither his friend, nor an impartial judge, but wished to profit from his embarrassments to regain what he had taken. "Well!" said he, "let us drive a bargain. How much is it you want?" Metternich replied, that all his master

desired was to see moderation, and respect for the rights of nations prevail; but matters were come to that extremity, that Austria could not remain neutral: she must be with the emperor of the French or against him. In the progress of their conference, as Napoleon collected from Metternich, that Austria could not be bribed to join him by any moderate concession to gratify her selfishness, he broke out into very angry language, and asked Metternich "what England had given to induce Austria to make war on him?" The Austrian minister, disdaining to defend himself against so coarse an accusation, only replied by a look of scorn and resentment. A profound silence followed, during which Napoleon and Metternich traversed the apartment with long steps, without looking at each other. Napoleon dropped his hat, perhaps to give a turn to this awkward situation. But Metternich was too deeply affronted for any office of courtesy; and the emperor was obliged to lift it himself. Buonaparte then resumed the discourse in a more temperate strain, and said he did not yet despair of peace. On the 14th of June, Great Britain acceded to the treaty concluded between Russia and Prussia. Metternich proposed, in the interview which has been described, that the French should entirely evacuate Germany, and that the Rhine should be the boundary of the French empire. The revolutionary governments of France, and Buonaparte, had proclaimed that the Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the ocean, were the natural limits of France. Metternich did not claim that Savoy should be given up, or the acquisitions of France beyond the Alps; but Buonaparte refused to yield what the Austrian negotiator had required, and declared that he would not abandon the Confederation of the Rhine. He attempted, by lofty-sounding language, to overawe Metternich. That able diplomatist had not to learn that the circumstances of the time made Austria omnipotent, and he was not to be intimidated any more than he was to be tempted or duped. It was in vain that Austria was offered the Illyrian provinces, with an indemnity for what she had lost, to be wrung from her ancient enemy, the Ottoman Porte. The offer was spurned, and Metternich declared that Germany must no longer be torn to pieces by wars: her independence must be restored. It now became evident that in the character of mediator, Austria

* Ce fut l'âge d'or des femmes livrées à la débauche. On en vit plusieurs s'enrichir au point de se constituer des rentes, ou de payer comptant en napoléons des maisons qu'elles achetaient.—*Témoin*, Oculaire, 148; Odeï, tom ii., p. 148.

could effect no accommodation: she could not be detached from the general cause by anything that Buonaparte offered for her exclusive advantage; and Napoleon rejected as insulting, terms which would have placed him on an equality with the most powerful sovereigns of Europe. It was then determined, as a last resort, to hold a congress at Prague; and it was the wish of Buonaparte that the negotiations should go on, even if the war were renewed. The congress accordingly assembled, but no pacification was brought about. It was forcibly pressed upon Austria by the allies, that she had only to throw her weight into the scale, and the overgrown power of Buonaparte must be destroyed for ever. The emperor Francis still hesitated. It may, however, be presumed that family considerations made him reluctant to become the foe of Buonaparte. On the 7th of August, Austria submitted to the assembled powers and their representatives, her plan of pacification, of which the bases were the following:—1. The dissolution of the grand duchy of Warsaw, which was to be divided between Russia, Prussia, and Austria. 2. The re-establishment of the Hanseatic towns in their former independence. 3. The reconstruction of Prussia, assigning to that kingdom a frontier on the Elbe. 4. The cession to Austria of the maritime town of Trieste, with the Illyrian provinces. The emancipation of Spain and Holland, as matters in which England, no party to the congress, took chief interest, was not stirred for the present, but reserved for consideration at the general peace. A concluding article stipulated that the condition of the European powers, great and small, as might be settled at the peace, should be guaranteed to all and each of them, and not innovated upon except by general consent.

Buonaparte in return offered much, but most of his cessions were clogged with conditions, which at once showed how unwillingly they were made, and seemed, in most cases, to provide the means of annulling them when times should be favourable.

1. The grand duchy of Warsaw Napoleon

* It has been truly said by a writer, who was an eyewitness of his fearful narrative, that "the progress and retreats of the French armies were marked by acts more suited to the ruthless and savage deeds of a horde of barbarians; to the followers of an Attila, a Timour Bee, or a Ghengis Khan, than to those of a European military force: they left behind them scenes of horror, misery, and desolation, unparalleled in the annals of war, but which are the inevitable results of the revenge-

agreed to yield up, but stipulated that Dantzic, with its fortifications demolished, should remain a free town, and that Saxony should be indemnified for the cession of the duchy, at the expense of Prussia and Austria. 2. The cession of the Illyrian provinces was agreed to, but the seaport of Trieste was reserved. 3. Contained a stipulation that the German Confederation should extend to the Oder. Lastly; the territory of Denmark was to be guaranteed.

Napoleon's agreement, however, to grant some of the terms of the allies was so tardy, that before they could arrive at Prague, the 10th of August, the day which concluded the armistice, had expired, and the signature of Austria was affixed to the secret article of the treaty of Reichenbach, entered into the preceding month of June, which had been expressly reserved by count Studeon for the sanction of the emperor of Austria, in which it was stipulated, that "in the event of Austria taking a part in the war, she should receive £500,000 in bills on London, and the like sum in military stores and equipments; that she should bring 200,000 men into the field." In the course of the night, the immediate recommencement of hostilities was announced to all the armies of the allies, by rockets thrown up from the heights along the frontiers of Bohemia and Silesia.

On the 27th July, the exiled general Moreau, at the pressing solicitation of Bernadotte and the czar, had landed from America at Goteburg, and on the 16th was received with high distinction at the allied head-quarters at Prague. At the same time Jomini, who had been chief of Ney's staff, chagrined at having been refused the rank of general of division in the French army, also passed over to the allies. The towns forming the Hanseatic league, who had fallen again under the dominion of the French, were now punished for their defection with the most heartless cruelty. All the atrocities of Junot, Massena, and Soult, in Spain and Portugal, were equalled by Davoust, Vandamme, and the other satellites of lawless power on the banks of the Elbe, Bremen, and other parts of Germany in the summer of 1813.*

ful passions inspired in a licentious soldiery, who are the instruments of evil and insatiable ambition." The historian of the operations of the French armies in Germany during 1809, says—"terror preceded, devastation followed us. The advanced guard seizes the best of everything, the centre have to glean, the rear-guard finding nothing, vent their rage in setting fire to the houses and buildings." The military reports, says that most impartial and truth-speaking

THE SAXON CAMPAIGN.


THE BATTLES OF DRESDEN, CULM, GROSS-BEEREN, DENNEWITZ, AND LEIPSIC.

To Buonaparte the coalition of Austria with the allies, and the breaking off of all negotiations for peace, were in every respect to the last extreme mortifying. He had been so far subdued, that he was willing to make

of all French writers, the late general Foy (*Histoire de la Guerre en Péninsule sous Napoleon*) presented nothing but a series of burnings and massacres, rapine and pillage, violation of women and children, and desecration of churches and altars. Our soldiers were inexorable to the patriot who defended the fruit of his garden, or the honour of his wife or daughter." Where the French armies bivouacked "the scene was such as might have been looked for in the camp of predatory Tartars rather than that of a civilized people." Forced requisitions were not limited to the necessary supplies of the armies. "In rich countries," says M. Blazé, "twenty times the quantity of provisions that it was possible to consume were brought to the camp; the rest was wasted. At each bivouac our detachment left more than enough to subsist a regiment for a fortnight. In some cases the provisions collected were so profuse, and the appetites of the marauders so delicate, that they regaled themselves only with the tongues, the kidneys, and the brains. In the environs of Linge, a village in Flanders, my company was quartered at a farm-house, and the owner, to conciliate them, furnished each man with soup, bouilli, vegetables, bread, roast mutton, a salad, cheese, a bottle of wine, and a small glass of brandy; but they were discontented, being enraged to see the oxen, sheep, poultry and pigeons, quiet in the farm-yard on the faith of treaties; they would have preferred to have fallen on them with sword and musket to slaughter them all; to fritter all away in a single day, and then to proceed in the same manner in the neighbouring villages. Had the host given them roasted angels they would have grumbled; they would have liked to have caught them themselves much better. Such was their spirit of destruction, that if they entered a cellar wherein appeared twenty pipes of wine in imposing and majestic battle array, they would fire a ball at the staves of every one of them, and presently twenty fountains would be playing on all sides, amidst bursts of laughter from the rioters. Had one hundred pipes been in the cellar they would have been broached at once." Their destruction of other property was equally extensive. General Foy says—"our armies, in their passage through a country, destroyed in a few days its whole resources. Where they bivouacked, our soldiers destroyed houses which had stood for half a century, in order to construct, with their materials, those long right-lined villages which were frequently destined but for a day." M. Blazé says that often thirty villages were demolished to furnish materials for a right-line village for a single regiment. M. Labaume's account of French violence and destruction in the calamitous retreat from Moscow is equally full of horrors; the Saxon campaign was no less free of it. Lannes, on the reduction

the sacrifices which Metternich had in vain laboured to obtain at Dresden. These were all now offered to no purpose. It is due to his penetration to say, he appears to have expected that Austria would decide as she

of Saragossa, rifled the church of Nuestra Senora of jewels to the amount of five millions of francs, and appropriated the same to his private benefit. "How many saints of gold and silver, how many pyres and cups," exclaims M. Blazé, "were transformed into ingots, to be afterwards exchanged for hotels in Paris. How many diamonds and rubies, after adorning for ages the pompous ceremonies of the Roman Catholic church, were utterly astonished to find themselves on the bare bosom of an opera dancer. The magnificent pictures which adorned the churches of Spain now adorn the galleries of our generals, and their vacant places are covered by a piece of black serge." Indeed their rapacity was so great, that Loisson carried off all he could lay his hands on, even cambric shirts, and the little silver ornaments from which the family on whom he had fastened himself furnished the toothpicks demanded for "his excellency's" use. Many French generals, among whom Vandamme and Davoust shone conspicuously, acted even more tyrannically in Germany and the other conquered countries. The lower and more abject condition of the man had been, the more sumptuously and ostentatiously he required to be treated, and the more fearful and exorbitant were his exactions. "The insatiable cravings of French marshalism and French generalism, are," as general Haug appropriately said at the Tower Hamlets meeting, January, 1852, "but little known and understood in England." Neither were those acts of rapine and robbery limited to the demands of the army and its rapacious generals, but all the valuable works of art were sent away from the conquered countries to Paris; and often large sums of money were levied on the inhabitants for the exchequer of Paris. Suchet, on the capture of Valencia, levied a contribution of fifteen millions of francs for the same purpose. Davoust subjected the city of Hamburg to a contribution of forty-eight millions of francs, and Buonaparte, in his Italian campaigns, remitted many hundred millions, having in the first of those campaigns sent fifty millions for that purpose, and in his treaty of peace with the pope, he exacted thirty-six millions, in addition to former contributions. Even the tombs were rifled of their valuable appendages. In a word, seldom, if ever, has war, under the most barbarous aggressions, been carried on in its fearful visitations to the excess it was by the French armies in the wars of the consulate and the empire. Town after town, and village after village, were pillaged and burnt, and the inhabitants, without distinction of age or sex, often wantonly massacred, being either shot, sabred, or hung on the trees by the road-side. Suchet's barbarity was excessive. In almost every town he sacked, every house reverberated with shrieks of



SCALE
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
COLOGNE

COLOGNE ON THE RUINE



SEE PLATE AT FAY'S GOTHIC
AND ROMANESQUE IN EUROPE





had done. Apprehensive of an attack from the mountains of Bohemia, behind which her armies were assembling, he had established an entrenched camp at Pirna, and thrown a bridge of boats over the Elbe, near Kœnigstein. Early in August he had assembled 250,000 men in Saxony and Silesia. At Leipsic there were 60,000 under Oudinot; at Loewenberg, Goldberg, Bautzlan, and various places on the frontier of Silesia, 100,000 were collected, to be commanded

horror, every hearth reeked with blood from the acts of his savage troops. The dreadful tragedy performed by Murat at Madrid, is thus described in the *Memoirs of a Voltigeur in the French Service*:—"It is with grief I speak it, but truth compels me to acknowledge that every conceivable atrocity marked the conduct of the French soldiery on this dreadful occasion. The troops took deadly vengeance, sparing neither age nor sex: the child and the adult, the male and the female, were cut down and pierced alike, by the edge of the sabre or the point of the bayonet. Even the penitent at the altar found no protection from the soldiers' mad vengeance; and the unhappy individuals confined by sickness to the wards of the hospitals, were torn from their beds and inhumanly lacerated. One of our grenadiers encountering a young woman, holding an infant in one hand, and brandishing a poniard in the other, stunned the mother with the butt-end of his musket, and impaled the child on the bayonet. To consummate the horrors of the dreadful scene, which took place on this occasion, the matron and the virgin were the victims of the most brutal and unbridled lust." Massena's advance and retreat in the Portuguese campaign—Junôt and Loisson's acts in Portugal—Suchet and Augereau's atrocities in the east of Spain—and those of Soult in the north of Portugal, in Catalonia, Murcia, Granada, Andalusia, and the vale of Placencia, exceed the most savage and ruthless atrocities that the annals of war exhibit. In the invasion of Portugal by Massena, the foraging detachments had orders to bring in all girls and women between twelve and thirty years of age, for the use of the soldiery. A correspondent of the *Quarterly Review*, vol. lxx., says, that when the French marshal retreated from before the lines of Torres Vedras, he "saw with his own eyes, between forty and fifty of those unhappy creatures in a state of disease, famine, and insanity beyond all conception." Their vengeance and cruelty extended even to the brute creation. When the English army closed on the rear of the fugitives, often the appalling scene occurred of numbers of mangled carcasses of both sexes; and of horses, mules, asses, and oxen, employed in the conveyance of the artillery, ammunition, and stores, as they became exhausted, were hamstrung, and left to perish from famine. Except by Dorsenne, Monçon, Jourdan, Macdonald, Marmont, Brune, Mortier, Travôt, Brennier, Charlot, and a few others, those acts of demoniac atrocity were sanctioned and enjoined by the French generals, in consequence of the standing order of Buonaparte. As an ingenious annalist (Alison, *History of Europe*) has said, "in the course of the Peninsular war, it was the peculiar and characteristic disgrace of the French, that the atrocious and revolting proceedings of the troops were not only permitted, but enjoined by the French

by Macdonald. In addition to these may be enumerated 50,000 in Lusatia, 20,000 with St. Cyr, stationed to observe the mountains of Bohemia, while in Dresden, Buonaparte appeared himself with his guard, amounting to about 30,000 men. Besides these his operations were aided by an army in Italy, commanded by Beauharnois, and 25,000 Bavarians formed an army of reserve under general Wrede. The allies possessed a force of 200,000 men, ready for action.

commanders in their general orders emanating from head-quarters." Soult, in his provinces, ordered all the villages to be delivered to the flames, and all the patriot bands to be considered as armed banditti. Augereau ordered the same species of force to be hung by the side of the highway, without any form of process. Suchet's conduct towards the Catalans was equally savage and atrocious. Bessières (proclamation, June 5th, 1811) ordered that the clergy, alcades, curés, and justices of every village should be responsible for the furnishing and the exact payment of the requisitions, and that every village not executing the orders, and furnishing the supplies, should be delivered over to military execution; and that fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, children, and nephews, should be responsible for the conduct of their relatives, and shot without any form of trial.—(Belmar, *Journeaux des Sièges dans la Péninsule*.) It has been well said, that as yet England, happily, knows little or nothing of the horrors and miseries of war, the massacres and burnings, the pillage and rapine, the violation of women and children, and the other horrors, miseries, and atrocities that are perpetrated, unchecked and with impunity, by the soldiery of foreign armies. These and the like enormities and dreadful visitations of war have never been experienced by the people of England in modern times; but let them recollect, that they will have to endure them, in the most frightful and aggravated form, should the sacred soil of England be polluted and profaned by the footsteps of a foreign foe. If we wish the salvation of our property from rapine, our wives and daughters from violation, our children from slaughter; if we wish to preserve our virtue and happiness undestroyed, and our national feelings and honour uninsulted, let us take counsel from the preceding notices of French lust, rapine, and cruelty. Those narratives, be it remembered, are not founded on English testimony; for, to the discredit of the English military writers, they are studiously silent on the subject, or endeavour to extenuate or cast a veil over the hideously cruel and criminal acts; and in this respect, the author of *The War in the Peninsula* stands pre-eminent; but on French works of high authority, and whose authors being men of honourable birth and high mental attainments, felt that their country had been dishonoured, and its arms tarnished, by those acts. Besides the preceding brief sketch, to those who wish to know the full measure of French atrocity and French outrage in the conquered countries of Europe during the wars of "The Consulate and the Empire," among many other trustworthy publications upon the subject, the perusal of a work entitled *Galli in Hispania; seu Napoleonis Rapacitatis Descriptio*, is recommended.

Of these 80,000 were Russians and Prussians, and 120,000 Austrians, commanded by Schwartzberg, who was named commander-in-chief of the army of the allies; a distinction which, it was supposed, his talents and experience entitled him to claim. The army of Silesia, under Blucher, defended the frontier of that country, and consisted of 80,000 Russians and Prussians, being half of the original invading army. The crown-prince of Sweden was nearer the gates of Berlin with an army of 90,000 men, 60,000 Prussians, and 30,000 Swedes;—30,000 Russians, Prussians, and insurgent Germans under general Walmoden, were on foot in the duchy of Mecklenberg. Hiller watched Beauharnois with 30,000 Austrians, and the prince of Reuss, with 25,000 men, watched a force of the same amount under the Bavarian general, Wrede.

The allies had arranged between themselves, to prevent their auxiliary corps from being defeated in detail, not to accept battle when proffered by the enemy, but to retreat and decoy as far as possible in pursuit, while the grand army advanced from the mountain passes of Bohemia on Dresden, and intercepted the enemy's communications. Blucher, to whom the protection of Berlin was entrusted, advanced in great force against the armies of Macdonald and Ney, who were on the Silesian frontier, menacing that capital. Immediately (15th August) on receipt of information of this movement, Buonaparte marched with the guards and Lautour Maubourg's cuirassiers to the assistance of his generals. Blucher, faithful to his engagement, retreated across the Kutzbach, and established himself in a position on the river Niesse, near Jauer, so as to cover Berlin. In these operations the forces of each side had sustained a diminution of 6,000 men, though no general engagement had taken place, only mere skirmishes. The grand allied army availing themselves of the denuded state of Dresden, descended from the Bohemian passes, and advanced towards that capital. On the approach of the allies, St. Cyr, who was posted, with 30,000 men, in the entrenched camp at Pirna, to protect the passes leading from the Bohemian mountains to Dresden, threw himself into that capital for its defence. By the 25th of August the allies had surrounded the place with 120,000 men and 500 cannon. The assault was postponed till the following day, to give time for the arrival of Klenau's corps from Freyberg, to take their place in

the line. They bivouacked on the neighbouring heights. Thus, in this early stage of the campaign, did Schwartzberg prove his incompetency in command, as Buonaparte justly observed. Had he been sufficiently active in his operations, he would have cut off the enemy from his pivot of operations, and possessed himself of the key to the line of his communications with Paris.

On receipt of the news of this masterly manœuvre of the allies, Buonaparte, leaving to Macdonald the control of the army destined to act in Silesia, hurried forward (August 21st) with the guards and cuirassiers towards Dresden.

About four o'clock of the 26th, at the signal of three guns fired from headquarters, 100 guns in the front line opened a tremendous fire on the devoted town; and bombs and cannon-balls fell on all sides over its whole extent. At the same moment six heavy columns, each preceded by fifty pieces of artillery, advanced to the embrasures of the redoubts. Immediately a storm of fire issued from the works; to which the allied batteries on the semicircle of heights about the town replied with a hurricane of projectiles. The devoted town was quickly enveloped in smoke and flame. The Mozinski redoubt was stormed by the Austrians under Colloredo, and the Prussians under Kleist drove the enemy out of the Grosse Garten, and approached close to the barrier of the suburb on that side; already the hatchets of the pioneers resounded at the gate of Plauen, and the barrier Dippolderwalde. All thought that a surrender was inevitable; when suddenly columns were seen rushing forward at the charging pace from the right side of the Elbe, the suburb of Friedrichstadt being the only part of the circuit of the town not yet enveloped by the enemy; and sweeping over its bridges, marched through the city, and halted on the western side at those avenues, from which it was designed they should debouch upon the enemy. At this instant (half-past six o'clock) the gates of Plauen and Pirna were thrown open, and dense masses of the newly-arrived troops, furiously rushing out, formed in line opposite to the besiegers. The allies being quickly driven from the lodgments they had made, drew off their troops, and bivouacked for the night on the heights around the walls. The French established themselves for the night from the barrier of Pirna to the suburb of Fried-

richstadt. The loss of the allies in the assault and battle had been 6,000 men. They now arranged their formidable masses in the form of a semicircle on the heights around the walls of the city, from the Elbe above the suburb of Pirna, to the foot of the slopes of Wolfinitz, near Priestnitz. Torrents of rain fell incessantly during the night. Amidst thick mist and incessant rain, the battle recommenced on the following morning. Shrouded by the fog, Murat,* with 12,000 cuirassiers, stole round the rear of Victor's corps, and posted his force close to the extreme of the Austrian left, almost perpendicular to their line, in the space left for Klenau's corps to complete the line. During the contest between the hostile infantry, he suddenly burst out of the mist on the flank and rear of the astonished Austrians, who in a few minutes were cut to pieces, or taken, to the number of 12,000. No sooner was Napoleon made aware, by the advancing cannonade on his right, that Murat's attack had proved successful, than he gave orders for his left to advance against Wittgenstein, while the action in the centre was still confined to a distant cannonade. Ney had concentrated the four divisions of the Young Guard between the Gross Garten and the Elbe, and with them and Kellerman's dragoons he immediately made a vigorous attack upon the enemy. He was received by the Russians with their wonted steadiness. The villages of Seidnitz and Gross Dobritz were gallantly defended, against an overwhelming superiority of force, by general de Roth; and when he could no longer make them good, he retreated in good order to the main body of Wittgenstein's men, placed in the rear behind Rieck. Jomini seeing Ney far advanced along the Elbe, and showing his flank to the allied centre, counselled the emperor Alexander to move forward Kleist, Milaradowitch, Colorado, and the masses of the centre which had not yet been engaged, and assail his columns in flank, by Strehlen: a movement which promised the most important results, and would probably have balanced the success of Murat on the left. Alexander at once appreciated the importance of this movement, and Kleist and Milaradowitch were already in motion to execute it; but to support them, and fill up

the chasm in the line occasioned by their descending the hills to the right, it was necessary that Barclay de Tolly, with the Russian reserve, should advance to the front. Barclay, however, did not move: the signal made for that purpose, was at first not seen from the mist, and subsequently disregarded; and before the order could be renewed by an officer, a dreadful catastrophe had occurred, which in a great measure determined the allies to retreat.

Moreau, who had with equal energy and ability discharged the important duties devolved upon him in the council of the allies ever since the campaign reopened, was in earnest conversation with the emperor Alexander about this very advance of Barclay's, when a cannon-shot from the French batteries in the centre almost carried off both his legs, the ball passing through the body of his horse. This melancholy event excited a very deep sensation at the allied head-quarters, and for a time averted Alexander's attention at the most critical moment of the action. The interest which it awakened was enhanced by the extraordinary heroism which the wounded general evinced under an excess of pain which might well have shaken any man's fortitude. He never uttered a groan while carried to the rear, with his mangled limbs hanging by the skin; and when laid on the table of the cottage into which he was carried to suffer amputation, he called for a cigar, which he smoked with the utmost tranquillity. He bore the painful operation with the same firmness which had distinguished his whole demeanour since his wound; and when the retreat commenced, he was transported in a litter to Laun, where at the end of five days fever supervened, and he expired with the same stoicism as he had lived, but without giving the slightest trace of religious impression.† Discouraged by this catastrophe, and the severe loss already sustained, Schwartzenberg, at a council of war, which was held at the allied head-quarters, decided for a retreat, contrary to the opinion of the czar, the king of Prussia, and their principal generals, who, as the whole centre and the reserves had not been engaged, were for continuing the battle. A retreat, however, was resolved on; and though Klenau had come up with his corps in the night of the 27th, it was begun on the following day, in three columns. The command of the rear-guard was entrusted to Wittgenstein; and Oster-

* Murat had again made his peace with the emperor, and had joined the French army on the 17th of August.

† Alison's *History of Europe*.

man, who, with a division of Russian guards and cuirassiers, had been posted so as to oppose Vandamme on the side of Pirna, was ordered to fall back towards Peterswalde, for the purpose of covering the retreat of the allies.

The retreat of the allies was directed towards Toplitz; and, as the principal roads were closed, Murat being established on the western road to Bohemia, by Freyberg, and Vandamme with 30,000 men blocking up that by Peterswalde, near the mountains of Bohemia, they were obliged to be content with the difficult and broken roads and narrow passes. All were hurrying to Toplitz, in order to concentrate on the only road practicable for artillery, by which they could hope to reach Prague. Disorder became extreme. Baggage and ammunition-waggons were lost at every step; and in the pursuit of the fleeing columns, Murat, St. Cyr, and Mortier captured above 2,000 prisoners.

Osterman, in his march to Peterswalde, for the purpose of covering the retreat of the allied army to Toplitz, and protecting the immense stores collected there until their arrival, was intercepted by Vandamme, who, descending from the heights of Peterswalde, beyond Pirna, on which he was posted, threw his force on the line of Osterman's march. The Russian general forced his passage through his opponents, and reached the plain between Culm and Toplitz. The French pursued, when Osterman faced round and made a resolute and inflexible defence. Being reinforced on the following day (August 30th) by some of the retreating columns, Vandamme's troops being soon overpowered, retreated, under cover of the night, to the heights upon Culm. At day-break of the following morning (August 31st) he renewed the attack, but his troops being quickly thrown into confusion, he formed his force into a column, the cavalry in front, under Corbineau, the artillery in the centre, and the infantry in the flanks and rear; and began his retreat. At this moment, Kleist's corps, that had evaded the pursuit of St. Cyr, appeared on the crest of the ridge of the Peterswalde heights, which Vandamme's retreating columns were preparing to ascend. The Prussians fearing the French were intending to intercept their flight, determined to force their way through them to Toplitz; the French, on the other hand, seeing their passage intercepted, formed the same conclusions as the Prussians had done. The Prussians, therefore,

breaking their ranks, rushed down the steep; while the French, in similar disorder, ascended it with a bravery of despair that supplied the advantage of ground. A scene of confusion ensued. All became a mass of confusion; the Prussian generals finding themselves in the centre of the French, and the French officers in the centre of the Prussians. But fresh columns of the retreating Russians coming up, Vandamme, with 7,000 men, 60 guns, 2 eagles, and 300 ammunition waggons, were captured. Corbineau, with 12,000 men, dispersing through the woods and wilds, and throwing away their arms, escaped over the mountains to Peterswalde. The total loss of the French in the two days exceeded 18,000 men, while that of the allies in the same period did not exceed 5,000. The loss of the allies in the two battles of Dresden had been 25,000 in killed and wounded, 13,000 prisoners, 26 cannon, 18 standards, and 130 caissons. The loss of the French was about 14,000 men. On the first day of the battle of Dresden, the Tyrtæus of modern Germany, the poet Theodor Körner, having received a ball in his breast, fell with his carbine in his hand, in the midst of a band of German students. Only a few hours before the battle began, he had composed his spirit-stirring dirge to his sword. During the continuance of the armistice of Pleswitz, while Lutzow's corps, to which Körner was attached, was returning to Silesia, it was perfidiously attacked by the French general, Fourier, at Ketzig, near Zeitz, in Saxony, and nearly cut to pieces. Before the attack commenced, Körner advanced to the French general to assure him that they were relying on the faith of the armistice. The perfidious barbarian leader exclaiming—"The armistice is for all the world except you," cut him down before he had time to draw his sword. The poet's comrades rushing in, raised him, weltering in his blood, and conveyed him to a cottage until he was removed to Leipsic.

The other pursuing French corps d'armée, fearful of committing themselves as Vandamme had done, halted on arriving at the verge of the Bohemian mountains; Murat at Sayda, Marmont at Zimmeldez, and St. Cyr at Liebenaa. The head-quarters of the czar remained at Toplitz. And the splendour of the victory at Dresden was not only obscured by the defeat at Culm, but other reverses rapidly followed.

When Buonaparte, on the 21st of Au-

gust, at the time of his departure to Dresden, transferred the command of the army of Silesia, amounting to 80,000 men, to Macdonald, his instructions to that marshal were to concentrate his troops, and march towards Blücher, who was in position in front of Jauer, so as to be in a situation to give his aid to the grand army at Dresden; but if attacked by superior forces to retire to the entrenched camp at Dresden. But Macdonald believing that the Prussian general was about to retreat in the direction of Breslau, marched, on the morning of the 26th, to attack him. At the same moment, Blücher being informed of Buonaparte's departure for Dresden, broke up from his position to resume the offensive. By this coincidence, the Prussian general was descending the river Kutzbach, while the French marshal was ascending it with the intention of attacking him in his position at Jauer. At two o'clock in the afternoon the hostile armies were in sight of each other; but the heavy rain, accompanied with thick mist, which had fallen the whole day, contributed to conceal the movements of the opposing armies.

The encounter took place on the plains which extend between Whalstadt and the Kutzbach. Blücher having his cavalry all in front, and ready for action, and observing the enemy unprepared, their forces not being yet concentrated, gave the signal for attack. The French cavalry, unable to resist, were driven headlong back, and Sacken's infantry coming up at the instant, charged the unprotected infantry of Ney's corps with the bayonet, and drove them headlong over the precipices into the Kutzbach and Wütbende Neisse. Souham's corps advancing to their assistance, met a similar fate. Lauriston, who commanded on the right, ascertaining the disaster which had befallen the left and centre, fell back, towards night, on those parts of the army which had not been engaged. Next day Blücher followed up his success, and on the following day crossed the Kutzbach, and drove the enemy back on all points towards the Bober. In the course of the pursuit, Puthé's division of Lauriston's corps, which had been despatched by a circuit to menace the rear of the allies, and harass their retreat, which had been deemed by the French marshal as inevitable, was driven into the Bober; 18,000 prisoners, 103 pieces of artillery, two eagles, 230 caissons, and several hundred ammunition-waggons, were the trophies of this victory.

The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was 7,000 men; that of the allies 4,000.

At the same time that orders were issued to Macdonald to march against Blücher, Oudinot was directed to advance against Berlin, and open the campaign in the quarter where Bernadotte maintained his position for the protection of that capital. On the very day of the receipt of his orders, Oudinot began his march, with an army consisting of 80,000 men. On the approach of the enemy, Bernadotte concentrated his forces, and prepared for battle. Early on the morning of the 23rd, the battle of Gross-Beeren was begun. In the early part of the day, the French had the advantage, but towards twilight it preponderated in favour of the allies, whose trophies were 1,500 prisoners, eighteen cannon, and a large quantity of baggage. On the 25th, the fortified town of Luckau, garrisoned by 1,000 men, surrendered; and on the following day, Girard, who had issued with 5,000 men from Magdeburg, to co-operate with Oudinot, was defeated at Leibnitz with the loss of 1,400 prisoners, and six pieces of cannon.

Undiscouraged by the reverses in Bohemia, Silesia, and Prussia, Ney was appointed to the command of the northern army, with strict injunctions to place his eagles on the walls of Berlin. Accordingly he assumed the command of Oudinot's army, which was lying under the walls of Wittenberg; and on the 5th September, moved forward against Bernadotte. On the evening of the same day the armies came in sight of each other. On the morning of the 6th, the battle of Dennewitz began. The contest had endured with the most vehement resolution nearly the whole day. The Prussian army, consisting of only 45,000 combatants, a great portion of whom were landwehrs, had maintained the conflict with heroic resolution against the French, who numbered 70,000 sabres and bayonets. At this moment Bernadotte with the Swedes and Russians, composing nearly one-half the allied army, appeared in order of battle, and proceeded to the attack, preceded by 150 pieces of cannon. Disorder and vacillation soon became visible in the enemy's line. Orders for a retreat were given at all points; the retreat soon became a flight. At length the whole army became a mass of fugitives. In the confusion the 7th corps, composed chiefly of Saxons, came over to the allies. The loss of the enemy on the field of battle, and the retreat to Torgau, exceeded 13,000 men, of

whom one-half were prisoners. The trophies were forty-three pieces of artillery, seventeen caissons, three eagles, and 6,000 stand of arms thrown away by the fugitives to accelerate their flight. The loss sustained by the allies was 6,000 men.

After having deputed to Ney his commission to plant the imperial eagles on the towers of Berlin, Buonaparte left Dresden with the imperial guard and cuirassiers on the 3rd of September, in the hopes of fetching a blow at Blücher; and on the 4th, joining Macdonald's corps at Hochkirk, immediately resumed operations against the Prussian general, and early in the forenoon came in contact with the advanced guard on the road to Górlitz. Blücher, according to the system agreed on by the allies at Trachenberg, immediately fell back. The French army bivouacked for the night around Hochkirk, and on the following morning resumed the pursuit. At this moment news being received that the grand allied army was marching upon Dresden, leaving Marmont with his corps at Hoyerswerda, Buonaparte immediately countermarched the guards and cuirassiers to Dresden.


Wittgenstein was already (September 6th) possessed of Pirna; the main body of the Russian army was concentrating in the environs of Culm and Toplitz, and the Austrians were in the passes of Altenberg, Fürstenwolde, and Peterswalde. On the 7th, Buonaparte advancing against Wittgenstein, he retreated through the passes of Erzgebirge to Peterswalde, fearful of one of those sudden strokes of inspiration, when his opponent seemed almost to dictate to fate. Thither Buonaparte pursued him; but when he viewed the difficult defiles of the valley of Culm, and recalled to his mind the calamity of Vandamme, he determined to retrace his steps to Dresden, which he re-entered on the 12th. No sooner had he retreated than Wittgenstein advanced towards Nellendorf, and attacking Dumonceau's division, posted on the summit of Erzgebirge, forced it back to Peterswalde, with the loss of 1,500 men; and St. Cyr. was compelled to withdraw his whole corps to Gieshübel. Buonaparte hurried with his guards and cuirassiers to the assistance of his lieutenant; on his approach the allies fell back into the Bohemian plains; on the 17th a partial descent was made into the plain; but the column was so roughly handled, that they lost 1,200 slain, as many prisoners, three guns, and one eagle; this rebuff, with

a glance at the scene of Vandamme's catastrophe, suggested the policy of a retrograde march on Dresden. On September 9th, a triple treaty of alliance between Austria, Russia, and Prussia, was ratified at Toplitz, in which all parties agreed to furnish contingents of 150,000 men each; and on the 3rd of October a preliminary treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Austria was signed at the same place.

On his return to Dresden, Buonaparte received the alarming news, that Bernadotte was preparing to cross the Elbe; and that Blücher had advanced to the right bank of that river, and was in occupation of Bautzen. After a few hours' rest, he crossed the Elbe with his guards and cuirassiers; but as soon as he reached the advanced posts of his veteran enemy, at Hartau, he found him like the phantom knight of the poet, no substantial body against which he could direct his blows; the Prussian field-marshal, in obedience to his orders, calmly retreating before him. As soon, however, as the Prussian general reached a favourable position, he offered battle, which, after the French troops had remained under arms for several hours, was declined. Buonaparte deeming himself too weak to hazard an action, returned next day (September 24th) to Dresden.

During these operations the French suffered considerable loss from the partisan warfare of some of the leaders of the allies. Platoff and Thielman had defeated, at Altenburg, September 28th, Lefebvre Desnouettes, in command of 8,000 chasseurs-à-cheval and cavalry of the guard, with the loss of 1,500 prisoners, and five guns; and Chernicheff, on September 30th, had, with 3,000 cossacks, entered Cassel, the capital of Jerome Buonaparte's kingdom of Westphalia, and carried off in triumph the stores of the arsenal, his kingship's horses and carriages, and an immense store of booty. Soon after this event, more than one Westphalian regiment took the first opportunity of passing over from their fugitive monarch, who had precipitately decamped from his capital without firing a shot, to the ranks of German freedom. On the 27th, a Saxon battalion had passed over to Bernadotte from the camp of Ney.

Affairs were now in that condition, that change of position, and alteration in the line of action, were imperatively necessary on the part of the French. Famine, contagion, and mortality beset the army. The troops, worn out with incessantly harassing marches and privations, were in the last





THE GREAT EAST-INDIA HOUSE,
ON THE CORNER OF THE GREAT
STREET, LONDON.

stage of destitution. Though the average mortality in the hospitals was 200 daily, 12,000 — “the remains of 60,000, who had entered the hospitals since the opening of the campaign” (Buonaparte’s admission to St. Cyr)—wretched beings were heaped together there, labouring under the effects of typhus fever of the most malignant kind. The distribution of rations of meat had become rare; those of bread were reduced to one-half; and the surrounding country was entirely exhausted by the triple scourge of quartering, pillage, and contribution. So great had been the diminution of the effective force of the French army, which, at the termination of the armistice had amounted to 360,000 men, that now it was less than 200,000.

The arrival of Bennigsen’s reinforcement, nearly 60,000 strong, at Toplitz, on the 1st of October, was the signal for the recommencement of hostilities. Blucher, with 65,000 men, crossed the Elbe on the 3rd of October, and at the same time Bernadotte transferred his army over that river, and entered into communication with the Silesian army. Simultaneously with this movement, the grand allied army, under Schwartzberg, were advancing from the Erzgebirge mountains towards Leipsic, by Marienberg and Chemnitz. Buonaparte leaving St. Cyr, with 30,000 men, in Dresden, with

orders to defend it to the last extremity, and giving orders “to carry off all the cattle from the woods, and destroy the fruit trees on the right bank of the Elbe,” marched from that city on the 7th with the imperial guard and cavalry, and Macdonald and Marmont’s corps, and forming a junction with Oudinot, Bertrand, and Regnier’s divisions, under Ney, in the vicinity of Torgau, meditated an advance on Berlin, and thus transfer the war into the Prussian territory, at the same time rallying to his standard the beleaguered garrisons on the Oder and Elbe, containing 80,000 men. After fruitlessly exhausting several days in altercations with his generals on the impolicy of the measure, he determined to face about, and march towards the Rhine. In the mean time, all the disposable French forces had been ordered to concentrate at Leipsic, whither the whole of the allied forces were converging. Already, a considerable number of the 280,000 conscripts voted by the senate, in consequence of the application of the regent, Marie Louise, on the 7th of October, when she appeared in the legislative chamber, and pronounced the discourse prepared by her husband for the demand, had reached the frontiers, and been speedily incorporated with the various divisions of the grand army.

BATTLE OF LEIPSIC.

ON the evening of the 15th October, Buonaparte having made his preparations, and surveyed the ground on which the allied army was being arranged, issued his orders to the different generals for the disposition of their respective corps, and then reconnoitring every outpost in person, distributed the eagles to those regiments that had not received those military emblems. The colours being presented, in the presence of the whole line, and military mass performed, the young soldiers, kneeling, swore that they would never abandon them, Buonaparte, at the same moment, exclaiming—“Swear that you will die rather than see France dishonoured!” “We swear!” was the universal response. On this day a brilliant cavalry skirmish between Prussian cuirassiers, commanded by Patlen, and six regiments of French cuirassiers, recently arrived from

Spain, under Murat, terminated in the defeat of the French cavalry, and Murat was so closely pursued, that he was nearly taken. Lindenau, through which ran the Mark-Ranstadt road, by which the only line of retreat to the Rhine, if necessary, must be effected, was occupied by Bertrand.

The night of the 15th passed in watchful silence, except by a midnight discharge of three rockets, emitting brilliant trains of white light, which ascended from the south of Leipsic, over the position of Schwartzberg; and they were immediately answered by four rockets of a deep red colour, from the northern horizon, marking the position of Blucher, and intimating that all was in readiness for a combined attack on the enemy early on the morrow.

The armies on each side consisted of two distinct bodies; one of each on the southern

side of the town, and one of each on the northern side. That on the southern side consisted of 110,000 men, of whom 1,800 were cavalry, under the immediate command of Buonaparte; that on the northern, posted at Möckhem, consisted of 45,000 infantry, and 3,000 cavalry, under Ney. The artillery of both armies consisted of 720 pieces of cannon. The allied army on the south, on the plain of Wachau, under Schwartzberg, consisted of 143,000 men, of whom 25,000 were cavalry, with 620 guns; that on the north, under Blücher, consisted of 56,000 effective men, with 156 guns. Blücher's colleague, Bernadotte, had not yet come up; a backwardness which had been visible in his conduct both at Gross-Beeren and Dennewitz, marked the whole of his conduct. His hope, with which the emperor Alexander had at one time amused him, of succeeding to the crown of France, did not incline him to push matters to an extremity, lest he should lose the favourable opinion of the French people, and his ambitious views be thus frustrated. At nine o'clock, on the discharge of three guns from the centre of Schwartzberg's army, the allied forces advanced against the French line in heavy columns, under cover of two hundred pieces of artillery. Confusion was occasioned in the French right; but in the centre the attack was not equally successful. Six times did the allies attack the villages of Wachau and Liebertnolkwitz, and six times were they repulsed. The battle had now lasted three hours, when Buonaparte ordered an attack on the allied centre, which, unable to resist the furious onset, under the murderous fire of 150 cannon, gave way. Buonaparte, deeming the battle gained, sent word to the king of Saxony in Leipzig of his supposed success; and enjoined him to cause all the church bells in the city, and adjoining villages, to be rung, to announce his victory. But at this imminent moment of danger, the czar, by advice of Jomini, ordering up his guards and reserves to the menaced point, and these troops being joined by the Austrian reserve under Nostitz, who had been placed in a position by Schwartzberg where they could not be brought before into action, restored the battle in that quarter. But though this extreme danger was averted in the centre to the west of Wachau, more imminent danger threatened the allies on the east of that village; Murat, at the head of 4,000 cuirassers of the guard, had borne

down on the flank of the allied right, and thundering through the gap they had made in the line, pushed on as far as Magdeburg, a village in their rear. To provide for the danger, the czar ordered up the red cossacks of the guard; and Barclay de Tolly's heavy cavalry, who bearing down on the hostile squadrons, instantly drove them back to their own lines, with the loss of twenty-four guns.

The crisis of the battle on this side Leipzig was not passed; but Buonaparte resolved to make one more effort for victory. About six o'clock he advanced against the village of Gossa, and captured it; but after it had been repeatedly taken and retaken, he was at last driven out of it by the Prussian division of Pirsch. Late in the evening Meerfeldt, in his endeavour to join the main army, being suddenly assailed by a division of the old guard and Poniatowsky, was made prisoner, with a whole battalion of his force. He was immediately brought into Buonaparte's presence. In an early part of the day Bertrand had been dislodged from Lindennau, but on receipt of Buonaparte's order to retake it at all hazards, after a desperate struggle he regained its possession. While the battle was raging on the western side of the city, the strife of war was equally rife at Mockern, on its north-west. Blücher, in conformity with the concerted plan of operations, put himself in motion at daybreak from his position in front of Halle, but did not come up with the enemy till the action had begun between the hostile armies on the northern side of Leipzig. After a most sanguinary conflict, in which Mockern was five times taken and retaken, and the villages of Gross and Klein Widderitzsch had been furiously thrice assailed, and as often bravely defended, Ney was driven back in confusion over the Partha, with the loss of 4,000 killed and wounded, 2,000 prisoners, twenty guns, and an eagle. In the course of the night, the cossacks, by surprise, captured an additional thirty cannon. Mortier's loss in killed and wounded was 6,000. The battle, which had been fiercely contested, continued to rage till nightfall, when the bloody work ceased, as if by mutual consent. Three cannon-shot, fired as a signal to the more distant points, intimated that the conflict was ended for the time, and the armies bivouacked in each other's presence, in the very positions they occupied the night before.

No sooner had the firing ceased, than

Buonaparte summoned Meerfeldt into his presence. Meerfeldt had been the person who, on the part of the emperor of Austria, had, after the battle of Austerlitz, solicited the armistice of Leoben. Through his agency, Buonaparte determined to appeal to the sentiments of affection which the emperor of Austria might be supposed to entertain for his daughter and grandchild. With many kind expressions, he dismissed him, on his parole, to the Austrian headquarters, "stored with every imaginable argument that could be urged against continuing the Russian alliance." "I seek only to repose in the shadow of peace," said the machiavellian diplomatist; "I am willing to make great sacrifices for this end. Adieu, general!" said he; "when on my behalf you shall speak of an armistice to the two emperors, I doubt not the voice that strikes their ears will be eloquent indeed in recollections." Meerfeldt had gone out like the messenger from the ark; and long and anxiously did Buonaparte expect his return. But he was the raven envoy, and brought back no olive branch. Buonaparte did not receive an answer till he had recrossed the Rhine.

The 17th passed without any actual hostilities; Buonaparte waiting for the result of his proposals, the allies the arrival of Beunigen and Bernadotte. In the course of the day, Buonaparte contracted his circuit of operations, ranging his army considerably nearer to Leipsic, and on more favourable ground, of which Probstsheyda was the central point. His reserves from Düben had come up; and the Saxons, under Regnier, had joined Ney on the Partha. Schwartzberg, who had been reinforced by Benignsen's reserve from Poland on his side, remedied his faulty dispositions, and made the requisite arrangements for pressing on the French columns on all sides of the narrow circle into which they had retired. Bernadotte had also effected a junction with Blücher. The allied army now amounted to 280,000 combatants, with nearly 1,400 guns.

At length the morning of the 18th dawned, and the folly of the cant of "Napoleon's star" and "destiny," with which the minds of men had suffered themselves to be beguiled, proved to be the juggle of the mountebank. Buonaparte was stationed on an eminence called Thornberg, which commanded a prospect of the whole field. Masses of infantry and cavalry were drawn up behind the villages, which

were to relieve their defenders with fresh troops as occasion might require; batteries of cannon were ranged in their front and in their flanks; and every patch of wooded ground which afforded the least shelter was filled with tirailleurs. The allied columns with rapid strides approached from every point. The battle was joined on all sides, and renewed with tenfold more vigour than had been the case on the 16th. A furious cannonade thundered along the hostile lines. On the external range of heights and villages, which had been so desperately defended on the 16th, the allies found no opposition but that of the outposts. The allies driving the Poles, under Poniatowski, and Augereau's corps, posted on the banks of the Elster before them, directed their principal efforts against the villages of Connewitz and Probstsheyda. Four times was the last-mentioned village, which formed the salient angle of the position of the French around Leipsic furiously assaulted; and four times was it recovered by its gallant defenders. Macdonald, at the village of Stoetteritz, on the left, was equally successful in resisting the repeated assaults of an overwhelming force. About this period of the battle, the Wurtemberg brigade of cavalry, under Hormann, passed over to the allies. Schwartzberg now receiving information of the decisive success which had attended Blücher and Bernadotte's attack on Ney, to save the fearful loss of life with which a continuance of the attack on the villages would be attended, retired his columns to the numerous hollows to save them from the destructive effect of the enemy's batteries; arranged his artillery, consisting of 800 pieces, in the form of a semicircle, of two leagues in length; and for the remainder of the day kept up an incessant fire on the enemy's columns as they showed themselves. The French batteries, from 500 pieces, replied with equal spirit though with diminished effect. "For four terrible hours" did this dreadful scene continue, until nightfall closed the conflict.

On the north side of Leipsic, the arrival of Bernadotte enabled Blücher to push the advantages he had gained on the 16th with irresistible effect. In the very commencement of the action, a brigade of Saxon cavalry and two brigades of infantry, with their artillery, passed over to the allies, and immediately turned their pieces against the ranks of their former comrades. By this defection Ney was compelled to contract his

line of defence, and fall back on Schönfeld, which forms almost one of the northern suburbs of Leipsic. By arrangement, the allies now pressed forward on all sides to encircle the enemy, and force them back at the point of the bayonet into the suburbs of Leipsic. Five times did the Russians penetrate Schönfeld, and five times they were driven back by the French. At length it was carried, and remained in the hands of the Russians; 4,000 of its assailants, and an equal number of its defenders, lying dead, or weltering in their blood, in its streets.

The French being now driven close under the walls of Leipsic, the battle ceased at all points; and three distinct cannon-shot discharged from end to end the line, again announced the general termination of the conflict, when the field was left to the slain and the wounded.

Buonaparte being now informed by Sorbier and Dulauloy, the commanders of the artillery, that there only remained about 16,000 cartridges to serve the guns, a number scarcely sufficient to support a hot fire for two hours, saw that his position was untenable; dispositions were, therefore, made for a retreat. Towards evening, the carriages and baggage of the army began to defile by Lindenau towards Weissenfels. The troops and Buonaparte left their bivouac at eight o'clock, and in the course of the night retreated by the defiles of Lindenau towards Erfurth. The king of Saxony was left in Leipsic to make his terms with the allies. The defence of the suburbs was entrusted to Macdonald and Poniatowski, in order to cover, as a rear-guard, the retreat of the army.

No sooner were the allies aware of the retreat of the French, than they pressed forward. In the suburbs they encountered a stern and desperate resistance. At this moment, the bridge of Lindenau being blown up, the rear-guard took to flight, and precipitating themselves into the river, the greater part perished in the deep and muddy stream; Macdonald, with difficulty, reached the opposite bank, but Poniatowski perished in the water. The means of escape being cut off by the destruction of the bridge, 15,000 troops and 22 generals were taken, besides 23,000 sick and wounded in the hospitals. During the three days' battle, the French had lost 30,000 prisoners and 21 generals, besides the killed and wounded, 250 pieces of cannon, 900 cha-

riots and ammunition waggons, and an incalculable quantity of baggage. That of the allies, during the same period, had been 1,800 officers, and 45,000 privates in killed and wounded. On the entrance of the allied sovereigns into Leipsic, general Bertrand, the French commandant of the city, surrendered his sword. The king of Saxony was sent prisoner to Berlin, under a guard of Cossacks. Bavaria, on the 8th of October, acceded to the Grand Alliance.

Buonaparte was now on his retreat towards Erfurth, with the shattered and disorganized remnant of his army. Pillage and rapine became universal. So great was the disorder, that the bonds of discipline, even in the guard itself, were relaxed. On the 23rd of October he reached that city. Almost all the German troops in his army had now withdrawn themselves, and had in most cases joined the allies. Several of the Polish regiments had also passed over to the allies. But the 600 infantry, and 1,500 cavalry of that nation, which now remained in his service, when the offer was made them to depart, unanimously agreed, that they would escort him safely beyond the Rhine, reserving their right then to leave his standard. At Erfurth, Murat left for his own dominions.

Already the allies were pressing on the rear of the fugitive columns. Sachen's cavalry had made 2,000 prisoners; and Blucher, at the passage of the Unstrut at Friedberg, had, after a sharp conflict, overthrown the rear-guard, with the loss of 1,000 prisoners, eighteen guns, and a large quantity of ammunition and baggage. The grand allied army had pursued through the Thuringian forest, but so rapid was the retreat of the enemy, that the task of pursuit was entrusted to the cossacks under Platoff, Chernicheff, and other leaders. So harassing and destructive were the retreat and pursuit now, that the roads were strewn, and the ditches on either side filled with the bodies of men and horses who had perished from the effects of fatigue and famine. With the exception of frost and snow, the fleeing host resembled that of the dismal retreat from Moscow.

On the 25th Buonaparte, after a halt of two days, left Erfurth, amid weather as tempestuous as his fortunes, closely followed by the cossack hordes of Platoff, Chernicheff, Orloff, &c. A fresh evil now threatened him. The Bavarian army, under Wrede, amounting to 45,000 men, so lately his allies, with



LEIPZIG.
IN THE OCCUPATION OF THE ALLIED POWERS

MEETING OF THE EMPERORS OF AUSTRIA & RUSSIA
AT THE TOWN HALL.

a strong auxiliary force of Austrians, were hurrying from the banks of the Inn, and had reached Wurtzburg on the Maine, with the design of throwing themselves between the French army and the frontier of France, and had taken up a position at Hanau for this purpose; and as his troops were stationed across the great road, the retreat of the French army to Mayence was entirely intercepted.

On the 30th, Buonaparte came in sight of his opponents, and at 11 o'clock the battle commenced. For four hours the French army was unable to force its passage, but at length the cuirassiers and artillery of the guard opened a passage, and Wrede withdrew under the protection of the cannon of Hanau. As the rear-guard, under Mortier, was still at Gelnhäusen, on the other side of the forest, Marmont remained on the banks, to cover his passage, which was effected on the 31st. The loss of the French in these contests was 7,000, that of the allies 10,000, of whom 4,000 were prisoners. The road to Frankfort from the field of battle was strewn with the wreck and relics of the French army; so precipitate had been its retreat. On the 1st of November, Buonaparte entered Frankfort; on the 2nd he reached Mayence; and on the 4th he departed for Paris, where he arrived on the 9th.

The fate of the garrisons, amounting to 180,000 men, in the fortresses of Dresden, Hamburg, Dantzic, Magdeburg, Torgau, &c., on the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula, was now sealed. On the 11th of November, Dresden, with St. Cyr, and 35,000 men, capitulated. Stettin, on the 21st, with 8,000 men, surrendered; and here the Prussians regained possession of 350 pieces of cannon. On the 29th, Rapp surrendered Dantzic, with 25,000 troops. In December, Zamosc, Torgau, and Modlin, surrendered, on the 22nd, 25th, and 26th. At the conclusion of the year, Hamburg, Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Custrin, Glogau, Erfurth, and Wurtzburg, were the only fortresses remaining in the hands of the French beyond the Rhine. Nine days after the battle of Leipsic, Jerome Buonaparte abandoned his kingdom of Westphalia, and precipitately fled to Dusseldorf, where he crossed the Rhine. On the 6th of November, the grand duchy of Berg united its arms to the common standards of Germany, and at the same time Hanover returned to its allegiance to the king of England. On the 15th of December an armistice was

concluded with Denmark, which terminated in a treaty, signed in the beginning of the following year, by virtue of which Denmark joined the Grand Alliance.

The accession of Bavaria to the Grand Alliance, on the eve of the battle of Leipsic, was followed by that of all the lesser states which formed the Confederation of the Rhine. By virtue of the convention signed at Leipsic, and the treaties concluded at Frankfort, November 18th and 24th, they agreed to furnish contributions for the maintenance of the common cause, equal to the gross revenue of their respective dominions; and contingents of troops, one-half to consist of the line, the other of landwehr, double that which had been previously furnished to the confederation.

In Italy affairs were little better; the usurper's power there was rapidly melting away from his grasp. Eugene Beauharnois,—who, in the beginning of the campaign, had been dispatched to oppose marshal Hiller, sent by the allies, after Austria had joined the Grand Alliance, to recover possession of the Lombard and Venetian states,—not being able to maintain himself against the Austrian general, received overtures from the allies, and sent a plenipotentiary to Châtillon to attend to his pretensions to his Italian dominions. Though Murat had manifested, at the time of his separation from his brother-in-law at Frankfort, the highest professions of fidelity and attachment, he secretly opened a negotiation with Metternich, proffering to enter into the coalition against Buonaparte, provided he were guaranteed his Neapolitan dominions. A treaty being concluded with him to that effect early in January of the following year, on the 19th of that month he entered Rome at the head of 20,000 men, denouncing his brother-in-law in this proclamation:—"Soldiers! as long as I could believe that the emperor Napoleon combated for peace and the happiness of France, I fought by his side; but now it is no longer possible to give credit to that illusion. The emperor breathes nothing but war. I would betray the interests of my native country, of my present dominions, and of yourselves, if I did not at once separate my arms from his, to join them to those of the powerful allies, whose magnanimous intentions are to re-establish the independence of nations, and the dignity of thrones. Soldiers! there are two banners in Europe; on the one are inscribed religion, morality, justice, law,

peace, and happiness; on the other, persecution, artifice, violence, tyranny, war, and mourning to all nations." Even the princess Eliza, Buonaparte's sister, showed no very overpowering reluctance to lend a hand in the overthrow of the falling colossus, could she but "save her beautiful palaccio Pitti."

A general insurrection in Holland came also to augment the embarrassments, and dislocate what remained of the subjugated countries. Among the Dutch, as with the Germans, numerous secret societies had for some time been formed for the purpose of availing themselves of the first opportunity to throw off the galling yoke of their oppressor, and which was particularly oppressive to them as a commercial nation, in consequence of the maintenance of the continental system. No sooner did the news reach them of the retreat from Leipsic, than Amsterdam, the Hague, Rotterdam, Leyden, and the other chief towns, hoisted the ancient national flag, and mounted the orange cockade (November 14th), amid loud and enthusiastic cries of "Orange boven" (Up with the orange). With the exception of Bergen-op-Zoom, and a few of the southern frontier fortresses, the French troops speedily quitted the country. Strong bodies of Russians and Prussians, and an English force, amounting to 6,000 men, under general Graham, took possession of Holland, in the name of the Stadtholder, the prince of Orange, who, on the 27th of November, landed from London, at Schevelin, whence he proceeded to the Hague.

Meanwhile, the allies were advancing towards the Rhine; but before resuming hostilities, they resolved again to offer peace to Buonaparte.

The agent employed on the occasion was the baron de St. Aignan, a French diplomatist of reputation, at the time ambassador of France at the court of Weimar, and who had been made prisoner in the course of the advance of the allies to the Rhine. Five days (November 9th) subsequent to their arrival at Frankfort, they dispatched the baron to Paris with a private note from the emperor of Austria to his daughter Marie Louise, and a diplomatic note from the whole of the allied sovereigns addressed to Buonaparte, in which they assured him of their willingness to make peace on these terms: "that France was to be restricted to its natural limits between the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees; that Spain should

be restored to its ancient dynasty; and that the independence of Italy and Germany should be secured, under princes of their native families." At the same time it was declared, that England would recognise every principle of commerce and navigation to which France had any right to pretend. To these propositions the French government appearing to consent, Manheim, on the right bank of the Rhine, was specified as the seat of negotiation. At the same time the allies published the following proclamation to show the amicable views with which they were actuated.

"The allied powers, desirous of obtaining a general peace on a solid foundation, promulgate, in the face of the world, the principles which are the basis and guide of their conduct, their wishes, and their determinations. They do not make war on France, but on that preponderance which, to the misfortune of Europe and France, the emperor Napoleon has long exercised beyond the limits of France. They desire that it should be powerful and happy; that commerce should revive, and the arts flourish; that its territory should preserve an extent unknown under its ancient kings; because the French power, great and strong, is in Europe one of the fundamental bases of the solid edifice; because a great people can only be tranquil so long as they are happy; because a brave nation is not to be regarded as overthrown, because in its turn it has experienced reverses in an obstinate and bloody struggle, in which it has combated with its accustomed valour. But the allied powers wish themselves also to be happy and tranquil; they wish a state of peace which, by a wise division of power, by a just equilibrium, may hereafter preserve their people from the calamities, without number, which for twenty years have oppressed Europe. They will not lay down their arms before they have attained that great and beneficent result; they will not lay them down till the political state of Europe is anew secured, till the immutable principles of justice have resumed their ascendant over vain pretensions, and till the sanctity of treaties has at length secured a real peace to Europe." Though Buonaparte's reply to these proposals for a general pacification, contained in a letter from Caulaincourt to Metternich, dated December 2nd, professed his acquiescence in the principle which should rest the proposed pacification on the independence of the

states of Europe, so that neither one nor the other should in future arrogate sovereignty or supremacy in any form whatever; it is evident, from the delays he unnecessarily interposed, that he was not sincere, and that he was desirous of merely gaining time for completing his defensive preparations, and to postpone settling the negotiations until he could ascertain how the chamber of deputies, who were summoned to meet on the 19th of December, were disposed to coincide with his views of prosecuting the war, and aiding him in his measures.

When Buonaparte arrived in Paris on the 9th of November, after his disastrous defeat at Leipsic, and the results of the Saxon campaign were publicly known, universal despondency took possession of the minds of the Parisians. The stocks, the thermometer of public opinion in that capital, and, indeed, throughout France, sunk so alarmingly, that it was found necessary to resort to official statements of their price, in order to prevent an universal panic.

To avert the dangers which now threatened France, vigorous measures were necessary. In an extraordinary council of state, consisting of Buonaparte and the two secretaries of state, Talleyrand and Molé, a dictatorship was created; and as the first display of his dictatorial power, Buonaparte, at his sole will, doubled the taxes. He then demanded a new conscription of 300,000 men, to be levied on those who had escaped the conscription of the former years, from 1803 downwards, and who had been considered as exempted from the service.* To give colour to his demand—"Wellington," said he, "has entered the south; the Russians menace the northern frontier; the Prussians, Austrians, and Bavarians threaten the east. Shame! Wellington is in France; and we have not risen in a mass to drive him back. I demand of France 300,000 men; but I must have grown men—not these conscript boys, to encumber my hospitals, and die of fatigue upon the highways. Counsellors! there must be an impulse given—all must march—you are fathers of families, the heads of the nation; it is for you to set the example." The levy required was granted. In little more than two months

from the opening of the Saxon campaign, above 600,000 men had been demanded for the disastrous encounters on the Elbe and the Pyrenees, and so dreadfully destructive of life had those campaigns been, that little more than a fraction of those unhappy men were in life; and even of the wretched remnant that had reached the left bank of the Rhine, and who had taken refuge in the fortified towns, such was the effect of the pestilential epidemic, typhus fever, engendered by their sufferings and privations, that the atmosphere was insupportable from the noxious odour arising from the exhalations of the multitude of dead bodies that had received imperfect sepulture; and the waters of the Rhine, the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula, were polluted by the corpses which were consigned from the vast charnel-houses, which the fortresses on their banks had become. In several weeks, at Mayence, the mortality exceeded 500 daily. Disastrous, however, as affairs were, his servile and obsequious senators waited on Buonaparte, five days after his return to Paris, with an address of felicitation; and, to the disgrace of science, Lacépède, the naturalist, who was the spokesman, made not the slightest allusion to the hundreds of thousands of his fellow-beings who had but just been slaughtered, and had perished of disease and want on the plains of Germany, but congratulated his august sovereign on having surmounted all his difficulties "in fighting for peace." But all Frenchmen were not of this servile and sycophantic nature. Though the legislative body had been for a length of time as tame and obsequious as the senate, there were some fiery and impatient spirits in it who remembered the days of the republic, and who could despise the imperial decree that made them a dumb legislature. The ravages of the conscription, the increase of the public taxes, and the necessity of bearing the insupportable expenditure of their emperor's endless wars, had created a spirit of general discontent, and in many quarters disaffection, throughout the nation. Lord Wellington had, with his usual prescience and sagacity, long foretold that when Buonaparte was compelled to draw his resources for his

* The usual price of a substitute was between £400 and £500, English currency; the last conscription had doubled that sum, and in some cases £1,200 were given. Families of respectability often sacrificed their whole property, the savings of a long lifetime, to provide substitutes for their sons. No sooner

had the conscript joined the army, than he was deemed numbered with the dead by his friends and relations, so dreadful were the ravages of the service. So little value was attached to the life of a conscript, that they obtained the soubriquet, or nick-name, of "chair-à-cannon,"—"cannon-wood."

profligate wars from France herself, the French population would be soon cured of their epidemic of glory, and sick of their imperial empiric prescriber. "War must be with him," said the English general, in a letter dated January, 1812, to baron Constant, an officer attached to the staff of the Prince of Orange, "a financial resource. * * * I have great hopes, however, that this resource is beginning to fail; and I think there are symptoms of a sense in France, either that war is not so productive as it was, or that nations who have still something to lose may resist, as those of the Peninsula have, in which case the expense of collecting this resource becomes larger than its produce."* So long as the national vanity was flattered with the scenes of dazzling victories that attended their standards, the expense of wars supported by the countries in which they were carried on, the French exchequer replenished with the war contributions, and the museums of Paris embellished with the rifled works of art of other countries, the French people could, with a happy and accommodating facility, reconcile themselves to the slaughter of their sons and relations, and their immolation on the altar of insatiable ambition and universal aggression on the rights, the liberties, and the happiness of other nations. The universal language of France, and sovereign balm to outraged nature, was "*nos enfans sont morts sur les champs de la victoire et pour la gloire de la France;*" but when defeat, reverse, and disgrace quickened their feelings, the war became odious in their sight, and their note of complaint was—"nos moyens, nos frères, nos enfans, sont sacrifiés à l'ambition d'un tyran." Their discontent arose so high that couplets, defamatory of their "beloved emperor" were circulated, and affixed to the pedestal of the column of Austerlitz, which was surmounted with his statue; one of these was characteristic of the violence of public feeling—

"Tyran ! juché sur cette chaise,
Si le sang que tu fis verser,
Pouvait tenir en cette place,
Tu le boirais sans te baisser."†


The chamber of deputies, as the legislative body, which had been summoned to assemble on the 19th of December, now met; and notwithstanding every effort had been


* Gurwood's *Despatches*.

† Tyrant ! if the blood which thou hast shed were collected together in this square, it would reach thy lips, so that thou mightest drink it without stooping thy head.

made to shape them to the views of Buonaparte, it soon appeared that the spirit of discontent and despair that prevailed in almost every part of France, animated a large party in that assembly. They appointed a committee to draw up a report on the state of the nation, and to whom the documents connected with the negotiations which had been opened with the allies should be submitted. Among the members of the chamber, who had a character for independence, was Lainé, a deputy of the Gironde, who was appointed president of this committee. Their report, drawn up by him, was presented to the chamber on the 28th, and was expressive of a desire for peace, consistent with the honour and welfare of France. "While the government will take the most effective means for the safety of the country, his majesty," said the inditer of the report, "should be entreated to maintain and enforce the entire and constant execution of the laws which ensure to the French citizens the rights of liberty, property, and security, and to the nation the free exercise of its political privileges." * * * "Let us attempt no dissimulation," said its high-minded author; "our evils are at their height; the country is menaced on the frontiers at all points; commerce is annihilated; agriculture languishes; industry is expiring; there is no Frenchman that has not in his family or his fortune some cruel wound to heal. The facts are notorious, and can never be sufficiently brought into view. Agriculture, for the last five years, has gained nothing; it barely exists; and the fruit of its toil is annually dissipated by the treasury, which unceasingly devours everything to gratify the cravings of ruined and famished armies. The conscription has become, for all France, a frightful scourge, because it has always been carried into execution with the utmost rigour. For the last three years the harvest of death has been reaped three times a year! a barbarous war, without an object, swallows up the youth, torn from their education, from agriculture, commerce, and the arts. Have the tears of mothers, and the blood of generations, thus become the patrimony of kings? It is fit that nations should have a moment's breathing-time; the period has arrived when they should cease to tear out each other's entrails."

The reading of this report conjured up a perfect storm in the chamber. It was so long since the words liberty and political







DUTCH PEASANTS

ON THE LOWS

Longitude East from Greenwich

16

rights had been heard within its walls, that the courtiers started as if high treason had been spoken in their presence. The president, Regnier, interrupted the report. "Orator," said the nominee of Napoleon, "what you say is unconstitutional——" Lainé boldly answered the president with—"Sir—what? there is nothing unconstitutional here but your presence." A majority of the chamber voted that the report should be printed. Buonaparte immediately ordered the printing to be stopped, and the sheets thrown off to be seized. On the 31st he summoned the council of state, in which he dissolved the legislative body, and ordered their doors to be closed. At a grand court levée at the Tuilleries on the following day, for the purpose of wishing "the emperor a happy new year," among the members assembled was a deputation of the *corps législatif*, whom Buonaparte, as soon as they approached him, thus addressed:—"I have prohibited the printing of your address, because it is seditious. Gentlemen, you had it in your power to do much good, but you have done nothing but mischief. Eleven-twelfths of you are good men, the rest are factious, and are rebels. What do you hope for by putting yourselves in opposition to me? To gain possession of the power of the state? What are your views? Are you the representatives of the people? No! I am the representative—you are hot-headed fools, desirous of anarchy like the Girondists, whom such opinions led to the scaffold. M. Lainé is a conspirator, an agent of England: I will keep my eye on M. Lainé: he is a bad man. Be gone to your homes. Even if I had done wrong, you ought not to have reproached

me with it thus publicly. People do not wash their dirty linen before the world. To conclude, France has more need of me than I of France."

Special commissioners were now sent down to all the departments to arouse the energies of the inhabitants, and induce them to take up arms; and where invasion was threatened, to effect a levy *en masse*—180,000 national guards and urban cohorts were ordered to be embodied to garrison the towns and fortresses. By the treaty of Valençay, Ferdinand was liberated from his confinement, and restored to the crown of Spain, in hopes of detaching the Spaniards from their alliance with England, and enabling Buonaparte to unite Suchet's forces in Catalonia with his new levies in the interior of France; or, as Buonaparte expressed himself in his holograph letter to that person, to prevent "the English from exciting anarchy and Jacobinism in Spain and establishing a republic." The pope was also removed from his confinement at Fontainebleau to Terason, in the south of France. At this time Bourbon royalism began to display itself in La Vendée and Provence. In the end of December, the Swiss cantons annulled the constitution introduced by Buonaparte, introduced by his act of mediation; and the allies at the same time made a solemn declaration not to lay down their arms till the independence of the Swiss confederacy was secured.

The grand army under Schwartzberg crossed the Rhine on the night of the 20th of December, between Schaffhausen and Bâle. The Prussian army, under Blücher, effected the passage on the 31st at Mannheim, Kaub, and Coblentz.

THE ALLIED ANGLO-SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE SECOND CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE.

A.D. 1814

THE year 1814 dawned auspiciously on captive Europe, and promised its liberation from thralldom and servitude. Wellington and his gallant comrades were established on the south-western frontier of France; and the heroic Prussians, Austrians, and Rus-

sians, under the command of Blücher and the incompetent Schwartzberg, had crossed the Rhine, the boundary of "the sacred territory" on the north-eastern frontier.

Brilliant and unparelled, under circumstances so discouraging, and means so

limited, as had been the achievements of the commander-in-chief of the allied Anglo-Spanish and Portuguese armies, and conducive as they had been to the general interests and welfare of Europe, his difficulties and embarrassments, political and financial, and the opposition to his measures, seemed to multiply, and become more inveterate in the midst of his triumphs and services. And those difficulties, and embarrassments, and oppositions, originated not only from the ignorant and imbecile Peninsular governments, and their generals and local authorities, but even from the members of the government of his own country—men who, as it has been sarcastically but justly said, “were at one minute urging progress beyond reason, at another ready to change lightly what they had proposed ignorantly;” who could rebuke their gifted and uniformly successful general for devising means to replenish his military chest, and provide supplies for his army, by his wise and provident provisions for opening the French ports, and regulating their commerce; who could remonstrate with him on the impossibility of supplying the maximum expenditure of £100,000 per month for the whole maintenance of the large force under his command, while they could reconcile their notions of patriotic duty to the subsidizing of foreigners to the extent of eleven millions sterling, in the course of the very year in which they were refusing supplies to the upholder of their country’s honour, and the interests of the great European community the means of carrying on the contest. These facts, though startling, are true, and appear from the Wellington despatches and correspondence, in which the complaints are frequent of the neglect and ill-usage of the army under the command of their writer.

In a letter to lord Bathurst, dated St. Jean de Luz, 8th January, 1814,—“It is incontestable,” says the upright and high-minded Wellington, “that this army, and all its departments, and the Portuguese and Spanish army, are at this moment paralyzed for want of money. Since the month of January, 1813, the arrear of pay to the army has increased from an arrear for five to an arrear for six months, and is now growing to one for seven months. The debt is immense in all parts of the country; and his majesty’s engagements to the Portuguese and Spanish governments are not performed. The hire of some of the mules

attending this army has not been paid for twenty-six months; we are in debt in all parts of Spain, and are becoming so in France; and the price of all commodities is increasing, as might be expected, in proportion to the delay in paying for them, the difficulty in getting payment at all, and the consequent want of credit in all the departments of the British army.

“Very lately I was obliged to prevail on marshal Beresford to send me back 50,000 dollars of the 200,000 sent from Lisbon, as the subsidy for the Portuguese government, in order to keep the Spaniards together; and after all I have not been able to give them the whole of this money. In order to keep the British cavalry from perishing, it was necessary to allot 10,000 dollars of the money to pay for their supplies.”

Again; in a letter to the same effect, bearing date the 27th of the same month, he says—“We are short of £18,000 for the last month’s pay to the troops; and there is not a shilling in any of the military chests. I yesterday wanted to send off a courier to general W. Clinton in Catalonia, and the money for his expenses was borrowed from those who happened to have a little to lend.”

Again; in a letter dated St. Jean de Luz, 4th February, 1814, to colonel Bunbury, the under secretary of state, who had been sent to protest against the monthly expenditure of £100,000; adverting to lord Bathurst’s disapprobation of the means which he had adopted to raise money for the maintenance of the troops, namely, the licences granted to French vessels to import merchandise into the ports which he had declared free, in hopes of drawing money and supplies from France for the maintenance of the army, by interesting the French merchants—a measure by which he sacrificed his personal interest to that of the public, and thus deprived himself of much prize money that he would otherwise have been entitled to; but this clashed with the prize-money pretensions of lord Keith, who commanded the fleet, of which Collier’s squadron in the Guipuscoan coast formed a detached portion:—“I am afraid,” said the patriot general, “that the government are not aware of, and do not feel, the difficulties in which we are at all times for want of money. * * * You will be able to inform lord Bathurst on the state in which you found us, and in which we were to the last moment of your being here.”

To the proposal of the ministry—a mea-

sure to which they were instigated by the allied sovereigns, and in which they were urging him to push his operations with more vigour in France—his rebuke contained in the letter dated 21st of December, 1813, and which appears at page 117 *ante*, of this work, was a cutting rebuke of their ignorance and presumption. His exposition of the evils endured by the army, and the facilities afforded the enemy of obtaining supplies by the default of sufficient naval assistance on the coast of Guipuscoa, which are also stated at page 118 *ante*, of this work, are proofs of the negligence and incompetency of the administration of the time, and their culpability in not affording him the requisite co-operation. The following quotation, already stated in the preceding pages, is an admirable specimen of refined ironical application of the adage, *ne sutor ultra crepidam*:—"In military operations, there are some things that cannot be done; one of these is to move troops in this country during or immediately after a violent fall of rain."

To the other measures to which the ministry were also urged by the allied sovereigns, particularly the czar, for transporting the Peninsular army by sea to the Netherlands, and causing it to form the right wing of the grand allied Russian, Prussian, and Austrian army,—in a letter dated St. Jean de Luz, 10th January, 1814, he replied—"If it should be the opinion of England, or of the allies, that it is most desirable, notwithstanding all the disadvantages attending the removal of this army to Holland, that it should go there, I am ready to comply." See also his observations in the letter addressed to lord Bathurst, before mentioned at page 117, *ante*. And in a letter dated from the same place, and on the 8th of the same month, according to the wish expressed by government, he wrote—"I am prepared in every respect, excepting with money, to push the enemy to the Garonne during the winter; and I am convinced that the greatest advantage to the cause would result from such an operation; but I cannot move at all. * * * There is not a shilling to pay for anything that the country could afford, and our credit is already gone in this country."

The impolicy of the proposal of the ministry to replace his seasoned and veteran battalions with the levies from the militia regiments, for which they had obtained an act of parliament, and their withdrawal of 2,000 of those men who, able and willing to

plant their colours wherever the general listed, but who were sacrificed in the ill-fated attempt on Bergen-op-Zoom, is admirably elucidated in a letter containing this passage:—"I beg colonel Bunbury to remind lord Bathurst that the 2,000 veteran soldiers whom he will take away from the army under the proposed arrangement, are of more use than the 4,000 he proposes to send me, or even than 6,000. I beg leave particularly to state to his lordship the state in which he saw the 32nd regiment passing through this town to the rear. All the really sick in the army are the recruits."*

The conduct of his allies was equally culpable. The Spanish government and the local authorities threw every available impediment in the way of his operations. The *xefe politico*, and the official authorities of Santander, affecting great alarm lest by the establishment of the principal hospital of the British army at that port, the yellow fever might be introduced into the country, placed the hospitals in quarantine; and the *xefe politico* of Guipuscoa, the man who had given breath to the libel of the destruction of St. Sebastian by the English, directed that all vessels proceeding from that port to other ports on the coast of that province, should be liable to sanitary regulations. Thus, as Santander was the only port on the Guipuscoan coast sufficiently capacious to serve as a general rendezvous for vessels bringing stores for the army, and, consequently, all had to proceed thither, to wait for orders for the removal to the other small harbours more in the vicinity of the troops, the harsh regulations of the *xefe politico* placed the supplies of the army in quarantine, and the cargoes when they reached those harbours, had to perform quarantine for having touched at Santander. In a letter to his brother, Sir Henry Wellesley, dated St. Jean de Luz, 14th January, 1814, the English general exclaims—"It will appear extraordinary to the world, that wounded British soldiers, without arms and legs, after having rendered such services to the Spanish nation, should be obliged to go to England to look for hospitals; and while refused the benefits of their own hospitals [to obviate inconvenience to the inhabitants, portable wooden houses had been brought

* Memorandum per colonel Bunbury, dated St. Jean-de-Luz, 1st February, 1814. See also the letters addressed to his royal highness the duke of York and lord Bathurst, dated St. Jean-de-Luz, 15th December, 1813.

from England for the reception of the sick and wounded] in Santander, should be put in a state of quarantine in that town. It is impossible I can any longer expose our establishments to the capricious treatment they have met with at Santander." To the magistrates of Fonterabia, who had made complaints against receiving the wounded, the following cutting reply was sent:—

"St. Jean de Luz, ce 11 Janvier, 1814.

"Messieurs,—Il faut des hâbitaux pour les soldats blessés et malades; et je suis sûr que ceux qui ont été sauvés par leur bravoure ne desirént pas qu'on les laisse mourir dans les champs. Dans l'hiver il est nécessaire de mettre les chevaux de l'artillerie et de la cavalerie à l'abri du mauvais temps, sans quoi ils seraient perdus, et si leur service manquait à l'armée au moment critique, il pourrait que la ville qui se plaint à présent de l'inconvénient de leur donner un abri en eut à souffrir un plus grand, que serait d'avoir encore dans ces foyers l'ennemi que y à été si long temps.

"El Ayuntamiento de Fuenterrabia."

Though the Spanish generals and troops paid an apparent sullen obedience to lord Wellington's orders, their outrages were still occasionally committed. In a letter written to marshal Beresford, on the 7th of February, he thus denounces their outrages—"Their conduct is terrible: I have done everything in my power by severity and fair means hitherto without success. * * * The truth is, the officers will not discipline their troops, and the generals will not give themselves any trouble about the matter, and rather encourage indiscipline." He expressed much apprehension of the evil consequences. The mischief he anticipated was already in operation. The population of the Vals de Bidarry and de Baygorry, in the mountainous districts at the foot of the Pyrenees, were armed, and had commenced a partisan warfare under the guidance of one of the principal men of the Basques, by name Etcheverry; and Soult despatched general Harispe to organize a system of guerilla warfare. To repress the rising, the following proclamation was issued in the Basque and French languages, in which the Basque peasantry were required to join the French standard openly, or remain at home in peace; at the same time it was announced to them by the English officers in their district, that if the order was not obeyed, their villages would be fired, and such as might be taken in arms should be hanged as banditti.

Proclamation, No. 11.

"Aux Habitans de Bidarry et Baygorry.

"La conduite du peuple des villages de Bidarry et Baygorry m'a fait la plus grande peine; elle est différente de celle de tous les autres habitans du pays, et ils n'ont pas le droit de faire ce qu'ils font. S'ils veulent faire la guerre, qu'ils aillent se mettre dans les rangs des armées; mais je ne permettrai pas qu'ils fassent impunément tour-à-tour le rôle d'habitant paisible et celui de soldat. S'ils restent tranquilles chez eux, personne ne les molesterá; ils seront, au contraire, protégés comme le reste des habitans du pays que les armées occupent. Ils doivent savoir que j'ai en tout rempli les engagements que j'ai pris, envers le pays; mais je les prévien's que, s'ils préfèrent me faire la guerre, ils doivent se faire soldats et abandonner leurs foyers; ils ne peuvent pas continuer dans ces villages. "WELLINGTON.

"Au quartier-général, ce 28 Jan. 1814."

Translation.

"To the inhabitants of Bidarry and Baygorry.

"The conduct of the people of the villages of Bidarry and Baygorry has given me the greatest pain; it differs from that of all the other inhabitants of the country, and they have no right to act as they have acted. If they wish to make war, let them join the ranks of the army; but I will not permit them with impunity to act alternately the part of peaceable inhabitants and of soldiers. If they remain quietly in their houses, nobody shall molest them; but, on the contrary, they shall be protected like the inhabitants of other places occupied by my troops. They must know that I have performed all the engagements I made to the country; but I warn them, that if they persist in making war, they must join the enemy's ranks, and become soldiers; they must not remain in the villages.

"WELLINGTON.

"Head-quarters, Jan. 28th, 1814."

What a contrast is this humane and manly proclamation to the savage announcements of "the great and magnanimous Napoleon" and his myrmidons, Soult, Massena, Augereau, and Bessiéres in Spain, Portugal, Italy, and the Tyrol. To prevent the continuance of the partisan warfare, the English general desired his officers to inform the Basque peasantry, that if any further outrages continued, he would treat them as the French had acted towards the inhabitants in Spain and Portugal.

The Basque peasantry, after the issue of

the proclamation, preserved a strict neutrality during the remainder of the war; and in consequence of the oppressive exactions imposed on them by Soult, and the outrages of the French troops, they brought all their portable property within the British lines for protection. "The English general's policy, and the good discipline he maintains," said one of the commissioners* sent into the departments to excite the population to arm themselves, "does us more harm than ten battles. Every peasant wishes to be under his protection." At the passage of the Adour, the peasantry voluntarily offered to repair the roads for the passage of the artillery, without wishing for remuneration.

Another cause of uneasiness to the English general at this time was Buonaparte's machinations and intrigues with Ferdinand VII., captive in the chateau of Valençay. As Napoleon's object, independent of his producing a rupture between the English and the Spanish nation, was to procure the liberation of the French prisoners in Spain, and the French forces in Catalonia and Valencia to assist him in his approaching operations in the interior of France; the English general transmitted orders to the Spanish government and generals, that Suchet's forces must be considered as prisoners of war. In his letters, dated St. Jean de Luz, 10th January, 1814, to marshal Beresford; 13th January, to his brother, sir Henry Wellesley, and 27th January to general W. Clinton, he complains that not only Copons, but the Spanish military people about himself, though they had a notion of the treaty of Valençay, were quite silent about it; that he had repeated intelligence from the French of some act of treachery meditated by the Spaniards; and that several prisoners of that nation had come from Bayonne to circulate reports of peace, and charges against the English. And it was for these reasons that he counselled the English ministry to be ready to withdraw the English army, and to demand the possession of St. Sebastian, to protect their embarkation, if necessary.

The arrival of the duc d'Angoulême, as the representative of the Bourbon interest, under the assumed name of the *comte de Pradel*, at head-quarters, in the early part of February, afforded an opportunity for the display of the sagacious and well-poised mind and high political morality of the Eng-

lish general. As a congress was sitting at Châtillon-sur-Seine, for the purpose of considering terms for a general pacification, and the allies had expressed no wish to have the Bourbons restored, he considered it would be unwise and ungenerous to precipitate the partisans of that house into a premature outbreak, and then leave them to the vengeance of their enemy. And even when marshal Beresford marched upon Bordeaux, his instructions to him were: "If they should ask you for your consent to proclaim Louis XVIII., to hoist the white standard, &c., you will state that the British nation and its allies wish well to Louis XVIII., and as long as the public peace is preserved where our troops are stationed, we shall not interfere to prevent that party from doing what may be deemed just for its interest; nay, further, that I am prepared to assist any party that may show itself inclined to aid us in getting the better of Buonaparte. That the object of the allies, however, in the war, and above all in entering France, is, as is stated in my proclamation, *peace*; and that it is well known the allies are now engaged in negotiating a treaty of peace with Buonaparte. That however I might be inclined to aid and support any set of people against Buonaparte while at war, I could give them no further aid when peace should be concluded; and I beg the inhabitants will weigh this matter well before they raise a standard against the government of Buonaparte, and involve themselves in hostilities. If, however, notwithstanding this warning, the town should think proper to hoist the white standard, and should proclaim Louis XVIII., or adopt any other measure of that description, you will not oppose them; and you will arrange with the authorities the means of drawing, without loss of time, all the arms, ammunition, &c., which are at Dax, which you will deliver to them. If the municipality should state that they will not proclaim Louis XVIII. without your orders, you will decline to give such orders for the reasons above stated." And to the mayor of St. Séver, who had applied to him for instructions to guide his proceedings, he replied: "I have not interfered in any way in what has happened at Bordeaux, and if the department of the Landes, or any town of the department, chooses to acknowledge the house of Bourbon, I shall not oppose it, but I cannot enjoin to the individuals or the authorities of those districts which, by the operations of the war, have fallen under my order,

* Pellot's *Guerre des Pyrénées*.

to take a step which must commit them personally, because, if peace should be made, I must cease to give them that assistance which I could afford them under existing circumstances." And yet, while adopting this noble line of conduct, and consulting the interests of all parties, Soult and Gazan issued a proclamation, accusing him of fomenting revolt and civil war in France, and seeking to obtain, by means of intestine faction, those advantages which he could not gain by the sword.

Money was now so scarce, that a Spanish dollar was equivalent to eight shillings British currency; and as the troops were paid in British money, and the French population had indicated considerable reluctance to receive it in exchange for their commodities; to prevent the consequent embarrassment, facilitate the currency, and obviate the difficulties which might arise from the circulation of the foreign coin, all the coiners and die-sinkers in the army were ordered to be sought out. The English general established a secret mint, and con-

verted the foreign coin into Napoleons, marking the recoined pieces with a private stamp, carefully preserving their just fineness and weight, in order that, when peace should be established, the French government might be enabled to call them in again for recoinage.

In so destitute a condition were the troops at this time, that the great-coats of the British soldiers for 1813, were not ready for delivery in January, 1814. The consequence was, that the soldiers had to brave the winter half naked, first on the snowy mountains of the Pyrenees, then in the more chilly damps of the low country about Bayonne. And this was not the only evil arising to the public service from this negligence. The clothing for the year 1813, not having arrived till the end of 1814, when the troops were in advance, many of the best regiments were, as there was no means of land carriage, obliged to return to the coast, to receive and fit it from the stores; and the critical and hardly-contested battle of Orthes was fought without them.

THE PASSAGE OF THE ADOUR, AND THE PREPARATORY OPERATIONS.

SINCE the passage of the Nive and the battles in front of Bayonne, the only hostile encounters between the contending armies, had been some trifling skirmishes between the Basque peasantry under Harispe, and Mina's troops, and a few affairs of outposts and cavalry skirmishes between the allies and the French on the Upper Nive, in the Joyeuse, and the Arreau.

The weather had been very inclement for some time; heavy rain, and cold and piercing winds having been prevalent. The low grounds on the deep clayey soil of Béarn were flooded by the overflowing of the rivers, and the continual fall of rain, so that the roads were impassable. The country was little better than a vast quagmire, and very difficult for military operations,

* Soult's effective troops in the field, after deducting the garrison of Bayonne and other forts which he was obliged to defend, did not exceed 40,000 men; and a considerable part of this force was composed of conscripts, who, though disciplined, were not yet inured to war, and could not be relied upon, either to withstand the fatigues or confront the dangers of serious warfare in the campaign. On the other hand, the Anglo-Portuguese force, by the *Morning Star* on February 13th, when the advance commenced, amounted to 70,000 men, of whom 10,000 were cavalry, and the Spaniards were 30,000

abounding with strong positions, and intersected by numerous rivers, which run in concentric courses from the Pyrenees to the Adour.

During this cessation of hostility, Soult had received a large accession of conscripts, chiefly of the levy of the latest organization, particularly that granted to the regent, Marie Louise; but he sustained the loss of two divisions of infantry, and one of cavalry, who marched to take the field under Buonaparte, in the centre of France. Lord Wellington also received a reinforcement of 5,000 men; and the whole cavalry, which had been posted, for want of forage, on the banks of the Ebro, were at the same time brought up to those of the Adour.* During that interval, also, the allied commander—more: in all 100,000, with 140 pieces of cannon—a prodigious force to be collected at one point, under the command of a single general; and, considering the discipline and spirit of the troops, and the talents and experience of their chief, the most formidable army which had ever been put forth by the power of England. This inequality of numbers, however, was to a great extent counterbalanced by the advantage of Soult's situation, with the now powerful and fully armed garrison of Bayonne, at the confluence of the Nive and Adour, to protect his right. —*Alison.*

in-chief was vigorously preparing for the prosecution of the campaign. He had secretly collected in the harbour of Socoa, forty large-decked sailing-boats, called *chasse-marées*, for the purpose of effecting the passage of the Adour, of from fifteen to thirty tons burthen, laden with materials for constructing a flexible boom and a bridge, between the mouth of the river and Bayonne, which are nearly three miles distant from each other.

Scarcely had the new year commenced, than the French, collecting a considerable force about the Gave d'Oleron, drove in the cavalry pickets between the Joyeuse and the Bidouse, and turning the right of Buchan's Portuguese brigade, on the heights of La Costa, established two divisions of infantry on that height, and on La Bastide, stationing the remainder of their army on the Bidouse and the Gave. Immediately the brigade of guards and the German legion were advanced to the outposts of Barouillet, and took up the ground of the fifth division, which was moved to the next position, and this change took place from post to post, until a succession of reliefs had taken place along the whole line; by which manœuvre three divisions were at liberty for the defence of the point threatened. An attack was made on the 6th, on the French advanced position, from which they were quickly dislodged, when the allied troops returned to their former position.

The weather still continuing inclement, another interval of repose took place; but on the 12th of February, a frost intervening, the roads became hard and passable. The commander-in-chief now determined to resume active operations against the enemy, and endeavoured to force him to quit his fortified camp in front of Bayonne. This he determined to accomplish by two measures. The first was to establish a bridge across the Adour, between the mouth of the river and Bayonne. By the adoption of this measure he avoided the difficulties which would present themselves to the movements of the army by its right, obstructed as it was by so many rivers, and he would also obtain possession of the only road on which he could depend for his communication with Spain and its seaports, as also with St. Jean de Luz, there being no highway practicable for this purpose in winter, except that which led direct to Bayonne. To mask his design from the enemy, leaving his own left wing to observe Bayonne, he determined to threaten the enemy's left

wing with his own right, consisting of Hill's corps, and turn it by the courses of the rivers at the foot of the Pyrenees; while Beresford, with the allied centre, menaced the enemy's centre. By this manœuvre, if his left, which was under Hope, succeeded in forcing the passage of the river, he hoped to cut off Soult from Bayonne, and drive him towards the upper Garonne. Accordingly, at daybreak of the 14th, Hill advanced, with 20,000 men, against Harispe, who was posted at Hellette. After a slight combat, Harispe fell back, and being joined by Paris's division, took post in front of Garris, on the heights of Montagne, determined to dispute Hill's further advance. The day was on the wane. At the moment, Wellington was riding up from St. Jean de Luz, and though only the 2nd division (Stewart's), and Morillo's Spaniards were at his immediate disposal, he immediately determined to commence the attack, hoping to be able to cut off the enemy's retreat by the bridge of St. Palais. The British division was therefore advanced to the attack in front, while Morillo's corps was directed to march on St. Palais as rapidly as possible. The position of the contending hosts was on two parallel ridges, separated by a ravine, beyond the extremity of which stands St. Palais. Wellington ordered the 39th and the 28th regiments to commence the attack, observing with concise energy—"You must take the hill before dark." The expression was eagerly caught up by the attacking troops. British soldiers are peculiarly sensitive to brief and pithy sentences, energetic thought and expression being the peculiar characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon race. It is a species of eloquence they best understand, and most readily heed. Plunging into the ravine, the 39th, followed closely by the 28th in support, rapidly ascended the crest of the ridge, upon which 4,000 Frenchmen were posted. No sooner was the crest gained, than the brave assailants formed into line and charged the enemy, who took to flight; but discovering the paucity of their opponents, they returned to the charge. The contest was fierce and bloody. Twice the enemy were driven back, and twice they returned to the charge. Darkness had already shrouded distant objects; still the strife continued with desperate obstinacy, volleys being delivered at pistol range, and bayonet charges repeatedly made. At length darkness closed the desperate scene, and the enemy fled towards St. Palais, leaving the

field in possession of the conquerors, with the loss of 300 men in killed and wounded, and 200 prisoners, with 10 officers. The loss of the allies during the contest was 230 men. In consequence of the sluggish march of the Spaniards, the enemy gained the bridge of St. Palais, and in the night crossed the Bidouse, destroying all the bridges behind them. As soon as the bridges were restored, Hill continuing the pursuit, on the 16th drove the enemy across the Gave de Mauléon. While the allied left were thus driving the enemy, the centre, under Beresford, advanced against the French centre, under Clausel, who immediately fell back across the rivers Joyeuse, Bidouse, and the Gave de Mauléon, in succession, behind the last-mentioned of which he took a strong position. At this time, the castle of Jaca, which commands the pass in that quarter of the Pyrenees, into Aragon, surrendered. The pursuit being continued, on the night of the 17th the French retired across the Gave d'Oleron, and took up a strong position on the ridge of Sauveterre, where Soult concentrated his forces, covering the road that leads to Orthes, and destroying all the bridges on the Adour not within the neighbourhood of Bayonne. Here the pursuing army was brought to a stand, till their pontoon train arrived to enable them to pass the Gave d'Oleron. Immediately that Harispe had been cut off from St. Jean Pied-de-Port, by his retreat from Hellette, that town was blockaded by Mina's Spaniards.

While these operations were going on on the allied right, Hope with the left, consisting of two British divisions (1st and 5th), two Spanish divisions, Aylmer's British and three brigades of Portuguese, and Vandeleur's cavalry, amounting to 28,000 men, prepared to put his orders into execution, for effecting the passage of the Adour. Accordingly, at one o'clock of the morning of the 23rd, leaving instructions to keep up a lively fire on the enemy's camp, to divert his attention, he marched from his cantonments, to direct and support the operation,—an operation for skilfulness of design and boldness of operation hardly less eminent than the passage of the Douro. The first division, consisting of the second brigade of guards, and two companies of the 95th rifles, and part of the corps of rocketeers, with a brigade of eighteen-pounders, under major-general Stopford, marched in the deepest silence along the skirts of the French outposts, and before day-break reached the sand-hills that border

the coasts from the neighbourhood of Biarritz to the mouth of the Adour, the space between which and the entrenched camp is almost covered by a pine forest, called the Bois de Bayonne. A detachment of the German legion, accompanied by a train of pontoon boats, and a troop of horse artillery, followed; while the first brigade of guards under colonel Maitland, advanced through the Bois de Bayonne, dragging along the heavy iron guns, that had been taken at the battles of the Nivelle and Nive, to the site of the Balise Orientale. The artillery was then placed in battery on the bank of the river. But the bridge flotilla, which had put to sea from Socoa, on the 22nd, not having arrived off the bar on account of contrary and baffling winds, sir John Hope determined to commence passing the river. Sixty of the guards were rowed across in a pontoon; and a raft being formed with four jolly-boats and five pontoons, and a hawser having been stretched across the river, so as to secure its stability, major-general Stopford, commanding 600 guards, two companies of the 95th rifles, and a part of the rocket brigade, passed over in presence of a picket of observation of the enemy. Immediately two columns of the enemy advanced to oppose them, with a great display of spirit, their drums beating the *pas de charge*; Stopford prepared to receive them; and when they were within twenty yards of his force, he gave orders to the rocketeers "to let fly at them." When the serpent-like missiles began to hiss, and hop, and jump, and rush among their ranks, the elated Frenchmen quickly made the best of their way back to the citadel, leaving behind them a number of killed and wounded. The troops and artillery continued to pass during the whole night, and by noon of the following day, the whole of the first division, with a squadron of hussars, had crossed.

On the morning of the 25th, the flotilla, protected by admiral Penrose, with the Porcupine frigate, the Lyra brig, and five gun-boats, appeared off the mouth of the river; and it being then high water, stood for the bar in single file; the wind was fair, and the weather clear and brilliant, but a long heavy swell from the Bay of Biscay, threw with prodigious fury, a violent surf on the bar. Nowise daunted, the boats of the men-of-war dashed into the raging surf. The shores were crowded with the troops, in breathless anxiety for the fate of the leading vessel; for in the course of that morning,

two of the men-of-war's launches had been swamped, and seven lives lost. The boat that led the way, having on board the commander of the flotilla and the principal pilot, was upset, and many of the crew were drowned. Several other boats which followed, and their crews, were swallowed up by the raging element. The larger craft then stood off, to wait the chance of the next tide.

To facilitate another attempt, a pilot was landed to, the south-west of the estuary, that he might erect a signal, consisting of a halberd, with a handkerchief attached to its top, in place of the signal-staff, known by the name of the *Balise Orientale*, which marked the line of navigation for vessels to steer by, in making for the mouth of the river, but which had been removed by the enemy. On that point the *chasse-marées* boldly steered when the tide again served, the way being led by the master's-mate of the *Lyra*, but his bark was lost, and the whole of its crew drowned. Others then followed, but in a moment they whirled round, went down, and the painful sight presented itself, of their crews struggling for life in the midst of the boiling waters, the poor fellows perishing within a few yards of their friends and the spectators on the shore, who in vain made every effort to assist them. Such was the force and fury of the surge, that though many of the wrecked men succeeded, by buffeting the waves, in getting a footing on the beach, the receding waves carried them back into the raging waters. At length, towards evening, lieutenant Cheyne, of the *Woodlark*, caught the channel or line of navigation, and passed. The wind having at that moment somewhat fallen, and the surge in consequence abated, about thirty-four of the flotilla passed, and reached the point designed for the bridge, where they were anchored head and stern upon the line chosen, which was about 800 feet in length, and on the following morning a strong bridge was constructed, and reported passable. Above it a boom chain was laid across the river, to resist the current in both directions, and protect the bridge from the enemy's flotilla of gun-boats and armed corvettes stationed higher up the stream; and above this again the gun-boats were stationed to check those of the enemy, should they make any attempt on the bridge. The troops and artillery now filed over the structure, and the investment of the citadel and works on the right

bank of the river took place, and the enemy was driven within his advanced line, though a vigorous opposition was made, in which the allies lost 500 men. The place was now closely blockaded, and the troops in reserve, as well as the advanced posts, were held in constant readiness, both night and day, to stand to their arms.

While this important operation was in execution, Wellington ordered the light and 6th divisions to break up from the blockade of Bayonne, and march to strengthen the right wing, which he had joined. On the 23rd the pontoons having arrived, he made so strong a demonstration, with Beresford's command, consisting of the 4th and 7th divisions and Vivian's brigade, on the left of the Gave, in the front of the line on which Soult now rested, that while the attention of that marshal was wholly engaged by the movements on his front, and by which he was forced to retire within his tête-de-pont at Peyrehorade, Hill crossed the Gave d'Oleron at Villenave, on the following day, without opposition. The 3rd and light divisions passed the Gave at the same spot, and the 6th, under Clinton, between Montfort and Laas. Soult's position being now turned, he hastily abandoned his ground, and retreated to Orthes, taking up a formidable position in an entrenched camp behind the Gave de Pau.

The initial movements of the second and last campaign of the Peninsular army were detailed by its leader in the following despatch, dated St. Jean de Luz, 9th January, 1813, addressed to the English secretary of state.

"The enemy collected a considerable force, on the Gave d'Oleron, in the beginning of the week; and on the 3rd instant, drove in the cavalry pickets between the Joyeuse and Bidouse rivers, and attacked the post of major-general Buchan's Portuguese brigade, on the Joyeuse, near La Bastide, and those of the 3rd division in Boulac. They turned the right of major-general Buchan's brigade on the height of La Coste, and obliged him to retire towards Briscous, and they established two divisions of infantry on the height and in La Bastide, with the remainder of the army on the Bidouse and the Gave. Our centre and right were immediately concentrated, and prepared to move; and, having reconnoitred the enemy on the 4th, I intended to have attacked him on the 5th, but was obliged to defer the attack till the 6th, owing to the badness of the weather, and the swell-

ing of the rivulets. The attack was made on that day by the 3rd and 4th divisions, under the command of lieutenant-general sir Thomas Picton, and lieutenant-general sir Lowry Cole, supported by major-general Buchan's Portuguese brigade of general Le Cor's division, and the cavalry under the command of major-general Fane; and the enemy were forthwith dislodged without loss on our side; and our posts replaced where they had been. I then ordered the troops to return to their cantonments, as the weather had again rendered all operations impossible for the moment, and the roads were in such a state, that it had become scarcely practicable to support the troops

at the distance they now are from the sea-coast. The enemy have considerably reduced their force in Bayonne, with which place they keep their communication by a coast line along the right of the Adour. I entertain but little doubt that I could obtain possession of the entrenched camp at Bayonne; but it is so near the works of the town, that I doubt my being able to hold it, unless I could lay siege to the town; for which operation, in the existing state of the weather, I am not prepared. In the meantime, the enemy have, for the third time since the battle of Vitoria, received very large reinforcements."

BATTLE OF ORTHES.

SOULT had retreated to a strong position at Orthes, in order to afford time for covering the evacuation of his magazines at Aire and Mont de Marsan, and to keep open his communication with the Pyrenees, thus affording the facility of being joined by the detachments from Suchet's army, as also of that marshal himself with his field army, should he, in virtue of the treaty of Valencay, and his arrangements with Ferdinand's emissaries, retire from Catalonia and Valencia.

The position the French marshal had taken up was very strong. It extended about one mile in length along a range of tabular heights, the right of which terminated on a steep and bold hill, covered in front by the village of St. Boës. The left rested on the town of Orthes, which is situated on the side of an eminence, and commands the bridge and passage of the river at that point; while the centre sweeps back in the form of an arc. Three divisions, under D'Erlon, occupied the centre; Reille, with two divisions and Paris's brigade, occupied the right; and the left was defended by two divisions, under Clausel. A reserve of two divisions of infantry was drawn up on an elevated and commanding height on the main road to Sault de Navailles, and the cavalry, under P. Soult, was posted on the low grounds in front of Orthes. The French army numbered 40,000 men, 32,000 of whom were veteran troops, and 40 guns.

The allied army came in front of the French position on the 26th. The English

general having carefully reconnoitred it, thus arranged his order of attack. Beresford, with the left wing, consisting of the 4th and 7th divisions, Vasconcellos's Portuguese brigade, and Vivian's British cavalry brigade, were ordered to attack the valleys of Boës, and having carried it, to assault the hill above it; Picton, with the 3rd and 6th division, supported by Somerset's brigade, was to attack the centre and left; and Hill, with the 2nd and Le Cor's Portuguese brigades, supported by Fane's heavy cavalry, was to pass the river at the ford of Souars, about two miles above the bridge of Orthes, to turn the enemy's flank, and taking him in rear, cut off his retreat. Wellington, with his staff, took post on a conical isolated hill, surmounted by the mouldering remains of a Roman camp, directly opposite the hill upon which Soult and his staff stood. The light division was posted behind Wellington's hill, and served as well to connect Beresford and Picton's columns, between which a fearful gap intervened, from the nature of the ground, as a reserve to aid either column, as necessity might require.

From daylight of the 27th, a partial fusilade had been kept up by the light troops, occasionally varied with the deeper booming of artillery; but about nine o'clock A.M. battle was joined. Cole, with the 4th division, made a vigorous assault on the village of St. Boës; at the same time, the 4th division, supported by the 6th, advanced to attack the height occupied by the French left and centre. Immediately that Ross

had carried the village, Beresford advanced to the attack of the two lines of the enemy, posted on the hill above Boës; but the approach to that part of the enemy's position lying along a narrow tongue of land, bordered by deep ravines on each side, the deployment of his force was impossible. While hedged in in this cramped position, a heavy battery of field artillery swept the assailing column diagonally with withering effect; while in front, and from the hollows on both flanks, the advancing troops were severely galled by musketry; still the gallant 4th struggled gallantly, though in vain, to reach the heights; but they maintained their ground until Vasconcellos's Portuguese brigade broke in confusion, ran in upon their ranks, and so disordered them, that it was with difficulty the retreat was covered by the timely support of Bernard's brigade of the light division. St. Boës was now repeatedly recovered and lost. "Five times breaking through the scattered houses did Ross carry his battle into the wider space beyond; yet ever as the troops issued forth, the French guns from the open hills smote them in front, and the reserved battery on the Dax road swept through them with grape from flank to flank; at the same moment the enemy's supporting masses rushed forwards with a wasting fire, and lapping the flanks with skirmishers, which poured along the ravines on either hand, forced the shattered columns back into the village.* Nor were the allies less unfortunate in the centre. A small detachment, which Picton had extended to his left, as it neared the summit of the central hill, was driven down with the loss of several prisoners.

The crisis was now urgent. As it seemed impossible to force the enemy's right wing on its right without unduly extending the allied line, a direct front attack on his centre was determined. Orders were therefore immediately dispatched to Picton to advance with the 3rd and 6th divisions, to Bernard's brigade of the light division, and to the 7th division, which had been hitherto in reserve, to move up to the support of Ross (the 7th inclining to their left); the whole mass to advance against the enemy's line at the angle formed on the height by the union of the right wing and the centre of the enemy, and break that part of the line. The 52nd regiment led the way, through a deep morass which separated the hill on which Wellington stood from the enemy's position, "sink-

ing in mud and water at every step, above the knees, in some places nearly up to the waist; but still pressing forward with that stern resolution which was to be expected from the veterans of the light division—soldiers that had never yet met their match on the field."† The rest of the troops of each column closely followed. As soon as the crest of the position was gained, in a moment the face of the battle was changed. This movement was decisive of the issue of the day; contesting each point as they retreated, the enemy, after a very severe struggle, was forced to give way. The allied artillery materially contributed to this important victory. Having gained the summit of a knoll which commanded the entire position of the enemy's centre, so dreadful a havoc was made among the hostile reserve, that a body of the French 21st hussars dashed forward to seize it, galloping round the hill; but though they drove back one of the supporting battalions, they were so roughly handled by the 42nd Highlanders that few of them escaped. During these operations, Wellington rode into the thickest of the fight, galloping from point to point, where his presence was most needed; addressing a few words of encouragement to each regiment as he passed along. While this furious contest was going on in front, Hill had effected the passage of the river above Orthes, and pushed forward his command in a line of march parallel to that by which Soult must retire his beaten army to gain the bridge of Sault de Navailles.

Soult's retreat from the field of battle was slow and leisurely; he fell back by echellons of divisions, each division covering the movements of its predecessor, and holding in succession the different positions which the ground they crossed presented; the rear-guard constantly facing about, and presenting an obstinate resistance wherever the intervention of a ridge afforded a favourable opportunity of making a stand. When, however, he perceived Hill's parallel movement on his right flank, he hurried the march of his columns to gain the bridge of Sault de Navailles, lest his retreat should be cut off. So fearful were the French of being intercepted, that they threw away their arms, knapsacks, and haversacks, and in a fearful state passed the bridge like a scared flock of fleeing sheep. Had not the broken nature of the ground prevented the pursuit, few of them would have escaped. Even disadvantageous as it was for the operations

* Napier.

† *Idem.*

of cavalry, the horsemen of Cotton and Somerset intercepted them near the bridge, and sabred about 300, taking as many prisoners. The 7th hussars intercepted 2,000 in an enclosed field, who immediately threw down their arms; but in the confusion they escaped. The pursuit ceased at Saulx de Navailles, when night closed on the victors and the vanquished. During the battle, lord Wellington was struck by a ball, which drove the pommel of his sword against his side, so as occasion severe contusion.*

The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded, was about 4,000. That of the victors, 287 killed, 1,928 wounded, and 73 missing. The trophies of the conquerors were 2,000 prisoners, and twelve cannon.

Soult, with his usual regard for truth, maintained that he was the victor. "But," as the author of the *Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns* well observes, "not all the bravado of all the Gascons, close to whose frontier the fight occurred, and into whose territory the fugitives were pursued, could convert this signal reverse into a seeming triumph. Nevertheless Soult attempted it in his proclamation, and in it told his soldiers that the allied loss was much more considerable than theirs, and that they were to consider the battle of Orthes as an advantage gained, although the ground had been lost."

The victor's despatch to the secretary of state for foreign affairs, of this important and hard-contested battle, is of deep and exciting interest. The French fought with the most desperate though unavailing valour; so desperate and enthusiastically confident were they at one time of eventual success, that Soult is said to have exultingly struck his thigh, exclaiming, "I have him at last." Vain hope! oft-repeated lessons should have taught him to think otherwise of his consummate opponent and his invincible comrades.

* St. Sever, 1st March, 1814.

• The movements of the right of the army.

• The description of the ball and the locality of the wound have been differently stated. Some say that it was a musket-ball, others a grape-shot. The wound is said by some to have been on the hip, by one officer that it was in the leg. The following communication will perhaps decide the point:—
"About three o'clock in the afternoon, when the 7th hussars were gallantly driving the French before them, Lord George Lennox rode up to sir William Vernon, who was then commanding the leading squadron of the regiment, to ask for a surgeon, as the duke was wounded; I immediately accompanied

which I detailed to your lordship in my last despatch, were intended to divert the enemy's attention from the preparations of St. Jean de Luz and Passages, for the passage of the Adour below Bayonne, and to induce the enemy to move his force to his left, in which objects they succeeded completely; but upon my return to St. Jean de Luz, on the 19th, I found the weather so unfavourable at sea, and so uncertain, that I determined to push forward my operations on the right; notwithstanding, that I had still the Gave d'Oleron, the Gave de Pau, and the Adour to pass.

"Accordingly, I returned to Garris on the 21st, and ordered the 6th and light divisions to break up from the blockade of Bayonne; and general Don Manuel Freyre to close up the cantonments of his corps towards Irun, and to be prepared to move when the left of the army should cross the Adour. I found the pontoons collected at Garris, and they were moved forward on the following days to and across the Gave de Mauléon, and the troops of the centre of the army arrived. On the 24th, lieutenant-general sir R. Hill passed the Gave d'Oleron at Villenave, with the light, 2nd, and Portuguese divisions, under the command of major-general baron C. Alten, lieutenant-general sir W. Stewart, and mariscal de Campo Le Cor; while lieutenant-general sir H. Clinton passed with the 6th division between Monfort and Laas; and lieutenant-general sir T. Picton made demonstrations, with the 3rd division, of an intention to attack the enemy's position at the bridge of Sauveterre, which induced the enemy to blow up the bridge. Mariscal de Campo don P. Morillo drove in the enemy's posts near Navarreins, and blockaded that place. Marshal sir W. Beresford likewise, who, since the movement of sir R. Hill on the 14th and 15th, had remained with the 4th and 7th divisions, and colonel Vivian's brigade, in observation on the Lower Bidouse, attacked the enemy on the 23rd in their fortified posts at Hastings and Oeyregave, him to a rising ground, where I found the duke dismounted. On examining his wound, I found it was caused by a spent ball striking him on the hip, breaking the skin, and causing his great pain: having dressed him, I assisted him to mount his horse. I had then a similar service to perform to general Alava, who had been struck at the same time, on the opposite hip, by a spent ball.—J. MORRIS, M.D., staff-surgeon 1st class, half-pay, formerly in the 7th hussars.—S. ORRANT-PHILIP, Sandy Cove, Dalkey, Dublin, 5th March, 1853.

on the left of the Gave de Pau, and obliged them to retire within the tête-de-pont at Peyrehorade.

"Immediately after the passage of the Gave d'Oleron was effected, sir R. Hill and sir H. Clinton moved towards Orthes and the great road leading from Sauveterre to that town; and the enemy retired in the night from Sauveterre across the Gave de Pau, and assembled their army near Orthes on the 25th, having destroyed all the bridges on the river. The right, and right of the centre of the army assembled opposite Orthes, lieutenant-general sir S. Cotton, with Lord E. Somerset's brigade of cavalry, and the 3rd division, under lieutenant-general sir T. Picton, were near the destroyed bridge of Berenx; and field-marshal sir W. Beresford, with the 4th and 7th divisions, under lieutenant-general sir L. Cole and major-general Walker, and colonel Vivian's brigade, towards the junction of the Gave de Pau with the Gave d'Oleron. The troops opposed to the marshal having moved on the 25th, he crossed the Gave de Pau below the junction of the Gave d'Oleron on the morning of the 26th, and moved along the high road from Peyrehorade towards Orthes, on the enemy's right. As he approached, lieutenant-general sir S. Cotton crossed with the cavalry, and lieutenant-general sir T. Picton with the 3rd division, below the bridge of Berenx; and I moved the 6th and light divisions to the same point; and lieutenant-general sir R. Hill occupied the heights opposite Orthes and the high road leading to Sauveterre. The 6th and light divisions crossed in the morning of the 27th at daylight, and we found the enemy in a strong position near Orthes, with his right on a height on the high road to Dax, and occupying the village of St. Boés, and his left on the heights above Orthes and that town, and opposing the passage of the river by sir R. Hill.

"The course of the heights on which the enemy had placed his army necessarily retired his centre, while the strength of the position gave extraordinary advantages to the flanks. I ordered marshal sir W. Beresford to turn and attack the enemy's right with the 4th division under lieutenant-general sir L. Cole, and the 7th division under major-general Walker and colonel Vivian's brigade of cavalry; while lieutenant-general sir T. Picton should move along the great road leading from Peyrehorade to Orthes, and attack the heights on which the enemy's

centre and left stood, with the 3rd and 6th divisions under lieutenant-general sir H. Clinton, supported by sir S. Cotton, with lord E. Somerset's brigade of cavalry. Major-general baron C. Alten, with the light division, kept the communication, and was in reserve between these two attacks. I likewise desired lieutenant-general sir R. Hill to cross the Gave, and to turn and attack the enemy's left.

"Marshal sir W. Beresford carried the village of St. Boés with the 4th division, under the command of lieutenant-general sir L. Cole, after an obstinate resistance by the enemy; but the ground was so narrow that the troops could not deploy to attack the heights, notwithstanding the repeated attempts of major-general Ross' and brigadier-general Vasconcellos' Portuguese brigade; and it was impossible to turn them by the enemy's right without an excessive extension of our line. I therefore so far altered the plan of the action as to order the immediate advance of the 3rd and 6th divisions, and I moved forward colonel Barnard's brigade of the light division to attack the left of the height on which the enemy's right stood.

"This attack, led by the 52nd regiment, under lieutenant-colonel Colborne, and supported on their right by major-general Brisbane's and colonel Keane's brigades of the 3rd division, and by simultaneous attacks on the left by major-general Anson's brigade of the 4th division, and on the right by lieutenant-general sir T. Picton, with the remainder of the 3rd division and the 6th division, under lieutenant-general sir H. Clinton, dislodged the enemy from the heights, and gave us the victory: In the mean time, lieutenant-general sir R. Hill had forced the passage of the Gave above Orthes, and seeing the state of the action he moved immediately, with the 2nd division of infantry, under lieutenant-general sir W. Stewart and major-general Fane's brigade of cavalry, direct for the great road from Orthes to St. Sever, thus keeping upon the enemy's left.

"The enemy retired at first in admirable order, taking every advantage of the numerous good positions which the country afforded him. The losses, however, which he sustained in the continued attacks of our troops, and the danger with which he was threatened by lieutenant-general sir R. Hill's movement, soon accelerated his movements, and the retreat at last became a

flight, and the troops were in the utmost confusion. Lieutenant-general sir S. Cotton took advantage of the only opportunity which offered to charge with major-general lord E. Somerset's brigade, in the neighbourhood of Sault de Navailles, where the enemy had been driven from the high road by lieutenant-general sir R. Hill. The 7th hussars distinguished themselves upon this occasion, and made many prisoners.

"We continued the pursuit till it was dusk; and I halted the army in the neighbourhood of Sault de Navailles. I cannot estimate the extent of the enemy's loss; we have taken six pieces of cannon and a great many prisoners, the numbers I cannot at present report. The whole country is covered with their dead. The army was in the utmost confusion when I last saw it passing the heights near Sault de Navailles, and many soldiers had thrown away their arms. The desertion has since been immense. We followed the enemy on the following day to this place; and we this day passed the Adour. Marshal sir W. Beresford marched with the light division and general Vivian's brigade upon Mont de Marsan, where he has taken a very large magazine of provisions. Lieutenant-general sir R. Hill has moved upon Aire, and the advanced posts of the centre are at Cazères.

"The enemy are apparently retiring upon Agen, and have left open the direct road towards Bordeaux. While the operations of which I have above given the report were carrying on on the right of the army, lieutenant-general sir J. Hope, in concert with rear-admiral Penrose, availed himself of an opportunity which offered on the 23rd of February to cross the Adour below Bayonne, and to take possession of both banks of the river at its mouth. The vessels destined to form the bridge could not get in till the 24th, when the difficult, and at this season of the year, dangerous, operation of bringing

them in was effected with a degree of gallantry and skill seldom equalled.

"The enemy, conceiving that the means of crossing the river which lieutenant-general sir J. Hope had at his command, viz., rafts made of pontoons, had not enabled him to cross a large force in the course of the 23rd, attacked the corps which he had sent over on that evening. This corps consisted of 600 men of the 2nd brigade of guards, under the command of major-general the hon. E. Stopford, who repulsed the enemy immediately. The rocket brigade was of great use upon this occasion. Three of the enemy's gun-boats were destroyed this day; and a frigate lying in the Adour received considerable damage from the fire of a battery of 18-pounders, and was obliged to go higher up the river to the neighbourhood of the bridge. Lieutenant-general Sir J. Hope invested the citadel of Bayonne on the 25th; and lieutenant-general don M. Freyre moved forward with the 4th Spanish army, in consequence of directions which I had left for him.

"On the 27th, the bridge having been completed, lieutenant-general sir J. Hope deemed it expedient to invest the citadel of Bayonne more closely than he had done before; and he attacked the village of St. Etienne, which he carried, having taken a gun and some prisoners from the enemy, and his posts are now within 900 yards of the outworks of the place. The result of the operations which I have detailed to your lordship is, that Bayonne, St. Jean Pied-de-Port, and Navarreins, are invested; and the army, having passed the Adour, are in possession of all the great communications across that river, after having beaten the enemy, and taken their magazines. I have ordered forward the Spanish troops, under general Freyre, and the heavy British cavalry and artillery, and the Portuguese artillery."

OPERATIONS FROM THE BATTLE OF ORTHES TO THE BATTLE OF TOULOUSE.

In the course of the night following his defeat at Orthes, Soult, crossing the Luy de Bèarn at Sault de Navailles, retreated to Hagetman, where he was joined by the garrison of Dax and two battalions of conscripts. Then dividing his force into two corps, he detached one to cover the evacuation of his magazines and artillery force at

Aire, while the other advanced to St. Sever, to be reorganised. Early on the following morning, after the battle, the allies advanced in pursuit, marching in three columns, with the hope of enveloping the fleeing foe. Unfortunately, only the centre column, whose march lay over a paved road, arrived at St. Sever at the appointed time, the

march of the flank columns having been retarded by the state of the roads, and thus the enemy gained time to escape to Agen. Wellington then prepared to possess himself of the enemy's magazines at Mont de Marsan, the principal town in the department of the Landes, and at Aire. Beresford was detached across the Adour for the accomplishment of the first purpose with the 2nd division, De Costa's Portuguese brigade, a brigade of cavalry, and a battery of horse artillery; and general Hill advanced by the left bank of that river towards Aire. On the 2nd of March Hill came up to the enemy, consisting of Villatte's and Harispe's divisions, under Clausel, who were drawn up in position upon a strong ridge of hills, about two miles in advance of that town, and covering the road to it, with their right appuying on the Adour. Hill immediately commenced the attack, the 2nd division under Stewart advancing by the road against the enemy's right flank; and De Costa's Portuguese brigade ascending the heights on their centre. The British division won the point they assailed; but the Portuguese brigade, though they gallantly gained the height, were so stoutly resisted, that their formation was broken, and they would have been driven back in confusion, had not Barnes's brigade, consisting of the 50th and 92nd regiments, advanced to their assistance. The enemy were then driven off the field; but rapidly rallying on their reserves, they returned to the charge, and continued the fight with the most vehement obstinacy, until Byng's brigade of the 2nd division, which had been hitherto in reserve, being brought forward, the enemy, after an obstinate resistance, abandoned the position and the town, and hastily crossed the Adour in great disorder, throwing away their arms, and leaving above 100 prisoners and the magazines in the hands of the allies. Before Wellington made arrangements for the renewal of the attack, darkness came on, and Clausel made a rapid retreat under its cover. The loss of the allies in killed and wounded was about 150; that of the enemy was not ascertained.

The weather becoming again unfavourable, the Adour and its tributary streams were so swollen by the heavy fall of rain on the night of the 1st of March, that the pontoon bridges over that river were unavailable, on account of the swell and rapidity of the stream, and therefore the intercommunica-

tion of the army on both sides of the river was interrupted. A halt was on this account made at St. Sever, where, on account of the heavy requisitions imposed on those districts for the supply of the French army, and the depredations and outrages of the French soldiery—(though those depredations were not aggravated by that fiendish cruelty which had characterized the French soldiery in Spain and Portugal)—practised on the peasantry, had become so intolerable as to render them hostile to the Buonapartean government, and in favour of the Bourbon family. Already demonstrations had been made in their behalf at Bordeaux.

At this time a deputation was sent by the loyalists at Toulouse, to the duc d'Angoulême, then at St. Jean de Luz, expressive of their attachment, and eager desire for the restoration of the Bourbons. In consequence of these indications of averseness to the existing government, the duke repaired to lord Wellington's headquarters, where he was met by a deputation from the mayor and citizens of Bordeaux, inviting his presence, and assuring the allied commander-in-chief, that a British force would be received there as friends. As the road to that city was now open, Beresford was, on the 8th, directed to march, with the 4th and 7th divisions, and Vivian's brigade of cavalry, from Mont de Marsan on Bordeaux, which he reached on the 12th; when the entire population, headed by the civil authorities, came out to meet him as their deliverer, assuring him, that "if he was about to enter Bordeaux as a conqueror, he might command the keys; but if he came in the name of the king of France, and his ally the king of England, they would be joyfully presented to him." The marshal replied, he was ordered to occupy and protect the city; when the mayor exclaiming, "Vive le Roy!" both he and the assembled multitude mounted the white cockade; and immediately the royal flag was displayed from the steeple of St. Michael's. This proceeding was entirely the impulse of the Bordelais themselves; the instructions of lord Wellington to Beresford having been (see page 153 *ante*), that he should recommend the inhabitants to weigh well their proceedings, lest they should be exposed to Buonaparte's vengeance, in case the congress assembled at Châtillon-sur-Seine should agree that peace should be made with him. On the approach of Beresford, Cornudet, the commissioner

extraordinary to that department, set fire, with his own hand, to the frigates on the stocks; and d'Huilhier, the military commandant of the town, crossed to the right bank of the Garonne, and took possession of the fortress of Blaye, and other strong posts on that river. Irritated at this event, Soult, in his usual impassibility of character, and in the spirit of one who served a tyrant in his schemes of iniquitous ambition, published his angry and defamatory proclamation, mentioned at page 154 *ante*.

The English commander-in-chief had invariably deprecated any premature declaration of the people of France against the existing government, apprehensive of the fearful consequences in which it might involve the parties who might engage in it. In a letter, dated "à Arriverette, ce 25 Fevrier, 1814," he says, "Je suis toujours convaincu cependant qu'il est dans les intérêts de la famille de votre altesse royale de ne pas d'avancer l'opinion publique, ni de la presser."—(I am still convinced that it is for the interests of your royal highness' family, neither to anticipate public opinion nor to press it.)—In convertible language, do not precipitate any movement, lest you implicate the safety of your devoted friends, and diminish the chance of your own success. When he had ascertained that the Bourbon cause made very little progress, and that the duc d'Angoulême sanctioned the address of the mayor and authorities, and even reported that it had the approbation of the allied commander-in-chief, that great and humane man then deemed it time, and imperative on his part, to exert himself to obviate its pernicious tendency. For this purpose he addressed the following admirable and spirited letter, dated "Seysses, 29th March, 1814," to the duke:—

"I am much concerned to find that the statement which I had repeatedly the honour of making to your royal highness of the principles on which I was determined to act in regard to the cause of your royal highness' family in France, had made so little impression on your royal highness' mind, as that your royal highness did not perceive, till you had read my letter of the 16th, that the proclamation of the mayor of Bordeaux was not consistent with what I had declared to your royal highness. This circumstance renders caution on my part more than ever necessary. I am not acting as an individual; I am at the head of the army, and the confidential agent of three independent nations;

and supposing that as an individual I could submit to have my views and intentions in such a case misrepresented, as the general of the allied army I cannot.

"I enclose to your royal highness a copy of a paper given, I believe, by your royal highness to lieutenant-general the earl of Dalhousie, which shows the consequences of those misrepresentations. I occupied Bordeaux with a detachment of the army in the course of my operations, and certain persons in the city of Bordeaux, contrary to my advice and opinion, thought proper to proclaim king Louis XVIII. These persons have made no exertion whatever; they have not subscribed a shilling for the support of the cause, and they have not raised a single soldier; and then, because I do not extend the posts of the army under my command beyond what I think proper and convenient, and their properties and families are exposed, not on account of their exertions in the cause (for they have made none), but on account of their premature declaration contrary to my advice, I am to be blamed, and, in a manner, called to account. My experience of revolutionary wars taught me what I had to expect, and induced me to warn your royal highness not to be in a hurry. I beg your royal highness to tell the writer of this paper, and all such persons, that no power on earth shall induce me to depart from what I conceive to be my duty towards the sovereigns whom I am serving; and that I will not risk even a company of infantry to save properties and families, placed in a state of danger, contrary to my advice and opinion. In reply to your royal highness' letter of the 24th inst., and upon the whole of this subject, I have to state that I earnestly hope your royal highness will shape your conduct, and your royal highness' counselors will advise you to draw your proclamations and declarations in such manner, as that I may not be under the necessity of declaring, by proclamation, what my opinions and principles have invariably been, and what I have repeatedly declared to your royal highness.

"1st. I consider your royal highness free to act exactly as your royal highness may think proper, without consulting my opinion in any manner. All that I ask is, that neither my name, nor the name, nor the authority of the allied governments, may be adduced, more particularly when I am not consulted, or, if consulted, when I have given my opinion against the measure adopted.

"2nd. I told your royal highness that, if any great town or extensive district should declare itself in favour of your royal highness' family, I would interfere in no manner with the government of that town or district; and that, if there was a general declaration throughout the country in favour of your house, I should deliver into your hands the government of the whole country which should have been overrun by our armies. The fact is, that the declaration even at Bordeaux is not unanimous; that the spirit has not spread elsewhere, not even into La Vendée, nor in any part that I know of occupied by the army. The events in my contemplation, therefore, have not occurred; and I should be guilty of a gross breach of my duty to the allied sovereigns, and of cruelty to the inhabitants of the country, if I were to deliver them over to your royal highness prematurely or contrary to their inclinations.

"I have never interfered in any manner with the government of the town of Bordeaux; and I recommend it to your royal highness to withdraw M. de Carrère from the department des Landes. I wish that it had not been necessary for me to write as I did to M. de Tholozé; and it will be very disagreeable to me to take any step which shall mark more strongly a want of understanding between your royal highness and me; but I cannot allow the honour and character of the allied sovereigns, or my own, to be doubted even for a moment.

"3rd. I entertain no doubt whatever, that when once there is any declaration in favour of the cause of your royal highness' family, it is important that it should be general; and I sincerely wish it was so. But I can interfere in no manner to produce this general declaration; nay, more, I must, as an honest man, acquaint all those who shall talk to me upon the subject with the state of affairs between the allies and the existing government of France, as I have done to this moment.

"I do not recollect any particular conversation between M. de Viel Castel and me in relation to Pau, excepting to the purport and on the principles above recited. It is not in my power, under existing circumstances, to make your royal highness the advance of money you desire; and indeed, after what has passed, I doubt whether I do not exceed the line of my duty in affording your cause any countenance or support whatever. In answer to the note enclosed by your royal

highness, drawn by your royal highness' council in the name of your royal highness, it appears to me to be written in the same erroneous view with the proclamation of the mayor of Bordeaux.

"The object of the note is to show that I am bound to support the operations of your royal highness' government by the military power of the army, because your royal highness entered the country with the army, and I have been the passive spectator of the declaration of a part of the city of Bordeaux in favour of your royal highness' family. If I am to be bound by such means to employ the army in this manner, it is still more incumbent upon me, than it was before, to be cautious as to the degree of encouragement (and to speak plainly, permission) I shall give to the measures taken by your royal highness' adherents, to induce the people in any district occupied by the army to declare in your royal highness' favour. I must say, also, that it is a curious demand to make upon me, who, in any light, can only be considered as an ally, to furnish troops to support the operations of your royal highness' civil government; when I ought to have a right to expect military assistance from your royal highness against the common enemy.

"In answer to this note I must tell your royal highness that, until I shall see a general and free declaration of the people in favour of your royal highness' family, such as I know they are disposed and pant for an opportunity to make, I will not give the assistance of the troops under my command to support any system of taxation or of civil government which your royal highness may attempt to establish; and I hope your royal highness will not attempt to establish such a system beyond Bordeaux. In regard to the notes upon tobacco, salt, and colonial produce, I will consider of them, and will give your royal highness an answer by an early opportunity."

While head-quarters were at St. Sever, orders to supply the place of the troops despatched to Bordeaux with Beresford, were despatched (March 4th) to Freyre to join the main army, by the Port de Landes, with two divisions (8,000 men) of the Andalusian reserves, from Irun; as also to Ponsonby's heavy brigade of cavalry, which had wintered on the banks of the Ebro; and to general William Clinton, to break up the army on the eastern coast of Spain, as soon as he should ascertain that Suchet had

marched with his field army from Catalonia, and having shipped the Sicilian part of his force to lord William Bentinck in that island, advance with the British and German portion by Saragossa, Pamplona, and St. Jean-de-Luz, and effectuate a junction with the main army. The order transmitted to Freyre contained the emphatic injunction, "Maintain the strictest discipline, or we are lost!" But soon was the just and magnanimous Wellington to find that his humane injunction was violated. In the course of their march, those licentious troops had been guilty of so great violence and outrage, that Wellington was overwhelmed with complaints from all quarters, and symptoms of a partisan warfare again begun to be indicated. The English general immediately addressed the following letter to Freyre, dated St. Sever, 5th March, 1814:—

"I am concerned to have to inform your excellency, that I receive from all quarters complaints of the conduct of the troops under the command of your excellency; and I beg to draw your serious attention to the following observations. However France may be reduced, there is no doubt that the army which I am enabled to lead into the country is not sufficiently strong to make any progress if the inhabitants should take part in the war against us. What has occurred in the last six years in the Peninsula should be an example to all military men on this point, and should induce them to take especial care to endeavour to conciliate the country which is the seat of war, by preserving the most strict discipline among the troops, by mitigating as much as possible the evils which are inseparable from war, and by that demeanour in the officers in particular towards the inhabitants which will show them that they at least do not encourage the evils which they suffer from the soldiers, and will afford the inhabitants some hope that the evils will be redressed, and will be of short duration. All soldiers are inclined to plunder, and can be prevented only by the constant attention and exertion of the officers; and I earnestly entreat you to urge those of the army under your command to attend to these circumstances. It will be highly disgraceful to the Spanish army, if the conduct complained

of should be continued; and I anxiously hope that, as I have taken measures to provide for the regular pay and food of the officers and troops, the most energetic measures will be adopted to prevent these constant complaints.

[The letter then states the regulations adapted to suppress all excess.]

"To these considerations I beg leave to add an observation, the truth of which I have learned from long experience, namely, that no reliance can be placed on the conduct of troops in action with the enemy who have been accustomed to plunder; and that those officers alone can expect to derive honour in the day of battle from the conduct of the troops under their command, who shall have forced them, by their attention and exertions, to behave as good soldiers ought, in their cantonments, their quarters, and their camps."

Some British troops having about this time plundered the villages and rifled the people, were enforced to make restitution of the property and payment for the articles they had consumed. The peasantry in one place having killed one soldier and wounded another in their defence, on complaint made, the wounded man was ordered to be hung.

Soult now deeming Wellington's army* inferior to his own, on account of the draught under Beresford for the occupation of Bordeaux, advanced, March 13th, from Lambege to Conchez and Vielle on the right flank of the allies, and driving in the pickets and outposts, made demonstration to attack at Aire, Hill's corps; but on that general being joined by two divisions, despatched to his assistance by lord Wellington, the French marshal thinking from appearances that he would be attacked on the morrow, he drew off his forces in the night of the following day to their original position.

Head-quarters were now fixed at Aire, and the army was in position on both sides of the Adour. Beresford was ordered to join with the 4th and 7th divisions, and Vivian's cavalry brigade, leaving the 7th division and a few squadrons of Vandeleur's cavalry, which had joined Beresford on his march to Bordeaux, to watch that city, and reduce the forts commanding the navigation of the Garonne, so as to enable the British

* Soult's army consisted of 31,000 sabres and bayonets, and 38 guns; the allies, of 27,000 combatants and 38 guns. The allied army at the battle of Orthes had but 27,000 infantry and cavalry in line, and 40 guns; the allied force having been diminished

by the large draughts necessary to blockade Bayonne, St. Jean Pied-de-Port, and Navarrens. Since the battle of Orthes it had received some small reinforcements, which brought it up to its complement at the time of that battle.

squadron, under admiral Primrose, to enter that river.

On the 27th, Primrose, with the *Egmont*, *Andromache*, and *Belle Poule* frigates, and some smaller vessels, entered the Garonne without loss from the fire of the forts and batteries at its mouth, and chasing the *Regulus* line-of-battle ship, three brigs of war, and some *chasse-marées* as high as the shoal of Talmont, the French squadron took shelter under the batteries on each side of Talmont; the English squadron anchoring outside the shoal. On April 2nd, Primrose attacked the flotilla of fifteen armed vessels coming from Blaye to join the French squadron, and carried off or destroyed the whole. Preparations were then made for attacking the hostile squadron, but in the course of the night the enemy set fire to the whole of it. Fort de Blaye, however, still prevented the navigation of the river. The usual co-operation being thus secured, while the admiral prepared to act against that fort, Dalhousie crossed the Garonne above Bordeaux with 3,000 men, and sending his cavalry over the Dordogne, intercepted the communication of P'Huilhier and Decaen, the last mentioned of whom was organizing an army in the Gironde, and had already collected 1,000 infantry, and all the national guards, custom-house officers, and gend'armes of five departments. Repassing the Dordogne, he advanced against P'Huilhier, who was posted at Etaulier with 1,200 infantry, and 300 cavalry, but the French general was no sooner attacked than he took to flight, with the loss of about 300 privates, and thirty officers.

The allied army now halted to give time for the junction of Freyre's Andalusian reserve, and the heavy cavalry under Ponsonby. The junction being effected on the 16th and 17th, the army moved forward on both banks of the Adour, and on the 19th marched in two columns on Vic Bigorre; the right moving by Lambege, the left by Maubourget. Soult immediately retreated, leaving d'Erlon, with two divisions, strongly posted in the vineyards surrounding that town, and extending for the distance of several miles, to cover his retreat; but after a brilliant combat, the enemy was dislodged by the light companies of the 3rd division, and a Portuguese brigade. The loss of the allies was about 250 men; that of the French was not ascertained.

On the morning of the 20th, the French were found in position near Tarbes, posted

on some favourable heights, with their left resting on Tarbes, and their right extending in the direction of Rabastens. Lord Wellington immediately directed Hill's command and the 3rd division to advance on the left flank of the enemy, and the 6th division, supported by two brigades of cavalry, to turn their right flank, while the light division assailed them in front. They were quickly driven to a second range of heights, covering the road to Tarbes. The fight was fierce and violent in the streets of Tarbes; the French supposing their opponents, from their dark green uniform, to be Portuguese, allowed them to approach to the very muzzles of their muskets before they took to flight. While arrangements were being made for dislodging them from their new position, darkness came on, and Soult made a rapid retreat by St. Guadens on Toulouse. The loss of the allies was 100 men; that of the French was not known.

On the 22nd Fane came up with the enemy's rear-guard at St. Guadens; when two squadrons of the 13th dragoons falling upon four squadrons of the enemy, drove them headlong through the town; and on their reforming beyond it, they were again discomfited, and pursued for two miles, leaving many killed and wounded, and 100 prisoners. The loss of the 13th was only six. "In this skirmish the veteran major Doherty was seen charging between his two sons, at the head of the leading squadron."*

In the course of Soult's retreat across the plains of Gers, lord Wellington wishing to ascertain the force with which the enemy held a wooded height, commanding the great road, and all who had attempted its reconnoissance having been prevented approaching near enough for the purpose by the fire of a cloud of skirmishers; at last an officer (Captain Light) overcame the difficulty. "He rode forward as if he would force his way through the French skirmishers; but when in the wood dropped his reins, and leaned back as if badly wounded; his horse appeared to canter wildly along the front of the enemy's light troops, and they, thinking him mortally hurt, ceased their fire, and took no further notice. He thus passed undisturbed through the wood to the other side of the hill, where there were no skirmishers; ascending to the open summit above, he put spurs to his horse, and galloped along the French main-line, counting their

* Napier.

regiments as he passed. His sudden appearance, his blue undress, his daring confidence, and his speed, made the French doubt if he was an enemy, and a few shots only were discharged; while he, dashing down the opposite declivity, broke from the rear to the very skirmishers whose fire he had at first assayed in front. Reaching the spot where lord Wellington stood, he told him there were but five battalions on the hill."*

This stage of the history seems to present a favourable opportunity of detailing the episodic operations of the close of the Anglo-Sicilian army on the eastern coast of Spain, without embarrassing the current of the narrative, or occasioning any harsh or violent disruption in its equable flow. Since the retreat of the Anglo-Sicilian force in September of the last year, the war had lingered on the eastern coast of Spain, and both sides had remained in a state of total inactivity, on account of their weakness. About the middle of January of this year, however, Clinton, in concert with Copons, arranged to surprise the enemy's cantonments at Molinos del Rey, and the adjoining villages, on the Lobrogat. The enterprise failed because Copons, without making any communication to the English general, instead of sending Manso and his brigade, as had been arranged, chose to go himself, and set off two hours later than had been agreed on, and finally appeared on the right flank of the enemy, instead of on the rear, which Manso was to have done. The consequence was, that the French, instead of being taken by surprise, were enabled to effect their retreat over the Lobrogat by the stone bridge. Had the original plan, that Manso should post himself on the strong ground in the rear of Molinos del Rey, close to the only road by which the enemy could retire, while Clinton attacked them in front, been adhered to, the whole must have surrendered. Suchet now concentrated his field army around Gerona, preparatory to his withdrawal of them into France, and at the same time sent secret instructions to the blockaded garrisons in his rear to make their escape the best way they could, and join him near Figueras. French dominion in this quarter of Spain was now to sustain a severe blow. A Spanish officer, by name Van Halen, of Flemish descent, who had passed from the Spanish service into that of Joseph's, and

* Napier.

had held a commission in his body-guard, and was subsequently aid-de-camp to Suchet, having possessed himself of that marshal's seal and cypher, namely, the insertion of a slender light-coloured hair into the cyphered paper, determined to make his court to the Spanish government, and get restored to the service by betraying Suchet. Accordingly he, in conjunction with baron d'Erolles, drew up orders addressed in that marshal's name to the governors of all the towns held by the French in the rear of the allies, directing them to evacuate the fortresses, and march towards him at Barcelona, in order to return to France. Possession of Lerida, Mesquinenza, and Mouzon, was obtained by this manœuvre. The garrisons evacuating those fortresses, on reaching the defiles at Mantriell, were suddenly surrounded. Two thousand six hundred men, with two generals, five guns, and a rich military chest, immediately capitulated. The same stratagem was attempted on the garrison of Tortosa, but its governor escaped the artifice by a wary test, and thus preserved his own fortress and that of Murviedro in subjection to Buonaparte.

Barcelona still continued closely blockaded. A sally made by Habert, the governor, on the 23rd of February, was repulsed with great loss; and on the 18th of April, long after peace had been concluded at Paris, he made another effort to cut his way through the blockading force, but was again repulsed, with the loss of 800 men to the besiegers. Santona, on the Biscayan coast, the only place that had remained in the enemy's power in that part of Spain, had capitulated in the early part of April.

Buonaparte being now very solicitous to obtain the co-operation of the French troops in Catalonia and Valencia, in his pending operations against the allies in the centre of France, liberated Ferdinand unconditionally, and sent him in conveyance to the Spanish frontier. At Perpignan the imbecile specimen of royalty was met by Suchet, and there promised the French marshal that every facility should be given to the French troops, both the field army and the blockaded garrisons, to cross the frontier; and in this design the Spanish general, Copons, co-operated. But as it was necessary, in the existing state of affairs, to obtain the assent of the cortes, that body referred the matter to lord Wellington, who, though Suchet detained Ferdinand and his brother, the infante

don Carlos, at Figueras, as hostages for the safety of the blockaded French garrison, refused to allow of any capitulation with the enemy's troops in Spain, except on the condition of their becoming prisoners of war, observing, that they were not to be trusted; and referred to the recent compact made with the garrison of Jaca, by which that garrison was to return to France under an engagement not to serve for one year, unless previously exchanged, but which the French, as usual, had violated.

Suchet, hoping that the presence of his precious hostage in Madrid would tend to incline the cortes to listen to his agreement for the return of the blockaded garrisons to France, liberated him. An arrangement was therefore made with Copons for his reception. Being conducted by the French marshal to the Fluvia, where the Catalan and the French armies were ranged in order of battle on each bank, he was delivered over to his own subjects, and became once more king of Spain. After that event, Suchet, blowing up the fortifications of Olat, Palamos, &c., passed the Pyrenees; and on the 14th of April, Clinton, according to his instructions received from lord Wellington in the early part of March, despatching the Italians, Calabrese, and Sicilian part of his force to lord William Bentinck in Sicily, proceeded with the British and German troops to join the main army under lord Wellington. The last French force, that of the garrison of Barcelona, under Habert, in Spain, marched on the 28th of May to France.

No sooner had "El Amado" (the beloved one) set his foot on the soil of Spain, than he began to plot with the priests, the overthrow of the Spanish constitution, and the infliction of punishment on those who merited his deepest gratitude and the thanks of their country.

It was the earnest desire of the drivelling bigot to indicate his attachment to the domination of the priests. For this purpose, he first visited all the nunneries in Valencia, and then attended an evening *Te Deum* in the cathedral, performed by the light of 20,000 tapers; after which, he and the infantes adored a chalice of legendary reputation which is highly venerated there: he then issued his manifesto, dated "Valencia, 4th of May." But Ferdinand was not the only recreant. Priests and nobles, soldiers and generals, and the lower classes of all kinds, expressed a wish for the restoration of the old despotism, and the inquisition.

The constitutional stone, erected on the Plaza Mayor, or great square, of most of the large towns, bearing the words *Plaza de la Constitucion*, was taken down, and one bearing the words *Real Plaza de Fernando VII.* was substituted. The word *liberty* became execrated. At Madrid, the word appeared in large bronze letters over the entrance of the hall of the cortes. The people set up ladders, forced out letter by letter from the stone, and as each letter was thrown into the street, the spectators approved the act with shouts of exultation. They collected as many of the journals of the cortes, and of the papers and pamphlets of the *liberales*, as they could; formed a procession, in which the religious fraternities, and the priests regular and secular, took the lead; piled the papers up in one of the public squares, and sacrificed them there as a political *auto-da-fé*; after which, high mass was performed, and *Te Deum* sung, as a thanksgiving for their triumph!*

On May 4th Ferdinand dissolved the cortes, and denounced all those who should oppose his manifesto as traitors. On reaching Madrid (13th of May) he proscribed the members of the regency, abolished the liberty of the press, and restored the inquisition. Within one short week of his reaching the capital, the dungeons of Madrid were crammed with the patriots who had conduced, by their courage and devotion, to his restoration. Fines, confiscation, imprisonment, and condemnation to the galleys were the lot of the *liberales*, or the promoters of liberal and enlightened principles. The venerable admiral, Valdez, was sentenced to be imprisoned in the castle of Alicant for ten years, and then to be confined at Ceuta. Garcia Herreros, formerly minister of grace and justice, was to serve eight years in chains in the garrison of Gomera, a rock on the coast of Barbary. The patriotic, eloquent, and learned Arguelles, was condemned to serve as a common soldier in the sentenced regiment stationed at Ceuta. Quintane, who, by his eloquent and patriotic writings, had contributed more than any other person to excite and sustain the national spirit, was immured in a dungeon, where he died. By the instigation of those fiends in human form, the priests, a law was made, ordaining all who should conspire to establish any other religion than the "catholic, apostolic, Roman religion" should suffer death as traitors. Such was "the

* Southey.

wretch" who had been "the libellous son in the palace, a plotting traitor at Aranguez, a dastard at Bayonne, an effeminate, superstitious, fawning slave at Valençay;"* "a wretch without one redeeming virtue;" whose obtuse intellect could not appreciate, and selfishness could not feel, the generous devotion, the noble sacrifices, the exalted patriotism of those who had the misfortune to be misnomered his subjects. Never did one of "the Lord's anointed"(!) afford so powerful a confirmation, and so instructive a comment of scriptural axiomatic truth—

"not to put faith in princes." But when will men "learn wisdom, and possess understanding?" When kings and priests lose sight of the real object of their mission—the public welfare—they have ever been an incubus and a drag-weight on society, and it is only by the progress of the human mind, and the enlightenment of the great mass of the people, that the misgovernment of such narrow-minded bigots as Ferdinand, who wiled away the tedium of his captivity under Buonaparte by *embroidering a petticoat for the Virgin Mary!* can be counteracted.

THE BATTLE OF TOULOUSE.

TOULOUSE,† the capital of Languedoc, stands on the right bank of the Garonne, and covers a space of ground about two miles in length from north to south, and its breadth from east to west is one mile and a quarter. It is surrounded by a considerable extent of suburb, or faubourg, under various names, as St. Cyprien, St. Etienne, St. Michael, &c. The faubourg of St. Cyprien stands on the left bank of the river, is connected with the town by a stone bridge, and is flanked on each side by the Garonne.

The city is surrounded on three sides, at the distance of three-quarters of a mile, by a water-channel, consisting of the Garonne and the canal of Languedoc, the latter entering the former about two miles below the city. The river protects the whole western side, and the canal covers it on the east and the north. On the south or fourth side, an open space extends from the Garonne to the canal, but can be approached only by roads impassable by artillery; besides, it is commanded by the heights of Mont Rave. To the east of the canal runs a range of bold and rugged heights, about two miles in length, called Mont Rave, extending along the open space between the canal and the river Eers. The plateau Calvinet is situated in the centre of the Mont Rave, the plateau St. Sypière on its right, and the hill or knoll La Pujada on its left. This Mont was defended by five redoubts (fortified by bastions fronted with ditches

full of water), and fortified houses, connected by lines of entrenchment which mutually flanked each other, and swept with their fire the entire front of the position, while they connected the flanks of the position with the defences of the town. Behind Mont Rave, at the distance of eight hundred yards, stand the hills of Sacarin and Cambon. The faubourg of St. Cyprien, which was surrounded like the city itself, with a high substantial wall, was fortified by strong field-works in front of its wall. The whole of this formidable position had been long in progress of being fortified, and for the last seventeen days since his retreat from Tarbes, the French marshal employed the whole of the army, and all the male population in the town and its neighbourhood in completing the fortifications. Thus the enemy had a triple line of entrenchments. If the ridge should be carried, the interior line of the canal, with its fortified bridge, houses, and suburbs, and within it again, the third line, consisting of the walls of the city, afforded him a retreat and protection. The width and rapidity of the Garonne completed the security of his position, and increased the difficulties of the assailants.

When Soult retreated from Tarbes, the allied army pursued in three columns; Beresford, with the left, taking the great road by Auch, Hill, with the right, that of St. Guadens; the centre moving, under the personal direction of the commander-in-church is the reputed work of St. Luke. The Dominicans in their church exhibit the body of St. Thomas Aquinas, authenticated by himself in ghostly person, and brought to that city, after numerous adventures, with 10,000 lighted tapers, and 150,000 people in procession.

* Napier.

† In the estimation of "good Catholics," Toulouse is held in high consideration for its religious edifices. Among these the cathedral is pre-eminent. That venerable building has the boasted good fortune of possessing the bodies of seven apostles. The Dorado

chief, by Gallan, Isle du Dodon, and St. Lys: but on account of having to transport with them a heavy pontoon train, and all the necessary stores, they did not reach the banks of the Garonne till the 27th.

Lord Wellington, on reconnoitring the enemy's position, determined to assail it by crossing the river. On the 28th he gave orders to lay down a pontoon bridge at Portet, a village situated about six miles above Toulouse; but when the sheer-line was stretched across the water-surface, the width was ascertained to be twenty-six yards more than the pontoon would cover; consequently the attempt was abandoned.

On the 31st a favourable place, near Penaguel, about one mile higher up, of a practicable width, having been discovered, Hill, with two divisions, Morillo's Spaniards, Fane's cavalry, and an artillery and rocket brigade, crossed the river, seized the bridge over the Arrière at Cintegebelle, with the intention of assailing the enemy on the southern front of the town; but finding the roads impassable, was obliged to retrograde, repassing the river on the night of April 1st.

The nature of the ground thus compelling the commander-in-chief to abandon his first intentions, he now determined to bridge the river below Toulouse, and attack the front of the enemy's position. On the 4th of April a pontoon bridge was laid down across a bend or loop of the river, about a league from Grenade, which is fifteen miles distant from Toulouse. The bridge was finished in four hours. A few men having been sent over in boats to take possession of the wood on the opposite bank, the passage began, the cavalry crossing in single files, the infantry by threes, while the bands played gaily "The Grenadier's March," and "The Downfall of Paris." The morning being bright and beautiful, the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages had collected to view the exciting spectacle. The peasants even volunteered their aid, and assisted in dragging the guns of the horse artillery up the banks.

A battery of thirty guns was now erected on the left bank of the river; and under the protection of its flanking fire, the 4th and 6th divisions, and three brigades of cavalry (Somerset's, Ponsonby's, and Vivian's), under the command of Beresford, effected the passage of the river, and the cavalry being pushed forward, captured a large herd of bullocks destined for the French army.

But just as Freyre's Spanish corps and the light division were preparing to follow, the river suddenly rose—an occurrence occasioned by the melting of the snow on the Pyrenees—to so dangerous a height, that it became necessary to take up the platform; and as the rain had set in heavily in the course of the night, several of the pontoons were swamped, so that it was necessary, on the following day, to take up the whole, to prevent its being carried away by the violence of the current. Thus the army was divided, without the possibility of rendering assistance to Beresford's portion of it, should he be attacked. Lord Wellington immediately crossed over in a boat, and drew up the troops in the strongest position the ground afforded, with their left resting on the Ers, and their right on the Garonne; and recrossing the river, he placed some artillery on its left bank so as to rake the front of Beresford's command. During this interval of anxious suspense, lord Wellington apprehending that Soult would soon be reinforced by Suchet's field army, amounting to 14,000 men, and probably by that (amounting also to 20,000 men) of the blockaded garrisons of Catalonia, should they be liberated by virtue of the treaty of Valençay; and deeming the British force under his command, which was greatly reduced in number by the necessity of carrying on unconnected operations in various quarters (namely, in blockading Pamplona, St. Jean Pied-de-Port, Navarriens, &c.), inadequate to make head against the superior numbers which might be brought against it; he addressed the following letter, dated Grenade, April, 7th to lord Bathurst:—"I beg leave again to draw your lordship's attention to the state of this army, particularly to that most important branch of it, the British infantry. Your lordship has been informed what troops are employed at Bayonne, and what at Bordeaux; and you will see what remains to be opposed to the united armies of marshals Soult and Suchet, if the garrisons [alluding to those of Catalonia] should be set free.

"Adverting to the state in which the army took the field in May last, to the number of actions in which it has been engaged, and to the small reinforcements it has received, it is matter of astonishment that it should now be so strong. But there are limits to the numbers with which this army can contend, and I am convinced your lordship would not wish to see the safety and honour

of this handful of brave men depend on the doubtful exertion and discipline of an undue proportion of Spanish troops. * * * * The reserve in Holland may doubtless be more important to the national interest than that in this country, but I hope it will be considered that that which is most important of all is, not *to lose* the brave army which has struggled through its difficulties for nearly six years." Be it observed, that this letter was written only one week before the war was ended; affording a clear demonstration of the culpable inattention of the ministry in maintaining the efficiency of the army, and enabling its general to avail himself of those opportunities that presented themselves of taking advantage of the enemy.

On the 8th, the river having sufficiently subsided for the pontoons to be laid down again, in the course of the night of that day, the bridge was carried across about a league higher up the river, near Ausonne, so as to afford that ready communication that might be necessary between the main army and Hill in the progress of the operations. Morillo's Spaniards, with the Portuguese artillery, crossed on the 9th, under the immediate command of the allied commander-in-chief, and were followed, early on the 10th, by the 3rd and light divisions. In the course of their advance towards Toulouse, the 18th hussars, by a bold and rapid movement, drove back the cavalry under the command of P. Soult through the village of Croix d'Orade, slew and wounded many, took 100 prisoners, and pursued them so closely, that they had not time to destroy the bridge over the Ers, the only one that had been left standing, and the possession of which was indispensably necessary to the proposed attack of the enemy's position on Mont Rave.

The signal for the commencement of the battle was given at seven o'clock of the morning of the 10th (Easter Sunday), at the moment the church bells of the distant villages were calling the peasantry to matins and early mass, and the roofs and steeples of Toulouse being at the same time covered with spectators. Immediately the whole of the allied army was in motion. The dispositions of attack were: Beresford, with the 4th and 6th divisions and three brigades of cavalry (Somerset's, Ponsonby's, and Vivian's), was directed to cross the Ers at the bridge of Croix d'Orade, and having driven the enemy from the village of Montblanc, to proceed along the left bank

of the Ers till he gained the enemy's right, when he was to form line and move to the attack of that flank. The Spaniards, under Freyre, supported by Ponsonby's cavalry, were to make a simultaneous attack on the left of the position, and when they had gained the mountain crest, to push forward then upon the heights, to effect a junction with Beresford. The 3rd and light divisions were to observe the enemy in the suburbs of St. Etienne, near the canal, and to attract his attention by threatening the fortified bridge which leads across it. Vivian's brigade of cavalry, under Arentschild, were to watch the French horse on both banks of the Ers; Hill, with the 2nd division and Le Cor's Portuguese division, was to confine the enemy within his entrenchments on the left of the Garonne; and the remainder of the cavalry was stationed at different points along the line, to check the movement of the enemy's cavalry.

The heights on the left of the enemy's position, called La Pujade, were occupied by two divisions of infantry, having in their front a brigade of cavalry. The plateau of Mont Calvinet, on the right centre, was held by one division of infantry; and the heights of Montandran, on the extreme right, were held by one brigade of infantry, with a strong body of cavalry in their front, on the road to Bordes. Heavy columns of reserve were posted in rear of the entire range of the heights. The canal, from the rear of La Pujade to its junction with the Garonne, was guarded by strong bodies of infantry; the faubourg of St. Cyprien, and that of St. Etienne, on the eastern side, by another, and various posts in the different faubourg and on the walls were defended by reserve conscripts and national or urban guards.

The light and 3rd divisions of the British having driven the enemy's advanced posts to the fortified positions, Beresford and Freyre simultaneously pushed forward by the Alby road, and crossed the Ers by the bridge of Croix d'Orade. Beresford, with his troops in three parallel open columns, diverging to the left, attacked and carried the village of Montblanc. Then continuing his march up the river in the same order, over difficult and marshy ground, in a line parallel to the whole of the enemy's position, and under a fearfully destructive and raking fire from their batteries, immediately that he had gained the point opposite the extreme right of the enemy's

position, he wheeled up his columns, and advanced in line to the attack.

As soon as Beresford's troops were ready to advance, Freyre formed his infantry in front of Croix d'Orade, in two lines of attack, with Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry formed in his rear as a reserve, and a battery of Portuguese artillery to cover his movements. He boldly crossed the valley which intervened between his troops and the enemy's position, and drove the French cavalry brigade, in front of their position, before him; but as they closed upon the enemy's position, his troops were exposed to so deadly a fire of grape, that they lost their formation, and during the confusion, the French, leaping out of their retrenchments, drove them down the hill with great slaughter, and pursued them to the bridge over the Ers, when a brigade (the 1st Portuguese caçadores) of the light division advancing to their relief, checked the hot pursuit of the foe, and rallied the fugitives.* Lord Wellington, too, the moment he saw them giving way, galloped to the spot, and rallied a small body of them, at an important point, in person.

Picton, on his side, had not been more fortunate, but here the attack had not failed from want of courage, but from an excess of daring. That officer had been directed to make a feint attack on the Jumeau canal bridge, nearest to the Garonne, which he converted into a real assault, hoping, if he succeeded, that he would be able to check the progress of the French in their pursuit of the fleeing Spaniards from the height of La Pujade. He accordingly pushed on to the edge of the counterscarp of the redoubt which defended the bridge of Jumeau; but when he approached he found it protected by a ditch six feet deep, and as many broad. Though they had no scaling ladders with them, his brave division, nowise daunted, jumped into the ditch, and tried, by climbing on one another's shoulders, to reach the top of the wall; but in vain: the attempt was impracticable, and he was obliged to draw off with the loss of 400 men and officers.

While these discomfitures had befallen

Freyre on the left, and Picton at the bridge of Jumeau, Beresford, on the right, was eminently successful; the enemy's position in that quarter of the field was in his possession. Nothing could resist the steady gallantry with which the 6th division, under Clinton, advanced up the steep and difficult heights of Mont Calvinet, commanded the whole way by the enemy's artillery; they carried the redoubts, St. Syprière, which covered and protected that hill, and established themselves in the enemy's position; though Harispe, who commanded that point, had been reinforced by the troops whom the repulse of the Spaniards at La Pujade had set at liberty. At the same time the 4th division, under Cole, forcing their way up the heights on the enemy's extreme right, established themselves on the left of the 6th division. Hill, at the same time, had driven the enemy from their exterior works in front of St. Cyprien, within the walls of the suburb, and made such demonstrations as kept them in fear of a powerful attack on that quarter.

Soult, now thrown on his defence, reformed his broken right wing, and took up a new line of defence, extending from Pont des Demoiselles on his right to the redoubts on the plateau of Calvinet on the left, the remainder of his line preserving its original ground opposite Freyre.

It was now noon, and Beresford having brought up his guns, which, on account of the badness of the roads, he had left at Montblanc, that his march might not be delayed, renewed the battle. He marched along the ridge at the head of his divisions, the 4th and 6th, while the Spanish troops made a corresponding movement, but with little or no effect. The 6th division led, the 4th followed, and simultaneously advanced against the enemy's redoubts in line; Soult hoping, by a sudden and weighty assault on the 6th, both in front and flank, to overpower it before the 4th could come into action, pushed forward Clausel's and Taupin's divisions against the front of the 6th, while Leseur's brigade and Berton's cavalry were to fall upon its flank.

ten thousand men running a race!" The solicitation of Freyre, who, with the usual presumption of his countrymen, imagining that his troops were invincible, and that "no soldiers not born Spanish can beat Spaniards," at the time of the arrangement of the battle, that his countrymen might lead the attack, must have added additional mortification to Spanish vanity.

* One author says, "That they broke into a thousand parties in their headlong flight, and turning tail, it was who should be first away from the unpleasant doings. I am told," says he, "that Lord Wellington wondered whether the Pyrenees would bring them up again." According to another anecdote, the scene of the scared runaways drew the ironical remark from the English general, "That he had seen many curious sights, but never before saw

The struggle was fierce and bloody. A volley was exchanged, when Lambert's brigade of the 6th, and Anson's of the 4th, rushed forward with levelled bayonets, and an appalling shout. It seemed as if the hostile lines must the next moment be locked together in the bayonet's bloody embrace. But the hearts of the French failing them, they fled in confusion. As soon as the smoke cleared off, the whole British force marched forward, Pack's brigade of the 6th, consisting of the 42nd, the 71st, the 79th, and 92nd Highland regiments, being in front, and the 42nd leading. The enemy, panic-struck, fled in consternation, and the whole position, with the redoubts of Columbette and Calvinet, together with the fortifications, were won at the point of the bayonet, and the enemy sought shelter within the works of Sacarin and Cambon. The 42nd established themselves in the first-mentioned redoubt.

A desperate attempt was now made by the enemy from the canal to regain these works. As they advanced in great force, the English, observing their approach, planted their colours on the parapets in defiance. A sanguinary struggle ensued. The enemy was driven from Calvinet with great loss, but they succeeded in recapturing Columbette, but not until the gallant 42nd had lost four-fifths of their numbers. The other highland regiments rushing to their aid, recovered the redoubt. About four o'clock Soult, finding all his efforts fruitless, withdrew his force behind the canal, holding the advanced fortified works of Sacarin and Gambon, leaving the victors in possession of the whole range of heights looking down on Toulouse. The light cavalry were now detached to occupy the Montpellier road, the only issue from the town that now remained to the enemy practicable for artillery and carriages. To lord Wellington's summons to surrender the town, Soult's reply was, that he would bury himself under its ruins. In the course of the night all the enemy's posts were withdrawn within the retrenched line behind the canal.

The whole of the 11th was employed in bringing up ammunition from the dépôts of Aire and Orthes, on the other side of the Garonne. The want of ammunition until the stores arrived was so great, that the troops were employed to collect the shot from the field of battle at a fixed price. The renewal of the attack of the enemy was fixed at daylight of the 12th. Though some heavy

guns were discharged from the ramparts by the enemy, not a shot was directed against the town, in consideration for the safety of the inhabitants. In the night of the 11th Soult, who, fearing to be shut up in the town, as he perceived indications of that intention, works having been commenced across the roads leading to his lines, and the allies advancing nearer to the place, abandoned Toulouse, defiling his corps within range of the allied artillery, and by a forced march of twenty-two miles reached Villefranche, and ultimately fell back by Castelnau-dry to Carcassonne. About noon of the 12th Wellington entered Toulouse in triumph, and was welcomed with loud expressions of joy and gratitude. The populace hailed him as their deliverer, amidst shouts of "*Vivent les Anglais! vivent nos libérateurs.*" The municipality, accompanied by the adjoints of the mayor—the mayor himself having decamped with Soult—went out to meet him, and presented the following address:—

"L'adjoint du maire de la ville de Toulouse à son excellence le marquis de Wellington.

"Ce 12 Avril, 1814.

"Monseigneur—Au nom du peuple de Toulouse, que celle heureuse circonstance nous fait doublement apprécier le bonheur de représenter, nous vous supplions à faire agréer à notre cher roi Louis XVIII. les hommages d'amour et de respect que vingt ans de souffrance n'ont fait qu'accroître, de recevoir en son nom la clef de sa bonne ville, et d'agréer, monseigneur, la reconnaissance sans bornes que votre conduite grande, généreuse, et sans exemple dans l'histoire, vous a acquise."

(Translation.)

In the name of the people of Toulouse, which this happy circumstance makes us deeply feel the honour of representing, we entreat you to convey to our dear king, Louis XVIII., the homage of love and respect which twenty years of suffering have only increased, to receive in his name the key of this great city, and to accept, sir, the unbounded gratitude that your conduct, great, generous, and unparalleled in history, has inspired us.

The allied commander-in-chief replied:—

"A Toulouse, ce 12 Avril, 1814.

"Messieurs,—En entrant dans votre ville il faut que je vous rappelle que j'ai envahi la France à la tête des armées alliées de sa majesté le roi d'Espagne et de leurs altesses royales le prince régent d'Angleterre et le

prince régent de Portugal, en conséquence de la guerre injuste que le gouvernement actuel de la France a faite à ces puissances, et des succès militaires de ces mêmes armées. L'objet des gouvernemens que j'ai l'honneur de servir a toujours été la paix; une paix fondée sur l'indépendance de leurs états respectifs, et de toutes les puissances de l'Europe; et j'ai toute raison de croire que les ambassadeurs de ces augustes souverains sont à présent engagés, de concert avec leurs alliés du nord de l'Europe, à Châtillon-sur-Seine, à négocier une telle paix, s'il est possible de l'atteindre avec le gouvernement actuel de la France. Je vois que la ville de Toulouse, comme beaucoup d'autres villes de la France, contient des personnes qui désirent suivre l'exemple de Bordeaux, de secouer le joug sous lequel la France a souffert pendant tant d'années, et d'aider à la restauration de la maison légitime des Bourbons, sous le gouvernement de laquelle la France a prospéré pendant plusieurs siècles. C'est à eux à décider si, d'après ce que je viens de leur annoncer, et ce que j'avais fait annoncer à la ville de Bordeaux, avant que d'y laisser entrer les troupes, ils veulent se déclarer. S'ils le font il sera de mon devoir de les considérer comme alliés, et de leur donner tous les secours en mon pouvoir, tant que la guerre durera. Mais il est également de mon devoir de leur faire savoir que, si la paix se fait avec le gouvernement actuel de la France, il ne sera plus en mon pouvoir de leur donner secours ou assistance quelconque.

"J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

"WELLINGTON.

"La municipalité de Toulouse."

(Translation.)

Gentlemen,—In entering your city, it is necessary that I should remind you, that I have entered France, at the head of the allied armies of the king of Spain, and of their royal highnesses the prince regent of England, and the prince regent of Portugal, in consequence of the unjust war which the present government of France has made on those powers, and of the military successes of these armies.

The objects of the governments I have the honour to serve, has always been peace—a peace founded on the independence of their respective states, and of that of all the powers of Europe; and I have every reason to believe, that the ambassadors of these august sovereigns are at present engaged, in concert with their allies of the north of Europe, at Châtillon-sur-Seine, in nego-

tiating such a peace, if it be possible to attain it, with the present government of France.

I perceive that the city of Toulouse, like many other cities of France, contains individuals who wish to follow the example of Bordeaux, in throwing off the yoke under which France has suffered during no many years, and in assisting to restore the legitimate house of Bourbon, under whose government France prospered during many centuries. It is for them to decide if, after what I have announced to them, and which I had also announced to the city of Bordeaux, before I allowed the allied troops to enter it, they will declare in favour of the Bourbons. If they do so, it will be my duty to view them as allies, and give them all the succour in my power while the war continues; but it is equally my duty to apprise them, that if peace should be made with the present government of France, it will be no longer in my power to give them any succour or assistance.

About five o'clock of the evening of the 12th, colonel Cooke and colonel St. Simon arrived from Paris at Wellington's headquarters; the first sent by the British minister, sir Charles Stewart, the ambassador to the court of Berlin, and who was then with the king of Prussia in Paris; the second by the provisional government of France, with dispatches announcing the abdication of Buonaparte, and the restoration of Louis XVIII. When the intelligence was announced in the theatre between the pieces, a clamour of applause burst out, and the orchestra struck up "Vive Henri Quatre!"—the man on whose name the Bourbons have ever been content to draw for popularity. The following incident, mentioned in Larpent's recently published volume, has a peculiar interest as connected with this event:—"Just as we were sitting down to dinner—about forty of us—general Freyre and several Spaniards, general Picton and baron Alten, and the principal French officers, in came Cooke with the dispatches. The whole was out directly; champagne went round, and after dinner lord Wellington gave 'Louis XVIII.,' which was very cordially received with three times three, and white cockades were sent to wear at the theatre in the evening. In the interim, however, general Alava got up, and with great warmth gave lord Wellington's health, as 'el liberador del España!' Every one jumped up, and there was a sort

of general exclamation from all the foreigners—French, Spanish, Portuguese, Germans, and all—*el liberador d'Espagna! liberador de Portugal! le liberateur le la France! le liberateur de l'Europe!* And this was followed, not by a regular three times three, but a cheering all in confusion for nearly ten minutes. Lord Wellington bowed, confused, and immediately called for coffee."

When the communication of the events that had occurred at Paris was made known to Soult, he refused to give in his adherence to the provisional government, and requested an armistice till he could receive orders from Buonaparte. Wellington refused to comply with this proposal, observing that it was useless to expect official advice from a government no longer in existence, and that St. Simon's mission to him (Soult) was a sufficient authentication of the transactions that had taken place.

As the object of Soult's proposition was to gain time to enable Buonaparte to protract the struggle, Wellington, on the 16th, put the army in motion, to compel the French marshal either to send in his adhesion, or to commence operations. In the mean time, Soult had received an official communication from Berthier, the chief of Buonaparte's staff, of his master's abdication, and Louis XVIII.'s accession. Gazan was therefore deputed, on the 17th, to enter into a convention with Wellington, which convention was ratified on the 18th, and a line of demarcation, namely, the limits of the department of the Haute-Garonne, with the departments of the Arrège, Aude, and Tarn, specified to be observed by the allied and French armies, until peace was ratified by the contending powers.

The loss of the allies in the celebrated battle of Toulouse had been considerable. That of the French, according to their own accounts, was little more than 3,000; but it is almost unnecessary to say that no credence is to be placed on their returns. The trophies of the allies were 1 gun taken on the field, 8 in the town, 1,600 wounded, 3 generals, and a large quantity of stores. Three points attending this battle, namely, the pretension of Soult to having obtained the victory; secondly, the accusation that Wellington's return of killed and wounded was not true; and, thirdly, that his army was greatly inferior in numbers to that of Soult—require to be cleared up.

The following acknowledgments of Soult

are decisive of his pretensions, though a monument has been erected on the site of the battle by his vain-glorious countrymen, and the French government contributed one thousand francs towards defraying the expense of the mendacious and braggart claim.

On the 7th of April, Soult writes to Suchet, "The maintenance of Toulouse, which contains the military establishments of all kinds, is of the last importance. I am determined to defend it whatever may happen."* On the very day of the battle, he says again to his brother marshal, "The battle which I announced to you has taken place to-day. It has been most murderous. The enemy suffered horribly, but have succeeded in establishing themselves in the position which I had occupied on the right of Toulouse. I do not think I can remain long in Toulouse. It may even happen that I may have to fight my way out." Again on the morning of the 11th, he tells Suchet that, "As I told you in my letter of yesterday, I find myself under the necessity of retiring from Toulouse, and I am even afraid of being forced to fight for a passage by Baziège, where the enemy has sent a column to cut me off from that communication. To-morrow I shall take a position at Villefranche, for I hope the enemy will not be able to prevent my passing. Thence I shall make for Castelnau-dry. If I shall be able to stop there I shall do so; if not, I shall take a position at Carcassonne."† "In the battle of Toulouse," says the duke of Wellington himself, in a memorandum written in May, 1838, "the allies carried, after a most desperate struggle, the key of the fortified position of the French army, the most important point in it, according to the opinion of marshal Soult, the commander-in-chief of the allies, and every officer concerned on either side. They held undisturbed possession of this position. From their ground they could, by their fire, prevent the occupation of the remainder of the position of their enemy. The possession of it gave them the means, of which advantage was taken, to cut off the retreat of their enemy; and their advanced troops were actually, on the night of the 11th, on the ground over which marshal Soult was under the necessity of passing on the same night in his retreat." Many French writers have recorded their opinions to the same effect. Vaudoncourt (*L'Histoire des Campagnes de*

* Suchet's Correspondence.

† Ibid.

1814 et 1815), a writer not very favourably disposed to speak in too glowing terms of Wellington, says, "The battle of Toulouse was, beyond all question, lost by the duke of Dalmatia." Bignon is of the same opinion; also adding that the abandonment of Toulouse was an evidence of defeat. And even the partial and prejudiced historian of *The Consulate and the Empire*, is at last obliged to avow that "it is no longer of use to deny" Wellington's title as victor on that occasion. The most obstreperous of the claimants in behalf of Soult is Coumara, in his *Précis Historique de la Bataille de Toulouse*.

The second accusation is best answered by reference to *The Morning Star*; according to which the allied force, on the 10th of April, the morning of the battle, was—4th division (Cole's), 4,613; 6th (H. Clinton's), 4,877; 3rd (Picton's), 3,924; light division (Alten's), 3,709; 2nd division (Stewart's), 5,990; Le Cor's Portuguese, 3,307=26,420 rank and file, bayonets; officers, sergeants, &c., 2,872—total infantry, 29,292: artillery, 6,832; cavalry, 3,600=39,724 British and Portuguese; Spaniards, 12,000. Total, 51,724.

The French effective force, according to Koch, was—infantry, 30,000; cavalry, 3,000; Travot's reserve, 4,000=37,000; artillery and drivers, 1,480. Total, 38,480; besides the national or urban guards, and the recently levied conscripts who manned the ramparts. The allies had 64 pieces of artillery, the French 80, of very large calibre.

The truth of Wellington's return will appear from the following observations. The casualties of a British army after a battle are collected in returns, by the sergeants of companies, under the direction of and signed by the officers commanding them, accounting for all the men of the company, absent or present. The regimental returns made from those of companies, as well as those of the brigades and divisions, are transmitted to head-quarters, and from them the general return is made out and signed by the adjutant-general, and laid before the general commanding the forces. They are transmitted to the secretary of state, and published in the *London Gazette*, recapitulating the loss of each battalion. The returns of killed and wounded in the battle of Toulouse, and those of all others printed in the *Gazettes*, have since been compared with the returns signed by the adjutant-general, of which they are correct copies. No officer in command of a British army would venture

to garble or alter a return. The loss so returned generally exceeds the actual loss, the officers and soldiers being interested, as their claims to pensions and rewards depend on their names being included in the returns. This explanation is here given to refute the assertion of general Guillaume de Vaudoncourt, charging the duke of Wellington with modifying the returns of killed and wounded.*

Other French authors assert that the allied army sustained a much larger loss than that detailed in the dispatch. Vaudoncourt says it was at least 10,000. Coumara is of opinion that it amounted to 17,000 killed, and 15,000 wounded. But the credit to be attached to that gentleman's opinion is best ascertained by his statement, that the 79th highland regiment sustained a loss of 600 men, and that, too, from only two companies of the 115th regiment of the line, in the carrying and the recovery of St. Augustine; whereas that regiment, at the time of the battle, had only 414 rank and file present on the field.

The operations and result of this sanguinary and fiercely-contested battle, the closing scene and consummation of the six years' glorious and protracted Peninsular warfare, was officially reported to the secretary of state for foreign affairs by its victor, in the following dispatch, dated—

"Toulouse, 12th of April, 1814.—I have the pleasure to inform your lordship that I entered this town this morning, which the enemy evacuated during the night, retiring by the road of Carcassone. The continued fall of rain and the state of the river prevented me from laying the bridge till the morning of the 8th, when the Spanish corps and the Portuguese artillery, under the immediate orders of lieutenant-general Don M. Freyre, and the head-quarters, crossed the Garonne. We immediately moved forward to the neighbourhood of the town, and the 18th hussars, under the immediate command of colonel Vivian, had an opportunity of making a most gallant attack upon a superior body of the enemy's cavalry, which they drove through the village of Croix-d'Orade, took about one hundred prisoners, and gave us possession of an important bridge over the river Ers, by which it was necessary to pass, in order to attack the enemy's position. * * * * The town of Toulouse is surrounded on three sides by the canal of Languedoc and the Garonne. On the left of that river, the suburb, which

* *Gurwood's Wellington Despatches.*

the enemy had fortified with strong field-works in front of the ancient wall, formed a good tête-de-pont. They had likewise formed a tête-de-pont at each bridge of the canal, which was besides defended by the fire, in some places, of musketry, and in all of artillery from the ancient wall of the town. Beyond the canal to the eastward, and between that and the river Ers, is a height which extends as far as Montaudran, and over which pass all the approaches to the canal and town to the eastward, which it defends; and the enemy, in addition to the têtes-de-pont on the bridges of the canal, had fortified this height with five redoubts, connected by lines of entrenchments, and had, with extraordinary diligence, made every preparation for defence. They had likewise broken all the bridges over the Ers within our reach by which the right of their position could be approached. The roads, however, from the Arrière to Toulouse being impracticable for cavalry or artillery, and nearly so for infantry, as reported in my despatch to your lordship of the 1st instant, I had no alternative, excepting to attack the enemy in this formidable position. It was necessary to move the pontoon-bridge higher up the Garonne, in order to shorten the communication with lieutenant-general sir R. Hill's corps, as soon as the Spanish corps had passed; and this operation was not effected till so late an hour on the 9th, as to induce me to defer the attack till the following morning. The plan, according to which I determined to attack the enemy, was for marshal sir W. Beresford, who was on the right of the Ers with the 4th and 6th divisions, to cross that river at the bridge of Croix-d'Orade, to gain possession of Montblanc, and to march up the left of the Ers to turn the enemy's right, while lieutenant-general Don M. Freyre, with the Spanish corps under his command, supported by the British cavalry, should attack the front. Lieutenant-general sir S. Cotton was to follow the marshal's movement with major-general lord E. Somerset's brigade of hussars; and colonel Vivian's brigade, under the command of colonel Arentschildt, was to observe the movements of the enemy's cavalry on both banks of the Ers beyond our left. The third and light divisions, under the command of lieutenant-general sir T. Picton and major-general C. Baron Alten, and the brigade of German cavalry, were to observe the enemy on the lower part of the canal, and to draw their

attention to that quarter by threatening the têtes-de-pont, while lieutenant-general sir R. Hill was to do the same on the suburb on the left of the Garonne.

"Marshal sir W. Beresford crossed the Ers, and formed his corps in three columns of lines in the village of Croix-d'Orade, the 4th division leading, with which he immediately carried Montblanc. He then moved up the Ers in the same order, over most difficult ground, in a direction parallel to the enemy's fortified position; and as soon as he reached the point at which he turned it, he formed his lines and moved to the attack. During these operations, lieutenant-general Don M. Freyre moved along the left of the Ers to the front of Croix-d'Orade, where he formed his corps in two lines, with a reserve on a height in front of the left of the enemy's position, on which height the Portuguese artillery was placed, and major-general Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry in reserve in the rear. As soon as formed, and that it was seen that marshal sir W. Beresford was ready, lieutenant-general Don M. Freyre moved forward to the attack. The troops marched in good order, under a very heavy fire of musketry and artillery, and showed great spirit, the general and all his staff being at their head, and the two lines were soon lodged under some banks immediately under the enemy's entrenchments, the reserve and Portuguese artillery and British cavalry continuing on the height on which the troops had first formed. The enemy, however, repulsed the movement of the right of general Freyre's line round their left flank, and having followed up their success, and turned our right by both sides of the high road leading from Toulouse to Croix-d'Orade, they soon compelled the whole corps to retire. It gave me great satisfaction to see that, although they suffered considerably in retiring, the troops rallied again as soon as the light division, which was immediately on their right, moved up; and I cannot sufficiently applaud the exertions of lieutenant-general Don M. Freyre, the officers of the staff of the 4th Spanish army, and of the officers of the general staff, to rally and form them again. Lieutenant-general Mendizabal, who was in the field as a volunteer, general Ezpeleta, and several officers and chiefs of corps, were wounded upon this occasion; but general Mendizabal continued in the field. The regiment of *Tiradores de Cantabria*, under the command of colonel Leon de Sicilia, kept its position, under the

enemy's entrenchments, until I ordered it to retire.

"In the mean time, marshal sir W. Beresford, with the 4th division, under the command of lieutenant-general sir L. Cole, and the 6th division, under the command of lieutenant-general sir H. Clinton, attacked and carried the heights on the enemy's right, and the redoubt which covered and protected that flank; and he lodged those troops on the same height with the enemy, who were, however, still in possession of four redoubts, and of the entrenchments and fortified houses. The badness of the roads had induced the marshal to leave his artillery in the village of Montblanc, and some time elapsed before it could be brought to him, and before lieutenant-general Don M. Freyre's corps could be re-formed and brought back to the attack. As soon as this was effected, the marshal continued his movement along the ridge, and carried, with general Pack's brigade of the 6th division, the two principal redoubts and fortified houses in the enemy's centre. The enemy made a desperate effort from the canal to regain these redoubts, but they were repulsed with considerable loss; and the 6th division continuing its movements along the ridge of the height, and the Spanish troops continuing a corresponding movement upon the front, the enemy were driven from the two redoubts and entrenchments on the left, and the whole range of heights were in our possession. We did not gain this advantage, without severe loss, particularly in the brave 6th division. Lieutenant-colonel Coghlan, of the 61st, an officer of great merit and promise, was unfortunately killed in the attack of the heights. Major-general Pack was wounded, but was enabled to remain in the field; and colonel Douglas, of the 8th Portuguese regiment, lost his leg, and I am afraid that I shall be deprived for a considerable time of his assistance. The 36th, 42nd, 79th, and 61st, lost considerable numbers, and were highly distinguished throughout the day. * * * * The 4th division, although exposed on their march

along the enemy's front to a galling fire, were not so much engaged as the 6th, and did not suffer so much, but they conducted themselves with their usual gallantry. * * * The ground not having admitted of the operations of the cavalry, they had no opportunity of charging.

"While the operations above detailed were going on, on the left of the army, lieutenant-general sir R. Hill drove the enemy from their exterior works in the suburb, on the left of the Garonne, within the ancient wall. Lieutenant-general sir T. Picton likewise, with the 3rd division, drove the enemy within the tête-de-pont on the bridge of the canal nearest to the Garonne; but the troops having made an effort to carry it, they were repulsed, and some loss was sustained. Major Brisbane was wounded, but I hope not so as to deprive me for any length of time of his assistance; and lieutenant-colonel Forbes, of the 45th, an officer of great merit, was killed. The army being thus established on three sides of Toulouse, I immediately detached our light cavalry to cut off the communication, by the only road practicable for carriages which remained to the enemy, till I should be enabled to make arrangements to establish the troops between the canal and the Garonne. The enemy, however, retired last night, leaving in our hands general Harispe, general Baurot, general St. Hilaire, and 1,600 prisoners. One piece of cannon was taken on the field of battle, and others, and large quantities of stores of all descriptions, in the town.

"Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under the command of field-marshal the marquis of Wellington, K.B., at the battle of Toulouse, April 10, 1814:—

	Officers.	Sergeants.	Rank & File.	Total Loss.
Killed .	31	21	543	595
Wounded 248 .	123		3,675	4,046
Missing .	3	0	15	18

The above loss as under:—

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
British .	312	1,795	17
Spanish .	205	1,722	1
Portuguese .	78	529	0
Horses .	62	59	2"

SORTIE OF BAYONNE.

BAYONNE, as has been before stated,* was invested on the 22nd of February by the left wing of the army under sir John Hope.

* *Ante*, p. 162.

It was not, however, lord Wellington's intention to subject the inhabitants to the calamities of a siege, as he felt satisfied that by his successes against the enemy in the

field, the fortress must necessarily fall into his hands. Neither siege guns nor stores were on the ground to tempt a sortie. Hope, up to the 7th of April, had with the utmost zeal and diligence proceeded in the investment of the place, but hearing about this time rumours of the events at Paris, he somewhat relaxed his labours. The brutal and savage Thouvenot, the governor, who had sprung from the filth of the revolution, and who, "in ninety-nine out of every hundred French books relating to the war, is applauded to the skies, as a brave and honourable man, and a true patriot," determined to avail himself of the relaxation of vigilance which the reputed news of the abdication of Buonaparte occasioned on the part of the besieging force.

On the 13th, sir John Hope having received advice of that event, caused the news to be communicated to the officers of the French advanced pickets and outposts, not deeming it proper to make an official communication to the governor of an event which had not been officially communicated to himself; the reply given was, the besiegers should learn something on this subject before long. French revenge was now busy at work to close the war with *éclat*, by the performance of a savage outrage, by which they hoped to inflict a signal injury on the English with but little loss to themselves.


Between the hours of two and three o'clock in the morning of the 14th, while the investing force was chiefly buried in sleep, the French, in great strength (3,000 men), rallied from the citadel, and slaughtering the pickets and outposts, rushed on the entrenched village of St. Etienne, putting all to the sword whom they encountered in their course. The allies sustained considerable loss before the troops could be got under arms, and in formation. Hope, hastening to the scene of action, was wounded, and his horse being shot under him, he fell into the hands of the enemy. But as the day began to dawn, the reserve brigades of guards, consisting of the Coldstream, and a battalion of the 3rd, under general Howard, rushed forward, and drove the enemy back into the citadel with great slaughter, when the posts of the besiegers were re-established. The loss of the allies in this untoward affair, was 133 killed, 457 wounded, and 236 prisoners; that of the enemy above 900 men. In the confused conflict that had taken place, as the direction of the range of the enemy's guns was, on

account of the darkness, guided merely by the flashes of the musketry, their shot and shell went at random through the hostile hosts, smashing as many of their own people as they struck of their opponents. The conduct of Thouvenot on this occasion cannot be too strongly reprobated. It was utterly useless as a military manœuvre. No object was or could have been gained by it; but much blood was idly wasted by the sanguinary disposition of a savage, who was a disgrace to the name of soldier. Thouvenot in a few hours was as completely inclosed again, as he was before the sally, his loss exceeded that inflicted on his enemy, and many of his casualties were caused by the indiscriminate fire of his own guns.

Macfarlane says, "Thouvenot's conduct was throughout, that of a savage. The capture of sir John Hope, and the knowledge that he was very severely, if not mortally, wounded, carried affliction to the bosom of every man who had been serving under him. Major-general C. Colville, who succeeded to the command, sent a flag of truce to request that Hope's friend, colonel Macdonald, might be admitted to the fortress to see him, and carry him assistance. Thouvenot had the brutality to refuse this request, and another which was made after it."

The convention which had been entered into by Wellington prevented serious hostilities being renewed on the Lower Garonne. Lord Dalhousie, who had succeeded to the command of the British force at Bordeaux, crossed the river on the 4th of April, to attack a considerable force which Napoleon had collected on the other side. The combat was soon decided, the French, about 2,000 strong, fled on the first onset, and the British cavalry charging, made 300 prisoners; admiral Primrose at the same time ascended the river, and in spite of the batteries at its mouth, burned the whole flotilla at Castillon; thus before the war ceased, the whole line of the Garonne, from Toulouse to the sea, with the intermediate country from thence to the Pyrennees had, with the exception of the fortress of Bayonne, been wrested from the French.

On the 20th, sir John Hope received official notice of the restoration of Louis XVIII.; and on the 27th, Soult ordered Thouvenot to surcease hostilities. And thus the great drama of the Peninsular War concluded in the tragical episode above stated—a catastrophe which threw a gloom over its glorious termination.



DA Williams William Freke
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